1 Monday, 10 November 2003
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.
6 JUDGE LIU: Call the case, please, Mr. Court Deputy.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is Case Number
8 IT-02-60-T, the Prosecutor versus Vidoje Blagojevic and Dragan Jokic.
9 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much.
10 Good morning, witness. Can you hear me?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can hear you. Good morning,
12 I can hear you.
13 JUDGE LIU: Thank you. Would you please make the solemn
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak
16 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
17 WITNESS: WITNESS P-128
18 [Witness answered through interpreter]
19 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much. You may sit down, please.
20 Mr. Waespi.
21 MR. WAESPI: Good morning, Mr. President. Good morning,
22 Your Honours.
23 Examined by Mr. Waespi:
24 Q. Good morning, Witness.
25 A. Good morning.
1 Q. If the usher could show you a piece of paper, please. Can you
2 confirm that this is your name.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Thank you very much. In the course of this examination, everybody
5 in the courtroom will be referring to you as P-128 or as Witness or as
6 sir, so please do not disclose your identity. And if you see your name or
7 your initials on one of these documents you are shown, you know, please
8 don't read it out. We'll go into private session for that. Do you
9 understand that?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Now, just briefly in terms of your background, can you tell us
12 your nationality, please.
13 A. Muslim.
14 Q. And where are you currently living?
15 A. Srebrenik, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
16 Q. And can you in all briefness describe to the Judges your
17 educational background.
18 A. I completed high school and I'm a mechanical technician. And I
19 completed it in Zvornik.
20 Q. And currently, what's your current position? What job are you
22 A. I'm working as a foreman at a petrol station.
23 Q. Now, did you serve in the JNA?
24 A. Yes, in Titovo Uzice and Kraljevo.
25 Q. And can you tell us the year.
1 A. I went to the army in December 1989 and I returned in December
3 Q. Did you have a specialisation when you served in the JNA?
4 A. Yes. I worked in signal communications.
5 Q. And can you tell us why you chose, if you were able to choose,
6 signals communications.
7 A. Because I became a radio amateur very early on. I passed the
8 C-class exam when I was 12 years old in my radio club.
9 Q. Now I would like to focus on the war period. Now, what did you do
10 in 1992 from April on, very briefly?
11 A. From the month of April 1992, together with some -- together with
12 my colleagues, radio amateurs, we joined the Territorial Defence of Bosnia
13 and Herzegovina.
14 Q. And what did you do?
15 A. We worked at interceptors -- as radio interceptors.
16 Q. And can you tell us the location from which you conducted these
18 A. Lipik, Majevica, Mountain Majevica.
19 Q. Now, was there a time you were given a new assignment and moved to
20 a different location?
21 A. Yes. We were at Lipik for a year and a half, and then we moved to
22 Okresanica, also on Mount Majevica, in the fall of 1993.
23 Q. And in Okresanica, were you part of a unit?
24 A. Yes. We belonged to a unit of the 2nd Corps command from Tuzla.
25 It was called electronic surveillance.
4 Q. Now, for how long did you stay on Mount Okresanica?
5 A. I spent -- I was at Okresanica until after the signing of the
6 Dayton Peace Agreement. I was demobilised in January 1996.
7 Q. Now, the Judges have heard a lot of evidence about the way
8 business was conducted at Okresanica and we don't need to go into details.
9 But can you tell us in one or two sentences what you were doing on Mount
10 Okresanica, please.
11 A. We were recording conversations.
12 Q. And how did you do that?
13 A. When I was working in my shift -- do you mean specifically the way
14 in which we did it?
15 Q. I'm basically interested in how you recorded it, whether you
16 transcribed it to any form of paper.
17 A. First of all, the devices scan the channels. When we heard a
18 conversation we would stop; we would turn on the UHER recorders; we would
19 note down the date, the time, and the frequency on a piece of paper, the
20 participants, if we knew who they were, and also the counter number on the
21 UHER. After that, we transferred that to paper, and sent it on to
23 Q. What kind of paper was that?
24 A. They were usually notebooks.
25 Q. All right. Now I would like to go with you through seven or eight
1 documents. And we would start with the first notebook, that's Prosecution
2 Exhibit 345.
3 MR. WAESPI: And Your Honours, the witness will first talk about
4 an intercept which you find in your first binder.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Excuse me, Mr. Waespi, I'm sorry to interrupt you,
6 but we have a problem with the LiveNote. It's not scrolling. We'll get
7 the technicians to have a look at it now.
8 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Waespi, would you please try it again?
9 MR. WAESPI: Yes, Mr. President.
10 Yeah, I don't see anything happening on the screen, unfortunately.
11 Now it seems to move, but it stopped again, so we just wait until
12 it's resolved.
13 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Waespi, can you try it again.
14 MR. WAESPI: Yes, Mr. President. I'll try to move on, because it
15 seems to be working.
16 Q. Witness, you just explained how you were conducting your business
17 on Mount Okresanica and I believe you said, while the transcript wasn't
18 really picking your voice up, that you were listening to the radios, that
19 you were screening the frequencies, that you were putting it down on
20 pieces of paper, eventually on notebooks, and that you also had the
21 computer which would encrypt these intercepts and send it on. Is that a
22 fair summary of what you said?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Now, I would like to show you a number of these notebooks, and we
25 would start with Prosecution Exhibit 345. If that could be shown to the
2 MR. WAESPI: And Your Honours, as I said, it's the first binder.
3 It's tab 14th July. He will talk about Exhibit Number 229. And he will
4 look at the Exhibit 229/D, that's a copy of what he's looking at in the
6 Q. Please, Witness, could you look at a page and it's an eight-number
7 page, but it's sufficient if you look, concentrate on the four last
8 digits, that's 7807 and the next page is 7808. And if you could tell us
9 whether you recognise the handwriting?
10 A. Yes, I do.
11 Q. And whose handwriting is it?
12 A. It's mine.
13 Q. Now, looking at the -- what appears to be a conversation from the
14 left page almost at the top, it starts with a frequency, "frekvencija" in
15 your language. Now, can you tell us what that is.
16 A. This is a transcript of a conversation from the radio relay
17 device. There is the frequency there, the channel, and the participants.
18 Q. Do you also see a time?
19 A. Yes, I do.
20 Q. And that's a time you would put down as you had told us earlier,
21 as soon as you would listen to the conversation. Is that correct?
22 A. That's correct.
23 Q. Now, I don't see a date of this intercept. Are you able by
24 looking at your notebook to determine what date, what day, this
25 conversation was intercepted?
1 A. Yes, I can. Just one moment, please. The 14th of July, 1995.
2 Q. And how were you able to determine that?
3 A. On page 7798.
4 Q. Now, you said earlier that you would also write down the
5 participants. Now, who are the participants in this conversation?
6 A. Zivanovic and Major Jokic.
7 Q. Now, it doesn't say in the conversation itself that Zivanovic was
8 talking. How were you able to determine that Zivanovic was indeed one of
9 the participants?
10 A. Because Zivanovic was always recognisable and probably he
11 introduced himself at the beginning of the conversation, but the actual
12 beginning was not recorded. But it was always possible to recognise him.
13 Q. I'll ask you about the second participant, Major Jokic. How were
14 you able to determine that it was him talking?
15 A. At the very beginning, Zivanovic says his name.
16 Q. And you also wrote down that he was the duty officer, Palma duty
17 officer. How were you able to determine that?
18 A. Because very frequently they worked through switchboards, so they
19 would very often say, "Give me the Palma duty officer," and so on.
20 Q. Thank you, Witness. Now, I would like you to look at the second
21 page of this intercept, that's 7808, and there is a comment at the end.
22 It starts with: "General Zivanovic." Now, can you read out this comment,
24 A. General Zivanovic spoke with distorted voice and was quite
1 Q. Now, apparently you were able to figure out what he was talking.
2 Can you explain us then what you mean by quite intelligible --
3 unintelligible, I'm sorry.
4 A. Always when General Zivanovic spoke, either his telephone was not
5 working properly or he spoke too loudly. So then this would change the
6 modulation of his voice. But with the assistance of my colleagues, I
7 managed to transcribe what he said.
8 Q. Now, if you could look at the next exhibit, this is Exhibit
9 P229/D, I believe. And I understand that he has been given the copy
10 already. Can you confirm that this is a true and accurate copy of the
11 original notebook.
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Now, if you could be shown Prosecution Exhibit Number 229/C,
14 please. Do you recognise this document?
15 A. Yes, I do. This is the typed or retyped transcript.
2 Q. And lastly, does this document have a date?
3 A. Yes. The 14th of July, 1995.
4 Q. Thank you very much, Witness. If these documents could be
5 returned, and we would go to the second notebook. The second notebook
6 would be Prosecution Exhibit 323.
7 MR. WAESPI: And for Your Honours that's, again, in the first
8 binder, conversation under tab 14th July, Exhibit Number 230.
9 Q. If you again could have a look at it. And I'm specifically
10 interested in the pages, again last four digits 9704, and the next page
11 which is 9705. The question again is: Do you recognise the handwriting?
12 A. Yes, I do.
13 Q. And whose handwriting is it?
14 A. It's mine.
15 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, if we could briefly go into private
17 JUDGE LIU: Yes, we'll go to private session, please.
18 [Private session]
3 [Open session]
4 JUDGE LIU: Now we are in open session.
5 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
6 Q. Now, if we can go -- have a brief look at this conversation. Can
7 you tell us the time it was recorded.
8 A. At 2048 hours.
9 Q. Now, are you able again to determine the date this conversation
10 was recorded?
11 A. Yes, I can.
12 Q. And if Exhibit 230/E could be prepared as well. If it's
13 impossible for you to do that, then you might as well just tell us.
14 A. This is either the 13th or the 14th of July, because the 12th of
15 July is on page 9683.
16 Q. Thank you. If you could have a look at Prosecution Exhibit 230/E.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And again, the same question: Do you recognise this document?
19 This has the same format we have been talking about in the course of the
20 previous document.
21 A. I recognise it.
22 Q. And do you see a date on it?
23 A. I see a date, the 14th of July.
24 Q. Thank you, Witness. And again, the Exhibit P230/B, is that an
25 accurate copy of the original which you have seen?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Thank you, Witness. If we could move on to the third exhibit.
3 MR. WAESPI: And for your information, Your Honours, it will be
4 eight documents. The next notebook is Exhibit 345.
5 And Your Honours, this is now the second binder, tab 16 July. And
6 that's Exhibit 246.
7 Q. Witness, if you could have a look at the two pages 7820 and 7821
8 and tell us whether you recognise the handwriting.
9 A. Would you please repeat the page number.
10 Q. Yes, certainly. It's -- I'll tell you the whole range 01077820.
11 A. It's not that notebook.
12 Q. If you could have a look. It should be Exhibit 345.
13 MR. WAESPI: I apologise, Your Honours. It's the same notebook he
14 has seen already.
15 Q. So that's Prosecution Exhibit 345, again. If you could have a
16 look at the last four digits, 7820.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Do you recognise the handwriting?
19 A. I recognise it. It's my handwriting.
20 Q. Now, who are the participants to this conversation?
21 A. Could you just give me the time of the conversation.
22 Q. Yes, certainly. It's 0706, 7.00 and 6 minutes.
23 A. The participant is Vinko Pandurevic. The other participant is
25 Q. Now, again we don't see Mr. Pandurevic mentioned at any account
1 during the conversation. Can you tell us again how you were able to
2 figure out that it's Pandurevic talking.
3 A. He probably introduced himself at the beginning of the
4 conversation or it was done judging by his voice, because the beginning
5 was not recorded.
6 Q. Do you remember how many times you would have listened to his
7 voice during the whole time you were on Mount Okresanica?
8 A. Many times.
9 Q. I would like you to go down to the middle of the conversation when
10 X says: "Dobro Sefe." Can you read out the whole sentence there, please.
11 In English that would be: "All right, boss." Continue, and so on.
12 Can you read out that line for us, please.
13 A. "All right, boss. Go on pounding them," and then under a question
14 mark, "and killing them." That is how we would mark a word or several
15 words that we could not understand exactly. But when there is a question
16 mark, it means that this is what we assume the person had said.
17 Q. Thank you, Witness. Can you tell us the date again of this
18 intercept, please.
19 A. The 16th of July.
20 Q. And again, just for continuation purposes, Exhibit Number 246/D,
21 is that a copy of that notebook?
22 A. Yes.
4 Q. If we could move on, sir, to next exhibit. That's 337. And now
5 this time it's in the notebook 97.
6 MR. WAESPI: Your Honours, this can be found under tab 17th July,
7 and it would be Exhibit 266.
8 Q. If you could have a look at the page 1282, please. And I'm
9 interested in the top conversation on that page, conversation timed at
10 1200 hours.
11 Again, my question: Is it your handwriting?
12 A. Yes, it's my handwriting.
13 Q. And could you tell us again the date it was taken, recorded.
14 A. The 17th of July, 1995.
15 Q. And could you check again whether Exhibit 266/E is an accurate
16 copy of the notebook?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And if you could be shown Exhibit 266/C. And the relevant parts
19 would be on the second page, the last conversation. Do you recognise
21 A. I do.
22 Q. Thank you, sir. If we could move on to the next document, that's
23 the fifth document we are dealing with today. This is again Prosecution
24 Exhibit 345. I believe the notebook number was 232.
25 MR. WAESPI: And Your Honours, again second binder, tab 17 July,
1 Exhibit Number 268.
2 Q. If, sir, you could turn to page 7837 and 38. Do you recognise the
4 A. Just a moment, please.
5 Q. 7837.
6 A. I recognise the handwriting; it is my handwriting.
7 Q. Can you tell us which date it was recorded.
8 A. I think it's the 17th.
9 Q. Thank you, sir. If you could compare, again, the copy you have,
10 marked as 268/D, with your original.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And if you could be shown Exhibit 268/G. Do you recognise this
14 A. I recognise it.
15 Q. Now, that could be returned, please. The next exhibit -- in fact,
16 the next two conversations originate from the same notebook, so we can
17 deal with them together. It's Prosecution Exhibit 333, which is notebook
18 number 91.
19 MR. WAESPI: And, Your Honours, that's 17th July, and it will be
20 Exhibit 270 and 271.
21 Q. Sir, if you could have a look at both 0639 and 0640. Do you
22 recognise the handwriting?
23 A. Yes, it's my handwriting.
24 Q. And can you tell us the date for both conversations, please. One
25 is timed 1244 and the other one timed 1249, according to your handwriting.
1 A. 17th of July, 1995.
2 Q. Thank you, sir. If you could compare again the two copies of
3 Exhibit 270/B and 271/B with your original.
4 A. That's it.
5 Q. Thank you. And the last part in relation to these two exhibits,
6 if you could be shown 270/E and 271/E, please. And in relation to 270/E,
7 you would need to go to the second page where you find the time 1244. Do
8 you recognise this document?
9 A. I do.
10 Q. And in relation to P271, the conversation starts at the bottom of
11 the second page, intercept 1249, and goes over to the last page. Do you
12 recognise this document as well?
13 A. I do.
14 Q. Thank you, Witness.
15 MR. WAESPI: Your Honours, if we could go to the last exhibit this
16 witness is dealing with. This is Prosecution Exhibit 339. That equals
17 notebook number 99. And, Your Honours, that's 18th July, again second
18 binder, and it's Exhibit 287.
19 Q. If you could move to page 1480 and 1481. Can you tell us the date
20 of this conversation.
21 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter could not understand the
22 witness. Could the answer please be repeated.
23 MR. WAESPI:
24 Q. Sir, if you could repeat, please, what you just said.
25 A. The 18th of July, 1995.
1 Q. Thank you very much. If you could compare the copy to the
2 original, and the copy being Exhibit 287/B.
3 A. Yes, that's the copy.
4 Q. And if you could be shown the last document, that would be 287/E.
5 A. That's it.
6 Q. And that's again a document which was typed, perhaps we can
7 mention it again. Typed by whom?
8 A. Alic Adil.
9 Q. And how quickly after you had given him your notebook would he
10 type up the conversation into the computer. Can you tell us now.
11 A. Well, very quickly. Five minutes at the most, perhaps.
12 Q. And my last question to you is the following: We have now seen
13 all these different intercepted conversations which you have transcribed
14 into the notebooks. How accurate and faithful were these transcriptions
15 in relation to the audio, what you could hear?
16 A. Well, most often it is close to 100 per cent, but I will say that
17 the bare minimum, the bare minimum is 90 per cent. But when you listen to
18 all of that you will see that it is almost 100 per cent.
19 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President, I have no further
21 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.
22 Any cross-examination, Mr. Karnavas?
23 MR. KARNAVAS: No, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.
25 Mr. Stojanovic?
1 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] I would like to put a few
2 questions, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE LIU: Yes, please proceed.
4 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] And I would kindly ask for us to
5 move into private session because I have a few questions related to his CV
6 and then we will take the other questions in order.
7 JUDGE LIU: Yes, we'll go to private session, please.
8 [Private session]
16 [Open session]
17 JUDGE LIU: Now we are in open session. You may proceed.
18 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Listening to all of these witnesses in the past few days, we can
20 have the impression that in this electronic surveillance platoon mostly
21 used soldiers who had experience as ham radio operators?
22 A. Yes, that's correct.
23 Q. Would you agree with me that for this very sensitive work, you did
24 need experience as an amateur radio operator?
25 A. Yes, that's correct.
1 Q. Let's try to be more specific. A radio amateur is always more
2 prepared, has more experience, and has better training than any soldier,
3 regular soldier, who is not trained in this field. Is that correct?
4 A. Yes, usually it is. That's right.
5 Q. Were there any soldiers in your platoon at Okresanica who did not
6 have any ham radio operator experience?
7 A. Yes, there were. But the radio amateurs were the ones who started
8 out this whole work.
9 Q. And would you agree that compared to you, these other soldiers
10 were less qualified for this work?
11 A. Yes. They were less qualified, but they very quickly managed to
12 learn all about it.
13 Q. Thank you. Now, I would like to move specifically to questions
14 relating to exhibits and questions that the Prosecutor put to you. Could
15 we please ask the usher to give you the notebook P345, and that would be
16 ERN number 01077807. This is an exhibit that you looked at a little bit
18 A. Page?
19 Q. 01077807. This is a conversation that you had in front of you
20 just a little bit earlier. Is that it there?
21 A. Yes, it is.
22 Q. I apologise, I have to take it a little bit more slowly because of
23 the interpreters, because we are speaking the same language. In answer to
24 a question by the Prosecutor, you said that you didn't know the voice of
25 duty officer Jokic from before and that you noted down that name because
1 General Zivanovic called him by that name in the conversation. Is that
3 A. Yes, that's correct.
4 Q. Looking at what you wrote down in the notebooks, I didn't notice
5 that there was any other occasion there where you encountered the name
6 Jokic in other intercepted conversations?
7 A. Yes, that's right.
8 Q. Would we -- can we agree that you did not recognise the voice of
9 the man who introduced himself -- who was introduced as Jokic, but that
10 you did recognise when you heard the voice of General Zivanovic?
11 A. I wouldn't agree, because at that time we were able to recognise
12 people by their voices. These were quite clear conversations, so there
13 was no problem there.
14 Q. I agree. You recognised the voice from before, so you knew
15 General Zivanovic's voice from before and you recognised it?
16 A. Yes. It was always recognisable precisely because of the
17 telephone that he used.
18 Q. And the voice with the name Jokic is not a voice that you
19 recognised before?
20 A. At that time I'm sure I did, but now I wouldn't be able to do it
21 for sure.
22 Q. According to your military training and education that you
23 received in the barracks in Kraljevo, do you know that there are several
24 duty officers in the barracks at any given time, the barracks duty
25 officer, the staff command duty officer, the operative duty officer, and
1 also in combat circumstances the duty officer at the forward command post?
2 A. Yes, that's right.
3 Q. Today, responding to a question by the Prosecutor, you said that
4 you wrote duty officer at Palma. If you can look at that, precisely
5 because at the beginning of the conversation this was a person who was
6 requested, the Palma duty officer.
7 A. Yes, that's right.
8 Q. So you cannot say whether this is the barracks duty officer, the
9 staff command duty officer, the operations officer, the forward command
10 post officer just based on that title. Is that right?
11 A. Yes, it is.
12 Q. Thank you. I would just like you to look at this conversation.
13 If you can just read it quickly, just skim it, and then I will just ask
14 you to answer one question for me about the content of this conversation.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. So I can ask my question?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Is anything mentioned in connection with prisoners anywhere in
19 this conversation? Is the word "prisoners" mentioned anywhere in this
21 A. The word "prisoners" is not mentioned anywhere.
22 Q. Thank you. I just wanted to clarify another part of it and then
23 we will finish with this conversation. You said that it is true that you
24 did not note down an intercepted conversation anywhere else where Jokic is
25 one of the participants?
1 A. I'm -- it's not clear to me, the question.
2 Q. In answer to my question a little bit earlier whether you
3 transcribed an intercepted conversation anywhere where the participant is
4 officer Jokic, you said that you did not.
5 A. Yes. That's right.
6 Q. If that is so, then this answer is not a little bit clear to me
7 that -- when you said it is possible that at that time I did recognise the
8 voice of the person Jokic, because you didn't hear it earlier?
9 A. At that time we recognised the majority of the participants by
10 their voices, because we were always listening, constantly listening to
11 the same people.
12 Q. I understand that. And that is precisely why I know that you said
13 that and I know as a rule whose voices you said you knew from before. You
14 said you recognised several officers of the VRS, and they are Krstic, the
15 voice of Mladic, the voice of Zivanovic, Obrenovic, and Popovic. Is that
17 A. Yes. Those are the voices that I could recall at the time.
18 Q. I assume that you remembered them better at that time than you do
19 today, because this interview with you was conducted four years ago.
21 A. Yes. That's right.
22 Q. Would I be right if I said that you did not recall recognising the
23 voice belonging to a person called Jokic?
24 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Waespi.
25 MR. WAESPI: I believe he answered the question before.
1 JUDGE LIU: Yes, I think this is at least the third time for you
2 to ask the same question.
3 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] I agree. Everything is all right
4 then. We will continue.
5 Could we again look at an exhibit we saw earlier. This is a
6 notebook P323, and this was also shown to the witness a little bit
8 Q. Could you please look at page 00779705.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. 705 are the last three digits. Thank you. I just wanted to
11 clarify the following: You said that as a rule because of a lot of
12 concentration, you worked for two or three hours and then you were
13 replaced, a new shift came?
14 A. Two to three hours of active work when there was a lot of traffic.
15 But shifts could also be longer when the traffic was not so intense.
16 Q. But as a rule, you would work intensely for two to three hours
17 without interruption?
18 A. Well, a shift would generally last for four hours, unless there
19 was a lot of traffic, in which case you could always ask for the
20 replacement shift to begin to work.
21 Q. Was your platoon commander also in the shifts at that time or did
22 he have other duties or other tasks at that time?
23 A. He had different tasks, and occasionally, only occasionally, he
24 himself would also work at the work stations.
25 Q. So I just wanted you to help me to clarify something. Look at the
1 pages that you have in front of you, 9705.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And could you tell me, could I be right if I said on the first
4 third of that page, the conversation that you recorded and transcribed
5 ends, one that you certified with your signature?
6 A. Could you please be more specific. What are you specifically
7 interested in?
8 Q. Let me repeat it. The first third of the page contains the end of
9 that conversation and your signature. Is that correct?
10 A. Yes, it is.
11 Q. Am I right when I say that this conversation from the page before
12 was intercepted at 2048 hours. Is that correct?
13 A. Yes, it is.
14 Q. The next conversation was intercepted at 2102 hours, so 14 minutes
15 later. Is that correct?
16 A. Yes, that is probably so. But that is not my conversation.
17 Q. Can you tell us whose conversation it is. You don't have to tell
18 us the name of the person, just their title.
19 A. Perhaps then I could have told you, but after so long, I no longer
20 recognise the handwriting.
21 Q. Would you agree with me that on the next page, 00779707, the next
22 intercepted conversation is at 2218 hours?
23 A. Yes, that's correct.
24 Q. So this is one hour and 16 minutes later. And would you agree
25 with me that this is a different handwriting than the one of the previous
1 intercepted conversations, so that these are two different handwritings?
2 A. Probably it is, but I don't see how that has anything to do with
4 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, since we're going
5 to be mentioning a name, I would just like to move to private session for
6 a while.
7 JUDGE LIU: Yes, we'll go to private session, please.
8 [Private session]
12 Page 4219 – redacted – private session.
25 [Open session]
1 JUDGE LIU: Now we are in open session. You may proceed.
2 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. If I gave you time to look through the notebook and to try during
4 the break at least to see whether you ever noted down these intercepted
5 conversations in which, like you mentioned a little bit earlier, you heard
6 the person called Jokic, would that help you, because we didn't find such
8 A. I don't know. I don't know whether that would help me, but I did
9 hear that name before, for sure.
10 Q. If you heard it, then I assume you should have written it down in
11 the notebook. Isn't that correct?
12 A. Yes, that's correct.
13 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] We have no more questions,
14 Your Honours. In view of the fact that it would take a lot of time for
15 the witness to go through the notebooks to see that there are no messages
16 with his handwriting which record the name of Jokic. So thank you very
17 much, Witness.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 JUDGE LIU: Thank you. Any redirect, Mr. Waespi?
20 MR. WAESPI: No, Mr. President.
21 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Judge Vassylenko.
22 Questioned by the Court:
23 JUDGE VASSYLENKO: Witness, I would like you to clarify your
24 statement that in 1995 you have been able to recognise the voice of
25 Major Jokic, but now you couldn't recognise it. What do you mean, that
1 you did forget his voice or something else?
2 A. It's normal after so many years to forget these things, but we did
3 listen to these voices very often at that time, so it was very easy to
4 recognise them.
5 JUDGE VASSYLENKO: Thank you. No more questions.
6 JUDGE LIU: Well, are there any questions out of Judge's question?
7 Mr. Karnavas?
8 MR. KARNAVAS: No, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.
10 Mr. Stojanovic?
11 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honours.
12 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.
13 Well, at this stage, are there any documents to tender?
14 Mr. Waespi?
15 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, at this point I would only like to
16 tender Prosecution Exhibit 351, that's the pseudonym sheet. But after the
17 break perhaps we would like to tender -- my colleague Ms. Issa will do
18 that, the two binders, because we are now at the end of these intercept
19 witnesses, and I think that's the best moment to go into that exercise.
20 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
21 Are there any objections to the document P351? Mr. Karnavas?
22 MR. KARNAVAS: No, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.
24 Mr. Stojanovic.
25 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE LIU: Thank you. This document is admitted into the
3 Well, as I instructed both parties that this is the last witness
4 in that group, so I hope after this witness that both parties, if they
5 will have some documents to tender, especially those intercept documents,
6 please send us a list. We only want that list. Then we will give the
7 parties a week to respond to those lists. So next Monday I hope we could
8 receive any objections or responses concerning those intercepts.
9 Well, Witness, thank you very much for coming to The Hague to give
10 your evidence. We all wish you a good journey back home.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 JUDGE LIU: When the usher pulls down the blinds, he will show you
13 out of the room.
14 Before we have the recess, Mr. Waespi, we have another witness
15 waiting this morning?
16 MR. WAESPI: Yes, Mr. President. This will be Mr. Butler.
17 JUDGE LIU: Yes. Thank you.
18 And we'll resume at 11.00.
19 --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.
20 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.
21 JUDGE LIU: Well, we'll continue our proceedings with the next
22 witness. And I've noticed that -- yes, Mr. Blagojevic.
23 THE ACCUSED BLAGOJEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, by your
24 leave I would like to say a few sentences.
25 JUDGE LIU: Yes, you may.
1 THE ACCUSED BLAGOJEVIC: [Interpretation] In mid-September this
2 year, here in this courtroom I submitted a request. I asked to have a
3 meeting with Mr. Sokran [phoen], independent counsel. This was not done,
4 although my request was not refused then or later.
5 The next thing I wish to say is the following: I have to say yet
6 again that I have none, I underline none, no legal protection or legal
7 representation before this Tribunal. Therefore, I am very concerned over
8 the next stage of the proceedings. I can say to you that it has come to
9 my knowledge that a person was dismissed, or rather, sacked, namely the
10 last member of the Defence team, let's call it the Defence team, who was
11 involved as my choice. And now all of this is being done until now and
12 now, all of this is being done without any influence coming from me or
13 without any involvement of mine. I'm asking you, Your Honours, how can
14 this happen?
15 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Blagojevic, I would like to draw your
16 attention to a decision rendered by the Appeals Chamber concerning of the
17 substantive issue as for your application to change your Defence team,
18 which was rendered on the 7th November, 2003. I hope this decision will
19 be translated into the language you understand as soon as possible. So if
20 you have some difficulties concerning with this decision, please do not
21 hesitate to let this Bench know. Up to now we haven't received any
22 filings from your part, so actually we don't know what your request is.
23 My suggestion is that if you have any requests, you may raise it
24 to the registrar. And this Bench will see what we can do in this respect.
25 THE ACCUSED BLAGOJEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if this
1 pertains to the first sentence I uttered, or rather, the request that I
2 submitted here before you orally, in all fairness, then I can submit that
3 request to the registrar, that is no problem for me. But since I did not
4 receive a full decision, and this previous decision of the Appeals
5 Chamber, I didn't receive that either, and now you're telling me this
6 decision was passed on the 7th of November, 2003, then I'm going to have a
7 look at it and I'll see what stems from that. I cannot say anything more
8 specific at this stage, because I am not aware of the contents fully.
9 JUDGE LIU: Thank you. We will bear your request in mind, but we
10 will continue the proceedings this morning. You may sit down, please.
11 THE ACCUSED BLAGOJEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 JUDGE LIU: Well, I've noticed that a representative of the U.S.
13 Government is present in this courtroom. For the sake of the record,
14 would you please identify yourself.
15 MR. KAY: Thank you, Your Honour. My name is David Kay and I'm
16 the deputy legal counsellor at the American Embassy here in The Hague.
17 Thank you.
18 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much. In accordance with our ruling
19 rendered last week, you are allowed to be present in these proceedings and
20 submit any interventions which you believe will infringe upon the
21 interests of your government.
22 Could we have the witness now.
23 [The witness entered court]
24 JUDGE LIU: Good morning, Witness. Would you please make the
25 solemn declaration, please.
2 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
3 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
4 WITNESS: RICHARD JOHN BUTLER
5 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much. You may sit down, please.
6 Mr. McCloskey, you may proceed.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Your Honours and good morning.
8 Examined by Mr. McCloskey:
9 Q. Good morning. Can you please state your name?
10 A. My name is Richard Butler.
11 Q. And what is your nationality?
12 A. I am a U.S. Citizen.
13 Q. And were you a member of the United States army for many years?
14 A. That is correct. I was a member of the United States army from
15 August 1981 to September 2001.
16 Q. From 1981 to 1983, you were an enlisted man in the army. Is that
18 A. From 1981 to 1987, sir.
19 Q. And from 1983 to 1988 you were a non-commissioned officer?
20 A. Yes, that is correct.
21 Q. And from 1988 until the time you retired, you were a warrant
23 A. That is correct, sir.
24 Q. And when did you retire?
25 A. I retired 30th September, 2001.
1 Q. And then just briefly, you worked for the United Nations for a
2 short time and then you have now gone on and will expect a job in the
3 United States government in January?
4 A. That is correct, sir.
5 Q. Can you tell us, you've spent most of your time in the army as a
6 warrant officer, what is a warrant officer as opposed to a regular
8 A. A warrant officer is an officer who is prepped to deal with
9 specialised technical issues, intelligence -- the technical issue of
10 intelligence. There are warrant officers in the logistics field. There
11 are warrant officers in aviation. What that means is that that career
12 pattern is tracked to allow for the warrant officer to spend his entire
13 military career working within the confines of his technical expertise.
14 In the sense of other officers, regular officers, they will be expected as
15 part of their normal career pattern to do things outside of the normal
16 career focus, such as teaching ROTC classes for several years, they will
17 be expected to do recruiting duty, they will be expected to do other types
18 of normal, out-of-track service. So as a warrant officer, our career
19 track is specifically designed to keep us focused on our narrow career
21 Q. As an army warrant officer, you have lots of abbreviations. Some
22 of them we're not familiar with. ROTC?
23 A. ROTC is Reserve Officers Training Corps. That is the programme
24 where active military officers are instructors at universities and
25 colleges teaching classes for college students who will one day become
1 army officers.
2 Q. What was your specialty as a warrant officer in your career?
3 A. My specialty, I was referred to as an all-source intelligence
4 technician. So my specialty revolved around information and intelligence
5 with respect to combat operations.
6 Q. Can you describe in a little more detail what this job entailed?
7 A. As an all-source intelligence technician, what the job normally
8 entails and what it did entail in my case, was the ability to take
9 intelligence or information from a variety of sources, that would include
10 human intelligence, it would include signals intelligence, open
11 source-based intelligence, combat information. Essentially to take in all
12 of this information in order to analyse it, synthesise it, and then be
13 able to take that information and present it back to the commander who I'm
14 supporting and allow that commander to have the best possible picture of
15 the battle operating environment that he's in or the strategic picture
16 that he's facing. Again, that allows the commander to make the most
17 informed decisions.
18 Q. And can you briefly go through with us what kind of experience and
19 training and schooling you had for that job. Just briefly, if you could.
20 A. As a -- in the military, my first course was, of course, in 1981,
21 which was the basic military intelligence course as an enlisted person.
22 In 1986, I believe it would be -- 1985 I think. It was the
23 non-commissioned officers course for intelligence analysis. In 1988, when
24 I became a warrant officer, it was the warrant officer technical
25 certification course. Then following that it was the warrant officer
1 advanced technical certification course.
2 Q. How about a college degree? Did you get a college degree anywhere
3 in there?
4 A. I have a bachelor's degree from the University of Maryland,
5 European division, in political science.
6 Q. Can you please define and describe the three subject areas of
7 military analysis.
8 A. Within the framework of military analysis, with the focus on land
9 warfare, there are three general areas. What we call the strategic form
10 of analysis, operational analysis, and tactical analysis. Strategic
11 analysis, as the name implies, is a form of analysis that has to do with a
12 larger body of nations, their political military structure, their military
13 industrial structure and how that supports the military and political
15 The operational level corresponds to the operational level of war
16 where the analyst looks at and studies the aspects of corps and army
17 operations, those types of longer-term operations and how armies and corps
18 and division interrelate.
19 And at the tactical level what we're looking at is the more micro
20 focus on the battle field. We're looking at from the division to the
21 brigade to the battalion. Those types of -- forms of intelligence
22 analysis that are directly relevant to combat commanders.
23 Q. All right. Have you been assigned to a combat theatre in your
25 A. Yes, sir, I have.
1 Q. And if we could get the CV of Mr. Butler which I believe is
2 Exhibit 355. And if we could just place that on the ELMO on page 2.
3 A. This starts on -- page 1 actually is my assignment history.
4 Q. Okay. And I don't want to go in detail of that, but these -- this
5 brief outline beginning with analysis of the former Warsaw Pact, military
6 forces, and going down to 1992 to 1997 --
7 A. Going chronologically from April 1997, of course, to present will
8 be working in support of this institution. August 1992 to March 1997, my
9 focus was dealing with issues pertaining to southwest Asia. And it was
10 during that time when I was dealing with southwest Asia that I had my
11 combat experience.
12 Q. All right. And does the rest of the CV reflect your other
14 A. Yes, it does. It reflects my time in Europe studying the Warsaw
15 Pact as it was back then. It reflects time in the United States doing
16 time with tactical-based units and some of the more strategic assignments
17 that I've had.
18 Q. All right. Okay. And when did you begin work for the United
19 Nations Office of the Prosecutor?
20 A. I began working for the Office of the Prosecutor in April 1997.
21 Q. Were you still an active army warrant officer at that time?
22 A. Yes, sir, that is correct.
23 Q. Can you describe your arrangement between the Office of the
24 Prosecutor and the United States, if any?
25 A. During that period of time, when the secondment programme still
1 existed through the United Nations, I as well as a number of other
2 individuals were seconded by the United States government in support of
3 the ICTY as the institution, and in my particular case in support of the
5 Q. And for most of your time working here, you have concentrated on
6 the Srebrenica investigation. Is that right?
7 A. That is correct, sir. I started working directly supporting the
8 Srebrenica investigation in June of 1997.
9 Q. Can you describe the tasks and objectives of your assignments
10 related to that investigation.
11 A. As the military analyst assigned to that investigation team, what
12 I was asked to do was essentially develop the military overlay for the
13 various crime scenes that were under investigation. So that was in
14 respect doing my research and analysis, determining what the relevant
15 military units were in and around that area, what the relevant police
16 units were, what the command and control interrelationships were, and as
17 that developed, then the next piece of analysis began looking for pieces
18 of information that may or may not tie specific units or specific
19 individuals to the crime scenes as they were identified.
20 Q. Did that include studying the basic military doctrine that may
21 have been in effect at the time in the former Yugoslavia?
22 A. Yes, sir. That was the first step.
23 MR. KARNAVAS: Just a minor point.
24 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
25 MR. KARNAVAS: I know we're still in the background, but I would
1 appreciate it if we can get the testimony from the witness as opposed to
2 the leading nature of that question, Your Honour. I know we want to speed
3 things up, but at some point I just -- I don't want to be jumping up and
4 down and objecting to leading --
5 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Karnavas, as you said we are still on the
6 fields of the background issues. In this area, the leading questions are
8 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE LIU: You may proceed, Mr. McCloskey.
10 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
11 Q. Now, the work that you've just very briefly described for the OTP,
12 which of the three areas of analysis did it involve: Strategic,
13 operational, or tactical or some combination thereof?
14 A. In this particular case with Srebrenica, it involved all three.
15 The first step, of course, the part of the strategic analysis was
16 understanding how the army of the Republika Srpska or the VRS, was
17 organised and how it operated within the framework of the political
18 leadership of the VRS. How it was supported, how it was organised, how it
19 was resourced. It dealt with the operational level, because the next step
20 was basically, once we understood that, how it operated and regulated
21 itself in a military or a combat environment. That was where the
22 understanding of the rules and the regulations of the former JNA and how
23 they applied to the VRS worked in, as well as the interrelationship
24 between the army level, which in this case would be the VRS Main Staff,
25 and the corps level, in this case the Drina Corps, and how it also related
1 to the police who were also part of the armed forces. Then at the final
2 level, the tactical level, the ability to understand at the brigade and
3 battalion level how those units acted, how they were commanded, and how
4 that interrelated with the corps level. So with respect to the Srebrenica
5 operation, I had to draw on my background in all three areas.
6 Q. Did your -- the results of your study and analysis take the form
7 of any reports?
8 A. With respect to my preparations for the trial of General Krstic, I
9 produced two reports. I produced a corps command responsibility report,
10 which delineated the responsibilities of a VRS corps commander in July of
11 1995. And I also did a report I call the Srebrenica military narrative,
12 which is the actual fact basis which discusses the linkage between the
13 Drina Corps, General Krstic, and those crimes that were investigated on
14 the ground.
15 Q. Okay. Have you made similar reports for this trial?
16 A. Yes, sir, I have.
17 Q. All right. Well, how do they -- just very briefly, relate to the
18 Krstic reports? Are they completely new or what?
19 A. Well, sir, they are structured very similar. The report that I
20 did in this particular case is called "the VRS Brigade Command Report".
21 And in this instance what I have done is taken much of the same
22 information and tailored it to the roles and responsibilities of a VRS
23 brigade commander during the period in question.
24 As for the Srebrenica military narrative, building on my original
25 product, what I've done is I've revised that, again tailoring it in some
1 respects to the brigade level as well as using it as an opportunity to add
2 a lot of new information that has come into possession of the OTP over the
3 intervening years.
4 Q. All right. And for the command report, can you give us not a
5 complete but a general idea of the kinds of materials you relied on in
6 writing that report.
7 A. For the most part, the foundation is set on a series of former
8 JNA, Yugoslav national army, rules and regulations, which in effect
9 regulate how combat operations are conducted and how the associated
10 support functions are conducted. One of the very first things that I had
11 to do as part of the analytical process, in order to understand how the
12 army worked was to determine their operating rules and regulations. In
13 this particular case with the VRS, for the most part, not totally, but for
14 the most part, they fully adopted the rules and regulations of the JNA.
15 And given the fact that most of the people who were involved in senior
16 leadership positions were formerly from the JNA, that obviously made a
17 certain amount of sense. Other things that I used were instructions,
18 documents, and orders that the VRS itself had produced, which the Office
19 of the Prosecutor had acquired through a series of seizures or had come in
20 through a number of other means.
21 Q. And how thorough or how complete were the various manuals and
22 instructions that you, in this investigation, assembled over the years?
23 A. I think it is pretty thorough. Obviously we are missing some
24 manuals that we would like to have that we just have not been able to
25 acquire. Certainly in the form of documents, there are missing documents
1 that we would like to acquire, but I think that we have enough of a broad
2 scope of material to be able to say that we have a relatively complete
4 Q. And, for example, did you recently get some new regulations in an
5 area of concern for this trial?
6 A. Specifically within the last few days the Defence has turned over
7 the JNA manuals on engineering regulations which were not in the
8 possession of the Office of the Prosecutor. So those are the type of
9 documents that we continue to look for as part of building the overall
11 Q. But not having those regulations, does that damage your ability to
12 understand the position of engineering officers?
13 A. Not particularly, because we're able to reconstruct a lot of that
14 same material from the 1984 brigade regulations and other various
15 documents that we do have. So in many cases, it's just a confirmation
16 that the VRS was still using the procedures envisioned by the JNA.
17 MR. McCLOSKEY: For the record, Your Honour, the command report is
18 Prosecution's number 357.
19 Q. Now, for the narrative report for this trial, can you describe the
20 kinds of materials, and I know we're going to be going at length into
21 specific materials, but can you just give the Chamber an idea of the kinds
22 of materials you were reviewing and analysing?
23 A. With respect to the narrative report, probably the most
24 significant series of documents were those documents that were seized by
25 the Office of the Prosecutor in 1998 from what was formerly the Zvornik
1 Infantry Brigade and the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade. Those documents
2 formed the foundation for the knowledge of how those two specific
3 organisations functioned during the war and how they functioned
4 specifically in July 1995. Since then there are other documents that have
5 also come in that also play important parts. For example, the Office of
6 the Prosecutor has seized documents from CSB Zvornik and from the RS MUP
7 headquarters which overlay and give more detail as to the relationship
8 between the army and the MUP. And of course that's a key component of the
9 events of July 1995.
10 Q. Can you tell us what CSB Zvornik means.
11 A. CSB is the centre for security. I mean, that's their regional
12 police station or regional security centre.
13 Q. Okay. And since the completion of your narrative for this trial,
14 have new documents come in that were not cited in your narrative?
15 A. In that respect, there are two new categories of documents that
16 we've obtained that are not in that narrative. The first -- and when I
17 say "narrative," I would also add I did publish an addendum to chapter 8
18 which does reflect some of the new material. But with this respect,
19 material that's not is would be material that we received from the -- when
20 the OTP did a -- conducted a search of the RS-RDB headquarters.
21 Q. And what is that?
22 A. The RS-RDB is the Republika Srpska state security. We acquired
23 some of their documents when we searched the headquarters of the RS
24 Ministry of the Interior. Those provide a background of what the state
25 leadership and the intelligence service had access to with forms of
1 information during July 1995. And also documents that were provided by
2 Mr. Obrenovic were also not incorporated into the narrative at this time.
3 JUDGE LIU: Mr. McCloskey, since you and the witness are speaking
4 the same language, just make a pause.
5 And witness, I understand that you are eager to give your
6 evidence. So whatever you say has to be in the transcript. So please say
7 it slowly.
8 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, will do.
9 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.
10 MR. McCLOSKEY:
11 Q. Did you use open-source material in your analysis?
12 A. We did use open-source material. Much of that what we call
13 open-source material would in fact be military magazines published by the
14 Republika Srpska, several news clippings from non-Bosnian newspapers for
15 issues pertaining to notice. But for the most part we relied on the
16 military documents.
17 Q. And did you rely on any investigative materials such as crime
18 scene information, witness interviews?
19 A. I have talked about some of the issues with witness interviews
20 only in the part or only in the sense of trying to establish the broader
21 context of where the military documents fit into a story that a witness
22 would say. So where I used witness statements or where I used, for
23 example, testimony out of the Krstic case is only to create the context of
24 what the witness has already said or testified on and where the military
25 documents may or may not relate to that. I don't use witness statements
1 or testimony that's been heard in court as a fundamental component of my
3 Q. Just, for example, in the Krstic trial, Muslim witnesses
4 identified by name several Serbs that were present in Potocari. Did
5 you -- how did you analyse the names of the Serbs that were provided in
6 the testimony?
7 A. In that instance, what I would do is taking that witness's
8 testimony, I would then verify or cross-index whether or not those names
9 of individuals showed up on military document listings showing that
10 they're members of a certain unit. So that would be a good example of
11 where I would take a witness testimony and use it to set the foundations,
12 so to speak, for why these military documents are now relevant.
13 Q. And at times in the investigation did you sit in on any interviews
14 of witnesses?
15 A. I sat in during the investigation in numerous interviews, and on
16 those interviews where I was not able to go because of other commitments,
17 I read the interviews after they were finished. So I have access to all
18 of that information.
19 Q. Why were you actually present during interviews of various people?
20 A. Well, certainly during the early days of the investigation and the
21 initial interviews that we started conducting in 1998, as the military
22 analyst, logically I was the person who had the broadest background as to
23 the military context of the individual and the questions that would be
24 asked. Most of these interviews were, in fact, of VRS military officers.
25 So it was pretty much, you know, a logical conclusion that I would be a
1 person in there to be able to assist investigators and the lawyers who
2 were present as a component of preparing for and in the interview to
3 determine not how accurate the individual is speaking, but to ensure that
4 on follow-on questions, we can get complete answers with respect to
5 military issues.
6 Q. Okay. As part of your narrative and as a part of your analysis,
7 did you review Bosnian Muslim army and Bosnian MUP intercepts?
8 A. Yes, sir, I did.
9 Q. And in reviewing them, did you make any judgement about them
10 regarding their value to your analysis?
11 A. As we obtained the initial products from the intercepts in 1998
12 and I believe I testified to this extent in the Krstic trial, I was, of
13 course, very skeptical of this product. And as a component of my
14 analysis, once we had these indexed and once they were translated in bulk,
15 which means I could look at the entire month and the entire periods in
16 context, the first thing I would do in looking at these intercepts is to
17 try and cross-index them to events we know occurred on the ground or
18 documents we know occurred -- or documents we have where we can say
19 reasonably that the Bosnian Muslim army would never have access to this
21 I also made myself aware of the collection environment that the
22 Bosnian Muslims were collecting against and their tactics and procedures
23 in doing that. So as I worked with this body of information over a
24 two-year period prior to the Krstic case and even today, I've gained a
25 great deal of confidence in this material that it, in fact, represents the
1 actual context of many of the things that were happening on the ground.
2 Q. Okay. For the record, the narrative is P358, and the addendum to
3 it is P359.
4 Now, you make, as we all know, many citations to many sources in
5 your narrative and your command report. One in particular was the
6 United Nations report to the General Assembly on Srebrenica. What did you
7 rely on that report for?
8 A. Well, as I've indicated in the introduction to my Srebrenica
9 military narrative, the goal of the narrative is rather focused to the
10 issues of the military, the VRS, the Drina Corps, and its interrelation
11 with the crime scenes. It is not a report which is designed to be an
12 all-encompassing historical perspective of the war in the Drina Valley or
13 the Podrinje region from 1992 to 1995. I rely on that report because that
14 report does offer a very broad contextual basis of the military and
15 political events that are occurring from 1992 to 1995.
16 Q. Okay.
17 MR. McCLOSKEY: And that report, Your Honour, has been specially
18 marked as P360, the UN report.
19 Q. All right, Mr. Butler, I want you to take us through some of the
20 key elements of your command report with some help from some -- we'll
21 start off with some charts that I know you have made. And the first area
22 I'd like you just to provide us a brief outline on is the structure of the
23 armed forces of the Republika Srpska. And I think that is best shown by
24 an exhibit that you've developed, P361, a chart.
25 MR. McCLOSKEY: It may be simpler for Mr. Butler just to place his
1 copies on the ELMO. They are marked with the exhibit number.
2 Q. So, Mr. Butler, first of all, could you just give us a brief
3 outline of the structure of the armed forces of the Republika Srpska.
4 A. Under RS law, the armed forces are defined as two entities. One,
5 of course, is the army. The other, of course, is the Ministry of the
6 Interior, or MUP. So those are the two branches of the Republika Srpska
7 armed forces.
8 With respect to the army, there are six ground corps which
9 are -- which represent the combat power of the army. And of course those
10 are listed on the chart there. And the corps that's most relevant to this
11 trial will of course be the Drina Corps. Also as part of the army are two
12 other units that are independent, insomuch as they don't answer to a
13 corps, they answer directly to the Main Staff. One of them is the
14 65th Protection Regiment and the other one is the 10th Sabotage
16 Q. Can you briefly describe what the 65th Protection Regiment is?
17 A. The 65th Protection Regiment is, again, is an organisation that is
18 a holdover from the former JNA protection regiment. It is a unit that is
19 designed to provide security primarily for military district-type
20 headquarters and strategic facilities. During the course of the war, with
21 the VRS, this unit, the 65th Protection Regiment, also played an
22 additional role not only in guarding such facilities, but it also played
23 an important role on the battlefield, because it was one of the best
24 equipped and best trained units in the army.
25 Q. And in particular to the Srebrenica situation, what role -- and
1 very briefly, where was it? What role did it play?
2 A. Well, with respect to the combat formations and manoeuvre
3 formations, they didn't play a role in Srebrenica at all as far as we can
4 determine. However, the unit did have a military police battalion, and
5 that battalion was garrisoned at Nova Kasaba. That battalion does play a
6 role in the events that occurred around Srebrenica.
7 Q. And can you give us the same brief description of the
8 10th Sabotage Detachment.
9 A. As described by both Mr. Erdemovic primarily and other accounts,
10 the 10th Sabotage Detachment was utilised during the final assault on the
11 urban area of Srebrenica itself. And later it comes into play as a
12 portion of the unit that was involved with the massacres at the
13 Branjevo Military Farm.
14 Q. And generally what kind of unit was the 10th Sabotage Unit?
15 A. It was organised specifically to do covert or clandestine sabotage
16 operations against strategic targets against the army of Bosnia. So in
17 this particular case they were specifically trained to operate in small
18 units and sabotage, demolition or strategic intelligence collection.
19 Q. All right. And who is the commander in chief of the armed forces
20 in July 1995?
21 A. Well, the commander in chief of the armed forces, again by their
22 law, would be Dr. Radovan Karadzic, who is the supreme commander.
23 Q. Now let's go into a brief outline of the Main Staff. So we'll go
24 from 361 which is a very rough chart to this more specific chart of P362
25 of the Main Staff.
1 And can you just start with the top, Mr. Butler, and talk to us
2 about who these people are and how -- just give us a very brief background
3 of what the Main Staff's function was and who -- first of all, what the
4 Main Staff function was. And secondly, who are some of these individuals
5 in the structure and where we should be looking for them in the events in
7 A. Well, the Main Staff as an organisation was the entity that
8 effectively commanded and controlled the armed forces -- or not the armed
9 forces. To be specific, it controlled the army. The commander of the
10 Main Staff at the time was Lieutenant Colonel General Ratko Mladic. He
11 had a deputy who at the time Lieutenant Colonel Manojlo Milovanovic. He
12 was called the chief of the Main Staff, but he performed the role of the
13 deputy commander. Now, in July of 1995, he is not functioning in his role
14 as deputy commander. One of the things that occurred as a result of the
15 military situation in the northern part of the country, the Main Staff
16 established a forward command post in Banja Luka controlling the
17 activities of the 1st and 2nd Krajina Corps. And General Milovanovic was
18 detailed to command that. As a result, that position was filled by
19 General Major Radivoje Miletic who was the chief of operations. This is
20 consistent with the former JNA doctrine which indicates that when the
21 chief of staff is absent, the position is filled by the chief of
23 Q. Just briefly, will we see General Miletic later on in some of the
25 A. We will see General Miletic in a document identified as the acting
1 chief of the Main Staff on 12 July, 1995. And we will also see intercepts
2 which feature conversations with General Miletic.
3 Q. Okay. If you could continue along this diagram going from the
4 left to the right, identifying anyone that -- and just give us a brief
5 kind of preview of where we might be seeing them as we go through some of
6 the documents.
7 A. In the combat services of the branch, Colonel Trkulja and
8 Colonel Sladojevic are operations officers. They are here and here. Both
9 of those individuals will be featured in a 17 July Main Staff order being
10 sent to the Zvornik Brigade to conduct an investigation into the events
11 that occurred with respect to the column.
12 Q. And let's -- we'll get into that in a little more detail later.
13 But let's continue on left to right.
14 A. Looking now at the department of security and intelligence
15 affairs, that is headed, of course, by General Major Zdravko Tolimir. We
16 have documents which now indicate that General Tolimir was at the
17 Drina Corps headquarters in Vlasenica on 12th July. From the intelligence
18 administration, some of the other people we would see would be
19 Colonel Radislav Jankovic who features on 11 July 1995 as one of the
20 individuals, with General Mladic, at the first meeting of the
21 Hotel Bratunac. He also conducts reports on the conduct of the movement
22 of the people from Potocari to Kladanj. And he is also involved with
23 dealing with issues of wounded Bosnian Muslims who were under care and
24 transferred to the Bratunac medical centre. So we will see him through
25 the continuing 11 to 17, 18 July period.
1 Colonel Milovan Stankovic is also an intelligence officer. We
2 will see his presence in Zvornik as part of this investigating commission
3 of officers on 17th July. Lieutenant Colonel -- for the intelligence
4 side, that's pretty much all that we'll see. On the other side, the
5 security administration affairs, one of the first people and one of the
6 prominent players we'll see is Colonel Ljubo Beara, who is the chief of
7 security. We first see him in the area of Bratunac or in that general
8 area in 11.00 on 13 July when he's involved in a conversation concerning
9 prisoners at Nova Kasaba. He is a constant player in the activities
10 through 18 July. Major Pecanac has been identified as a security officer
11 who is primarily concerned with security of General Mladic. We have a
12 document from him dated 12 July 1995 which is an intelligence report which
13 he authored from Bratunac.
14 Lieutenant Colonel Keserovic is a security officer who is charged
15 with oversight of the military police of the Republika Srpska. We will
16 see his presence on the 17th as an officer who's detailed to assume
17 command or control of various units sweeping the terrain in and around
18 Nova Kasaba and Konjevic Polje.
19 Q. Let's go over to the department for moral, religion and legal
21 A. Lieutenant Colonel General Milovan Gvero is the assistant
22 commander for moral, religious, and legal affairs of the army. We have
23 visibility on him in the form of a document where he is with
24 General Krstic on the evening of 9th of July at the forward command post.
25 Below him is Lieutenant Colonel Milovan Milutinovic who functions
1 as the public affairs officer for the VRS. We have him in and around the
2 Bratunac area, and some of the video footage that was taken of the Hotel
3 Fontana meetings was in fact by him.
4 Q. All right. Let's go now to the other main structure of the armed
5 forces that you mentioned briefly. And that is the -- under the Ministry
6 of the Interior. And we have an exhibit P363. And can you, like you did
7 before, briefly describe to us the structure, first of all, and then give
8 us a briefest of outlines of who these people are and where we might be
9 seeing them.
10 A. At the time in question, Tomislav Kovac is the acting minister of
11 the interior. Subsequent to this he becomes the minister of interior. We
12 see his name featured in the 10 July 1995 order directing that elements of
13 the special police brigade be sent to the Srebrenica battle front. We'll
14 also see Mr. Kovac, his physical presence approximately 14 July in and
15 around the Bratunac and Srebrenica area.
16 Q. Okay. Now, the next two boxes begin with CJB Zvornik and then
17 special police brigade. Now, the Trial Chamber has heard a fair amount of
18 information on this, but could you just give us the briefest outline of
19 the differences of these two outfits, what their functions are.
20 A. Well, in that time period, the police were organised into two
21 separate entities -- I mean, two significant separate entities. There are
22 smaller ones, obviously. But in this respect, the CSBs, the regional
23 security centres, public security centres, are organised, their primary
24 function is law enforcement within the Republika Srpska. As a component
25 of that primary function and due to shortage of manpower with the VRS in
1 general. The CSBs were directed to have available police officers who
2 could be organised into companies and be sent to battlefield on short
3 notice for short periods of time. Those are what we call the PJP
4 companies. Those are special police companies but they are made up of the
5 municipal police. On the other side, the police also had what they called
6 a special police brigade which was organised for more strategic
7 anti-terrorism operations, things of that nature. They were also
8 organised into detachments of roughly two company or battalion size. And
9 like the PJP counterparts, when required, they were also used in combat
10 operations to make up for manpower. So there are two distinct branches,
11 however, in practice they often worked very closely with each other.
12 Q. All right. And is this exhibit P363, does it reflect a particular
13 time frame and operation?
14 A. This particular exhibit reflects my understanding of the police
15 infrastructure and relationships in July of 1995.
16 Q. And I will go over some of the names as we get to them. I don't
17 think we need to go over them right now.
18 All right. Now, as we work our way towards the -- understanding
19 the Drina Corps and where it fits into the structure, can we just take a
20 brief look at Exhibit 364 which -- and tell us what this is.
21 A. If we could scan out just a little bit. Thank you. This is a
22 computer-generated map which I have done based off of VRS maps and
23 documents that we have which lays out the zone of the Drina Corps in July
24 of 1995. Just for reference, this is the Srebrenica safe area. This will
25 be the Zepa safe area. And down here is the Gorazde safe area.
1 Q. Is this map roughly to scale?
2 A. Yes, sir.
3 Q. And so what's the distance roughly from the perimeter of the Zepa
4 safe area and the Srebrenica safe area?
5 A. Generally, while its straight line, 10 to 15 kilometres. Again,
6 nothing in that region is straight line because of the terrain, so you're
7 looking at -- it's going to be a little bit longer route because you have
8 to follow the terrain contours. So it's about 15 to 20 kilometres
9 perimeter-to-perimeter wise.
10 Q. And while we've got them up there, let me just ask you briefly:
11 What was the problem the VRS was facing in July of 1995 when they talk
12 about communication between the two enclaves? We'll go into this entire
13 historical thing a little more deeper. While we see the two enclaves
14 there, can you tell us what was going on.
15 A. Well, with respect to Srebrenica and Zepa, there was, for the most
16 part, an active crossing of troops back and forth, as you will. There was
17 essentially three brigades of the 28th Division in Srebrenica. There was
18 another brigade of that division in Zepa. And there was a constant amount
19 of travel back and forth between the soldiers. Where this became a
20 problem particularly for the VRS is that, particularly for elements of the
21 Bratunac, Skelani and Milici units, is that there used to be frequent
22 ambushes in this area and of course it would be a constant manpower drain
23 in controlling it, and particularly the Skelani unit would take a
24 significant amount of casualties.
25 Q. And just briefly, in the larger picture of the war, how did this
1 affect the VRS?
2 A. Well, always going back to the position that one of the
3 significant shortfalls in the VRS was a lack of manpower to -- for the
4 frontage that they held. This particular situation with these safe areas
5 meant that a number of combat formations, particularly units like the
6 Bratunac Brigade, the Milici Brigade, Skelani brigade, the
7 Visegrad Brigade and Rogatica Brigade were tied down in these areas here
8 and their manpower was not available for other areas of the front.
9 Q. Was that the specific intention of the Muslim army?
10 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour.
11 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Karnavas.
12 MR. KARNAVAS: I don't mean to interrupt the gentleman but if we
13 could have a foundational question. Now he's being asked to speculate at
14 this point. If he has a basis or has come across some documents or
15 something that would give us some comfort that he's not speculating.
16 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. McCloskey. Lay some foundations for us
17 before you ask that question.
18 MR. McCLOSKEY: The question will lead to the foundation, Your
19 Honour. But I can go on to another subject.
20 JUDGE LIU: Well, we come to the issue of the chicken first or the
21 egg first. But you may ask some questions to this witness concerning the
22 foundations and later on come to that question.
23 MR. McCLOSKEY: One of the reasons I asked the question like that
24 is I believe it's part of Mr. Karnavas's case, as it is with ours, that
25 this was a deliberate policy of the Muslim army to tie down VRS troops.
1 It's stated in documents that Mr. Butler's read. So I didn't know I would
2 get an objection, but I know Mr. Karnavas likes to keep me strictly to the
3 way he does, so we can -- that's all we're doing. I'll try to go forward.
4 JUDGE LIU: Yes, you may proceed.
5 MR. McCLOSKEY:
6 Q. Just briefly, have you reviewed documents that indicate what the
7 BiH army's policy was towards the military actions in the enclave?
8 A. Yes, sir, I have.
9 Q. And what was that?
10 A. Certainly as the war progressed the ABiH government recognised the
11 strategic value of having those forces tied around the enclaves as opposed
12 to being used in other more critical fronts of the battlefield. The one
13 advantage that the ABiH did have over the VRS was in numbers. As a result
14 one of the patterns we would see is when the ABiH was launching operations
15 in an area, one of the best examples would be the Sarajevo 1995 offensive
16 by the ABiH. That what the 28th Infantry Division, and it was known in
17 July 1995, was directed to do was to launch offensive operations in order
18 to prevent forces from the Drina Corps and these forces specifically from
19 being used to reinforce battlefields in and around the Sarajevo area.
20 Q. Okay. Well, let's now get off that little diversion and go back
21 to the Drina Corps, back to our structure of the Drina Corps. And I think
22 in order to assist your testimony, let's have P365. And can you tell
23 us -- again, describe to us where the Drina Corps fit in and very briefly
24 how it was organised. And we'll start going through the chart in
1 A. Well, the Drina Corps was organised consistent with the way that
2 former JNA corps were organised. So by using that, it shows the JNA model
3 and this is how that corps was built. This chart reflects my
4 understanding of the key personalities on 13th July, 1995, when
5 General Radislav Krstic assumed command of the corps.
6 Q. Okay. So can you just describe briefly how these corps are
7 structured, how their command staffs are structured and what kind of units
8 they have with them.
9 A. Well, in tandem to the Main Staff which was organised having
10 branches for operations, moral, legal, and religious affairs, the security
11 and rear services, the corps organisation and the corps staff is organised
12 along the same manner. You will have a corps commander. You will have a
13 corps chief of staff who functions as the deputy commander in the absence
14 of the commander, or if the commander is not available. You will have as
15 part of the corps staff your operations department, personnel, and
16 intelligence. You will have a security department. You will have a
17 department for moral, religious, and legal affairs. And you will have
18 your department for rear services.
19 Q. And what about the actual combat units under the corps?
20 A. In this context, what the VRS did for the most part was organise
21 their forces under a corps brigade structure. So while the corps staff
22 was the commanding and directing entity of the corps, the actual combat
23 power of the formation was in its brigades. So in this particular case,
24 the Drina Corps had a number of brigades. And in some cases some separate
25 battalions that represented the bulk of its power.
1 Q. Okay. Let's do like we did before and just very briefly identify
2 the people in the various positions and just where we might be seeing them
3 as we go through the rest of the narrative.
4 A. Starting with the top, obviously, with General Major
5 Radislav Krstic. We see him first as the Chief of Staff and then later as
6 the commander of the Drina Corps. He is a principle player in designing
7 the operation to initially reduce Srebrenica to its urban area, and then
8 later take the actual city itself. And of course his troops were involved
9 and he is involved with a lot of the events that occur after the fall of
10 the safe area. The chief of staff position on 13th July is nominally
11 filled by then-Colonel Svetozar Andric, who was the commander of the Birac
12 Infantry Brigade. However, due to the fact that his brigade was involved
13 in combat operations in Zepa at the time, we don't believe that he
14 actually assumed the position of chief of staff of the brigade during that
16 Q. Can you talk briefly about General Zivanovic.
17 A. Well, General Zivanovic was the corps commander until
18 approximately between 1800 and 2000 hours on 13th July, 1995. While
19 General Krstic was responsible for organising the operation and the actual
20 conduct of it at the IKM, General Zivanovic was the corps commander. And
21 certainly by the 10th of July, General Zivanovic was down there overseeing
22 the operation with General Mladic.
23 Q. Okay. Let's in this brief overview again start with the
24 operations and training section. And just give us the briefest of -- if
25 you recognise any of these individuals as being significant later on down
1 the road.
2 A. In this particular case the first person would be the chief of
3 operations Colonel Obrad Vicic. For the most part he is accompanying
4 General Krstic. He is up at the forward command post, the IKM Pribicevac.
5 And it is his function to direct the actual combat operations and make
6 sure those are fully coordinated. Other officers we will see,
7 Colonel Slavko Ognjenovic and Colonel Predrag Jocic. Their names as
8 Drina Corps officers will show up in intercepts or in actual documents
9 that delineate their position. For example, on 13 July 1995,
10 Colonel Predrag Jocic is the duty officer of the Drina Corps. And on the
11 13th and 14th he is responsible, as the duty officer, for passing
12 information to the corps commanders and to also subordinate brigades.
13 As the section for reinforcement, Radenko Jovicic. He is visible
14 by virtue of a document, which is signed by him, noting that the change of
15 command between General Zivanovic and General Krstic on the 13th of July.
16 In the intelligence section, Lieutenant Colonel Kosoric is an intelligence
17 officer. He is the chief of intelligence for the Drina Corps. You see
18 him, of course, he goes down with General Krstic and his presence is noted
19 at the Hotel Fontana in a series of meetings. And also as a focal point
20 we'll see him in many documents that are transmitted concerning
21 information derived from prisoner of war interrogations.
22 Major Golic is an intelligence officer. During the period that
23 Colonel Kosoric is in the field, Major Golic is at the Drina Corps
24 headquarters. We will see him author some of the intelligence reports
25 that go to the Bratunac Brigade, that go to the Zvornik Brigade and are
1 sent to the forward command post. One thing that I do want to note before
2 we leave that in the corps staff is you will note that underneath is the
3 name of Colonel Nedjo Blagojevic. As the chief of security or chief of
4 communications within the Drina Corps. I note this because in the context
5 of intercepts and in the context of other documents, I have to take this
6 into account if we have an identification with only a last name, that one
7 of the accused, you know, shares that last name with him and therefore I'm
8 cognizant of that fact when I go into my analysis of who the
9 correspondents of a discussion are.
10 Moving now to the security department. The key player is in this
11 particular case Lieutenant Colonel Vujadin Popovic, who is the chief of
12 security of the Drina Corps. We see his presence in Potocari on -- or we
13 see his presence in the Bratunac area first on the morning of 12 July.
14 And he is a featured player in intercepts and also other documents with
15 respect to the mass executions of Bosnian Muslim men.
16 Colonel Slobodan Cerovic is the chief or he is the assistant
17 commander for moral, legal, and religious affairs and has guidance, but
18 it's translated two different ways. In this particular case we see him,
19 one witness places him in Potocari on the 12th of July. But primarily
20 where we'll see him involved is as a duty officer in the Drina Corps on
21 the 15th and 16th of July where his name comes up in intercepts referring
22 to orders related to the execution of prisoners.
23 Q. Okay. And how about for the department for rear services?
24 A. I'll just fold this over a bit. A number of these individuals
25 are -- will be associated with the movement of the Bosnian Muslims from
1 Potocari to Kladanj. And their names come up with respect to the
2 resources needed to do that as well as the buses which will ultimately
3 move the Bosnian Muslim men from collection centres in and around Bratunac
4 to the zone of the Zvornik Brigade. First among these is the assistant
5 commander or the chief of rear services, Colonel Lazar Acamovic. We will
6 see references to Lieutenant Colonel Rajko Krsmanovic who is the head of
7 the transportation service of the Drina Corps. We will see his name
8 frequently with respect to buses and other means of transportation. The
9 chief of the technical service, Major Tomislav Basevic, his name is
10 featured in a series of intercepts with respect to 16th July, 1995, where
11 because of the execution operations they need more fuel and Basevic is the
12 head of technical services, represents the approval of authority for this
14 Q. Okay. Now, could you just point out which of the actual brigades
15 we may be hearing about. And again, very -- we're not going detail here,
16 but just mention the ones that we may be hearing of.
17 A. If we can just zoom in a little bit, please. Thank you. The
18 Birac Infantry Brigade, the first unit there, they're involved in combat
19 operations with respect to Srebrenica and Zepa. The Vlasenica Infantry
20 Brigade, their involvement is with respect to having reserve forces
21 available as well as a component of their forces are at the last point of
22 departure from the RS for buses of Muslims being evacuated or moved out of
23 the enclave. So they are the forces that when you hear at Kladanj, at
24 the -- those are the forces of the Vlasenica Brigade.
25 The Zvornik Infantry Brigade as you're aware from the testimony of
1 Colonel Obrenovic, is involved in both the actual military capture of
2 Srebrenica, as well as the criminal events that follow in their zone. The
3 Milici Light Infantry Brigade, there again they have a part in the actual
4 takedown of Srebrenica, although its primarily defensive in nature. Their
5 units are also involved in Zepa. However, forces of the Milici brigade do
6 capture Bosnian Muslim men along the road on 12 and 13 July, 1995.
7 Q. Okay. And just very briefly for the Bratunac Brigade.
8 A. Well, Bratunac, by virtue of their location, they have a part to
9 play in both the actual capture of Srebrenica and they're also involved in
10 the issue with the movement of people out of Potocari and on the Bosnian
11 Muslim men around that area.
12 Q. Okay. Skelani Separate Battalion?
13 A. That unit as far as we can determine has no active role in
14 anything other than operations regarding the takedown of Srebrenica. They
15 are not involved in anything following that.
16 Q. Rogatica?
17 A. The Rogatica Brigade is in fact dealing with issues related to
18 Zepa. So in this particular case with Srebrenica, their only involvement
19 is when the focus of the VRS operation shifts from Srebrenica to Zepa,
20 they will become involved. But with respect to any potential criminal
21 activity, there is no known involvement.
22 Q. You may need to slow down a bit. Visegrad Brigade?
23 A. The Visegrad Brigade is again primarily involved with operations
24 around Zepa. Where we see this involvement with respect to some of the
25 crimes related to Srebrenica is that on 13th and 15th of July, there are
1 references to one unit of the Visegrad brigade, or the 5th Podrinje Light
2 Infantry Brigade as it's also known, being asked for use in a mass
4 Q. The next one, the 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade?
5 A. The 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade had elements involved in the
6 actual military operation to take down or capture the Srebrenica town.
7 There's no known involvement with them in any of the criminal acts.
8 Q. And the 5th Engineering Battalion, and can you describe briefly
9 what this is, where they're located.
10 A. The 5th Engineering Battalion is located in the village of
11 Konjevic Polje at the intersection. They represent the corps's engineer
12 unit, primarily bridging assets, earth moving equipment, combat engineer
13 related functions. Of course their garrison being in Konjevic Polje, they
14 are involved in the programme or process where prisoners are being taken.
15 Several of their soldiers are killed or injured as a result of that on 12
16 and 13 July, 1995.
17 Q. Okay. And the 5th Mixed Artillery Regiment.
18 A. Just as the engineer battalion is where the engineering equipment
19 for the corps is, the 5th Mixed Artillery Regiment is the corps' artillery
20 regiment. In this particular case, most of its assets are deployed in or
21 around the area of Pribicevac and are involved in providing fire support
22 for military forces conducting operations at Srebrenica.
23 Q. The 5th Military Police Battalion?
24 A. This battalion organisation of military police is generally not
25 seen in and around the Srebrenica area. The best information that we have
1 is that as has happened in many cases in the past with the VRS, the
2 military police unit, because it represents a reserve of manpower that can
3 be used, instead of being used for traditional law enforcement functions
4 is used as a combat formation. The best knowledge that we've been able to
5 put together with respect to documents and the evidence, the bulk of this
6 unit was deployed on a battle front in the area or the zone of the
7 Birac Infantry Brigade. There are some individuals who may be members of
8 the 5th Military Police Battalion that touch around the actual area of
9 Srebrenica or the crime scenes. But the bulk of the formation is not
10 involved as far as I can tell.
11 Q. And the 5th Communications Battalion.
12 A. Well, this unit, again by its design, is the unit that provides
13 the communication backbone for the Drina Corps. When I say "backbone,"
14 it's the communication nodes, the radio relay sites for multichannel
15 communication. That's their function. In this particular case they had
16 deployed a mobile communications vehicle to the corps forward command post
17 or IKM, in Pribicevac. And Major Milenko Jevtevic is there as part of
18 that organisation.
19 Q. Okay. And the 4th Drinski Battalion or Brigade.
20 A. Okay. This particular unit, the 4th Drinski Brigade, is not a
21 normal part of the organisation. Again, as a reflection of an overall
22 shortage of manpower, what the VRS, and specifically the Drina Corps, on
23 many occasions had to do was to essentially put together a composite
24 formation in response to tasking by the Main Staff to provide a one or two
25 battalion-sized formation for a particular part of the battlefield. In
1 this particular case, the 4th Drinski Brigade was composed of elements of
2 the Zvornik Brigade, elements of the Birac Brigade, some elements of the
3 Bratunac Brigade, and were deployed on Trnovo on the Sarajevo battle
4 front. Of course, one of the consequences to this is when we're looking
5 at the period of 12 and 13 and 14 July, when the unit commanders are
6 talking about having no manpower, it's because in most cases not only does
7 the manpower completely stretched to the zones where they're in, but
8 hundreds of their own zones are deployed out of sector.
9 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. McCloskey, it's time for a break.
10 Yes, we'll have 30 minutes break. We'll resume at 5 to 1.00.
11 --- Recess taken at 12.23 p.m.
12 --- On resuming at 12.58 p.m.
13 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. McCloskey, please proceed.
14 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
15 Q. Now, Mr. Butler, we've just finished off the overview for the
16 Drina Corps. And so now I want to ask you about the Zvornik and Bratunac
17 Brigades. We had seen a map of the zone of the Drina Corps. Did the
18 Bratunac and Zvornik Brigade have a zone delineation?
19 A. Within the zone of the Drina Corps, both of those units did have
20 their own zone.
21 Q. Okay. So we're now looking at P85. Can you tell us what this is.
22 A. This particular document is a computer-generated map graphic that
23 outlines the zones of responsibility of the Zvornik Infantry Brigade and
24 the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade in July of 1995.
25 Q. And what do you mean by zone of responsibility?
1 A. One of the hallmarks of the VRS, particularly on the basis of when
2 it was organised or the way it was organised in 1992, was that the
3 brigades were given broad but delineated areas of responsibility or zones
4 of responsibility. In many cases they corresponded to rough municipal
5 borders that were in existence or geographic zones. And the brigade was
6 responsible for the conduct of military operations within this area.
7 Q. Okay. Now, this exhibit, did you assist in marking the zones of
8 responsibility for this exhibit?
9 A. Yes, sir, I did.
10 Q. And for the Bratunac Brigade, can you show us briefly where those
11 zones are or that zone is, excuse me.
12 A. For the Bratunac Brigade, the general zone corresponds from
13 roughly the Drina River towards Drinjaca, Konjevic Polje, down but just
14 around Nova Kasaba, does not control Nova Kasaba. More or less a straight
15 line towards a mountaintop down here and it's more accurate on the map, on
16 this map here.
17 Q. Well, we'll get to that map in a minute and give it an --
18 A. And then around what covers in a large part what was then
19 considered the Bratunac municipality.
20 Q. All right. And on what material or information did you rely in
21 drawing or assisting in drawing P85?
22 A. With respect to the Zvornik Brigade zone, as part of the seizure
23 of documents and material in the Zvornik Brigade, there were a number of
24 maps which had a zone of operations delineated on it, the area of
25 responsibility. The same applies with the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade
1 and a number of documents that were seized from that location. This
2 particular one which I believe is listed as Prosecution Exhibit P369, I
3 believe. This was a map from the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade, dated
4 roughly 1992, early 1993, which delineates the Bratunac Brigade zone of
5 responsibility. Now, further in this case what I was able to do is one of
6 the documents we had seized was the war history of the Bratunac Light
7 Infantry Brigade. And as part of that war history, it defined the same
8 brigade boundaries that correspond to the map.
9 Q. Okay. So looking at 369, did you make any markings on this map?
10 A. There is one marking that is attributed to me on this map. If you
11 will look on this sticker here, I was involved in part of the process for
12 once the material came back from the field from the Bratunac Brigade, to
13 catalogue this material and index it. And as a part of doing that, what
14 we did was each and every document received an index number. And in this
15 particular case that index number is listed as E15001 and my initials, RB.
16 So I was the particular person who indexed this document.
17 Q. So did you do anything relating to the filled-in features that
18 identify the zone of the Bratunac Brigade?
19 A. No, sir. Other than this sticker that I placed on it for
20 accountability purposes, I didn't put any marks on the map.
21 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now, let's talk briefly about the structure of
22 the brigades that Mr. Jokic is from, the Zvornik Brigade, and the brigade
23 that Mr. Blagojevic is from, the Bratunac Brigade. Let's start with the
24 Zvornik Brigade and let's go with Exhibit P367, a line-and-block chart.
25 Did you assist in developing this line-and-block chart?
1 A. Yes, sir, I did.
2 Q. All right. And just -- you've described in very brief terms how
3 the corps was formed in terms of the various organs and command structure.
4 Can you do the same with the brigades and relate that to the structure of
5 the corps.
6 A. Well, just the same as the VRS corps's structure is mirrored at
7 the Main Staff level, at the brigade it tends to be as close as possible
8 to that same mirror. For example, you will find in this brigade, this is
9 the Zvornik Infantry Brigade, you will have a commander, you will have a
10 chief of staff, you will have your operations and training organ, your
11 intelligence organ, and your other associated organs and branches which
12 are part of the brigade staff. You have an assistant commander or chief
13 of moral, legal, and religious affairs for the brigade. You will have an
14 assistant commander for security affairs, the security organ or the chief
15 of the security organ as he's called. And you will have your rear
16 services or logistics organ and an assistant commander for that.
17 Q. And a corps has brigades attached to it. Does a brigade have
18 fighting units attached to it?
19 A. Well, in the brigade structure, the combat power or unit
20 informations are devolved into the infantry battalions, or in some cases
21 separate armour or infantry companies.
22 Q. All right. Now, before we get into this brigade in particular, I
23 note this is called the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade. Can you compare
24 that with the -- what we have known -- Bratunac to be called the 1st Light
25 Infantry Brigade. What's the difference?
1 A. Well, structurally speaking, the difference is that a light
2 infantry brigade, being more biased towards light infantry forces, will
3 not have a lot of the staff elements that you would normally find in a
4 normal brigade. For example, in a light infantry brigade, you will not
5 have an armour officer or staff position, some of those types of things.
6 One of the most significant differences, particularly with respect to the
7 issue of Srebrenica 1995, is that in the light infantry brigade structure
8 as designed, the role of security and intelligence is combined under one
9 office; it's not broken into two offices. So in the Zvornik Brigade you
10 will have an assistant commander for security affairs and a chief of
12 By doctrine or by their regulations for a light brigade structure,
13 you will have in a light brigade, one assistant commander for security and
14 intelligence affairs.
15 Q. How about the Drina Corps? How did they break down intelligence
16 and security?
17 A. The Drina Corps structure resembles that of a regular brigade.
18 You have a designated assistant commander for security affairs or a chief
19 of security, and you will have a chief of intelligence.
20 Q. How about the Main Staff? How does the Main Staff break down in
21 intelligence and security?
22 A. In that particular instance, the Main Staff person in charge who
23 in this case is General Tolimir, he is known as the assistant commander
24 for intelligence and security. And his subordinate staff is broken into a
25 security branch or a security department and an intelligence department.
1 Q. That is similar to --
2 A. It actually is more similar to the light infantry brigade as
3 opposed to a regular infantry brigade.
4 Q. Okay. Let's look at the Zvornik Infantry Brigade structure. And
5 I just want to -- you've already gone over the basic units, so I just want
6 to focus you on the position of chief of engineering. Where does that fit
7 into the structure? I don't want to get into the definition of that job
8 right now, but how does it work in the -- how is it in the command
10 A. Within the command structure, the chief of engineering is
11 considered a member of the brigade staff, and he is subordinate to the
12 chief of staff. So he's considered part of the brigade staff under the
13 chief of staff.
14 Q. All right. And we'll get into his relationship with the
15 engineering company a little later. Can you just again quickly go to the
16 security box in the Zvornik Brigade, and like you had done with others,
17 tell us about any people in there that we may be seeing.
18 A. With respect to the security organ, one of the key players is
19 Lieutenant Drago Nikolic who is functioning as the assistant commander for
20 security affairs of the Zvornik Infantry Brigade. He is noted at the IKM
21 of the Zvornik Brigade on the evening of 13 July. And as indicated by
22 Colonel Obrenovic, at a point in time that evening, he is released from
23 the IKM and he begins to become involved in the actual processing of
24 Bosnian Muslim men who have come up from the Bratunac area and in their
25 executions. And he is involved in executions at Orahovac and other
2 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Karnavas.
3 MR. KARNAVAS: I guess at this point I would like to register an
4 objection to this gentleman testifying to what other witnesses have said
5 in this particular case. Unless he is testifying from information that he
6 had outside witness testimony, I would prefer that his answers include
7 only what he is aware of from his personal observations as opposed to now
8 testifying as if it were gospel what other witnesses have stated in this
9 particular case. Because you are the finders of the fact. You have yet
10 to make a determination whether the testimonies of Nikolic or Obrenovic or
11 any other witnesses are true, accurate, and complete, and reliable in this
13 So given the answer that he has given, I understand he wishes to
14 incorporate all this information, and also, as I understand the question
15 that was posed, it was very limited in nature and properly so. So just
16 to -- so we have a clear record as to what he actually knows. And now
17 he's being asked to describe a position as opposed to what an individual
18 did according to what another witness has testified in this particular
20 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Karnavas, I think the witness gave us a very
21 good answer. During his answer he might cite whatever the other person
22 said in this particular case. We did not give any findings at this
23 moment, and this is not the subject of the present proceedings. But later
24 on, I believe that we will come into the very details of these incidents.
25 Let us allow Mr. McCloskey to proceed while remembering that there is an
1 objection in this aspect from the Defence team.
2 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.
4 You may proceed, Mr. McCloskey.
5 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. And just in a brief
6 response, I am -- do not intend to ask Mr. Butler to carefully go through
7 the testimony of critical people and evaluate it. I do agree that that is
8 for the Court. This is merely for some background, and he, of course, may
9 mention what various people have testified to, if it's important and
10 relevant to some document or some other exhibit. But I did not intend to
11 have him -- or question him at length about what other people have said.
12 We want to get Mr. Butler home for Thanksgiving and we would be here a
13 long time if we did that. So we'll continue.
14 Q. All right. So that's for Mr. Nikolic. How about a brief -- where
15 might we see or hear from the other person in that security organ? Who is
16 that and what is his position?
17 A. That individual is an individual Captain Milorad Trbic. He is
18 considered to be a security officer. He is an individual who shows up
19 with respect to the intercepts on 16 and 17 July. He's also functioning
20 on 16th and 17th July as the duty officer of the Zvornik Infantry Brigade.
21 Q. All right. Now, let's go to the -- talk about the 1st Bratunac
22 Light Infantry Brigade structure. If we could look at P368. Again you
23 have described the -- roughly the structure of a light infantry brigade.
24 But before we -- well, let's go briefly into the structure. We see the
25 commander in July is, of course, the accused, Vidoje Blagojevic. The
1 chief of staff, deputy commander, what can you tell us about this person.
2 A. In July of 1995, that individual is Major Radomir Pantic [phoen].
3 He is the chief of staff and deputy commander. The issue with him is on
4 13 July 1995 --
5 Q. Could you just check that --
6 A. I'm sorry. I'm sorry, Novica Pajic. My apologies. It doesn't
7 show up well on the screen here. He is the chief of staff, deputy
8 commander in July of 1995. On 13 July 1995, he is assigned to lead an
9 80-person combat group in the zone of the Milici Brigade. So we don't
10 have a lot of information concerning him, other than on the afternoon of
11 13 July he is assigned to lead a combat group out of the zone.
12 Q. All right. And let me ask you about -- let's go to the security
13 and intelligence organ. I won't ask you about Mr. Nikolic. We've had a
14 lot on Mr. Nikolic. How about Captain First Class Dragisa Jovanovic.
15 Who's he? What can you tell us where he might show up in this?
16 A. He's an individual who, as I've recently learned, was appointed
17 the intelligence officer of the 1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade. So
18 notwithstanding the JNA structure, there was apparently a decision to
19 split the intelligence and security functions. In this particular
20 instance, that officer during the period in question, we have documents
21 and orders which indicate that he was accompanying Bratunac Brigade
22 soldiers who were deployed to the Trnovo battlefield.
23 Q. All right. And what about in the rear services, what can you tell
24 us about Major Trisic.
25 A. Major Trisic is the assistant commander for rear services for the
1 Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade. From the available information that I
2 have, he was present in and around the Bratunac headquarters during the
3 period. And there will be select references to him on the basis of
4 documents or some of the intercepts.
5 Q. All right. Now, before we go into some of your highlights
6 regarding the roles and responsibilities of a commander, can you describe
7 to us briefly, in July 1995 how well equipped and organised was the
8 Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade, in your opinion?
9 A. With respect to organisation, they were organised like any of the
10 other light infantry brigades within the Drina Corps. With respect to
11 equipment, personnel, manning, things of that nature, comparable to modern
12 military forces, they would not compare very favourably at all. Like all
13 of the other units in the VRS, they were undermanned, they were
14 understaffed. In the particular case of the Bratunac Light Infantry
15 Brigade, there were a very few, very limited number of officers who were
16 actually officers from the former JNA who had active service and were
17 professional officers. With the exception of the accused and his chief of
18 staff, those were the only -- they were the only two people. All of the
19 other officers were reserve officers. All of the junior officers in the
20 battalions, most of the non-commissioned officers filling those positions
21 were reservists who were mobilised in 1992 and were fighting the war as
23 With respect to manning, the Bratunac Brigade like all of the
24 other brigades always was short of troops and they suffered a problem with
25 troops deserting their positions and not returning after leave or not
1 returning after a two-week break from the lines. So with respect for that
2 particular brigade, it was a significant issue. However, the brigade with
3 respect to other VRS units in the Drina Corps, particularly light infantry
4 brigades, was no better or no worse off. So that was the standard at the
6 Q. All right. Let's now go into some of the high points or the key
7 points in the -- defining the concept of superior command, a commander's
8 responsibility. Was this a subject of your command report?
9 A. One of the key topics of my command report was identifying the
10 mechanism of command and the mechanisms by which a commander exercises
11 command over subordinates within the VRS. In this respect, the documents
12 and the regulations of the former JNA with respect to the brigade rules
13 are extremely enlightening on that. At the same time, the documents
14 pertaining to JNA command staff operations and procedures also lay out
15 those mechanisms and the interfaces that occur within the military
16 structure. And again as part of my analysis, looking to see if those
17 models applied to the JNA and the VRS and particularly to the Bratunac and
18 Zvornik Infantry Brigades, they, in fact, do.
19 Q. Have you identified some of those rules and regulations for
20 this -- for your discussion on this topic?
21 A. Yes, sir, I have.
22 Q. Okay. Well, the first one that we have is P370/A. And can you
23 tell us, Mr. Butler, just briefly what this document is and then direct us
24 to the key points relating to the command issue that you wanted to point
1 A. This document is, of course, the English translation of the
2 brigade rules for infantry, motorised, mountain, alpine, marine and light
3 infantry brigades of the former SFRY. It is dated 1984. However, in
4 conducting my analysis, it is clear that these regulations remained in
5 effect during the constituent period and were the basic operating
6 framework by which VRS brigades functioned in 1985.
7 With respect to brigade command, paragraph 115 essentially lays
8 that out. It indicates that the brigade commander has the exclusive right
9 to command all brigade units and attached units. And that he bears full
10 responsibility for the work of the brigade command and subordinate
11 commands for the state of morale, for security, and combat readiness for
12 training, and for the proper performance of tasks. That in effect it
13 encompasses a principle broadly known not only within the SFRY military
14 doctrine, but in almost all military doctrines universally as unity of
15 command, that is, the commander, he is the single individual with right of
17 Q. Can the commander delegate his responsibility to others?
18 A. As a general function of the command and staff process, a
19 commander can and does delegate responsibility for the conduct of tasks to
20 his subordinates. That delegation can be codified in regulations such as
21 the delegated responsibilities of officers on his staff by position, be it
22 an operations officer, an air defence officer, an engineer officer, a rear
23 services or security, or it could be a non-codified one which is when an
24 individual is a duty officer. But one of the things it comes back to is
25 while the commander can delegate the authority for the accomplishment of a
1 mission, that ultimately the commander retains the responsibility for the
2 accomplishment of that task or mission.
3 Q. Okay. And the last sentence in the first paragraph: "The
4 commander takes decisions, assigns tasks to units, monitors their
5 fulfillment, and demands their strict execution regardless of the
6 difficulties that arise."
7 In simple terms, can you tell us what that amounts to on the
9 A. That is essentially the function of command. Taking the
10 decisions, assigning tasks, delegating the authority to conduct those
11 tasks. One of the key things of command is monitoring their fulfillment.
12 Within the concept of JNA command, it's not enough for a commander to give
13 an order and leave it. That commander is -- and part why his staff exists
14 is to ensure that once that order is given it is carried out in full and
15 that the compliance of that order is reported back. So it's not just
16 enough to give an order and assume it's been completed. A commander is
17 required under these regulations and as part of his command to verify
18 compliance with those orders.
19 Q. Okay. The next paragraph: "Through his personal conduct, work
20 involvement in the implementation of the SKJ policies, ethical standing,
21 courage, ability, fairness, cool-headedness," and it goes on. "The
22 commander vitally influences the entire condition of the brigade,
23 especially the morale of his units and command."
24 What does that really amount to in your opinion?
25 A. The commander is, in effect, he is the linchpin by which the
1 brigade operates around. I believe perhaps the best way to put it would
2 be to quote General Dannatt who testified several years back here where he
3 indicated that command is a personal thing. The -- no other person within
4 the brigade has more influence on how the brigade functions or does not
5 function as the commander. It is his to command. And as you can see in
6 this document, the issue of command is not just a series of professional
7 schools or qualities or check blocks. Many of these issues of command are
8 personal character traits: Ethical standing, courage, ability, fairness.
9 I mean, these are all characteristics and qualities of command. And I
10 would say not only in the SFRY or former JNA or VRS, but these are
11 standard throughout most military units. These are what people look for
12 in command.
13 Q. All right. Let's go to the next document that you've chosen to
14 help us understand command, P374. First of all, this says -- well, P374
15 is the -- it should be the military lexicon definition.
16 A. Sorry. My apologies.
17 Q. First of all, can you tell us, this is a quote from the 1981 JNA
18 military lexicon. What is that?
19 A. A military lexicon is essentially the military version of a
20 dictionary which gives the definitions of many of the arcane or complex
21 terms that the military tends to use. It's generally an important
22 document within all militaries, because it is essential from a military
23 standpoint that everyone recognises and understands intrinsically what
24 basic principles are, how they're defined.
25 Q. We've heard in this court already the principle of unity of
1 command. What does it mean?
2 A. In essence, unity of command is the general military philosophy
3 that only one individual can be in command of one unit -- or of one series
4 of units. You cannot have a function where you have multiple commanders
5 in one unit. I think historically that approach has been found to not
6 work effectively on the battlefield, and I'm not aware of any armed forces
7 that conducts military operations where they have a dual or three- or
8 four-part command. It is command centralised on the individual, the
10 Q. All right. Now, let's go to the next document that you have that
11 helps us identify key command principles.
12 A. 372? Or...
13 Q. Do you have 371? Can you tell us first of all what -- this is
14 entitled "Provisional service regulations of the Army of the Serbian
15 Republic." What is that?
16 A. At the beginning of the war or beginning of the conflict in Bosnia
17 starting from roughly May onwards, the entity that later became known as
18 the Republika Srpska went by the name of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia
19 and Herzegovina. So what this document is are the service regulations for
20 that army, the Army of Serbian Republic of BH.
21 Q. All right. And directing your attention to what should be page
22 10, relations in the army, "Giving Orders". Paragraph 17. "Members of
23 the army shall carry out the orders of their superiors without demur, in
24 full, accurately, and punctually. If by any chance the order was not
25 given in good time, the person is required to take measures and act in
1 accordance with the specific situation."
2 Now, what is this?
3 A. Well, the service regulations are the regulations that are bound
4 to -- by every service member in the VRS. This particular paragraph
5 essentially categorises the fact that an army, and the VRS is an army,
6 operates on a system where orders have to be complied with, fully and
7 without demur.
8 Q. That's not unique to this army, I take it?
9 A. That is a basic function in every military that I know of, sir.
10 Q. All right. Let's go to the next exhibit you've chosen, 372/A,
11 page 15. And it -- starting at paragraph 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 --
12 A. If it's possible to scroll the ELMO down a little bit, we can...
13 Or scroll up.
14 Q. Why have you chosen these paragraphs? Can you explain in simple
15 terms their importance in command.
16 A. First if I may, this document is referred to as what we call the
17 command and staff rules. It's the work of the command and staff. And
18 what this document does is in great detail explain how command and staff
19 process works on an organised military staff. And of course that would
20 include a brigade. When a lot of the terms that come out that you will
21 see in military orders, sometimes these terms have a different meaning in
22 both a western connotation, or even in a military connotation. And what
23 does document does is in effect list out what some of these terms are and
24 what is meant by them.
25 Q. So 13.
1 A. Essentially lays out what the term "command" is. A process or
2 function of control. The content is the assignment of tasks by command
3 documents, which orders, commands, orders, directives and instructions. A
4 command act communicates a commander's decision and activates the process
5 of the task's execution. Moving to paragraph 14, the phrase
6 "coordination," in this military sense, is a function of command and
7 control, in ensuring that the various elements in the execution of the
8 task have been set.
9 Moving down to paragraph 15: Issue of cooperation is also a form
10 of coordination which harmonises the combat operations carried out by
11 units. One of the important things to note here, with the phrase of
12 cooperation is that cooperation is organised by commanding officers in the
13 staffs normally at all levels of command and control. However, if we go
14 to the next page, it notes that it's -- the terms of cooperation or
15 cooperation orders are pursuant to the decisions of the commanding
16 officer. So it's the commander who defines the terms of cooperation and
17 organisations it for the subordinates to, in effect, do that cooperation.
18 Q. Do we see this term actually used in some documents that you'll be
19 discussing later on?
20 A. We will see the term "cooperation" in a number of the documents
21 particularly relevant between the relationship between army units on the
22 ground in or near Bratunac and Zvornik, and RS MUP units that are
23 operating in that same area.
24 Q. All right. Then what about collaboration, number 16.
25 A. Well, collaboration, as it says, is a manner of regulating the
1 relations between unit commands and control organs of other non-military
2 types of units. Again, in this sense it's dedicated to the function and
3 support of combat tasks in the combat area. Collaboration achieves a
4 consensus on the manner of which armed combat is to be unified and ensures
5 the integrity or materialisation or the fulfillment of the commander's
7 In this case, the basis for collaboration is provided by the
8 superior command. The phrase collaboration does not necessarily, and I
9 think in this one it spells out fairly clearly, does not imply a command
10 relationship. A collaboration is more of a relationship that in a western
11 parlance we would see as cooperative. That's why it's important to get
12 the terminology correct in the way the JNA uses it. In many things when
13 we look at the phrase cooperation, from a western military standpoint,
14 that's not a term that implies a command relationship. However, within
15 the doctrine of the former JNA, that term does imply a command
16 relationship. And the other term that doesn't is collaboration. So
17 that's why the specificity of the terms is important in this case.
18 Q. And lastly, verification. Verification is a process function of
19 command and control. Does that fit into any of the other definitions
20 you've talked about?
21 A. Again, wrapping back to the issue of the overall function of
22 command, verification is, again, that process of a commander or a giver of
23 orders ensuring that the orders have been complied with. That is a
24 function of command and at the higher levels, brigade staff and above
25 being part of those higher levels, in many cases that verification is a
1 function of the brigade staff and why it exists to support the commander.
2 Q. Now, have you -- can you give us any sort of practical examples of
3 documents that show how command works, in particular in the Zvornik and
4 Bratunac Brigade.
5 A. As part of my analysis into whether or not these JNA rules and
6 regulations were applicable to the VRS several years down the line, one of
7 the things we did when looking through the documents and doing research is
8 to find documents, orders, or directives, which would affect these JNA
9 rules and regulations. This particular document is Prosecution Exhibit
10 376. This is a document which was from the Zvornik, at that time, Light
11 Infantry Brigade, which is the delineation of the duties and tasks of the
12 command staff and staff organs. As you can see in the opening paragraph,
13 it is directly based on the rules of the brigade and the relevant
14 paragraphs. So in this sense, it's a validation that the Zvornik Infantry
15 Brigade, or Light Infantry Brigade as it was back then, is adopting and is
16 following as part of their regulatory basis those rules.
17 Q. And do you have any indication that the Bratunac Brigade was doing
18 the same thing, following those basic rules?
19 A. This is a document which was obtained by the OTP in its search of
20 the Bratunac Brigade.
21 Q. And this is Exhibit 377/A.
22 A. And again it is a document which defines the command and staff
23 process. Now, unlike the document from the Zvornik Light Infantry
24 Brigade, this one does not have the commander's signature and it does not
25 have any indication or something which I can date it by, per se. However,
1 my analysis of this indicates that again it is a direct lift from the JNA
2 1984 brigade regulations.
3 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, that's probably a good time to
4 break. We go into another area after this.
5 JUDGE LIU: Well, we have to break now.
6 Witness, I have to remind you, as I did to other witnesses, that
7 while you are in The Hague, you are under the oath. So do not talk to
8 anybody about your testimony and do not let anybody talk to you about it.
9 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
10 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
11 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, I've spoken briefly to
12 Mr. Karnavas. I haven't had a chance to speak to Mr. Stojanovic, but we
13 of course will abide by that normal rule. However, in terms of an expert
14 that may be testifying for a while, sometimes there's logistical items
15 where we may need to talk about; when he's coming and what exhibits might
16 be next. To that degree if there's no disagreement, if all of us could
17 deal on those practical logistical ways with our experts, that would be
19 JUDGE LIU: Well, I hope somebody from the registrar could also be
20 present at your meeting with this witness if it's only concerning
21 logistical matters.
22 MR. McCLOSKEY: Well, I'll talk to the registry about that. Your
23 Honour, also just one other complication is, as you're aware, the Krstic
24 appeal hearing is scheduled in November. And Mr. Butler has -- does
25 sometimes provide assistance and help to the appellate staff or other
1 people involved. Now, that may cover the subjects of his testimony,
2 because of course it's the same subject, but it has nothing to do with his
3 testimony. But I did want people to be aware of that. If there are any
4 concerns or problems -- he's not real active in that appeal, but sometimes
5 it's helpful for the appellate attorneys to ask Mr. Butler about a
6 document or something like that.
7 JUDGE LIU: Mr. Karnavas.
8 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you. Well, I don't know what to say about
9 the appeal process. I'm unaware of why -- the reasons why an appellate
10 lawyer would need to consult with a witness, unless it's a Rule 115, as we
11 have here, as it applies in this Tribunal. But as far as the appeals
12 process is based on the record, it's based on the facts that are in the
13 record, it's based on the law. So unless the gentleman is going to be
14 providing testimony, I see no reason.
15 Having said that, knowing the individuals that are working on the
16 appeal, I have no problem, you know, assuming that there are some strict
17 guidelines, like they separate Krstic versus this particular case. And I
18 understand the difficulties. As far as the first request is concerned, as
19 I indicated to Mr. McCloskey, I'm very flexible in that manner.
20 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much for your cooperation.
21 Mr. Stojanovic, are you in a position to give a reply for that?
22 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, as for our Defence,
23 although I did not talk to Mr. McCloskey during the break because I was
24 speaking to my client, we believe -- our Defence believes that generally
25 speaking there will be no problem with this. Organisationally,
1 logistically, in order to have this expert heard, it can be done. Now, it
2 is for you to say whether it's going to be in the presence of someone from
3 the registry or not. But we certainly leave that to you.
4 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much for your cooperation.
5 Mr. McCloskey, I think your request is granted by this Bench. And
6 I hope there could be somebody very neutral in this case to be present
7 during that talk. And I believe that you will discuss it with our Court
9 So we'll resume at 9.00 tomorrow morning in the same courtroom.
10 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned
11 at 1.48 p.m., to be reconvened on Tuesday,
12 the 11th day of November, 2003,
13 at 9.00 a.m.