Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 6393

1 Thursday, 22 January 2004

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

5 JUDGE LIU: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

6 Mr. Court Deputy, would you please call the case.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is Case Number

8 IT-02-60-T, the Prosecutor versus Vidoje Blagojevic and Dragan Jokic.

9 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much.

10 Before we are going to hear the witness, there is a matter that

11 this Trial Chamber would like to mention. That is the Trial Chamber has

12 been informed of the concerns expressed by Mr. Blagojevic regarding the

13 decision of the Trial Chamber not to call Mr. Erdemovic for

14 cross-examination. In order to ensure that no misunderstanding is made on

15 what granted this decision, the Trial Chamber wishes to clarify a few

16 points.

17 First, the decision has already been rendered by this Trial

18 Chamber and it is not subject to reconsideration. Like in all other

19 decisions rendered by this Trial Chamber, it may not please both parties

20 or one or the other party. The decision was made by the Trial Chamber in

21 full independence while the arguments of both parties were heard and

22 considered before the decision was reached. This decision is the decision

23 of the Trial Chamber which does not reflect the position of the parties,

24 but the position of the Trial Chamber.

25 If, being aware of the decision process, Mr. Blagojevic still

Page 6394

1 wants to examine Mr. Erdemovic as a witness, he still has the possibility

2 to call him as a Defence witness in the future in his case. This is the

3 explanation we would like to make concerning our decisions of not calling

4 Mr. Erdemovic to be cross-examined.

5 Yes, Mr. Blagojevic.

6 THE ACCUSED BLAGOJEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, thank you

7 very much for considering so diligently these key issues. I must say that

8 your work is of great assistance to me because I am alone in all these

9 goings on. But I wish to point out one thing. At the end of the day,

10 what we see here is an effort to push the view of the Prosecutor through

11 the 92 bis statements and to shape opinions through these statements.

12 It's a very dangerous situation, because the situation is shaped through

13 92 bis statements. I would like no shadow to overcast the truth that we

14 are supposed to arrive at in considering a matter so important as

15 Srebrenica. We should try to put an end to this and prevent the

16 Prosecutor in these efforts, because matters are much more complicated

17 than that. Because this international Tribunal should bring

18 to justice those who are really responsible for what happened.

19 Furthermore, Your Honours, allow me just to avail myself this

20 opportunity to say one more thing in order not to take the floor again.

21 In principle, I'm not happy with the cross-examination conducted,

22 specifically with regard to witness Deronjic. But it seems that I am

23 impotent to do anything about it. It all seems to me as a stage managed

24 effort by the Defence that has been imposed on me, but there's nothing I

25 can do about that either. I wish only to remind you of the 17th of

Page 6395

1 December last year when the Prosecutor referred to three 92 bis witness,

2 namely Erdemovic, Deronjic, and I believe Mrs. Rasim Begovic. If I

3 understood correctly from subsequent information, because I was not

4 informed at the time and I am learning as we speak the English language

5 out of necessity, the Prosecutor spoke of the high degree of understanding

6 between him and Mr. Karnavas. That's what I noted. This high degree of

7 understanding seems to be to my detriment, I must say.

8 Let's take, for instance, what my imposed Defence counsel said on

9 the 19th of January when he said that they reached an agreement over

10 Erdemovic. What that says to me is the following, and I deeply believe

11 this: That the aforementioned person from my Defence team has joined the

12 Prosecutor's team and is working against me. This is indefensible.

13 I only wish to corroborate this with one substantive fact, and

14 that is something that is in the transcript of the Milosevic trial of the

15 26th November, last year. It was not only Mr. Deronjic who was supposed

16 to be heard here, but also Mr. Erdemovic, not for purposes of my defence,

17 not because I wanted to accept or introduce the 92 bis statement of

18 Erdemovic here. The Prosecutor wanted that. It was stage managed and its

19 contents is not the truth, especially not the truth that goes in my

20 favour. The same is true of the third witness. God only knows what will

21 transpire in the future with regard to these witnesses. As I understand

22 Your Honours, you ordered in the month of December that my illegal Defence

23 submit a report on the status of my Defence case. We are now in the month

24 of January and we still haven't got that report. I would like to know

25 where I stand.

Page 6396

1 In addition, two or three days ago a witness V80 was mentioned as

2 another 92 bis witness. I have no idea who this witness is and what is

3 being done with relation to him. I am supposed to rot in prison here for

4 something that I am maybe not even guilty of. The indictment is being

5 strengthened by the fact that my Defence is working against me. Please, I

6 am begging for your understanding. I am only asking for what is

7 fundamental and elementary to my rights. If we go on this way, this is

8 the twilight of justice, not only the twilight of Blagojevic.

9 JUDGE LIU: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Blagojevic, for your

10 statement. I think there are still some misunderstandings between us. As

11 for the 92 bis witnesses, in the Rules and in the practice of this

12 Tribunal, there are very strict Rules concerning of the admission of the

13 evidence through 92 bis. And at the same time the Defence team will have

14 the same right to introduce any evidence through 92 bis in their case in

15 the future. There's no problem about that.

16 Secondly, Mr. Blagojevic, I think you made a very serious

17 allegation against your counsel. So far as I know you have to present

18 some concrete evidence to verify your allegations. During the process of

19 the proceedings in this Tribunal, the parties are encouraged by this Bench

20 to meet each other to exchange views on such matters. If there's

21 agreement between the parties mostly on the procedural matters, that will

22 grateful facilitate the proceedings of this trial. As the a guarantor of

23 the rights of the accused, this Trial Chamber will watch very carefully

24 and review any result of the agreement the party has already reached. Up

25 to now, we don't see any irregularities in this practice in this case.

Page 6397

1 I think you misunderstand the meanings of our decisions in last

2 December. We do not request Defence counsel to present his case to us.

3 This is entirely his business. We just want the Defence counsel to file

4 us a report on his relationship with you, Mr. Blagojevic, to see if

5 there's any improvement between your relationship. We have no right to

6 interfere into the communications between you and your counsel,

7 Mr. Karnavas.

8 As for the specific issue concerning of Mr. Deronjic's

9 cross-examination, in our decisions rendered on the 15th January, 2004, we

10 admitted the transcript as well as the previous statement by Mr. Deronjic

11 into the evidence under 92 bis. And we only gave the limited direct

12 examination to the Prosecution, that is certain matters regarding his

13 reference to Mr. Blagojevic, while at the same time we gave the full right

14 to the Defence counsel to cross-examine Mr. Deronjic in relation to all

15 the evidence admitted. Of course we do not expect that cross-examination

16 will take so long, but I could say many, many aspects, if I may say it

17 more clearly, many, many more important aspects in the transcript or in

18 his previous statement has been touched upon by Mr. Karnavas during the

19 last two days.

20 I hope that Mr. Karnavas could finish his cross-examination today

21 because there are many witnesses waiting to testify, and some of them have

22 been here in The Hague for a week. As I said before that the counsels and

23 the Registrar is willing to help you to help yourself. She or he could

24 explain to you the legal aspects of all the matters I mentioned today in

25 very detail. If you have any questions, please feel free to ask him or

Page 6398

1 her and try to get direct contact with your counsel, Mr. Karnavas, as soon

2 as possible, because I understand that the Prosecution's case is

3 approaching an end and the Defence case will start very soon.

4 Well, having said that, could we have the witness, please.

5 [The witness entered court]

6 JUDGE LIU: Good morning, Witness. You may sit down, please.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honour.

8 JUDGE LIU: Are you ready to start?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, of course.

10 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much.

11 Mr. Karnavas.

12 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President, Your Honours.


14 [Witness answered through interpreter]

15 Cross-examined by Mr. Karnavas [Continued]

16 Q. Good morning, Mr. Deronjic.

17 A. Good morning, Mr. Karnavas.

18 Q. During the Milosevic trial where you testified on 26th November,

19 2003, and I quote from page 29.702, you stated to Mr. Milosevic: "If you

20 think that these killings were also part of my responsibility, I reacted

21 to them as a human being. I had nothing to do -- it had nothing to do

22 with my duties, with my official responsibilities."

23 When you made that statement under oath a few months ago, was that

24 a truthful statement as far as you understand it to be? I was quoting

25 from lines --

Page 6399

1 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm sorry, from lines 24, counsel, on page 29.702,

2 going on to the next page.


4 MR. McCLOSKEY: Just for background. Are we referring to

5 Srebrenica and not Glogova?

6 MR. KARNAVAS: Srebrenica.

7 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.


9 Q. Do you recall making that statement, sir?

10 A. I recall that statement, but I cannot remember the entire

11 contexts, although you did remind me a little by this quotation. I

12 suppose the discussion was about Srebrenica. In response to which

13 question was that answer made? You mentioned me reacting as a human

14 being. I suppose it had something to do with the arrival of Mr. Beara.

15 Q. Well, yes, it did, and I think overall your responsibility. You

16 go on to say: "I want to remind you that the complete staff of the Army

17 of the Republika Srpska was present there, everyone from the Main Staff to

18 brigade staff, all the relevant steps in the hierarchy were represented,

19 including the police force. And with all that in mind, do you really

20 think it was my job to secure those prisoners?"

21 Do you recall making that statement, sir?

22 A. Yes, yes, now I remember all of it. And of course I stand by my

23 assertion that it was not my duty to provide security for those people. I

24 was not given any such order, nor did I have anything to do with the

25 prisoners and the security provided to them, meaning physical security.

Page 6400

1 Q. Those prisoners, however, as we already discussed, were from the

2 civilian population from Potocari or originating from Srebrenica, were

3 they not?

4 A. Yes, from Srebrenica, generally speaking. But you seem to omit

5 the fact, or maybe you're not aware of it, that a great number of those

6 prisoners were not brought from Potocari; a great number of them were

7 taken prisoner in war operations in Konjevic Polje in combat. They were

8 brought by the army, it was logical for the army to take care of their

9 prisoners and to provide security. If you're talking about those who were

10 singled out, a group of civilians who were brought from other places and

11 placed in Potocari, I told you what the order of the president was, and I

12 conveyed that order. I did continue to display interest in them and found

13 out where they were detained. I found out that this group that was

14 singled out was held in municipal city prisons and in the command of the

15 brigade, in its prison quarters. I thought that this was sufficient, to

16 say that they were adequately protected.

17 Q. Leaving aside the prisoners of war, that is those who had been

18 captured by the VRS forces or the special police as they were trying to

19 make their way through the woods on to the safe territory, aside from

20 those, are you suggesting that those boys and men from ages 16 or 15 all

21 the way to 60 were not part of your official responsibilities, keeping in

22 mind that you had a decision appointing you commissioner of Srebrenica?

23 A. Mr. Karnavas, I think that what you are saying, at least I wish to

24 believe that you are saying it sincerely and without pathos. I had no

25 information that a single boy from that group of civilians was singled

Page 6401

1 out. I'm not saying that this never happened. On the contrary, I later

2 heard that among the great group of people who were later killed, there

3 were even boys and old men. However, I had no such information then. I

4 told you that the information I had on the 12th was that some people were

5 being singled out, and I said as much to the Prosecution, that people were

6 being singled out, that a part of those prisoners who were separated from

7 the others were in the military station in town and in the military

8 prisons. I mentioned even the names of some of those people, but nobody

9 told me that there were boys among them. You are saying that to me for

10 the first time. I'm not saying that this didn't happen; I'm saying that I

11 didn't know.

12 Is it a fact that even those prisoners in the presence of

13 General Mladic, the supreme commander of the Main Staff of the VRS, were

14 singled out, separated from the others. The military police took part in

15 that and logical to expect of them to take care of such prisoners, not me.

16 Q. Mr. Deronjic, you were given a mandate to protect those people in

17 Potocari. Correct? Do you agree with me on that?

18 A. Will you please read where it is stated.

19 Q. Okay. I'm reading from the decision that was given to you. It's

20 marked for identification purposes as P687. And it states that: "The

21 commissioner shall ensure that all civilian and military organs treat all

22 citizens who participated in combat against the Army of Republika Srpska

23 as prisoners of war and to assure that the civilian population can freely

24 choose where they will live or move to."

25 And then if you go to paragraph 5 it says: "Decisions by the

Page 6402

1 civilian commissioner shall," not may, but shall, "be binding for all

2 civilian authority organs," that would include MUP, that would include the

3 civilian police, in particular Mr. Borovcanin who you were instrumental in

4 bringing over there. So given this mandate, sir, is it not a fact that

5 one of your responsibilities was the well being of those who were being

6 separated. Correct?

7 A. Correct. I just told you to what people it referred and what I

8 undertook. Do you have information that anybody in Bratunac was separated

9 from general groups of prisoners taken out of prisons, executed, killed?

10 They are all I know about. I don't know what happened to the others. You

11 are insinuating very serious things and you are trying to misrepresent

12 things to the Court. And you are even saying at some point that I was

13 issuing orders to the brigade. If you are trying to make that out to be

14 my responsibility, then we have to go back to the issue of my powers. Do

15 you mean my de jure authorisations and powers to command? You are really

16 not allowing me to explain.

17 Q. Mr. Deronjic, you've had these explanations and we've heard them

18 before. I'm trying to get a concrete answer from you. You had a

19 responsibility to protect those civilians, including the men that were

20 separated.

21 A. No, that is not correct.

22 Q. Okay. That is your understanding of your mandate under this

23 decision?

24 A. First of all, have you established and proved that I had this

25 decision at the time when we discussed that matter and when those things

Page 6403

1 were going on? Have you reached that conclusion or are you insinuating

2 that as well? I did not have such proof, and if you are claiming that I

3 did, then you should state that and then we will discuss it.

4 Secondly, that decision does not state what you are saying,

5 neither can it be interpreted in that way. There is a sentence stating

6 about the treatment of the prisoners of war. I asked the president from

7 the command about the treatment of the prisoners of war. What do you

8 imply under treatment? Yes, I apologise. I asked him: What do you imply

9 by this treatment, Mr. President, because I don't have that paper with me.

10 I told him ironically, Do you think I can command Mladic and ensure the

11 proper treatment and the protection of those people, the prisoners of war.

12 He said, Of course, Miroslav, I don't think you have that power. He

13 laughed. He said, I know what your relations are with Mr. Mladic. He

14 said I will convey orders to him about that. This is of course a clear

15 thing. He is the supreme commander of the Army of Republika Srpska.

16 Please wait, I have to finish. You are not allowing me -- well, first I

17 have to say that it is very impolite --

18 Q. We will continue on Monday --

19 A. No, no, please. What are you talking about? Monday, I have to

20 finish my sentence. So the president --

21 Q. [Previous translation continues]... We will continue.

22 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Karnavas, I think the witness has given us a

23 very important piece of information.

24 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, he has given us this information over

25 and over again. He's trying to minimise his responsibility. I'm asking

Page 6404

1 him a concrete question. He answered it. He said that he did not have

2 the powers. I accept that if that's what his answer is. Now I'm ready to

3 move on. We've heard his explanations.

4 JUDGE LIU: Mr. Deronjic, do you have anything to add?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, of course. I wanted to say

6 that this conversation with President Karadzic clarified for me my role

7 regarding the treatment of the prisoners of war. He conveyed that to me

8 and he said, and this is what I said in my statement, that I have to

9 convey at an official meeting how the Serbian side -- we on the Serbian

10 side should treat eventual prisoners of war which would be found amongst

11 the civilians possibly. This is what the president meant when he was

12 explaining my role to me in regard to this issue of the treatment, and I

13 stated this at the Fontana publicly, even though Mladic did not want to

14 state this openly, but I was convincing him to state it openly. I told

15 him that the president told me that we do have the -- we are obliged under

16 the conventions of war to act in that way.


18 Q. During that conversation, assuming that it took place over the

19 phone, as you claim it to be, at no time did President Karadzic remind you

20 or insinuate in any way about your alleged conversation that you had with

21 him with respect to the Western Slavonia principle?

22 A. What telephone conversation? The Western Slavonia principle --

23 Q. You indicated that you managed to get all of this information from

24 the telephone on the 11th. In the past, you have given conflicting

25 interviews, one stating that you actually went to Pale on the 11th and had

Page 6405

1 a personal meeting with President Karadzic. Here you seem to be denying

2 that, saying that you didn't go on the 11th but rather you got all of your

3 instructions on the telephone. Is that correct?

4 A. Correct, Mr. Karnavas. You are making assertions and asking

5 questions.

6 Q. This is what you -- this is your assertion today and yesterday and

7 the day before, that you never went to Pale on the 11th, which would give

8 you, obviously, the reason to come here today and say, I didn't have this

9 decision physically in my hand. Correct?

10 A. Mr. Karnavas, you know that I had the interview on the 25th of

11 November, 1993. That's what it states here. That's when I decided to say

12 everything correctly when I gave the exact chronology and stated the exact

13 facts. You are constantly dealing with the things that I said from the

14 beginning were not true. For four days you are trying to establish that

15 it is not true, what I had already said was not true. Please stick to

16 this. All of this is absolutely correct, so that is what is correct. And

17 I myself said that the previous things were not correct.

18 Q. All right. So when you were giving false information to the

19 Prosecutor, pushing it on to them as truthful, you wanted to be believed

20 by them so you wouldn't be indicted. Now that you're indicted, somehow

21 what you're saying all of a sudden must be the truth once again. Correct?

22 So I guess the question is: The truth depends on what's good for

23 Deronjic, if he's going to gain, if it's good for him, as in this case

24 trying to get a nice comfortable deal from the Prosecution, then what

25 you're saying must be the truth. So it all depends how you look at it.

Page 6406

1 Isn't that a fact, Mr. Deronjic?

2 A. Mr. Karnavas, just see how many allegations you've made in one

3 question. If you're looking for a yes or no answer, I cannot give you

4 such an answer. Allow me to deal with each one of your assertions, which

5 are quite substantial, so I can give an explanation. I can see what this

6 is all about. You are guessing about my motives even, why I told the

7 truth now. And you determined that my motive is my benefit -- is self

8 interest. But you could ask me if something is true or not. Instead of

9 that, you are just making guesses and not asking me. Some things you are

10 not even talking about.

11 When I made my decision to admit my guilt, at the same time I made

12 another decision. There are lawyers, they have their names, you can call

13 them here to testify, and I suggest you call all three of them to testify.

14 It's a shame that you didn't ask them to do so the day before when my

15 lawyer was still here. I made the decision to testify. I have reasons,

16 very important reasons, why I would want to do that. But I do not have to

17 tell you about those reasons. But if the Trial Chamber asks me, I ask

18 respond to that. My decision does not depend in the least on the offer

19 from the Prosecution to make a deal. Let's leave Glogova aside. There

20 was a statement about all the events that I participated in from the

21 beginning of the war right until the end when I withdrew from politics. I

22 will skip over Glogova only because I don't believe that we would agree on

23 that question. I said, Tell the Prosecution I will testify about all of

24 this regardless of --

25 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Deronjic, I think the Defence counsel asked

Page 6407

1 you a simple question, why previously you gave the incorrect statement

2 until the last time. Just tell us.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that my earlier statements

4 were incorrect because there are several reasons, one of them I did

5 mention, that was fear for my own safety or maybe my wrong thinking about

6 wrong political implications if this truth were to come out, and

7 ultimately I wanted to use my right which is well-known, that I am not

8 obliged to tell the truth if it can harm me in any way at that point. So

9 I did not give an entirely truthful statement for those reasons. But I do

10 not agree that those statements are completely untrue. They are partially

11 untrue, but Mr. Karnavas is making insinuations about that. And I cannot

12 enter into a dispute about that with him.


14 Q. Mr. Deronjic, when you had this conversation with

15 President Karadzic on the 11th of July from the command post of the

16 Bratunac Brigade, that would have been two or three perhaps even four days

17 after you had this conversation with President Karadzic in Pale where the

18 Western Slavonia principle had been raised. Correct?

19 A. I didn't hear -- I'm sorry, I didn't understand.

20 Q. I'll break it down. According to your testimony, once you decided

21 to make an agreement, you claim that when you met with President Karadzic

22 on the 8th or 9th or 10th, we're unclear of the date, that -- and you

23 asked him what the intentions were for Srebrenica and you asked that

24 Borovcanin be brought into the picture because you knew him and you

25 wanted, I believe the word was, serious forces. At that point you claim

Page 6408

1 that President Karadzic raised the issue of the Western Slavonia principle

2 with respect to what should be done to the folks from Srebrenica in the

3 eventuality Srebrenica were to fall. Do you --

4 A. That's the question? Correct. Of course.

5 Q. Now, and yesterday we established that we have no concrete

6 evidence, physical evidence, either in written form or maybe an eyewitness

7 who overheard the conversation and gave a statement, we have nothing other

8 than, we have nothing other than, your testimony that this is what

9 President Karadzic told you on that particular day. I'm talking about the

10 conversation, not whether you were seen meeting with President Karadzic.

11 I'm saying whether they heard it. Correct?

12 A. I don't know whether they were able to hear. They were close, but

13 perhaps they were able to hear. But I don't think so. I cannot say one

14 or the other. When you say I don't have any proof about this

15 conversation, yes, I can agree with you there, there is no proof.

16 Q. Okay. Now, on the 11th you get notice to go to the Bratunac

17 Brigade headquarters to telephone President Karadzic because you have

18 learned that you have this new appointment. Correct?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And you indicate and your testimony, your firm testimony here in

21 court, is that all of your instructions were received over the phone and

22 perhaps later on, a few days later, this is your testimony now, you

23 received -- you physically received the copy of the decision. Correct?

24 A. More or less that's correct. I would not say all the

25 explanations, because we cannot predict any situation -- every situation

Page 6409

1 that would happen, but in essence, yes, that was it.

2 Q. And it was during this conversation where you had expressed with

3 some degree of assertiveness to President Karadzic that you would have a

4 difficult time carrying out part of your task, at least as it related to

5 General Mladic, because there had been, you know, some history between the

6 two of you, and in fact Mladic didn't get along with Karadzic either.

7 Correct?

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. And I suppose that that conversation, because it was taking place

10 in a secure environment, which is why you went to the Bratunac Brigade,

11 took some time, a few moments?

12 A. Of course. Correct.

13 Q. All right. And during this conversation, at no time -- at least

14 we don't see it in any of your statements, either before or after you

15 decided to cooperate, we don't see anything wherein those statements

16 either you or Mr. Karadzic discussed or reminded each other about your

17 previous conversation with respect to the principle of Western Slavonia.

18 Correct?

19 A. Are you saying nobody was able to hear that? Is that what you

20 mean?

21 Q. No. I'm saying that from what I see here -- what I hear here, you

22 have never stated that during that conversation President Karadzic

23 reminded me of our conversation or hinted about, well, what are you going

24 to do? Remember what we talked about, you know, somewhat in code. But

25 there was nothing in that conversation that gave you any indication that

Page 6410

1 President Karadzic was discussing the principle of Western Slavonia, such

2 as you knew it to be?

3 A. Yes, nothing was mentioned in that conversation.

4 Q. Okay. And I take it -- because if we are to believe, okay, and

5 I'm a skeptic, I must admit. I can't help that. But if we are to believe

6 that this conversation did, in fact, take place on the 9th or the 8th,

7 whatever, in Pale with respect to Western Slavonia, you indicate that it

8 is President Karadzic who is asking you, in the plural, what you intend to

9 do. Correct?

10 A. Yes, correct.

11 Q. And it's during this conversation, if we are to believe what you

12 said, that is during this conversation you tell President Karadzic that

13 you are not in a position to speculate, because --

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. -- After all there had been many occasions where there were

16 attacks on Srebrenica and they never came to fruition. Correct?

17 A. Correct.

18 Q. And of course you've testified, and if we are to believe your

19 testimony, this in fact was the first time that you had learned that there

20 was even a possibility or one of the options was the actual taking over of

21 Srebrenica. Correct?

22 A. Correct.

23 Q. Now, on the 11th when you called him, I take it from reading what

24 I have here, and there's lots of material, perhaps too much, there is no

25 indication that you, Deronjic, president of the SDS of Bratunac who now

Page 6411

1 was in the position to answer that question to President Karadzic with

2 respect to what should happen to the people and whether the principle of

3 Western Slavonia should be instituted, you never raised that with the

4 president either, did you? At least we don't have it here.

5 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters didn't understand whether that

6 was a yes or no.


8 Q. Was that a yes or a no for the interpreters, it wasn't clear. I

9 took it as a no.

10 A. No.

11 Q. All right. And in fact, if I understand your testimony, even

12 today it seems to me that you were left with the impression that those

13 that were to be separated were to be classified as or identified and

14 classified as individuals who had committed war crimes. Correct?

15 A. Correct.

16 Q. In other words, your understanding was that there was not to be an

17 indiscriminate separation of everyone of military age, which would be from

18 15 or 16 to 60, but rather there would be some sort of a selection

19 process, where if people were known to have committed crimes, war crimes,

20 they would be put aside, and of course they would be titled prisoners of

21 war and treated accordingly. Correct?

22 A. According to that method, absolutely I agree. Yes, that's what

23 was the idea.

24 JUDGE LIU: Yes.

25 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection to a statement. It's a misstatement of

Page 6412

1 the fact. There's nothing in the record to indicate that 15 years old is

2 an age that is of military age in Bosnia.

3 JUDGE LIU: Well, but 16 years is also mentioned. So should we

4 stick to 16 to 60.

5 MR. KARNAVAS: 16 to 60 is the military age, although the

6 Prosecution, I believe, in the past has indicated that there had been some

7 15 year-olds that -- and I didn't want to draw any objection that I was

8 mischaracterising, but I take the position and we can move on.



11 Q. At some point on the 12th you had learned from Mr. Vasic, who you

12 knew and got along with, that there was some separation going, and you

13 asked him to instruct or pass along your wishes, since you were in no

14 position to order, but your wishes to General Mladic that that was to

15 stop, the separation. Correct?

16 A. Correct.

17 Q. Now, on that same day, on that same day, the 12th of July, you

18 were also holding a meeting, sort of a rally, were you not, in the town of

19 Bratunac for the people of Bratunac, or certain people of -- certain

20 citizens who perhaps would be going back to Srebrenica, because they were

21 there in Bratunac as refugees. Correct?

22 A. Correct.

23 Q. And in fact, you spent a great deal of energy and time preparing

24 for that?

25 A. As much energy and time as I had to spend.

Page 6413

1 Q. And if I understand the situation as it was occurring, you were

2 the only one that actually addressed the crowd as the new commissioner of

3 Srebrenica, having been vested this power from the President. Correct?

4 A. Yes. Correct.

5 Q. And in fact, preparations begun, you know, for the eventuality of

6 the moving of these people back to Srebrenica, and perhaps the first task

7 was the setting up of a police station there. Correct?

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. And if I understand the situation as it was occurring back then,

10 you were in close consultation with your closest associates?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. All right. And in fact, you have said as much about who these

13 close -- your closest associates were. And I believe - I want to make

14 sure I get them right - Mr. Simic, who was president of the municipality;

15 Mr. Davidovic; Mr. Vasic; Mr. Borovcanin; and others. Correct?

16 A. Correct.

17 Q. And so I take it, from what you have given -- this is from one of

18 your statements, you viewed Mr. Vasic and Mr. Borovcanin as close

19 associates or your closest associates, one of your closest associates? At

20 least that's what you say here. Correct?

21 A. That is not correct. I did not say the closest associates. It's

22 true to say that I knew them. Mr. Borovcanin was for a while in Bratunac

23 as the commander of the police. And Vasic I know from Zvornik. Where

24 does it say that they were my closest associates, Vasic and Borovcanin?

25 Q. All right. Since you ask, let me help you out this here. And

Page 6414

1 this is from your testimony or your -- the statement that you gave on June

2 18th, 2003. It's --

3 A. When you said -- you said I'm constantly thinking of the text that

4 I have in front of me -- well, go ahead and read what you have.

5 Q. Let me read what it says. I have the English version; it's on

6 page 34. And I'm reading from lines 31 onwards. "Yesterday we finished

7 the interview at the" -- this is you speaking. "Yesterday we finished the

8 interview at the point when I described the end of the meeting, which was

9 in fact a public discussion, a public forum held in the cinema building,

10 following which I went to the SDS premises. In addition to myself, others

11 came with me to the SDS premises. Those were my closest associates.

12 Mr. Simic, who was the president of the municipality; Mr. Davidovic;

13 Vasic; Borovcanin; and other people that I mentioned yesterday."

14 A. Yes. When you're talking about semantics, but this is also a part

15 of that. But this is as long ago as 1998. But you can also interpret it

16 in that or in this way. Let me tell you who my closest associates were.

17 Vasic, Simic -- Simic, Davidovic, and Vasic, and Borovcanin. I could have

18 added others, too, but that does not have to mean that all of the persons

19 named were my closest associates, if you want to analyse it like that.

20 But let's not go into semantics again. I agree, I knew these people, I

21 knew Borovcanin. I even considered him to be a friend.

22 Q. Well, you had lobbied President Karadzic to bring him, who was a

23 MUP, to bring him up there for the campaign of Srebrenica. Correct?

24 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

25 MR. McCLOSKEY: Your Honour, the -- this has been gone over

Page 6415

1 constantly, the relationship he's had, we've talked about boyhood friends.

2 I think he said that he recommended Borovcanin to go five, six times.

3 This is a lot of repetition. In fact most of this morning has been

4 repetition. I haven't objected. But I don't see why there's any need to

5 constantly repeat things. If -- it's inflaming the situation, too,

6 because as you see it breaks down into arguments. These old arguments of

7 yesterday and the day before are brought up again and they're more

8 difficult when you have them a second and third time.

9 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Karnavas, we don't think the matter of the

10 closest associates is that important.

11 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, Your Honour, there is a point. I can

12 understand the Prosecutor wishing to hide the truth, because Borovcanin

13 was charged. They allowed him to escape, basically, escape from being

14 here. He should be here. He was indicted. And I am trying to show a

15 linkage, because my next question, had Mr. McCloskey allowed me to ask it,

16 would have been: Isn't it a fact that you have stated to the Prosecution

17 in those days Mr. Borovcanin and Mr. Vasic were coming to you asking you

18 to act as an intermediary between Mladic and them.

19 JUDGE LIU: Yes.

20 MR. McCLOSKEY: Your Honour, I would request this Court at this

21 time to ask Mr. Karnavas to try to restrain himself from these incredible

22 accusations. I'm used to them by now, frankly but -- and I know he

23 doesn't really mean them --

24 MR. KARNAVAS: There's in my pleadings, Your Honour --

25 MR. McCLOSKEY: -- he's doing the same thing to the witness

Page 6416

1 repeatedly. It just inflames the situation. It doesn't help.

2 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Karnavas, I think the question you put to

3 this witness is a relevant one. You may ask this question.

4 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Your Honour.

5 JUDGE LIU: There is no necessity to bring the Prosecution into

6 the picture in this context. Any conclusions should be drawn by the

7 Bench.

8 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, when the Prosecution accuses

9 me of trying to inflame the situation, I need to remind them why I'm --

10 why, perhaps, they may be feeling some heat.

11 JUDGE LIU: Just stick to your question.

12 MR. KARNAVAS: I will.

13 Q. Isn't it a fact that during those days Mr. Vasic and

14 Mr. Borovcanin were coming to you and asking you to act as an intermediary

15 between them and General Mladic?

16 A. I will answer that question, but if I can only ask the

17 Trial Chamber for a clarification because my lawyer isn't here now. Does

18 Mr. Karnavas have the right really to say, the witness is feeling some

19 heat? I know exactly what he means, but I don't see why he needs to

20 speculate whether I'm feeling heat or not. And I too am getting used to

21 it, but I really cannot take it all lying down.

22 JUDGE LIU: Well, Witness, I believe that the -- Mr. Karnavas, the

23 Defence counsel, has a right to ask the questions which are relevant to

24 our case. But I agree with you, there's no necessity for Mr. Karnavas to

25 add more words other than necessary. We have been used to it. I hope you

Page 6417

1 don't mind about that. If that happens, I'll warn Mr. Karnavas once

2 again.

3 MR. KARNAVAS: For the record, Your Honour, there was a

4 misinterpretation.

5 JUDGE LIU: I understand. I understand that.


7 Q. The heat was for the Prosecutor, not for you, sir. A wrong

8 interpretation. All right, never mind.

9 A. I accept that. And in that case, I apologise to you. I will

10 answer your question now.

11 Q. Please answer the question so we can get going.

12 A. To what part of my statement are you referring to? Is it in the

13 last interview? In which paragraph so I can look it up and refresh my

14 memory?

15 Q. Well, while I'm looking it up, let me ask you this question:

16 Mr. Borovcanin had advised you at some point, had he not, that he had

17 heard that General Mladic was scheduled to leave for Zepa or the forces

18 were scheduled to leave for Zepa on the 14th. Correct?

19 A. I don't think the interpreter got it right. What I heard was

20 something about Mladic leaving Zepa. I know what you mean.

21 Ljubisa Borovcanin and I were discussing the decision, and the idea was

22 for Mladic to move from Bratunac to Zepa or against Zepa. That was the

23 decision of the 12th of July discussed by Mr. Borovcanin and myself.

24 Q. All right. And that decision concerned you, did it not, that

25 Mladic would be going off towards Zepa?

Page 6418

1 A. Not in the least.

2 Q. All right. I'm being told that perhaps there's a problem with the

3 translation. Let me go back. You gave a statement to the Prosecution on

4 the -- I believe this would have been the 19th of June, 2003. And I'm

5 quoting from page 41, I'll go slowly, and let's see if this is correct.

6 And I'll be reading from line 25.

7 "Ljubo Borovcanin told me about Mladic having issued an order.

8 I'm not exactly sure when, but military should move towards Zepa on 14th.

9 That information was very significant for me and also very upsetting, if I

10 may use that word. I thought that the" -- and it's a little unclear

11 there. "I thought that the -- was no where near to be completed that the

12 majority of the Muslim forces were not defeated and that Muslims were very

13 close to the Bratunac area and that anything was possible. And another

14 aspect of that that particularly upset me was the following one: What

15 upset me was that we already knew that there were many Muslims imprisoned

16 there in Bratunac. I told you that they were imprisoned in the school,

17 the hangar, the stadium, and what occurred to me is that -- or rather,

18 what it seemed to me at the time was that Mladic just wanted to distance

19 himself from the whole problem and just leave with the military basically,

20 cover himself -- the paperwork and let the civilian authorities, possibly

21 police, be responsible for the faith" -- it should be fate -- "of the

22 Muslim prisoners. I am not saying that I knew this for a fact. I'm just

23 saying that it occurred to me. I had this impression. Perhaps that was

24 not justified, but this is something that made me quite concerned. And

25 then I talked to Ljubisa Borovcanin regarding that, and he agreed with me

Page 6419

1 to a great extent. He was also concerned that he and his police would be

2 involved."

3 Now, do you recall making this statement?

4 A. Yes, yes, Mr. Karnavas. And let us note one thing. You keep

5 saying that my earlier statements are absolutely untrue, and now you have

6 stated word for word something from my earlier statement, and let us note

7 that this for once is absolutely true.

8 In response to a previous question of yours when you asked me

9 whether that decision had anything to do with me, I replied no, because I

10 meant I was not going to move to Zepa myself or anything like that. But

11 if you mean whether it concerned me indirectly and whether I had any

12 thoughts about it like what it could possibly mean, then the answer is

13 yes. And I described here what exactly that decision meant to me.

14 Q. All right. Perhaps, as I said, there was a miscommunication with

15 the translation. The fact that Mladic was leaving with the military while

16 the prisoners were still in Bratunac, that was your concern. Correct?

17 A. Correct.

18 Q. Because the civilian authorities, MUP, your close -- one of your

19 closest associates, Borovcanin and Vasic, would then have to also be

20 responsible for the fate of those prisoners, what would happen to them.

21 Correct?

22 A. Well, they could become responsible. I'm not saying that they

23 were not responsible as it is, but I had the impression that Mladic wants

24 to leave the responsibility for the prisoners to civilian authorities and

25 the police, which I thought inappropriate. And if that had indeed

Page 6420

1 happened, maybe their fate would have been different.

2 Q. Yes, perhaps it would have been, but that was your concern, that

3 the military was leaving, the prisoners were there in schools, in

4 warehouses, and you were going to have to deal with that situation. You

5 and the civilian structure, including the local police and the special

6 police, all members of the Ministry of Interior. Correct?

7 A. Yes, yes.

8 Q. Okay. And while this is going on, you're at the same time holding

9 these meetings with respect to what should occur to the people, the

10 refugees, from Srebrenica that are -- the Serb refugees, that is, trying

11 to get them back from Bratunac to Srebrenica. Correct?

12 A. Yes. I did hold that meeting, but I don't know what you mean by

13 saying while that is going on. What is going on on the 12th?

14 Q. Well, okay. Let me clue you in. You have Potocari, which is only

15 5 kilometres away from Bratunac. Correct?

16 A. Correct --

17 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection, Your Honour.

18 JUDGE LIU: Yes.

19 MR. McCLOSKEY: I think we all know what's going on. I think the

20 question is what Mr. Karnavas meant by that, and it appears Mr. Karnavas

21 is now going to give us a rendition of what is going on.

22 MR. KARNAVAS: What I'm trying to show, Your Honour --

23 JUDGE LIU: Well, yes, I think Mr. Karnavas is trying to explain

24 to the witness.


Page 6421

1 Q. We have two scenarios being played out here. One is what's

2 happening in Potocari; another one what is happening in Bratunac.

3 Correct?

4 A. The way you see it, maybe. Maybe you think these are two separate

5 stories. That's not the way I see it. In any case, Mladic went to his

6 office -- Mladic went to Potocari, and I went to my office.

7 Q. All right. Let me go further. You were responsible, both to the

8 people that were in Potocari and to the Serb refugees that were in

9 Bratunac, were you not?

10 A. You have just tried to -- started to explain what was going on,

11 and now you stopped. I cannot jump from subject to subject. Let us have

12 a single context of discussion. I told you what the responsibilities were

13 towards ones and the others. And then you give a lump sum qualification

14 for everything in one sentence.

15 Q. While the people were being separated in Potocari, you were trying

16 to cater to the Serb refugees in Bratunac, correct, by holding these

17 rallies. And there was not just one meeting, but there were two.

18 A. Mr. Karnavas, you are trying to say that I didn't do anything, and

19 that's obvious in the way you are phrasing your questions. And you are

20 leading me to give you a specific answer. What I said is that ignoring

21 the scale at which people were being separated -- I didn't know, because

22 Mladic was in Potocari with the entire elite of the VRS. I didn't have

23 any reason to expect any wrong doing. And I had no information on what

24 scale people were being separated in Potocari. At that time, I was

25 holding a meeting conveying conclusions and discussion points from

Page 6422

1 different meetings. I had no feeling, no premonition, that a tragedy was

2 about to occur. Who says that on the 12th there were elements that could

3 indicate to me that a tragedy was going to occur? I had a feeling that

4 something bad was beginning to happen. At some point I got a report

5 saying that that had stopped. I was happy with that. I thought that

6 Mladic had seized those activities and didn't look into it any further.

7 On the 13th when prisoners were brought to Bratunac in droves, I

8 told you how I reacted. Let me not repeat.

9 Q. We'll get to the 13th. Perhaps -- I think it's time for the

10 break, but during the break you can come up with an answer as to why you

11 never went to Potocari. Okay? Think of that. Perhaps when we come back

12 we can pick up from there. Why you never went to Potocari if you had this

13 premonition and you had this mandate.

14 JUDGE LIU: Yes. We'll take a break and resume at quarter to

15 11.00.

16 --- Recess taken at 10.16 a.m.

17 --- On resuming at 10.47 a.m.

18 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Karnavas.

19 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President, Your Honours.

20 Q. Mr. Deronjic, please tell us why you did not go to Potocari on the

21 12th or the 13th of July, 1995.

22 A. Yes. I will answer your question. There are several reasons.

23 Whenever you think I'd said enough, you can interrupt me. Reason one, I

24 had agreed with Mr. Karadzic to keep him posted. I left Fontana, as I

25 wrote in my report to my office, to call him and inform him of the course

Page 6423

1 of the meeting and what we had accomplished at the Fontana Hotel. I

2 explained that at length already. I won't repeat that, to save time.

3 Reason two, based on the orders issued by Mladic and the tasks

4 issued to everyone as we were leaving, I understood that the order, as

5 pertaining to civilian authorities, primarily people from the municipality

6 because he didn't mention me specifically, was to secure a certain amount

7 of food and water for the people who were held in Potocari because the

8 humanitarian situation was critical, as was noted at the meeting. And to

9 make sure, as far as we were able, that enough vehicles for transport were

10 secured. So I went to the office to work on that, because I knew a lot of

11 people in the community who were able to help us. Just for example,

12 bread, a certain amount of bread, was delivered from Zvornik at my request

13 after I called President Simic. We called up Ljubovija and various other

14 municipalities to take care of the various tasks that Mladic had given us.

15 Another one, General Mladic with his entire entourage, his topmost

16 associates and representatives of the UNPROFOR with their vehicles went to

17 Potocari. I thought their presence was completely sufficient, and I

18 didn't see any reason for myself to go there and waste time, because

19 nobody at that point expected that something was going to deteriorate

20 after the meeting. I had a good reason to believe it wouldn't, and that

21 is that the command of the UNPROFOR had left the Fontana Hotel, together

22 with General Mladic in a generally friendly atmosphere, and nobody asked

23 me to go to Potocari with them. Nothing that happened during that day

24 indicated that a drama was about to occur. I was supposed to continue

25 with my regular duties and preparations for entering into Srebrenica. I

Page 6424

1 informed President Karadzic about that, and I told him what my intentions

2 were. He approved that and he told me to continue with my work and my

3 preparations for that day.

4 Do you need me to give you more reasons?

5 Q. That will be fine. Now, was it that same day -- I should say, was

6 it not on that same day that you held a meeting at the small university

7 conference room?

8 A. In the evening?

9 Q. In the evening.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And That's a separate one from the one you had held earlier, the

12 rally, I believe it was at the cinema. Correct?

13 A. Correct.

14 Q. And as I indicated -- as I understand the situation, there were

15 convoys already moving that day, that afternoon, and that evening.

16 Correct?

17 A. Yes, that's correct. Very soon after the meeting, I don't know

18 the exact hour, the first convoys set out from Potocari.

19 Q. And you were conducting your preparations for entering Srebrenica?

20 A. Yes. Yes. We were continuing those preparations.

21 Q. And in essence, you were waiting for that evacuation or for the

22 convoys to be -- to leave. So once that completed, you could then go into

23 Srebrenica. Correct?

24 A. Correct.

25 Q. At one point I understand that you asked the civilian police to

Page 6425

1 get on the megaphones and to call out the citizens, I believe that was for

2 one of the meetings that you held in Potocari. Correct?

3 A. No, not in Potocari.

4 Q. [Previous translation continues]... I apologise, Bratunac.

5 A. Yes, I understood what you meant. I asked for that announcement

6 to be made not only on the megaphones but also on the radio for citizens

7 from Srebrenica to go to the cinema hall.

8 Q. Was that on the 12th and 13th or just the 12th?

9 A. On the 12th because the meeting was held in the evening of the

10 12th, and there was no need for citizens to rally on the 13th.

11 Q. Okay. Suffice it to say that if someone was walking around

12 Bratunac centre, they would have heard these megaphones?

13 A. I suppose so, of course.

14 Q. All right. Now, I want to digress a little bit and go back to

15 before your meeting with President Karadzic on the 8th or 9th. As I

16 understand your testimony, you had been out in the field along with

17 another individual during the campaign against Srebrenica. Correct?

18 A. Correct.

19 Q. And that individual - his name escapes me right now --

20 A. Sinisa Glogovac.

21 Q. Mr. Glogovac, he was also from the civilian sector, was he not?

22 A. A member of the state security.

23 Q. And that's under the Ministry of Interior. Correct?

24 A. Correct.

25 Q. And so at that point in time as I understand it, you were unaware

Page 6426

1 of what exactly the mission was on the attack of Srebrenica. You didn't

2 know the goal?

3 A. You understood that quite well, and I have said it many times.

4 Q. I find it rather curious - and perhaps you can explain -- give us

5 some explanation as to how is it that if President Karadzic had problems

6 with Mladic, why would he keep his top official, president of the SDS

7 party, in the complete dark as to what the ultimate goal or goals of

8 Srebrenica were, while at the same time inform the military.

9 A. A very unusual question indeed, but I will answer. In that zone,

10 countless military operations took place, some of them you mentioned and

11 noted. It was true. Not for a single military operation in which various

12 brigade commanders were involved was the civilian sector informed or the

13 president of the party, because I suppose there are certain matters which

14 are completely in the hands of the army alone. Why would the president of

15 the SDS have to be aware of military objectives? You have to address that

16 question to the relevant person. I wasn't told and I didn't think I

17 should.

18 Q. All right. But nonetheless, according to you, at some point you

19 realised that you needed to find out, and that's why you went to Pale.

20 Correct?

21 A. I stated a number of reasons for going to Pale, among other

22 things, to find out -- not because I had to find out and not that there

23 was any guarantee that I would be told. I simply wished to find out.

24 Q. Well, one of your concerns was the operation wasn't going well

25 enough and that they needed serious assistance from someone that was from

Page 6427

1 the Ministry of the Interior, from MUP, Mr. Borovcanin. Correct?

2 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection, repetitive. This has all been gone

3 over in detail.

4 MR. KARNAVAS: I'll move on, Your Honour.



7 Q. Now, in the field, I understand it, you were able to come across

8 General Krstic. Correct?

9 A. Yes. I think it was on the first day when I arrived, possibly the

10 day after my arrival. I met with General Krstic.

11 Q. And general -- and you didn't have any problems with General

12 Krstic, not like, for instance, General Mladic?

13 A. I didn't have any problems with him because I had no relationship

14 whatsoever. It was the first time I laid my eyes on him.

15 Q. But you knew his position, did you not? You knew that he was the

16 chief of staff of the Drina Corps. Correct?

17 A. No, I didn't know the particulars of who was what, but I did see

18 him in command, commanding there.

19 Q. All right. I take it -- and from what I understand, you went and

20 introduced yourself to him?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. You say it with some hesitancy. Isn't it a fact that you went

23 there, introduced yourself, spoke to him, and perhaps - that's what you

24 said, perhaps - had a cup of coffee with him?

25 A. Yes. I didn't say I hesitated, but we are talking about something

Page 6428

1 that took place eight years ago. I don't believe that to be very

2 relevant, but it's true, I did go up to him, I introduced myself, we spoke

3 briefly, I don't remember whether there was coffee or not. It's quite

4 possible. I know exactly where the table is where we sat at the forward

5 command post, where the logistics building was. I had a friend there, a

6 neighbour with whom I spoke. I cannot remember all the details, but if

7 that's not so relevant, I don't know why you are insisting on it.

8 Q. Well, you didn't ask General Krstic what was the ultimate aim on

9 the attack of Srebrenica?

10 A. No. At that point, I didn't have any dilemmas about that.

11 Q. All right. Well, before heading all the way 130 to 140 kilometres

12 to Pale when you did have the dilemma, why not track down General Krstic

13 who was at or around Pribicevac any during that period? Why go all the

14 way to Pale?

15 A. I explained why. First of all, I met Krstic at one point,

16 probably the first day when I arrived. I'm not claiming that 100 per

17 cent, but it's correct 90 per cent. At that point, I assumed based on

18 earlier information about Srebrenica, my talks with Karadzic on different

19 occasions, that there was a major problem about Srebrenica, which I

20 explained earlier, and that is the gap between our lines in the southern

21 part. So we probably spoke about that. Nobody said that there were any

22 deeper more important objectives. It was also important for me to spend a

23 day or two on the lines. One night I slept with those men together in the

24 trenches. I don't know exactly where that was, at Livnakja [phoen], for

25 example. It was important to speak to those people, to toe the lines. My

Page 6429

1 colleagues were there, the teachers from school, you know, at the time

2 everybody was mobilised.

3 A large number of people who didn't have a lot of experience in

4 war, who were not in military operations too often. Such people were

5 asking me different questions, hoping I would know the answer, what was

6 going on. There was fighting already, there were casualties already.

7 People were afraid. So I concluded - of course I had my own ideas about

8 everything in that conversation - I concluded that it would be more

9 logical to get explanations from the president since I didn't have any

10 concrete duties there at the time. I'm not a soldier in the classic

11 sense. I wasn't mobilised. It seemed to me that I was just wasting time

12 there. It would be better for me to go to Pale to see what the objectives

13 were of that action so that I could explain that to people. And it seemed

14 to me that the operations at that point were becoming more complex, so

15 that's the reason.

16 Perhaps I could have asked Krstic also, but I don't know the man.

17 I noticed that he had a lot of work to do. He was in command later, I

18 didn't see him. He was out in the field for some time then he was back.

19 I wasn't close to him in order to ask him. And ultimately perhaps such a

20 high officer would not feel any need to explain anything to me. So these

21 are all my views on it. Perhaps they're not absolutely right but ...

22 Q. You know Colonel Blagojevic at the time, did you not?

23 A. Yes, I did.

24 Q. You knew that he was the commander of the Bratunac Brigade.

25 Correct?

Page 6430

1 A. Yes, but I didn't know the dates. I said that I wasn't following

2 that -- the date of his appointment.

3 Q. You knew at that time that he was the commander, yes or no?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. You knew at that time that he was from Bratunac. Correct?

6 A. Well, I don't know at what point I found out that Mr. Blagojevic

7 was born in Bratunac and that he had family there. It's possible I knew

8 it at the time. I cannot remember when I found that out. I didn't know

9 Mr. Blagojevic earlier. I didn't meet him before that.

10 Q. Do you think it would be logical for a commander to be concerned

11 about the well being of his soldiers?

12 A. Of course.

13 Q. But you never spoke with Mr. Blagojevic to find out what the plan

14 was?

15 A. No.

16 Q. And you would agree with me that he did not have the same position

17 and exude the same sort of power as Mladic, Krstic, or even Zivanovic, for

18 whom you had very little taste for?

19 A. Yes, I agree with your statements.

20 Q. And while you were at the field, you also came across - I believe

21 he was a lieutenant colonel at the time - Pandurevic. He might have been

22 a colonel, I don't know.

23 A. I really don't remember the rank. I didn't come across him. But

24 I went to actually see that action up close. I went to the actual

25 location where he was in command.

Page 6431

1 Q. Right. And -- but you even had an opportunity to speak with him,

2 did you not?

3 A. No, Mr. Karnavas. I just greeted him like this. I can describe

4 it. He was -- it's a trench in the left part of Pribicevac, and from that

5 trench which was being fired on, there was firing -- so we were in that

6 trench. I just said hello to him. He was issuing orders as far as I can

7 remember. I could see that with my eyes. That unit was in the process of

8 taking an elevation, so I followed that for a few minutes. And I

9 understand that it wasn't my place to be there absolutely, that I was just

10 in the way as fighting was going on, so I withdrew. There was firing. I

11 think at the time they had a couple of wounded, a couple of Legenda's

12 soldiers were hurt. I heard that over the radio. But the situation

13 wasn't really suitable to discuss anything like that. Before that, I

14 asked Pandurevic -- I saw him once or twice. I saw him once in 1992. And

15 once in 1993, I just remembered, in Konjevic Polje.

16 Q. In reading your statements and transcripts, one gets the

17 appearance that perhaps it was during the efforts that were being made by

18 Pandurevic and Legenda of the Drina Wolves that led you to the firm

19 conviction that a serious military unit needed to be brought into the

20 area.

21 A. All of the information that I gathered over those few days,

22 including what you are talking about, made me think, amongst other things,

23 that perhaps a more professional unit needed to be there. My primary

24 objective was to try to protect those people, my neighbours. Bratunac is

25 a small town. Everybody knows everyone.

Page 6432

1 Q. Okay. And the more professional unit that you had in mind was

2 from the civilian sector?

3 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection.


5 MR. McCLOSKEY: This is the same area that's been gone over and

6 over and over.

7 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm about to put the next question. I need that

8 answer, Your Honour. I know it's been gone over. I'd like the answer so

9 I can go on.

10 JUDGE LIU: Maybe you can put your question more specifically.

11 What do you mean by the civilian sector?


13 Q. Isn't it, isn't it -- can we not draw a logical conclusion,

14 Mr. Deronjic, that the reasons you went to see President Karadzic in order

15 to lobby for MUP, and in particular Mr. Borovcanin, was so that you could

16 maintain control over the situation after the fall of Srebrenica, because

17 by the time you went there it was obvious to everyone that Srebrenica was

18 about to fall?

19 A. I didn't don't understand. First of all, I said I didn't know

20 that they would enter Srebrenica. At that point, I drew some conclusions.

21 What do you mean control over Srebrenica? What sort of control over

22 Srebrenica am I supposed to have? It's unclear. I'm really trying to

23 help you, but I don't understand what you mean by that.

24 Q. All right.

25 JUDGE LIU: Yes.

Page 6433

1 MR. McCLOSKEY: Your Honour, that question or one similar to it

2 was asked and dealt with yesterday. Mr. Deronjic had answered extensive

3 questions about his ability to control the special police and these other

4 issues. So this is in effect a rehash of material again already gone

5 over.

6 JUDGE LIU: But at this place, I believe that Mr. Karnavas is

7 asking a question about the purpose of Mr. Deronjic to see the president.

8 Am I right, Mr. Karnavas?

9 MR. KARNAVAS: That's correct, Your Honour.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I replied to the question of what

11 the purpose was. What I wanted was for that unit to come there and for me

12 to find out what the real intentions regarding Srebrenica were and to

13 consult about it all with the president.


15 Q. Right. In other words, you were not asking for another military

16 unit to come from some other place of the Republika Srpska, you were

17 asking for a specific unit that was attached or part of the Ministry of

18 Interior. And you were asking for a particular individual who was from

19 Bratunac or had been the chief of police of Bratunac, who you later on

20 have described as one of your closest associates.

21 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour --

22 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection, Your Honour.

23 JUDGE LIU: Yes.

24 MR. McCLOSKEY: It's been asked and answered several times and

25 it -- it's fundamentally, I think, an unfair practice to deal with one

Page 6434

1 subject one day, come to the same subject the next day when you've already

2 gone through it and keep beating on it. The witness eventually crumbles

3 sometimes. We've seen that happen. But not only is it asked and answered

4 but it really is an unfair practice to go over the same topics over and

5 over again. I don't have any problem with new directions or new twists,

6 or new information, that's fine. But this is the same. I don't see any

7 difference.

8 JUDGE LIU: I quite understand your objection, Mr. McCloskey, but

9 I believe that first this matter is actually important in this case.

10 Secondly, Mr. Karnavas somehow changed a little bit from a different

11 angle. So I think this question is allowed, but at the same time,

12 Mr. Karnavas, don't try to travel on the repeated road.

13 MR. KARNAVAS: I know, Your Honour.

14 Q. Can you give us an explanation why it is that you didn't ask for

15 another military unit, as opposed to asking for your friend, your

16 associate, who was from the civilian sector to come with his forces who

17 were part of the Ministry of Interior. Can you give us an explanation,

18 particularly in light of your observations that - and as you put it - a

19 serious military unit needed to be there and you were concerned for the

20 well being of the soldiers.

21 A. Yes. You've already mentioned some of the reasons. You said I

22 knew Mr. Borovcanin, I knew that unit, I knew its structure. I had a lot

23 of information about how much training it had had, how many times it had

24 participated in the different fronts, and it had shown itself to be a very

25 good unit in the military sense. All of these are reasons which made me

Page 6435

1 decide. And anyway, as opposed to the military, which mostly used

2 untrained people for different reasons - I'm not accusing them but that

3 was the situation - and the lack of trained elite units, I believe that

4 that resulted in much -- many losses on our side in unnecessary

5 casualties. We often discussed this matter in the party and at higher

6 levels as well about the need to form such a unit, to form a special

7 brigade. But I don't want to deal with that too long.

8 Anyway, up until 1995, Bratunac had over 1.000 casualties. I'm

9 speaking about that entire area. I'm speaking about the people from

10 Srebrenica who were there, Skelani is included, too. I explained how

11 much -- this is over 10 per cent of the total Serb population in Bratunac.

12 So all of these are reasons why I wanted to have a trained unit come. The

13 only one I knew at the time was this special unit, which very often took

14 part in actions on the front in less problematic assignments. And in

15 particularly, Borovcanin was well familiar with the terrain around

16 Bratunac. He was there on several occasions. So it did not seem logical

17 to me that he wasn't there with his unit.

18 Q. It also seemed logical that he would be one that you could

19 control?

20 A. The question -- the assertion is not correct. My relations with

21 the ministry for internal affairs with Mr. Kovac, if you ask me and if I'm

22 permitted, I'm thinking about the Trial Chamber, I will explain to you

23 what Tomislav Kovac's relationship was to me so --

24 Q. I'm not asking for Kovac, I'm asking for Borovcanin. You did not

25 call for Kovac --

Page 6436

1 A. How.

2 JUDGE LIU: Mr. Karnavas, that's very argumentative.

3 MR. KARNAVAS: I would like the witness, Your Honour, to answer

4 the question. He wanted Borovcanin because he could control Borovcanin,

5 he could work with Borovcanin. That's the reason.

6 Q. Is it not, Mr. Deronjic --

7 JUDGE LIU: Mr. McCloskey.

8 MR. McCLOSKEY: If I can briefly state, I'm sure we all remember

9 the 10 July document ordering Mr. Borovcanin to the area. It's authored

10 by Mr. Kovac. So I don't know what the answer to his question is, but my

11 guess is his ability to control Mr. Borovcanin may have something to do

12 with his comments about Mr. Kovac, who is Mr. Borovcanin's boss. So I

13 think it's a fair answer that Mr. Karnavas should allow the witness to

14 explain his answer, whatever it may be.

15 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, with all due respect, the relationship

16 with Kovac is irrelevant because Kovac has a particular duty. Once he

17 gets an order from the president, that order -- then he must execute that

18 order irrespective of whether he likes this gentleman or not. And then

19 from Kovac the order comes down to Borovcanin. So in essence because this

20 gentleman here had such pull with Karadzic, which he explains repeatedly

21 in the statements, he was able to get President Karadzic to order Kovac to

22 bring his particular man, Borovcanin, on the scene. That's what I'm

23 alluding to, Your Honour.

24 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Deronjic, please answer the question as

25 concise as possible.

Page 6437

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At no point, particularly during war

2 operations, was I able to use any kind of power that you ascribe to me in

3 order to be able to control a brigade whose commander, the true commander,

4 of that brigade was Goran Saric whose commander I practically didn't know.

5 He was the one who directly issued orders to Borovcanin. And Borovcanin

6 was the chief of staff of the special brigade at the police. This was a

7 very tightly -- tight unit, tightly interconnected to the chain of

8 command, particularly during military operations, combat operations. So I

9 hardly think that I could have any influence on the behaviour of that

10 unit, and in particular, Mr. Borovcanin who was the commander of that

11 unit, who was with that unit.

12 Q. Let's go to the events of July 13th. At some point it becomes

13 obvious to you that the situation in Bratunac town is rather serious,

14 safety-wise. Correct?

15 A. Correct.

16 Q. And just for the record, was that based on observations, or was

17 that based on someone coming to your office having to tell you this

18 information?

19 A. I described that already. In order not to repeat that,

20 information was conveyed to me from out in the field and from the town

21 itself.

22 Q. So somebody had to come into your office, the SDS office, to tell

23 you that the situation in Bratunac is rather vicarious?

24 A. I cannot say to the office. Perhaps to the office as well. I

25 explained all the things that I did not course of the 13th, so it's

Page 6438

1 possible that during a meeting which we held in the small conference room

2 of the university -- it's possible at any point. People were coming in

3 and out and they were informing us if the situation was dramatic. A

4 meeting was not so important in the course of the operations to take

5 Srebrenica, so that Davidovic, Vasic, Simic would not be able to enter to

6 the meeting to inform us.

7 Q. And at some point, you were urged, as I understand it, or you may

8 have come to the realisation on your own, that you should contact

9 President Karadzic. Correct?

10 A. Yes. That was the 13th, towards the evening. If I have correct

11 information, this conversation took place at 8.00 p.m.

12 Q. Right. And as you came to learn at some point accidentally, as

13 you put it, that there was an intercept of that conversation. Correct?

14 A. Yes, yes. Of course I found out about it for the first time when

15 this was shown to me in Belgrade, that transcript of the intercepted

16 conversation.

17 Q. Okay. And that's a rather short conversation, is it not?

18 A. Well, this is not a transcript of a complete conversation. There

19 are some parts of the conversation which were not recorded, and some of

20 them -- over some, you can hear the sound of the teleprinter. So this

21 is -- it's not a complete conversation.

22 Q. Are you saying that you were able, through the Office of the

23 Prosecution, to hear the recording of this intercept?

24 A. No. I saw the transcript and it states there inaudible because of

25 the noise of the teleprinter.

Page 6439

1 Q. Okay. And the blanks, there's three dots, so it's your assumption

2 that that's where this supposed conversation that wasn't recorded would

3 have been?

4 A. Yes. Perhaps there. Perhaps there are other breaks. I didn't go

5 into it in the technical sense of all the things that are missing, but I

6 assume the three dots would indicate what you say they do.

7 Q. Okay. And isn't it rather coincidental that the most damning

8 information against President Karadzic and others just happens to be in

9 that blank information, the three dots?

10 A. I don't know what you mean.

11 Q. Okay. Well, if we were to look at this intercept, there is

12 nothing here about somebody coming with instructions, is there?

13 A. That part where he says that a man with instructions will come,

14 it's missing.

15 Q. Okay. That's assuming that was said, because we have nothing to

16 verify it, other than you, at this point in time?

17 A. I don't know what you have. I don't have anything else.

18 Q. That's my whole point. We have to trust Deronjic. Correct?

19 A. I agree. I agree.

20 Q. All right. And we know that Deronjic has not always been truthful

21 in the past, don't we?

22 A. I agree with that. I said that.

23 Q. Now, in one of your previous interviews, this is before you were

24 indicted, of course, you indicated that after you came back from this call

25 with President Karadzic, you found Colonel Beara in your office. Do you

Page 6440

1 recall stating that?

2 A. Yes, I recall. But that is not correct. Colonel Beara came the

3 way I said that, the way I explained that in my last interview.

4 Q. Okay. Well, let me just -- I want to cover this interview first,

5 and we'll get to the last interview. In this interview you state that

6 when you got to your office he was waiting for you.

7 MR. McCLOSKEY: Can we just get an indication, I'm sorry, of which

8 interview that.

9 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, the interview is on 21 October, 1999. It's

10 marked for identification purposes as P692, and I am referring to page 15.

11 And the appropriate sections are around line 4. I'm told that this is

12 marked for identification purposes as D95. I don't want to confuse

13 anyone. And in the Srpski version, it's lines 1 through 4.

14 Q. You said -- in this particular interview, you said that

15 Karadzic -- you say: "Well, Karadzic told me that he's going to convey

16 that information to General Mladic and that night Beara got into my

17 office. Actually, he was waiting for me in my office. And because I was

18 not present, the president of the municipality was sitting with him when I

19 got there."

20 A. It's all correct, except for the fact that he was waiting for me.

21 He came later, and I said at what time he came.

22 Q. Okay. Well, can I ask why would you state that he was actually

23 waiting for you, and the time would have been around 8.30 or so, given

24 that the conversation with President Karadzic was around 8.00. How could

25 you make such a mistake, or was this another one of your fabrications?

Page 6441

1 A. Why would I fabricate something like that? There's no reason why

2 I would. I was just describing that he was in my office, and I always

3 tell the Prosecution at the outset at every interview that I'm not sure

4 about dates, hours, details. I had no intention of concealing the fact

5 that he was there. Does the way in which Beara appeared really matter at

6 all? I described many times how he came, and we are not still certain

7 after many statements when exactly he came, at what time, an hour less or

8 more. Does it really matter? And if you look at my interviews, you will

9 see that in every meeting I tell the Prosecution, I have no way of

10 checking this. I have no way of verifying the details. I think that's

11 how it happened.

12 Q. Well, in this one instance you had one way of verifying it, and

13 that would have been with the president of the municipality. Correct?

14 A. Yes. But unfortunately Mr. Simic does not remember the chronology

15 either. There are other people, my secretary, Mr. Sofir and others.

16 Everyone remembers that Beara came, but they don't remember when.

17 Q. All right. Having stated that I want to go back into this

18 interview to the previous page. And you indicate on page 14. And I'm

19 reading from lines 19 to 26. You stated that: "Mr. Karadzic told me that

20 all prisoners of war should be transported out of Bratunac. He was trying

21 to tell me that in code, actually because that was an open-line

22 conversation."

23 A. Yes, yes.

24 Q. And then you go on to say, he said that actually the "goods should

25 be in the warehouse," that's verbatim, word for word of what he said, "and

Page 6442

1 I got it as a 'military prison,' I got it on that way, that that was the

2 military prison. And he told me that he was going to inform

3 General Mladic to do it that way, because I told you the same situation in

4 Bratunac at the time was very dramatic. That -- actually the president of

5 the municipality had made an intervention with me as well as the president

6 of the Executive Board. But they opposed to the fact that these people

7 were to be held in civilian facilities. That is why I did it that way, I

8 acted that way. So Karadzic told me that he is going to convey that

9 information to General Mladic, and that night, you know, Beara got into my

10 office," and then I quoted the rest.

11 Now, if we look at this --

12 A. Just a minute, please. I just want to note that what you are

13 reading differs, perhaps not significantly but in details from the

14 original. Maybe it's a question of translation.

15 Q. Well, for that you will have to blame the Prosecutor, not me.

16 This is an official translation that I have gotten from them. But if you

17 think something is significant, you can point it out. But the essence of

18 it is that Karadzic here, according to you, is telling you that he's going

19 to give instructions to Mladic. Correct?

20 A. I agree with you. But in my experience there's sometimes focus on

21 single words. Please ask your question and if what you said here does not

22 really matter in terms of particular words, then I will simply answer.

23 Q. All right. Well, is it not a fact that on 21 October 1999 you

24 told the Prosecution that Karadzic -- President Karadzic had told you that

25 he would be informing General Mladic to do it that way, that is to send

Page 6443

1 these folks to a military prison, as you understood the coded words to be?

2 A. Yes. That's what I said.

3 Q. Now, when you said that statement, we know for a fact at least,

4 because we have the intercept, assuming the intercept is correct, that the

5 quote with respect to the warehouse is approximately right on target.

6 Because the intercept states: "All the goods must be placed inside the

7 warehouse before 12.00 tomorrow."

8 And you quote: "The goods should go to the warehouse."

9 So that we can accept as being rather accurate. And of course we

10 don't have --

11 A. You asked a question, didn't you?

12 Q. Well, is that accurate or not over all, the context of it?

13 A. Yes, it is. But I haven't answered the question. It was a

14 question and I want to answer it. You asked: Is that correct? And

15 without letting me answer, you move on to another question. If you don't

16 need my answer, I'm not going to give it.

17 So at that moment when I was giving that statement, I was speaking

18 to the best of my recollection. When I saw that transcript, I noticed

19 that there is a discrepancy between what I said and certain parts that are

20 missing, if the transcript is true. I am not trying to convince you of the

21 truthfulness of my statement. But in 1997 and in 1998, I was describing

22 that conversation. And when I testified later, and the transcript is

23 available, you say that it's right on target. Wouldn't it be logical for

24 you to accept that even the other parts of my statement are true, just if

25 we rely on analogy. I asked the Prosecution to measure if there are there

Page 6444

1 are lapses and how long they are in the intercepts. They told me they

2 would do that. They said that the intercept is not continuous, there are

3 breaks, and the transcript would reflect that.

4 Q. So the Prosecution told you that there was a gap there, probably,

5 given the dots. And that at least gave you an indication that there might

6 have been something that you didn't put in -- that wasn't in there?

7 A. In the last one, yes. I'm not saying that you have to believe me.

8 I'm just saying what we were able to note so far.

9 Q. Right. Well, we're going step by step, Mr. Deronjic.

10 Now, based on your answer, can we not then logically state or

11 conclude that the remainder portion, that is, that President Karadzic was

12 going to instruct General Mladic to take those prisoners out of Bratunac

13 and to Batkovici or to some military prison?

14 A. I have already explained this to the Prosecution. I'm answering

15 your question. I said that as far as this fact is concerned, I can really

16 not claim with absolute certainty anything, as I wasn't able to claim

17 anything about the arrival or the timing of the arrival of Mr. Beara. And

18 I cannot really speak in this instance of something that I am not

19 absolutely sure of.

20 Q. All right. Then if we extend that by analogy, later on when you

21 have your deal from the Prosecution and then you come up with the -- you

22 fill in the blanks where you say President Karadzic tells you he's going

23 to send someone with instructions, can we not also state that you're not

24 sure that that's what was said either to you. Correct?

25 A. It is not fair to say that I made a deal and then gave an

Page 6445

1 interview. I gave an interview before I made the deal. You can see my

2 interview with Mr. Harmon submitted as part of my case where it says:

3 Mr. Deronjic undertook to give truthful statements and cooperate

4 substantially without any promises, and so on and so forth. So my

5 interview has nothing to do with the deal. That's the first fact that I

6 want cleared up.

7 Second, I claim that there is evidence for everything I stated, at

8 least for 99 per cent of what I said there is evidence. Of course you

9 will always ferret out something, a minor part, for which evidence is hard

10 to find. But I didn't stage any of this. It is very difficult for me to

11 organise evidence which doesn't exist. But if you take the bulk of my

12 statements, for every detail you can challenge me and I will find you

13 evidence to prove it. You cannot say that everything is untrue,

14 everything that I said. Mr. Karnavas, after all it is an undisputable

15 fact that Mr. Beara came to my office after my conversation with the

16 president. That does not mean anything in itself, but it lends

17 plausibility to what I stated. I agree with you that it is not fool-proof

18 evidence.

19 Q. Okay. Since you mentioned that, just to get the points out in the

20 open, when Colonel Beara came and he said that he had orders from the top,

21 as you have stated, you never asked him concretely: Are those orders from

22 President Karadzic, did you?

23 A. We talked about. I didn't ask the question directly. I just

24 said, Mr. Beara, I don't have any such orders. I did talk to

25 President Karadzic and I have orders of a different kind. But I didn't

Page 6446

1 ask the question in so many words. I had the conversation I had with

2 Karadzic. After that, I received the visit of this gentleman, and I put

3 two and two together.

4 Q. Let me put the question again, sir. You never asked him who the

5 top is because he is in the military structure and his top could be number

6 one, right, Mladic? Your top was another number one, that's Karadzic.

7 Did you ask for clarification what he meant when he said he has orders

8 from the top, yes or no?

9 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

10 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection to the tone and the elevated voice.

11 It's going to -- that's argumentative; it's not going to get us anywhere.

12 JUDGE LIU: Yes, but the question itself has some meanings in it.

13 So I hope the witness could answer that question. I also warn

14 Mr. Karnavas, be careful.


16 Q. Did you ask him?

17 A. I will tell you, but let me explain to the Honorable

18 Trial Chamber, there is no need to interrupt us.

19 MR. KARNAVAS: [Previous translation continues]... I object. I

20 ask him a pointed question, yes or no. He should answer the question.

21 JUDGE LIU: Mr. Deronjic, please answer the question directly. If

22 you feel you need some explanation, and then you could do that.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I meant to give a clarification, but

24 I'll skip it. Mr. Karnavas, I think you digress sometimes, perhaps

25 deliberately, and I have to come back to the subject --

Page 6447

1 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, I object again. There's no answer

2 here. I put a specific question to the witness, yes or no, did he ask for

3 clarification as to who the top was. I would like a clear answer. He's

4 dancing around the issue.

5 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Deronjic, I have already given you

6 instructions how to approach this issue. Answer the question first. If

7 you feel you need, you may give an explanation.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The answer is no, I didn't ask him

9 that. But what I want to say is this: You suggested this on a number of

10 occasions, that it was never -- I never asked him. I never met the man

11 again. How could I ask him? Between Mladic and Karadzic, there was no

12 disagreement as to the military operation. In the war, Mr. Karadzic is

13 the supreme commander of the armed forces. In my eyes at that moment, it

14 was not so important whether the order was issued by Karadzic or Mladic.

15 What is the big difference? I didn't feel that as an important

16 distinction. I didn't ask him. He just said: I have orders from the

17 top. And he obviously wanted to keep it discreet.


19 Q. Allow me to point out the distinction. Here comes a man who wants

20 to kill innocent people. You have a particular order, as you state. As a

21 human being, as the head of the party, as the most powerful man in

22 Bratunac with a mandate, did you not think that it might be relevant to

23 say: Who gave you such an inhumane barbaric order that you're going to

24 kill 7.000 people or 2.000 people, or 1.000, whatever the number was? Did

25 it ever occur to you to ask: How could you dare do such a thing? Who

Page 6448

1 gave you that order?

2 A. First and foremost, I had a more important priority. My first

3 priority is to prevent Mr. Beara -- please do not make faces at me. I am

4 not making faces when you are being unduly pathetic. My first priority

5 was to prevent Mr. Beara to put this all in practice. That was a much

6 more important task. Discussions were continuing in an atmosphere which

7 was already largely disrupted. I told you that I had to make a person

8 leave the room because I didn't want him to hear the conversation. I

9 wanted to spare him from the knowledge that our leaders could even be

10 contemplating such orders. So I remained one-on-one with Mr. Beara. That

11 first night I rang for security around those people, and I already had in

12 place in agreement, which I maybe didn't mention because that's part of my

13 defence. I cautioned Mr. Beara that I was going to see the president in

14 the morning and to convey to him our conversation.

15 There were a lot of other things said, not all of which I

16 described, but I described the essence, perhaps not word for word because

17 it was eight years ago. But a lot of things were said, with people coming

18 and going all the time. In the morning I went to see the president. I

19 managed to forestall that for the time being.

20 Q. And when you saw the president the next day, did you concretely

21 and directly ask the president whether Beara was the one that he had

22 ordered to come and grab or take the prisoners out of there so he could

23 kill them or have them killed?

24 A. I said to Karadzic, word for word, Mr. Beara came to my office,

25 told me this and this. I didn't ask the question -- I didn't put it the

Page 6449

1 way you put it. I put it differently.

2 Q. Did you ask him directly: Mr. President, yesterday when you told

3 me on this intercept that you would be sending somebody with instructions,

4 was that be any chance this Colonel Beara who came and told me that he was

5 there to kill all of the prisoners? Did you tell him that? Did you ask

6 him that question, yes or no, directly?

7 A. No, not that directly. We discussed the situation, and I had an

8 opportunity to clarify it.

9 Q. Why didn't you ask him directly?

10 A. Mr. Beara didn't say I got orders from Mr. Karadzic. He said I

11 got orders from the top. That's one.

12 Second, he was drunk, very drunk. I didn't have the freedom to

13 ask Karadzic, Look, Mr. President, did you order the killing of 7.000

14 people? And I had my doubts about Beara. The way I put my question was

15 such that Karadzic had to tell me in no uncertain terms whether it was

16 true or not. There was no ambiguity. He had to give me a clear answer,

17 and he had to tell me what he thought about it.

18 Q. Mr. Deronjic, could it be that your conversation with Beara was

19 that you do not care about whether those people who you were supposed to

20 protect were killed; it's just that you did not want them killed in

21 Bratunac. Isn't that another logical conclusion that we can draw, based

22 on what you're saying and what you have said and under the circumstances

23 as they existed?

24 A. Well, that was my first priority, to prevent it from happening

25 until we clear up the situation, to prevent it from happening ever. And

Page 6450

1 we have records of that. We have five years of statements and interviews.

2 I never uttered that it was acceptable for me that these people be killed.

3 Maybe one day I will be indicted too and we'll have an opportunity to

4 clarify it further. So far I haven't presented my defence, and there is

5 no need for us to discuss what I thought, what I intended, et cetera. It

6 would sound demagogical and I don't want to do it.

7 Q. Okay. Needless to say, on that night, the 13th, you didn't go

8 back to the Bratunac Brigade headquarters to get on the phone and to try

9 to contact President Karadzic?

10 A. According to my information, I finished my meeting at 3.00 a.m.

11 That's what I always said in my working interviews. In Nikolic's

12 statement you can read that it was over around 12.00. In any case, we

13 continued our preparations. And I don't know exactly when I went home,

14 but it was in the small hours of the next day, with the knowledge that I

15 was going to Pale the next day.

16 I hope I answered your question. How was I supposed to call up

17 the president at 3.00 a.m. Or 4.00 a.m.? He's not sitting in his office

18 all the time. He has to sleep sometime, too. I did secure the agreement

19 that I would see him, and I did secure -- I did make sure that nothing

20 would happen that night. And as for the rest, I would go and see him

21 tomorrow. That's what I was thinking at the time. That was logical I

22 think.

23 Q. Mr. Deronjic, you could go at any point in time to the Bratunac

24 Brigade headquarters to use their communication facilities as you wished.

25 Isn't that a fact?

Page 6451

1 A. Correct.

2 Q. You didn't need, for instance, permission from the commander of

3 the Bratunac Brigade, you had the authority to go and use those

4 communication means, which were supposed to be secure especially when

5 having sensitive conversations with the president. Correct?

6 A. Correct. Absolutely correct. I just want to add, I always asked

7 for permission, because that's the kind of man I am, although I didn't

8 strictly need to. They would always tell me, of course, go on and call.

9 Q. You say "permission." You never asked permission from

10 Colonel Blagojevic directly. You didn't go to his office and say,

11 Colonel, Commander, I need to use the communications?

12 A. No, I wouldn't. I would rather go to the brigade and contact the

13 duty officer. Mr. Blagojevic wasn't around in those days. I would ask

14 the duty officer who was there.

15 Q. Okay. Now, to recap, you had a very inebriated individual who, as

16 you had indicated, you had met for the first time. He was speaking in a

17 rather bizarre manner to the point where he was openly saying that he was

18 there to kill all of the prisoners. Correct? Correct?

19 A. Correct.

20 Q. In fact, he was so brazen about what he wanted to do that -- and

21 he was speaking to openly, that it caused you concern, hence you taking

22 your close associate and friend out of that room, Mr. Simic, so he would

23 not be subjected to this conversation. Correct?

24 A. Correct, but at that point the conversation began on that topic

25 right then; the conversation didn't really proceed too far.

Page 6452

1 Q. I agree. He leaves. Now it's you and it's Beara. And as I

2 understand it, you put a little fuel to the fire because when Beara wanted

3 another drink, you provided him with some vodka, at least that's what you

4 said in some of your statements. You had sort of a drink, which is

5 customary, at least in that part of the world, anyway. Correct?

6 A. Yes, that's correct. Let me answer the question first and then

7 give the explanation. You said I was pouring oil on to the fire, as if at

8 that moment I knew why Beara had come and I wanted to make him more angry

9 with the alcohol. It's not like that. A high officer came, I offered him

10 a drink. He said -- yes, I noticed this that he was slightly inebriated,

11 but that is a custom of ours to offer a drink or coffee.

12 Q. Well, coffee might have been a little more appropriate under the

13 circumstances.

14 A. I am not the one who makes that decision. I acted according to

15 his wishes. I agree with you. It would have better had he not have come

16 at all, now that we're talking about what would have been best.

17 Q. I couldn't agree with you more.

18 JUDGE LIU: Yes.

19 MR. McCLOSKEY: Could we have our coffee break?

20 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm about to close on this issue. Why does

21 Mr. McCloskey have to be so rude.

22 JUDGE LIU: No, I think the mention of coffee triggered it.

23 MR. KARNAVAS: He see's me, Your Honour, he sees me looking at the

24 clock. I'm well aware of it. I'm just about to close on the issue, and

25 now he wants to break. And this is done routinely in the United States as

Page 6453

1 a way of breaking the thread.

2 JUDGE LIU: Well, let's finish, let's finish this action first.

3 MR. McCLOSKEY: I agree, Your Honour. If we can close, I can sit.


5 Q. And during this period you learn that this madman wants to kill,

6 you know, a large amount of people, don't you think that if you wanted to

7 contact President Karadzic, even at 2.00 or 3.00 in the morning, just to

8 be on the safe side, that you could have got a hold of President Karadzic.

9 Don't you think that would have been possible?

10 A. No. There are several reasons for that and I will list them all.

11 One of the reasons why I didn't call I already mentioned. I know for sure

12 that at that time he's not at the presidency. I would have to look for

13 him privately. I don't know where he lived when he's at Pale. I've never

14 seen him there. I agree, I should speak up -- I don't even know the

15 telephone. This is what I'm trying to say.

16 Secondly, in a previous conversation between myself and Karadzic

17 he warned me, and you have that in the transcript, it says: If you have

18 anything confidential, and this is the most confidential kind of

19 information, don't do it by telephone, send it by teleprinter or in some

20 other way through more secure communications. This is that kind of

21 information which I wouldn't even dare to send over the teleprinter. I

22 didn't know if it was true. Of course it could prove to be very

23 dangerous. At the brigade command it seemed to me pointless to go there

24 at that time. It didn't seem to be much point in going to there and

25 calling from there because the next day I was going to Pale anyway. And I

Page 6454

1 would have gone early, had I not been delayed by the Ciglani event. So I

2 went there two or three hours later.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 MR. KARNAVAS: Mr. President, if we could take the break now.

5 JUDGE LIU: Yes. We'll resume at 25 minutes to 1.00.

6 --- Recess taken at 12.05 p.m.

7 --- On resuming at 12.37 p.m.

8 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Karnavas.

9 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President, Your Honours.

10 Q. Mr. Deronjic, in one of your statements - I'm referring to 12

11 March 2001 - you were asked whether you knew what instructions Mr. Beara

12 had. And you indicated back then that you did not know. Do you recall

13 making that statement?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And when -- and that statement, I take it, given your testimony

16 here today or for the past several days, that statement was false at the

17 time it was made?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Now, in order for us to accept your version of events with respect

20 to what transpired during that telephone conversation with President

21 Karadzic, we would have to accept your word for it, would we not?

22 A. Amongst other things, I don't know what else you or the

23 Prosecution have.

24 Q. Well, concretely, we don't have that tape with -- where you're

25 speaking. Correct?

Page 6455

1 A. You don't have it -- I don't know if you have it or not.

2 Q. Well, you were never provided with a tape-recording by the

3 Prosecution of your conversation with Mr. Karadzic. Correct?

4 A. Correct.

5 Q. There was no one else that was -- that gave a statement that we

6 know of or that you looked at where they have indicated that in fact

7 President Karadzic had said: I will be sending someone with instructions.

8 Correct?

9 A. I don't know that, whether anybody made a statement regarding

10 this.

11 Q. All right. Assuming that there are no statements, because there

12 aren't any to my knowledge, then all we would have left is your word and

13 your word alone, save for if we had President Karadzic over here or the

14 former President Karadzic over here. Correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And even if we did have President Karadzic here, if he were to

17 say, No, I never said that, then you would maintain that this is what he

18 said, at this point we would have a dilemma which of the two we should

19 believe, President Karadzic or you. Correct?

20 A. Correct.

21 Q. Now, as I understand and as we talked a little bit about it, over

22 the years as the case against you or the investigation, I should say,

23 against you progressed from you being a witness to a suspect, during this

24 period of time you were conducting your own investigation. Correct?

25 A. To the degree I described, yes, correct.

Page 6456

1 Q. And you were looking for documents that might be of some

2 assistance in at least giving you some clues as to what might be in the

3 possession of the Prosecution?

4 A. I was checking it orally more. I of course could not look for

5 documents on the assumption that nobody would give them to me anyway. If

6 you're thinking of any documents of your own or the possibility that I

7 made some notes, wrote some things down, then yes.

8 Q. And in fact -- at least we know with respect to the chronology,

9 you consulted a certain friendly connections that we talked about

10 yesterday. Correct?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. And would it be fair for us to assume that including the names

13 that we mentioned yesterday, we should also include some of your closest

14 associates at the time, that is Mr. Vasic and Mr. Borovcanin, did you not

15 consult them as well?

16 A. Yes. I remember one occasion with Vasic and I remember one

17 occasion with Borovcanin when we discussed this topic.

18 Q. When was it that you met with Mr. Borovcanin, by the way?

19 A. He came to Bratunac once. We met. After an indictment was issued

20 against him or perhaps there was some indications of that, I'm not quite

21 sure about that, we met briefly and talked about this topic in a cafe or

22 restaurant called Jasen.

23 Q. So that would have been in the last year or two?

24 A. No, I wouldn't say that. I've been here for almost two years, so

25 it could have been -- yes, before that. I really couldn't tell you

Page 6457

1 exactly when it was. I remember that he was coming back from a vacation.

2 He was on a vacation and he dropped by in Bratunac.

3 Q. But was that before or after, say, 2000?

4 A. Let's say that it was after 2000.

5 Q. Okay. So if you had told the Office of the Prosecution as late as

6 8 April 2002 that you hadn't seen Mr. Borovcanin for at least three or

7 four years, that would have been false, would it not?

8 A. What year did I state that?

9 Q. This would have been on -- actually, I believe it's the 9th April

10 2002, and I'm quoting from page 146 of the transcript that was provided to

11 us of your statement given in Banja Luka.

12 A. Yes, I probably said that.

13 Q. And if you had probably said that -- well, actually you did say

14 it. And so since you did say it, that was false information, wasn't it?

15 A. At that time, Borovcanin had already been indicted [Realtime

16 transcript read in error "invited"]. So if I am linked with him, then

17 there would be assumptions that I knew where he was. And I had enough

18 trouble as it is without that, or perhaps at that point I did not remember

19 that we had talked. But I do not want to give you any other reasons.

20 Q. The transcript should read "indicted" as opposed to "invited," I

21 understand.

22 So you wanted to protect yourself, and so in order to protect

23 yourself you provided the Office of the Prosecution with false

24 information.

25 A. What do you mean? I'm protecting Borovcanin more than myself?

Page 6458

1 Q. Well, sir, they ask you a concrete question and then you state

2 that you haven't seen Mr. Borovcanin, who you -- we've already discussed

3 is one of your closest associates at that period of time, the critical

4 period. And you indicate that you haven't seen him for three or four

5 years. Thus, one would conclude that you had no contact with him, hence

6 no ability to get together with him to sort of discuss the events and

7 maybe have a unified front on the events, the facts, the dates, and so on

8 and so forth.

9 A. Well, whether -- I am responding the question. Whether I spoke to

10 Borovcanin or not has nothing to do with the events the Srebrenica; it's

11 not relevant. Has it ever happened to you in life that you remember

12 something later. You're walking down the street and you go "Aha, I

13 remember something." Is it possible for you to remember something at one

14 point and not another point? If you need, I can provide you a scientific

15 explanation about why this happens. For example, in a whole variety of

16 events in which you took part you forget one fact. It seems as if it

17 never happened to you. But then later you might be walking down the

18 street, you might have an association, and then you would go "Aha" and

19 remember something that happened to you.

20 Q. Well, the question that was posed to you by Mark Harmon is, and

21 I'm reading from page 146, it's paragraph 25.1. It says: "Did

22 Mr. Borovcanin, who was in charge of the special police ever conduct an

23 investigation into the crime at Kravica warehouse?

24 "A. I haven't seen Mr. Borovcanin for at least three or four

25 years. I know that currently he is in Banja Luka. I don't know telephone

Page 6459

1 number, and he is not really calling me, so I cannot answer this question.

2 He is very unwilling to have contacts with anybody regarding these

3 events."

4 A. Correct. I did say that. He was not willing. He didn't even

5 give me his phone number or anything. We just happened to meet

6 accidentally in the middle of the street. He was coming out of his car,

7 so he couldn't avoid me. It's well-known that for a number of years

8 Borovcanin is not in that area. I'm not going to go into is the reasons,

9 but basically nobody knows where he's living and working for a long number

10 of years. At that point, perhaps I didn't remember. I don't want to go

11 into further details. I didn't remember that I had seen him. But this

12 wasn't an investigation. We were not conducting an investigation; we were

13 just talking about events. What I said later, this happened on the 13th

14 when he told me about it, but this wasn't an investigation. He just told

15 me about the incident relating to Kravica. But afterwards later, we

16 didn't discuss that much.

17 Q. But nonetheless you would agree with us that this is incorrect

18 information. Intentional, unintentional, it's incorrect.

19 A. Correct. I just want to add an explanation. Mr. Borovcanin told

20 me on that occasion that the Prosecution -- that he admitted that

21 information to the Prosecution that he was there, that he saw and was

22 around during those conversations regarding Kravica.

23 Q. Okay. Speaking of Kravica, is not Kravica within the Bratunac

24 municipality, you know, the general area?

25 A. Yes, of course.

Page 6460

1 Q. And would that not be under your purview, your powers, your

2 domain as the president of the SDS for the Bratunac municipality?

3 A. If you wish de jure, no, because I had a different function than

4 for Srebrenica. Kravica does not belong to Srebrenica de facto or de

5 jure. But I want to say that this did happen in Bratunac and I was in

6 Bratunac. Are you asking me if I have any information about that? Yes,

7 then these answers are correct. I'm not avoiding any questions, but de

8 jure, I'm not. Since sometimes you are talking about de jure and de

9 facto. I am saying de jure, I am not. So let us note that. As for de

10 facto ...

11 Q. Well, as you indicated, and I don't have the exact quote but I can

12 dig it out, that sometimes de facto can be much more powerful than de

13 jure -- one's powers can be much more meaningful. Correct?

14 A. Of course. We will go back to that question of powers and I will

15 try to answer that question. I noted it down to discuss it a little bit

16 if we have the opportunity. I do have serious remarks to state to what

17 you are trying to do.

18 Q. Well, based on your de facto powers that you were exercising at

19 the time and given at least a mandate that you had from President Karadzic

20 appointing you as the commissioner for Srebrenica, do you think that you

21 might be responsible for the events that occurred in Kravica on the

22 evening or afternoon, late afternoon, that evening in the Kravica

23 warehouse. Yes? No?

24 A. No. May I augment that briefly? Did I cause this incident in

25 some way? Did I perhaps incite it. Did I try to conceal it? What do you

Page 6461

1 take as my responsibility in that?

2 JUDGE LIU: Well, I don't think you can move on. This is involved

3 very complicated legal issues on this matter. So if that is not the gist

4 of your cross-examination, let's move on.

5 MR. KARNAVAS: It's -- well, Your Honour. It's a question of

6 command responsibility for the civil authority.

7 JUDGE LIU: I understand that, but it's a very complicated

8 question. Let us draw the conclusion --

9 MR. KARNAVAS: If I could get a couple more facts, Your Honour.

10 I'm not asking for legal conclusions.

11 JUDGE LIU: Yes.


13 Q. Is it not a fact, sir, that with respect to the events that

14 occurred in Kravica, you learned of those events from Mr. Borovcanin?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And in fact you discussed those events with him?

17 A. I asked him how it happened, that he should explain it to me. So

18 he explained it to me in the way that he knew how it happened.

19 Q. Okay. And so you had full knowledge of that as early as the

20 evening of July 13, 1995?

21 A. Yes. More detailed information in the early evening hours.

22 Q. Now, in your testimony in the Milosevic case, you indicated that

23 based on your conversations that you had with President Karadzic and based

24 on the information that you were getting from Colonel Beara, you came or

25 you made the assumption that Beara was President Karadzic's emissary?

Page 6462

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And in order for us to accept that, we would first have to accept,

3 would we not, that in that conversation, that intercepted conversation,

4 President Karadzic did in fact say to you that someone would be coming

5 with instructions. Correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. In other words, if we take out that short sentence and we look at

8 the intercept, as it was recorded by those folks, one could not come to

9 that conclusion?

10 A. I allow for that.

11 Q. On the other hand, if we look at your earlier version where you

12 say again that during that blank space President Karadzic said that he

13 would pass on the instruction to General Mladic with respect to putting

14 those prisoners in the warehouse, one could draw a reasonable conclusion

15 that Beara might have been the emissary of General Mladic, carrying out

16 the order that Karadzic had given Mladic pursuant to your conversation.

17 Correct?

18 A. This is an assertion, and I don't feel the need to comment on it

19 because I don't think that it's really important. But it's logical to

20 think that that is the right conclusion.

21 Q. What I'm trying to state is that, at least, we have two versions

22 from you. One where Karadzic is saying that he's going to give

23 instructions to Mladic, and then a subsequent one where he says to you, I

24 will send someone. Correct?

25 A. Yes. That's the essence of what I said.

Page 6463

1 Q. And assuming that nothing happened -- there was no conversation

2 other than what we have on the intercept -- in other words, during the

3 three dots where the Prosecution told you that that might have been a

4 space where some lost conversation might have occurred. If we were to

5 accept the paper on its face, then --

6 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

7 MR. McCLOSKEY: This is the tenth time this comment has been made.

8 The context has not changed. It's the same thing. It's over and over and

9 over again. I don't mind the point, but let's find a point.

10 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Karnavas, you may ask a direct question to

11 this witness. There are two kind of statements concerning this

12 incidents --

13 MR. KARNAVAS: There's a third --

14 JUDGE LIU: Which is -- or maybe third.

15 MR. KARNAVAS: There's a third version, Your Honour.

16 JUDGE LIU: Which is truthful. This is a very direct question.

17 MR. KARNAVAS: There is a reason for my questioning. And the

18 third version was where I was trying to make my record, where according to

19 this gentleman's testimony he's been propped by the Prosecution to know

20 that there is a space where potentially conversations might have occurred.

21 And then if we follow on, I have a good-faith basis for laying my

22 foundation. That's all I'm doing, showing the different versions. And I

23 will be quick, five minutes at the most on this.

24 JUDGE LIU: I have to remind you that Mr. Deronjic in this case is

25 not accused, just a witness. And I also have to remind you, there's no

Page 6464

1 need to make some allegations against the Prosecution --

2 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm not. Your Honour, he stated that he was

3 told --

4 JUDGE LIU: The question is that we will find the truth in this

5 particular case.


7 Q. Mr. Deronjic, did you not earlier testify that when you were going

8 over the intercept with the Prosecution that they alerted you that there

9 could -- that there might have been a gap here, and I'm showing you this

10 gap on the page of this intercept where there are three dots which would

11 convey perhaps some lost conversation?

12 A. Yes. I did talk to the Office of the Prosecutor after I gave my

13 statement, and they thought there was a discrepancy. And we clarified it

14 in the way you suggest.

15 Q. I'm sure you did clarify it with them. But they pointed out to

16 you that in this space which could be a pregnant pause, a long pause,

17 where there's no conversation, they also suggested, did they not, that

18 there could be some lost conversation?

19 A. Are you suggesting that they suggested I insert this into the

20 text? I already gave an answer, so they couldn't suggest anything of the

21 kind. They maybe suggested one of the possible reasons for gaps in the

22 transcript. I don't really understand what you're asking. It says here:

23 "Drowned out by the teleprinter." That is not audible.

24 Q. Okay. Now, we have to accept -- let's assume that this intercept,

25 as it is, is the true and accurate conversation that you had with

Page 6465

1 President Karadzic. We can then -- can we not then include --

2 A. Wait a minute.

3 Q. Can we not then conclude that when Mr. Beara comes to your office

4 and he says to you that he has orders from the top to kill these people,

5 given his position can we not logically conclude that the top would have

6 been Mladic?

7 A. No. I could not conclude that, because although I agree with you

8 it's a logical explanation, but all this is not entirely logical. I

9 remind you again that I gave all my interviews before ever being able to

10 see the transcript. What is interesting is that everything is accurate

11 when compared to the transcript. I stand by what I said at the very

12 outset. Mr. President Karadzic told me, a man would come to see you.

13 That is what I stated and stand by from day one. I never changed anything

14 about that. I described that before I ever got the opportunity to see

15 this. It is a fact that there are gaps and there is a spot when we speak

16 about the prisoners, something is drowned out by the Teletype. Then

17 president continues, a man would come, giving you full instructions, all

18 the goods have to be placed in the storage. Everything seems to fit in

19 logically, despite the gaps. I'm not suggesting anything, but I do assert

20 that I heard that with my own ears. Of course you may have a logic of

21 your own and you can follow it and you can find different explanations. I

22 have nothing against that.

23 Q. Again, let's get one thing clear on the order. On 12 March 2001,

24 before you gave the statements where you claim that those statements are

25 the truth versus the other ones, did you not state that, and I quote, I'm

Page 6466

1 quoting from page 13, line 12, what has been marked as D97, you state: "I

2 accidentally got a text where it was stated that this was recorded, this

3 conversation between me and President Karadzic. I saw that in an office

4 in Belgrade which is devoted to investigation of crimes in Bosnia."

5 So, sir, in fact you had seen that document before you gave your

6 statements. Correct?

7 A. Which date did you quote? You are walking me from one document to

8 another. Just give me the date of the statement.

9 Q. March 12th, 2001.

10 A. May I answer now? Before that I gave how many statements? I

11 cannot really tell you now because I am really tired. How many statements

12 did I give until then? Are you now saying that I never mentioned that

13 conversation until this date?

14 Q. Sir, sir, what I am stating here is that in your previous answer

15 you said that you hadn't had an opportunity to see this intercept before

16 you gave your statements to the Prosecution pursuant to the understanding

17 that you had for your plea agreement. And now I'm showing you -- I'm

18 contradicting you concretely and showing you that you admit to the

19 Prosecutor that you had seen a text of this on 2001. Correct? So you

20 would agree with me that you had seen it. Maybe you forgot, but that's

21 what you said.

22 A. Where? Where did I say that? Where did I say that I had never

23 seen that text before? It's really very difficult for me to follow you

24 across all of these documents. Where did I say that?

25 Q. Mr. Deronjic, you stated it only two minutes ago, lied on the

Page 6467

1 record here. You stated that you did not see this document, meaning the

2 intercept, before you gave your statements where you claim that

3 President Karadzic told you that somebody would come with instructions.

4 You stated that on the record. That's here today.

5 A. How? What do you mean? That's not true. I said that after

6 talking to the Prosecutor - and it is the Office of the Prosecutor who

7 showed me the document - we clarified the issue of these dots, gaps, et

8 cetera. And you see, I said in an earlier interview that I had seen the

9 document. If that was misunderstood, I'm sorry. That's not what I meant

10 to say. I didn't mean to say I had never seen that document before. I

11 only meant that we discussed and clarified the issue of gaps in the

12 conversation during the interviews. If that needs to be corrected, let it

13 be corrected.

14 Q. Thank you for that answer. And now, if I could go back to your

15 statement in 2002, which would have been after you saw the document, you

16 also injected some language into those gaps. And that's the language that

17 we talked about where you state you conveyed to President Karadzic your

18 concerns, and he says he's going to give instructions to Mladic so that

19 the prisoners could go to the camp or to the prison. That was your

20 understanding. Correct?

21 A. Well, again I don't have the text in front of me and I have to

22 take your word for it, otherwise I would have to find it. And truth to

23 tell, you don't sometimes quote accurately. You simply give me cause to

24 mistrust you.

25 Q. Let me ask you this, Mr. Deronjic: Earlier in a previous session,

Page 6468

1 did we not discuss this area where I read to you what you stated, that you

2 had concerned with Mr. Mladic, and Karadzic told you that he would send an

3 order? Do you recall that?

4 A. I do. I don't remember every detail, but I do remember that I

5 said that.

6 Q. Okay. All right. And we won't go over it since we covered that

7 area. And I think it's in the record and we can later on find out. Now,

8 in the Milosevic case you were asked a question by the Prosecutor, and I

9 thought -- I would like to get your interpretation.

10 The question was - and I'm reading from the transcript Wednesday,

11 26 November 2003. It's on page 29.629. And I'll read the question and

12 answer. I'll read it verbatim. It starts on page -- it starts on line

13 11.

14 "Q. Dealing simply with your last observation about Srebrenica

15 1995, being a logical finale, the only thing that could result, is that

16 something that you simply judge looking back, or was it something that was

17 in your mind as an observer at the time?"

18 That was the question. And here was your answer according to the

19 transcript.

20 "Your Honour, of course I was a participant in most of these

21 events, and I explained this in my statement in a very precise manner. Of

22 course I thought about everything that was going on during the war as

23 well. But I drew a great many conclusions after all these events when I

24 had the opportunity of having contacts with the Office of the Prosecution

25 that went on from 1997 onwards. I saw a series of documents which

Page 6469

1 explained the situation that I was in from various other aspects. Most of

2 these documents, orders, et cetera, were things I was not aware of at the

3 time when I was engaged in my work that had to do with the war conflict

4 itself."

5 Then there is -- do you remember being asked that question and

6 giving that answer?

7 A. Yes, I do.

8 Q. Okay. And I just want to read the next question to make sure that

9 I'm totally fair with you. The next question is: "I am not sure that

10 that answers the question, but you may say whether you thought about these

11 things at the time and thought that something like this was going to

12 happen or not. But if you don't want to answer further, I won't press

13 you."

14 The Prosecutor didn't want to press you at all in being concrete.

15 Go figure.

16 The answer is: "I have said that I realised many things during

17 the war itself, but that I finally came to my own conclusions after the

18 war operations in the area ended."

19 And then you're thanked by the Prosecutor, Mr. Nice. My question,

20 sir: Would not one get the impression from reading this that as part of

21 your formulation of the conclusions, your opinions, you drew on documents

22 that you either received in the field or looked at in the field, documents

23 you received from the Prosecution, conversations you had with your

24 friendly connections and others, conversations with the Prosecution, where

25 for instance they're pointing out that something might have been left out

Page 6470

1 in the gap, can we not draw that conclusion --

2 A. Which conclusion that is true?

3 Q. That these conclusions are based on a conglomeration of all of

4 this and not based on an independent and reliable memory.


6 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection, it's vague. It's unclear about what

7 conclusion he's referring to.

8 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm talking about all of them.

9 JUDGE LIU: At least I'm clear about the scope.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is clear to me as well,

11 Your Honours, and I will answer the question. It is just by accident that

12 I omitted my own memory when enumerating the sources. Of course I drew on

13 my own memory as well, as well as on subsequent documents, reflections.

14 And in responding to specific questions, I relied on the series of

15 documents that are in the possession of the Prosecution related to this

16 issue. You will notice that in my previous interviews you cannot find

17 this observation because when I was giving my last very voluminous

18 statement of 1999, I didn't have that. But when I saw this series of

19 documents, orders of various units, deployment of various units, et

20 cetera, the conclusion that I cannot help drawing was that it was an

21 extensive, completely misguided campaign that led to the results that we

22 now are familiar with, with the intentions of the author being perfectly

23 clear.

24 Q. Okay. That's your answer?

25 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection. That is argumentative.

Page 6471

1 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm asking the question. I'm going to --

2 JUDGE LIU: To me, the witness answered the question. There is no

3 need to reconfirm it.


5 Q. Is it not logical, sir, for you to fill in the blanks and maybe

6 add to the events as you recall them after seeing documents?

7 A. There's no question of that. I had already by then given my

8 interview without seeing the documents. And I didn't get any other

9 chance. Maybe I would have made certain additions to my interview, but I

10 didn't have the opportunity.

11 Q. Earlier - and I don't believe it was caught in the translation -

12 but I think you said that you're holding something back in the event -- in

13 the case that you should get indicted for Srebrenica. Did I hear you

14 correctly, that you have -- you're holding back information?

15 A. No. I did state all the facts and explain them. But there are

16 elements based in law that I could use in my defence case, should the need

17 arise, if I have to defend myself, God forbid.

18 Q. So we're talking law, not facts?

19 A. Yes. Yes.

20 Q. On the 14th of July, as I understand it, you were appointed to the

21 presidency of the war council for Srebrenica. Is that correct?

22 A. Yes, correct.

23 Q. And I believe -- so once you became the president of the war

24 council, your title as commissioner of Srebrenica ceased to exist.

25 Correct?

Page 6472

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. It would be fair to conclude, would it not, that you would have

3 known what your mandate was as a commissioner before your subsequent

4 mandate came into play, that is that of the president of the war council?

5 A. I knew that from two sources. From my conversation with the

6 president, who clarified certain things for me; and second, I tried to

7 find out what the post of the civilian commissioner implies. And if you

8 want me, I can explain to you in theory what powers I had and what I

9 didn't have. It is a well-known institution that carries with it certain

10 powers. And if you want, I'll explain.

11 Q. I don't need an explanation at this point, but in that appointment

12 there were others appointed as well, were they not, to the War Presidency?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Now, were you instrumental in selecting those names, or were they

15 loyal SDS party members that Karadzic drew from?

16 A. The best answer I can give you from my recollection is that a lot

17 of problems were involved in the selection. People were angry that I was

18 appointed at all. They were involved in discussions while president

19 talked to me. At one point the president left the office and told us, You

20 have exactly five minutes to reach an agreement and submit a paper.

21 Somehow, at long last, a list of names was drawn up, mainly according to

22 their wishes. I didn't want to get involved very much, and I didn't see

23 any reason to interfere. We tried to get the best possible composition of

24 the war council. I did make several suggestions, and it really was very

25 difficult to make that list, to decide.

Page 6473

1 Q. Okay. And on the list I note there is one Sretan Petrovic?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Now, is that the same Sretan Petrovic that you have talked about

4 in one of your statements?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Is that the same Sretan Petrovic who was wounded during the attack

7 on Srebrenica?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And when you were describing that one of the motivating factors

10 for you to go to Pale on July 7th or 8th or 9th was that their soldiers

11 were getting wounded and, in your opinion, unnecessarily. Was that on the

12 basis of him getting wounded, one of the bases?

13 A. That was the least of my reasons, although it was one of them.

14 But I can't agree that it's the only reason. I explained the reasons

15 already.

16 Q. Right. But I guess concretely speaking, was he injured before or

17 after you went to Pale?

18 A. I don't know. I think it was after.

19 Q. Okay. All right.

20 MR. KARNAVAS: Mr. President, at this time I would ask that we

21 take our break, primarily because -- well, I could go for a little bit

22 longer, but there is some information that is lacking to us. Apparently

23 we have learned that -- from Mr. Deronjic himself that he had an

24 interviewing session on May 4th, 2002. And apparently in the midst of the

25 interview he wished to have the tape recorder shut off. I'm told by the

Page 6474

1 Prosecutor that they have notes that they're trying to gather and have

2 them transcribed for us. I certainly would like to have those notes,

3 because it is subsequent to this period of time when there is a failed

4 negotiation during an untape-recorded session, which Mr. Deronjic has

5 indicated lasted many, many hours. It was subsequent to this that

6 Mr. Deronjic was indicted.

7 So I would like to know what is in the possession of the

8 Prosecution and to see to what extent I should go into it. And there is -

9 now that I think of it - one last matter that we could take at this point.

10 I don't know when we're supposed to break.

11 JUDGE LIU: Well, we usually will break in 20 or 15 minutes.

12 MR. KARNAVAS: I can use up the last 20 minutes. And then

13 Mr. McCloskey has indicated to me that he has asked that, for that --

14 those notes to be provided to us, hopefully during the break. And he's

15 rather hopeful, and that's encouraging. And if he's hopeful, I'm hopeful.

16 JUDGE LIU: Well, could I turn to Mr. McCloskey.

17 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. That's correct, and I had

18 promised Mr. Karnavas to get those to him shortly after the end of this

19 session so that he would be able to review them for the afternoon session.

20 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much.

21 Mr. Karnavas, did you almost cover all the aspects of your

22 cross-examination except one which might need private session?

23 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you for anticipating that, Your Honour. Yes,

24 yes. And I would like to have the caveat since we do have some extra time

25 in the afternoon, during the break, the lunch break, for me to sort of sit

Page 6475

1 down with my co-counsel to figure out if there are any last-minute

2 miscellaneous matters, as I would like to call them, but yes.

3 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much.

4 Could I at this moment ask Mr. Stojanovic whether you have any

5 matters that you would like to cross-examine this witness concerning with

6 your case.

7 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. While

8 preparing for this examination, we agreed to ask only a couple of

9 questions that follow from the last proofing session before the testimony

10 at trial, and that is the conversation that is the interview between

11 Mr. McCloskey and the witness on the 14th of January. That would be very

12 brief.

13 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much.

14 Are there any re-directs, Mr. McCloskey, at this stage?

15 MR. McCLOSKEY: I don't really see anything at this point,

16 Mr. President.

17 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.

18 Well, there is still 15 minutes left for the morning session. I

19 think we have to make the best use of the time available.

20 Yes, Mr. Karnavas, would you please continue.

21 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Your Honour. I suggest that we go into

22 private session as this point.

23 JUDGE LIU: Yes, we'll go into private session, please.

24 [Private session]

25 (redacted)

Page 6476












12 Page 6476 redacted, private session














Page 6477












12 Page 6477 redacted, private session














Page 6478












12 Page 6478 redacted, private session














Page 6479












12 Page 6479 redacted, private session














Page 6480

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 [Open session]

4 JUDGE LIU: Now we are in open session. And we'll resume at 3.00

5 in Courtroom I. The hearing for this morning is adjourned.

6 --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.42 p.m.

7 --- On resuming at 3.03 p.m.

8 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Karnavas. Have you received the documents?

9 MR. KARNAVAS: I have, Your Honour --

10 JUDGE LIU: Your microphone, please.

11 MR. KARNAVAS: I have, Your Honour. And I think perhaps it may be

12 more comfortable for Mr. Deronjic, since he doesn't have counsel here, to

13 have this discussion in private session. I leave that up to him. In

14 private session.

15 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Karnavas, it depends on what kind of

16 question you are going to ask, you know. Because you have to give me

17 somehow a reason so that we could come into the private session.

18 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, could we go into private session so I can

19 give you the reason?

20 JUDGE LIU: Yes, we'll go to private session, please.

21 [Private session]

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

Page 6481












12 Pages 6481 to 6501 redacted, private session














Page 6502

1 (redacted)

2 [Open session]

3 JUDGE LIU: Now we are in open session. You may proceed.

4 Cross-examined by Mr. Stojanovic:

5 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Deronjic.

6 A. Good afternoon, Mr. Stojanovic.

7 Q. I know you're waiting for your own proceedings next week and I

8 know that you're very tired after these four days, but I will try to just

9 put a couple of questions to have you clarify some things for us. The

10 questions relate to the notes from a meeting that you had with

11 Mr. McCloskey on the 14th of January, 2004. Do you remember that meeting?

12 A. Yes, the recent meeting. I remember it.

13 Q. According to those notes, it seems that you said that in July

14 1995, you said that you did not know Dragan Jokic. Is that correct?

15 A. Correct.

16 Q. So I just wanted to ask you a couple of questions regarding this.

17 Did you know Dragan Jokic at all during those war years, from 1992 until

18 1995, or does this only refer to July 1995?

19 A. I never saw Mr. Jokic until the time he came to the Detention

20 Unit. I didn't know him. I didn't even encounter him. I don't even know

21 if I heard his name, other than in matters relating to the indictment.

22 But I don't remember making a connection between those things. So the

23 answer is negative; I did not know him at all at any time in my life.

24 Q. Earlier you mentioned that you saw him for the first time when

25 you, or rather, when he came to the Detention Unit. Could you please

Page 6503

1 clarify that.

2 A. Yes. When he came I think that that was not the first time, but I

3 think it was after his provisional release, he came to the same floor

4 where I was. That's when we met. We talked during those days, so we got

5 a little bit better acquainted. We have some mutual friends in Zvornik,

6 and this is what we talked about.

7 Q. Thank you, Mr. Deronjic. In view of the fact that we know what

8 your posts were during the war from 1992 until 1995, and in view of the

9 duties that you talked about, did you ever have the opportunity of hearing

10 of any kind of role of Dragan Jokic in the events in Srebrenica in 1992

11 [as interpreted]?

12 A. No. I never had the opportunity to hear anything about him during

13 the whole war. I did not hear his name, and I did not connect his name in

14 any way to any kind of specific activity.

15 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Those are my questions. Thank

16 you, Your Honours, and thank you, Mr. Deronjic.

17 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much. I think there is something wrong

18 in the transcript. The question is that: "Did you ever have the

19 opportunity of hearing of any kind of role of Dragan Jokic in the events

20 in Srebrenica in 1995," instead of 1992. Is that right?

21 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, precisely. On page 7 [as

22 interpreted], if I am not mistaken, this page of the transcript, it states

23 1992. I asked from 1992 until the end of 1995. And the answer was, since

24 we're speaking the same language, maybe that's the problem, the answer

25 was: No, I did not. I think that's it, and I thank you, Your Honour.

Page 6504

1 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.

2 Any re-direct. Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

3 MR. McCLOSKEY: No, Mr. President.

4 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.

5 Any questions from the Judges? Judge Vassylenko.

6 Questioned by the Court:

7 JUDGE VASSYLENKO: Mr. Deronjic, you testified before this Bench

8 that president of the Republika Srpska, one Radovan Karadzic, ordered to

9 kill all Muslim prisoners and refugees in the Srebrenica enclave. In this

10 regard, I would like to know whether you delivered this order to

11 Colonel Blagojevic or discuss this order and details of murder operation

12 when you have met him?

13 A. Your Excellency, I was never -- I never had the opportunity to

14 discuss anything with Mr. Blagojevic. I did not ask for him. I did not

15 look for him. I only saw him on that one occasion that I described. And

16 I did not talk about this with Mr. Blagojevic.

17 JUDGE VASSYLENKO: And my next question: Do you have specific

18 facts or evidence to indicate that Colonel Blagojevic was directly and

19 actively involved in the crimes which were committed against Muslims from

20 Srebrenica enclave in July 1995?

21 A. Your Excellency, to the extent it was possible, I did do a lot of

22 investigations regarding Srebrenica, and I am stating before this Trial

23 Chamber that I never encountered any fact which would speak to or suggest

24 to me anything of the involvement of Mr. Blagojevic in those crimes. And

25 I would like to add something also. I asked Mr. McCloskey during our last

Page 6505

1 conversation if he could tell me what is Mr. Blagojevic being charged

2 with, what is the basic charge, and what is the possible -- what is the

3 possible evidence against him. And to the extent that he could, he did

4 give me an answer. I am curious, because I really -- I live in Bratunac.

5 I know a lot of people, and I never heard of Mr. Blagojevic, not earlier,

6 nor during that period. I never heard anything that is unpleasant or not

7 nice about Mr. Blagojevic.

8 JUDGE VASSYLENKO: Hvala hvalum. I have no more questions.

9 JUDGE LIU: Any questions out of Judge's questions?

10 Mr. Karnavas?

11 MR. KARNAVAS: No, Your Honour.

12 JUDGE LIU: Mr. Stojanovic?

13 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] No questions, Your Honour. Thank

14 you.

15 JUDGE LIU: Mr. McCloskey.

16 MR. McCLOSKEY: No, Your Honour.

17 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.

18 At this stage, are there any documents to tender? Mr. McCloskey?

19 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. P686, the gazette with the

20 six strategic objectives. 687, Mr. Deronjic's appointment as civil

21 commissioner. 688, the decision on the appointment of Mr. Deronjic to the

22 War Presidency. 689 is the English plea agreement documents. 689/B is

23 the B/C/S version of that. And we have what you had admitted under 92

24 bis, Ms. Stewart has given 690 as the transcript of Mr. Deronjic's

25 testimony in the Nikolic sentencing. 691 would be the Krstic appeal. 692

Page 6506

1 is the Milosevic trial. And 693 is the OTP witness statement dated 26

2 November 2003. All of those last four were the subject of the 92 bis

3 order of the Court.

4 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.

5 Any objections, Mr. Karnavas?

6 MR. KARNAVAS: No objections, Your Honour.

7 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.

8 Mr. Stojanovic?

9 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] No objections, Your Honour, to

10 these documents.

11 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much. We believe that those documents

12 are admitted into the evidence.

13 On the part of the Defence, are there any documents to tender?

14 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes there are, Your Honour. Given the extensive

15 line of questioning on the previous statements given by Mr. Deronjic, of

16 course we would be asking that all other statements that we referred to

17 here be also admitted for contextual purposes. I do understand, however,

18 that we have a ruling from prior times that generally, and I underscore

19 generally, those statements are not admissible, but I think this might be

20 one of those occasions where it might be worth having all of them. So I

21 would ask that those be admitted, and I believe it's -- I'm trying to

22 think of whether I have referred to all of these. If I could have a

23 moment.

24 Okay. It would be D92/1, D93/1, D94/1, D95/1, D96/1, D97/1,

25 D98/1, D100/1. I should point out that the D96/1 is the understanding of

Page 6507

1 the parties between the OTP and Mr. Deronjic. That's the one that we

2 received. And then D104/1. And I would also be asking perhaps that we

3 mark for identification and at least tender at this point so it's on the

4 record the three documents that were given by the Prosecution this

5 afternoon, the interview between Wajid Zia, Costello, and Miroslav

6 Deronjic, 4 May. And perhaps we could give it to you, 108/1, with A, B,

7 and C, A being the document entitled interview; B being the declaration of

8 investigator, Mr. Zia; and C being the typewritten, abbreviated notes of

9 Mr. Costello, dated 4/5/02.

10 JUDGE LIU: Any objections?

11 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, D96/1, as Mr. Karnavas has stated,

12 the understanding of the parties, should normally be something you have as

13 part of the plea agreement. It was read into one of his statements that

14 is evidence. But it should come in in this form as well, so we have no

15 objection to that.

16 The other matters, the previous statements, I think it's a good

17 rule, but to the degree the Court feels these would be helpful in their

18 analysis, I would not object.

19 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much.

20 Mr. Karnavas, as you rightly pointed out, generally speaking, we

21 do not admit the previous statement of the witness into the evidence.

22 Since we have the witness here and you have conducted considerable

23 cross-examination to this witness. But since we have already admitted the

24 statement, the latest statement of this witness, and we believe that the

25 previous statements are somehow related to this statement. So under these

Page 6508

1 circumstances in order for the Trial Chamber to have an overall assessment

2 of the truthfulness of this witness and to see the testimony of the

3 witness and an overall picture, as an exception we admit all those

4 documents you ask into the evidence.

5 Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

6 MR. McCLOSKEY: Just so the Court is clear, as you know

7 Mr. Deronjic has given so many statements. His final statement that you

8 admitted through 92 bis is a synopsis of a series of -- it must be eight

9 or nine days of tapes. And I don't think that was part of what Mr.

10 Karnavas offered. But -- and we have not offered it, because it's mostly

11 to do with 1992. But I -- just to be clear, that would be the whole

12 Deronjic package, if that's the intention, not to overburden you with

13 material. But that is the -- you will see that in the synopsis there are

14 references in the synopsis and particular facts where Mr. Deronjic speaks

15 more -- in more detail. And so if you, for example, get to the part

16 about -- there will be a very brief statement about the six strategic

17 objectives and then it will cite to the tape statement where he will talk

18 about it for three or four pages. So I don't know if you want all of it,

19 but that's all there is.

20 JUDGE LIU: Do you mean document D108/1, A, B, and C?

21 MR. McCLOSKEY: You mean of this -- the recent notes we have been

22 talking about?

23 JUDGE LIU: Yes.

24 MR. McCLOSKEY: No, that's different. The there were -- there's

25 volumes of interviews after Mr. Deronjic's arrest pursuant to the plea

Page 6509

1 agreements where he talked at length about -- mostly about 1992. And what

2 we have provided is a synopsis of that. There are two tapes from that

3 series of interviews where Srebrenica was specifically dealt with. And

4 I'm not sure if Mr. Karnavas tabbed those for evidence or we did, but I

5 think Mr. Karnavas did. So part of those tapes are in, but there's a

6 whole series of others that are not, but are referred to in the synopsis.

7 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. McCloskey, I think Mr. Karnavas offered some

8 documents which is in the written form with the D numbers as he read out

9 just now.

10 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. And as you'll see, two of those documents I

11 believe are part of this larger interview. And just so you know now, if

12 you review those, you will see that there are many other tapes. So I just

13 want to let you know, if you want the whole thing, we have that.

14 Everybody has been provided it in discovery, but it's a lot, that's why

15 we've kept to the synopsis, because it's mostly 92.

16 JUDGE LIU: We only entertain whatever the Defence counsel

17 tendered, which is limited to the numbers he read out just now. I don't

18 think that will include any tapes.

19 MR. McCLOSKEY: That's fine. I think we do have transcripts of

20 that material, but again I didn't think it was necessary for this

21 proceeding, and it's just a lot of extra work and reading.

22 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much. Since there's no -- yes.

23 MR. KARNAVAS: I understand what Mr. McCloskey is referring to. I

24 had, unfortunately, the task of reading all of that several times, all the

25 volumes. There are some tapes that are strictly related to Glogova. They

Page 6510

1 are interesting but not necessarily relevant to this case. And that's why

2 we didn't tender them. I don't object to all of them coming in,

3 somebody -- but if they're going to come in, they should be read. I

4 don't know if that's necessary. But if they want to get the full flavour,

5 that's fine. But we're talking hundreds and hundreds of pages.

6 JUDGE LIU: Yes. As I said, we'll only admit those written

7 documents in the written form. So I see there's no objections from

8 Mr. McCloskey, so the document tendered by the Defence team is admitted

9 into the evidence.

10 Well, Mr. Deronjic, thank you very much indeed for your

11 willingness to testify. And today is the first day of the Chinese New

12 Year. I will take this opportunity to wish you good luck in the new year,

13 the year of monkey. And we wish you good luck, especially in your

14 sentencing hearing which is scheduled next week.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Your Honour.

16 And I would like to wish you a Happy New Year as well, and I wish

17 everybody all the best.

18 JUDGE LIU: Thank you. The usher will take you out of the room.

19 Thank you very much.

20 [The witness withdrew]

21 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, while we're waiting. There is a

22 technical matter I'm told by Mr. Registrar here. 108 should actually be

23 108.1, .2, and .3, and not A, B, C. I hesitate to mention it, but I'm

24 getting these looks. So I assume that we want a clear record.

25 JUDGE LIU: Yes, thank you very much.

Page 6511

1 Mr. McCloskey, are there any changes in the witness list?

2 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, nothing seems to be easy, but I

3 have -- we just in the last day or two communicated with Mr. Stojanovic

4 regarding the upcoming handwriting expert. And this is an issue that I

5 had spoken with Ms. Sinatra about before when we first got the books. And

6 just to confirm that we did not have access to Mr. Jokic's handwriting

7 samples. I recently sent a letter to Mr. Stojanovic to that

8 effect. And he tells me that he and Mr. Jokic have now agreed to provide

9 a handwriting sample.

10 Now, it has to do mostly, I believe, with the material in the

11 workbook provided by Mr. Obrenovic, which as you're aware has some rather

12 significant entries in it. So it is a significant issue. And I think in

13 that -- this science of handwriting expertise is part of our evidence, we

14 have -- are now in the process of speaking to the expert to see if this

15 offer of a new handwriting -- or a handwriting example or examples would

16 assist her in her viewpoint. I haven't heard back from her yet. My guess

17 is the answer would be yes, which I am trying to push to be able to get

18 the examples, get them to her, get her test, and then get her here -- get

19 her report and get her here, of course, by the end of the trial -- our

20 case, which February 6th stands out as a date I don't want to fool around

21 with.

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

Page 6512

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 JUDGE LIU: So you think that we could finish the testimony of the

8 next witness in one day?

9 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. I have spoken to Mr. Karnavas, and as a day

10 or two ago, we think we should be able to finish this next witness

11 tomorrow. It should be a short witness and it really has nothing to do

12 with Mr. Stojanovic's situation. So we should be ready -- we shouldn't

13 have a problem. And I've just gotten a note. We have spoken to Ms. Barr

14 and she will be able to do her analysis in one day, and so hopefully we

15 will -- and she will be available Thursday or Friday next week. So it

16 looks like we're on track.

17 JUDGE LIU: But first of all, I think we need that latest report

18 concerning of the new signatures before her testimony.

19 MR. McCLOSKEY: Of course. I've spoken to Mr. Stojanovic and Mr.

20 Jokic is available tomorrow afternoon. And we will get the FedEx to --

21 the person is in the United Kingdom and it will take one day. So we will

22 make sure everybody has this hopefully one or two days beforehand.

23 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much. I think that's all for today.

24 We have been sitting for a long time, and we'll resume at 9.00 in

25 Courtroom III. The hearing for today is adjourned.

Page 6513

1 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned

2 at 4.40 p.m., to be reconvened on Friday,

3 the 23rd day of January, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.