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  1. 1 Friday, 3rd July, 1998

    2 (Open session)

    3 --- Upon commencing at 9.56 a.m.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Please be seated. Would the

    5 registrar please bring in the accused?

    6 (The accused entered court)

    7 JUDGE JORDA: And also bring in the witness

    8 at the same time. I would like to also say hello to

    9 everyone. Good morning to the interpreters.

    10 (The witness entered)

    11 JUDGE JORDA: If everyone can hear me, if

    12 everything is functioning properly, then we will

    13 continue with the cross-examination of

    14 Lieutenant-Colonel. Lieutenant-Colonel, do you hear

    15 me?

    16 THE WITNESS: Yes.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Are you rested?

    18 THE WITNESS: I'm rested, yes.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Do you feel well? You are in

    20 your own country, so everything should be okay.

    21 Let us resume then. Mr. Hayman?

    22 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, Mr. President. Good

    23 morning, Your Honours. Good morning,

    24 Lieutenant-Colonel.

    25 WITNESS: HENDRIK MORSINK (continued)

  2. 1Cross-examined by Mr. Hayman:

    2 Q. Let us continue yesterday where we broke with

    3 Exhibit 416 which is the document titled "Call for

    4 Help" dated 4th of May, 1993, and authored by then

    5 Colonel Blaskic. If that could be provided to the

    6 witness in case he needs to refer to it?

    7 In looking at the document, I didn't find

    8 anything that suggested in it that Croats in Zenica

    9 should flee or evacuate. Do you have a contrary

    10 understanding of the contents of the document?

    11 A. I see no order for Croats to flee, but then

    12 the title on top is a "Call for Help," not a call for

    13 flee.

    14 Q. So it was a call for assistance from the

    15 International Community in protecting Croats who were

    16 isolated to a greater or lesser extent in Zenica; is

    17 that fair?

    18 A. It's addressed to the U.N. High Commission of

    19 Refugees, and they are the organisation -- if any

    20 request is made, it should be made to this

    21 organisation.

    22 Q. And is the request fairly characterised as a

    23 call for help to protect the Croat civilians remaining

    24 in Zenica?

    25 A. I think the UNHCR is not the organisation to

  3. 1protect people, they are the organisation to provide

    2 help, to check on any threats made to certain

    3 populations.

    4 Q. Well, it's also addressed to the ECMM, the

    5 United Nations, and so forth.

    6 A. That's right. But as I recall it, the

    7 mandate for the U.N. organisations at that time were

    8 only to provide security for UNHCR, and they did not

    9 have the clear mandate to provide security for any

    10 group of population at all.

    11 Q. And was that a source of frustration for both

    12 of the warring parties at times?

    13 A. As I recall it, both parties tried to get

    14 assistance from UNPROFOR and from other organisations.

    15 Q. Would you agree that the gist of this

    16 document is a request for help to protect Croats

    17 remaining in Zenica?

    18 A. I agree that this document is a request for

    19 help, but the facts listed in this document were not

    20 correct or at least not found to be true by us.

    21 Q. Well, let's go back to the facts in the

    22 document. The document states in paragraph 1: "The

    23 difficult position of Croats in Zenica who have been

    24 living in total isolation for some time."

    25 Had the Croats in Zenica been cut off and

  4. 1isolated for some time as of the 4th of May, 1993?

    2 MR. HARMON: Objection, Mr. President. That

    3 question was asked yesterday and answered yesterday.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: I do not remember, really, very

    5 well. Perhaps I will call upon your memory, but if it

    6 has been stated that you have asked this question

    7 yesterday, then please go on to another question.

    8 Thank you, Judge Riad, for reminding me.

    9 MR. HAYMAN: I will go forward,

    10 Mr. President. We only have limited time this morning,

    11 I know.

    12 If Exhibit 417 could be put before the

    13 witness?

    14 Q. There's a redaction in the upper right-hand

    15 corner of the document. Do you know what's been

    16 redacted?

    17 A. I tried to find the redaction on my own

    18 original, and I think it says Mr. Philip Morillon.

    19 Q. Do you know who redacted that or marked on

    20 that portion of the document?

    21 A. I don't know. I got this as a copy from

    22 the -- I think from the ECMM headquarters in Zenica.

    23 Q. Now, this document was not addressed to the

    24 news media; is that correct?

    25 A. As far as I can tell from the distribution

  5. 1list, the news media are not on this list.

    2 Q. So it went to international organisations?

    3 A. That's correct, but I cannot tell whether it

    4 was distributed to anybody else.

    5 Q. On its face, it went only to international

    6 organisations; correct?

    7 A. That's correct.

    8 Q. So when you described Exhibit 417 as

    9 propaganda, did you mean that Colonel Blaskic was

    10 trying to influence the views of international

    11 organisations present in Central Bosnia with respect to

    12 the plight of Croat people in Central Bosnia?

    13 A. According to my opinion, he is exaggerating

    14 the facts and he is trying to influence the

    15 international organisations that were working in that

    16 area at that time.

    17 Q. And with respect to this document, the

    18 reference to Kakanj, tell the court if Colonel Blaskic

    19 is exaggerating in this document events in Kakanj.

    20 What did happen in Kakanj on or about the 12th of June,

    21 1993?

    22 A. As I told you yesterday, I'm not fully aware

    23 of the events that happened in Kakanj since I left the

    24 scene at the 10th or 11th of June for a small vacation

    25 at the coast, and I came back in the area on the 16th

  6. 1or the 17th.

    2 Q. Do you think this document is an attempt to

    3 encourage Croat people in Vares -- excuse me, in

    4 Kakanj, to flee, or have they already fled Kakanj as of

    5 the 14th of June, 1993?

    6 MR. HARMON: Objection, Mr. President. The

    7 witness testified he did not and was not familiar with

    8 the events in Kakanj.

    9 MR. HAYMAN: I asked him concerning --

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, objection sustained. The

    11 witness did indeed answer you. He said very honestly

    12 that he did not have any details about the events in

    13 Kakanj. Please go on to the next question.

    14 MR. HAYMAN:

    15 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, you have characterised

    16 this document as propaganda. Do you think this

    17 document was an attempt to encourage Croats to flee

    18 Kakanj? I'm not asking you about events in Kakanj.

    19 I'm asking you about the document. Was it an attempt

    20 by Colonel Blaskic to get Croats to flee Kakanj?

    21 A. I'm still not sure about fleeing from Kakanj,

    22 but I know that this fits into a pattern of

    23 exaggeration and a pattern of propaganda used by the

    24 HVO day after day. They sent a lot of messages like

    25 this to us ECMM, we used to discuss these messages in

  7. 1the evening meetings, and the general opinion of

    2 Mr. Thebault and also my opinion was that grave

    3 exaggeration was used as a propaganda to put influence

    4 on certain groups of Croats.

    5 Q. What group of Croats were the target, the

    6 influence, the group that was targeted for influence by

    7 Exhibit 417?

    8 A. As I read it, the number of Croats are

    9 referred to as people from Kakanj.

    10 Q. So your testimony is this was an attempt to

    11 influence Croats in Kakanj; is that right?

    12 MR. HARMON: Objection, Mr. President. He

    13 did not testify to that.

    14 MR. HAYMAN: It's a question.

    15 A. As I told you before, I am not familiar with

    16 the situation at Kakanj --

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, please try to respond to

    18 the question.

    19 A. I have read this article, this paper, this

    20 document as one document in a line of attempts to

    21 influence us as international organisations and to

    22 influence Croat people to come to certain Croat-held

    23 areas.

    24 Q. Tell us, of the Croats in Central Bosnia who

    25 had to leave their homes, how many stayed in Central

  8. 1Bosnia and how many left Bosnia altogether? Can you

    2 tell us that?

    3 A. I don't know the exact numbers. I know that

    4 from certain areas around Zenica, in the beginning of

    5 my tour of duty, people fled to Grahovcici as I

    6 testified yesterday. A part of this group was brought

    7 back, the thing that we arranged. Later on, quite a

    8 large group fled from the area of Guca Gora in the

    9 direction of Novi Bila. I know of situations where a

    10 lot of Croats fled from the Travnik area and went to

    11 the Serb side, and after long travel, they came to

    12 another Croat-controlled or HVO-controlled area, and I

    13 was told by my own monitor that in the area of

    14 Kiseljak, a similar thing was prepared, that people

    15 from Kiseljak -- my own interpreter was a Croat girl

    16 living in the Kiseljak area. She and her family and

    17 other Croats had to be prepared to go to Ilidza, and as

    18 far as I know, Ilidza is a town in the centre of

    19 Sarajevo and was held by the Bosnian-Serb army. This

    20 all fits into a certain pattern that Croats either have

    21 to come to the HVO-controlled area or try to flee

    22 through Serb-held territory to another HVO-held

    23 territory.

    24 Q. We'll come back to this. But you said that

    25 your interpreter lived in the Kiseljak pocket or her

  9. 1family was there, and that there was an evacuation plan

    2 for Croats in the Kiseljak pocket in case it fell to

    3 the BiH army; is that right?

    4 A. That's not what I said. Not in case it

    5 fell. She was told or her family was told by the Croat

    6 leaders, by the HVO leaders, to be prepared to evacuate

    7 to Ilidza.

    8 Q. To be prepared to evacuate the Kiseljak

    9 pocket to a location closer to Sarajevo outside of the

    10 pocket if necessary; is that right?

    11 A. I think they should be prepared if necessary,

    12 yes, but I'm not aware of any threat on the Kiseljak

    13 pocket.

    14 Q. Well, obviously someone viewed the Kiseljak

    15 pocket as threatened or else there wouldn't have been

    16 an evacuation plan; correct?

    17 A. That's correct.

    18 Q. Now, coming back to my earlier question. If

    19 you don't know, that's fine. Just tell us. But do you

    20 know: Did 185.000 Croats or more leave Bosnia, not for

    21 other HVO-held territories but for Croatia and the west

    22 as a result of the conflict?

    23 A. I'm not aware of that number.

    24 Q. Thank you. If Exhibit 418 could be put

    25 before the witness? This is the Mate Boban letter of

  10. 122 June, 1993, that you have characterised in the same

    2 vein, I believe, as Exhibits 416 and 417. Was this

    3 document on its face directed to the news media?

    4 A. I cannot tell that from the face. On its

    5 face, it's directed to General Philip Morillon,

    6 UNPROFOR commander.

    7 Q. Now, tell us again how this came to you in

    8 the summer of 1993.

    9 A. Like I told you yesterday, I'm not sure

    10 whether I saw this one -- this document --

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, perhaps you should

    12 avoid having the witness repeat himself, if you wish to

    13 gain some time.

    14 MR. HAYMAN: That's fine, Mr. President. He

    15 said he wasn't sure. Yesterday I thought he said he

    16 saw it when he was an EC monitor in Central Bosnia,

    17 which I didn't understand how he would see General

    18 Morillon's personal correspondence at the time. He

    19 appears to be retracting from that statement, but I

    20 will --

    21 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. I withdraw my own

    22 observation. This is in your interests, it is only in

    23 your interests that I make that comment. That's all.

    24 Please go ahead.

    25 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, Mr. President.

  11. 1Q. Do you know whether you saw this as an

    2 EC monitor or not?

    3 A. No, there was a mix-up in numbers yesterday

    4 afternoon, and I referred to this one since I had it on

    5 my desk yesterday-- I'm not sure whether I saw this one

    6 in Bosnia or later on.

    7 Q. When you say "later on," in preparing for

    8 your testimony in the past few days?

    9 A. That's right.

    10 Q. Did this document, on its face, is it copied

    11 to General Blaskic or the HVO authorities, the military

    12 authorities?

    13 A. I cannot tell from the heading.

    14 Q. It's not reflected on the heading that it

    15 was?

    16 A. It's not reflected on the heading.

    17 Q. The document on page 1 references a number of

    18 places, including Fojnica, that's about ten lines down

    19 under "Dear Sir." Do you know what happened to the

    20 Croat population of Fojnica?

    21 A. I visited Fojnica once, and that was in the

    22 end of May or the beginning of June, and there was

    23 nothing wrong in Fojnica. The army of BiH and the HVO

    24 were cooperative in that area by that time.

    25 Q. There were joint civil authority structures

  12. 1in Fojnica, as you recall?

    2 A. I only checked on the military structures,

    3 and they were joint military structures by that time.

    4 Q. Do you know what happened in Fojnica in July

    5 1993?

    6 A. I read about it in the newspapers, but I

    7 wasn't there at that time. I think I left Bosnia

    8 already.

    9 Q. And did you read that two days after General

    10 Morillon visited and proclaimed Fojnica a bright spot

    11 in an otherwise despairing situation, the BiH army

    12 attacked the Croats in Fojnica and drove them out and

    13 indeed they withdrew, causing a mass exodus of more

    14 than 5.000 Croats from Fojnica? Is that in substance

    15 what you read?

    16 A. The only thing I recall from reading the

    17 newspapers, the Dutch newspapers, was that the Dutch

    18 battalion gave assistance to a mental hospital and a

    19 kind of orphanage in Fojnica.

    20 Q. You don't remember anything else?

    21 A. That's what I remember from the newspaper

    22 articles.

    23 Q. The same page implores General Morillon with

    24 respect to number of places, including Bugojno, asking

    25 that the same not happen there. What happened to the

  13. 1Croat population in Bugojno, do you know?

    2 A. It was not in my area of operations, it was

    3 in the same area of the British battalion, so I heard

    4 some things about what happened in Bugojno, but it was

    5 not my operation, and I did not visit Bugojno.

    6 Q. Prior to your tour, were you briefed on

    7 events in the village of Dusina in the Zenica

    8 municipality?

    9 A. No, I never heard that name before.

    10 Q. Have you heard of the village Lasva in the

    11 Zenica municipality?

    12 A. I heard of a river called Lasva but not a

    13 village called Lasva.

    14 Q. What about the village called Miletici?

    15 A. Yes, I heard some allegations on a village

    16 called Miletici.

    17 Q. Did you visit this spot?

    18 A. I did not visit it myself, but I know the

    19 allegations and I know that investigations have been

    20 done and that some of the allegations, as I recall it,

    21 a number of -- five or ten Croats have been killed in

    22 Miletici, allegedly by Muslim -- by the 7th Muslim

    23 brigade.

    24 Q. This Boban letter references in the second

    25 paragraph promises made in a meeting held on June 10 in

  14. 1Medugorje. Do you know about that meeting, about any

    2 promises made in that meeting by General Morillon?

    3 A. I know the meeting taking place. I am not

    4 fully aware of the contents, I am not fully aware of

    5 the agreements made in Medugorje, because that was the

    6 beginning of my small vacation period.

    7 Q. Thank you. Now let's turn to the issue of

    8 the responses to allegations of misconduct by the BiH

    9 army on the one hand and the HVO on the other.

    10 Would you agree that you did not have

    11 sufficient contact with either Colonel Blaskic or his

    12 counterpart General Hadzihasanovic in Zenica in order

    13 to judge their personal responses when news of

    14 improprieties or misconduct reached them?

    15 A. Well, I had daily contacts with his

    16 representatives, so if they had thought it would be

    17 necessary for Mr. Blaskic to come with us, I think they

    18 would have advised him so.

    19 Q. My question was: Do you believe you have a

    20 basis to compare the personal responses of Colonel

    21 Blaskic with the personal responses of General

    22 Hadzihasanovic with respect to the issue of

    23 improprieties, crimes, and misconduct. If you do,

    24 please state, if not, please state?

    25 A. I never met General Hadzihasanovic myself, I

  15. 1met Mr. Blaskic several times.

    2 Q. Well, General Hadzihasanovic had a staff, did

    3 he not?

    4 A. Yes.

    5 Q. Did you meet them on a regular basis?

    6 A. I met Mr. Merdan every day, almost every day.

    7 Q. And Mr. Alagic, you spent time with

    8 Mr. Alagic, he reported to General Hadzihasanovic;

    9 correct?

    10 A. I think he did. I'm not sure.

    11 Q. So are you saying that you can judge General

    12 Blaskic's responses to these types of issues -- excuse

    13 me, the then Colonel Blaskic -- but not General

    14 Hadzihasanovic, or do you have, in essence, an equal

    15 basis for judging both?

    16 A. Well, as I told you, I never met

    17 Mr. Hadzihasanovic. It's hard to judge about his

    18 reactions. I met Colonel Blaskic several times, and I

    19 am sure that the things I reported during all the

    20 meetings were -- or at least could have been reported

    21 to Mr. Blaskic, and there were no reactions from the

    22 HVO side. The other thing is that we did not ask

    23 Mr. Alagic to come with us, he offered it himself, so

    24 it was his gesture.

    25 Q. Let's talk about General Alagic's grand

  16. 1gesture regarding Guca Gora. You have testified that

    2 after you visited Guca Gora, the monastery was wrecked

    3 and desecrated, correct, in Guca Gora?

    4 A. Weeks after we first visited the church of

    5 Guca Gora, it was checked again, and then damage was

    6 found.

    7 Q. Did you talk to Alagic or anyone else in the

    8 BiH army then about this issue?

    9 A. Yes, we did.

    10 Q. And what did they say?

    11 A. They showed that they were humiliated by

    12 that, and Alagic ordered -- or gave orders to BiH

    13 soldiers to clear up the mess.

    14 Q. And was anyone ever found responsible for the

    15 desecration and the destruction of the inside of

    16 the monastery?

    17 A. I have no signs that anybody was punished for

    18 that.

    19 Q. Did you ever get a report from the BiH army or

    20 Mr. Alagic concerning his investigation?

    21 A. I did not get a report.

    22 Q. When he told you it would be taken care of,

    23 did you trust him in that regard?

    24 A. Yes, I did.

    25 Q. Let me read to you a portion of a report from

  17. 1the council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, dated 31

    2 August, 1994, and ask you if you agree with it?

    3 MR. HARMON: Excuse me, Mr. President. It

    4 would be helpful to the Prosecutor if we could have a

    5 copy of the same report that Counsel's reading from so

    6 we could take the statement that he's going to read to

    7 the witness, put it in proper context.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: I think Mr. Hayman will give

    9 you a copy because even the Judges don't have one, so I

    10 assume that we're going to have something like this

    11 before you tender it; is that right, Mr. Hayman?

    12 MR. HAYMAN: Mr. President, I'm not showing

    13 him the document. I'm going to ask him if he agrees

    14 with the statement. I'm going to read the entirety of

    15 the paragraph that begins "Guca Gora," it's a publicly

    16 available document, I don't have any copies. If the

    17 witness and the Prosecutor would like to look at it

    18 during the next break, he's free to.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Well, I think that's what we'll

    20 do. Maybe during the break, you can make some

    21 photocopies of that page, perhaps, if that's possible.

    22 MR. HAYMAN: I'll make it available for

    23 photocopies to be made, certainly.

    24 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Registrar, during the

    25 break, will a copy please be given to the Judges. Do

  18. 1you intend to tender it as evidence, Mr. Hayman?

    2 MR. HAYMAN: It depends on whether the

    3 witness agrees with the statement.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: I see. Very well. Then please

    5 read it slowly so that the witness will not be caught

    6 off guard. Thank you. Please go ahead.

    7 MR. HAYMAN:

    8 "Guca Gora: The civil and military BiH

    9 authorities in Travnik permitted the consultant to

    10 visit this site. The village, which contained many

    11 traditional farmhouses and buildings, was taken from

    12 the HVO, perhaps by Mujahedin soldiers, and it was

    13 ethnically cleansed of Croats with a lot of burning.

    14 Two weeks later, the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina

    15 occupied the Franciscan monastery, which it still

    16 occupies."

    17 Q. My question for you, Lieutenant-Colonel: Did

    18 General Alagic ever tell you that the monastery in Guca

    19 Gora became the BiH army headquarters in Guca Gora?

    20 A. No, he did not tell me because I think it was

    21 not the fact when I was there in that period. I

    22 visited this monastery several times, and when I viewed

    23 it, it was not used as a BiH headquarters. And the

    24 other sentence about Mujahedin attacking and a lot of

    25 houses burning, that was not the case when I was there.

  19. 1Q. So when you left the theatre in July, the BiH

    2 army was not utilising the monastery?

    3 A. Not as far as I know. I did not visit Guca

    4 Gora the day when I left. I went several times.

    5 Q. When is the last time you visited?

    6 A. I'm not sure. I think the end of June. I'm

    7 not sure about the date. The end of June.

    8 Q. You said that HVO authorities weren't

    9 responsive to allegations of improprieties and

    10 frequently attributed them to uncontrolled elements; is

    11 that right?

    12 A. That's right.

    13 MR. HAYMAN: Let me ask that a Prosecution

    14 Exhibit be put before you, 242, and that you be

    15 assisted in finding page D1 of Exhibit 242.

    16 242, Mr. President, is an exhibit prepared by

    17 the ECMM, it's a report on inter-ethnic violence in

    18 Vitez, Busovaca, and Zenica, April 1993, and page D2

    19 are the notes of the ECMM concerning an interview with

    20 General Hadzihasanovic, commander 3rd Corps, BiH army,

    21 held on 7 May, 1993.

    22 Q. If you could find page D1?

    23 A. I've got that page in front of me.

    24 Q. Very well. The top of the notes indicate

    25 that the issue of hostages, which is an apparent

  20. 1reference to the kidnapping of commander Todic and

    2 other HVO officers in mid April 1993, was an issue

    3 raised with General Hadzihasanovic. And then if you

    4 look at the last two paragraphs of the notes, they read

    5 as follows, and this is attributed to General

    6 Hadzihasanovic: "It was best to go slowly. He wanted

    7 to have 7 Muslim brigade under control rather than

    8 not. The Mujahedin are not under control. There are

    9 many elements who are not controlled. He recommended I

    10 should meet one of his staff in the morning to go into

    11 detail."

    12 Now, is it your testimony you heard this type

    13 of representation from officers within the BiH army or

    14 you did not?

    15 A. I'm aware of the fact that when I arrived in

    16 theatre, the 7th Muslim brigade was not under control

    17 of the 3rd Corps army of BiH. Mr. Merdan told us

    18 several times. He also told us that he was desperately

    19 trying to get them under control, and he told us that

    20 he had achieved to do so -- I'm not sure when it was,

    21 but the end of May or the beginning of June, he said as

    22 of that moment, the 7th Muslim brigade was under his

    23 control.

    24 Q. Is that before or after the Guca Gora mosque

    25 (sic) was desecrated and destroyed by the 7th Muslim

  21. 1brigade?

    2 A. The Guca Gora monastery was not devastated it

    3 was not destroyed. The 7th Muslim brigade came under

    4 their control a few days after the exchange of

    5 Mujahedin prisoners from Kaonik prison, and the Croat

    6 colonels and some other Croat officers. I'm not sure

    7 when that was. I can look it up in my notes.

    8 Q. It's in May, middle of May, something like

    9 that?

    10 A. So at the end of May then, they came under

    11 control.

    12 Q. You said in your direct testimony that

    13 Mr. Nakic and Mr. Merdan's orders were obeyed. Are you

    14 qualifying that earlier testimony by saying now to the

    15 Court that prior to the end of May, the BiH army and

    16 General Merdan did not have control over the 7th Muslim

    17 brigade and his orders would not have been obeyed and

    18 respected by the 7th Muslim brigade?

    19 A. Well, according to my opinion, in the Dutch

    20 army, you cannot give orders to units that are not

    21 under your command. So it's not a matter of disobeying

    22 orders, they were just not under the command of third

    23 Muslim -- of the third BiH army.

    24 Q. So General Merdan told you that he wasn't

    25 attempting to give orders to the 7th Muslim brigade

  22. 1because he felt he could not control them; is that

    2 right?

    3 A. He told me that he was attempting to get them

    4 under his control.

    5 Q. And how do you do that if you don't attempt

    6 to give direction, including orders, to a unit?

    7 A. I'm not sure whether they were in his order

    8 of combat, I mean, in the hierarchy of the 3rd corps,

    9 or maybe they changed a commander or punished somebody,

    10 I'm not sure about that, but the fact is that after the

    11 exchange of prisoners, this Muslim brigade was reported

    12 to us as being under control.

    13 Q. At the end of May?

    14 A. At the end of May.

    15 Q. You discussed the relative levels of

    16 destruction to Muslim religious sites and Catholic

    17 religious sites in Central Bosnia. Have you undertaken

    18 a study of that question or is your testimony anecdotal

    19 in nature?

    20 A. I did not make a special study on that

    21 subject myself. I think I can state this opinion by

    22 everything I saw in theatre, and I can state it by the

    23 discussions we had at ECMM and BRITBAT headquarters.

    24 Q. Let me just test the breadth of your

    25 experience by mentioning a few locations and ask you if

  23. 1you ever visited them or heard of them. The monastery

    2 in Doboj (phoen) Travnik municipality?

    3 A. I'm not aware of Doboj in Travnik.

    4 Q. The church in Cep near Kacuni?

    5 A. I visited the church in Cep near Kacuni, and

    6 I did it together with the priest from Busovaca, we

    7 escorted him, and there the priest showed us that some

    8 of the sacred Catholic things, like the box where they

    9 keep the sacramental wafers, this box was forcefully

    10 opened, and the sacramental wafers were thrown on the

    11 ground. That is felt as a desecration of holy Catholic

    12 objects, and we cleared up the mess together with this

    13 party that visited the church. The church itself was

    14 not damaged.

    15 Q. Was it later damaged much more severely, or

    16 do you not know?

    17 A. Not during the period I visited that area

    18 because I used to drive along that church when I had to

    19 go to the Kiseljak area.

    20 Q. Did you know the church in Proseje was

    21 burned?

    22 A. Can you tell me where that is, this town.

    23 Q. In the Busovaca municipality.

    24 A. It would help me if I can see it on the map,

    25 because I'm familiar with most names in the area where

  24. 1I worked, but --

    2 Q. We'll find it --

    3 A. Normally I use a map.

    4 Q. We'll find it on a map during the next

    5 break. The church in Borovici near Vares?

    6 A. I never visited that church in Vares.

    7 Q. The monastery in Klarisa (phoen) near

    8 Brestovsko (phoen)?

    9 A. I never was in Brestovsko.

    10 Q. You said in Grahovcici, the 2nd corps allowed

    11 a meeting and that was indicative of their positive

    12 attitude. Could you explain that comment? I didn't

    13 understand it?

    14 A. I'm not sure whether I said the 2nd corps

    15 because it doesn't sound familiar to me, I don't think

    16 there was a 2nd corps there.

    17 Q. I didn't think so either. The BiH army then.

    18 You said some kind of a meeting was allowed in

    19 Grahovcici, and that was indicative of a positive BiH

    20 army attitude. Can you add to that comment?

    21 A. I think you are referring to my visit at

    22 Grahovcici at the beginning of -- no, at the end of

    23 April when I assisted Father Stjepan in investigating

    24 in the area and in convincing the Croats that it was

    25 safe for them to go back to their own houses. This

  25. 1assistance made by the 3rd corps was in that way that

    2 they allowed us to pass checkpoints to allow us to

    3 cross the frontlines and to go into HVO-held

    4 territory. And later on, in the second phase of our

    5 operation, they assisted us with providing buses, in

    6 the beginning they provided an ambulance but took it

    7 back later on because Zenica was under artillery

    8 attack, and they provided military police escorts as

    9 far as the latest BiH checkpoint.

    10 Q. Thank you for explaining your earlier

    11 comment. You described being blocked at an HVO

    12 checkpoint trying to evacuate wounded from Travnik on a

    13 particular occasion. Do you recall that?

    14 A. That's correct. I recall that.

    15 Q. Okay. Let me ask you about that. Did you

    16 have permission from the 3rd corps and the HVO

    17 operative zone for that evacuation and nonetheless you

    18 were stopped?

    19 A. That's correct. This was an evacuation

    20 prepared during one of the meetings, during one of the

    21 local commission meetings were brigade commanders

    22 usually were present, and they assured us that we could

    23 take a number of wounded people from the Travnik

    24 hospital, and this was a mixed number of people, so

    25 civilians and soldiers, Croat soldiers and Muslim

  26. 1soldiers, Croat civilians, Muslim civilians, women and

    2 children, a number of 18 altogether. We prepared this

    3 very thoroughly with help of Dr. Mirsad Granov, they

    4 selected the most severely wounded people for us, and

    5 everybody agreed in passing the checkpoint, everybody

    6 agreed in us evacuating these wounded people to Zenica

    7 hospital where they could get better treatment.

    8 Q. And yet either the order didn't get passed

    9 down to the checkpoint or the soldiers at the

    10 checkpoint didn't obey that order; is that correct?

    11 A. That's correct.

    12 Q. Am I correct in concluding that during your

    13 tour of duty, you did not receive any reports of

    14 investigations into atrocities or misconduct from

    15 either army, BiH army or HVO?

    16 A. Most of the allegations of atrocities were

    17 from the BiH side in the direction of the Croats. We

    18 did a lot of investigations ourselves, and we asked

    19 both sides to do their investigations from their side,

    20 and we did not get results from -- on that request. If

    21 I compare them, I think we did at least ten times more

    22 requests through the HVO side than to the other side.

    23 Q. So I take it your answer is yes, you did not

    24 receive any reports of investigations from --

    25 A. We did not receive any reports.

  27. 1Q. Would that be normal, that an army would not

    2 give out internal reports of investigations to outside

    3 parties, such as internal (sic) organisations? Would

    4 the Dutch army do that as a matter of course, give out

    5 internal investigative reports?

    6 A. Depends on what it is. If there is a normal

    7 military operation, you wouldn't report on that

    8 operation to foreigners, to outsiders, but if there's

    9 an incident like a truck bomb, then I would be very

    10 keen on investigating that and reporting to anybody who

    11 would like to know it. Because reporting is the only

    12 chance to get the burden off your back.

    13 Q. Now, ECMM did an investigation into the

    14 shelling of Zenica on the 19th of April; is that

    15 correct?

    16 A. That's correct.

    17 Q. And that was a written report? Was it a

    18 written report --

    19 A. It's a report made by Mr. Lars Baggesen, one

    20 of my colleague monitors, and an investigation into the

    21 shelling was done during the period I was in Vitez or

    22 the ECMM house in BRITBAT.

    23 Q. Do you know whether that report was made

    24 available to Colonel Blaskic?

    25 A. I'm not sure whether it was made available,

  28. 1but all the findings of the ECMM were usually discussed

    2 during the joint operation command meetings or during

    3 the old Busovaca Joint Commission meetings.

    4 Q. You have no knowledge that the report was

    5 made available; is that correct?

    6 A. I personally have no knowledge of that.

    7 Q. How many times was Zenica shelled during your

    8 ten- or eleven-week tour of duty?

    9 A. It was shelled very often.

    10 Q. You also said that you were denied entry into

    11 Gomionica in the Kiseljak municipality?

    12 A. That's correct.

    13 Q. Prior to going, and while I'm asking this,

    14 could Exhibit 93 be retrieved? Prior to going, do you

    15 have approval from the HVO operative zone to go into

    16 the Kiseljak municipality?

    17 A. That's correct. Prior to going, we went to

    18 the Kiseljak headquarters, we met Mr. Bradara there, we

    19 told him that we would go to Rotilj to investigate on

    20 allegations, and that after that, we would go to

    21 Gomionica, and he told us that he agreed on that and he

    22 would prepare safe passage for us.

    23 Q. Yet you went to Gomionica and you were

    24 stopped by a squad of HVO soldiers; correct?

    25 A. That's correct. We were stopped by a single

  29. 1HVO soldier.

    2 Q. And did he tell you that his commander Ivica

    3 Rajic (phoen) had given orders to stop all UN, UNHCR,

    4 and ECMM vehicles? If you need to refresh your

    5 recollection, that statement is in the middle of your

    6 report which is Exhibit 93, about the eighth or ninth

    7 line down.

    8 A. That's correct. That's what I reported in my

    9 special report of that day.

    10 Q. Now, elsewhere in your statement to the

    11 Prosecutor's Office, you identified Mijo Bozic as the

    12 brigade commander in Kiseljak, is that correct, Mijo

    13 Bozic?

    14 A. I don't recall that I used his name before.

    15 Q. Who was the brigade commander in Kiseljak

    16 during your tour of duty?

    17 A. Well, in the beginning it was Mr. Rajic, but

    18 he was told (sic) to be killed at the frontlines, and

    19 later Mr. Bradara introduced himself as being the

    20 brigade commander.

    21 Q. Was this incident -- I'm sorry. The dates on

    22 your reports are somewhat difficult for civilians to

    23 comprehend. Can you help me? What was the date of

    24 your visit?

    25 A. I have to look it up in my book, but the date

  30. 1when this report was sent was the 27th of April.

    2 Q. Thank you. As of the 27th of April, had

    3 Mr. Rajic been killed on the front-line yet, or was he

    4 still in command?

    5 A. I'm not sure. I have to look it up. But I

    6 think when I reported in this way, then that's what the

    7 soldier at the front-line told me, that his commander,

    8 Rajic, apparently was still alive.

    9 Q. And your understanding was if Rajic was alive

    10 and was his commander, he would have been the brigade

    11 commander?

    12 A. That's correct, he would have been the

    13 brigade commander. But if his deputy or his second in

    14 command or the one who introduced himself as the actual

    15 brigade commander tells us that we can go anywhere we

    16 like and that it's free for us to investigate in Rotilj

    17 and in Gromiljak, then I think there's good grounds for

    18 us to believe it.

    19 Q. And it tells you, does it not, that something

    20 is wrong, when you go to the brigade headquarters, they

    21 tell you you have permission to go, and yet when you go

    22 to the village, a soldier blocks you and says someone

    23 else gave him an order to block you?

    24 A. That's right, but that's an excuse often used

    25 by soldiers, that somebody else told him not to let us

  31. 1through.

    2 Q. So what do you think? Do you think this was

    3 a deception by Mr. Bradara or what? What are you

    4 telling this Court? Or do you know?

    5 A. I don't know. Maybe it's a miscommunication,

    6 maybe it's a deception. I cannot tell.

    7 Q. So on this particular day, the HVO wasn't so

    8 well-organised and well-functioning; is that fair?

    9 A. That might be true. I cannot say from the

    10 facts. The only thing I can say is that we were

    11 stopped there and that one of the top level officers in

    12 the headquarters of Kiseljak, HVO Kiseljak, told us

    13 that we were free to go.

    14 Q. Yes. You've said that. Thank you.

    15 Let's turn to the subject of interference

    16 with aid. You saw the Convoy of Joy interfered with.

    17 Where did you see the Convoy of Joy?

    18 A. I saw the Convoy of Joy heading for the

    19 coast, hundreds of trucks, and I saw it coming back. I

    20 didn't see the interference myself, but I saw the

    21 results of it. And the results were that in the area

    22 of Novi Travnik and -- a lot of trucks were damaged,

    23 that some trucks were held in HVO-held territory, that

    24 some trucks were looted, some other trucks were hidden

    25 behind a church in Rankovici, and we spoke to the

  32. 1priest about those trucks hidden behind the Catholic

    2 church, and he told us that these trucks were meant to

    3 go to the area north in Bosnia, and that he saved those

    4 trucks from the looting.

    5 There were clear signs of robbed trucks, all

    6 kinds of things, clothing and pieces of food lying on

    7 the ground. Later on we found trucks in Busovaca, we

    8 found four drivers belonging to the Convoy of Joy in

    9 Busovaca. They stated that they didn't dare to go on

    10 anymore, and that they lost their trucks and their

    11 cargo.

    12 I wrote in my diary that we did not believe

    13 them at that time because we thought they had sold

    14 their goods in Croat-held territory. That's what I

    15 know about the Convoy of Joy.

    16 Q. Thank you. Actually, my question was: Where

    17 did you see it? And we will be able to conclude this

    18 morning if you focus on my question. On redirect, you

    19 can give any additional details that the Prosecutor

    20 invites.

    21 I take it you didn't see it until after it

    22 was broken up, and then you saw some trucks in

    23 different places; is that correct?

    24 A. That's correct.

    25 Q. Do you know on whose orders or direction the

  33. 1Convoy of Joy was commandeered?

    2 A. The Convoy of Joy was arranged by, as far as

    3 I know it, by the joint command in Travnik, they had a

    4 special officer to arrange this Convoy of Joy, a

    5 Colonel Siber, and they asked for support several

    6 times, and as far as we were allowed and we were

    7 capable, we supported them.

    8 Q. Who directed the robbing of the convoy, if

    9 you know?

    10 A. I don't know that.

    11 Q. Do you know whether Colonel Blaskic attempted

    12 to free and recover the convoy?

    13 A. I'm not aware of that.

    14 Q. Let's turn to Kruscica. You said a second

    15 road was opened for you after Colonel Blaskic wrote his

    16 order which is Defence Exhibit 141. What do you mean,

    17 a road was opened for you?

    18 A. There apparently was a parallel road to the

    19 main road, and at the base of the road, as we drove by,

    20 there was an HVO-manned military roadblock opened for

    21 us to be able to pass, so I pulled off the road--

    22 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters request

    23 that there be a break between questions and answers for

    24 the interpretation. Thank you.

    25 MR. HAYMAN: My apologies to the

  34. 1interpreters.

    2 Q. Was this roadblock that had existed

    3 essentially on the front-line, was it on the front-line

    4 in Kruscica?

    5 A. You cannot say that the roadblock is exactly

    6 on the front-line. The roadblock is that far away from

    7 the front-line so there is no direct fire on the

    8 roadblock.

    9 Q. The last presence of the HVO before no man's

    10 land, is that right? Is that fair?

    11 A. No, that's not correct. I would say that

    12 it's the last safe place. Soldiers on the front-line

    13 always move a little bit further, so there's no direct

    14 fire on the roadblock, soldiers on the front-line can

    15 receive direct fire and they should be able to give

    16 direct fire.

    17 Q. You had had permission, authority, and so

    18 forth from the Vitez brigade to go into Kruscica before

    19 you received Defence Exhibit 141; correct?

    20 A. We discussed this matter with Mario Cerkez

    21 several times, and we discussed it in the local

    22 commission Vitez several times where his

    23 representatives were present, and the answer we got

    24 almost after every request was that the road was

    25 blocked by angry civilians and that they could not

  35. 1control these angry civilians. Nevertheless, we tried

    2 to force our way through this human blockade, and we

    3 failed in that.

    4 Q. Had there been any discussion about an

    5 alternate route before the occasion when you went in

    6 through an alternate route?

    7 A. No.

    8 Q. No?

    9 A. We were not aware of that alternate route, so

    10 we didn't ask for it. I think the people at the

    11 ground, living in their own community should be aware

    12 of an alternate route.

    13 Q. You said your life was threatened by an HVO

    14 soldier at the Novi Bila hospital. Do you recall that?

    15 A. That's correct.

    16 Q. Was that threat reported to the Vitez brigade

    17 or the operative zone?

    18 A. That's correct. I reported it myself during

    19 one of the local commissions Vitez.

    20 Q. To ...

    21 A. To the officer present at that time. I'm not

    22 sure whether it was Mario Cerkez himself, Mr. Borislav

    23 Jozic was present at all those meetings, so he must

    24 have been there as well.

    25 Q. Borislav Jozic, was he killed by a sniper in

  36. 1Stari Vitez during your tour of duty?

    2 A. He was killed after I left the scene. I was

    3 told by a colleague monitor in a private letter.

    4 Q. Did you learn he was killed by a sniper in

    5 Stari Vitez?

    6 A. I was told that he killed -- he was killed in

    7 the area of Vitez. They didn't write to me whether it

    8 was done by a sniper or anybody else.

    9 Q. Let's turn to Busovaca and the four trucks of

    10 medical aid and powdered milk. Exhibit 421 may be

    11 helpful to your testimony. If it could be provided to

    12 the witness? 421.

    13 I would first direct your attention to

    14 paragraph 4. During most of your testimony yesterday,

    15 you referred to the police commander as a chief of

    16 police or commandant of police, but, in fact, he was

    17 the commander of the military police, the HVO military

    18 police, based in Busovaca; correct?

    19 A. That's correct.

    20 Q. And is it also correct that the convoy was

    21 hijacked apparently by local soldiers from Busovaca and

    22 then taken into the custody of the military police?

    23 A. That's correct. I was not present when it

    24 was hijacked. That's what I was told by the drivers

    25 and later on by the commander of the police himself.

  37. 1Q. Is the contents of paragraph 5 correct,

    2 wherein it discusses the fact that the papers for the

    3 cargo were not in proper order?

    4 A. That's correct, but the meaning of that is

    5 that the drivers took some goods with them for their

    6 private use, like a small gas burner to heat up their

    7 own food they needed during the road, and those small

    8 things. Maybe 1 per cent of the cargo was not on the

    9 cargo list.

    10 Q. And the rest of paragraph 5, is it correct?

    11 A. That's also correct.

    12 Q. Thank you. Now, in paragraph 13, you discuss

    13 the linkage issue, which I still don't understand. I

    14 apologise for that.

    15 Did the issue of the roadblock arise when two

    16 BRITBAT Warriors came down the road and ran into the

    17 roadblock?

    18 A. No, it did not. The BRITBAT Warriors were

    19 already in Busovaca when I arrived. I tried to go with

    20 my own car, my armoured Mercedes from Zenica, using the

    21 normal road along the Lasva Valley, and we were stopped

    22 at this roadblock, it was unmanned, there was a large

    23 lorry blocking the road, and mines around this lorry,

    24 so we had to return to Zenica, and then asked for

    25 permission to use the road, the mountain road from

  38. 1Zenica through Botajica (phoen), Grabovica, and then to

    2 Busovaca. The warriors came from the British

    3 battalion. They were already in Busovaca.

    4 Q. What is it that Mr. Grubesic said he wanted

    5 done or not done with respect to that lorry. What was

    6 linked to the issue of the medical supplies and trucks?

    7 A. What was linked? That he asked us to take

    8 away the threat coming from Zenica, military threat on

    9 Busovaca. That was the reason why they put the

    10 roadblock there. If we were able to take that threat

    11 away, then he would give us back the trucks and the

    12 cargo and the drivers.

    13 Q. But, of course, you're not able to take away

    14 the threat from the 3rd corps?

    15 A. That's clear. We were not a party in this

    16 conflict.

    17 Q. So basically he told you, "No, we're not

    18 giving you back the cargo"; is that right?

    19 A. You could make that out of his words, but he

    20 did not say that literally, of course.

    21 Q. Would you be surprised to learn that Colonel

    22 Blaskic had ordered that roadblock be cleared?

    23 A. Yes, I'm surprised by that because the next

    24 day the truck was taken away but then there was a large

    25 crater in the road, so there was even a larger

  39. 1roadblock.

    2 Q. Now I understand. Very well. Thank you.

    3 Now I have a question about what this

    4 military police commander in Busovaca told you, and

    5 this is very important to the Defence, so please listen

    6 carefully.

    7 Did this military police commander tell you

    8 that on the second day -- July 2nd, 1993, that you came

    9 to discuss the issue of the medical supplies, that you

    10 would have to come back later because he had to ask

    11 permission from his superior in Mostar before acting on

    12 this matter?

    13 A. That's correct. We had a long discussion

    14 with this chief of military police at the 2nd of June,

    15 and at the end of the day, he gave us the impression

    16 that everything could be arranged. The only thing he

    17 needed was permission from his chief in Mostar, and

    18 that we should come back the next day, that's the 3rd

    19 of June. That's what we were prepared for, to do on

    20 the 3rd of June.

    21 Q. And you understood him to be referring to the

    22 chief of the overall military police of the HVO in

    23 Herzegovina; correct?

    24 A. Well, hearing him speaking as --

    25 JUDGE JORDA: Are we talking about June or

  40. 1July? Which month is it? You mentioned 2nd of July,

    2 then I heard you mention the month of June.

    3 MR. HAYMAN: It's 2nd July, Mr. President.

    4 I'm sorry if I misspoke.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Continue. That's very clear.

    6 So you said you had to come back on the 3rd of July. I

    7 understand now. Please continue.

    8 A. Hearing this man in his uniform, police

    9 uniform, speaking to us, referring to his chief, then

    10 it's clear for us that his chief must be a policeman as

    11 well, a military policeman.

    12 MR. HAYMAN: Let me ask the technical booth

    13 now to assist? I'd like to play a few seconds of

    14 Exhibit 270, a videotape, and we'll try to freeze the

    15 videotape on a particular individual, and my question

    16 for you will be whether you can identify the military

    17 police commander in Busovaca, the individual you dealt

    18 with in connection with this convoy, on the videotape.

    19 So if the videotape could commence?

    20 I'm not seeing it on my screen. Maybe it's

    21 coming.

    22 (Videotape played)

    23 This tape, Mr. President, is a Prosecution

    24 Exhibit. It's a videotape taken on the night of the

    25 16th of April, 1993, in the bungalow in Nadioci

  41. 1adjacent to Ahmici after the action in Ahmici on 16

    2 April.

    3 If we could freeze the tape there?

    4 Q. Do you recognise that individual in the

    5 bungalow on the 16th of April as the same military

    6 police commander who told you his chief was in Mostar?

    7 A. He looks like the picture that was shown to

    8 me yesterday that I identified as Mr. Ljubesic.

    9 Q. It looks like the same man?

    10 A. It's hard to say in a dark surrounding like

    11 this, but it looks like the same man. Same eyebrows,

    12 same nose.

    13 Q. Thank you. Yesterday with the Prosecutor you

    14 reviewed four orders of Colonel Blaskic which you

    15 obtained from BRITBAT, I believe, in the course of your

    16 tour of duty. Those are defence 141, Exhibit 422,

    17 423 -- excuse me. That's 423 and 424. It occurs to

    18 me, Mr. President, if a still could be made from the

    19 freeze frame of Exhibit 270 and marked as the next

    20 exhibit in order, that would be helpful.

    21 You said, Lieutenant-Colonel, that these four

    22 orders were well organised and well-written

    23 professional military orders; is that true?

    24 A. That's true.

    25 Q. And we can deduce from that, and this Court

  42. 1should deduce from that, should it not, that these

    2 orders were written by a trained military officer?

    3 A. I think so, yes.

    4 Q. Beyond that, can you deduce from the orders

    5 themselves the quality of reports that may have been

    6 received in return, or even whether proper reports were

    7 received in return?

    8 A. I cannot tell from this order because it's

    9 the first order I saw, and I'm aware of, that his

    10 subordinates were ordered to report back.

    11 Q. Those are matters, I take it, that are

    12 internal to an armed force and generally aren't shared

    13 with outside entities?

    14 A. That depends on whether it's normal military

    15 activity that's not spread outside, and if it concerns

    16 violations of humanitarian laws, then I think it should

    17 be reported to ECMM, to UNHCR, and to the British

    18 battalion as well.

    19 Q. Tell me, from the lower level commanders in

    20 the HVO you encountered, were they professional career

    21 military officers? Take Mario Cerkez, for example.

    22 Was he a career officer?

    23 A. I think so, yes.

    24 Q. Do you think he had been to military academy?

    25 A. I'm not aware if there's a military course

  43. 1like that in the former Yugoslavia, but I think he was

    2 trained and it was his normal professional job.

    3 Q. Would you be surprised to learn he was

    4 trained in the area of mechanics or mechanical, you

    5 know, machines?

    6 A. I'm surprised by that, yes.

    7 Q. What about Mr. Grubesic, the brigade

    8 commander in Busovaca? Was he a career professional

    9 military officer; do you know?

    10 A. No, I don't think so. He made a less

    11 professional impact on me, and I state that because of

    12 this picture shown to me yesterday where he wears a red

    13 beret in a way a professional soldier should not wear

    14 his beret.

    15 Q. He had been an auto mechanic before the war,

    16 had he not? Did you learn that?

    17 A. No, I did not learn that.

    18 Q. Did you learn what -- excuse me. Did you

    19 learn what his occupation had been?

    20 A. No, I did not.

    21 Q. In the case of each of these orders, you were

    22 asked by the Prosecutor whether these orders referenced

    23 higher orders or agreements between the parties, and

    24 you said "Yes." If a commander repeatedly and of his

    25 own initiative orders and reminds subordinates of their

  44. 1obligations under international law and the laws of

    2 war, what would that say about that commander to you,

    3 as opposed to a commander who only passes down orders

    4 from his superiors?

    5 A. If there was any need to do it repeatedly,

    6 then it would show to me that he did not have full

    7 control of his -- over his subordinates, but this was

    8 the first time it was reported to us, and we discussed

    9 these matters of violations of humanitarian law almost

    10 every day, and since this is reported on the 19th of

    11 June, I was in theatre for more than two months then

    12 reporting it every day, so that's 50 or 60 times, there

    13 was no answer, no reply, nothing at all.

    14 Q. So the question you have in your mind, I take

    15 it, is why weren't these things ordered sooner?

    16 A. Why didn't they show us that they ordered

    17 these things?

    18 Q. If the usher could assist, Mr. President?

    19 This is an exhibit, Mr. President, which is the first

    20 in a series of exhibits. They are orders of General

    21 Blaskic. They consist, at least most of them, of an

    22 original B/S/C copy, a French translation, I'm pleased

    23 to say, and an English translation, and I would ask

    24 they be marked as the next exhibit in order, with the

    25 French designated as the "A" Exhibit and the English as

  45. 1the "B" Exhibit?

    2 JUDGE JORDA: Is this right? Will the French

    3 take the letter "A" Mr. Dubuisson?

    4 THE REGISTRAR: When possible, yes.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: I see. I'm very happy about

    6 that.

    7 MR. HAYMAN: We have noticed that,

    8 Mr. President. May I inquire what the number of this

    9 first exhibit will be of the registrar?

    10 THE REGISTRAR: This will be document D147.

    11 MR. HAYMAN:

    12 Q. If you could take a moment,

    13 Lieutenant-Colonel, to examine the exhibit. It's

    14 short. This is just to summarise, briefly, this is an

    15 order issued on the 27th of April, 1993, by Colonel

    16 Blaskic to the commander of the Vitez brigade,

    17 supplementing an earlier order of the 24th of April,

    18 prohibiting any treatment of temporarily detained

    19 civilians contrary to the basic provisions of the

    20 Geneva Convention. Is this an order that, on its face,

    21 was done at the self-initiative of Colonel Blaskic?

    22 A. It's a supplement to another order, so I

    23 can't tell for sure, but reading it from these few

    24 lines, there is no sign that it is based on another

    25 order, but it's still a supplement to an order number

  46. 1from the 1st of April -- the 24th of April.

    2 Q. What would it tell you if Colonel Blaskic was

    3 repeating an order three days later that he had

    4 previously given on the 24th of April? Does that tell

    5 you that there was a need, over a period of only 72

    6 hours, to repeat and reinforce an order to a brigade

    7 commander?

    8 A. I think so, yes. There was a need then.

    9 MR. HAYMAN: If the usher could assist once

    10 again? We have an improved translation, Mr. President,

    11 of what had been marked as Exhibit D43, the English

    12 translation has been redone by the translation unit,

    13 and I think it's improved over the original provided by

    14 the Office of the Prosecutor, and so I would like to

    15 have it marked as a new exhibit and shown to the

    16 witness. Again, it's in triplicate, three languages.

    17 I believe this will be Defence Exhibit 148, 148A, and

    18 148B.

    19 Q. If you could find the English copy,

    20 Lieutenant-Colonel, I'll direct you to it. It also is

    21 an order of Colonel Blaskic to multiple brigades and

    22 special purposes units and others regarding treatment

    23 of citizens' personal property, and it reads in the

    24 opening line: "In order to stop arson attacks on

    25 houses and business premises as well as the looting of

  47. 1property, I hereby order" -- and the order includes

    2 paragraph 1 on the territory of the area of

    3 responsibility of the Central Bosnia operative zone

    4 command controlled by the HVO --"I most strictly forbid

    5 the torching of houses and business premises and the

    6 looting of property."

    7 Is this an order that you came into

    8 possession of during your tour in Central Bosnia or

    9 indeed prior to your testimony yesterday?

    10 A. I don't recall that I saw this order before,

    11 at least not that I got it in the area, and I cannot

    12 tell because normally I used to read the English first,

    13 so I don't know whether the first translation is

    14 available. Maybe I can recognise it from that.

    15 Q. If Exhibit D43 could be provided to the

    16 witness, perhaps he can recognise the earlier version

    17 of the translation. D43.

    18 THE REGISTRAR: This is the same document

    19 except there are no references there to the D43 on it.

    20 MR. HAYMAN: I'm sorry, I didn't understand

    21 that comment, Mr. Registrar. Is it the wrong exhibit

    22 or is it the same?

    23 THE REGISTRAR: The same.

    24 MR. HAYMAN: The question is, if it could be

    25 shown to the witness so that he can determine if it's a

  48. 1document, the English version of which he may have seen

    2 in the theatre at the time of the conflict?

    3 A. No, I do not recall that I saw this document

    4 before.

    5 Q. On its face, was this an order merely handing

    6 down or repeating the order of a superior commander, or

    7 was it an order taken on the initiative by Colonel

    8 Blaskic, by his own self-initiative?

    9 A. No, it doesn't say so in the heading that he

    10 is basing this on another order and he doesn't --

    11 doesn't either say that he's repeating it. He orders

    12 it in a clear way.

    13 MR. HAYMAN: Very well. Let me ask for the

    14 registrar's assistance for another order in this

    15 series. If the registrar could assist? This, I

    16 believe, will be D149, 149A and 149B.

    17 Lieutenant-Colonel, regrettably the

    18 translation we obtained of this does not include the

    19 full heading -- wait a minute, I'm sorry, I may have

    20 misspoken. Yes, it does. The English translation is

    21 spread out over three pages, and this order is dated 24

    22 April, 1993, titled "Position on Housing and Property

    23 in Flats," it was issued to multiple units, and

    24 included the police station in Vitez and the chief of

    25 police in Travnik in which the accused recites

  49. 1initially: "In view of the large number of flats which

    2 have been temporarily abandoned and are being forcibly

    3 entered by armed individuals, HVO soldiers and other

    4 persons, and with the aim of increasing the quality of

    5 public peace and order in the town of Vitez and other

    6 towns /added in handwriting / and preventing these

    7 negative occurrences, I hereby order:

    8 (1) Use all means necessary and in extreme

    9 cases use force to prevent the usurpation of housing

    10 space and appropriation of property from flats

    11 belonging to citizens who are temporarily and under

    12 various conditions" -- let me confer with my colleague.

    13 There's a word, Mr. Nobilo advises me, that

    14 the word "absent" should appear, at least in the

    15 English translation in paragraph 1, and we will look

    16 into that, Mr. President.

    17 And then the order continues.

    18 Q. First, Lieutenant-Colonel, this order being

    19 directed to the civil police, is that normal? What

    20 does that tell you, if the civil police are being

    21 called to action to protect private property and

    22 prevent, quite frankly, Muslim apartments from being

    23 confiscated and Muslims from being forced from their

    24 flats?

    25 A. I'm not aware of any civil police force still

  50. 1in action, still being in action in Vitez, I never saw

    2 any civil police, but if he addresses an order to the

    3 civil police, I suggest they are still there. But they

    4 never showed themselves.

    5 Q. They were not much of a presence; is that

    6 right?

    7 A. I never met them.

    8 Q. Was this an order, on its face, merely

    9 repeating or passing down the order of a superior

    10 command, or does it appear to have been taken on the

    11 initiative of Colonel Blaskic?

    12 A. It doesn't say so in the heading that it's

    13 based on another order.

    14 Q. Is this an order you saw in the theatre?

    15 A. No, I did not.

    16 Q. Tell us, at this time, the 22nd to the 26th

    17 or 27th of April, 1993, was the HVO under extreme

    18 pressure because of attacks by the BiH army?

    19 A. What period again?

    20 Q. Roughly the 22nd, 20th or 22nd of April to

    21 the 26th or 27th of April, that week.

    22 A. I'm not aware of any severe pressure on the

    23 HVO positions, but that was the period when I was

    24 active in Grahovcici.

    25 Q. Let me ask for the assistance then of the

  51. 1usher?

    2 This exhibit, Mr. President, is a protest

    3 from Colonel Blaskic concerning BiH army attacks in

    4 violation of the cease-fire that had been agreed to at

    5 the time in the area of Kuber Mountain and elsewhere.

    6 It will be marked, I believe, as Exhibit D150, 150A,

    7 and 150B.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: Perhaps we will now take a

    9 break, Mr. Hayman. This will give you the time to

    10 distribute these documents.

    11 Before the break, however, I'd like to make

    12 some point about how we're going to organise our work.

    13 We're going to be stopping at 1.00 p.m. How much more

    14 time do you think you will need, Mr. Hayman? Do you

    15 think you will need to use the entire rest of that

    16 time? Don't forget, there may be questions from the

    17 Prosecution as well, and also the Judges will have

    18 questions. Otherwise, the Colonel will have to come

    19 back another time.

    20 MR. HAYMAN: I am cognisant of that, and I do

    21 want to help all of us finish this session. I estimate

    22 I have one more hour.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: We will take a 15-minute break,

    24 but I doubt that we'll be able to end this morning. I

    25 think given the fact that we have very little time,

  52. 1we'll have to stop at 1.00 p.m., and we'll simply have

    2 to bring the witness back when it is necessary to do

    3 so. I don't think there is anything else to state. I

    4 have no power nor wish on my part to restrain you in

    5 the questions you wish to put. You are at liberty to

    6 put the questions you wish. I try to cut any

    7 repetitions or cut any lengthy answers, but this is how

    8 things are.

    9 So let us now take a break, and we will take

    10 a 20-minute break because the interpreters need a

    11 20-minute break, and then if there are any questions

    12 left, we will have those questions, then go on to the

    13 next session when the witness can come back.

    14 --- Recess taken at 11.16 a.m.

    15 --- On resuming at 11.43 a.m.

    16 JUDGE JORDA: The Tribunal is now in

    17 session. Would the accused please be brought in?

    18 (The accused entered court)

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Please continue, Mr. Hayman.

    20 The floor is yours.

    21 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, Mr. President.

    22 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, we were looking at

    23 Exhibit D150. Does this refresh your memory concerning

    24 events during the time period, roughly the 22nd of

    25 April, for the following week concerning the level of

  53. 1activity and fighting between the BiH army and the HVO?

    2 A. Reading this protest, I'm aware of the fact

    3 that there were cease-fire violations in the area of

    4 Kuber, which I referred to in this document. There

    5 were a lot of cease-fire violations from both sides in

    6 the entire area, and I know there have been made a lot

    7 of protests on these cease-fire violations.

    8 Q. Do you know where Kuber Mountain was?

    9 A. Yes, I know where it was. Between Zenica --

    10 it's the high ridge between Zenica and the Lasva

    11 Valley.

    12 Q. Is it fair to say that whoever held Kuber

    13 Mountain held the dominant high ground between Zenica

    14 and Vitez?

    15 A. It depends on what kind of weapons you have.

    16 Q. Would you agree that Kuber Mountain was a

    17 very important military site in the conflict between

    18 the Muslims and the Croats?

    19 A. I agree.

    20 Q. And it was taken by the BiH army; correct?

    21 A. I'm not aware whether it was taken or whether

    22 they had it in their possession already.

    23 Q. But it was under their control at least by

    24 the end of your tour of duty?

    25 A. It has been -- according to my knowledge, it

  54. 1has been under their control for a long time.

    2 Q. Did you see this protest during your tour of

    3 duty? It's addressed to the ECMM Zenica, and do you

    4 recognise it?

    5 A. I did not see it during my duty there. I'm

    6 aware of the facts that are described in this document,

    7 and I recall that they were discussed during one of the

    8 ECMM meetings in Zenica.

    9 Q. Thank you. Now, do you know whether, when

    10 violations of Colonel Blaskic's orders came to his

    11 attention, did he follow up? Do you know?

    12 A. I know that we reported violations or

    13 discussed violations almost every day during our local

    14 commission meetings, and we were not reported by any

    15 action coming from Colonel Blaskic.

    16 Q. So his follow-up, if there was follow-up, was

    17 a private matter within the HVO; is that right?

    18 A. If there was any follow-up, it was a private

    19 matter. We never got reports on that.

    20 MR. HAYMAN: If the usher could assist and

    21 distribute D151?

    22 This only exists at this moment,

    23 Mr. President, in B/S/C. We'll have to put it on the

    24 ELMO and deal with it as best we can. It's been

    25 provided to the interpreters in advance.

  55. 1JUDGE JORDA: Yes, of course.

    2 MR. HAYMAN: So if we can put it on the ELMO

    3 and, Lieutenant-Colonel, we can all listen while my

    4 colleague describes the date heading and reads the

    5 critical portion of the order. I'm not asking him to

    6 read it in its entirety to save time.

    7 THE REGISTRAR: This will be document D151.

    8 MR. NOBILO: It's an order of the operational

    9 zone Central Bosnia from the 30th of May, 1993, and the

    10 order has been given to the command of the military

    11 police of the 4th battalion Vitez and to the assistance

    12 of the security and information unit, and the title is

    13 "Existence of Behaviours Contrary to the Orders and

    14 Operational Tasks."

    15 "On the day of the 30th of May, the person

    16 on duty of the operational zone Central Bosnia has

    17 reported that members of the military police,

    18 Mr. Franjo Ramljak and Mr. Slavko Hrgic, are forcibly

    19 expelling Muslim families despite the order which

    20 prohibited to do the above-mentioned actions, and for

    21 which the above-mentioned gentlemen were responsible

    22 with regard to the execution.

    23 "In order to prevent any other actions that

    24 jeopardise the implementation of the order and correct

    25 behaviour of the military police members during the

  56. 1execution of the ordered tasks, I order: Firstly, to

    2 investigate this case and enforce disciplinary measures

    3 against the perpetrators of this action. Report to me

    4 why individual members of your unit, despite continuous

    5 warnings and instead of maintaining public order,

    6 persistently commit misdeeds and what to do to prevent

    7 further occurrences."

    8 The date for the implementation of this order

    9 is the 5th of June, 1993; the signature of Colonel

    10 Blaskic and the seal of the operational zone.

    11 MR. HAYMAN:

    12 Q. First let me ask you, this is directed in its

    13 first line I believe to the commander of the 4th Vojne,

    14 Vojne Policije in Vitez. Do you know whether that is

    15 the same individual you dealt with in Busovaca from the

    16 military police?

    17 A. I'm not sure that the military police

    18 commander in Busovaca was the battalion commander

    19 himself.

    20 Q. If he was, then this would be addressed in

    21 part to the same individual; correct?

    22 A. That's correct, yes.

    23 Q. What does it tell you if -- you've seen the

    24 prior orders issued by Colonel Blaskic concerning the

    25 protection of apartments and flats and so forth. What

  57. 1does it tell you that one of the units empowered to

    2 implement the prior order is now, apparently, not only

    3 not enforcing the prior order but perpetrating

    4 violations of it to the point where Colonel Blaskic has

    5 to act? Does that tell you that his orders are not

    6 being faithfully carried out by this particular unit,

    7 the 4th Vojne of the Vojne Policije?

    8 A. It tells me that he is reacting on certain

    9 violations, but it also tells me that this 4th

    10 battalion is under his command.

    11 Q. Tell me, if a unit had dual lines of command,

    12 that is, one to a geographic zone commander but also to

    13 another command, such as the military police commander

    14 in Herzegovina, would it be incumbent on the geographic

    15 commander, when he learned of a violation, to do his

    16 best to enforce discipline and enforce control over

    17 that unit even if that unit had two lines or chains, if

    18 you will, of command?

    19 A. I cannot believe that there were really two

    20 lines of command. In a war zone, there's only one

    21 commander. That's the theory that's used in -- I think

    22 in every army, there's one chain of command, there's

    23 one top commander in the area. There might have been a

    24 second chain, but then probably an administrative

    25 chain. I cannot believe that there are two commanders

  58. 1in one area. It's impossible to work with.

    2 Q. Tell us: Did you discuss this subject with

    3 the Prosecutors during the break?

    4 A. I did not discuss this subject of two

    5 commands. It's -- really, it's my personal opinion.

    6 It's impossible to use -- to work, to operate with two

    7 commanders. We discussed the subject about whether it

    8 was operational or technical command.

    9 Q. With respect to the Vojne Policije?

    10 A. With respect to the 4th battalion as such.

    11 Q. Let's turn now to the subject of civilians

    12 digging trenches. You went to Skradno with members of

    13 the local joint commission to investigate this issue;

    14 correct?

    15 A. That's correct. The local joint commission

    16 Busovaca.

    17 Q. As a result of that meeting, did the HVO in

    18 Skradno agree not to use civilians in that form of

    19 work?

    20 A. The allegation was made several times, and

    21 that was the reason why we went to Skradno and talked

    22 to the people in Skradno, and they were the ones who

    23 told us that it still went on, and we tried to react on

    24 that again, but it's hard to get concessions from one

    25 of the parties.

  59. 1Q. Was the joint commission member from Busovaca

    2 on behalf of the HVO present?

    3 A. There were two members present, one in

    4 civilian clothes, an older man with a bald head, and

    5 there was one of the military members present. I've

    6 got a picture of that meeting, so I'm very sure who was

    7 present there.

    8 Q. What was the position or role of the

    9 civilian?

    10 A. He was, as I recall it, one of the members of

    11 the civil government of Busovaca.

    12 Q. Did he have a civil defence function?

    13 A. I'm not sure. After a while, working in

    14 Busovaca, we introduced the civil government from both

    15 sides, including the Catholic priest and the imam from

    16 the area of Busovaca, to bring some more trust amongst

    17 parties.

    18 Q. Did one or both of the HVO or Croat joint

    19 commission representatives tell the HVO in Skradno that

    20 they were not to compel civilians to dig trenches?

    21 A. The HVO Skradno was not present during this

    22 visit. We visited these people in their own houses or

    23 in the houses where they lived together with relatives

    24 or friends.

    25 Q. You said in your prior statement that on the

  60. 112th of May, "We got agreement from the HVO at Skradno

    2 to stop the use of civilians to dig trenches." Is that

    3 true?

    4 A. As I recall it now, it was in Stranje, that's

    5 the small village on the other side of the village --

    6 the other side of the river, approximately one

    7 kilometre from Skradno.

    8 Q. It was in Stranje that agreement was obtained

    9 to stop the practice?

    10 A. That's correct.

    11 Q. In Stranje, did the joint military members,

    12 either civil or military from Busovaca, on behalf of

    13 the HVO and the civil Croat government, did they tell

    14 the HVO in Stranje that they were not to engage in this

    15 practice?

    16 A. I don't know, since the -- only the

    17 discussions I personally had with Croat or Muslim

    18 people were translated by my interpreter, and she

    19 didn't used to translate all the other conversations.

    20 Q. Can you recall any particular occasion when

    21 the allegation of forcible trench-digging by civilians,

    22 Muslim civilians, was raised with Franjo Nakic?

    23 A. Mr. Nakic was present at most of the meetings

    24 where these allegations were raised, so he was aware of

    25 the fact.

  61. 1Q. And what did he say?

    2 A. Most of the time he let the -- both brigade

    3 commanders do the discussions, and he only used to

    4 interfere when matters really went out of hand during

    5 the meeting, and he had discussions with his battalion

    6 commanders during the breaks.

    7 Q. Did he tell you that Colonel Blaskic had

    8 issued orders prohibiting the practice?

    9 A. He did not tell me that.

    10 Q. Let's discuss the burning of houses. We've

    11 already seen orders issued by the accused on that

    12 subject.

    13 Did you see any burning of houses in the

    14 Lasva Valley?

    15 A. I saw a lot of houses burning. I did not see

    16 anybody setting any house on fire.

    17 Q. Are you able to tell us, in the villages that

    18 you named, whether all the houses were burned in all

    19 those villages at once or whether all of the houses in

    20 a particular village were burned on one occasion, or do

    21 you not know?

    22 A. What do you mean by "at once"? In one day or

    23 all in the same hour?

    24 Q. I'm suggesting on the same day, were houses

    25 in all the villages -- all the houses in all the

  62. 1villages that you saw burned, or did they occur on

    2 different days, and within each village? Can you tell

    3 us that all the houses in a particular village were

    4 burned on one day or, rather, that events were more

    5 far-flung, sporadic, and varied?

    6 A. I can tell for certain villages that it was

    7 done in one day or one night, and that some other

    8 villages where the majority of the houses were burned

    9 in one day and where additional houses were burned

    10 because of fighting or because of movements of the

    11 frontlines. In other days, then the majority of the

    12 houses were burned.

    13 Q. Let's compare Ahmici with Rotilj. You

    14 visited both?

    15 A. Yes, I did.

    16 Q. In Ahmici, all the Muslim homes were burned?

    17 A. That's correct.

    18 Q. What about in Rotilj?

    19 A. In Rotilj, approximately five or seven houses

    20 were burned in one area where -- well, let's say where

    21 you entered the village.

    22 Q. And that's five or seven houses out of 100 or

    23 200 Muslim homes?

    24 A. Approximately, yes.

    25 Q. Did you learn information concerning what

  63. 1event or incident caused the burning of those seven or

    2 eight houses in Rotilj?

    3 A. I made an investigation on that myself. I

    4 went to see the civilians in Rotilj. A lot of Muslim

    5 families gathered there. They told me the story. Then

    6 I went to one of the local HVO commanders in the area

    7 of Rotilj, and he told me a story in the atmosphere of

    8 I was -- "I came under fire with my soldiers. One of

    9 my soldiers was wounded. I had to return fire, and

    10 then I had to burn all seven houses. What else could I

    11 do?"

    12 JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me. What do you mean

    13 "What else"?

    14 A. He explained it to us in a way that this was

    15 the only logical reaction on coming under fire and

    16 having one casualty at his own side, so he explained to

    17 us that this was a logical reaction.

    18 JUDGE RIAD: Did he mean that they were being

    19 shot at from these seven houses? Were they military

    20 zones?

    21 A. It could have been in a fighting zone. He

    22 came under fire, as he told us, one of his soldiers,

    23 one of his HVO soldiers, was wounded. He had to return

    24 fire, and then he said he had to burn down the houses.

    25 It was a logical reaction.

  64. 1MR. HAYMAN:

    2 Q. Let's be perfectly clear,

    3 Lieutenant-Colonel. Tell us if you agree with your

    4 prior statement on page 7 when you said that you

    5 discussed this with the local HVO commander and he

    6 said, "He claimed that villagers had opened fire on his

    7 troops from a Muslim house and that one HVO soldier had

    8 been killed. Fighting had started, and that was when

    9 the Muslims had been killed and seven Muslim houses

    10 were burnt. The Muslims had handed over 20 weapons and

    11 the young men taken to prison. I think this story was

    12 accurate."

    13 Is that a correct statement?

    14 A. That's the statement I made in my special

    15 report, yes.

    16 Q. And do you believe it to be true?

    17 A. I believe it to be true.

    18 Q. Thank you. You described a meeting with

    19 Mario Cerkez on the 24th of May, 1993, in which he was

    20 angry that the BiH army in Kruscica was being reinforced

    21 from Opara, and he said something about a threat to

    22 burn down all or some portion of Kruscica.

    23 Tell me, did Mario Cerkez control Kruscica at

    24 the time?

    25 A. Kruscica was a BiH-controlled village.

  65. 1Q. Was that true throughout your tour?

    2 A. I think so, yes. We were not able to enter

    3 Kruscica every day, of course, but from the beginning

    4 and at least in the end, Kruscica was still

    5 BiH-controlled.

    6 Q. You described a meeting on the 4th of May,

    7 1993, with the Spanish, British, and French ambassadors

    8 at which Dzemal Merdan spoke of Muslims being expelled

    9 from Gacice; do you recall that?

    10 A. That's correct.

    11 Q. Now, is it also correct that -- Colonel

    12 Blaskic was not present at that meeting, was he?

    13 A. I don't recall that he was present.

    14 Q. Now, the fighting in Gacice had been some two

    15 weeks earlier, around the 20th of April, 1993; is that

    16 correct, or do you know?

    17 A. I'm not aware of any fighting in Gacice.

    18 Q. What did Merdan say had occurred in Gacice

    19 the prior night, May 3rd, 1993?

    20 A. As I recall it, Merdan made -- or got the

    21 chance to make a lot of complaints in the face of these

    22 three ambassadors to explain his view of the whole war

    23 so far, and as I recall it, he used, amongst other

    24 examples, the example of Gacice where the expelling of

    25 Muslims still went on.

  66. 1Q. Did he say who was expelling Muslims? Did he

    2 know?

    3 A. I'm not sure whether he said so.

    4 Q. You have spoken of Franjo Nakic at some

    5 length. What did you think of Mr. Nakic?

    6 A. I experienced Mr. Nakic as a moderate man who

    7 could have been my father. He gave me that impression.

    8 Q. Do you think he worked diligently to further

    9 the work of the joint operational centre under what

    10 were very difficult circumstances?

    11 A. I learned to know him as a member of the

    12 headquarters operational zone, that he supported our

    13 work very well.

    14 Q. Yesterday you mentioned HVO uniforms being in

    15 order in Central Bosnia or that HVO soldiers were

    16 well-uniformed. Is it correct that you never saw units

    17 of the HV or army of the Republic of Croatia in the

    18 Lasva or Kiseljak Valleys during your tour?

    19 A. I never saw units showing the HV insignia. I

    20 saw on some occasions individuals wearing this badge

    21 with "HV" on it, and I addressed to one of those

    22 individuals on one occasion, asking him why he was

    23 wearing this, and he said it was hard to obtain

    24 uniforms.

    25 Q. Implying that he was not a member of the HV,

  67. 1he just had their uniform?

    2 A. That's not literally what he said, but that

    3 was the explanation why he used another uniform.

    4 Q. How many such persons did you see in the

    5 Lasva or Kiseljak Valley wearing at least portions of

    6 an HV uniform during your tour?

    7 A. Approximately five.

    8 Q. Now I'd like to ask you some questions, and

    9 this is my final area of inquiry, concerning command

    10 and control.

    11 You have described a meeting with an

    12 individual known as Djuti on the 2nd of June, 1993. I

    13 believe you said the prior night Alagic had been

    14 stopped at an irregular checkpoint, and it had a car

    15 and property taken from him; is that correct?

    16 A. I'm not sure whether the checkpoint was

    17 irregular, but he was stopped at an HVO checkpoint and

    18 then his car and things and his personal weapon were

    19 stolen.

    20 Q. Well, tell me, Lieutenant-Colonel -- I chose

    21 my words carefully. In your statement to the

    22 Prosecutor at page 16-17, you said: "Earlier that

    23 night, Alagic had been stopped at an irregular HVO

    24 checkpoint, disarmed, as were his bodyguards."

    25 Did you believe the checkpoint to be

  68. 1irregular at the time?

    2 A. I think that the manning of the checkpoint

    3 was irregular. The checkpoint itself might have been

    4 in a proper place.

    5 Q. What do you mean by it was "irregularly

    6 manned"?

    7 A. The way I experienced it was that it was

    8 manned by soldiers that were not -- maybe not under

    9 control or wore different clothing than normally was

    10 done by HVO soldiers.

    11 Q. Did you learn and conclude from all the facts

    12 and circumstances that the individuals who had

    13 basically robbed Alagic of this property were acting on

    14 self-initiative and not pursuant to orders or

    15 directives from the HVO chain of command?

    16 A. I'm not sure. They returned the goods, so

    17 maybe they came under pressure of their commander

    18 afterwards. I'm not sure if they did it on their own

    19 initiative or maybe they were ordered to.

    20 Q. Are you aware that Colonel Blaskic apologised

    21 to Mr. Alagic through Colonel Duncan for the incident?

    22 A. Yes, I'm aware of that.

    23 Q. Do you agree it would be odd for Colonel

    24 Blaskic to direct such an incident, direct it to occur?

    25 A. Would you say that again?

  69. 1Q. Do you agree it would be odd for Colonel

    2 Blaskic to direct such an incident at a checkpoint and

    3 then apologise for it?

    4 A. If that's the way you describe it, then it

    5 would be odd, yes.

    6 Q. Now, the items taken from Alagic, you learned

    7 that they were taken by a group of four men that

    8 included two men who had the last name of Tuka,

    9 T-U-K-A; is that correct?

    10 A. That's correct. I've got the names in my

    11 notebook.

    12 Q. Were these individuals, the Tuka group, were

    13 they HVO soldiers?

    14 A. I don't know. I never met them.

    15 Q. Did Mr. Nakic ever tell you why he couldn't

    16 just order this Tuka group to return the property?

    17 A. I don't know. He ordered Mr. Djuti and he

    18 arranged that they were returned.

    19 Q. Did he -- well, did you have an interpreter

    20 with you when you and Nakic met with Djuti?

    21 A. Yes, I did.

    22 Q. Did the interpreter translate what was said

    23 between Nakic and Djuti?

    24 A. She translated everything that was openly

    25 said during the meeting, not any private discussions,

  70. 1because she used to stay with me and not go with Nakic.

    2 Q. Would you agree that Nakic told Djuti to use

    3 his influence on the group, referring to the Tuka

    4 group, to "calm them down"?

    5 A. That could be true, but Djuti gave me the

    6 impression that he was one of the people that stole the

    7 things because he made all kinds of excuses why he was

    8 allowed to do so and why he was in the full rights to

    9 keep the things.

    10 Q. Were you told that Djuti was an extremely

    11 powerful and influential person in the Bila-Travnik

    12 areas?

    13 A. I got the impression that he was powerful and

    14 he was an impressive person.

    15 Q. Did you learn, in the course of your dealings

    16 with Djuti, that he and a group of his men had freed

    17 captives from the Kaonik prison, among other places,

    18 through armed assault? Did anyone ever tell you that?

    19 A. The Kaonik prison was an HVO-held prison.

    20 Q. Correct. Did anyone tell you that, that

    21 Djuti and his men had attacked the Kaonik prison to

    22 free one of their comrades at one point during the war?

    23 A. No, I'm not aware of that.

    24 Q. You spoke of the 7th Muslim brigade not being

    25 under the control of the 3rd Korpus until late May

  71. 11993. Do you know how many men were in the 7th Muslim

    2 brigade and how many soldiers were in the 3rd Corps,

    3 excluding the 7th Muslim brigade?

    4 A. I don't know. I met several of these

    5 soldiers belonging to the 7th Muslim brigade. I saw

    6 them in Zenica once in a while when we went by car to

    7 Vitez.

    8 Q. Why was it necessary to have four local joint

    9 commissions rather than one joint operational command

    10 which could simply issue orders to -- down the chain of

    11 command?

    12 A. There was one joint command in Travnik,

    13 operational from, I think, in the middle of May, maybe

    14 the beginning of May, and they asked us to organise

    15 four local joint commissions to be able to deal with

    16 local problems, to be able to arrange to make local

    17 arrangements in freedom of movement, in checking on

    18 allegations, freedom for Catholic priests in

    19 Muslim-held territory or for the imam in HVO-controlled

    20 territory, all kinds of local arrangements.

    21 Q. Such as observance of the cease-fire which

    22 had been agreed to between the warring factions?

    23 A. Observance of the cease-fire was not a task

    24 for the local joint commission. Both parties agreed on

    25 the cease-fire; they should hold to the cease-fire

  72. 1themselves. We were not capable and not asked to check

    2 the cease-fire itself.

    3 Q. Release of prisoners, was that a subject

    4 dealt with by the local joint commissions?

    5 A. That's correct. We discussed these matters

    6 very often. After a certain -- after a few weeks, we

    7 thought we had released the majority of the prisoners,

    8 but then new allegations started of new prisons and of

    9 more alleged prisons and prisoners being held there.

    10 Q. You said that different results were obtained

    11 by the different local joint commissions. What were

    12 the variables, the factors that affected the relative

    13 success or failure of the different local joint

    14 commissions?

    15 A. Let's start with the best commission,

    16 according to my opinion. It was the local commission

    17 Busovaca where, in the middle of June, we had reached

    18 the phase that the representatives of civil government

    19 could speak to each other again, where they agreed in

    20 making statements for local radio and local television

    21 together, where they agreed in freedom of movement for

    22 the imam where one of the Muslim fests could be

    23 achieved more or less openly, where they agreed on

    24 restoring electricity and telephone lines, where there

    25 was a certain amount of freedom of movement. So that's

  73. 1the best example.

    2 The worst example is Kiseljak where, at the

    3 first meeting, HVO representatives failed to come,

    4 where Mr. Nakic had to use his influence to order HVO

    5 representatives to show up, and, in fact, we never left

    6 the phase of complaints. So the few meetings we had in

    7 Kiseljak at the Canadian camp were all influenced by

    8 complaints from both sides, and there was hardly ever

    9 real action undertaken. There was no real result in

    10 dealing with local problems at all.

    11 Q. You've described the level of results in two

    12 of the local joint commissions, but my question was:

    13 Why were there such variations? Was it because, for

    14 example, there was local resistance within the HVO

    15 military to obeying orders concerning release of

    16 prisoners, et cetera? Was it because there were

    17 variations in the degree to which civil authorities

    18 wanted to cooperate and work together? Can you tell us

    19 something about that?

    20 A. I think that's both true. Of course, there

    21 are differences in personalities. Some of the

    22 commanders were just not willing to discuss things with

    23 us. I think both commanders in Busovaca, from HVO and

    24 army of BiH, were, for the time being, willing to

    25 discuss things with us. They sat together. Quite

  74. 1often we went with them on the ground to check on

    2 allegations, we went to this petrol station at Stranje

    3 to discuss with local commanders to discuss how the

    4 cease-fire could best be implemented. In Vitez, we

    5 made with this commission a real exchange of dead

    6 bodies, we visited with Mr. Hajdarevic and Mr. Jozic,

    7 the two liaison officers, a lot of presence. So in the

    8 beginning, the cooperation in Vitez was also quite

    9 well.

    10 Q. Thank you, Colonel. You told us the orders

    11 of Merdan and Nakic were followed. Let me ask you

    12 about an incident that may have been related to you by

    13 Lars Baggesen, one of your colleagues. Did he describe

    14 how, in Novi Travnik in the middle of April 1993, a

    15 military policeman arrested Dzemal Merdan and refused

    16 to release him despite the presence of Nakic and

    17 direction of Nakic that he should be released? Did

    18 Mr. Baggesen describe that to you?

    19 A. No, he did not.

    20 Q. You did give us an example in your direct

    21 testimony of an order being followed by -- that is an

    22 order given by Mr. Nakic being followed by subordinate

    23 commanders concerning Kiseljak and Mario Bradara. The

    24 example you gave was that Bradara said he had received

    25 an order to release prisoners, but he wasn't prepared

  75. 1to obey it because the BiH army had not released their

    2 prisoners held in Klokoti, in I think the same region;

    3 is that correct?

    4 A. That's correct.

    5 Q. So I take it Bradara had received a written

    6 order to unconditionally release prisoners but had

    7 refused?

    8 A. At least he did not implement it, and he

    9 found an excuse for that because, according to his

    10 opinion, the other side didn't do the same.

    11 Q. Have you seen the order that he received?

    12 A. No, I did not.

    13 Q. Are you familiar with the agreement of April

    14 29th, 1993, between Generals Petkovic, Halilovic and so

    15 forth, for the unconditional release of prisoners?

    16 A. Yes, I was present during that meeting.

    17 Q. So Mr. Bradara, I take it, although he had

    18 received an order for unconditional release, he had

    19 added a condition to it?

    20 A. That's correct.

    21 Q. And Mr. Nakic spoke to him at some length; is

    22 that right?

    23 A. That's correct.

    24 Q. And Mr. Nakic was able to persuade him to

    25 release BiH army or other civilian prisoners in the

  76. 1Kiseljak barracks; correct?

    2 A. That's correct.

    3 Q. And did those prisoners, did they appear to

    4 be in poor condition?

    5 A. They didn't look in a poor condition.

    6 Q. Now, at the time, Nakic was able to meet face

    7 to face with Bradara and persuade him to follow the

    8 order. This was at a time where Nakic was able to get

    9 to Kiseljak because he travelled with you; correct?

    10 A. We accompanied Mr. Nakic in -- I think it was

    11 in our vehicle or maybe in a British armoured vehicle,

    12 I'm not sure.

    13 Q. And is it correct that after Bradara released

    14 the prisoners from Kiseljak barracks, then and only

    15 then did the BiH army release some 59 prisoners that

    16 they had at Klokoti?

    17 A. That's correct.

    18 Q. So can we also conclude that the local BiH

    19 army commander had not followed orders to

    20 unconditionally release the prisoners that he held as

    21 well?

    22 A. In that case, that's correct.

    23 Q. Now let's look at another example that wasn't

    24 mentioned in your direct. Two days later, on the 3rd

    25 of May, you went to Vitez, I believe, and met with Pero

  77. 1Skopljak, the head of the Commission for Prisoners, and

    2 with the mayor of Vitez, a Mr. Santic; do you recall

    3 that?

    4 A. I recall that, yes.

    5 Q. What was the role of the Commission for

    6 Prisoners in Vitez; can you tell us that initially?

    7 A. They didn't fully explain that to me. I met

    8 Mr. Skopljak before already, and he introduced himself

    9 then as I think the vice-president of HDZ in the area

    10 of Vitez, so I was surprised that he introduced himself

    11 in a new function later on, and he showed me a long

    12 list of people they had in an HVO-controlled prison,

    13 and he explained to me that he was head of this new

    14 commission and that he was there to organise the

    15 release of prisoners on an equal basis from both sides.

    16 Q. So this Commission for Prisoners in Vitez was

    17 headed by a civil authority or a civilian,

    18 Mr. Skopljak?

    19 A. That's correct.

    20 Q. Was there a like entity or institution in

    21 Zenica concerned with the subject of prisoner release

    22 also headed by a civilian?

    23 A. I'm not sure. I did not meet that commission

    24 in Zenica, but I was told that there was a -- I think

    25 he's called Bozic who was supposed to be in command or

  78. 1in control of this new commission on the other side.

    2 Q. Let me ask you: On the 3rd of May, did

    3 Skopljak and Santic, would you say it's accurate to

    4 describe what occurred at that meeting as follows:

    5 "They were a pair of hard-liners, and they did not want

    6 to release prisoners. They said that they had received

    7 orders to release the prisoners, but they refused to do

    8 so."

    9 Is that accurate?

    10 A. That's accurate. That was my opinion at that

    11 period. That's what I wrote in my diary that night.

    12 Q. The next day, the 4th of May, there was a

    13 joint operational command meeting, and is it correct

    14 that Ambassador Thebault said at that meeting that he

    15 would try and negotiate with the mayor of Zenica,

    16 Mr. Spahic, and with Mr. Santic over the release of

    17 prisoners?

    18 A. I recall that Mr. Thebault more or less took

    19 over this problem of release of prisoners.

    20 Q. And in the same context, did Mr. Nakic

    21 complain that there was no success with prisoner

    22 release in Vitez and Zenica because the civil

    23 authorities were not cooperating?

    24 A. That's correct, he complained about that, but

    25 the prisoners, as far as I know, were held in a cellar

  79. 1in Vitez under the cinema, and the other prisoners were

    2 held in Dubravica, and I visited both prisons and they

    3 were guarded by HVO soldiers, not by Mr. Skopljak.

    4 Q. Obviously, Mr. Skopljak can only be in one

    5 place at one time.

    6 A. That's clear. But he was in charge of this

    7 commission, and he was not in charge of guarding the

    8 prisoners themselves.

    9 Q. Let me ask you. You mentioned a moment ago

    10 the formation of the Kiseljak joint commission, and I'd

    11 ask you to think about that subject on the issue of

    12 command and control.

    13 Do you know, had the Kiseljak HVO brigade

    14 been ordered on approximately the 22nd of April to form

    15 a joint commission in a joint order issued by Dzemal

    16 Merdan and Franjo Nakic?

    17 A. That's what Mr. Nakic told me, that he issued

    18 the order to all his subordinates.

    19 MR. HAYMAN: If the usher could assist? And

    20 if this exhibit could be provided to the witness and

    21 distributed?

    22 Mr. Registrar, will this be Defence Exhibit

    23 152?

    24 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, indeed, that's right, it

    25 is D152.

  80. 1MR. HAYMAN:

    2 Q. Colonel, this is a copy of an order, with

    3 appropriate translations, signed by Dzemal Merdan and

    4 Franjo Nakic, among other things ordering the BiH army

    5 and the HVO in the towns of Vitez, Travnik, Busovaca,

    6 and Kiseljak to form local joint commissions; correct?

    7 A. That's correct.

    8 Q. And it's dated the 22nd of April, 1993?

    9 A. It says so in handwriting.

    10 Q. Then let's take that as our basis for

    11 analysing this question and proceed to the 10th of May,

    12 1993. You went to CANBAT in Visoko for a meeting, a

    13 planned meeting, of the Kiseljak joint commission;

    14 correct?

    15 A. I don't recall whether it was the 10th of

    16 May, but we had one of those meetings, one of these

    17 start-up meetings, in Visoko at CANBAT.

    18 Q. Is it correct that at this first start-up

    19 meeting, the HVO delegates did not appear?

    20 A. That's correct. We arranged transport for

    21 these delegates through the Canadian battalion, and

    22 they did not show up with the HVO representatives.

    23 Q. So they had been ordered on the 22nd of April

    24 to form the local joint commission, but on the 10th of

    25 May, they didn't show up for the meeting.

  81. 1Did you then go to Kiseljak with Mr. Nakic to

    2 try and "move them off the dime," if you will?

    3 A. I'm not sure whether we went to Kiseljak on

    4 that very day, but I recall that we did go to Kiseljak

    5 maybe on the second occasion to speak to the local HVO

    6 commanders and to explain to them the need for a local

    7 joint commission and the use we could be to them as

    8 well to organise this local joint commission.

    9 Q. Let me ask you if this refreshes your

    10 memory. It's on page 11 of your statement under the

    11 10th of May, 1993: "We went on to Kiseljak to try and

    12 locate these members. We met Bozic," a reference to

    13 brigade commander Mijo Bozic, "and he said that he had

    14 received orders to establish the local commission but

    15 he said he was waiting for further orders."

    16 Do you recall that?

    17 A. I think that was on the same day then.

    18 Q. Is that a way of a subordinate commander -- a

    19 way a subordinate commander might state "I haven't

    20 complied with the order," in effect?

    21 A. Well, if he states that he got the first

    22 order and still doesn't comply, then he's just

    23 disobeying.

    24 Q. And then did Nakic discuss this with

    25 Mr. Bozic and order Bozic to get on with it, to get on

  82. 1with the work and form the commission?

    2 A. That's correct, and later on the commission

    3 was formed.

    4 Q. Now, two days later, you again went to

    5 Kiseljak for the joint commission meeting, this is the

    6 12th of May, 1993, and am I correct that again the HVO

    7 representatives did not show up?

    8 A. That's correct. This mission -- this next

    9 meeting was organised at the Canadian base in Kiseljak

    10 itself, called Camp Paardeberg, and it's only a few

    11 kilometres from the HVO headquarters, so we again went

    12 to the HVO headquarters, and Nakic, according to my

    13 knowledge, again explained to them why they had to show

    14 up.

    15 Q. Were you surprised that these HVO officers in

    16 Kiseljak were so brazenly defying Nakic's instructions

    17 as well his written order of the 22nd of April?

    18 A. No, this was already the third occasion where

    19 they refused to obey orders which they actually had

    20 received, according to their own statements, and, well,

    21 finally Nakic succeeded in ordering these people to

    22 show up and they did.

    23 Q. Now let's return to Vitez. On the 24th of

    24 May, 1993, there was a local commission meeting in

    25 Vitez, and I believe this is the meeting in which Mario

  83. 1Cerkez made remarks about burning in Kruscica.

    2 A. Would you say the date again?

    3 Q. 24 May, 1993.

    4 A. Is that the day when the ambassadors were

    5 present?

    6 Q. No, it's not, according to your earlier

    7 statement. What I would like to ask concerning this

    8 meeting is whether or not, at this meeting, there were

    9 HVO representatives present who said that "They had

    10 orders from Mr. Skopljak to stop the work of the

    11 commission."

    12 Do you recall that?

    13 A. I recall that, yes.

    14 Q. Who was that -- sorry.

    15 A. It was a very unclear situation to us since

    16 the local joint commission Vitez more or less seemed to

    17 come to an end. We didn't like that, and we tried to

    18 find out how this was arranged or what was the reason

    19 why we couldn't continue our work.

    20 The first explanation was from the side of

    21 the HVO members of the local commission that it was

    22 unsafe for the whole commission to travel in the area.

    23 The second explanation, maybe on the same day or a day

    24 later, was that we should transfer our military

    25 commission into a civil commission; and as I recall it,

  84. 1that was relating to this, let's call it an order or

    2 words of Mr. Skopljak to stop the military part of the

    3 commission and change it into a civil commission.

    4 Q. At this meeting on the 24th of May, 1993, did

    5 Mr. Nakic, Colonel Blaskic's representative to the

    6 joint operational command, appeal to the commanders

    7 present to stop the war activities and have an

    8 unconditional cease-fire, but there was no willingness

    9 from the local HVO to make things work? Is that

    10 correct?

    11 A. I remember that I made that statement

    12 according to my notes from this meeting.

    13 Q. On the 30th of June, you tried to resuscitate

    14 the Vitez joint commission; is that not true? You

    15 tried to have another meeting?

    16 A. That's correct. I tried to restart it at the

    17 end of June.

    18 Q. And Mr. Nakic went with you, he was organised

    19 and waiting, but the BiH army side cancelled, saying

    20 they were too busy with their military operation in

    21 Zepce; is that correct?

    22 A. I'm not sure whether Mr. Merdan could not

    23 show up or whether the local BiH commanders could not

    24 show up. I think it must have been Mr. Merdan since

    25 the local commanders didn't have anything to do with an

  85. 1area outside their area of operations.

    2 Q. And he couldn't come because at the time the

    3 BiH army was attacking the HVO in Zepce; correct?

    4 A. I don't know whether they were attacking

    5 there. He was busy dealing with Zepce items or Zepce

    6 things in his headquarters in Zenica.

    7 Q. Did Mr. Nakic tell you at the meeting you had

    8 with him -- I guess it was just the two of you -- on

    9 the 30th of June, 1993, that the BiH army had attacked

    10 the HVO on three sides in Zepce, and that the HVO plus

    11 40.000 refugees had been forced to flee?

    12 A. That's what he told me, and later on the

    13 BRITBAT did examinations on that, and it appeared to be

    14 something else than Mr. Nakic told me.

    15 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, Colonel. That

    16 concludes my examination. Thank you for your

    17 patience.

    18 I would like to offer into evidence Exhibits

    19 D141, D144, D145, D146, D150, and D152. If there is an

    20 objection to D152, I would ask to be permitted to ask a

    21 few further foundational questions of the witness to

    22 lay the foundation and to authenticate that document.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Harmon? There's a proverb

    24 in French: "Silence is consent."

    25 MR. HAYMAN: If I can assist, perhaps? A

  86. 1couple of these exhibits are the stills of the video

    2 which counsel may not have a copy of, so there may not

    3 be documents corresponding to every number.

    4 MR. HARMON: Can you identify those, counsel,

    5 for us, which are the stills? We have no objection to

    6 those.

    7 MR. HAYMAN: I would need the assistance of

    8 the registrar to do so, I'm sorry.

    9 THE REGISTRAR: I will remind you, all of the

    10 documents which were presented, D141 and 141A were

    11 documents which were presented before another witness

    12 for the first time on the 29th of June before Mark

    13 Bower, and that was represented again today.

    14 MR. HARMON: We have no objection to D141.

    15 THE REGISTRAR: D144 was the document --

    16 rather, a still image taken from a video, 409, that was

    17 presented yesterday evening.

    18 MR. HARMON: We have no objection to any of

    19 the stills taken from videos.

    20 THE REGISTRAR: D146 is the same thing,

    21 that's also taken from video 270; document 145 was a

    22 document read by Mr. Hayman which comes from the

    23 Council of Europe document that was read.

    24 MR. HARMON: No objection.

    25 THE REGISTRAR: 145. 146 is the still

  87. 1photo. You said you have no objections to that. There

    2 was also D147 A and B, D147 A and B, D149. These are

    3 not being tendered, I understand, and then there was

    4 D150. I believe that's an order, if I'm not mistaken.

    5 As well as D151.

    6 MR. HARMON: We have no objection to 150.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. No objections,

    8 Mr. Harmon?

    9 MR. HARMON: No objections.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Thank you. And

    11 document 152? There is still 152.

    12 MR. HARMON: No objection.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Thank you. I see

    14 we have somewhat of a problem here. It is 12.40.

    15 Now, I first want to turn to you,

    16 Mr. Harmon. Do you intend -- how much time do you

    17 expect for your redirect? Please tell us very

    18 objectively how much time you feel you need.

    19 MR. HARMON: Probably in the area of 30 to 40

    20 minutes.

    21 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. In that case, we

    22 are going to then adjourn. The witness will return to

    23 receive questions from the Prosecution and also the

    24 Judges have questions for the witness, and therefore,

    25 we'll also need to take the time necessary for those

  88. 1questions.

    2 Of course, the 20 minutes remaining will not

    3 be taken as part of those minutes allotted to the

    4 Prosecution.

    5 Therefore, we're going to ask the witness to

    6 return, but I'd like to know, Mr. Harmon, and also the

    7 witness, when can the witness return? Can he come back

    8 on Monday, for example?

    9 THE WITNESS: Monday would be fine. Monday

    10 suits me, Your Honour.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. We thank the

    12 witness, therefore, for making this contribution.

    13 Mr. Harmon, then, we will resume on Monday

    14 with the witness. That's the best solution, I

    15 believe. Are we in agreement?

    16 MR. HARMON: Yes, Mr. President.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. On these

    18 conditions, we will now adjourn, and we would also like

    19 to thank the witness for his contribution. Have a very

    20 nice weekend.

    21 The Chamber shall resume at 2.30 on Monday.

    22 --- Whereupon proceedings adjourned at

    23 12.43 p.m., to be reconvened on

    24 Monday, the 6th day of July, 1998,

    25 at 2.30 p.m.