Case No IT-95-14
1 Tuesday, 22nd July 1997
2 (10.00 am)
3 Mr. Robert Donia (continued)
4 Cross-examined by Mr. Hayman
5 JUDGE JORDA: Please be seated. Can we have the accused
6 brought in which the usher, please?
7 (Accused enters court)
8 JUDGE JORDA: Before we start our hearing today -- let us
9 wait until Mr. Blaskic sits down -- I would like to ask
10 Mr. Harmon to come here along with one of the Defence
11 lawyers, perhaps two of them, but either one, Mr. Hayman
12 or Mr. Nobilo. It is for an organisational issue that
13 I would like to have in camera here. So I'm asking you
14 to approach the bench. (Pause.)
15 All right. We can now resume our hearing, the
16 public hearing, that is. Usher, would you please have
17 the witness brought in, Mr. Donia?
18 (Witness enters court)
19 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Donia, good morning. Do you hear me?
20 A. Yes, sir. Good morning.
21 JUDGE JORDA: Have you rested?
22 A. Yes.
23 JUDGE JORDA: That's good. Mr. Hayman, you have the
24 floor.
25 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you. Good morning, Mr. Donia?
1 A. Good morning, Mr. Hayman.
2 Q. Let me return to the subject that we ended with
3 yesterday, Exhibit D/6, the document titled "joint
4 statement". Do you know of any agreements between
5 these parties prior to this date of April 1993 wherein
6 in substance the parties agreed to any of these points?
7 A. On 24th March 1993 in New York President Izetbegovic and
8 Mr. Boban, according to Lord Owen, held a five hour
9 session at which they reached agreement on the interim
10 arrangements, in Lord Owen's words, after President
11 Izetbegovic had been threatened by Mr. Boban with the
12 dissolution of their then military alliance.
13 Q. Do you know any more about what interim arrangements
14 were agreed upon on March 24th?
15 A. No.
16 Q. Do you know of any other agreements prior to 2nd April
17 1993 within any of the six points in the joint
18 statement, which is Exhibit D/6, were agreed upon
19 between the parties.
20 A. There was reported an agreement between President
21 Izetbegovic, on the one hand, and President Tudjman and
22 Mr. Boban, on the other hand in Zagreb on I believe it
23 was 28th of March. That pertained, as far as the
24 announcement was concerned, only to the establishment of
25 a joint command.
1 Q. That would relate -- would that relate to point three or
2 four in Exhibit D/6?
3 A. Well, it would -- it's similar to point four.
4 Q. After this date, April 2, 1993, when was the first
5 agreement between the parties ratifying or documenting
6 agreement on any of these six points in Exhibit D/6?
7 A. I do not know of any in the immediate time-frame of this
8 document.
9 Q. Do you know of any in April of 1993?
10 A. No.
11 Q. If the usher could assist, your Honour, I have a
12 document I would like placed before the witness.
13 (Handed.) This has been provided to the translators and
14 I understand they have had a chance to review it, but
15 they have not produced a written translation, your
16 Honour. If you would take a moment to review that,
17 Mr. Donia, please ...
18 A. Okay. (Pause.)
19 Q. Perhaps while we are doing that, your Honour, a site
20 translation could be provided?
21 JUDGE JORDA: Oui. What passage, Mr. Hayman, are you
22 talking about? What passage do you want to have
23 translated? I would like it not to be too quick so that
24 our interpreters can do it properly.
25 MR. HAYMAN: I would recommend the introduction, then under
1 "joint statement", paragraph 2, 3, paragraph 5 and the
2 paragraphs titled "enclosure" on the second page, which
3 are five short paragraphs. (Pause.)
4 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, thank you.
5 MR. HAYMAN: Mr. Donia, would you agree, walking through this
6 document with me, that under paragraph two on the first
7 page, under the heading "joint statement", the last
8 sentence regarding a cease-fire of hostilities, that that
9 is substantially equivalent to point 5 in Exhibit D/6,
10 the joint statement?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Moving on to the next page, to the top of the page,
13 which is the continued part of paragraph 3 of the joint
14 statement, I draw your attention again to the last
15 sentence regarding two things: first, the directive:
16 " ... to immediately start implementing the
17 agreement on the legality of both the army of Bosnia and
18 Herzegovina and the HVO".
19 Do you know to what that is a reference?
20 A. No.
21 Q. The next clause provides further a directive or an
22 agreement on:
23 "... the establishment of a joint command of both
24 forces made up of representatives of both headquarters".
25 Do you agree that that constitutes all of the
1 essential elements or components in point four of the
2 joint statement, which is Exhibit D/6?
3 A. It specified no deadline for that creation, but other
4 than that is in agreement with point four.
5 Q. And it directs the establishment of a command?
6 A. It does, yes.
7 Q. Then directing your attention to the portion marked
8 enclosure, paragraph three directs or indicates that the
9 permanent joint headquarters or command will be located
10 at Travnik. Do you see that?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Do you know whether or not that joint command was
13 established in Travnik?
14 A. No.
15 Q. You do not know?
16 A. No.
17 Q. In paragraphs 4 and 5 would you agree -- this is also of
18 the enclosure, in the enclosure -- would you agree that
19 the contents of those paragraphs constitute the same
20 agreement, the same elements present in point three of
21 Exhibit D/6, the joint statement?
22 A. Point three -- excuse me just a second.
23 Q. Strike that. Let me restate the question. Would you
24 agree that without specifying which force will have
25 command in what particular territorial area, that
1 paragraphs 4 and 5 of exhibit D/8 creates the same
2 structure or a similar structure as is contemplated in
3 paragraph 3 of Exhibit D/6, that is unified command over
4 HVO and ABIH forces?
5 A. There is a contradiction between that portion of point 4
6 -- point 4 in the enclosure, which states these would
7 be related to the operational command for joint
8 operations and not to provincial boundaries and the
9 specifications, I believe, of point two on the joint
10 statement. The establishment of a joint command under
11 joint headquarters seems to me to correspond to the
12 provisions in that first paragraph of point three.
13 Q. You are referring now to Exhibit D/6?
14 A. To the joint statement, yes.
15 Q. Wouldn't you agree that in paragraph 4 of exhibit D/8,
16 which is the agreement of 25th April, that an agreement
17 was made that military districts would be identified?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And would you further agree that each district was to
20 have a commander and a deputy, one from the HVO and the
21 other from the ABiH?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And would you further agree that line of command was to
24 have unified command overall BiH and HVO forces within
25 that military district?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Do you know whether in April, as of April 25th of 1993,
3 whether point two, that is the issue raised in point two
4 of Exhibit D/6, the joint statement, was that a live
5 issue in Central Bosnia, if you know? Was that an issue
6 of any contention between the parties, the presence of
7 so-called outside forces in the region?
8 A. Yes, it was.
9 Q. How do you know that?
10 A. It was -- I certainly have considered it as a source of
11 tension between the government and Bosnian Croat parties
12 for some months after the signing of the Vance-Owen by
13 the Bosnian government on 25th March.
14 Q. What issue do you perceive or believe to have existed
15 between the parties on that subject as of that date?
16 A. Well, the question of whether the armed forces would be
17 and police would be separated by the Vance-Owen
18 boundaries.
19 Q. By that you mean local -- whether local forces within
20 each canton or province would, in effect, be in charge?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. So you maintain that that was still an issue in dispute
23 as of April 25th, 1993?
24 A. That would be my understanding, yes, it was.
25 Q. If I may have a moment, your Honour ... (Pause.) We'll
1 come back to that issue after perhaps the break, if we
2 reach one, Mr. Donia. Perhaps if you have an
3 opportunity during the break, you, too, can review the
4 provisions of the Vance-Owen plan agreed upon on 25th
5 March 1993.
6 Q. Let me ask you: during the evening recess did you have
7 a chance to confer with anyone concerning whether
8 Exhibit D/6, the joint statement, was ever, in fact,
9 reached, that is whether any agreement was ever reached
10 between the parties indicated on that statement as to
11 those points?
12 A. Well, the first part of your question is yes, I have had
13 an opportunity to confer with members of the Prosecution
14 on that issue of the joint -- so-called joint statement
15 of 2nd April. I can't tell you that I reached a
16 conclusion on the second part of your question, which
17 was exactly the nature of the agreement reached.
18 Q. Did they give you their position?
19 A. No.
20 Q. Did they tell you what they believed with respect to
21 that issue?
22 A. I do not know that they have a position and they haven't
23 shared a particular belief with me on it.
24 Q. Did they make any additional materials available to you?
25 A. They made available to me two documents which I first
1 saw on 26th May 1997, which were the Statement of Facts
2 relevant not to this document but to the other one that
3 you showed me, from which you indicated that material
4 had been excised. I would tell you that, in fact,
5 I have seen that document before on 26th May. It is,
6 in fact, 41 pages long, has 169 paragraphs in it. So
7 when you stated that there was material excised, I think
8 you were referring to about 20 pages, and 168
9 paragraphs.
10 Q. That's right. In order to relieve the burden on the
11 interpreters and so forth, you can imagine it's
12 necessary --
13 MR. KEHOE: I object to Mr. Hayman's speech.
14 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, would you go ahead?
15 MR. KEHOE: I object to Mr. Hayman's speech, after yesterday
16 he gives this witness one paragraph from a 41 page
17 document with 169 paragraphs in it and uses as an excuse
18 the fact that he is trying to alleviate the burden on
19 the interpreters. I object to his speech. He did
20 what he did.
21 MR. HAYMAN: The facts speak for themselves, your Honour.
22 I can proceed.
23 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, all right. Then proceed.
24 MR. HAYMAN: Are you telling us, Mr. Donia, that you were in
25 error when you testified yesterday that you'd never seen
1 the materials which were Exhibit D/7?
2 A. I assume your designation of the exhibit is correct. I
3 had indeed seen those on 26th March as a very small part
4 of a much larger document of the length that
5 I indicated, yes.
6 Q. And did you discuss with the Prosecutor whether this
7 redaction of this document was some attempt by me to
8 deceive you as to the content of what I showed you and
9 what was Exhibit D/7?
10 A. No.
11 Q. Do you believe it was an attempt by me to deceive you?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. You testified yesterday that you first focused on the
14 so-called ultimatum, which you have -- a label you have
15 assigned to Exhibit D/6, some time in May of this year;
16 is that right?
17 A. That's -- no, I think I believe I said in June, either
18 late May or early June.
19 Q. And that's well after your book had been published?
20 A. Well after it, yes.
21 Q. And the material you came into possession of at or after
22 that point in time caused you to change your opinion as
23 to the causes of the conflict between Croats and Muslims
24 that erupted in Central Bosnia in April of 1993;
25 correct?
1 A. Perhaps not my broad general opinion, but the specific
2 causation certainly is much more closely pinpointed for
3 me at this point, yes.
4 Q. Now would your opinion change if you learned that at
5 least one influential actor on the ground in the region
6 did not view Exhibit D/6 as an ultimatum? Might that
7 cause you to change your opinion? I'm referring to an
8 actor on the side of the Bosnian government.
9 A. It might. I am of the belief that any student of
10 history has to at any time be willing to revise
11 conclusions based on new evidence --
12 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me, Mr. Hayman. Could you make your
13 question more specific because you are making your
14 question to people who know one another. I ask you to
15 rephrase your question making it very clear what you are
16 referring to. It's difficult for the judges to listen
17 to this dialogue between two people who know what
18 they're talking about. So make your questions more
19 specific, please.
20 MR. HAYMAN: I will, your Honour. I will try. Your
21 Honour, I have a document I would like placed before the
22 witness. It's a portion of a statement of a
23 prosecution witness whose identity and the contents of
24 the statement I am not free to publicly disclose,
25 including here in this public session. But I would
1 nonetheless like it placed before the witness and
2 I would ask him to read the last paragraph. I would
3 ask that a site translation of the last paragraph be
4 provided. The translators already have a copy of
5 this. All we need, your Honour, is some way to inform
6 the witness of the position of this individual and then
7 I simply intend to ask the general question: does
8 having this information in any way cause him to change
9 or even question the opinion he has proffered to the
10 court?
11 JUDGE JORDA: This document that you're going to show, is
12 this covered by any kind of confidentiality
13 requirement?
14 MR. HAYMAN: It is. It is covered by the requirement
15 imposed on the Defence not to disclose the identity of
16 certain prosecution witnesses, nor the contents of their
17 statements, unless necessary, for example, even in
18 investigation. I submit this is necessary and the
19 court can make whatever instructions to the witness that
20 it needs to in terms of future confidentiality of the
21 material.
22 JUDGE JORDA: I think we have to first hear what the
23 Prosecutor wishes to say.
24 MR. KEHOE: Quite candidly without going into closed session
25 with this statement and discussing it, it is quite
1 difficult to talk about the statement in the abstract
2 because I am not sure exactly which witness we are
3 discussing here. I am not sure if it's the 53
4 witnesses that Mr. Hayman was sought to exclude. I do
5 not have any more information in that regard than your
6 Honours. So if we ought to proceed in this fashion,
7 and there are other objections with cross-examining
8 someone from somebody else's statement, but before we
9 get to that point, I think it is crucial for the
10 Prosecution and for the court to determine who this
11 witness is, in closed session naturally. (Pause).
12 JUDGE JORDA: The Tribunal says we are now in private
13 session. We are not in camera but we will cut the
14 sound in the public gallery. How is this done
15 technically? Do you give the instructions? Do I? What
16 do we do? Is there an override I have to touch? It's
17 done? Are you sure?
18 (In closed session).
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19 (In open session).
20 JUDGE JORDA: Registrar, we are no longer in closed
21 session. It's not a private session now. If I can
22 judge by the fact that everyone has deserted us now.
23 If you would like to proceed without any further delays,
24 and we will try to finish by 12.45. This afternoon we
25 will start again at 3 o'clock with Mr. Donia to answer
1 the questions that my colleagues want to ask or that
2 I might want to ask. Mr. Hayman, we'll try to conclude
3 your cross-examination at 12.45.
4 MR. KEHOE: If I may be heard, your Honour, I will have a
5 few questions.
6 JUDGE JORDA: Bien sur.
7 MR. KEHOE: With all due respect, I will have a few
8 questions of Mr. Donia as well. I do not know if you
9 want to do that before your questioning or after it.
10 JUDGE JORDA: I will have to deliberate this with my
11 colleagues. Yesterday you were so eager that this
12 principle be agreed to, that there be one counsel, one
13 witness. At least I think this merits deliberations
14 with my colleagues. Otherwise we can see that the
15 Defence will also ask for time to reply. So we have to
16 be reasonable here. We will discuss this.
17 MR. KEHOE: May I comment on that proposition,
18 Mr. President?
19 JUDGE JORDA: Oui.
20 MR. KEHOE: Of course the Prosecution at this juncture has
21 the burden of proof and there are some items being
22 brought out by the Defence in cross-examination that
23 clearly need to be clarified for Mr. President and your
24 Honours' review.
25 MR. HAYMAN: If they can be, your Honour.
1 MR. KEHOE: Please. (Pause.)
2 JUDGE JORDA: All right. Comparing the different legal
3 systems is an enriching experience but it can also slow
4 things down. Together with my colleagues and pursuant
5 to a reading both of the spirit and the law of Rules 85
6 of the Rules, we have decided that the party which
7 called the witness to testify, that is will have the
8 right, in fact, to reply on new points. That means
9 that the Prosecutor in this case for Mr. Donia, because
10 this is a prosecution witness, may reply in order to
11 provide -- to find answers to new points that were
12 raised during these discussions. In principle this
13 same rule will apply to a Defence witness, which means
14 that in this case the Defence cannot reply. However,
15 if there were any new points which the Prosecutor, who
16 ordinarily should not intervene, brings in new
17 accusations, at that point the Tribunal will decide
18 whether or not it is right to give the floor to the
19 Defence. But the principle has now been established
20 that the witness was examined and cross-examined by the
21 Defence and the Prosecutor may reply only in order to
22 answer new points. Having settled this issue,
23 Mr. Hayman, I give you back the floor.
24 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, your Honour.
25 Mr. Donia, is your position with Merrill Lynch a
1 full-time job?
2 A. Yes, it is.
3 Q. Approximately how many -- strike that.
4 THE INTERPRETER: Can we have the microphone for the
5 witness, please? Thank you.
6 A. Can you hear me? Okay.
7 MR. HAYMAN: Do you have a title with Merrill Lynch?
8 A. Yes. I'm a Senior Resident Vice President.
9 Q. Do you have managerial responsibilities over a
10 particular group of people?
11 A. Yes, I do.
12 Q. What group is that?
13 A. It is a group of financial consultants in San Diego
14 County.
15 Q. How many persons do you supervise?
16 A. About 85.
17 Q. So it's a full-time job in every sense of the word?
18 A. In every sense of the word.
19 Q. The subject of your doctoral dissertation was "Bosnian
20 Muslims in transition 1878-1906"; is that correct?
21 A. That is correct.
22 Q. The subject was bounded by those temporal limits; is
23 that correct?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Is it also correct that that study, your dissertation
1 "dealt almost exclusively with elite Muslims"?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. You completed that dissertation in 1976?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. From 1974-1975 were you a Fullbright scholar?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Did you spend those years principally in Sarajevo?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. In fact, did you reside in Sarajevo during that period?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Did you reside anywhere else in Bosnia-Herzegovina other
12 than Sarajevo during the period of that Fullbright
13 scholarship?
14 A. No.
15 Q. Have you ever resided anywhere out of Sarajevo in
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina?
17 A. No.
18 Q. Now you also published a book in 1981; is that correct?
19 A. The book in 1981 was a revised version of the
20 dissertation of 1976, yes.
21 Q. You published it under the title "Islam under the double
22 eagles, the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1878-1914";
23 is that correct?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. So the time period covered by the book was extended by
1 six years, from 1908 in your dissertation, to 1914 in
2 the book; correct?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. This book, like your dissertation, also focused on
5 Muslims in the so-called elite during that period?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. What was your occupation prior to joining Merrill Lynch?
8 A. I was an assistant professor of history at the Ohio
9 State University Lima campus.
10 Q. For how many years had you held that position?
11 A. Three.
12 Q. When did you join Merrill Lynch?
13 A. 1981.
14 Q. Have you ever been a full professor?
15 A. No.
16 Q. The work you have done in the field of history since
17 1981, has it been funded or unfunded?
18 A. Unfunded.
19 Q. You testified that between 1994 and the present day you
20 made seven trips to Bosnia-Herzegovina and one trip to
21 Croatia?
22 A. One trip solely to Croatia. In most of the trips to
23 Bosnia I was also in Zagreb for anywhere from one to
24 four days.
25 Q. Did you personally fund those trips as well?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Now I would like to direct your attention to your 1994
3 book, "Bosnia and Herzegovina, a tradition betrayed".
4 I take it you only wrote the portions in the book after
5 1878?
6 A. That is correct. Chapters 5 forward and the
7 introduction.
8 Q. And your co-author, Dr. Fine, wrote the other portions of
9 the book?
10 A. That is correct.
11 Q. The year 1878 corresponds to the beginning of the
12 Hapsburg period, also the period you studied in your
13 dissertation; correct?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. But in the book you also wrote about periods of time
16 after the Hapsburg period ended; correct?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Did you undertake some kind of study or review of that
19 period prior to writing those sections of the book?
20 A. Well, yes. I think the book kind of began as a
21 conception of trying to provide a general survey,
22 history in one volume, of Bosnian history from the sixth
23 century forward, and my role in this was to cover that
24 period that is roughly defined as the modern period.
25 So that involved consulting a great deal of new
1 literature, trying to identify, you know, more recent
2 studies in some of these areas and trying to tell a
3 story that was concise by definition of a somewhat
4 summary character, but which hopefully provided an
5 integrated account of the history of Bosnia.
6 Q. Did you take a leave of absence from Merrill Lynch to
7 work on this study?
8 A. No.
9 Q. Did you take a leave of absence from Merrill Lynch to
10 work on the book in any regard?
11 A. No.
12 Q. Does the book rely principally on secondary sources or
13 primary sources?
14 A. I would say it relies principally on secondary sources
15 with the exception perhaps of some insights derived from
16 my own work in the period from 1878-1918.
17 Q. By secondary sources you mean other publications,
18 newspaper accounts, that kind of thing?
19 A. Yes. Other scholarly studies, some press accounts and a
20 variety of things, some of which arrived by the
21 Internet, and many of which are simply publications that
22 have come out.
23 Q. Would you agree that the book is written more for a
24 popular audience as opposed to a scholarly audience?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. You would not claim it is a scholarly work?
2 A. I would not deny it as a scholarly work but would leave
3 others to judge that. I should perhaps put it in a bit
4 of a context, in that up until this volume and one
5 other, which was written at just about the same time, by
6 Noel Malcolm called "Bosnia: A short history" there
7 really did not exist in any language a single
8 comprehensive history of Bosnia from the arrival of the
9 Slavs in the Balkan peninsula into the 1990s. So there
10 was a gap there in terms of the literature in general, a
11 gap which has proven surprisingly difficult even for
12 scholars in the region to fill.
13 Q. Would you agree, though, your book is not annotated to
14 any significant degree?
15 A. Oh, yes, I would agree.
16 Q. There are about 20 footnotes in 300 pages?
17 A. I didn't count but I would concur.
18 Q. Is it fair to say your book, "Bosnia and Herzegovina, a
19 tradition betrayed" focuses on urban Bosnia?
20 A. I wouldn't say it focuses on it. It ends up saying a
21 great deal about urban life in Bosnia over various
22 times. It is in many respects a political study, but
23 I wouldn't necessarily say it focuses on urban issues or
24 urban groups.
25 Q. Would you say your own experience in living in
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina was an urban experience?
2 A. Very much so, yes.
3 Q. And that is your own personal point of reference with
4 regard to this subject matter?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. You wrote an article in 1978; correct? You wrote a
7 chapter in a book perhaps in 1978; correct?
8 A. Well, I wrote -- I delivered a paper in 1978 which was
9 subsequently published by the -- I believe by the
10 Academy of Sciences of Bosnia and Herzegovina, if that's
11 what you are thinking of. I did co-author a piece with
12 an anthropologist, William Lockwood. I do not know
13 what exactly you have.
14 Q. That's what I am referring to, the piece with
15 Mr. Lockwood, titled "The Bosnian Muslims: Class,
16 Ethnicity and Political Behaviour in a European State"?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Do you recall generally that article?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Did you state in that article with reference to modern
21 day Bosnia and Herzegovina that:
22 "Villages are most commonly ethnically homogenous,
23 although some villages are mixed. In the latter case
24 ethnic groups are usually segregated into distinct
25 neighbourhoods or hamlets"?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Did you also state with respect to the subject of ethnic
3 groups:
4 "They tend to constitute three distinct social
5 systems superimposed on the same geographic region.
6 Contact is limited primarily to the economic sector,
7 especially among peasants, and this is reflected in
8 marriage patterns, visiting ..." --
9 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe?
10 MR. KEHOE: If I may, I would like a reference for what
11 counsel is reading from. I realise he is reading from
12 the Donia/Lockwood article but where in the article,
13 counsel?
14 MR. HAYMAN: Page 186 in the version I have, your Honour.
15 If I can finish the quote:
16 "Contact is limited primarily to the economic
17 sector, especially among peasants, and this is reflected
18 in marriage patterns, visiting patterns, communication
19 networks and world view".
20 Do you agree with that statement?
21 A. Yes. Those are the words of my co-author there,
22 Professor Lockwood, and I would certainly concur.
23 Q. Would you agree that your book "Bosnia and Herzegovina:
24 A Tradition Betrayed" has been criticised by some
25 reviewers as overly emphasising a, if you will, rosy
1 picture of urban life in Bosnia-Herzegovina before the
2 war?
3 A. Not only urban life, I would say, but for
4 over-emphasising perhaps the degree of harmony between
5 the nationalities generally.
6 Q. So that criticism has emanated from a number of sources,
7 has it?
8 A. It has certainly been cited in three or four reviews
9 I've seen, yes.
10 Q. Your Honour, I would like to have one of those book
11 reviews placed before the witness and marked as an
12 exhibit, if the usher could assist.
13 JUDGE JORDA: This will be D/10, Mr. Kehoe? D/10; right?
14 MR. KEHOE: Yes, your Honour.
15 MR. HAYMAN: Mr. Donia, this is the first two pages of a
16 review. I think it does continue into additional
17 pages, but what I wish to ask you about is on the second
18 page. The fourth full paragraph and I would like to
19 read it to you and then ask a question:
20 "Donia and Fine's view of Bosnian culture is on
21 the whole compelling, but its presentation is troubling.
22 Having defined Bosnian tradition as free from
23 inter-ethnic strife, they must engage in contortions to
24 explain ..."
25 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, give a little bit of time, please,
1 for the interpreters here. They have to be given the
2 text.
3 MR. HAYMAN: They have it, your Honour.
4 JUDGE JORDA: Would you recall the reference, please, for
5 the interpreters.
6 MR. HAYMAN: I will, your Honour. They do have this
7 story. It was provided to them yesterday highlighted
8 with the relevant paragraph highlighted. I will
9 reading from Exhibit D/10, which is from the Information
10 Access Company. It is a headline "Bosnia and
11 Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed", book reviews
12 published on September 12, 1994.
13 JUDGE JORDA: Go ahead.
14 MR. HAYMAN: Returning to the second page marked in the
15 upper right-hand corner as page 33, the fourth full
16 paragraph reads as follows:
17 "Donia and Fine's view of Bosnian culture is on
18 the whole compelling, but its presentation is
19 troubling. Having defined Bosnian tradition as free
20 from inter-ethnic strife, they must engage in
21 contortions to explain the region's long record of
22 bloodshed, including peasant revolts under the Ottomans
23 and local nationalist (especially Serbian) resistance to
24 Hapsburg, Royal Yugoslav and Titoist rule. All of
25 these had ethnic and religious aspects. When such
1 purported aberrations are attributed solely to class
2 differences or "outside forces", the argument begins to
3 sound circular. Bosnia is tolerant, and if it sometimes
4 hasn't been, it wasn't acting like Bosnia. By focusing
5 on urban culture as the true picture of Bosnia, the
6 authors neglect the more refractory countryside where,
7 in fact, much of the current conflict is rooted.
8 Finally, the atrocities of World War II constitute an
9 exception so drastic it virtually disproves the rule".
10 Do you see that passage, Mr. Donia?
11 A. Yes. In fact, I read it before.
12 Q. Are there other critiques and criticisms out there in
13 the press touching upon some or all of these strains?
14 A. Certainly.
15 Q. Now your book was written you state in the early pages:
16 "To shed light on the sources of the Bosnian
17 conflict that began in early 1992"; correct?
18 A. That is correct.
19 Q. Is there any mention in your book of Tihomir Blaskic?
20 A. No.
21 Q. Now I would like to direct your attention to Exhibit 4A,
22 which is a chronology attached to an outline that you
23 prepared. Do you have Exhibit 4A, which I believe is
24 an English translation of Exhibit 4? While the witness
25 is finding that, your Honour, perhaps the usher could
1 hand out an additional exhibit. Do you find that
2 exhibit?
3 A. Is this lands of the western Balkan chronology. There
4 is an outline, ICTY presentation outline and attached is
5 a chronology.
6 MR. HAYMAN: Chronology of six pages. The total document
7 appears to be six pages in length?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. I would like to direct your attention to the last page,
10 marked as page 6, of Exhibit 4A, the English
11 translation, to an event that you cite as having
12 occurred on 9th July 1993. It reads as follows:
13 "Meeting Owen and Stoltenberg in Zagreb, Croatian
14 President Tudjman accepts the idea that if Croats want Novi
15 Travnik, Vitez and Busovaca, they will have to give up
16 Stolac to Muslims".
17 Do you see that entry?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Did you get the fact of that event from your own
20 personal knowledge or some other source?
21 A. I believe I got that from Lord Owen's book.
22 Q. Did you make a decision to include that in the
23 chronology or did someone else suggest you do so?
24 A. No, I made the decision to include it.
25 Q. Now would you agree that in the -- that this event, as
1 depicted by Lord Owen in his book "Balkan Odyssey" that
2 he depicts this event as President Tudjman making a
3 concession in order to bring about the success, if you
4 will, of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. In fact, if you turn to the next exhibit which has been
7 placed in front of you, excerpts of the Lord Owen book,
8 "Balkan Odyssey" -- do you have that? Have you been
9 provided with that? No. I think it's coming your
10 way. It has been marked as exhibit D/11. Have you
11 read "Balkan Odyssey", Mr. Donia?
12 A. Yes, I have.
13 Q. If you would turn to page 209, there is a portion that
14 has been highlighted. I would like to read it to
15 you. This is page 209 of exhibit D/11, excerpts from
16 Lord Owen's book "Balkan Odyssey":
17 "The most important result from our two meetings
18 on 9th July, respectively in Belgrade and Zagreb, was
19 that Milosevic and Tudjman were now committed to
20 reaching 30 per cent of territory for a Muslim majority
21 republic. Over lunch with me, Tudjman seemed
22 grudgingly to accept that if the Croats wanted Novi
23 Travnik, Vitez and Busovaca, then the arithmetic alone
24 dictated that they would have to give Stolac to the
25 Muslims. A map for a predominantly Muslim republic
1 from the Sava to the sea was now becoming closer to
2 reality ..."
3 Would you agree that this agreement recounted by
4 Lord Owen for a 30 per cent territorial share for a
5 Muslim republic was a breakthrough in the Vance-Owen
6 peace process?
7 A. Just to clarify, I believe this was at the time when
8 Mr. Vance was gone and we had Owen and Stoltenberg
9 working on the various plans that made this up.
10 Q. The continued effort?
11 A. Yes. I would agree. I think it was one of a number of
12 discussions that reached the percentage numbers that the
13 negotiators were seeking to arrive at, and I would
14 therefore agree with you that it's a breakthrough of
15 sorts.
16 Q. Would you agree that as used in this passage the phrase:
17 "If the Croats wanted Novi Travnik, Vitez and
18 Busovaca ... they would have to give Stolac",
19 that that's a reference to the boundaries of
20 provinces or cantons under the Vance-Owen or
21 Owen-Stoltenberg Agreement; correct?
22 A. Yes. Again Vance-Owen was dead by now as a plan, so
23 I think the notion that he was grudgingly accepting this
24 trade-off speaks for itself. He was willing to make
25 that trade-off and clearly on a arithmetic basis Stolac,
1 which was then under Croat control, would have to go to
2 the Muslims.
3 Q. But this was not part of a discussion. This statement
4 you put in your chronology does not reflect any
5 annexationist intentions or discussions engaged in on 9
6 July 1993; correct?
7 A. Correct.
8 Q. In terms of annexationist as territory being annexed in
9 some way to the Republic of Croatia. Do you agree with
10 that?
11 A. I would agree.
12 Q. Now four entries down from the one we've been discussing
13 on your chronology, again Exhibit 4A, the English
14 translation of Exhibit 4, I would like to direct your
15 attention to an entry from December of 1993, which
16 reads:
17 "President Tudjman informs Ambassadors of EU
18 countries, then Owen and Stoltenberg, that Vitez and
19 Busovaca can under no circumstances be given: must be
20 included in predominantly Croatian unit of Bosnia".
21 Again did you obtain that information from the
22 book "Balkan Odyssey"?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Would you agree, based on your review of "Balkan
25 Odyssey", that President Tudjman made this statement,
1 assuming it was made, in the context of negotiations
2 concerning the terms of the so-called EU action plan?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. This was a proposed union of three republics within
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And that this was a proposed solution to the conflict
8 proposed by the EU? Would you agree with that?
9 A. That's correct, yes.
10 Q. And that every party to these discussions at this point
11 in time was engaging in negotiations concerning what
12 territory might be included in each of these three
13 constituent republics within this EU solution, proposed
14 solution to the conflict?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. I would like to direct your attention in Exhibit D/11 to
17 page 77, the bottom of page 77. Lord Owen writes --
18 and if you look over on page 76 you will see this is a
19 reference to November, the November of 1992 time
20 period. That's the point at which we are in in the
21 book. Lord Owen writes at the bottom of page 77,
22 Exhibit D/11, excerpts from "Balkan Odyssey":
23 "I knew at this early stage that Tudjman had
24 accepted recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its
25 internationally agreed boundaries as a necessary price
1 for recognition of Croatia, but had never hidden his
2 belief that Bosnia-Herzegovina was not sustainable, and
3 the Cvetkovic-Macek map was more than a glint in his
4 eye".
5 Do you see that passage?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Would you based on your knowledge and study agree as of
8 this date President Tudjman had accepted the
9 internationally agreed upon boundaries of BiH?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Turning to page 127 of these excerpts from Lord Owen's
12 book, in the right-hand side of the page there is a
13 reference to:
14 "... the Croatian role in controlling all arms
15 supplies to the Bosnian Government".
16 Do you agree that the Republic of Croatia
17 controlled the flow of virtually all arms to the
18 Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Would you agree that an extensive amount of arms were,
21 in fact, provided by the Republic of Croatia to the
22 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the course of the
23 war?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Do you see the passage below the one I noted in which
1 President Izetbegovic is addressing at a certain point
2 in time exactly what quantity of arms he did possess and
3 his government did possess? Do you see that passage?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. You have characterised the Croat militia in Bosnia as
6 existing principally in Western Herzegovina or based on
7 troops drawn from, personnel drawn from Western
8 Herzegovina. Could you clarify that?
9 A. I do not --
10 Q. I'll restate the question.
11 A. Okay.
12 Q. Do you agree that the Croat militia in Bosnia and
13 Herzegovina was drawn principally from personnel in
14 Western Herzegovina?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And would you agree that those individuals had a
17 principal loyalty to political leaders within
18 Herceg-Bosna?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Namely Mate Boban?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Would you also agree that an organisation known as HOS
23 came to be merged within this Croat militia derived from
24 western Herzegovina personnel?
25 A. Yes. That's my understanding, that in the course of the
1 Summer or Fall of 1992 that that took place.
2 Q. Who was HOS? What is HOS?
3 A. HOS was a kind of an alternative paramilitary
4 organisation. Its political leaders -- and I know very
5 little about its military composition and so on -- its
6 political leaders were probably more sympathetic to a
7 Muslim participation in their ranks or at least more
8 appealing to Muslims and so attracted a fair number of
9 them. It also, of course, came into conflict with the
10 HVO in the summer of 1992.
11 Q. The HOS forces did?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Would you agree that HOS was an ultra nationalist
14 organisation?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And that members of HOS tended to have extreme
17 nationalist views?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Would you also agree that to the extent one can
20 generalise, Bosnian Croats residing in Western
21 Herzegovina tend to have extreme or highly nationalist
22 views?
23 A. As a rule, yes.
24 Q. Would you agree that that stands in some contrast to the
25 views held, again to the extent one can generalise, to
1 views held by Bosnian Croats native to the Central
2 Bosnia area, where there is a greater mix of ethnic
3 groups? Would you agree with that proposition?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Do you know what part of Bosnia the defendant in this
6 case came from, where he grew up?
7 A. I don't, no.
8 Q. Were most of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina forces
9 involved in the conflict with Bosnian Croats in Central
10 Bosnia, were they members of "all Muslim brigades"?
11 A. I just don't know.
12 Q. Would you turn to page 234 of "Bosnia and Herzegovina:
13 A Tradition Betrayed" and see if that refreshes your
14 recollection in that regard, at the top line?
15 A. I say:
16 "Most of the fighting was done by all Muslim
17 brigades".
18 Q. Would you agree that in the Spring of 1992 or beginning
19 in the Spring of 1992 Muslim irregulars and gangs
20 terrorised civilians in government-controlled areas? If
21 you would like to refer to the passage, it is at page
22 267.
23 A. Yes, I would agree.
24 Q. Would you further agree that for the most part the
25 activities of these Muslim units were restrained by the
1 government, even though Muslim gangs were tolerated
2 because of their contributions to the war effort?
3 A. There's -- I'm sorry. The first part of that question
4 is -- I mean, I would agree they were tolerated by the
5 government because of their contribution to the war
6 effort, but there was also some effort to restrain
7 them. In October of 1993 the gang control of Sarajevo
8 basically came to an end at the insistence of Prime
9 Minister Selezic.
10 Q. Do you know how many of the dead in Yugoslavia during
11 the World War II time period were victims of Yugoslav
12 violence, that is died at the hands of other Yugoslavs?
13 A. As I've said, I have again reconsidered that issue in
14 the light of recent scholarship and I can't give you a
15 direct answer to your question if terms of numbers but
16 feel there has been a substantial tendency to exaggerate
17 those numbers over time, and the total number of dead
18 I think is -- the number right around 1 million is
19 something that I think has been convincingly established
20 by demographic work.
21 Q. So you would disagree with Lord Owen's words at page 9
22 of Balkan Odyssey in Exhibit D/11 that:
23 "In total of the 1.7 million Yugoslavs killed
24 during the second World War, about 1 million were slain
25 by fellow Yugoslavs".
1 Would you disagree with that statement?
2 A. The statement is a reflection of a very commonly used
3 figure. As I say, I think the newer work on it would
4 suggest that it probably is lower than 1.7 million. So
5 yes, I find the newer work convincing and would think
6 that the number is somewhat lower than that.
7 Q. You stated in your direct testimony that at some point
8 in 1993 Bosnian Croats:
9 " ... had a window of opportunity to implement
10 some of these territorial ambitions that were expressed"
11 in the formation of Herceg-Bosna. Transcript page 216,
12 lines 16-22. Would you like to refer to that passage?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Do you find that passage?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. When in your view was this "window"?
17 A. It really began with the adherence by President
18 Izetbegovic on behalf of the Bosnian government to the
19 Vance-Owen plan, and at that time, and by "window of
20 opportunity" what I mean is that the entire energy and
21 attention of the international community was directed
22 towards the Serbian, Bosnian Serb position at that time
23 vis-à-vis the Vance-Owen plan. They were renewing some
24 military activity in Eastern Bosnia. They were
25 engaging in some very complex negotiations, trying to
1 establish greater ethnic purity in a couple of cities of
2 Eastern Bosnia and the international community was
3 increasingly talking about sanctions, about possible
4 greater military involvement in the event that either
5 the agreement was signed or that the Serbs declined to
6 do this. The attention of the international community
7 was just solely riveted on events there.
8 Q. When was the window? That was my question. Can you
9 answer the question? When was the window?
10 A. Well, I told you the beginning date of it. It's the
11 time that the Bosnians signed on, and that would be 25th
12 March. Probably went through the 5th May, the time
13 that the third Bosnian assembly rejected the provisions
14 of Vance-Owen.
15 Q. Now to posit that there was a window for territorial
16 conquest requires military superiority; would you agree?
17 A. To posit that there was a window for military conquest
18 would require military superiority, unless one's
19 energies on the other side were directed to some other
20 objective, so at least, let us say, in the immediate
21 region or area it would require military superiority,
22 yes.
23 Q. What happened to the territories controlled by the
24 Bosnian Croats in Central Bosnia after conflict erupted
25 on April 16th, 1993 until the end of the conflict,
1 February 1994? Did they gain territory or did they lose
2 territory?
3 A. They lost territory.
4 Q. In fact, they lost a lot of territory, did they not?
5 A. Yes, they did.
6 Q. If you turn to Exhibit D/11, excerpts from "Balkan
7 Odyssey", the last page, page 363, there is a map. Do
8 you see the map?
9 A. Are you talking about "Balkan Odyssey"?
10 Q. "Balkan Odyssey", the last page of these experts, on
11 page 363. Do you see the map?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. You drew upon a number of maps from this book in your
14 direct testimony and they were admitted as exhibits,
15 didn't you?
16 A. Yes, I did.
17 Q. Was this map one of them?
18 A. No, it was not.
19 Q. This map, would you agree, purports to indicate the
20 situation regarding territory held either by the Bosnian
21 Croats or by the Bosnian government on 12th October
22 1995. Do you agree with that?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Would you also agree that these territories reflected in
25 this map were essentially locked in at the end of the
1 conflict in February of 1994 and they are, in fact, the
2 same as those that would have existed in October of
3 1995?
4 A. Yes. They are essentially the same.
5 Q. Now focusing your attention to Central Bosnia, do you
6 see a little bow tie with Vitez in the middle of the bow
7 tie?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And that is a Croat enclave within Central Bosnia;
10 correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Do you see that enclave has been cut off from another
13 enclave around the area of Kiseljak?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Do you have the other maps before you that were admitted
16 during your testimony?
17 A. I don't believe I do, sir.
18 Q. Would one of those maps depict the territories
19 controlled by Bosnian Croats prior to April 16th, 1993?
20 Did you include such a map?
21 A. No, I have no -- all the maps I gave to you I believe
22 were peace proposals and not territorial control by --
23 JUDGE JORDA: Not to make a comparison with other maps.
24 It has to be clear to the judges. You can't just speak
25 about maps. You are comparing a map which was not used
1 by the witness. I mean, you compare it with the maps
2 that he himself made, that he drew from the same work.
3 Could you be clearer, please?
4 MR. HAYMAN: Mr. Donia, you are stating you did not reference
5 in your testimony any maps reflecting terrain held by
6 Bosnian Croats prior to April 16th, 1993; is that right?
7 A. I believe that's correct, yes. There may have been
8 some congruence between the peace plans and the
9 territorial holdings, but the maps that I presented were
10 specifically to show peace plan proposals.
11 Q. But you would agree that the map on page 363 of the
12 "Balkan Odyssey" excerpts, Exhibit D/11, shows the
13 dramatic loss of territory that resulted, that is loss
14 of territory by Bosnian Croat forces, that resulted from
15 the conflict with Bosnian Muslim forces that began in
16 April 1993, would you not?
17 A. That I would agree. Just to make a point, there are
18 some gains there which reflect Croat military offensives
19 prior to 12 October 1995 in the kind of north-western
20 area, but your point is fundamentally correct. There
21 were gains by the Bosnian government vis-à-vis the
22 Bosnian Croats prior to the time that this map came into
23 effect.
24 Q. Are there any gains reflected in the central Bosnia
25 region reflected in this map vis-à-vis land held prior
1 to April 15th, 1993 that you are aware of?
2 A. Again I don't have the prior map, but the situation from
3 April 15th, 1993 until the time of this map would
4 clearly not reflect any gains in that area. It would
5 reflect losses and gains by the Bosnian government
6 forces.
7 Q. Your Honour, if I may have a moment to review my notes,
8 and while I'm doing that, perhaps I would like to move
9 for admission of all other remaining exhibits that have
10 been tendered during the cross-examination of this
11 witness.
12 JUDGE JORDA: We are going to suspend -- do you want to say
13 something, Mr. Kehoe?
14 MR. KEHOE: Yes, your Honour. If there's some type of
15 admission of this Statement of Facts excerpt by counsel,
16 I am not only going to object, but contest this
17 document, and ask the court for some sanctions with
18 regard to this document due to the total impropriety of
19 trying to admit a Statement of Facts or any portion
20 thereof into evidence. That's not to argue with D/6,
21 which is the joint statement, which is a separate
22 document. I'm simply talking about the Statement of
23 Facts and the excerpt from the Statement of Facts and
24 the impropriety of offering such a document to the Trial
25 Chamber.
1 MR. HAYMAN: I have no idea what that's a reference to. If
2 there is a portion of it that needs to be sealed because
3 there is something sensitive, I have no objection to
4 that. I didn't reference the identity of any witness
5 or any other content. It was offered because it was
6 relevant what this witness had and had not been told,
7 I believe, by the Prosecution.
8 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe?
9 MR. KEHOE: Quite simply, your Honour, what was shown to
10 this witness was, as this witness pointed out, one
11 paragraph of a 41 page document, in which there were 169
12 paragraphs, in addition to the supplementary Statement
13 of Facts, which I believe is about 18 pages. I think
14 it is somewhat clear. I believe that Mr. Hayman argued
15 this during the motion on the vagueness issue, that the
16 presentation of facts, the facts in the statement that
17 were given to the Confirming Judge, could not be
18 presented to this Chamber. I believe, Mr. President,
19 that to some degree your Honour echoed that during oral
20 arguments on that subject, but quite clearly Mr. Hayman
21 stridently put forward that position in writing and
22 orally. Nevertheless he presents a portion of a
23 Statement of Facts that is only supposed to go to a
24 confirming judge and not to a Trial Chamber to this
25 court, knowing full well, based on his prior comments,
1 that it was improper. Now quite clearly the way to
2 rebut that statement --
3 JUDGE JORDA: What are you specifically -- what exhibit are
4 you particularly speaking about? What document are you
5 talking about?
6 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, I'm referring to D/7, which is the
7 exhibit that Mr. Hayman presented yesterday.
8 JUDGE JORDA: In general the problem of exhibits was dealt
9 with during the first week. The Tribunal showed that
10 it desired to take all exhibits that would be filed so
11 long as it did not have to settle identification problem
12 relating to protected witnesses, because each of the
13 parties would try to argue with the judges that the
14 document in question serves only a part of the interests
15 of the adversary. I believe that this issue was more
16 or less settled. I would like to consult my
17 colleagues. (Pause.)
18 The exhibit will be accepted, as in general others
19 are put into the file. Each of the parties has to
20 evaluate the partial nature of this or that exhibit and
21 during their final deliberations the judges will decide
22 to what extent they will take into account the
23 probability or credibility of this or that document.
24 However, there is an exception for those documents which
25 are attached to the file and which would raise problems
1 as far as the identity of witnesses are concerned. As
2 it is now 12.45, we are suspending our hearing and we
3 will resume at 3 o'clock.
4 (12.45 pm)
5 (Luncheon adjournment)
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1 (3.00 pm)
2 JUDGE JORDA: We can resume our hearing. Usher, have the
3 accused brought in, please.
4 (Accused re-enters court).
5 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, when we broke a while ago, the
6 Registrar was taking in all the documents and numbering
7 them. Mr. Hayman, I now give you the floor to continue
8 the cross-examination, which would last for about one
9 hour; is that right? A maximum of one hour?
10 MR. HAYMAN: No more than ten questions, your Honour.
11 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, but if each of the questions lasts an
12 hour, that will take up a lot of time. All right.
13 Proceed. Proceed please.
14 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you. Mr. Donia, we have spoken of your
15 current conclusions and opinions regarding the causes of
16 the conflict in April of 1993 in Central Bosnia.
17 I would like to ask you another question about the
18 causes of that conflict as you set them forth in your
19 book, "Bosnia and Herzegovina, a tradition betrayed".
20 Would you agree in your book you identify two events as
21 specific cautions of the conflict in the spring of 1993?
22 A. I identified two general factors, I believe. I said
23 sovereignty and symbols were the primary cause of the
24 outbreak. Perhaps you would like to ...
25 Q. If you would like to refresh your memory on page 252,
1 you are most welcome to. Let me ask specifically do
2 you state in the book at the top of page 252 that first:
3 "Croatian commanders demanded that Bosnian army
4 units in Western Herzegovina, an area assigned to
5 Croatian control under the peace plan, be merged into
6 the Croatian army"?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Do you also state:
9 "In the Travnik area, another region designated as
10 Croatian in the plan, despite its large Muslim
11 population, Croatian officers insisted that the Croatian
12 flag fly beside the Bosnian flag"?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Are those the two specific incidents, if you will, or
15 events that you cite as causes of the spring conflict?
16 A. These are the factors that I cited in the book, yes.
17 Q. Later on in the Fall of 1993 where you agree with Lord
18 Owen, and I would like to direct you to page 237 of
19 Exhibit D/11, which are the excerpts from Lord Owen's
20 book, "Balkan Odyssey", would you agree with his
21 statement at page 237 that in the time-frame, September
22 1993:
23 "The Muslims had clearly chosen to continue with
24 the war, believing that sanctions would soften up the
25 Serbs and on the advice of their military commanders,
1 that they could defeat the Croats in Central Bosnia"?
2 A. I'm sorry. I don't have that exhibit at hand.
3 Q. I think you should be allowed to read this sentence in
4 print?
5 A. Thank you. 239?
6 Q. 237, the top of the first full paragraph, the sentence
7 beginning with the phrase:
8 "The Muslims had clearly chosen ..."
9 A. I probably would not agree with the word "clearly"
10 because I am not too sure it was all that clear, but
11 I agree with the general thrust of that assessment by
12 Lord Owen.
13 Q. Now we have spoken a great deal during your testimony
14 concerning the ancient tribal hatreds, this is,
15 starting, I believe, in the sixth century and going, of
16 course, right up into the 20th century. I would like
17 to direct your attention now to the spring of 1993.
18 The war in Bosnia had been raging for roughly how long
19 at that point, in months?
20 A. Let us say about 13 months, 14 months.
21 Q. So over a year?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And perhaps as many as 1 million refugees had been made
24 homeless and remained within Bosnia?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Would you agree that by the spring of 1993 inter-ethnic
2 tensions were at an extraordinarily high level?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And would you agree that those tensions at times and in
5 certain places were characterised by feelings such as
6 terror?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Fear?
9 A. Certainly.
10 Q. Paranoia?
11 A. Unquestionably.
12 Q. You write in your book that certainly by the middle of
13 1993, if not the spring, atrocities had been committed
14 by members of each of the three major ethnic groups in
15 Bosnia. Would you agree that in the course of the war
16 atrocities were committed by members of the three ethnic
17 groups, major ethnic groups?
18 A. I think if you look at the specific comments that
19 I made, they pertain to the armed forces of these three
20 groups. I don't believe I made the statement that the
21 ethnic groups per se committed those atrocities.
22 Q. So you state that members of the armed forces of all
23 three combatants committed atrocities?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And would you agree that the fact that there were
1 victims of such atrocities of all sides further
2 increased tensions and the volatility of the situation
3 in Bosnia in 1993?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. I want to ask you about two examples. One, you cite
6 the deaths of approximately 35 civilians in a town
7 called Kriz, K-R-I-Z, at the hands of the soldiers of
8 the Bosnian army in September 1993?
9 A. Yes, I do.
10 Q. The victims, were they mixed Serb/Croat?
11 A. I do not know. I have not revisited that question
12 since the writing of the book.
13 Q. Then also I want to ask you and finally, on page 255 you
14 discuss the tragic killing of two clerics in a monastery
15 in Fojnica. Do you describe in that passage how in the
16 course of a battle between the armed forces of the
17 Bosnian Croats and the government forces that a rumour
18 spread among the government forces defending Fojnica
19 that the Franciscan monastery in Fojnica harboured a
20 radio transmitter and was being used as a storehouse for
21 weapons?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And apparently based on this rumour soldiers from the
24 government army entered the monastery on November 13th,
25 1993 and murdered the two clerics in the monastery?
1 A. I state that those soldiers did enter the monastery on
2 that date. I don't tie it to the rumour of the radio
3 transmitter per se.
4 Q. Can you think of anything else that would cause members
5 of any military to murder religious figures other than
6 feelings such as the paranoia, fears and prejudices that
7 could be inflamed as a result of rumours of the type you
8 identify in that passage?
9 A. I think paranoia, fears and prejudices are exactly what
10 is at stake here rather than transmitters.
11 Q. No further questions, your Honour. Thank you,
12 Mr. Donia, for sharing your views with us.
13 JUDGE JORDA: The cross-examination is now concluded.
14 Mr. Kehoe, in agreement with the Trial Chamber, which has
15 set up its case law in this matter, will now take the
16 floor again. The Trial Chamber wishes to ask the
17 Prosecutor to comply with what was decided, that is the
18 questions that you ask will not be repetitions of
19 questions that have already been asked during the
20 initial questions, but new ones. Mr. Kehoe, you are
21 under -- you are free but you are being watched.
22 MR. KEHOE: Thank you, Mr. President.
23 Re-examination by Mr. Kehoe.
24 MR. KEHOE: Turning to the last line of questioning by the
25 Defence, I think you described the situation in Central
1 Bosnia as one of fear and anxiety and essentially, for
2 lack of a better term, very heightened tensions; is that
3 correct, sir?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Given those circumstances do you, as a historian, find
6 it somewhat bizarre that a President such as Mate Boban,
7 who wanted allegedly peace, would issue -- the HVO would
8 issue an ultimatum as you found in Slobodna Dalmatia and
9 also found in Vjesnik in April 1993?
10 A. I would characterise it as inflammatory.
11 Q. Just to cover a few things handled by the cross, your
12 Honour. This is a Defence exhibit. I believe it's
13 Defence Exhibit 10. Mr. Dubuisson, if Exhibit D/10 can
14 be presented to Mr. Donia, D/10. That description is a
15 two-page article by Jerry Kisslinger -- Kisslinger from
16 the New Leader dated 12th September 1994. Do you have
17 that, sir?
18 A. Yes.
19 JUDGE JORDA: Go ahead.
20 MR. KEHOE: Now on the second page of that there is an area
21 that is highlighted; is that right? That was read by
22 the Defence?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Go to the bottom of that page. There is a somewhat
25 complementary statement concerning you and Professor
1 Fine at the bottom of that page that is cut off; is that
2 right?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. It says that:
5 "Still, like Vulliamy", I believe relating to
6 another author, Ed Vulliamy, "Donia and Fine deepen our
7 understanding of what has been lost in Bosnia and
8 underscore the distance between knowledge and political
9 wisdom".
10 Your Honour, for the sake of accuracy --
11 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me, this is D/10 "Bosnia and
12 Herzegovina, a tradition betrayed". Are these the
13 comments on the book, the criticisms of the book? Could
14 you be more specific with your question, because you
15 didn't follow it? This is after the underscored
16 paragraph, the one that was underscored by the
17 Defence. What was the question? Could you read the
18 paragraph please, as we did this morning, this paragraph
19 that is going to support the question that you are going
20 to ask.
21 MR. KEHOE: Yes, your Honour. The beginning last paragraph
22 on that page states:
23 "Still, like Vulliamy, Donia and Fine deepen our
24 understanding of what has been lost in Bosnia and
25 underscore the distance between knowledge and political
1 wisdom".
2 Do you see that?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Do you take that as a compliment, sir?
5 A. I will take it as a compliment with pleasure.
6 Q. For the sake of accuracy and completeness, your Honours,
7 if this document is going to be admitted into evidence,
8 which I believe it is, the Prosecution would like to
9 offer to the court the complete critique of the article,
10 and we would offer it to the court as Prosecutor's
11 Exhibit 39, with the help of the usher?
12 JUDGE JORDA: Do you have that?
13 MR. KEHOE: Yes, I do, your Honour.
14 JUDGE JORDA: Therefore if improperly summarising for the
15 same article there are two numbers. One is D/10 for
16 the Defence and D/39 for the Prosecutor. Is that
17 right? D/10 and D/39. There's no translation into
18 French, I guess. We will allow the French Judge to
19 come to the explanations that he needs.
20 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, that was the point I was to get to
21 next. With some of these exhibits being taken off the
22 computer relatively recently, this being one of them, I
23 will provide a French translation quickly.
24 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, all right. I'm moving ahead, Mr. Donia,
25 because we don't need to get involved in a literary
1 debate. You were shown another document by the
2 Defence, which I believe was marked as D/8. Again with
3 the assistance of Mr. Dubuisson, that is the cease-fire
4 agreement signed on 25th April 1993?
5 A. Yes, sir.
6 Q. Now you were questioned concerning that document by the
7 Defence this morning, were you not?
8 A. Yes, I was.
9 Q. Correct me if I'm wrong, Mr. Donia, but a few events took
10 place between early April and a cease-fire agreement that
11 was signed on 25th April 1993, didn't it?
12 A. Yes, they certainly did.
13 Q. What happened?
14 A. Renewed hostilities broke out on the morning of April
15 16th in selected portions of Central Bosnia, in
16 particular the Lasva Valley, and those hostilities
17 continued for some time.
18 Q. Would it be fair to say, Mr. Donia, that people were
19 killing each other in Central Bosnia or in Bosnia before
20 this agreement was signed?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And turning to paragraph 2, isn't there an
23 acknowledgement that not only was there killing, but
24 there were serious violations of international
25 humanitarian law?
1 A. Those are the words, yes.
2 Q. Carrying on in that paragraph, the signatories ask for
3 an immediate cease-fire?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Carrying on, sir, to the following page, and I direct
6 your attention -- one moment -- on paragraph 5 there's
7 an agreement, is there not, that these violations of
8 international humanitarian law, of rights -- excuse me.
9 I will read it:
10 "Each instance of violation of such rights, there
11 will be an immediate examination of the personal
12 responsibility for the conflicts and crimes perpetuated
13 against the civilian population"?
14 A. That's correct.
15 Q. That is, is it not, according to this defence document,
16 an acknowledgement taken on by the HVO, by the signatory,
17 Mate Boban; is that right?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. To your knowledge, sir, do you know if the HVO ever
20 brought anybody to justice based on crimes that took
21 place in Central Bosnia or any place in Bosnia during
22 this time-frame?
23 A. Not to my knowledge.
24 Q. Now, turning on, we move to the enclosure, which sets up
25 the joint headquarters between Sefer Haliolovic and
1 Milvoj Petkovic. Do you see that, sir?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Now in the prior agreements on Vance-Owen, the division
4 of land was being talked about in terms of cantons, was
5 it not?
6 A. Provinces.
7 Q. Provinces.
8 A. Ten provinces, yes.
9 Q. I believe -- correct me if I am wrong -- the three
10 provinces that were to be controlled by the Bosnian
11 Croats were 3, 8 and 10?
12 A. Provinces 3, 8 and 10, yes, were to be the majority
13 Croat provinces.
14 Q. There was language in the Vance-Owen Peace Plan
15 concerning the military aspects of 3, 8 and 10 as well,
16 weren't there?
17 A. Yes, there was.
18 Q. Does this document say anything about provinces 3, 8 and
19 10 and reordering their military according to provincial
20 boundaries -- excuse me -- according to province
21 boundaries?
22 A. Well, it specifically rejects the notion of organising
23 the military command under the joint commanders along
24 provincial boundaries. Point 4 specifically states
25 that:
1 "The two commanders in chief will form military
2 districts under the joint headquarters, whose areas will
3 be related to the operational requirement for joint
4 operations and not to provisional provincial
5 boundaries".
6 Q. So would it be fair to say, Mr. Donia, that after the
7 fighting broke out in April of 1993, we're talking about
8 an entirely different scenario, when this document is
9 signed?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And the armies are driven by operational concerns as
12 opposed to by provincial concerns; isn't that so?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Do you find that significant?
15 A. Well, I think it amounts to a rejection of the notion of
16 provincial boundaries as a basis for military
17 organisation, and therefore is very significant in that
18 it rejects specifically the terms that were earlier
19 proposed by the HVO in its ultimatum of 3rd April.
20 Q. Let's turn our attention to a few other questions that
21 were asked by the Defence on cross-examination.
22 I focus your attention, and again I request the
23 assistance of Mr. Dubuisson, and ask that he give D/11 to
24 the witness. D/11, your Honours, is the excerpt from
25 "Balkan Odyssey" by David Owen offered by the Defence.
1 A. I have it.
2 Q. Do you have it, Mr. Donia?
3 A. Yes, I do.
4 Q. Let me turn your attention to what has been underlined
5 by the Defence on page 77.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. In the area that has been underlined by the Defence it
8 reads as follows:
9 "I knew at this early stage that Tudjman had
10 accepted recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its
11 internationally agreed boundaries as a necessary price
12 for recognition of Croatia".
13 Do you see that, sir?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Do you recall the question by the Defence where you were
16 asked whether, in fact, Tudjman had recognised the
17 territorial boundaries of Bosnia-Herzegovina? Do you
18 recall that question?
19 A. Yes, I do.
20 Q. Was there another reason, a more expanded reason, than
21 explained here for Croatia acknowledging
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina or recognising Bosnia-Herzegovina?
23 A. Lord Owen suggests it here. It was a necessary price
24 for the recognition of Croatia in this broad package
25 arrangement that was led by the European community and
1 the United States, and specifically the provisions of
2 the Badenter Commission in December and January of --
3 December of 1991 and January of 1992, which required
4 Croatia as a price of recognition to participate in the
5 recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
6 Q. So it was a package deal, wasn't it?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Tudjman recognises Bosnia and then Croatia is recognised
9 by EU countries and the United States?
10 A. That's correct.
11 Q. Nonetheless, Lord Owen continues on and says:
12 "But Tudjman had never hidden his belief that
13 Bosnia and Herzegovina was not sustainable and the
14 Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement", the Banovina plan of 1939,
15 "was more than a glint in his eye".
16 Do you see that, sir?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Following that Lord Owen continued on and he mentioned
19 that:
20 "On July 9th, 1993 Tudjman seemed grudgingly to
21 accept that if the Croats wanted Novi Travnik, Vitez and
22 Busovaca, then the arithmetic alone dictated that they
23 would have to give Stolac to the Muslims".
24 You quoted that during your direct and in cross,
25 and that is in Lord Owen's book, is it not?
1 A. Yes, it is also in the chronology. I believe. It is
2 referred to in our chronology.
3 Q. Novi Travnik, Vitez and Busovaca are where?
4 A. In the Lasva Valley, near the extreme north Eastern
5 extension of the Croatian Banovina as defined in the
6 Cvetkovic-Macek agreement.
7 Q. Where did hostilities break out on the morning of 16th
8 April 1993?
9 A. In the Lasva Valley.
10 Q. As we move on, there is another quote that you presented
11 from 20th December 1993 by Owen, where Lord Owen says:
12 "As the search for more territory for the Muslims
13 gathered momentum, the Croatian Government once again
14 and without any attempt to pretend that they did not set
15 policy for the Bosnian Croats, stated to all EU
16 Ambassadors in Zagreb that there had to be 17.5 per cent
17 for any predominantly Croat republic, and in no
18 circumstances could Vitez and Busovaca be given up".
19 Did he write that in his book?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. This is the same Vitez and Busovaca that he mentioned on
22 July 9th that's in Central Bosnia?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. The same Vitez and Busovaca in Central Bosnia that was
25 attacked --
1 JUDGE JORDA: Could you ask your question, please? Try to
2 be succinct, because there is a discussion starting
3 now. We often reproach the Defence for this. Let's
4 try to be more synthetic, that is, to synthesise better
5 and make your questions clearer. Thank you.
6 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. Thank you, sir. The same
7 Vitez and Busovaca that was in or around the attack on
8 the morning of 16th April 1993?
9 A. Yes, and that emphasis on the Lasva Valley communities
10 is consistent with his approach to the Cvetkovic-Macek
11 plan.
12 Q. Turning once again to the Defence exhibits and showing
13 you what has been marked as D/6 and D/7, again with the
14 assistance of the usher and Mr. Dubuisson, D/6 and D/7,
15 if you could hand those to Mr. Donia. (Handed.)
16 Now, Mr. Donia, let's turn our attention to D/7.
17 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me. Go ahead.
18 MR. KEHOE: Let's turn our attention to D/7, which is the
19 one paragraph of 161 paragraphs and 61 pages that has
20 been excerpted by the Defence. Do you see that?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Now the second sentence -- actually the first sentence,
23 can you read that, sir?
24 A. Point 19?
25 Q. Yes.
1 A. "The Vance-Owen Peace Plan placed a number of provinces
2 under joint HVO and ABH command, of which province
3 number 10 included the municipalities of Vitez and
4 Busovaca. Subsequently on 2nd April 1993 Alija
5 Izetbegovic, President of the Presidency of the Republic
6 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Mate Boban, President of
7 the HZ H-B, agreed to place province number 10 under the
8 command of the general headquarters of the HVO".
9 Q. Was this particular paragraph part of a longer document
10 or documents that you reviewed on 26th May 1997?
11 A. Yes, it was. The cover page and the point 19 were part
12 of that much larger, more extensive document.
13 Q. Now talking about the events on 2nd April 1993, does
14 this paragraph of the document offer a full explanation
15 of the important events that happened at that time?
16 A. No. It's very partial. It's incomplete.
17 Q. Now turning your attention back to D/6, do you see a
18 written date up in the upper right-hand corner, sir?
19 A. I see 4th November 1995.
20 Q. Your Honours, I think that the court can take judicial
21 notice that that is the date that this was logged into
22 the Registry of the International Law Crimes Tribunal,
23 4th November 1995, a date that is almost two years ago?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Take us through, sir, exactly the chronology and the
1 significant events that are missing from this document,
2 starting from the 2nd?
3 A. Well --
4 Q. Excuse me. You can actually start from the
5 negotiations on Vance-Owen in late March 1993?
6 A. On March 24th, as reported by Lord Owen, Mr. Boban and
7 President Izetbegovic arrived, after a five hour
8 meeting, arrived at an agreement on the transitional
9 arrangements for the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, according to
10 Lord Owen, after Boban had threatened to withdraw from
11 their then military alliance. This was at the end of
12 three protracted periods of negotiation in New York, in
13 which United Nations' officials Owen and Vance attempted
14 to achieve agreement from all three parties. On 25th
15 March 1993 President Izetbegovic signed all portions of
16 the Vance-Owen plan, joining Mr. Boban in that complete
17 adherence, however, noting in a separate annex that he
18 was expecting either Serbian compliance to follow
19 shortly or the international community to compel Serbian
20 compliance, and that the plan would be signed within a
21 period of ten to fifteen days, perhaps somewhat longer,
22 where he would reconsider his signature.
23 Following that, he left New York, went to Zagreb
24 and Mr. Boban went to Zagreb as well, and the two of them
25 and President Tudjman met, discussed extensively
1 provisions for a joint command, and President
2 Izetbegovic emerged from that meeting at the new Embassy
3 of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Zagreb and noted that they had
4 reached agreement in principle, but that the specifics
5 would be, in his words, "a difficult piece of business
6 on the ground" in terms of a joint command. At that
7 point the Serb, Bosnian Serb leadership had still not
8 acquiesced to the Vance-Owen plan and the events of the
9 day of 2nd April and early morning of 3rd April in
10 Bjelica that at that point the Bosnian Serbs rejected
11 the Vance-Owen plan.
12 Q. Did that change the dynamics of the Vance-Owen plan?
13 A. Well, it changed the overall situation rather
14 dramatically, because it had to be a deep disappointment
15 to Owen, to Vance, really to all the other parties, and
16 it meant that there was at that point no treaty, no
17 agreement on peace.
18 Q. Just as a sideline, while this particular negotiation is
19 going on and the Bosnian Serbs are refusing in the early
20 morning hours of the 3rd -- by the way, what time in the
21 morning was this; do you know?
22 A. I think about 6.00, just before 6.00 in the morning.
23 Q. This is a meeting that starts on 2nd April and finishes
24 at 6.00 in the morning on 3rd April?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Is there anything significant going on in other parts of
2 Bosnia concerning the Bosnian Muslims and the Serbs?
3 A. The city of Srebrenica was under siege. The Serbs were
4 conducting a kind of on-going offensive against the
5 Bosnian government in Eastern Bosnia and experiencing
6 military successes in that endeavour. At the same time
7 the international community was threatening sanctions
8 against Serbia itself for support of the Bosnian Serbs
9 and was prepared to impose them if the Bosnian Serbs did
10 not agree to the Vance-Owen plan.
11 Q. Now, sir, turning your attention again to D/6, with an
12 unsigned document that is dated 2nd April 1993 in
13 Mostar; is that right?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. You said -- have you seen any documents, sir, that have
16 led you to believe that this particular document was not
17 signed and that the factual statement made almost two
18 years ago in the Prosecutor's Statement of Facts is
19 incorrect?
20 A. Well, first of all, this document which was presented
21 yesterday to me by the Defence as an original of the
22 plan -- of the joint statement is not signed. There
23 are no signatures on the original local language version
24 of this document, although there appear to be spaces for
25 signature underneath the typed names of the two persons,
1 Alija Izetbegovic and Mate Boban.
2 In addition I have reviewed the newspaper
3 Oslobodjene, on 3rd April, which reported that on 2nd
4 April Alija Izetbegovic presided in Sarajevo over a
5 joint meeting of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina
6 and the government of the Republic of
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and on that same day met with the
8 French Ambassador to discuss possible humanitarian aid
9 as a recognition of his signature to the Vance-Owen
10 peace plan.
11 Q. Your Honour, at this time I would like to hand out as
12 Prosecutor's Exhibit 40 the article from Oslobodjene,
13 dated 3rd April 1993, that reflects the two meetings
14 that Mr. Donia just discussed, i.e. the cabinet meeting and
15 also the meeting with the French Foreign Minister, and
16 I request the assistance of the usher. I will say,
17 your Honour, that not only do we not have a French
18 translation of this; we do not have an English
19 translation either. I will subsequently provide
20 both.
21 JUDGE JORDA: What shall we do? Shall we have a site
22 translation here? Is this a new exhibit?
23 MR. KEHOE: Yes, your Honour. I have, Mr. President,
24 provided this to the translation booth, and if your
25 Honour wants a site translation --
1 JUDGE JORDA: Perhaps it could be put on the ELMO so that
2 the public gallery could see it as well. This is D/40.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, this is 40, not D/40 but 40.
4 JUDGE JORDA: Do you see it, Mr. Donia.
5 MR. KEHOE: The article, Mr. Donia, you are pointing to at
6 this point is which article, sir?
7 A. This is the article pertaining to the common joint
8 meeting session of the Presidency and the Government of
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina.
10 Q. Does that article reflect any discussion about a joint
11 command with the HVO?
12 A. Yes, it does.
13 Q. What does it say?
14 A. Just paraphrasing, the last sentence of the Article
15 indicates that the combined meeting was determined as a
16 first priority to enter into and promote discussions
17 about the establishment of a joint command with the HVO.
18 Q. Mr. President, I do not know if you want a site
19 translation or ...
20 JUDGE JORDA: It's not too long. Perhaps there could be a
21 site translation. Perhaps the witness could read it in
22 Serbo-Croat?
23 A. You stretch my capabilities here, Mr. President, but I
24 will do my best.
25 JUDGE JORDA: I will allow the interpreter to do it?
1 A. Okay.
2 JUDGE JORDA: Go ahead. Would you read it, please?
3 A. Yes.
4 THE INTERPRETER: "A joint session of the Presidency and
5 Government of The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was
6 held today chaired by Alija Izetbegovic. The State
7 delegation of Bosnia-Herzegovina at today's meeting
8 submitted a report on the course and results of the
9 peace talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina held in New
10 York. The Presidency and the government accepted this
11 report and made a positive assessment of the work of our
12 delegation. It was pointed out that at the talks in
13 New York the strategic policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina
14 for peace was confirmed, which does not mean the
15 weakening of our defensive capability, the more so as
16 our country is under the strong pressure of the
17 aggressor's military forces. It was decided that talks
18 should be continued as soon as possible on the formation
19 of joint commands of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and
20 the HVO".
21 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you.
22 MR. KEHOE: Now, Mr. President, at the right side of the page
23 is the article I do believe with the meeting with the
24 French Ambassador. If we could also have a site
25 translation of that particular article in the right-hand
1 column.
2 JUDGE JORDA: Allez-y.
3 THE INTERPRETER: "The French government expresses its
4 satisfaction that the President of the Republic of
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, has signed the
6 Vance-Owen Peace Plan, because it considers that in this
7 way the implementation of those documents will restore
8 peace to these regions and enable the return of numerous
9 refugees to their homes. This was stated yesterday in
10 talks with Alija Izetbegovic by the French Ambassador in
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Henri Jacolan, after the President
12 of Bosnia-Herzegovina had informed him of the positions
13 of the Presidency in relation to the Peace Plan.
14 According to a statement issued at the end of a cordial
15 reception in the Presidency by the Cabinet of the
16 President, Ambassador Jacolan informed the hosts that
17 France will continue to send humanitarian aid to
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina and that the tempo will not slow
19 down. Reference was also made to humanitarian
20 activities for Srebrenica, when the French Ambassador
21 underlined that General Phillipe Morrion enjoys the
22 support of the French government and particularly of
23 public opinion. The French Ambassador had a meeting
24 yesterday also with Dr. Zlatko Lukumjia, Vice-President
25 of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina".
1 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, at this time the Prosecutor would
2 like to have marked as Prosecutor's Exhibit 41 a
3 composite exhibit of three pages, a letter addressed to
4 you, your Honour, by the president of the Republic of
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic. It is in
6 Bosnian, with a cover letter from the Minister's
7 counsel, Mme Vidovic. It reads as follows:
8 "Referring to the letter of Prosecutor,
9 Mr. Mark Harmon, I hereby state the following: I have
10 never signed a statement concerning Izetbegovic Boban
11 nor had I been in Mostar on that day, 2nd April 1993.
12 I do not recall that such a statement has ever been
13 offered by any party or that it had been contained into
14 the documentation at my disposal".
15 Again, your Honour, this is addressed to you
16 directly, and we offer it as an exhibit, Prosecutor's
17 Exhibit 41. We have copies to be handed out.
18 JUDGE JORDA: What is the date of this document?
19 MR. KEHOE: The date of the letter, your Honour, I believe
20 is today.
21 JUDGE JORDA: I'm glad to know that I'm receiving mail
22 today.
23 MR. HAYMAN: If it is to be received, your Honour, I would
24 like to note our objection at an appropriate time.
25 JUDGE JORDA: Before we take this document, I would like to
1 hear your objection.
2 MR. HAYMAN: Your Honour, I'm certainly --
3 JUDGE JORDA: (Pause). Mr. Hayman, first, you wanted to
4 make an intervention and then the Tribunal has to take a
5 decision. First we want to hear what Mr. Hayman has to
6 say.
7 MR. HAYMAN: Your Honour, I must raise this as a matter of
8 principle. In the instance of this particular letter
9 it is really of no consequence to the Defence whether
10 it's admitted or not. As the court can see, if you
11 have it, in the second paragraph President Izetbegovic
12 refutes the notion of an ultimatum and says he doesn't
13 recall the matter at all. It obviously made no
14 significant impact on him. Our point is this. This
15 is a court of witnesses and proper evidence. This is
16 not a court where witnesses can mail in their statements
17 and not be subjected to normal court processes, the
18 defendant's, the accused's right of confrontation and
19 cross-examination. So although this particular letter
20 is quite innocuous I can imagine if this practice were
21 condoned, where does it lead? As to all witnesses,
22 prosecution, defence, and indeed the court's witnesses,
23 there must be a right of confrontation. There must be
24 a right of cross-examination. So that is the concern
25 I wish to raise. Thank you.
1 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you for your objection. First of all,
2 the Tribunal states that -- actually personally I say
3 that I'm surprised that there is correspondence
4 addressed to me which goes through the Office of the
5 Prosecutor and then arrives in the middle of the hearing
6 in a very unusual way of working, especially in judicial
7 matters.
8 Then the second point: first we have to know, in
9 fact, whether this does, in fact, come from the
10 President of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
11 Mr. Izetbegovic. That's the minimum of precautions that
12 we can take. The third comment goes back to one that
13 the Defence already made, and that the Tribunal agrees
14 with, that this is an adversarial procedure and either
15 Mr. Izetbegovic is going to appear, as called by the
16 Prosecutor, or a representative of his to come to
17 testify in regarding to this letter in order that the
18 Defence may be able to ask questions as well.
19 First, if you could answer my first two comments
20 and then for the time being we will not take this as
21 evidence -- rather as an exhibit. We will keep it
22 outside of the record until the Prosecutor says what it
23 wants to do with it, specifically as regards any
24 possible testimony by Mr. Izetbegovic, I suppose he had
25 been told by the Prosecutor to intervene in this debate
1 or a representative of his, but I don't think as it
2 stands it can come in as this, because especially this
3 is a letter which affects me personally. Would you
4 give us some explanations about this, Mr. Kehoe.
5 MR. KEHOE: Yes, your Honour, gladly. For the record, this
6 letter references a letter by my colleague, Mr. Harmon.
7 Mr. Harmon sent a letter yesterday after this subject had
8 been raised by the Defence, to Mme Vidovic. Based on
9 that letter the response coming from the Bosnian
10 government is the response that Mr. President and your
11 Honours have before you. That letter came to Mr. Harmon
12 directly at approximately 3.00 pm. So we have had it
13 literally or I have had it since the time I have been
14 standing in this courtroom and not before that time.
15 With regard to the authentication of the document,
16 your Honour, of course, the Prosecution has no
17 objections to holding the document in abeyance and we
18 will provide further authentication of this document at
19 the appropriate time.
20 JUDGE JORDA: (Pause.) The Tribunal asks the Registrar to
21 identify the document and asks that it not be tendered
22 as an exhibit for the time being. It will be taken as an
23 exhibit once there is an adversarial hearing, if later
24 the Prosecutor wants to bring in a witness or put it in
25 as part of a hearing which will be inter partes. For
1 the time being I'm asking the Registrar to write a short
2 note telling what happened here. Mr. Kehoe, if you want
3 to bring this into a later hearing, you can, of course,
4 but for the time being I want you to move on to the next
5 question and not refer to this document for the time
6 being, which is not known either by the judges or the
7 witness or the Defence, or even yourself. So now we
8 move on to the next question that you want to ask the
9 witness.
10 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. Mr. Donia, a document that
11 you referred to during your direct examination and that
12 was referred to on cross concerning the two newspaper
13 articles that are part of Exhibits 24 and 25, wherein
14 you stated on direct and on cross the threat exists.
15 Can you turn your attention to Exhibit 25, which is the
16 article of Slobodna Dalmatia of 4th April 1993?
17 A. Yes, sir.
18 Q. Do you know who the author of that article is?
19 A. The author --
20 Q. Microphone, please?
21 A. Can you hear me? Okay. The author of the newspaper
22 article in Slobodna Dalmatia is Mr. Vagar, Vaso Vagar.
23 Q. Do you know who Mr. Vagar is?
24 A. He is obviously a correspondent for Slobodna Dalmatia.
25 He is also the spokesman for the HVO.
1 Q. So the person who is the spokesman for the HVO is also
2 the author of this article?
3 A. That's correct.
4 Q. Now in this particular article, the article that wasn't
5 addressed by the Defence, can you point to what you
6 argue is the threat, the ultimatum?
7 A. In this particular article I would point to the section
8 that is just below the six points. In the English
9 language version this is the -- just beginning one
10 paragraph below point 6.
11 JUDGE JORDA: Can you put it on to the ELMO, please?
12 A. Yes.
13 JUDGE JORDA: I think it will be clearer for everybody that
14 way.
15 A. If I may read these two paragraphs which are most of the
16 ultimatum or threat:
17 "In the event that the statement is not signed by
18 the heads of the Muslim delegation in provinces 3, 8 and
19 10, the HVO of the HZ H-B", that is the Croatian
20 Community of Herceg-Bosna, "has decided to apply the
21 provisions of the peace plan whereby each national armed
22 force will have to withdraw to its domicile province.
23 Since the Basic Agreement and the agreement on
24 Transitional Organisation clearly differentiate between
25 the future central authority and authority in the
1 provinces, the HVO of the HZ H-B shall prevent any
2 attempt by the present one-sided Presidency and the
3 Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina to appoint various
4 bodies, (counties for instance) while all decisions of
5 the future transitional Presidency of the Republic of
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the transitional central
7 government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina shall
8 be respected and applied in conformity with the
9 obligations undertaken by signing the Peace Plan".
10 Q. Would you term this a unilateral demand?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Is there a request in this document for the signature of
13 President Alija Izetbegovic?
14 A. Yes, there is. It is in the paragraph immediately
15 above what I just read, where the pointer is:
16 "The HVO of the HZ H-B hopes that Izetbegovic,
17 having understood the exceptional importance of the
18 statement, will sign that document as well, because the
19 document also confirms the desire for peace which is so
20 necessary for everyone".
21 Q. Taking this particular newspaper article in conjunction
22 with the newspaper article of the previous day from
23 Oslobodjene, that put President Izetbegovic in two
24 separate meetings in Sarajevo, have you as a historian
25 reached any conclusions from President Izetbegovic
1 agreed to this unilateral demand by the HVO?
2 A. Given that there is no signature on the documents -- the
3 document from 2nd April, given that he is reliably
4 reported to be tied up in Sarajevo, and given that the
5 next day the HVO requests his signature on this
6 document, I think it highly unlikely that he agreed to
7 or signed the document that was submitted for the 2nd
8 April. I would add that the HVO actually began its
9 deliberations in Mostar on 1st April, and we can see a
10 report on that first meeting by the same correspondent
11 in Slobodna Dalmatia. My best guess would be this
12 might have been a draft prepared for the signature of
13 these two parties, but never signed by Mr. Izetbegovic.
14 Q. This particular article and demand came out after the
15 Bosnian Serbs had voted down the Vance-Owen Peace Plan,
16 didn't it?
17 A. Yes. I think we can establish, based on the document
18 that we have been looking at from the 2nd April, that
19 the six point agreement probably preceded that
20 rejection, but the broader document here, which I've
21 characterised as the ultimatum, does indeed date from
22 3rd April, after the rejection by the Bosnian Serb
23 assembly at Bjelica.
24 Q. Did that change the various aspects of this tripartite
25 agreement between the Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and
1 the Bosnian Muslims?
2 A. It rendered it at least for the time null and void and
3 sent the international mediators back to a process to
4 seek Serbian compliance with it and in a sense got the
5 process going again.
6 Q. Mr. Donia, you were challenged on cross-examination
7 concerning the deadline of this ultimatum, were you not,
8 sir?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And you stated in cross-examination that you, as a
11 historian, were not the only individual who concluded
12 that in reading this documentation it was, in fact, an
13 ultimatum; is that correct?
14 A. That's correct.
15 Q. Let me show you, first, your Honour, with the assistance
16 of the usher -- again I only have an English copy and I
17 will have the others translated -- what has been marked
18 for identification as -- what has been marked as
19 Prosecutor Exhibit 42. Mr. President, before we put
20 this on the ELMO for a site translation, if we can just
21 have a couple of questions as to what exactly this is.
22 May I proceed, Mr. President?
23 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, of course. Go ahead.
24 MR. KEHOE: Before we put this on the ELMO, Mr. Donia, can
25 you explain exactly what this is and what type of
1 resource this comes from?
2 A. This is a page from the Foreign Broadcast Information
3 Service, which is a US government supported research
4 service providing coverage of daily press reports in
5 Eastern Europe. It was sent to me at my request by a
6 research assistant at the University of Michigan, Centre
7 for Russian and East European Studies, Helene
8 d'Erlinson, and the date of that was June 7th, 1997.
9 Q. That was subsequent to the conversations that you and I
10 had had here in The Hague?
11 A. That's correct, after our first conversation.
12 Q. Mr. President and your Honours, with the permission of
13 the court, if we can put this on the ELMO for a site
14 translation. I have given a copy to the interpretation
15 booth to assist them in that regard as well.
16 JUDGE JORDA: But you could be more specific. Which
17 American media are you using? This is from a daily
18 presence which was set up by some kind of American
19 media. Mr. Donia, do you have the name of this American
20 media? Is this a press agency, a specialised organ?
21 What it is?
22 A. Yes, Mr. President. The foreign broadcast information
23 service is a monitoring service that monitors radio and
24 periodical press in Eastern Europe and then publishes
25 texts of relevant documents. This particular article
1 is from the Belgrade Tanjug service in English on 10th
2 April 1993. So this was a broadcast made out of
3 Belgrade and monitored by the Foreign Broadcast
4 Information Service Assets and then reported in this
5 publication. It is a relatively -- it is very widely
6 used, heavily used research resource for specific
7 developments throughout the Eastern European area.
8 MR. KEHOE: It we could put that on the ELMO?
9 A. May I suggest perhaps for brevity's sake, I think there
10 are just a couple of key paragraphs here if you wish to
11 only translate part.
12 MR. KEHOE: With the court's permission, if we could point
13 to those key portions of the article, that would be
14 helpful.
15 A. It begins here.
16 MR. KEHOE: Can you move it on the ELMO?
17 JUDGE JORDA: All right. You may read those passages
18 which you consider to be relevant.
19 MR. KEHOE: Perhaps beginning with this paragraph.
20 JUDGE JORDA: Go ahead.
21 A. "The Muslim Croat conflict broke out a few months ago in
22 central Bosnia-Herzegovina in the towns of Busovaca and
23 Travnik and it spread to the region of Konjic and
24 Jablanica last month, where they split up over military
25 and political power in ethnically mixed parts of
1 provinces designated by international mediators, Cyrus
2 Vance and Lord Owen.
3 Both Croats and Muslims, however, expect that the
4 real conflict is yet to come after April 15th, the
5 deadline set by Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban for the
6 withdrawal of all Muslim units from so-called Croat
7 provinces of the Vance-Owen plan. There is a Muslim
8 Croat conflict in Zenica also. Here it was provoked by
9 the fact that humanitarian and other convoys are finding
10 it increasingly difficult to reach Muslim territories
11 through Croat controlled territories. This
12 particularly pertains to the road through Metkovic,
13 Mostar, Jablanica, Prozor, Gornji Vakuf, Travnik and
14 further towards Zenica, Zepac or Gradacac, the Bosnian
15 Serb army report said".
16 Q. This particular article comes out of Belgrade, a Serb
17 source, as you say?
18 A. It comes out of Belgrade and is further based on a
19 Bosnian Serb army report, yes.
20 Q. You also mentioned in your cross-examination an article
21 from Borba, dated 5th April 1993, did you not, which
22 references a Reuters article?
23 A. Yes. The Belgrade newspaper, Borba.
24 Q. Mr. President, with the court's permission again we will
25 refer to Prosecutor Exhibit 43, the Borba article, and
1 the English copy coming from the computer, which is
2 44. Again we will provide a French translation as soon
3 as possible.
4 JUDGE JORDA: About how many questions do you have left,
5 Mr. Kehoe?
6 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, I have another document to go
7 through after these documents and then come
8 conclusionary questions. I will probably be finished,
9 if we go straight through, at 5 o'clock.
10 JUDGE JORDA: Okay. We will take a look at this
11 document. Then there is another one, you said?
12 MR. KEHOE: Yes, your Honour, there are these two documents
13 and there is a third.
14 JUDGE JORDA: All right. Go through this document.
15 MR. KEHOE: Mr. Donia, let us turn our attention to these two
16 documents. We are referring to the Borba article of
17 5th April 1993, which has contained in it, does it not,
18 a wire service article from Reuters; is that correct?
19 A. Yes, it does. That's correct.
20 Q. Again what is Borba?
21 A. Borba is a Belgrade newspaper.
22 Q. The other article, which is the English article, what is
23 that, sir?
24 A. This is taken off the archives of the Reuters service
25 and was the Reuters story as originally disseminated on
1 April 4th.
2 Q. Again with the -- Mr. President and your Honours'
3 permission, if we can put this on the ELMO and have
4 Mr. Donia do a similar translation on this document using
5 the English version?
6 A. Again with your permission, Mr. President, I'll only read
7 selected portions for the sake of brevity.
8 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, all right. Go ahead.
9 A. Thank you. This is by Mark Heinrich, Dateline Zagreb,
10 April 4th, 1993:
11 "Bosnian Croats on Sunday demanded the withdrawal
12 of Muslim troops from provinces designated or Croat
13 self-rule under a UN peace plan, reviving tensions
14 between nominal civil war allies, who battled earlier
15 this year.
16 Bosnia's Croat militia command, HVO, threw an
17 extra spanner into the peace works when in an ultimatum
18 like statement carried by Croatian state media called on
19 Muslim army and police units to vacate regions earmarked
20 for Croat government.
21 The HVO set an April 15th deadline for Bosnian
22 President Alija Izetbegovic to sign a joint communiqué
23 ratifying the withdrawals, creating a common high
24 command and certifying there were no Muslim Croat
25 territorial disputes. "If Izetbegovic fails to sign
1 this agreement by April 15, the HVO will unilaterally
2 enforce its jurisdiction in cantons 3, 8 and 10", the
3 statement from HVO headquarters in the south-west Croat
4 stronghold of Mostar warned.
5 Muslims constitute large minorities or even
6 localised majorities in number 8 and 10 provinces.
7 Pitched battles erupted there in January after the
8 dominant HVO tried to force Muslim units to submit to
9 its command".
10 Q. Lastly, Mr. Donia, the --
11 A. Let me finish with the --
12 Q. Go ahead.
13 A. "Sponsored and armed by neighbouring Croatia, the HVO has
14 transformed territory approximating the two provinces
15 into a protectorate of its patron, named Herceg-Bosna,
16 complete with Croatian currency and car numbers.
17 Muslim anger over this quiet take-over of terrain
18 uncontested by Serbs had simmered for months, with world
19 attention diverted by Serb sieges of the Bosnian
20 capital, Sarajevo, and the Muslim populated east".
21 Finally in reference to the central government it
22 said:
23 "Any attempt by what it calls Bosnia's
24 illegitimate one-party government to set up parallel
25 authorities in the region will be thwarted".
1 Q. Mr. Donia, I apologise for getting ahead of myself.
2 I would ask you to take a look at one last article
3 again. This is in Bosnian Serbo-Croatian from Borba,
4 dated 6th April 1993. With the assistance of the usher
5 ... I believe for the sake of the record the document
6 -- the Borba and Reuters article are 43 and 43A and
7 this new article is moving to 44.
8 JUDGE JORDA: For the numbering, could you tell us what the
9 number of this is, Registrar? The Borba article is 43.
10 MR. KEHOE: Yes, your Honour.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Oui. Yes, it is.
12 JUDGE JORDA: And the Reuters is 44? I'm just asking the
13 question. 43A. This is now 44. Mr. Kehoe, proceed,
14 please.
15 MR. KEHOE: The document that's before you, Mr. President, is
16 44. Again, Mr. Donia, that's a Borba article dated 6th
17 April 1993, is it not?
18 A. The article is in the newspaper dated 6th April, yes,
19 that's correct.
20 Q. Again what is the periodical Borba?
21 A. A Belgrade newspaper.
22 Q. For the sake of a site translation, your Honour, we have
23 it on the ELMO, and I have given a copy to the
24 translators for translation.
25 THE INTERPRETER: "The leader of the Bosnian Croats, Mate
1 Boban, has demanded that the Bosnian army, which is
2 under the control of the Muslims withdraw from three
3 provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina which are considered
4 Croatian. Threatening that unless that is done he will
5 resort to force, in an appeal to President Alija
6 Izetbegovic, published in Zagreb yesterday, Boban
7 demanded that the Vance-Owen plan be implemented
8 immediately, which envisages the division of
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina into ten provinces. The leader of
10 the Bosnian Croats refers to the "declaration on the
11 Croat Muslim co-operation and military organisation of
12 Bosnia until its complete demilitarisation", which
13 envisages that units of the Bosnian army and police
14 until the complete demilitarisation of Bosnia withdraw
15 to their domicile provinces within three days".
16 MR. KEHOE: May I proceed, Mr. President? Now, Mr. Donia,
17 when you were talking about other commentators calling
18 this statement by the HVO an ultimatum on 3rd April
19 1993, were you considering these other sources?
20 A. No. I actually considered at that point only the --
21 earlier I considered only the FBIS source and more
22 recently have looked at these. So clearly in looking
23 at these several stories, this one from the French press
24 agency, the one from Reuters, and the one reported by
25 Tanjug, all of them I think are consistent with the
1 notion that this was a threat or an ultimatum.
2 Q. Did the review by these other commentators support your
3 conclusion that this statement by the HVO was an
4 ultimatum to expire on 15th April 1993?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. As a historian looking back on the events, were there
7 any other events, any other significant events, other
8 than these particular articles, that as you look back,
9 led you to the conclusion that the comments of the HVO
10 made on 3rd April 1993, was meant to be an ultimatum
11 that was to be complied with by the Bosnian Muslims by
12 15th April 1993?
13 A. Well, the outbreak of hostilities on 16th April is
14 clearly consistent with that position.
15 Q. Can I have one moment, your Honour? Your Honour, I have
16 no further questions.
17 JUDGE JORDA: All right. We are going to take a break.
18 Mr. Hayman, I think that will relax everybody. We are
19 now going to take a 20 minute break and we can begin
20 around 4.55. We can now suspend the hearing.
21 (4.30 pm)
22 (Short break)
23 (4.55 pm)
24 JUDGE JORDA: We can now resume our hearing of the please
25 have the accused brought in.
1 (Accused re-enters court)
2 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, if we've understood correctly, you
3 have completed what you had to do.
4 MR. KEHOE: Yes, your Honour, except --
5 JUDGE JORDA: We could bring the witness in though. This
6 is a witness I could ask even if the witness is not
7 here. You have concluded. At least that's what
8 I have understood you to have said.
9 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President, except for introducing the
10 exhibits that I tendered to the Registrar, absent the
11 letter from President Izetbegovic.
12 JUDGE JORDA: So you presented. Letters. I am not too
13 sure I understand what distinction you are making
14 please. When you say presented them, what do you
15 mean?
16 MR. KEHOE: I just want to introduce into evidence
17 Exhibit 39, 40, 42 --
18 JUDGE JORDA: I understand.
19 MR. KEHOE: We are not offering the letter from President
20 Izetbegovic, what I believe has been marked as
21 Exhibit 41.
22 JUDGE JORDA: Yes. Which, in fact, I had just received a
23 fax from. I am on an equal footing. I have the
24 letter as well. But that does not change the decision
25 which the Trial Chamber has taken. Thank you,
1 Mr. Kehoe. I think we have concluded. Mr. Hayman
2 wanted to take the floor again. If not, I believe we
3 have finished with Mr. Donia and want to thank him. In
4 principle you don't come in now but do you want to speak
5 about something else, Mr. Hayman.
6 MR. HAYMAN: All I would ask is in respect with these three
7 new articles, or I guess there are four, I have a couple
8 of questions on each, simply with respect to this new
9 material. That would be my request.
10 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, all right. Go ahead. Be brief,
11 please.
12 MR. HAYMAN: I understand, your Honour. Thank you.
13 Further Cross-examination by Mr. Hayman
14 MR. HAYMAN: Mr. Donia, directing your attention to
15 Exhibit 42, the Tanjug article?
16 A. Tanjug.
17 Q. The source is the government agency in Belgrade; is that
18 right? That's the by-line of the material?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. That government press agency in turn cites its source as
21 the Bosnian Serb army?
22 A. That's correct. The first Krajina Corps of the Bosnian
23 Serb army.
24 Q. Would you agree at this time the Bosnian Serb army was
25 engaged in warfare with the two other parties whose
1 conduct are discussed in the article?
2 A. Yes, absolutely I would agree with that and would note
3 the bias that would obviously accompany that source.
4 Q. They have an interest in destabilising any alliance
5 between those two parties, would you agree?
6 A. Yes. I think they do. I guess my observation, having
7 looked at a fair number of these reports, is that their
8 information is sometimes surprisingly accurate and good
9 and at other times is clearly influenced by the
10 political agenda of the Bosnian Serbs.
11 Q. Let us look at this article as an example of that
12 proposition that sometimes they are accurate and
13 sometimes they are grossly inaccurate. In the first
14 paragraph after the introductory paragraph the article
15 references a heavy artillery duel in Travnik over the
16 issue of which flag would be flown. Do you see that
17 reference?
18 A. Yes. Uh-huh.
19 Q. In your book you describe an incident regarding flag
20 raising in Travnik, do you not?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. There is no mention in your book of any artillery duel;
23 correct?
24 A. That's correct.
25 Q. Have you ever heard that there was a heavy artillery
1 duel in connection with this flag raising incident in
2 Travnik?
3 A. I am not even really convinced there was a flag raising
4 incident in Travnik any more. There were some
5 corrections after that story came out in the US press.
6 So it may be that even that part of it is erroneous.
7 Q. Based on everything you know isn't the second paragraph
8 of this article false with respect to the allegation
9 that a heavy artillery duel occurred in Travnik in
10 connection with this flag raising event in Travnik?
11 A. I am an agnostic on that. I do not know.
12 Q. It is not how you characterise it in your book?
13 A. It is not how I characterise it in my book and I would
14 share some doubts about the accuracy.
15 Q. In the fifth paragraph of the article it references a
16 supposed call by Boban:
17 "... for the withdrawal of all Muslim units from
18 so-called Croat provinces in the Vance-Owen plan".
19 Do you see that?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Anywhere in Exhibit D/6, the joint statement, is there
22 any call for the withdrawal of all Muslim units from any
23 province in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
24 A. Well, let's see. I'm --
25 Q. Exhibit D/6, the joint statement. This is the
1 April 2nd, 1993 short half page joint statement. I'm
2 showing it to you now to help you find it?
3 A. That, as I've indicated many times, is not the
4 ultimatum. It's not the obvious reference here to a
5 deadline for the withdrawal of Muslim units, no.
6 Certainly this joint statement which we now question was
7 ever signed, or I would question was ever signed, this
8 is not what we're talking about here. It's not the
9 reference in this article either.
10 Q. So you would agree that Exhibit D/6 does not contain any
11 request or demand for the withdrawal of all Muslim units
12 from anywhere; correct?
13 A. I don't know what the relevance of that is to this
14 particular document, because this report clearly does
15 not refer to Exhibit D/6.
16 Q. To what does it refer?
17 A. It obviously refers to what I have referred to as the
18 ultimatum, which is the HVO proclamation of 3rd April.
19 Q. Would you like to look at the Vjesnik version or the
20 Slobodna Dalmatia version?
21 A. Your choice.
22 Q. Why don't we start with the Vjesnik version,
23 Exhibit 24C? Is there a request in this document for
24 the withdrawal of all Muslim units from so-called Croat
25 provinces so designated under the Vance-Owen plan?
1 A. Not in that language, no.
2 Q. If I could direct your attention to Exhibit 43A, the
3 Borba -- the translation of one of the Borba articles,
4 this story also states, for example, in the lead line:
5 "Bosnian Croats on Sunday demanded the withdrawal
6 of Muslim troops from provinces designated for Croat
7 self-rule".
8 Do either the so-called joint statement or the two
9 news articles which you have characterised as in the
10 nature of an ultimatum demand the withdrawal of Muslim
11 troops from provinces designated for Croat self-rule?
12 A. Well, I think that as a news article it draws by
13 inference the conclusion that the Bosnian Croats in
14 demanding the withdrawal of units from which they came
15 refers to Muslims. So there is an implication drawn
16 here in the article as a news article, and does not use
17 the precise language of the statement issued by the HVO,
18 HB H Z.
19 Q. It is a news reporter adding their gloss; correct?
20 A. It's a news reporter drawing an inference from original
21 statement.
22 Q. Do you have any basis to tell this court that in April
23 of 1993 the implementation of point two of the joint
24 statement, which is Exhibit D/6, would have required the
25 removal of a single government soldier from Central
1 Bosnia, that is would have required their removal to
2 another province or canton; in other words, were any of
3 those soldiers of an origin from outside that area? Do
4 you have any basis to tell us that that was the case?
5 A. I'm not too sure exactly what you're asking. If you're
6 asking me to identify specific individuals or comment on
7 the general observation, it is clear that the
8 organisation of the HVO and the army of Bosnia and
9 Herzegovina as they existed at that time would have
10 entailed substantial movement of troops in order to come
11 into accord with the provisions of this statement.
12 Q. Weren't the troops from the Government of Bosnia and
13 Herzegovina that were in the Lasva Valley in April of
14 1993, weren't they from the Third Corpus, which was
15 based in Zenica, or do you not know?
16 A. That I don't know. This refers to a variety of -- could
17 refer to a variety of troops of the Bosnia-Herzegovina
18 army, which had certainly Muslim brigades. It had
19 brigades with a lot of Serbs and Croats in them. For
20 that matter, I think it's quite safe to assume that the
21 HVO at this point has some Muslims in it.
22 Q. Directing your attention to Exhibit 44, does the second
23 paragraph represent that Mr. Boban threatened the use of
24 force? This is the second paragraph of the Borba
25 article -- Borba publication of an AFP article?
1 A. Yes. Yes, it does.
2 Q. Do you find that anywhere a stated threat of force in
3 any of the joint statements or in Exhibit 24 or 25?
4 A. An explicit threat of force is not there.
5 Q. Do you know if any of these newspapers or press reports
6 we have been reviewing made their way to the Lasva
7 Valley in April of 1993?
8 A. Well, it would probably be highly unusual if the
9 Slobodna Dalmatia did not make it to the Lasva Valley,
10 and I would say the same is probably true of Vjesnik.
11 Q. At this point in the war you think they were getting
12 regular newspaper deliveries?
13 A. I didn't say that. I said it would be highly unlikely
14 that it did not make its way there.
15 Q. In April or six months later?
16 A. No, in April.
17 Q. No further questions.
18 JUDGE JORDA: All right. We have now finished the
19 examination and cross-examination, the comments of the
20 Prosecutor, the last observations of the Defence.
21 I would now like to turn to my colleagues and ask
22 whether they want to ask any questions. Judge Riad?
23 JUDGE RIAD: Professor Donia, I would like to have some
24 clarifications. First, how was the HVO created and for
25 what purpose was it created?
1 A. It was created, I believe, on 8th April 1992 immediately
2 -- 7th or 8th April, immediately after the declarations
3 of independence and the first hostilities were
4 evolving. It was created clearly to create a fighting
5 force which would incorporate Croatian, Bosnian Croat
6 soldiers and also whatever Muslims or others might wish
7 to join it.
8 Q. Who created it?
9 A. I really don't know exactly who created it in terms of
10 the personalities.
11 Q. Who are the leaders of this HVO? Where did they come
12 from?
13 A. I really don't know. I would have to say I would be
14 misleading you if I tried to answer that question.
15 Q. Do you know any of them? Do you know any of the leaders
16 of the HVO?
17 A. No.
18 Q. And the recruits?
19 A. The recruits were principally Bosnian Croats and some
20 Muslims.
21 Q. But in the light of the dual nationality, they could
22 have been Croats too?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Let us say the weapons, where did the weapons come from?
25 A. Certainly some of the weapons came from Croatia.
1 Q. To your knowledge at the very outset, the creation of
2 the HVO, did any official officers of the Croatian army
3 participate in founding this HVO?
4 A. Yes, there was at least some participation from Croatian
5 army officers from the Republic of Croatia in the
6 formation of it.
7 Q. After its Croatian was it sponsored in any way or
8 controlled by the Croatian Government?
9 A. I'm really not qualified to answer questions of the
10 degree of control. I would say that the understanding
11 in the scholarly literature is that it has been
12 basically an extension of an instrument of the armoury
13 of the Republic of Croatia.
14 Q. When the confrontation started with the Government of
15 Bosnia -- of the army of the Government of Bosnia, where
16 did the Croatian army itself reside? Where was it
17 stationed?
18 A. Well, it was stated really at various points throughout
19 -- I mean, it was obviously at that point very
20 concerned about the Serb areas that were under Serbian
21 control, and therefore had troops, you know, surrounding
22 those areas. It had troops just really all over in
23 terms of the areas near Croatia or in Croatia and near
24 Bosnia.
25 Q. But it did not go inside Bosnia?
1 A. Well, it clearly went inside Bosnia at numerous times
2 during this period of time. That actually led to some
3 reprimand from the United Nations and threats by the
4 Security Council to sanction Croatia for its use --
5 sending Croatian regular Republic of Croatia troops into
6 Bosnia.
7 Q. It penetrated the frontiers to give support of the HVO
8 to the HVO in its confrontation?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Or was it in its own right?
11 A. Probably both. Clearly it was in strong support of the
12 HVO during this period in Central Bosnia, yes.
13 Q. You mentioned that the Croatian Democratic Union
14 advocated and I quote "a territorial unit as an
15 extension of the republic of Croatia". This union was
16 representing -- what did it represent, this union?
17 A. Well, the Croatian Democratic Union was founded to
18 represent the Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It
19 originally -- its first representatives represented
20 Croats from all over Bosnia, those living in cities, in
21 villages, territorially completely dispersed through the
22 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
23 Q. What links did this Croatian Democratic Union -- what
24 was the link between it and the Croatian Government?
25 A. I think it really operated with the support and the
1 encouragement of the Croatian government up until the
2 events of February 1992, when it was essentially taken
3 over by people who were acting directly at the orders of
4 people in the Croatian government. From that point on
5 it functioned rather slavishly as an instrument of The
6 Republic of Croatia foreign policy.
7 Q. Was there any kind of dominance of the Croatian
8 government on other political institutions in
9 Herceg-Bosna?
10 A. Yes. That domination was very complete in terms of the
11 army, in terms of the educational institutions. The
12 telephone network was linked with Croatia. The entire
13 really governmental, administrative structure was
14 closely linked with Croatia.
15 Q. When you said in terms of the army, was it -- was the
16 army financed by Croatia or were the weapons or --
17 A. I would say -- yes, financed and armed.
18 Q. Financed and armed?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. You also quoted Lord Owen's book, "Balkan Odyssey" and
21 mentioned that Dr. Tudjman had one goal:
22 "To control the territory which he believed
23 historically belonged to Croatia".
24 Now what was precisely the territory mentioned
25 here and were there any plans foreseen to gain these
1 territories?
2 A. That's just, I think, a very important question. There
3 really are, I guess, two ways of answering it. The one
4 really is the answer that was favoured by the far right
5 in Croatia, some of the rightist parties, which defined
6 the Bosnian Muslims -- thought of the Bosnian Muslims as
7 all Croats, and therefore any policy should encompass
8 incorporating all of Bosnia-Herzegovina into land
9 defined as Croatian. This was the, let us say,
10 theoretical position of President Tudjman, but when it
11 came to the practical policies of supporting
12 Herceg-Bosna as a territorial entity, then he appears to
13 be very much driven by the notion of the Cvetkovic-Macek
14 map, which of course amounted to a partial annexation of
15 Bosnia, including those areas in Western Herzegovina
16 which were fundamentally purely Croat and those areas in
17 Central Bosnia which had a substantial Croat population
18 but not a majority Croat population, but were
19 incorporated in the map from 1939.
20 Q. Were there any steps foreseen to implement this wish?
21 A. I would characterise that as a, let us say, gradual
22 process of annexation that has gone on to this day. It
23 involved the merging of administrative entities, support
24 for the military and police. As I have mentioned, phone
25 system, postal system, all these kind of administrative
1 services, were integrated over time. The specific, you
2 know, plans kind of advanced step by step as
3 opportunities arose in the course of the war in Bosnia
4 and the contention even that has been there since the
5 Peace Plan that has been implemented.
6 Q. But as far as the population were concerned, were there
7 any plans?
8 A. You mean were there specific plans?
9 Q. As far as the people living in these areas are
10 concerned?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Were there any plans?
13 A. You mean plans that might have been launched by the
14 people in the areas?
15 Q. Plans as far as the people dwelling in these areas?
16 What were they supposed to be dealt with?
17 A. Oh, you mean people who were not Croats?
18 Q. Yes.
19 A. No. I know of no specific plans that were created to
20 deal with the non-Croat population, no. I don't think
21 that that was -- that wasn't something that was, let us
22 say, premeditated, a pre-planned part of these
23 annexationist ambitions.
24 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much.
25 A. Thank you, sir.
1 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Professor, I have two series of
2 questions for you. The first has to do with the
3 ultimatum or alleged ultimatum. You have given
4 evidence of a proclamation I think of 3rd April 1993 and
5 evidence has been introduced to the effect that certain
6 parts of the media characterised that proclamation as
7 amounting to an ultimatum, which I think is consistent
8 with your own analysis of the position. Defence
9 counsel asked you whether the newspapers in question
10 might have found their way into the Lasva Valley and you
11 gave the answer which you gave. Are you in a position
12 to assist the court by saying whether those newspaper
13 articles which describe the proclamation as amounting to
14 an ultimatum might have permeated into parts of
15 HVO-controlled areas outside of the Lasva Valley?
16 A. My impression of the original announcement on April 3rd
17 was that this was a very major announcement designed for
18 consumption by the public in Croatia and Croatian
19 inhabited areas of Bosnia. The citation from the FBIS,
20 the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Tanjug, in
21 English, is a radio broadcast. So I don't think one
22 should limit the notions of these newspapers -- of
23 dissemination of this ultimatum, as I have characterised
24 it, to the printed media. This was certainly a time
25 when many people were closely attuned, tuned to their
1 radios for information on the war and what was going
2 on. So I would -- given the emphasis, the publicity
3 that was attended to this statement on April 3rd and the
4 fact that it was picked up by several different media in
5 the subsequent three to five days, to me the value or
6 perhaps the importance of the Tanjug article is that it
7 says that this is a broad public understanding, that
8 there is a deadline of April 15th. That would suggest
9 to me that throughout these areas this was well-known.
10 Q. So you are saying to the court that the characterisation
11 of the proclamation of 3rd April as an ultimatum would
12 have been generally disseminated throughout
13 Croatian-controlled areas?
14 A. That would be my assessment, yes, sir.
15 Q. Are you in a position to assist the court by saying
16 whether there ever emanated from any official quarter in
17 Croatian-controlled areas of a denial of the
18 characterisation of the proclamation as an ultimatum?
19 A. I have looked to see if there was such a denial issued
20 in the press that I have looked at. I have found no
21 denial, and would believe that any such denial would be
22 -- would have been very widely disseminated in that
23 period.
24 Q. I turn to the second point which I have in mind. It
25 has to do with your residence in Sarajevo while you were
1 composing your dissertation. I think you said you
2 resided in the city?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And an issue was raised as to a comparison between the
5 attitudes of rural people and the attitudes of people in
6 the urban areas. You remember that area?
7 A. Yes, sir.
8 Q. Now, did you ever travel outside of Sarajevo?
9 A. Yes, I did.
10 Q. How frequently, would you say?
11 A. Oh, once or twice a month.
12 Q. And during what overall period?
13 A. During the entire period from the summer of 1974 through
14 the early fall of 1975.
15 Q. In the course of those travels outside of Sarajevo,
16 would you have had occasion to speak to any persons?
17 A. Yes, certainly.
18 Q. What kinds of persons?
19 A. Well, first of all, there are numerous towns of a
20 smaller dimension than Sarajevo that I spoke with:
21 Mostar, Jablanica, Metkovic, Tuzla, Banja Luka. So
22 I certainly visited some of the lesser towns and spoke
23 to people there. I had several occasions to visit
24 villages typically with friends that either came from
25 those villages or who had friends in, and so I did,
1 I think, experience some small taste of village life.
2 I regret that I did not have the experience of some
3 anthropologists who have spent a full year in one
4 village or so, but I did have some exposure to village
5 life.
6 Q. In your judgement as a historian, would those visits have
7 presented you with an adequate opportunity to collect an
8 impression of the attitudes of rural people?
9 A. Certainly on the basis of personal experience again
10 there were, I'm sure, many issues that I never touched
11 on with them but certainly had that opportunity.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Donia, the Tribunal wishes to thank you
14 for your long testimony, which demonstrated your
15 availability to the International Criminal Tribunal.
16 At this time the usher will accompany you out of the
17 courtroom and we will proceed according to the schedule
18 set up by the Prosecutor until 6 o'clock. That is
19 either the hearing of another witness or the
20 cross-examination -- another cross-examination which you
21 wish to have, unless you were not prepared at this
22 point. Thank you, Mr. Donia.
23 A. Thank you.
24 (Witness withdraws from court).
25 MR. KEHOE: With all due respect, your Honour, the witness
1 that I thought we would get on earlier this afternoon we
2 excused because I thought we were only going to 5.30.
3 I was unaware that we were going to 6 o'clock.
4 I apologise to your Honour.
5 JUDGE JORDA: Because we did begin a little bit later.
6 I say that for you and for the interpreters as well.
7 Then we will stop at 5.30. You may be seated.
8 Tomorrow we will resume at 10 o'clock, because on
9 Thursday we will not have a hearing. I would simply
10 like to call your attention to the fact both of the
11 Prosecutor and the Defence -- I have made a very simple
12 calculation. We have spent four days on Mr. Donia's
13 testimony. If we multiply the number of days of that
14 very important witness by the number of witnesses
15 mentioned by the Prosecutor and the Defence, you can
16 imagine how we would need a second courtroom. That's
17 being done but actually and more seriously this is not
18 in any way an ultimatum from me. I would request that
19 within these proceedings, which is very, very carefully
20 carried out and very respectful of the rights of the
21 Defence, and which allows the Prosecutor to move forward
22 through his proof properly. I would like to request,
23 as I have already done, to consider that in this
24 Tribunal history is looking at us, and that justice is
25 one of our concerns, as well as care, but also a certain
1 type of speed. I am not saying -- don't make me say
2 what I am not saying. I am not saying that four days
3 of hearing for this testimony, 21st June and today as
4 well. You are very familiar with these proceedings.
5 You know that these are not those that are practised in
6 other systems, but this is the one that we are
7 practising. Therefore I am asking you to be conscious
8 of the responsibility which is yours. My colleagues
9 and myself will not hesitate when there are questions
10 which are being repeated to tell you so in order for us
11 to move things forward quickly. On the good intentions
12 we will end this hearing and begin tomorrow again at 10
13 o'clock.
14 (5.30 pm)
15 (Hearing adjourned until 10.00 am tomorrow)
16 --ooOoo--
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