1 Monday, 13th July 1998
2 (Open session)
3 --- Upon commencing at 2.38 p.m.
4 JUDGE JORDA: Would you have the accused
5 brought in, please?
6 (The accused entered court)
7 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Prosecutor, we can now
8 resume. Who is the witness today? I see you have a
9 new assistant with you. Would you introduce her to us,
11 MR. KEHOE: I will, Your Honour, a new
12 assistant that is ultimately going to take over for
13 Emil van der Does de Willebois is Ijeoma Udo, and she
14 will be working with us until the end of the case.
15 JUDGE JORDA: We would like to wish her
16 welcome and at the same time say good afternoon to our
17 interpreters, to the Defence as well.
18 Now, Mr. Kehoe, would you begin, please?
19 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. Good
20 afternoon, Mr. President, and good afternoon, Your
22 JUDGE JORDA: The name -- I hope it will be
23 spelled properly, both for my colleagues and for
24 myself, that is in the transcript. I want to make sure
25 that there is no error in the transcript with the
1spelling of the name.
2 MR. KEHOE: I'm sorry, I-J-E-O-M-A and the
3 last name is Udo, U-D-O.
4 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you very much. We can
5 begin now. Please go ahead.
6 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. I think all
7 of us can congratulate you and France on the win
8 yesterday. There were some bets on whether or not you
9 were going to make it this morning but ...
10 JUDGE JORDA: Well, Mr. Kehoe, I didn't think
11 that you were going to congratulate me in that
12 nationalistic way, but I am touched by that of course.
13 Every one knew that as far as the France-Croatia match
14 was one that was of interest to everybody, I suppose
15 that is what you are talking about. Thank you very
17 We can now resume, but more seriously, since
18 we are dealing with a serious case here, I can say to
19 you, please go ahead.
20 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. Our next
21 witness is a man by the name of Lee Whitworth.
22 Mr. Whitworth was a captain in the Prince of Wales' Own
23 Regiment of Yorkshire during their tour of duty in
24 Bosnia from May of 1993 until early November of 1993.
25 Subsequent to the tour in Bosnia, Captain Whitworth
1resigned from the British military and has been in the
2 education field as a teacher since that time.
3 I will say, and he's rather a modest man,
4 that he was awarded the Queen's Gallantry medal for his
5 actions in Bosnia during his six-month stay.
6 We will not, Mr. President and Your Honours,
7 engage in a repetition of much of the testimony that
8 Your Honours have heard concerning various events that
9 took place during the tour of the Prince of Wales' Own
10 Regiment of Yorkshire. What we would do with this
11 witness and at the Prosecutor's request is to present
12 the evidence in a more episodic fashion, that is,
13 particular instances of this particular witness's
14 experience that will tie in much of that has been
15 raised by the Prosecution and also by the Defence
16 during the months of trial we've been talking about,
17 the six months of the Prince of Wales' Own tour.
18 So in that sense, Mr. President, it will be a
19 testimony that focuses on connections. This particular
20 individual was a liaison officer with the Hotel Vitez.
21 In that capacity, he met the Defendant on occasion, and
22 most of the time he spent speaking with an individual
23 by the name of Darko Gelic, G-E-L-I-C, Darko Gelic was
24 the Defendant Blaskic's liaison officer and did the
25 speaking for then Colonel Blaskic during this period of
2 He will speak to you about the structure of
3 the Hotel Vitez, he will speak to you about his
4 observations concerning Blaskic as a commander, he will
5 speak about the communication capabilities of the HVO
6 during this time frame. In conjunction with this
7 testimony, he will speak about the use of helicopters
8 moving in and out of the Lasva Valley at one particular
9 location controlled by the HVO. He will talk about the
10 Defendant being a commander who was out on the ground
11 at various points.
12 He will then talk about some of the men in
13 the HVO that Your Honours have heard of to date. He
14 will talk about his rather shocking conversations with
15 Anto Valenta in the Hotel Vitez, his meeting of Mario
16 Cerkez and his dealing with Mario Cerkez, those will be
17 the two prominent individuals that he will talk about
18 at the outset. He will then talk about a conversation
19 that took place in late May, 1993 concerning the
20 Jokeri, the Jokeri being housed at the Bungalow just
21 past Ahmici on the way to Busovaca, and he will talk
22 about the conversations that he had with the Jokeri,
23 their identification of an individual as their leader,
24 that individual being Pasko Ljubesic, and the
25 subsequent attempts by Mr. Whitworth to talk to Pasko
1Ljubesic, and how he can relate Ljubesic and the
2 military police, and connect them with Darko Gelic and
3 the Hotel Vitez vis-a-vis the Defendant.
4 He will then testify as to the Jokers in an
5 actual military operation. That military operation
6 obviously was not the one observed -- Ahmici was not
7 observed by this witness, but the attack on the village
8 of Grbavica on the 7th and 8th of 1993 was observed by
9 this witness, and he will talk about the participation
10 of the Jokeri in that attack along with the
11 participation of other HVO soldiers.
12 He will then talk about the Vitezovi, his
13 knowledge of Darko Kraljevic. Darko Kraljevic was
14 under the command and control of the Defendant Blaskic
15 and part of the HVO military structure, and to that
16 end, he will not only describe what the role was of the
17 Vitezovi but he will also describe the particular
18 instance, an offensive operation, where the Vitezovi
19 moved into Donji Vecerska and actually participated in
20 an operation where they fought against the ABiH,
21 defeated the ABiH, and subsequently the person who
22 spoke to the media about that particular event in
23 praiseworthy fashion was the Defendant's liaison
24 officer, Darko Gelic.
25 We will not go through a long participation,
1Your Honours, of Stari Vitez. We will talk about Stari
2 Vitez to a minor degree in the sense of how this
3 witness viewed Stari Vitez and how the HVO viewed Stari
4 Vitez in light of many of the military activities that
5 were going on in the valley.
6 He will then be the individual who, with
7 Darko Gelic, on Blaskic's word, recovered the trucks
8 that were taken in the Convoy of Joy. That recitation
9 will be quite brief. He will also talk about the
10 investigation of Dobrila Kolaba as he was the
11 individual that was on the scene, we've heard some
12 testimony about the killing of Dobrila Kolaba, the
13 BRITBAT interpreter by Brigadier Duncan, but this
14 particular witness was one that was actually there on
15 the scene. He will talk about the investigation and
16 the conclusions by the HVO on Dobrila, and he will also
17 talk about the conclusions of the killing of the UNHCR
18 driver Boris and the actual firing point and the weapon
19 that was employed. He will touch to some degree on the
20 use of propaganda on behalf of the HVO and how the HVO,
21 and specifically Cerkez, had control over much of what
22 was played on the radio.
23 Lastly, he will talk about the attack on
24 Grbavica and the actual looting and burning that took
25 place in Grbavica after it was secured.
1As you can see from the indictment,
2 Mr. President and Your Honours, the Prosecutor doesn't
3 charge that the attack on Grbavica was unlawful, but it
4 was the destruction and plunder of property after the
5 attack by Blaskic's soldiers that is the crime.
6 Suffice it to say, Mr. President and Your
7 Honours, the testimony of Mr. Whitworth will focus on
8 any number of counts, virtually all of the counts,
9 because in this episodic fashion, it will touch on
10 connections between participation by individual units,
11 that Your Honours have heard to date, as well as the
12 connections back to the Defendant Blaskic. The only
13 actual attack he will talk about in some detail is the
14 attack on Grbavica on the 7th and 8th of 1993.
15 In any event, virtually all of the counts in
16 the indictment, certainly the persecution count in
17 Count 1, the wilful killing and serious injury in
18 Counts 5 through 10, the destruction and plunder of
19 property, Counts 11 through 13, and destruction of
20 religious monuments to some degree as he will be unable
21 to testify directly of the burning of the mosque in
22 Grbavica, but he will testify that all of the
23 individual structures around it were burning at the
25 That is basically the presentation to be made
1by Mr. Whitworth. As I noted at the outset, it is
2 basically testimony that connects various people and
3 events that we have spoken about to date, and that
4 would be the Prosecutor's presentation at this
6 JUDGE JORDA: About how long do you expect
7 this to take, Mr. Kehoe?
8 MR. KEHOE: I would say, Mr. President,
9 probably a couple hours, I would think, depending --
10 JUDGE JORDA: When you say a few hours, what
11 do you mean? A couple of hours? What does that mean,
12 a couple of hours? That could go from two to 24.
13 MR. KEHOE: Closer to two than 24. No, I'm
14 kidding. Probably two and a half hours in toto.
15 JUDGE JORDA: That's it, two and a half
16 hours. What I would like to ask you, in light of all
17 of the questions that are going to be asked, is for you
18 to focus on what is most important in the testimony.
19 Please do not forget that if it's a long examination,
20 if you have the witness speak about all of the
21 subjects, necessarily we're going to have a long
22 cross-examination and it will be very complicated and
23 very subtle discussions in order to know whether the
24 cross-examination is going to be on the scope of the
25 direct examination.
1Therefore, Mr. Kehoe, please try to focus on
2 the essential points. A witness is not a witness to
3 everything that he saw throughout his stay. If you
4 want to make him that, you can, of course, but then
5 it's going to take very, very long.
6 Try to be as concise as possible. Thank you
7 very much. The witness can now be brought in
8 (The witness entered)
9 JUDGE JORDA: Do you hear me? Would you tell
10 us your name and your given names and what your rank
11 was at the time of the events, and then please remain
12 standing until you have read your oath, and after that,
13 you might be seated.
14 Please go ahead.
15 THE WITNESS: My name is Captain Lee
16 Whitworth, a Captain and liaison officer with the 1st
17 Battalion Prince Of Wales' Own Regiment of Yorkshire
18 during the battalion's tour in Bosnia.
19 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Read the oath,
20 please, the solemn declaration.
21 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I shall
22 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
24 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Captain. Please be
25 seated. You have been called to this Tribunal as part
1of the trial of General Blaskic who is in this
2 courtroom now and whom you knew at the time. Mr. Kehoe
3 is going to ask you several questions. Please testify
4 freely. He has given us the general framework of your
5 testimony. Please answer as close to the questions as
6 you can.
7 Mr. Kehoe?
8 WITNESS: LEE WHITWORTH
9 Examined by Mr. Kehoe:
10 Q. Thank you, Mr. President. Your Honours,
11 counsel. Good afternoon, Captain.
12 Captain, you noted at the outset of your
13 testimony that you were formerly a member of the Prince
14 of Wales' Own Regiment of Yorkshire and a liaison
15 officer, I believe, during the six-month tour in Bosnia
16 from May of 1993 through early November 1993; is that
18 A. That's correct, sir, yeah.
19 Q. I am pausing one moment just to allow the
20 interpreters to catch up. You and I have spoken about
21 that before. Also I would ask you, when you are
22 testifying, to direct your attention to the Judges.
23 Captain Whitworth, tell the Judges about your
24 military career, time of service, what you did in the
25 service, and the specifics concerning your role as a
1liaison officer in Bosnia during your six-month tour?
2 A. I was -- prior to Bosnia, I was serving in
3 Northern Ireland, working and liaising with the Royal
4 Ulster Constabulary. On my initial deployment to
5 Bosnia, I was employed as the regimental signals
6 officer, that is responsible for the communications and
7 running of headquarters of the battalion. It was only
8 after a period of two or three weeks, after the Colonel
9 had reassessed the situation in the Lasva Valley, that
10 he directed that we would have several of the liaison
11 officers and I was appointed as the liaison officer to
12 the Vitez-Lasva Valley area.
13 Q. Now, as liaison officer to Vitez and the
14 Lasva Valley area, what did you do?
15 A. I was effectively the eyes and ears of the
16 Colonel, and my job really was to develop a rapport and
17 relationship with the people on the ground in order to
18 facilitate our mission in supporting the UNHCR on their
19 delivery of humanitarian aid to the people in the
20 Lasva-Central Bosnia area.
21 Q. As part of that, Captain, did you become
22 familiar with the Hotel Vitez and the various
23 personalities in the Hotel Vitez?
24 A. I did indeed, sir. The Hotel Vitez was
25 pretty much a pivotal point as far as I was concerned,
1there were several key personnel in there who held
2 great prominence in the Lasva Valley area, primarily
3 Colonel Blaskic.
4 Q. During your tour there, did you meet the
5 Defendant Blaskic?
6 A. I did indeed, sir, on numerous occasions.
7 Q. And were mostly your dealings with his
8 liaison officer?
9 A. A good number of those dealings were not with
10 Colonel Blaskic directly but his personal liaison
11 officer who was Darko Gelic.
12 MR. KEHOE: If we can, we might as well start
13 moving in through the photographs that we have
14 identified, if we can, with the assistance of the
15 usher, just pull out the first four photographs in the
16 batch that we have? And Mr. Dubuisson, the photograph
17 series is ...
18 THE REGISTRAR: This is 432.
19 MR. KEHOE:
20 Q. If we can move these in series. Now,
21 Captain, where is that photograph taken and are you in
22 that photograph?
23 A. That photograph is the front steps of the
24 Hotel Vitez in the centre of Vitez itself. It was the
25 operational headquarters of the HVO military command
1and military police.
2 Q. And is, in fact, the military police insignia
3 on the front of the Hotel Vitez?
4 A. It is. I can't see it very well on my
5 screen, but it says there.
6 MR. KEHOE: If I may just stop at some point.
7 Counsel doesn't have his copies of his
8 photographs, so before I move ahead, I apologise.
9 Q. That is you, is it not, in the lower
10 left-hand corner with the beret on?
11 A. That's right, sir, it is, and one of my
12 drivers sat on the steps also with several members of
13 the military police and HVO.
14 MR. KEHOE: Let us turn to the next
15 photograph. The next photograph I believe would be
17 Q. Is that a photograph that's taken inside the
18 Hotel Vitez?
19 JUDGE JORDA: Why is it 432/2? I don't
21 THE REGISTRAR: I think there are about 40
22 photographs, so it's going to be 432/1 for the first,
24 JUDGE JORDA: All right. Then the whole
25 series represents Exhibit 432; is that correct?
1THE REGISTRAR: Yes, that's right.
2 JUDGE JORDA: And there will be slash 1, 2,
3 3. So this is 432/2; is that correct?
4 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, that's correct, Your
6 MR. KEHOE:
7 Q. This photograph, 432/2, is that a photograph
8 with you and other military policemen inside the Hotel
10 A. It is, sir, yeah, in the foyer/entrance area.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Correction. No, it's 433/2.
12 MR. KEHOE: I apologise. 433.
13 Q. And 433/3, the next one, sir. Now, is that
14 likewise taken inside the Hotel Vitez?
15 A. It is indeed, with Darko Gelic, the liaison
16 officer for the HVO.
17 Q. Could you use your pointer and point to Darko
19 A. (indicated).
20 Q. And he is to your right; is that correct?
21 A. Right.
22 Q. And the next photograph, 433/4. Again, is
23 that you and Darko Gelic?
24 A. That's Darko and myself and that's on the
25 road outside Vitez (indicated).
1Q. Now, Captain, during your period of time
2 there, did you become very comfortable walking around
3 the Hotel Vitez?
4 A. That's correct, yes, sir.
5 Q. Did you become familiar with the
6 communication capabilities that were located in the
7 Hotel Vitez and elsewhere that were available to the
9 A. Yes, sir. They had a system of -- they had
10 computers in there, fax facility, telephone, and what
11 appeared to be some form of transmittable
12 radio/telephone system in there which didn't require
13 telephone lines to operate, but they also had workable
14 telephone lines going in and out of the building.
15 Q. Did you see any other communication
16 capabilities in and around the Hotel Vitez or the Lasva
17 Valley that indicated to you the ability of the
18 Defendant to communicate with his troops in Central
20 A. There were -- there was also -- had the
21 ability to transmit radio, there was a local radio
22 station, they also had the ability to receive satellite
23 television, and as I think -- I hoped I explained
24 earlier, they seemed to have some system of satellite
25 telecommunications, i.e. telephone system as well as
2 Q. Now, Captain, during your tour, you said that
3 you met the Defendant. Did you come to have some
4 understanding as to what type of commander the
5 Defendant was, and by that I mean, did he spend all his
6 time in the Hotel Vitez? Was he a commander who was
7 out on the ground inspecting his troops or consulting
8 with them? I mean, what's been your experience?
9 A. Colonel Blaskic seemed a very active
10 commander, he seemed to be well-informed, had a very
11 good understanding of the situation, not just in the
12 Lasva Valley area but also up and down all the HVO
13 pockets as far as Vares. Often, when delivering
14 messages for my own Colonel, it would be impossible for
15 me to see Colonel Blaskic, I would be given the excuse
16 that he wasn't in the building, he was out with the
17 troops or he would be out at some other location in and
18 around the Lasva area, and that was one of the reasons
19 I didn't meet him directly as many times as I was
20 instructed by my Colonel, and I also had the
21 opportunity to meet him in other areas up and down the
22 Lasva Valley, so he was quite active in terms of not
23 centrally located on all occasions in the Hotel Vitez,
24 taking an active role as the commander in the area.
25 Q. Did you have occasion, Captain, to meet the
1Defendant at a headquarters other than the Hotel Vitez?
2 A. Yes, sir. On one particular occasion, prior
3 to the fall of the Travnik area, I met Colonel Blaskic
4 in what looked like an operational headquarters
5 location which was out of the Hotel Vitez and located
6 near the wood yard forward toward the Travnik, Novi
7 Travnik area. He was supported by his usual entourage
8 of military police protecting that particular tactical
10 Q. Was he upset in any way that you had found
11 him in this forward headquarters?
12 A. He was extremely upset as was his liaison
13 officer, Darko Gelic, who I had managed to trick, as it
14 were, into leading me to him in the first place. Darko
15 was very worried because he appreciated that Colonel
16 Blaskic didn't want people to bother him at this
17 particular location because obviously it was a very
18 busy time at this tactical headquarters.
19 Q. Now, you noted, Captain, that Blaskic was in
20 contact with other areas in his area of command. Did
21 he, in fact, use Darko Gelic to introduce you to other
22 individuals within his area of command?
23 A. Yes, sir, there were numerous occasions when,
24 for example, if I wanted to do any particular work in
25 an area, then Darko Gelic would be assigned to me as
1Colonel Blaskic's liaison officer, and Darko would then
2 assist me in gaining access to particular areas that
3 would have otherwise been difficult had I not had a
4 senior HVO liaison officer and representative of
5 Colonel Blaskic with me.
6 Q. Captain, let's turn our attention to 433/5,
7 and if we can put that on the ELMO? Now, that is Darko
8 Gelic in the blue shirt; is that right?
9 A. It is indeed, sir, yes.
10 Q. And what was happening here?
11 A. This was -- Darko had taken me over to
12 introduce me to commander Grubesic, who was the brigade
13 commander in the Busovaca area, and the chap on the
14 right of Darko, i.e. on the left of the photograph, is
15 Commander Grubesic in the white T-shirt.
16 MR. KEHOE: If we can stay there, usher, and
17 I just want to ask you about some capabilities of
18 travel inside and out of the Lasva Valley area.
19 Q. Did there come a time, sir, when the
20 Defendant and the HVO had capabilities of moving in and
21 out of the Lasva Valley by air?
22 A. That's the -- there were very, very frequent
23 helicopter movements, HVO helicopter movements, in and
24 out of the Lasva Valley despite the U.N. restriction of
25 air movement. HIP helicopters would come in once,
1maybe twice a week, land by a quarry facility not far
2 away from the British battalion location, stay for five
3 to ten minutes, and leave, and there were periods of
4 time when Colonel Blaskic was unavailable for us to
5 speak to, but we assumed that he was moving, very
6 probably moving in and out of the area to discuss
7 matters with other commanders in the Kiseljak area or
8 maybe down south in Prozor area. That is purely
9 supposition, but it became very difficult to ascertain
10 his location at times, and that was an assumption on
11 our part that was quite feasible.
12 MR. KEHOE: Before I move to the next
13 photograph, if, Mr. Dubuisson, I could move to this
14 particular map? And I believe that will be Exhibit
16 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, that's correct, 434.
17 MR. KEHOE:
18 Q. Now, Exhibit 434, of course, Mr. President
19 and Your Honours, is a portion of Exhibit 172. The
20 area is circled to the right of this. Did you identify
21 that location as the spot that the helicopter came and
22 went from?
23 A. On several occasions, that area, yes, was
24 identified as the place where the helicopter was
25 actually landing and taking off from.
1THE INTERPRETER: Could you ask the witness
2 to slow down a little bit, please, for the sake of the
4 MR. KEHOE: Did you hear that, Captain?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Using the pointer, Captain, could you point
7 to where the British battalion base was, and you are
8 pointing to that area on the left-hand side of the
10 A. (indicated).
11 Q. Now, this area that is circled as a helipad,
12 why do you believe that area was chosen?
13 A. Because of the nature of the ground around
14 that area, it would have been very difficult for BiH
15 troops in the area to engage the helicopter with direct
16 fire weapons or indirect fire weapons once it was on
17 the ground because there were hill features around it,
18 so the helicopters always engaged -- were engaged by
19 some small arms on the way, but once it actually
20 touched down, they were out of sight whilst static on
21 the ground.
22 Q. The helicopter coming in and going out was
23 still fired on by Armija soldiers?
24 A. Indeed it was, yes.
25 Q. If I can, Mr. Usher, if we can move back to
1our series of photographs 433/6, I believe. Now,
2 Captain, 436/6 is a photograph that was taken by you in
3 Kiseljak; is that right?
4 A. It is so, yes.
5 Q. Was this some of the evacuation of medical
6 wounded from Kiseljak to some other location?
7 A. Yes, sir, this was a helicopter lift from
8 Kiseljak. I organised the vehicle evacuation from Novi
9 Bila hospital to Kiseljak, and the HVO liaison officers
10 and officers in Kiseljak then arranged for an
11 HV helicopter to pick up those casualties and take them
12 further south to Croatia for medical treatment.
13 Q. Captain, was this the type of helicopter or
14 variations of this helicopter that -- the ones that
15 flew into the quarry area that you just described on
16 the prior exhibit?
17 A. They were indeed, sir, yes.
18 Q. Let's turn to the next photograph which
19 should be 433/7. Did you take that photograph?
20 A. I did, sir, yes.
21 Q. What is that?
22 A. That's one of the helicopters spiralling down
23 into the motion quarry area that we indicated on the
24 map earlier.
25 Q. Now let me change subjects, if you will, and
1if I can ask the usher just to remain there for one
3 During the period of time you had the
4 opportunity to observe the HVO and the operation of the
5 HVO, was there a chain of command?
6 A. There was a very comprehensive chain of
7 command, sir, yes. Colonel Blaskic was the senior
8 military figure in the Lasva Valley area, and he had
9 numerous subordinate brigade commanders and sub-unit
10 commanders in the Lasva Valley.
11 Q. Did he appear to be taking steps to train his
12 troops as well as other steps to defend the Lasva
13 Valley area during the period of time that you were
15 A. Yes, on a few occasions we came across what
16 appeared to be young soldiers being trained up to take
17 their place as members of the local militia and
18 brigades defending the Lasva pocket.
19 Q. Let me turn your attention to 433/8. Again,
20 is that another photograph that was taken by you,
22 A. It is indeed, sir, yes.
23 Q. What does it depict?
24 A. Several young men I assessed at about the age
25 of 15, 16, some a little bit older, in military
1uniform, formed up as a squad marching up the road, and
2 that's just outside the wood yard area near one of the
3 tactical headquarter locations that Colonel Blaskic had
5 Q. Captain, based on your military experience,
6 is that type of training you, as an officer, would
7 expect to see with an army in theatre?
8 A. It is indeed, sir, yes.
9 Q. You also noted that Blaskic was an effective
10 commander in the defence of the Vitez area, and that
11 included a large trenching system, did it not?
12 A. Yes, there was a very comprehensive series of
13 trenches laid out around the -- all areas of the Lasva
14 pocket. There were also detailed secondary defensive
15 trenches which made it very difficult for the Armija to
16 make any progress, so it was obviously a very carefully
17 planned defensive system.
18 Q. Let me just show you an example of some of
19 this trenching system, a photograph that you took,
20 433/9. Is that one such photograph of an HVO trench
21 that you took during your tour?
22 A. It is, sir, yes.
23 MR. KEHOE: Now, if I can change subjects
24 with you and move, Captain, to some of the
25 personalities, and I'm just going to take a little bit
1of a break from those photographs, Mr. Usher, and to
2 move to some photographs that were in evidence.
3 The first photograph that I would like to
4 talk to you about is a -- if I may, Mr. Dubuisson, this
5 is part of Exhibit 80, eight zero.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Yes. This is Exhibit 80/8.
7 MR. KEHOE: Thank you.
8 Q. Captain Whitworth, these photos of these HVO
9 leaders are a series of photographs that were taken by
10 you, were they not, sir?
11 A. They are indeed, sir, yes.
12 Q. And within these photos, is an individual by
13 the name of Anto Valenta depicted?
14 A. Yes, sir. That's Mr. Valenta there.
15 Q. And you're pointing to the man with the
16 moustache carrying the suitcase on the left half of
17 that photograph; is that right?
18 A. Yes, sir.
19 Q. Did you have occasion early in your tour,
20 Captain, to meet with Valenta and to discuss the
21 political goals of the HVO and the Lasva Valley, and if
22 so, tell the Judges in your own words what was that
24 A. During the early part of my tour, I was
25 introduced to Anto Valenta by mayor Santic and Pero
1Skopljak, some political leaders. They took me to the
2 Hotel Vitez and introduced me to Mr. Valenta as the new
3 liaison officer for UNPROFOR in the Vitez area.
4 Mr. Valenta went into great detail and described to me,
5 using a series of maps and diagrams, what was happening
6 in the area and what the future intentions as far as he
7 was concerned were. That involved using a map and
8 indicating to me an area of Central Bosnia that was
9 covered in pie charts depicting the current
10 distribution of different ethnic groups. The pie chart
11 would show the percentage of Serbs, the percentage of
12 Muslims, the percentage of Croats in each of the large
13 towns, and Mr. Valenta then indicated the area that, as
14 far as he was concerned, was going to be in the near
15 future declared as Herceg-Bosna and indicated to me
16 that this would be an entirely Croat area, not as it
17 was then with three different ethnic groups of Serbs,
18 Muslims, and Croats living in that area.
19 Q. Did that shock you, Captain?
20 A. It shocked me a great deal as it was at the
21 beginning of my time in Bosnia and it was contradictory
22 to what the U.N. had been working to and what the
23 politicians in various organisations had said that they
24 were working towards, it contradicted all those things
25 that we expected to hear from a character who was
1allegedly the most senior political Croatian figure in
2 the Lasva Valley at that time.
3 Q. Captain, where was Valenta's office?
4 A. It was in the Hotel Vitez on the ground floor
5 just a little bit down from the place I met Colonel
6 Blaskic on several occasions, the place I came to know
7 as his office or working place.
8 Q. And, Captain, did you come to any conclusions
9 in what regard Valenta was held by the other members of
10 the HVO in the Hotel Vitez?
11 A. Valenta was seen as a key political figure, a
12 figure who was revered, as far as I saw it, by the
13 Croatian people in general, and also one of the
14 policymakers in the Lasva Valley area as far as
15 dictating military -- he obviously had an influence on
16 military activity in the area. That was certainly the
17 impression I got because of his proximity to Colonel
18 Blaskic, the key military personnel in the Lasva
20 MR. KEHOE: Let us now touch on another
21 personality, and if I may have, Mr. Dubuisson, Exhibit
23 Mr. Usher, it's this photograph (indicated).
24 Q. Captain, do you know that individual?
25 A. Yes, sir. That's Mr. Mario Cerkez, a
1commander of the Vitez brigade, i.e., the local militia
2 commander in the centre of Vitez.
3 Q. He was the Vitez brigade commander?
4 A. He was indeed, sir, yes.
5 Q. Was he subordinate to Blaskic?
6 A. He was one of Colonel Blaskic's brigade
7 commanders, that's right, sir, yes.
8 Q. Did you ever see Blaskic and Kordic relate to
9 one another or did you see -- let me take -- in the
10 Convoy of Joy situation, did you see Blaskic and
11 Cerkez -- did I say Kordic? I apologise. Did you ever
12 see Blaskic and Cerkez relate to one another?
13 A. On one particular occasion during the Convoy
14 of Joy, Colonel Blaskic was attempting to bring all the
15 elements of the Convoy of Joy together and assist it on
16 its way up towards the Tuzla area. There had obviously
17 been considerable disruption to the convoy by the local
18 civilians and HVO and pressure from Ambassador Thebault
19 and Colonel Alastair, along with Colonel Blaskic, were
20 literally going around trying to pressure people into
21 releasing the vehicles so the convoy could re-form.
22 On this particular occasion, at the Vitez
23 checkpoint, Colonel Blaskic was trying to defuse the
24 situation with a lot of Croatian civilians, and I could
25 make out Commander Cerkez in the background trying to
1avoid being seen but nevertheless a witness, witness
2 what was taking place. When Colonel Blaskic noted the
3 presence of Commander Cerkez, he reprimanded him very
4 strongly in front of the crowd of people and told him
5 that what was happening to the Convoy of Joy was wrong
6 and that he was to assist in releasing the vehicles and
7 encouraged the local civilian population to do
8 likewise. Commander Cerkez wasn't particularly happy
9 or enthusiastic about this idea but nevertheless
10 concurred with Colonel Blaskic's wishes.
11 Q. Was it clear to you that Cerkez was a
12 subordinate to Blaskic?
13 A. I had always thought that, and that instance
14 was, for me, said exactly that, whilst Commander Cerkez
15 was at times disrespectful of Colonel Blaskic and
16 didn't always like what he wanted to happen,
17 nevertheless, as his superior commander, he obeyed when
18 directed to by Colonel Blaskic.
19 Q. And based on the word of Blaskic, did you
20 recover the trucks that were taken from the Convoy of
21 Joy with the assistance of Darko Gelic?
22 A. That's correct, sir. Darko Gelic and another
23 one of the staff from the Hotel Vitez, one of Colonel
24 Blaskic's staff, assisted me for the following two or
25 three days in visiting all the HVO and local militia
1that were holding the vehicles and Darko and another
2 HVO representative from the Hotel Vitez assisted me in
3 getting those vehicles released and reforming the
4 Convoy of Joy so they could move north of Tuzla.
5 Q. Did they obey, did the HVO local authorities
6 obey the order of Blaskic as conveyed by Gelic?
7 A. They did indeed, sir, yes.
8 MR. KEHOE: We're going to move to another
9 subject, Captain, and the subject I'd like to talk to
10 you about begins with a photograph 152? It's this
11 photograph (indicated).
12 THE REGISTRAR: This is 152/3.
13 MR. KEHOE:
14 Q. If I may put the larger one on there, it's a
15 little easier to see.
16 Now, Captain, I know you recognise that
17 rather handsome chap depicted in that photograph as a
18 colleague of yours, now Major Bower; is that right?
19 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
20 Q. But for the purposes of our testimony, we're
21 going to be talking about the building that is situated
22 behind Major Bower in this photograph, and I ask you,
23 do you recognise that building?
24 A. Yes. It was a building we referred to as the
25 Swiss cottage, the French alpine hut, we used some
1other names, and it was on the road at Nadioci on the
2 main road between Zenica and Vitez, a place called
4 Q. And several hundred metres from Ahmici?
5 A. Yes, sir, several hundred metres from Ahmici.
6 Q. Early on in your tour, did you have the
7 opportunity to go to this location and talk to the
8 soldiers that were garrisoned in that building?
9 A. Yes, sir. During the early days of my tour
10 as a liaison officer, I took it upon myself to drive
11 around to familiarise myself with all the different
12 parts and soldiers and commanders in the area. On one
13 particular occasion, I noticed several youngish
14 soldiers sat on the balcony area of the alpine hut, so
15 I drove up in my Land Rover with my interpreter, got
16 out, and tried to make conversation with them.
17 Initially, this was very successful. I
18 talked to several young soldiers, all of whom were
19 dressed in black carrying large knives, maybe one or
20 two hand guns apiece, and there were plenty of
21 weapons. Actually inside the building and on the porch
22 area. A gentleman of similar description but slightly
23 older kept coming out of the back of the cottage and
24 looked at me with disdain and obviously was not happy
25 about me talking and making conversation with the
1younger chaps on the front.
2 He made some reference to my interpreter, who
3 was Muslim, and the situation got a little bit tense,
4 but after calming that down, they divulged to me that
5 they were part of an elite military police unit they
6 described as the Jokeri, and they boasted quite happily
7 about the fact that they had been involved in all the
8 major HVO successes and offensive operations in and
9 around the Busovaca-Vitez-Lasva Valley area.
10 Throughout this, a gentleman kept coming out
11 the back, again grunting and making comments to the
12 effect that the chaps that sat on the front shouldn't
13 be talking and divulging this information to me. I
14 asked them -- I introduced myself as the liaison
15 officer and said to them that, you know, it would be of
16 use to me and maybe I might be of assistance to them if
17 I was to meet their commander. They told me his name
18 was a gentleman named Pasko and I should go to Vitez
19 and look for him, and at this particular point the chap
20 came out of the back and said that enough was enough
21 and I had to leave and the younger gentlemen shouldn't
22 talk to me any further.
23 On that particular occasion, I then went into
24 Vitez to continue exploring the sort of HVO hierarchy
25 in the Vitez area.
1Q. Before we talk about that, can you use this
2 photograph and the pointer and just tell the Judges
3 exactly where this conversation took place?
4 A. Yes, sir. It took place actually on the
5 balcony, up here (indicated). So I could see quite
6 plainly into the actual Swiss cottage itself, and we
7 sat on chairs out front with five or six members of the
8 Jokeri, the elite military police unit.
9 Q. Captain, how long did this conversation go on
11 A. I was there for approximately 30 minutes.
12 Q. Now, Captain, did they indicate to you
13 anything about Ahmici or did you reach any conclusions
14 about their participation in Ahmici after this
16 A. At the time they said to me, they elaborated
17 on the fact that they had been involved in all the
18 major successful military operations, and I actually
19 mentioned Ahmici, and they said -- they reiterated to
20 me that it was all the successful military operations,
21 so I took it from that that, yes, they were directly
22 involved in Ahmici.
23 Q. Continue on, Captain. You said after this
24 conversation you went back into Vitez to try to
25 continue to find out who the leader was of this
1organisation. Can you tell the Judges what you did?
2 A. I had already been directed to Hotel Vitez
3 and Vitez area by these young members of the Jokeri. I
4 had already made contact there, so I decided to use
5 this as an excuse to introduce myself to the civilian
6 police. I introduced myself to them, and they directed
7 me to the Hotel Vitez and said I need to speak to the
8 senior military police commander in the Hotel Vitez.
9 They weren't actually part of the Jokeri, but the
10 commander of such would be found or the gentleman
11 responsible for them would be found in the Hotel Vitez
13 Q. Let me follow up something you just said.
14 Who was not part of the Jokeri?
15 A. The normal civilian police, which is whom I
16 had visited to explore who the commander was of the
17 Jokeri, this Pasko chap.
18 Q. So the Jokeri was part of the military
20 A. That's right, so I used this as a way of
21 brokering myself into the local civilian police, but
22 they directed me quickly over to Hotel Vitez and said
23 that I would find the chief of military police in
25 Q. Now, this is the same location that has
1"Military Police" on the front of it as we saw in one
2 of the initial photographs that I believe was 433/1; is
3 that right?
4 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
5 Q. Did you go in there and meet a member of the
6 military police?
7 A. Yes, sir. I went in and asked if I could
8 speak -- introduced myself to the senior military
9 policeman because he was obviously a key figurehead in
10 the area that I needed to be familiar with, and
11 after -- after a brief wait, a gentleman, maybe late
12 40s, early 50s, bald head came to me and looked
13 disdainfully and disinterested at me, wasn't really
14 interested in meeting me, but introduced himself as one
15 of the senior military police figures in the Vitez
17 MR. KEHOE: Let me show you Exhibit 258, this
19 Q. Captain, do you recognise Exhibit 258?
20 A. Yes, sir. It was the gentleman who was
21 introduced to me as one of the senior military police
22 figures in the Hotel Vitez, I think his name is Vlado.
23 Q. Now, after this meeting, did you come to
24 certain conclusions about the connection between the
25 military police and the Jokeri?
1A. I did so and I reported that I had met the
2 Jokeri and as far as I was concerned that they were a
3 sub-unit based in the Lasva area, but their command was
4 located in Hotel Vitez as part of the HVO hierarchy.
5 Q. Now, did there come a time when you, in the
6 presence of Darko Gelic, were finally introduced to
7 this individual, Pasko, who was head of the military
9 A. That's right, sir. One of my functions as
10 liaison officer was to supervise the delivery of
11 humanitarian aid, and during a particular part of the
12 tour, there was a lot of tension. Consequently, the
13 HVO insisted that they would only allow aid to be
14 delivered to the Muslim areas as long as it was
15 delivered simultaneously to the Croat area of Vitez,
16 and this would only happen after the vehicles had been
17 inspected by the senior military police commander. I
18 arranged for the delivery to Vitez, the vehicles turned
19 up, and Darko Gelic introduced me to a gentleman named
20 Pasko Ljubesic who Darko introduced him as the senior
21 military police commander from the HVO.
22 Q. Was it clear to you at this point that Darko
23 was working together with Pasko on this?
24 A. Absolutely, sir, yes. He was again a
25 sub-unit commander, part of the HVO based in the Hotel
1Vitez, and was a very close liaison between him and
2 Darko Gelic, Colonel Blaskic's liaison officer.
3 Q. Was it also clear to you, Captain, that this
4 Pasko was the Pasko who was also the overall commander
5 of the Jokeri?
6 A. That's right, sir. Pasko was the name, first
7 name I had been initially given by the Jokeri on my
8 first meeting with them, and it fitted the
10 MR. KEHOE: Let me turn our attention,
11 Mr. Dubuisson, to photographs 255 and 256.
12 Q. Captain, if I may, I'd like to show you a
13 series of photographs, two photographs. If we can get
14 over to the left a little bit? The chap is not --
15 there he is, okay.
16 See it on the screen, Mr. Usher? Okay.
17 That's good. That's good. That's great.
18 This is Exhibit 255, and this again is
19 another photograph that was taken by you, was it not,
21 A. It was indeed, sir, yes.
22 Q. Who is the individual in the right-hand side
23 of this photo?
24 A. He was the chap introduced to me by Darko
25 Gelic as Pasko Ljubesic, commander of the military
1police in the HVO.
2 Q. And, if I may, Mr. Usher, the next
3 photograph, 256?
4 How about the individuals in that photograph?
5 A. That is Darko Gelic, Colonel Blaskic's
6 liaison officer --
7 Q. Excuse me a second. Can you put the pointer
8 on? That is the individual in the uniform to the left
9 talking to the blue uniformed gentleman in the back; is
10 that right?
11 A. That's right, sir, yes. And that's Pasko
12 Ljubesic (indicated) and these were the two local
13 policemen who were just on the checkpoint who were just
14 being informed of what was actually happening but
15 weren't actually involved in the search themselves.
16 Q. This individual -- this photograph was taken
17 by you as well; is that right?
18 A. It was indeed, sir, yeah.
19 Q. Now, you observed with me a videotape of an
20 event where various individuals have been identified by
21 you; is that right?
22 A. That's right, sir, yes.
23 MR. KEHOE: If I may, Mr. President, just go
24 to the clip that is 270, we would ask for a still, but
25 I think the Defence counsel had a still of
1Mr. Ljubesic. If I could just have Defence counsel's
2 number, I don't really understand -- know the number we
3 had on that. We can take another one or take the
4 Defence's Exhibit.
5 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Dubuisson?
6 THE REGISTRAR: Are you going to --
7 JUDGE JORDA: What is your position here,
8 Mr. Kehoe? I didn't quite understand. What do you
9 want to show?
10 MR. KEHOE: We'll play the video and then
12 JUDGE JORDA: Very well.
13 THE REGISTRAR: This is the cassette 270; is
14 that right?
15 MR. KEHOE: That's correct.
16 (Videotape played)
17 MR. KEHOE:
18 Stop, please.
19 Q. My first question to you, Captain, is: Does
20 that video, and I realise there is more on the video,
21 does that appear to be the inside of the Swiss chalet?
22 A. I examined it closely, sir, earlier on, and
23 it does appear to be what looked like the inside of the
24 Swiss chalet.
25 Q. Can we go back on the monitor, the still on
1the monitor? That individual, do you recognise him?
2 A. That's Pasko Ljubesic, sir.
3 Q. Is he the individual that you previously met
4 or you had met after with Darko Gelic?
5 A. It is indeed, sir, yes.
6 Q. That particular still is a still that was put
7 into evidence by Defence counsel last week, and for the
8 purposes of the record, we can just duplicate that
9 effort as opposed to taking yet another still. There's
10 no need to clutter up the record in that regard,
11 counsel, I really don't know what the number is, but we
12 can clarify it later.
13 If we can continue on with that video?
14 Better still, can you go back a little bit, just back a
15 bit to the prior person on that video. Just a little
17 (Videotape played)
18 MR. KEHOE:
19 Q. That man, do you recognise him?
20 A. I'm quite -- I'm reasonably as certain as I
21 can be bearing in mind the length of time that that was
22 one of the gentleman I spoke to, sat on the front of
23 the Swiss cottage that day.
24 MR. KEHOE: Can we continue to play?
25 (Videotape played)
1Q. Stop. How about the individual -- the bald
2 individual with the hand on his head?
3 A. I'm as certain as I can be that that's the
4 gentleman that I was introduced to as one of the senior
5 military police officers in the Hotel Vitez that day.
6 Q. Now, the Jokers informed you that they were
7 involved in the HVO military successes in the Lasva
8 Valley; is that right?
9 A. They indeed, sir, yeah.
10 Q. Just for clarification sake, approximately
11 when was this conversation you had with these Jokers?
12 A. It was very early on in my tour, I think it
13 was about the end of May, beginning of June, 28th, 29th
14 of May, something like that.
15 Q. Fair enough. Thereafter, Captain, did you
16 see members of the Jokeri involved in any other HVO
17 military successes in the Lasva Valley after that?
18 A. Towards the end of our tour, during the HVO
19 assault on Grbavica, I came -- I saw several gentlemen
20 dressed in exactly the same manner, i.e. all in black,
21 similarly well-equipped, who looked very familiar in
22 terms of -- I was quite confident that they were
23 members of the Jokeri that I had spoken to earlier on a
24 few months earlier.
25 Q. This attack on Grbavica was when?
1A. 7th, 8th September, beginning of September
3 Q. Now, you noted just previously that based on
4 this, there was a connection between the Jokeri, as
5 part of the military police, and the military police in
6 the Hotel Vitez; is that right?
7 A. That's right, sir, yes.
8 Q. How about Blaskic? Did you see these
9 military policemen in Blaskic's presence on occasion?
10 A. Colonel Blaskic, whenever he appeared on the
11 ground, if there was some senior U.N. dignitary in the
12 Lasva Valley, Colonel Blaskic would appear as a senior
13 HVO commander and he would always be escorted and
14 guarded by members of the military police unit based in
15 the Hotel Vitez.
16 MR. KEHOE: Let me turn ourselves to some
17 photographs, and if we can go to this one? Is there a
18 number on the back of that?
19 Q. Let's go a little bit out of sequence here,
20 433/12. Do you recognise that, sir?
21 A. That's a photograph I took when Cedric
22 Thornberry was visiting Novi Bila hospital. That's
23 Colonel Blaskic in attendance, Colonel Alastair, and
24 Cedric Thornbury visiting and assessing circumstances
25 of the Novi Bila hospital. And those are the military
1policemen who were in abundance around the hospital
2 during Colonel Blaskic's visit.
3 Q. Was it quite normal to see these military
4 policemen in and about when Blaskic was present?
5 A. Yes, sir.
6 Q. Now, let us talk about an instance involving
7 the local command and also the military police in the
8 area of Rijeka (phoen) in early June of 1993. Do you
9 remember an instance of maybe 30 Bosnian Muslims being
10 held in the Rijeka area?
11 A. Yes, I came across twenty to thirty, what
12 were actually DPs, Displaced Persons, that weren't
13 actually native of the Lasva Valley, and they were
14 being accommodated in a group of houses in the area of
15 Rijeka. They were all Muslims and the HVO/BiH
16 frontline was a couple of hundred metres up the same
17 road. When I found them there, I decided and spoke to
18 them that they weren't in a very good situation, and I
19 asked them what they would like to do. They said that
20 they would like to go to Zenica where they had
21 relatives, but they were being prevented from leaving
22 the area by the local HVO.
23 MR. KEHOE: Before we go ahead with the
24 story, if I can show you this particular map, and I
25 believe our next exhibit is ...
1THE REGISTRAR: If you permit me to, do you
2 want a freeze from the video clip, or do you want a new
3 number for the cassette.
4 MR. KEHOE: The cassette is 270, that's okay.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Then it would be 270C, and
6 the next number is 435.
7 JUDGE JORDA: So the cassette keeps its
8 original number; is that correct?
9 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, it keeps its original
10 number, there's A and B for the French and English
11 transcripts, and then C for the extract that we saw
13 MR. KEHOE:
14 Q. Captain Whitworth, I show you Exhibit 435, an
15 area circled in green at the top of the photograph. Is
16 that the general area where these people were kept?
17 A. That's correct, sir, yes, it was.
18 Q. And how far from the frontline was that?
19 A. Two, three hundred metres. I think it's also
20 important to point out, they weren't actually being
21 held within buildings, they weren't actually prisoners,
22 they were just free to -- left to roam around that
23 particular area but they weren't allowed to move from
24 the area of those houses. They were provided with
25 everything they needed but weren't actually kept as
1prisoners. There were actually 5 or 6 families of
2 people there.
3 Q. Let me show you this next photograph which
4 should be 433/10. Does that photograph depict the area
5 that is right near the frontline where these
6 individuals were kept, where they were being held
7 although being allowed to walk around?
8 A. They were, sir, yes. They're basic hollow
9 houses, and in the distance behind the Land Rover, as
10 the track goes up, you can see that there are mines
11 along the road because just over that horizon was the
12 declared frontline area between the HVO and the BiH.
13 Q. What were they being held for, Captain?
14 A. That wasn't immediately apparent to me, but
15 it seemed like they were there as a deterrent to the
16 BiH to not assault that particular avenue.
17 Q. Did you determine that they were being used
18 as human shields?
19 A. I did indeed, yes.
20 Q. What did you do?
21 A. I went to see Mario Cerkez, the local brigade
22 commander, because the soldiers in that area were under
23 his direct command. He said -- he wasn't really
24 interested, it was of no concern to him. He assured me
25 that they were free to go where they wanted, but that
1was obviously not the case, and he was pretty
2 disinterested about the whole thing.
3 I then spoke to -- went to the Hotel Vitez
4 and tried to address the matter to Darko Gelic, and he
5 said again that they were free to move as and when they
6 wanted to, so I promptly went back up to BRITBAT, got
7 two Warriors and my Land Rover, and then went back to
8 Rijeka and attempted to give them an opportunity to
9 walk out in whatever direction that they chose with me
10 as a guide. As we tried to leave, several members of
11 the local militia HVO appeared, as did a vehicle with
12 several military police and said that they were not --
13 the Muslims are not allowed to go anywhere, that they
14 were to stay in the Rijeka area.
15 So at that point, after getting extremely
16 angry and annoyed, I then went to address the matter to
17 the mayor, Mr. Santic, and he appreciated that it was a
18 difficult circumstance and he would look into it, and
19 then I spoke to Hotel Vitez again and said that what
20 they had told me was not true, that I had been stopped
21 by military police escorting them or assisting them in
22 going wherever they wanted to in the Lasva area.
23 I left the matter that particular day and
24 went back a couple of days later to see if the
25 circumstances had changed, and on my return, all the
1Muslims had left and it wasn't till two or three months
2 later, after questioning people in Zenica that actually
3 managed to make contact with several of them, and it
4 would appear that the HVO had actually allowed them to
5 leave the area and walk up over the mountain road into
6 the Muslim area.
7 Q. Now, Captain, this is the participation of
8 two arms of the military, the local HVO and the
9 military police from the Hotel Vitez; is that right?
10 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
11 Q. Who was the military commander above both of
12 those units?
13 A. The military police were based in the Hotel
14 Vitez, and Mario Cerkez, the brigade commander for the
15 Vitez area answered directly to Colonel Blaskic's file,
16 as far as I was concerned, so ultimately he was
17 responsible for that troops' action on that particular
18 day stopping the Muslims leaving.
19 Q. Did you reach conclusions that who, in the
20 military structure, ordered that these people could
22 A. I think -- I concluded that basically after I
23 had pointed out the fact that these people could be
24 construed as being used as a human shield, it became a
25 bit of an embarrassment to the HVO, and the necessary
1orders were -- must have been issued by the Hotel Vitez
2 to allow them to leave.
3 Q. Before we move to the next point, Captain, on
4 the military police and their sub-units, the Jokeri,
5 based on what you've told us about your conversations
6 with the Jokeri, about your conversations in the Hotel
7 Vitez with Vlado Santic, your meeting with Pasko
8 Ljubesic, with Darko Gelic, the activity of the Jokeri
9 in the offensive operation in Grbavica, and lastly, the
10 release of individuals who were formally being stopped
11 from leaving by the local HVO and the military police,
12 based on all those facts, did you reach any conclusions
13 on what command Blaskic had over these military police
14 in theatre?
15 A. Commander Blaskic had the ultimate command
16 over the military police as far as I was concerned and
17 of the brigade commanders in the Lasva area. He had
18 obviously lots of strategic considerations outside the
19 Lasva Valley -- the valley area, but he ultimately
20 demonstrated on numerous occasions that he had
21 effective command and control on the soldiers on the
22 ground, including the military police, and all these
23 brigades, and the other sub-units that we came into
24 contact with in the Lasva area.
25 MR. KEHOE: Captain, I'm going to move to
1another segment, and you can -- we'll finish with those
2 photographs in a little bit -- and I'd like to talk to
3 you just briefly about your experiences with the
4 Vitezovi, and before we begin to that, I'd like to move
5 to yet a new tape, Mr. Dubuisson, which I believe would
6 be 436.
7 Mr. President and Your Honours, this is a
8 video clip that was provided to the Office of the
9 Prosecutor by the British Broadcasting Company, and if
10 we can play it at this juncture?
11 (Videotape played)
12 MR. KEHOE: Stop, please.
13 Q. Do you know that man?
14 A. I do indeed, sir, yes.
15 Q. Can you go back on the screen? Who is he?
16 A. He's the commander of one of the elite
17 special forces units of the HVO in Vitez, Lasva area,
18 called Darko Kraljevic.
19 Q. Tell the Judges how you met Darko Kraljevic?
20 A. First time I met him, I think was the evening
21 of 11th, 12th of June. I didn't know his name then,
22 but he was involved in the taking of several U.N.
23 vehicles as hostages in the centre of Vitez on the
24 night of the 11th, 12th, during which I was the liaison
25 officer that organised the release.
1Q. I'm sorry, the night of the 11th and 12th
2 of ...
3 A. June, I think it was, sir. Effectively,
4 several vehicles on their way back from Zenica had been
5 directed into the town centre of Vitez. Once there,
6 mines had been placed around them and across the roads,
7 and the local population came out in force to protest
8 that, the ineffectiveness of UNPROFOR. During this
9 particular time the BiH were shelling, decided to shell
10 the centre of Vitez. I was sent by Colonel Alastair to
11 try to negotiate for the release of the vehicles from
12 the centre of Vitez area. During that time, it was
13 late at night, 2.00 in the morning, a gentleman held a
14 gun to my face and threatened to kill myself and my
15 interpreter and refused to release the vehicles on the
16 grounds that UNPROFOR was moving weapons and munitions
17 on behalf of the Armija and that we're not supporting
18 the HVO in the same manner.
19 After a heated discussion, several tense
20 minutes, I extracted from the area, after making sure
21 everybody was safe in the vehicles, and went to the
22 Hotel Vitez where members of the ECMM were being held
23 in the basement. I spoke to Darko Gelic, asked him to
24 get Colonel Blaskic out so we could discuss the matter,
25 pointed out the fact that this was just serving to
1upset any UNPROFOR-HVO relations, and after a few hours
2 and a period of time when the mortaring had subsided
3 outside during which the hotel had been hit on one or
4 two occasions, Darko Gelic came back to me with
5 instructions that Colonel Blaskic had said that the
6 vehicles were to be released.
7 I went outside, supervised removal of the
8 mines, and spoke to the local commander, a chap called
9 Carlo Grabovac who was a battalion commander near the
10 entrance to Vitez town centre who made sure that the
11 population had dispersed and we were then allowed to
12 escort the vehicles out of the area.
13 Q. Let me show you two photographs, one which is
14 Exhibit 252 and this particular exhibit, which is the
15 top one, which is part of the 433 series, if we can get
16 both of those?
17 Exhibit 252, can you take a look at that,
18 Captain -- it's not coming up on the monitor for some
19 reason. There we go.
20 Do you recognise the individual facing --
21 A. That's Carlo Grabovac. He's one of the
22 battalion commanders of the Vitez brigade, i.e. he's
23 subordinate to Mario Cerkez and he was one of the
24 commanders he had to liaise closely with on the ground
25 to be able to get the civilians dispersed who were in
1part responsible for holding the vehicles hostage.
2 Q. The next photograph that is in the series,
3 433, and what is that number? 11, and is Carlo
4 Grabovac in that photograph as well?
5 A. He is indeed, sir, yes. He stood on my left
6 or your right as you look at the photograph, and that's
7 taken outside the cinema in Vitez, which was Mario
8 Cerkez's, the brigade commander, headquarters which is
9 about 100 metres away from the Hotel Vitez.
10 Q. So in this particular instance, you had Darko
11 Kraljevic and his Vitezovi operating in conjunction
12 with the Vitez brigade on the command of Cerkez and
13 Carlo Grabovac; is that right?
14 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
15 Q. And Blaskic was the one that ordered the
16 release of this convoy of U.N. vehicles; is that right?
17 A. That's right, sir. I was -- went straight to
18 the top in terms of -- it was obvious that it was
19 difficult to quell the situation at a local level, so I
20 went straight to the head man, spoke to Darko, who then
21 went to speak to Colonel Blaskic, and then after
22 several discussions Darko eventually came back with
23 permission that the vehicles should leave.
24 Q. Did they obey?
25 A. Very soon afterwards, yeah, after I had
1supervised it, everybody doing what he had been
2 instructed to doing by Darko Gelic, they did, yes.
3 Q. So they obeyed Blaskic?
4 A. They did.
5 Q. Let's go to this map briefly, which is the
6 map marked 124 --
7 JUDGE JORDA: Perhaps you're going to take a
8 break here. This might be a time to take a break. We
9 can start in about 20 or 25 minutes.
10 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. Thank you.
11 --- Recess taken at 4.03 p.m.
12 --- On resuming at 4:35 p.m.
13 JUDGE JORDA: We will resume the hearing, and
14 please have the accused brought in.
15 (The accused entered court)
16 THE REGISTRAR: Now we are ready.
17 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. We can continue.
18 MR. KEHOE:
19 Q. Thank you, Mr. President, Your Honours. If I
20 can just move to the next exhibit, which is --
21 THE REGISTRAR: This is 437.
22 MR. KEHOE:
23 Q. Captain, just briefly going through Exhibit
24 437, this is a depiction of the locations of the
25 various events, about which you just discussed on the
1night of the 11th of June, 1993; is that right?
2 A. It is, sir, yes.
3 Q. And number 1 is the area where the U.N.
4 convoy was stopped by the HVO and the Vitezovi; is that
6 A. It is indeed, sir, yes.
7 Q. At the general location where you had a gun
8 put in your face by Darko Kraljevic?
9 A. That's correct, sir.
10 Q. Number 2, does that indicate the place where
11 mines were put across the road to prevent a BRITBAT
12 Warrior from getting into Vitez?
13 A. That's correct, sir, the road was cut off,
14 mines were placed across, and there were civilians in
15 area 3 as well.
16 Q. From 3, you went and tried to get assistance
17 of Carlo Grabovac who was headquartered in number 4; is
18 that right?
19 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
20 Q. The place where you got relief was from
21 Blaskic in the Hotel Vitez; is that correct?
22 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
23 Q. Now, this event took place before you had
24 been formally introduced to Darko Kraljevic, I take
25 it. Let me show you a document, Exhibit 422, if I may,
1Mr. Dubuisson? This is a document that is in both
2 English and Bosnian/Serbian/Croatian. Now, this is a
3 document that you saw while in theatre; is that right,
5 A. It is one of several we saw produced by the
6 Hotel Vitez, yeah.
7 Q. And normally did you get such documents from
8 Darko Gelic?
9 A. Yeah, I was the mail boy between Hotel Vitez
10 and Colonel Alastair, and these things would then be
11 disseminated accordingly to Kiseljak or wherever,
12 depending on what the content was.
13 Q. If you could turn to page 2, the distribution
14 list on that document? Can you read that distribution
15 list, sir?
16 A. All HVO brigades, all the independent units
17 under the command of the HVO 3rd operational zone
19 Q. And that was Blaskic; right?
20 A. That is Colonel Blaskic, sir, yes. Which
21 included the MTD, which is -- I think it's the
22 transport one. It could have been the artillery. The
23 ones I'm familiar with are the last ones which are the
24 4th military police battalion which is Pasko Ljubesic
25 and the guys based in the Hotel Vitez, the Vitezovi
1which is commanded by Darko Kraljevic, and TURTKO 2nd,
2 which were another sort of elite offensive fighting
3 force based around the Travnik, Novi Bila, Novi Travnik
4 area, and lastly a chap called Djuti who was a local
5 dodgy car salesman, criminal, entrepreneur, and also
6 involved militarily in several things that went on,
7 particularly around the Novi Travnik area.
8 Q. Did you see how these individual units were
9 used in the overall tactical structure of the HVO?
10 A. We saw the same pattern throughout our tour
11 in Bosnia, which was that the local brigades, either
12 local militia, would maintain the military positions
13 around the Lasva Valley, but when it came to any
14 offensive action or any attacks by the BiH that
15 required supplementary troops, then the 4th military
16 police, or the Vitezovi, or the TURTKO, or the Jokeri,
17 people like that would be put to use if there was any
18 particular area, for example, if the BiH were making an
19 advance or an attempted advance into the Lasva area,
20 then one of those specialist units would be drafted in
21 to substantiate and increase the strength of the local
22 brigade and militia position in that particular area,
23 and if there were any offensive activities, military
24 operations taking place, those were not undertaken by
25 the HVO brigades, the local militia in the area, but by
1those specialist units, the Vitezovi, the TURTKO, and
2 the military police sub-units.
3 Q. Did you consider that the use of these
4 independent units was intricately involved in the
5 tactical strategy of the HVO in the Lasva Valley?
6 A. Absolutely. They came under command of
7 Colonel Blaskic and they were used in augmenting --
8 correction, wrong, in actually carrying out the HVO's
9 military intention; establishing, strengthening, and
10 regaining ground lost to the BiH.
11 Q. Let's take your point on ground lost to the
12 BiH, and I direct your attention to the latter part of
13 October of 1993. Omit October of 1993. Did you
14 observe an instance when the Vitezovi came in for the
15 goal of doing exactly what you did, take over ground
16 lost to the BiH, and if so, tell the Judges what
17 happened, what you observed, and what ultimately
19 A. I was visiting one of the local battalion
20 commanders in the area of Donji Vecerska, we sat
21 drinking coffee, exchange the niceties of the day, I
22 was there with my Muslim interpreter when a chap came
23 in who was -- who became known to me as Darko
24 Kraljevic, the leader of the Vitezovi. He took over
25 the meeting. It was quite obvious to me that he was
1revered by the battalion commander who gave up his seat
2 for Darko Kraljevic, and Kraljevic told me that he was
3 here to take command of the HVO in this particular
4 area, just to explain that the Sesilja (phoen) area had
5 fallen to the BiH recently, and that Kraljevic was
6 saying that he had been instructed to take charge of
7 the situation and to regain the ground lost to the
8 Armija in that particular brigade area.
9 Q. Captain, was this local commander in Donji
10 Vecerska a member of the HVO?
11 A. He was indeed, sir. He was a battalion
12 commander that came under the Vitez brigade.
13 Q. And did Kraljevic then came up headquarters
14 in Donji Vecerska?
15 A. He did so. He took over the headquarters,
16 and I had cause to meet him there on several occasions
17 after that, and also to bump into him further south
18 from that position, i.e., in the direction of the HVO
19 positions that had been lost to the BiH.
20 Q. During these meetings that you had with Darko
21 Kraljevic, on some occasion did you have a pistol
22 contest with Darko Kraljevic that you won?
23 A. Yes, sir. Darko is a very egocentric
24 character, enjoys demonstrating his machismo and
25 soldiering prowess. He challenged me to a pistol duel
1by way of me establishing myself with him as an equal,
2 as it were, and I undertook the competition, won the
3 competition, and he handed me over as a prize a .357
4 Smith & Wesson Magnum which contained dum-dum bullets
5 that he claimed he had used during Ahmici.
6 Q. Let me turn your attention back to Darko in
7 October of 1993, and if I can move to these two
8 exhibits, Mr. Dubuisson.
9 THE REGISTRAR: This is 438 for the part of
10 the exhibit which comes from Exhibit 55.
11 MR. KEHOE:
12 Q. Just going with 438 first. There is a
13 particular building circled in that exhibit. Is that
14 the building that you circled as the location of the
15 Vitezovi when you were there in October of 1993?
16 A. Yes, it is, sir, yeah.
17 Q. Let's go to the next exhibit, the map, 439.
18 And there are three locations depicted in orange, one
19 Donji Vecerska, but the other two, what are those other
20 two locations?
21 A. If you go southwest, you come to the ring,
22 the orange ring, that's Sesilja, that's a village that
23 I visited early on that had an ethnic mix that was in
24 the possession of the HVO but fell about this time to
25 the BiH, and that's what Kraljevic had told me that he
1had been sent to re-establish or to repossess on behalf
2 of the HVO.
3 Q. And how about feature 1105?
4 A. Feature 1105 was a key strategic point as far
5 as both the HVO and the BiH were concerned because it
6 overlooked the area, Muslim area, of Kruscica and
7 was -- the troops in charge of that particular point
8 were allowed to see vantage and viewpoint over the
9 Lasva Valley in order to coordinate fire, so it was
10 important to both of them. It was initially the
11 territory of the HVO but fell again at about the same
12 time to the BiH who were subsequently able to organise
13 movements through the -- from the south into Kruscica
14 and supplement their own position.
15 Q. Was the taking position of feature 1105
16 important to the military strategy of the HVO in the
17 Lasva Valley?
18 A. Yes, it was.
19 MR. KEHOE: If I can, Mr. President, move to
20 the next video, which is Exhibit 440. Again, this is a
21 BBC video commentary by Martin Bell, you will see the
22 date in the video itself I believe is the 14th October,
23 1993, and if we could dim the lights and move to that
24 next video?
25 (Videotape played)
1MR. KEHOE: If we can wind that back,
2 please? Stop there. Back up.
3 (Videotape played)
4 MR. KEHOE: Stop.
5 Q. That's the man you know as Darko Kraljevic;
6 is that right?
7 A. Kraljevic is on the right and the chap to his
8 left was his deputy.
9 Q. And the feature that they were exploding was
10 feature 1105; is that correct?
11 A. Correct.
12 MR. KEHOE: Continue on with the tape.
13 (Videotape played)
14 MR. KEHOE: Stop there.
15 Q. The person speaking on behalf of this action
16 was Blaskic's liaison officer, is it not?
17 A. That's correct, sir, it's Darko Gelic.
18 Q. Now, based on your activity as a liaison
19 officer in Central Bosnia, in conjunction with the
20 evidence that you've discussed here today, did you see
21 or did you conclude that what Blaskic wrote in this
22 order, Exhibit 422, was, in fact, correct, that the
23 Vitezovi was an independent unit under his command?
24 A. I did, sir, yeah. The fact that Gelic was
25 making the statements he was making on behalf of the
1HVO and Kraljevic clearly had been instructed to carry
2 out that action on behalf of HVO and Colonel Blaskic.
3 Q. Let me show you a Defence Exhibit, Defence
4 137, if I may, which is a portion of a milinfosum
5 introduced by counsel of the 8th of August, 1993.
6 MR. KEHOE: I'm having a bit of a tough time
7 with the monitor here, Judge.
8 JUDGE JORDA: It's not just you. We're also
9 having difficulty. All right. Is that okay now?
10 MR. KEHOE: I figured out the combination.
11 My colleague, Mr. Harmon, said press the top button
12 first so ... the top button and the second button, and
13 it seems to work.
14 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: It does.
15 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, you're a real star
16 because the only thing I see on the screen is you. I
17 don't see any document here.
18 MR. KEHOE: How depressing.
19 JUDGE JORDA: No. For the time being -- oh,
20 I see -- is you. Okay. Now I have the transcript. I
21 don't have the video. There you go.
22 Thank you, Judge Shahabuddeen. Very well.
23 We can go forward.
24 MR. KEHOE:
25 Q. Can you see the document D137?
1A. Yes, sir.
2 Q. That is a conversation by a Borislav Jozic
3 related to you; is that right?
4 A. It was indeed, sir.
5 Q. Who was Borislav Jozic?
6 A. He was one of the officers of Mario Cerkez
7 who was responsible for supervising and organising the
8 exchange of bodies with his opposite number in the
9 BiH. I liaised between the two. Wasn't a key military
10 figure and was pretty poorly informed in that respect,
11 but he was a local -- I think he was an ex-policeman or
12 something like that who was quite a nice chap but had
13 the onerous task of doing the body exchanges.
14 Q. Now, Captain, in the second-to-last line of
15 this Jozic note, it tells you that he, Jozic, further
16 claimed that they, the Vitezovi, were not effectively
17 under Blaskic's control. Do you see that?
18 A. Yes, sir, yes.
19 Q. Did he tell you that?
20 A. That was his impression, yes, sir.
21 Q. Do you agree with that impression?
22 A. No, I don't, sir. I think that was
23 effectively supposition on his part. He was not
24 really, as I mentioned earlier, conversant with the
25 structures that were operating in the Hotel Vitez and
1didn't really have a lot to do with military matters
2 and the HVO, was simply an HVO representative for
3 organising the body exchanges.
4 Q. Did Gelic or Blaskic or anybody in the Hotel
5 Vitez indicate to you at any time that the Vitezovi was
6 not under the command of the Defendant Blaskic?
7 A. Not at any time, sir, no.
8 Q. In fact, sir, did you see any linkage between
9 the local HVO brigades, under Mario Cerkez, and the
11 A. Mario Cerkez was actually a close friend and
12 comrade of Darko Kraljevic, they spoke very fondly and
13 often about each other, and on one particular occasion,
14 I met them together up at the Donji Vecerska
15 headquarters because obviously it was Mario Cerkez's
16 brigade area that Kraljevic was trying to regain ground
18 Q. During any of your negotiations or any
19 conversations with Cerkez concerning the release of any
20 hostages, did Cerkez try to factor in any release of
21 HVO soldiers?
22 A. Yes, he did so, on one particular occasion,
23 some members of the Croat population in Vitez came to
24 me and explained that their three sons had been taken
25 hostage and captured by the Armija in Kruscica. I
1visited Kruscica, spoke to their local Armija commander
2 in Kruscica, and he allowed me to see the three young
3 lads who were about 13, 14, and 15, and they were being
4 housed quite comfortably in the local civilian police
5 quarters in Kruscica area.
6 I arranged with the local -- I tried to
7 arrange with the local commander for the release of the
8 three boys but was ineffective initially. Shortly
9 afterwards, Mario Cerkez stopped an ICRC vehicle who
10 were removing people from Stari Vitez on medical
11 grounds, they were evacuating two casualties from Stari
12 Vitez. Mario Cerkez's troops stopped the ICRC vehicle
13 and removed the two casualties and held them captive as
14 prisoners and then offered them in exchange for the
15 three children who were being held in Kruscica.
16 I then re-set up an exchange of -- exchange
17 the three boys for the two casualties that Mario Cerkez
18 was now holding in the cellar of the cinema. On that
19 particular day, I went to collect three boys and left a
20 representative of mine with Mario Cerkez's headquarters
21 and the two casualties. I retrieved the three boys in
22 an armoured vehicle and was sat in no man's land
23 between the HVO and BiH frontlines waiting for
24 confirmation from my sergeant that the boy -- the two
25 casualties had been released to him, and it was at this
1time that Mario Cerkez said that the exchange was not
2 going to go ahead until, in addition to the three boys,
3 three members of the Vitezovi that were allegedly in
4 the possession of the BiH were also added to the
5 exchange, i.e., so the two casualties taken from the
6 ICRC would be released when we -- the three boys and
7 the three members of the Vitezovi who were allegedly
8 held by the BiH were released into my possession to be
9 brought back to Mario Cerkez and the HVO.
10 Q. Mario Cerkez was the HVO brigade commander in
12 A. That's right, sir.
13 Q. And he wanted to get three Vitezovi soldiers
14 back as part of this exchange?
15 A. He did indeed, sir.
16 Q. Was there some connection there between the
17 Vitezovi and the Viteska brigade?
18 A. There was a very strong connection as far as
19 I was concerned. Not only were they the Vitezovi
20 working on behalf of the HVO to support and help them
21 attain their military goals in regaining the ground
22 lost, but there was a close liaison and friendship
23 between Mario Cerkez and Darko Kraljevic.
24 MR. KEHOE: We can move ahead, and we'd like
25 to go back to some of these photos and before we talk
1about Stari Vitez very briefly let me just chat for one
2 moment about the first two photographs, these two,
3 which will be -- which are these? 433/13 and 433/14
4 again, Captain, these are a series of photographs which
5 you took, many of which are now in evidence, where
6 General Prelak with Blaskic came to Novi Bila hospital,
7 is that right?
8 A. General Petkovic.
9 Q. Petkovic, I'm sorry.
10 A. Is the bald chap in the middle, to the right
11 of him is Colonel Blaskic, and to the right of him, in
12 the background, is one of the military police personal
13 bodyguards of Colonel Blaskic and to the right but to
14 the foreground is the liaison officer from Kiseljak of
15 the HVO. The people to the left of Colonel Petkovic,
16 General Petkovic, are in the background are two
17 representatives from Kiseljak and the U.N. overseeing
18 the triage and the two people in white coats are the
19 doctors from the Novi Bila hospital.
20 Q. The next photograph is, in fact, you and
21 Petkovic and the liaison officer, Vinko Lucic, from
22 Kiseljak; is that correct?
23 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
24 Q. All right. Thank you, Mr. Usher. Let us
25 turn, if you will, to Stari Vitez very briefly.
1Captain, what was your assessment of the HVO strategy
2 in Stari Vitez?
3 A. Stari Vitez seemed a very convenient
4 bargaining chip, really, for the HVO, it was a very
5 small pocket of Muslims, there was no real Armija
6 soldiers in there, they were all local militia, there
7 was a large number of women and children, families who
8 were originally living in the Stari Vitez area, and
9 really, I saw that as a bargaining chip/lever used by
10 the HVO on numerous occasions to release pressure
11 brought to bear by them by the BiH from the Zenica
13 Q. In what sense? Explain that.
14 A. If there were any military action conducted
15 against the Lasva Valley area or any shelling or any
16 military activity, then they had on their doorstep a
17 small Muslim enclave in the form of Stari Vitez which
18 they could apply pressure to. The commander Sefkija,
19 in the centre of Stari Vitez, had direct communications
20 to the troops and people in the Muslim community in
21 Zenica, and so, very quickly, he could communicate to
22 them that a lot of pressure was being brought to bear
23 on Stari Vitez. So, for example, if there were any
24 military action by the BiH onto the Lasva pocket, then
25 it was very easy for the HVO to then -- to shell or to
1apply military pressure to Stari Vitez. Stari Vitez
2 would then communicate to Zenica to say, "Stop whatever
3 it is you're doing because we're taking casualties at
4 this particular end." And that seemed an effective
5 tool as far as we were concerned.
6 Q. What type of pressure did the HVO put on
7 Stari Vitez?
8 A. They employed what were affectionately known
9 as "babies," there was regular small-arm sniping on a
10 daily basis, but periodically they would up the level
11 of activity and aggression towards Stari Vitez by
12 launching mortars and these improvised mortar bombs
13 called "babies" or fire extinguisher bombs into the
14 Stari Vitez enclave, obviously causing a considerable
15 amount of damage and numerous casualties.
16 Q. Explain to us something about these "babies."
17 Are they indiscriminate and why are they
19 A. A "baby" is a fire extinguisher packed full
20 of home-made explosive or explosive that is obviously
21 produced in the ammunition factory. It doesn't really
22 have a cushion cap, it just has a fuse, and there is an
23 improvised tube welded together in which its led and
24 then a firing charge is put underneath it which
25 launches the fire extinguisher through the air,
1throwing it maybe 400 or 500 metres up in the air and
2 forward a couple of hundred metres. That then lands,
3 the fuse burns down, and the fire extinguisher full of
4 home-made explosive explodes to great effect with a
5 rather large bang. It's a very poorly aimed weapon
6 with a very limited range and you can't guarantee it
7 going off when it lands and neither can you guarantee
8 the direction in which it's going to -- or the area in
9 which it's going to fall, so they're just lobbed in the
10 general direction of where you want to create the most
12 Q. So it can hit either civilians or a military
14 A. Absolutely.
15 Q. Let me show you Exhibit 82/7, and I believe
16 this is another photograph taken by you. I may be
17 mistaken --
18 THE REGISTRAR: This is 82/5.
19 MR. KEHOE: Five. I apologise.
20 Q. Is that a photograph of one of the "babies,"
22 A. It is indeed, sir, yes.
23 Q. Did you take that photograph?
24 A. I did indeed. That was taken in Stari
25 Vitez. It's actually got the date on it that it landed
1within the confines of the Stari Vitez enclave.
2 Q. And that would be what date?
3 A. It's the 9th of September -- 9th of July,
5 Q. Now, did there come a time when you were
6 blocked from going into Stari Vitez?
7 A. Quite early on in the tour. The west -- the
8 road coming from the West I. from BRITBAT into Stari
9 Vitez was completely blocked off by a large lorry
10 allegedly stuffed full of local home-made explosive, it
11 actually had the words "Dynamite" painted on the side,
12 but in addition to that, there was rocks and earth
13 piled up and several anti-personnel and anti-armour
14 mines placed around the vehicle itself, so it was a
15 complete obstacle as far as we were concerned.
16 MR. KEHOE: Let's turn to this photograph
17 which is part of the 433 series. That's 433 -- I'm
18 sorry, Mr. Usher, what's the number on the back of
20 THE USHER: The number is 15.
21 MR. KEHOE:
22 Q. 433/15. Is that a photograph that you took,
24 A. It is indeed, sir, yes.
25 Q. Can you point to the explosive device that
1you were just discussing in your testimony?
2 A. Yeah. This is the road coming from -- so
3 BRITBAT is approximately about a mile off the bottom of
4 the picture, it approached Stari Vitez which is
5 literally on the other side of this vehicle here that's
6 got "TNT" written on it. There are several mines
7 placed underneath the vehicle and around the vehicle
8 and a large pile of earth and rocks, and allegedly
9 there was TNT stuffed in the vehicle as well as the
10 mines placed in the water around the front of the
11 obstacle itself.
12 Q. Now, that is on the backside of Stari Vitez
13 going towards BRITBAT.
14 A. That's correct, sir.
15 Q. On the front side, moving toward Vitez, did
16 that receive the brunt of the attack on the "babies"?
17 A. It did indeed so, yeah. It was the eastern
18 side, where the majority of the "babies" were launched,
19 were either Vitez town centre side of Stari Vitez.
20 Q. Could we turn to the next photograph? This
21 is 433/16. Again, a photograph taken by you?
22 A. It is indeed, sir, yeah.
23 Q. Housing in the back; is that an example of
24 the blast damage from "babies"?
25 A. It is, sir, yeah.
1Q. And just for -- to put this in perspective,
2 let's move to the next photograph, which is 433/17. Is
3 that the trenching area on the Muslim side of Stari
5 A. Yeah, it is, sir. The wall, the perimeter
6 wall there, you can see is about 200 or 300 metres. On
7 the other side of that is Vitez town centre. In fact,
8 you can actually make out, on the right-hand side, the
9 blocks of flats in the centre of Vitez there. That's
10 at the top end of the town.
11 Q. How far is this, as the crow flies, if you
12 will, from the Hotel Vitez?
13 A. Five hundred, 600 metres.
14 Q. Would someone sitting in the Hotel Vitez be
15 aware of the indiscriminate shelling with "babies"
16 being done on Stari Vitez?
17 A. Absolutely so, yes.
18 Q. Now, there was a time -- thank you, sir.
19 There was a time when aid was cut off, was it not?
20 A. There was indeed, yes.
21 Q. Why was that?
22 A. The HVO alleged that I had been supplying
23 weapons, munitions, to the BiH and also moving troops
24 in and out of the area.
25 Q. Was that true?
1A. No, sir.
2 Q. Was there ever an occasion that ammunition
3 was smuggled in without your knowledge?
4 A. There was one occasion where an attempt was
5 made to use me to smuggle a small amount of ammunition
6 in, that's correct.
7 Q. And what was that about?
8 A. I had been asked to take some medical
9 supplies into Stari Vitez and picked up several small
10 boxes of medical supplies from the UNHCR building in
11 Zenica, which was a Muslim enclave, took them into
12 Stari Vitez, handed them over to Commander Sefkija. He
13 immediately handed them over to one of his subordinates
14 who took them away to another room. I sat and drank
15 coffee and exchanged pleasantries of the day, assessing
16 the situation with Commander Sefkija, and then shortly
17 after decided -- made an excuse to leave and took a
18 walk around the houses and buildings adjacent to
19 Commander Sefkija's headquarters.
20 I walked into a room and found them unpacking
21 the boxes that were allegedly full of bandages, and
22 inside each of the bandages was a box of 20 rounds of
23 ammunition. So there was maybe 600 or 1.000 rounds in
24 total that if each box had contained, you know, 400 or
25 500 rounds, so they had managed to wrap a carton of 20
1rounds in a bandage, basically, and then stick a box
2 full of bandages in the back of my vehicle.
3 When I found that out, I got very annoyed
4 with Commander Sefkija, left after expressing my
5 disappointment that, as far as I was concerned, he must
6 have been aware that this was going to happen or it had
7 been happening and that he had betrayed my trust, and I
8 stopped all subsequent deliveries of medical supplies
9 into Stari Vitez and those were only conducted by the
10 ICRC on an official basis from that point onwards.
11 Q. During this period of time, during your tour,
12 did you have conversations with Darko Gelic as to what
13 the overall strategy was of the HVO if the army of
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina attempted to take over the Lasva
16 A. They said it wasn't going to happen, that it
17 would be met with determined resistance, and if all
18 else failed, they would end up blowing up the
19 ammunition factory and everything in the vicinity.
20 Q. Did Blaskic make such allegations as well?
21 A. If I remember correctly, he did so, yes. He
22 actually informed Colonel Alastair of that at a meeting
23 that I had arranged.
24 Q. What would have been the net result to the
25 Lasva Valley of such an explosion?
1A. There would have been a large number of
2 casualties, both civilian and military, in the area.
3 Q. Did Gelic ever comment to you about what they
4 would do to Zenica if such an invasion by the army of
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina took place?
6 A. He did indeed. On one of the regular
7 replies, as I think I mentioned earlier, to any
8 determined BiH military offensive onto the Lasva Valley
9 was for them to employ one of their large howitzers,
10 effectively known as "Nora," they would lob
11 155-millimetre shells into the centre of Zenica, and on
12 several occasions, civilians were killed due to the
13 blast from these shells.
14 Q. What did you conclude was the reason for such
15 a strategy?
16 A. It was a tit-for-tat exchange saying quite
17 clearly to the BiH, "Don't try anything because we're
18 quite prepared to do whatever it takes to put you off."
19 Q. And "put you off," what do you mean "put you
21 A. "To deter you launching any offensive onto
22 the Lasva Valley area."
23 Q. We're going to change subjects again,
24 Captain, and move to the 5th of July, 1993, and the
25 killing of Dobrila Kolaba and your participation in
1that investigation. Can you talk to the Judges briefly
2 about that, your participation in the investigation,
3 and what the HVO conclusion was?
4 A. Do you want me to recount the incident
6 Q. Please, briefly.
7 A. I can't quite remember the dates. On one
8 particular evening, a small arms exchange had broken
9 out around the BRITBAT location. Several of the
10 officers were accommodated in buildings outside the
11 actual fence of the BRITBAT location, and living in
12 amongst us in those houses were some of the
13 interpreters who were local to the area, one of which
14 was the Colonel's personal interpreter, a young lady
15 named Dobrila who was actually a Serb.
16 On one side of the BRITBAT location, there
17 were HVO Croats' trenches and frontlines, and on the
18 other were the BiH, and so there were regular small
19 arms exchange in and around the camp area.
20 On this particular occasion, after two or
21 three hours, there was an increase in the level of
22 small arms fire, and the Captains' House, as it was
23 known, where two of the interpreters resided downstairs
24 and myself and two of the captains lived on the
25 upstairs floor, was raked with small arms fire.
1Dobrila was shot through the head during that
3 I was made responsible by the Colonel for
4 investigating the incident with a view to finding out
5 who had been responsible and punishing those
6 responsible, bearing in mind it was a U.N.
7 representative, an interpreter, who had been injured.
8 I went to the Hotel Vitez, and Colonel
9 Blaskic expressed his sympathies about what had
10 happened and said that he would provide an
11 investigative team to assist in finding out who was
12 responsible for Dobrila's death.
13 The investigation lasted two to three days,
14 which I oversaw, I escorted the HVO representatives
15 around the firing point and the impact point where
16 Dobrila had been murdered, and after three days, they
17 reached a conclusion. The conclusion they offered was
18 that a BiH soldier must have crossed over the road into
19 Croat lines, assumed one of the sniper positions in the
20 houses opposite the officers' mess, fired the rounds,
21 and then returned over the road back into the Armija
23 Q. What did you think about that?
24 A. I think it was rubbish.
25 Q. You didn't believe it?
1A. Absolutely not.
2 Q. Was any HVO soldier ever punished for this?
3 A. Absolutely not.
4 Q. Let's move to the next instance a little more
5 than a month later, the 14th of August, 1993, the
6 killing of a UNHCR driver by the name of Boris in Stari
7 Vitez. Are you aware of that?
8 A. I am indeed, sir, yes.
9 Q. Tell us about it.
10 A. The UNHCR at this particular point had
11 relatively free and safe passage in the area but would
12 nevertheless come into BRITBAT, register with myself as
13 the area liaison officer, and tell me what they were up
14 to and leave instructions with the headquarters.
15 On this particular occasion, they came in. I
16 wasn't there. They left, headed back down the road to
17 Vitez because -- went and drove through the town centre
18 of Vitez, entered Stari Vitez through the chicane, and
19 on entering Stari Vitez, were sniped at with a large .5
20 inch calibre weapon which resulted in the death of
22 Q. Let me turn your attention to -- by the way,
23 a .5 inch round is also known as a 12.7 --
24 A. 12.7 millimetre.
25 Q. -- millimetre round. It's a pretty
1significantly sized round, is it not?
2 A. A very significantly sized round, yes, sir.
3 Q. Just to put this in perspective, if we could
4 then move to this particular map.
5 Before we move to this map, after the killing
6 of Boris, did you go back and analyse the ground to
7 check the firing point and to see, based on the point
8 of impact, where the firing point was?
9 A. I did indeed, sir, conduct a very thorough
10 investigation over the next two days and then I had to
11 present myself to several senior U.N. representatives
12 who flew up from Zagreb who wanted me to present all
13 the information and evidence to them.
14 Q. Let's turn our attention to this map --
15 THE REGISTRAR: This is 441.
16 MR. KEHOE:
17 Q. Using the pointer with Exhibit 441, could you
18 help us, first, to show the path that Boris took when
19 he was driving up to the BRITBAT camp and the path he
20 took returning to go back into Stari Vitez?
21 A. Can we open the picture out a little bit
23 MR. KEHOE: Can we just pan it back just a
24 little bit? Maybe just move it down just a little bit,
25 Mr. Usher?
1A. This is the main road coming from Zenica and
2 the BRITBAT location is down this end here, so Dorothy,
3 who was the UNHCR field officer, and Boris would have
4 driven along this road, past -- along the road to
5 BRITBAT, left a message that they were going to Stari
6 Vitez; then they would have gone back along this road,
7 because there was no access into Stari Vitez because of
8 the blockade that we saw earlier down here, they would
9 have gone back down past this point, turned right,
10 entering the town of Vitez, passing through the chicane
11 about here, and entering the area of Stari Vitez, and
12 at this point here, the vehicle would have been slowing
13 down to turn and meet with Commander Sefkija whose
14 headquarters are about here.
15 Q. Now, on the left-hand side of this
16 photograph, there's a somewhat broken line in orange.
17 What does that depict, sir?
18 A. There was somewhere along this particular
19 stretch, and my memory escapes me which side of this
20 garage thing it was, what we call a sanger, which is a
21 trench with overhead cover, a well-established firing
23 Q. Controlled by what unit?
24 A. By the HVO.
25 Q. All right.
1A. And I examined closely the impact point and
2 the vehicle. The round went through the right-hand
3 side of the vehicle, i.e. it was moving in this
4 direction, so it could only have come from this
5 particular side of the road, and this was an account
6 given to me by the woman who survived the incident, who
7 was the UNHCR field officer. And this area here, this
8 junction (indicated) --
9 Q. You're pointing to the arrow, where the arrow
11 A. Where the arrow is -- whilst there are houses
12 there, there are several large gaps between the houses
13 that allow a clear field of view across to this sanger,
14 and, in fact, all these houses and trees here are
15 riddled with small arms marks because this was a
16 regular site where the occupants of Stari Vitez were
17 sniped at by the HVO forces from this established
18 trench position on this side.
19 Q. Is there any question in your mind that there
20 was no mistake, that this was a UNHCR vehicle?
21 A. The vehicle is white, it would have transited
22 this point on three occasions immediately prior to
23 going -- on two occasions immediately prior to going
24 into here, and at several points along its journey,
25 it's quite easy to see the vehicle's progress as it
1progresses along this road. This is open field area.
2 Q. How far is it from the firing point into
3 Stari Vitez?
4 A. About 700 metres.
5 Q. Let's turn your attention to the next
6 photograph in the 433 series. Mr. Usher ...
7 THE USHER: Number 18.
8 MR. KEHOE:
9 Q. 433/18. What is that, sir?
10 A. That's the round that was embedded in the
11 front windscreen. It's actually finished its journey
12 there. It entered through the right-hand side of the
13 vehicle, it was deflected by the kevlar plating, went
14 through the back of Boris, out through his heart, and
15 then wedged itself, embedded itself in the front
17 Q. This round is not coming in, it's actually
18 after going through his body, lodging itself with the
19 blunt end in the windscreen?
20 A. What it hit the kevlar, it started spinning,
21 which is what ripped the front of his chest out, and
22 therefore it stuck, in an obtuse angle, into the
24 Q. Subsequent to this, did you have
25 conversations with anyone in the HVO about this event?
1A. I attempted to investigate it in the same way
2 that I had with Dobrila, got the military police
3 involved from BRITBAT, and they were offering to assign
4 a team from Hotel Vitez, from the HVO as well. There
5 was instant denial of it being any HVO soldier --
6 Q. Who instantly denied that?
7 A. Darko Gelic. And when I showed him the
8 round, he said, "Well, we don't have any weapon of that
9 calibre, we don't possess anything of that particular
10 type, but I do know that they produced those calibre of
11 weapons in the Zenica steel factory."
12 The investigation quickly ground to a halt
13 because Commander Sefkija, the BiH commander in Stari
14 Vitez, would not let any member of the HVO into the
15 area to investigate the impact point, i.e. where Boris
16 had actually been shot.
17 Q. Let me turn your attention to a couple of
18 exhibits in the 82 -- Exhibit 82, Mr. Dubuisson?
19 THE REGISTRAR: This is 82/9 and 82/10.
20 MR. KEHOE: If we could also use this
21 photograph as well, which is part of the 433 series,
22 which is 433 -- which one, Mr. Usher?
23 THE USHER: Nineteen.
24 MR. KEHOE:
25 Q. Now, Gelic told you that they didn't have any
1such weapon to fire a 12.7 millimetre round or a .5
2 inch round; is that right?
3 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
4 Q. And that such rounds were made in Zenica?
5 A. That's right, sir, yes.
6 Q. Thereafter, did you find such a weapon?
7 A. I did indeed, sir, yeah. There was one in
8 possession of Darko Kraljevic.
9 Q. Or the HVO?
10 A. Indeed, sir.
11 Q. Did you take photographs of have weapon?
12 A. I did, sir.
13 Q. Let's go to the first photograph --
14 THE INTERPRETER: Will you please slow down a
15 little bit because of the interpreters?
16 MR. KEHOE: I'm sorry.
17 Q. 82/9. Using the pointer, point to the weapon
18 that would shoot a 12.7 millimetre round.
19 A. (Indicated)
20 Q. That is the weapon that the individual has in
21 his left hand? I think there is yet another angle of
22 it in 82/10, and lastly, a single photograph of it on
24 Now, how rare is that weapon, Captain?
25 A. They're an American specialist sniper rifle.
1They're very rare, used by the IRA, but they're pretty
3 Q. Did you ever see another one in Bosnia when
4 you were there, much less in the Lasva Valley?
5 A. Nope.
6 Q. What did you conclude when you saw this
7 weapon in the possession of the Vitezovi?
8 A. They were a specialist branch of the HVO
9 forces. They were equipped with everything that they
11 Q. What did you conclude about this weapon in
12 relation to the killing of Boris?
13 A. That that was the only weapon I saw during my
14 time in Bosnia that was capable of taking one single
15 shot from 700 metres and doing that sort of damage.
16 Q. Did you report back to your headquarters that
17 you had, in fact, found the weapon that killed Boris?
18 A. As far as I was concerned, yes, I reported
19 back that that was the weapon, the only weapon that
20 could have been responsible for it.
21 Q. Now, let me change subjects, and thank you
22 again. We will move back to the balance of the
23 photographs in one moment.
24 Before we move into the attack on Grbavica,
25 I'd like to talk to you just briefly about the use of
1the media by the HVO. Did there come a time in August
2 of 1993 where Radio Vitez threatened white vehicles or
3 U.N. vehicles in the Lasva Valley?
4 A. There was a time, yes, sir.
5 Q. During that period of time, were you also
6 personally threatened over the radio or Radio Vitez in
7 the Lasva Valley?
8 A. There were incidents where I was made
9 particularly unwelcome by members of the HVO at
10 frontline locations as I tried to transit from one area
11 to another, and when asked why, they told me that I was
12 no longer a friend of Croatian people in the Lasva
13 Valley and that they had been instructed that they were
14 not to cooperate with me in any way whatsoever.
15 Q. Were you informed by Darko Gelic that such a
16 threat had been placed over Radio Vitez?
17 A. I was indeed, yes.
18 Q. Do you have any instances to conclude that
19 any member of the HVO military staff had some control
20 over what was broadcast on Radio Vitez?
21 A. I had the pleasure of visiting Mario Cerkez
22 on one day, and he was boasting about some new song, a
23 propaganda song, that had been written locally in an
24 attempt to raise morale of the HVO and the Croatian
25 people, and he had a radio on his desk, and he said to
1me, you know, "Listen to this. You can hear how good
2 it is." And he promptly banged on the wall, and within
3 minutes, this song appeared on the radio playing on his
4 desk, and understandably, I was quite amazed by this,
5 and he disclosed to me that next door to his office
6 they had a radio station broadcasting news and whatever
7 they thought was necessary to the local people in the
9 Q. Let's turn our attention to another subject
10 at this point, Captain, and that is the attack on
11 Grbavica on the 7th and 8th of September of 1993.
12 Now, prior to this attack, had both Blaskic
13 and Cerkez noted to you that they were going to have to
14 do something about the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina
15 positions in Stari Bila -- or in Grbavica?
16 A. Yeah. The Armija had the high-point
17 positions in Grbavica overlooking BRITBAT and the Croat
18 positions on the other side of the road. There were
19 regular small arms exchanges, and therefore, regular
20 casualties, usually on the part of the Croatian
21 populace and military forces, around the BRITBAT
22 location. There were repeated threats by Commander
23 Blaskic that he was going to have to deal with this
24 problem and likewise from Commander Cerkez because they
25 were taking far too many casualties.
1This threat wasn't actually carried out for
2 some considerable period of time because we regularly
3 reminded Colonel Blaskic that we had -- the colonel had
4 set up an agreement wherein there would be no military
5 action within 500 metres of the BRITBAT location, and
6 that agreement lasted until about the 7th, 8th of
7 September when the HVO launched a full military assault
8 onto the Grbavica position.
9 Q. Now, militarily speaking, the attack to
10 remove Bosnian army forces from that ridge was a
11 legitimate military objective; is that right?
12 A. Absolutely. And very well-executed.
13 Q. Explain the execution to the Judges, if you
15 A. From a tactical point of view, it was
16 well-thought and planned out, and troops, they --
17 what's the word I'm looking for? -- they pummelled and
18 suppressed the position for about 24 hours with small
19 arms, anti-aircraft weapons, mortars, in an attempt to
20 soften up the BiH troops in the Grbavica area, and then
21 that following morning, at dawn, they then launched a
22 carefully planned military assault after taking out the
23 high-point feature.
24 MR. KEHOE: Let's turn to one of our last
25 exhibits, and that will be this exhibit, Mr. Dubuisson.
1THE REGISTRAR: This is 442, 442A for the
3 MR. KEHOE:
4 Q. Using this photograph by the numbers,
5 Captain, can you just tell the Judges exactly how this
6 assault took place following sequentially on the
8 A. Point 1 is a high feature and along which
9 were located several large weapon systems like machine
10 guns, anti-aircraft weapons, and they were involved for
11 the first 24 hours in firing into and suppressing the
12 BiH positions, particularly at this point here, Point
13 3, which was the high point which overlooked all the
14 HVO positions all along here on this side of the road.
15 This is the BRITBAT location here (indicated), and so
16 on -- this is the main road feature. It runs up here.
17 And on this side effectively is the BiH, and on this
18 side is the HVO.
19 After the first 24 hours, during that 24
20 hours, there was a lot of fire laid down onto these
21 positions where the Muslim -- there were lots of Muslim
22 people and there were also soldiers of the Armija.
23 The following morning, what then happened was
24 an infantry assault from this point here (indicated),
25 they used the low ground here to move soldiers up the
1banking, and from this point, they then launched a
2 systematic clearance through these houses, and that's
3 indicated by the large arrow there, clearing through
4 all the houses in this way. There were also troops
5 that came from this area.
6 So 2 is the movement, the infantry movement
7 of troops in, and 3 is then the clearance, systematic
8 clearance, of enemy soldiers and Muslims from that --
9 from the Grbavica community there.
10 Q. How about 4, over to the left?
11 JUDGE RIAD: Just a second. Excuse me. What
12 do you mean by "clearing the houses"?
13 A. It's a term we use, i.e. checking each
14 individual house, it's got no soldiers in it, no people
15 in it, so making sure there is nobody in there.
16 JUDGE RIAD: Making sure there is nobody in
18 A. Yes.
19 JUDGE RIAD: Or no weapons in it?
20 A. Nobody alive left in them.
21 JUDGE RIAD: And if there was somebody alive?
22 A. If there were soldiers, then they would be
23 dealt with accordingly. However, if they surrendered,
24 you would take them as prisoners --
25 JUDGE RIAD: And civilians?
1A. That's entirely up to the troops doing the
3 JUDGE RIAD: What happened?
4 A. And here I don't think we found any civilian
5 casualties. We did find two or three bodies, one of
6 which had been beheaded in there, but they did have the
7 items of uniform on them, so we assumed that they were
8 soldiers of the Armija.
9 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you.
10 MR. KEHOE:
11 Q. The point designated number 4?
12 A. Four represents the arrow and that was the
13 route taken, the general exodus of the Muslim community
14 during the night of the 7th, still in dark in the
15 morning of the 8th before the infantry attack actually
16 took place.
17 Five was the infantry attack that actually
18 took place in the morning, and during that time, we're
19 assuming that all the civilians had actually left, and
20 there were only a few Armija soldiers still left
21 defending the position. The area had taken a
22 considerable beating with various weapon systems
23 throughout the previous 24 hours.
24 Q. Captain, after -- just taking up from Judge
25 Riad's question -- after the village itself was cleared
1of people, what did the HVO soldiers then do in the
3 A. After they had actually been through and
4 cleared it, there was a systematic burning of all the
5 buildings that we saw in there. I actually was sent by
6 Colonel Alastair to go into Vitez and to address
7 Colonel Blaskic and say, "Look, this must stop. It's
8 getting out of hand." I was told that Colonel Blaskic
9 was not available by Darko Gelic who ignored -- who
10 said to me, as far as he was concerned, there was no
11 military action taking place anywhere in the Lasva
12 Valley. And then as I journeyed back up the road from
13 Vitez, I observed numerous soldiers and literally
14 all -- there was some looting going on by the HVO
15 soldiers and all the buildings had been set on fire.
16 Q. Were you sent there by Colonel Duncan or the
18 A. It wasn't Colonel Duncan, it was Richard
19 Watson, the 2-IC who was present at the time.
20 Q. Captain, can you tell the difference between
21 damage from artillery fire and damage to houses that
22 are purposely set on fire?
23 A. Absolutely, yeah. If it has just been burnt,
24 there is obviously no shrapnel damage, no obvious
25 damage from small arms, and very limited blast damage.
1A fire is a fire, really.
2 MR. KEHOE: If we can go to the next video,
3 Mr. President, and I believe the next video is
4 numbered ...
5 THE REGISTRAR: 443.
6 MR. KEHOE: 443. Again, this is another BBC
7 video, Mr. President and Your Honours, from the 8th of
8 September, 1993.
9 (Videotape played)
10 MR. KEHOE: If you can roll it back? Stop
11 right there. A little bit further.
12 (Videotape played)
13 MR. KEHOE: Stop there. Just back up a
14 little bit. That's good.
15 Q. Now, Captain, as a military officer, was it
16 necessary for the HVO to burn those houses
18 A. Absolutely not. There were several examples
19 you can see in this film where the buildings have
20 deliberately been set on fire in their foundations to
21 make sure that there was nothing left for anybody to
22 come back to and that they were uninhabitable.
23 MR. KEHOE: Before we go to those particular
24 houses, I would like to put that frame back on the
25 screen. Can we put that frame back on the screen?
1I'm not sure it's coming on your screen,
2 Mr. President. It's coming on one screen but not the
3 other screen.
4 Counsel, is it on your screen?
5 MR. NOBILO: I have it.
6 JUDGE JORDA: I've got the picture.
7 MR. KEHOE: It just came, Mr. President.
8 Q. Early on in your testimony, you said you
9 observed members of the Jokeri -- can you leave that on
10 the screen, please? -- members of the Jokeri that were
11 involved in the attack on Grbavica.
12 A. I did indeed so, yeah.
13 Q. Do you see anybody in that photograph that
14 fits that description from that day?
15 A. The gentleman to the rear dressed in black is
16 typically wearing the type of uniform that I witnessed
17 that day when I met the Jokeri, and I did see that day
18 several insignia and faces that looked familiar to me
19 as if they actually belonged to that organisation. For
20 the most part, these are soldiers I recognise as being
21 part of the TURTKO before the second which is the one
22 we saw detailed on Colonel Blaskic's orders earlier as
24 Q. If we can move ahead on that tape --
25 MR. HAYMAN: Can we make a still,
1Mr. President, for ease of future reference?
2 MR. KEHOE: Sure. If we could do that, that
3 would fine, make it the next Prosecutor's Exhibit.
4 (Videotape played)
5 MR. KEHOE: Stop right there.
6 Q. Captain, is that burning from artillery fire
7 or intentional burning, in your opinion?
8 A. The building to the fore looks like it has
9 small arms marks on the outside, but that looks like
10 it's been burnt, the one in the background looks like
11 it's just been set on fire.
12 MR. HAYMAN: Could we have another still,
13 Mr. President, to speed my examination so we won't have
14 to take extra time to find these locations?
15 MR. KEHOE: No problem. We'll make that
16 another Prosecutor's Exhibit. We'll move ahead to
17 another series --
18 JUDGE JORDA: You'll have all the time you
19 need, Mr. Hayman. If you think it's taking a long
20 time, that's how it is.
21 Go ahead, Mr. Kehoe.
22 Mr. Hayman, you will have the time that you
24 MR. KEHOE: Continue just a little bit more
25 on the tape?
2 MR. KEHOE: Stop right there.
3 Q. How about that burning?
4 A. That's the woodpile underneath the house
5 that's been deliberately set on fire to make sure it's
6 levelled to the ground or uninhabitable, at least, by
7 anybody who wants to live in it. So that's not been
8 set on fire by artillery or small arms fire or anything
9 like that.
10 MR. KEHOE: We can make a frame of that as
11 well, whatever the next exhibit happens to be.
12 Q. Subsequent to the attack on Grbavica, did you
13 have a conversation with Mario Cerkez about this
14 particular event?
15 A. Yes. I was attempting to find out who had
16 been responsible for it, it was a very well-executed
17 and well-planned attack, so I went to see Mario,
18 flattered him about it, said as such, and he admitted
19 to me that he hadn't been responsible for it but it had
20 been planned by the staff officers in the Hotel Vitez
21 and intimated that it had been by, in fact, a chap I
22 know as Filipovic who was a former JNA officer.
23 MR. KEHOE: Can we turn to -- this is a part
24 of Exhibit 80, this particular photograph. It's part
25 of the 80 series, I'm not sure which one in 80 it is.
1JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, we've got to think
2 about when we're going to stop. How much more do you
3 have to -- how much more time do you need? Do you
4 think you're going to be finished by 6.00?
5 MR. KEHOE: I think so, Mr. President.
6 JUDGE JORDA: Then continue.
7 MR. KEHOE: That's the photograph, yeah.
8 THE REGISTRAR: This is 80/6.
9 MR. KEHOE:
10 Q. The photograph that has been received in
11 evidence, 80/6, is the individual that Cerkez -- or
12 that you came to understand was responsible for the
13 success at Grbavica, is he depicted in that photograph?
14 A. He is indeed. He's the gentleman with the
15 white hair, sat on Colonel Blaskic's right or on the
16 left as we look at it.
17 Q. Can you point to him with the pointer,
19 A. (Indicated)
20 Q. So it's just to Blaskic's right and our -- is
21 that right?
22 A. (Indicated)
23 Q. Okay. The individual in the gray hair to his
25 When you were up there observing what was
1going on and the houses were being systematically
2 burnt, did you notice any looting going on as well?
3 A. Yeah, there was -- I saw numerous instances
4 of soldiers removing items from the houses, I think I
5 actually photographed one of them removing a tape
6 recorder, and there was a lot of looting that took
7 place immediately afterwards by the local population,
8 in fact, who started turning up in large numbers with
9 flatbed trucks, et cetera, to reclaim whatever they
10 could quickly before the place was burnt to the ground.
11 MR. KEHOE: If we could quickly go through
12 the last series of photographs, Mr. Usher, in the 433
13 series, and what's the first number?
14 THE USHER: First number is number 20.
15 MR. KEHOE: Starting with 433/20.
16 Q. Captain, that's a photograph that you took,
17 is it not?
18 A. It is, sir, yes.
19 Q. Is that of Grbavica prior to the events of
20 the 7th and 8th of September?
21 A. It is indeed, sir, yeah, with the mosque in
22 the bottom there.
23 Q. Let's go to 433/21, the next photograph.
24 What is that, sir?
25 A. That's a photograph I took as I left Vitez on
1the way back to BRITBAT, approaching Grbavica. You can
2 make out the mosque which is on the Vitez side as I'm
3 approaching it, and basically all the buildings are on
5 Q. Are the buildings in and about the mosque on
6 fire as well?
7 A. They are indeed, yes.
8 Q. Let's turn to the next one, 433/22.
9 A. I think that's the photograph I took
10 originally as I left Vitez. When I turned around, as I
11 was approaching the road, I was quite astounded by the
12 sight of it as I was returning, so that's the first
13 photograph I took, just showing the extent of what was
14 actually burning.
15 Q. Next photograph, 433/23. Is that just house
16 damage and ...
17 A. Yes, those are the two houses really where
18 the Armija set themselves which are the two houses
19 which overlook BRITBAT and the HVO position, so it was
20 those two houses which all the sniping came from
22 Q. How about the next photograph, 433/24?
23 A. That's a picture I took of some of the
24 soldiers who had been looting in the area. One of
25 them's got a cassette, the other one's carrying what,
1in fact, was a large butcher's axe, chopping axe.
2 Q. The other has a radio in his hand?
3 A. He has indeed, sir, yes.
4 Q. Can you point to that and point to the axe?
5 The one on the left has the radio --
6 A. That's a large chopping axe.
7 JUDGE RIAD: What was it used for?
8 A. I don't know, Your Honour, I'm afraid. I
9 can't honestly say other than one of the bodies that
10 was found in there had been decapitated, but I wouldn't
11 make the assumption that that person and weapon was
12 responsible for that.
13 JUDGE RIAD: But this is a soldier, the one
14 holding it?
15 A. It is, yes.
16 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you.
17 MR. KEHOE:
18 Q. Let's go to the next photograph, 433/25.
19 A. That's a similar photograph, just panning
20 back so you can see at close quarters the number of
21 buildings that are being burnt out and the soldiers in
22 the vicinity immediately after the attack.
23 Q. 433/26? Just houses burning in Grbavica?
24 A. That is, in fact, the house of -- that we saw
25 earlier that my Land Rover was parked outside of that
1belonged to a woman and her daughter that I knew.
2 Q. You mean the same prior to the actual attack?
3 A. That's right, sir, yes.
4 Q. 433/27?
5 A. Same houses. It's another house in Grbavica.
6 Q. 433/28.
7 A. That's actually a picture capturing the HVO
8 using "babies" in their infantry assault the morning of
9 the 8th of September.
10 Q. Can you point to that "baby" in there?
11 A. Yeah. That black mark is actually a fire
12 extinguisher tumbling through there, and you can't make
13 it out very clearly on the screen, but on here there is
14 a white flash -- this photograph actually was in
15 colour, and that was an orange flash. That was the
16 detonation point which launched the "baby" through the
18 Q. The next series of photographs, 29, 30, and
19 31, if you can just look at those? Those are just a
20 series, I believe, of houses burning in Grbavica. If
21 you can just have the witness look at those, that would
22 be fine.
23 That one, the next one, 30, and 31, all
24 houses burning, Captain, on the --
25 A. Yes.
1Q. Next photograph as well?
2 JUDGE RIAD: Which village is that, please?
3 MR. KEHOE: It's all Grbavica, Your Honour.
4 Q. Captain?
5 A. It's the same village, Your Honour. They're
6 all just shots taken surveying the damage after the
7 attack and the extent to which the burning took place.
8 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you.
9 MR. KEHOE:
10 Q. Next photograph? What number is that?
11 THE USHER: It is 33.
12 MR. KEHOE:
13 Q. Thirty-three and 34. I believe those both
14 mark the top of the feature that was taken by the HVO?
15 A. That's right, sir. Can you leave that one?
16 That was the area the troops came up and that's where
17 the "baby" was being launched from and that's where the
18 BiH snipers were originally flying from but now it's
19 flying a Croat HVO flag.
20 Q. Thirty-five is the same point from a
21 different angle?
22 A. That's right.
23 Q. Next one, sir?
24 JUDGE JORDA: Are you concluding now because
25 we're going to stop soon. Please conclude within two
1or three minutes so we can do the cross-examination
2 tomorrow, and now the direct examination in the next
3 three minutes should be completed.
4 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. I'm just
5 trying to get through these photographs and I'll be
6 through right here.
7 Q. The next photograph, sir, is just the troops
8 themselves. The next several photographs are just
9 again the firing point?
10 A. (No audible response)
11 Q. The next two photographs being burnt houses
12 again, is that right, sir, all from Grbavica?
13 A. That's correct.
14 Q. Let's go to the last photograph, last
15 photograph of the individuals, and what is that, sir?
16 A. Those are some triumphant HVO troops
17 immediately after the attack and that was their tea
18 that they were dragging around with them.
19 Q. Where was that taken?
20 A. That was taken literally as the flag was
21 going up on top of the hill. The attack had finished
22 and the buildings were on fire, as you can see, by the
23 haze and the smoke that was making the camera shot very
24 hazy, and those are the troops that had been -- some of
25 the troops that had been involved in the actual attack
2 Q. You noted that all these houses were burnt
3 and you also noted that it wasn't necessarily
4 militarily in securing that area to burn all those
5 houses; is that right?
6 A. Absolutely not, sir. During the night, all
7 the civilians had had a chance to move from the area,
8 and so I assume that those remaining and keeping the
9 fight up for Grbavica were the Armija soldiers left,
10 the handful of Armija soldiers left, so there was very
11 few people actually left in the Grbavica area by the
12 morning of the 8th. So there was no reason, really.
13 They had taken possession of the hill, they had secured
14 it to the high point, and so it was completely
16 Q. What message do you think the HVO was sending
17 to the Bosnian Muslims in burning every house in the
19 A. It was a message that I saw repeatedly
20 throughout the year, one that -- they did not want to
21 encourage the return of the Muslims to the area. They
22 weren't -- they didn't want to -- they weren't happy to
23 coexist as such. They were determined to make the
24 place unlivable for anybody else but themselves.
25 Q. Is that consistent with what Anto Valenta
1told you in one of your first meetings in the Hotel
3 A. It is, sir, yes.
4 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, the last exhibit
5 is just a series are photographs that were taken on the
6 16th of September, 1997, after this individual's tour.
7 It shows the complete continued devastation of
8 Grbavica. They were taken by an investigator of the
9 Office of the Prosecutor.
10 We have no intention of going through these
11 photographs, and we offer them in evidence as to the
12 state of affairs in 1997 to be taken in conjunction
13 with the photographs that were taken at the time.
14 So that would be a series of photographs, and
15 I am not sure what the next photograph number would be,
16 but if I might hand those up to the Defence counsel,
17 Your Honours, and to --
18 JUDGE JORDA: You're asking that things be
19 put back -- I don't really understand what the last
20 sentence was. What are you asking?
21 MR. KEHOE: These photographs, this last
22 series of photographs that we haven't shown that are in
23 this binder, are photographs that were taken in 1997 by
24 an investigator for the Office of the Prosecutor. We
25 offer those in evidence at this point. We could call
1the investigator, but I believe everybody would
2 stipulate that these are, in fact, photographs taken in
3 1997 and were not taken during the tour and they're
4 offered simply as an example of what this village
5 looked like in September of 1997. We don't intend to
6 go through those photographs seriatum, we just offer
7 them to the court by way of information.
8 JUDGE JORDA: All right. We have noted that
9 it is for information purposes.
10 Very well. The direct examination is
11 complete. We will resume tomorrow at 10.00 for the
13 Court stands adjourned.
14 --- Whereupon proceedings adjourned at
15 6.05 p.m., to be reconvened on
16 Tuesday, the 14th day of July, 1998,
17 at 10.00 a.m.