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  1. 1 Tuesday, 8th September 1998

    2 (Open session)

    3 --- Upon commencing at 10.11 a.m.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Registrar, have the accused

    5 brought in, please.

    6 (The accused entered court)

    7 JUDGE JORDA: I would like to say good

    8 morning to the interpreters and to make sure that they

    9 understand what I am saying. They can hear me. Good

    10 morning. Good morning, everybody.

    11 Very well. Let me say good morning to the

    12 Defence and to the Prosecution counsel and to the

    13 accused, and I believe that we can now continue.

    14 Mr. Hayman, the floor is yours. I think you

    15 said you had about an hour; is that correct?

    16 MR. HAYMAN: I expect about another hour, and

    17 then we would commence with our first witness,

    18 Mr. President.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: All right. The time is yours,

    20 of course; you do with it what you like. We will

    21 squeeze a little harder with the witnesses, but for the

    22 opening statement, the time is yours, and you can use

    23 it as you like.

    24 Please proceed, Mr. Hayman.

    25 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, Mr. President. Good

  2. 1 morning, Your Honours, and thank you for your

    2 patience. I know my remarks are lengthy.

    3 Before I begin, let me note that, as I said

    4 yesterday, the relief model is made to scale, but the

    5 height, such as the height of the mountains, has been

    6 magnified by a factor of three, so it is actually 3-1

    7 in terms of height, which was done for readability, but

    8 if the mountains were actually made to scale, in other

    9 words, they would only be one-third the height that

    10 they are depicted on the model. I wanted to stress

    11 that for clarity, Mr. President.

    12 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you for the explanation.

    13 Yes, we did really have impressions here that this was

    14 more like the Alps than it would be Central Bosnia, but

    15 thank you for your specifications. But this also

    16 allows us, the Judges, not to have to come down to look

    17 at the model. Thank you for your explanations. It

    18 will be noted in the transcript.

    19 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you.

    20 When we broke yesterday, we had discussed the

    21 16th and 17th of April, 1993, and those events, and now

    22 I would like to turn to two other events that occurred

    23 during the heavy and chaotic fighting from the 15th to

    24 the 19th of April, 1993, in the Lasva Valley.

    25 On the 18th of April, Vitez was rocked by a

  3. 1 huge explosion that occurred within Stari Vitez. The

    2 Operative Zone headquarters, the Central Bosnia

    3 Operative Zone, had no prior knowledge that an

    4 explosion would occur. The explosion occurred behind

    5 BH army lines and was --

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me, Mr. Hayman. I'm

    7 trying to follow your organisation. You are using a

    8 written document. I'm trying to follow what you are

    9 saying, but you are still talking about the fighting at

    10 this point; is that correct? I noted it down.

    11 MR. HAYMAN: The subject, Mr. President, is

    12 the war in Vitez and the Lasva Valley the latter half

    13 of April, is where I am now, in terms of the

    14 chronology. I have discussed the fighting that began

    15 between the 16th and 20th, actually, in the different

    16 villages around Vitez, culminating with the fight in

    17 Gacice on the 20th, but now I am going back to discuss

    18 two other events that occurred during this time period,

    19 the truck bomb on the 18th of April and then I will

    20 turn to the shelling of Zenica in the marketplace on

    21 the 19th, the following day.

    22 On the 18th, Vitez was rocked by this

    23 explosion. The explosion was caused by a truck bomb

    24 planned and instigated by Darko Kraljevic, commander of

    25 the Vitezovi unit. It was organised without the

  4. 1 knowledge of Tihomir Blaskic. When he heard the

    2 explosion, he was surprised, and he directed the

    3 headquarters staff to find out what had occurred. The

    4 reports he was given will be presented to Your

    5 Honours. There was no conclusive information provided

    6 to him concerning this bomb.

    7 The following day, on the 19th of April,

    8 several artillery shells hit the marketplace in Central

    9 Zenica, killing and wounding a large number of

    10 civilians. Without artillery radar at the time, it is

    11 not possible to identify with precision the origin of

    12 those shells. The evidence will show that from April

    13 until into June 1993, Zenica was regularly shelled by

    14 the Bosnian Serbs from the Vlassic feature and/or from

    15 other locations north of Travnik.

    16 Tihomir Blaskic did not order the shelling of

    17 Zenica on the 19th of April or at any other time. On

    18 the 19th of April, he had no reason to believe that

    19 Zenica would be shelled by the HVO or by anyone else.

    20 After the word of the shelling spread to

    21 BRITBAT, Colonel Stewart visited Tihomir Blaskic and

    22 told him that Zenica had been shelled by 155-millimetre

    23 artillery. The HVO did not have a 155-millimetre

    24 artillery piece in Central Bosnia. Tihomir Blaskic

    25 asked Colonel Stewart to investigate with him and to

  5. 1 visit HVO artillery sites and to go to Zenica so that

    2 the HVO investigators could visit the scene of the

    3 shell impacts. Colonel Stewart declined the request on

    4 the ground that Zenica was too dangerous for HVO

    5 personnel to visit.

    6 As I have discussed, in mid-April, Tihomir

    7 Blaskic issued numerous directives to HVO units not to

    8 target civilians but, rather, to protect them in times

    9 of war activity. Although after mid-April the Serbs

    10 regularly shelled Zenica, there is no allegation in the

    11 indictment that the HVO did so.

    12 Tihomir Blaskic is also charged with

    13 responsibility for the unlawful detention of Bosnian

    14 Muslim civilians and the inhumane treatment of such

    15 persons.

    16 The evidence will show that on the morning of

    17 the 16th of April, he did not order the detention of

    18 any civilians. Rather, when a general conflict on the

    19 territory of the Vitez municipality occurred, large

    20 numbers of civilians were detained by local units.

    21 They appear to have been motivated in part by fears of

    22 attacks from the Muslim population, by fears concerning

    23 the fate of some 20.000 Croats in Zenica at the time,

    24 and their continued detention may have been motivated

    25 by the prospect of private exchanges organised for a

  6. 1 fee.

    2 The fear and panic that caused civilians to

    3 be detained was mirrored in Zenica where, on the same

    4 day, large numbers of Croat civilians were being

    5 detained.

    6 What did Tihomir Blaskic do with respect to

    7 this activity?

    8 He tried repeatedly to prevent the detaining

    9 of civilians and to protect those that had been

    10 detained.

    11 On the 18th of April, he ordered all HVO

    12 units to exchange detained soldiers and civilians at

    13 once.

    14 On the 21st of April, he ordered all units to

    15 protect civilians caught up in combat and to provide

    16 humane treatment to all detained civilians.

    17 Again, after further combat activity in the

    18 summer, on the 17th of June, he ordered, reminded all

    19 HVO units to prevent the arrest of civilians during

    20 combat activities or the taking of hostages.

    21 In the chaotic atmosphere that prevailed in

    22 Central Bosnia, the most effective way to get detained

    23 civilians released was to organise rapid exchanges.

    24 This was principally a civilian matter, and by the

    25 agreement of all concerned, Commissions for Exchange

  7. 1 were set up in Vitez and Zenica, headed by civil

    2 authorities. At the same time, Tihomir Blaskic did

    3 order all HVO personnel to fully cooperate with the

    4 International Red Cross and others to facilitate such

    5 exchanges.

    6 But when his orders to release all detainees

    7 clashed with the preferences of local civil

    8 authorities, the civil authorities did as they pleased,

    9 and the evidence will so demonstrate.

    10 We will also introduce evidence in our case

    11 concerning his efforts to calm rather than to inflame

    12 the situation with respect to the plight of Croats in

    13 Zenica during the April 1993 conflict. For example,

    14 when large numbers of displaced Croats wished to return

    15 to Zenica after the worst of the conflict there had

    16 subsided, he supported their decision and assisted them

    17 in returning to their homes in the Zenica municipality.

    18 The evidence will also show that at the

    19 height of the conflict in mid-April, his concerns about

    20 the safety of Croats in Zenica were genuine and were

    21 fully justified.

    22 From the 16th of April on in Zenica, Bosnian

    23 Croats were victimised in large numbers. They were

    24 murdered, beaten, detained, their houses were looted,

    25 and hundreds of their homes were burned.

  8. 1 Due to this atmosphere, and for other reasons

    2 I will discuss in a few minutes, approximately 9.000

    3 Croats fled the Zenica municipality between April and

    4 the end of 1993. Those who stayed continued,

    5 unfortunately, to be harassed, and many of the men,

    6 Bosnian Croat males, who stayed in Zenica, were

    7 forcibly conscripted and sent to the very first

    8 positions on the frontline with the Bosnian Serbs.

    9 Their treatment is reflected by the fact that

    10 after the Washington Agreement in 1994, another 5.000

    11 Bosnian Croats chose to leave the Zenica municipality.

    12 Now I would like to return to the Kiseljak

    13 municipality where there is one unlawful attack on

    14 civilians charged relating to Rotilj in April of 1993,

    15 that is, during that time period.

    16 The evidence will show there was no order

    17 from the Operative Zone headquarters to attack Rotilj.

    18 What did happen in Rotilj on the 18th of

    19 April?

    20 Local HVO soldiers did go to Rotilj on that

    21 day. They went to the village and told the BH army

    22 commander - there was a BH army or Territorial Defence

    23 unit in Rotilj - and told him that they had been

    24 directed to disarm the TO unit in the village. They

    25 asked for his cooperation. They sat down on the front

  9. 1 porch of a home in the village and had coffee and

    2 discussed the problem. But the BH commander would not

    3 agree. He was not in a position, for whatever reason,

    4 to agree to disarm and, predictably, a conflict

    5 started.

    6 While searching homes in the village for

    7 weapons, one HVO soldier was apparently shot and killed

    8 by refugees, Muslim refugees who were housed in the

    9 village at that time. Repeating a pattern I have

    10 alluded to earlier, some of the soldiers at the scene

    11 took immediate revenge, killing several of the

    12 civilians, Muslim civilians, and burning six or eight

    13 homes, however many it was. This was not activity

    14 directed or condoned by the Operative Zone

    15 headquarters, nor was it reported to it. In fact, it

    16 was contrary to all orders issued by the Operative Zone

    17 headquarters and Tihomir Blaskic.

    18 We will also prove, Your Honours, that Rotilj

    19 was not a prison camp.

    20 After the incident I described, the local HVO

    21 commander made a decision to erect a checkpoint on the

    22 main road to Rotilj and gave instructions that no one

    23 was to pass into Rotilj without his permission. He did

    24 this for the protection of the residents. There were

    25 many roads and paths leading out of Rotilj, some of

  10. 1 which led directly to BH army territory near Fojnica.

    2 The residents were free to leave, but Croat

    3 refugees and some criminals who wanted to take revenge

    4 on the Muslim residents of Rotilj were kept out by this

    5 checkpoint. The same food and aid was delivered to

    6 Rotilj as was provided to Croats in need in the

    7 Kiseljak municipality. In fact, no distinctions based

    8 on national groups were made in the distribution of

    9 aid.

    10 In the summer and fall of 1993, there was

    11 good reason to take steps to protect Muslim residents

    12 in the Kiseljak municipality. That municipality became

    13 increasingly lawless as the security situation

    14 deteriorated. When Travnik fell, that is, when Travnik

    15 was taken over by the BH army in June 1993, large

    16 numbers of displaced HVO soldiers came to Kiseljak from

    17 Travnik through Serb territory.

    18 On the 3rd of July, '93, two days after

    19 General Morillon declared Fojnica an oasis of peace,

    20 the BH army attacked the HVO in the town and drove them

    21 out. Of the 7.000 Croat residents of Fojnica, all but

    22 150 fled, and they fled to Kiseljak. Their homes were

    23 looted and, over time, burned by angry persons, angry

    24 refugees, perhaps angry BH army soldiers in a pattern,

    25 this Court will see, that was repeated in other

  11. 1 locations.

    2 These throngs of displaced persons and

    3 soldiers arriving in Kiseljak were joined by others

    4 later in 1993 when the BH army overran, first, Kakanj

    5 and then Vares. Literally, tens of thousands of

    6 refugees and displaced soldiers arrived in Kiseljak.

    7 Security was so poor in Kiseljak that even in 1994,

    8 after the Washington Agreement, EC monitors visiting

    9 the municipality were afraid to get out of their cars.

    10 There were incidents in Kiseljak during this

    11 period directed against both Muslim residents and

    12 Muslim places of worship. The evidence will show that

    13 Tihomir Blaskic could not, despite diligent efforts,

    14 exercise effective control over HVO in the Kiseljak

    15 enclave.

    16 As I have said, the Vitez-Busovaca enclave

    17 was encircled by the BH army and BH army territory. By

    18 contrast, the Kiseljak enclave bordered on a stretch of

    19 Bosnian Serb controlled territory, and that's reflected

    20 in some of the maps, I believe, that we were looking at

    21 yesterday. For a price, transportation of goods and

    22 people between the Kiseljak enclave and Herzegovina was

    23 possible travelling through Bosnian Serb territory. So

    24 a situation developed in which Tihomir Blaskic in Vitez

    25 was cut off and isolated, but the Kiseljak enclave had

  12. 1 a connection to Herzegovina, to the HVO main command in

    2 Mostar.

    3 The Kiseljak HVO's superior access to the HVO

    4 main command in Mostar dictated the actual command

    5 relationships that evolved in 1993 between those three

    6 entities, the HVO main command, the 3rd Operative Zone

    7 for Central Bosnia, and the HVO units commanded by the

    8 HVO commander in Kiseljak, which included not only the

    9 Ban Jelacic brigade, but also the brigades in Vares and

    10 in Kakanj and a unit in Fojnica. Again, through Serb

    11 territory, the HVO commander in Kiseljak could travel

    12 to Vares and Kakanj and, in fact, did travel to Vares

    13 and had effective control over HVO units in those

    14 locations.

    15 The HVO commander in Kiseljak was Ivica

    16 Rajic. In January 1993, he was replaced by another

    17 officer, and you'll hear about that, but by May of '93,

    18 he was back in power in Kiseljak.

    19 According to Rajic, and I quote -- could we

    20 have the next slide, please. This is a quote from the

    21 HVO commander in Kiseljak. "In the beginning, Blaskic

    22 was my superior, but later he was transferred to Vitez,

    23 while I remained in Kiseljak. Although Blaskic was

    24 formally my superior even then, the conditions on the

    25 ground imposed a situation where he and I were equally

  13. 1 responsible to the main staff of the HVO, he for his

    2 sector and I for mine."

    3 This proposition will be confirmed by other

    4 documentary evidence. In August 1993, General Petkovic

    5 of the main HVO command in Mostar issued a simultaneous

    6 directive to Tihomir Blaskic and Ivica Rajic to

    7 coordinate on certain operative matters. In other

    8 words, the commander up here issued a directive, the

    9 same piece of paper, to both the Operative Zone for

    10 Central Bosnia and to the HVO commander in Kiseljak,

    11 supposedly subordinate to the 3rd Operative Zone, to

    12 coordinate. That would be normal if those subordinate

    13 entities were on the same level, such as if Rajic had

    14 been the commander of the 1st Operative Zone, wherever

    15 that was, in Mostar or some other location, but, of

    16 course, he wasn't. He was the commander of a unit who

    17 was supposed to be subordinate to Tihomir Blaskic.

    18 Similarly, the liaison officer at the HVO

    19 Kiseljak brigade reported directly to the HVO command

    20 in Mostar, not to the Operative Zone headquarters in

    21 Vitez. The liaison officer was the principal person to

    22 whom complaints and concerns about war activities were

    23 raised by international organisations.

    24 The inability of Tihomir Blaskic to control

    25 Ivica Rajic was a source of concern to him. He tried

  14. 1 to control Rajic. He continued to issue orders to

    2 Rajic during 1993, but he was not able to control him,

    3 both due to his physical isolation and due to the

    4 superior contacts between the Kiseljak HVO and the HVO

    5 main command in Mostar.

    6 Approximately half of the specific charges in

    7 the indictment pertain to events in the Kiseljak

    8 enclave after it was cut off from the Operative Zone

    9 headquarters in Vitez in April of 1993.

    10 Now I'd like to return to the Vitez enclave

    11 and briefly discuss the balance of the war in that

    12 enclave after the 20th of April, 1993.

    13 From the 16th of April onwards, the war in

    14 the Vitez-Busovaca enclave was, from the perspective of

    15 the HVO, a war for the survival of the HVO and the

    16 Croat residents of the Lasva Valley. They were

    17 completely encircled and outnumbered by the BH army by

    18 as many as ten to one. There were persistent shortages

    19 of all supplies, as well as basic necessities of life.

    20 Water and power were periodically cut off by the BH

    21 army which controlled both. The only available

    22 hospital was a makeshift facility in the Nova Bila

    23 church. Mortaring and sniping of soldiers and the

    24 civilian population was an everyday occurrence from BH

    25 army positions. Their situation continued to

  15. 1 deteriorate over 1993.

    2 In the January conflict, 65 per cent of the

    3 Busovaca municipality had been lost. That is, the BH

    4 army had taken control over it. In mid April, Kuber

    5 Mountain was lost, as were the HVO brigade and

    6 approximately 20 Croat villages in the Zenica

    7 municipality. In the first half of June, Travnik was

    8 lost. By the 12th of June, half of the Novi Travnik

    9 municipality was lost, again, to the BH army. On the

    10 12th of June, Kakanj fell to the BH army. In July,

    11 Fojnica fell to the BH army. In September, the

    12 dominant feature at Zaberje south of the main supply

    13 route in the Vitez-Busovaca enclave fell. In December,

    14 Krizansevo Selo fell with 75 dead, and in January,

    15 Buhina Kuce fell also.

    16 After April 1993, there is one unlawful

    17 attack on civilians charged in the indictment in the

    18 Vitez or Busovaca municipalities. That is an attack

    19 alleged on Vitez in August of 1993. Perhaps it's a

    20 reference to an attack that did occur in Stari Vitez

    21 the prior month. The Defence doesn't know, after 15

    22 months in trial, what this relates to. There are two

    23 alleged acts of unlawful destruction of property in the

    24 Vitez or Busovaca municipalities after April of 1993.

    25 They pertain to Stari Vitez and Grbavica. I will

  16. 1 discuss each briefly in turn.

    2 There was an attack on Stari Vitez on the

    3 18th of July, 1993. It was planned and instigated by

    4 Darko Kraljevic in retaliation for an attack by the BH

    5 army on his brother a day or two before. Tihomir

    6 Blaskic did not plan or approve this attack. His lack

    7 of involvement in the attack is reflected by the fact

    8 that it was an amateurish attempt and that a large

    9 number of Vitezovi soldiers were killed while

    10 attempting to approach Stari Vitez.

    11 The Court will be in a position to compare,

    12 for example, that operation with operations that the

    13 Operative Zone headquarters did approve and participate

    14 in the planning of, such as the Grbavica operation,

    15 which I will discuss in a moment.

    16 There were many proposals to attack Stari

    17 Vitez in the summer and fall of 1993 as the HVO

    18 military position deteriorated. Stari Vitez was a

    19 drain on HVO resources. Constant mortaring and sniping

    20 claimed civilian lives and soldiers' lives in Vitez,

    21 and as that occurred, demands to do something about

    22 Stari Vitez escalated within the HVO and in the Croat

    23 community. Tihomir Blaskic, however, consistently

    24 rejected proposals to attack Stari Vitez on the grounds

    25 that too many civilian casualties within Stari Vitez

  17. 1 would result.

    2 The only other post-April 1993 unlawful

    3 attack on civilian property alleged in the indictment

    4 relates to Grbavica. Grbavica is located here to the

    5 northwest of Vitez and was a dominant hill feature

    6 immediately adjacent to the BRITBAT base which was

    7 located here. There was a BH unit in Grbavica, part of

    8 the 325th Mountain Brigade. One objective of that unit

    9 was to close down the main supply route, this part of

    10 the supply route which ran from Vitez and into Travnik

    11 and, if you took the fork, to Novi Travnik, to close it

    12 to HVO and Croat civilian traffic, and that it did.

    13 Through sniper positions on the hill, the

    14 Grbavica hill, the BH army was able to effectively

    15 close the main supply route and force the HVO for many,

    16 many months to use an unimproved track, a dirt track,

    17 which went back some distance below the main supply

    18 road, which, of course, was a paved or sealed road, a

    19 much better road. They used that dirt track in order

    20 to avoid the problem, rather than to confront it

    21 directly. You can see from the hill feature that it

    22 is, literally, the only hill feature to the north of

    23 the road in the immediate area, and it was the dominant

    24 feature.

    25 There were many civilian and military

  18. 1 casualties from this hill feature, and it grew to a

    2 head in late August or September 1993 when several

    3 school children were shot by snipers on Grbavica while

    4 returning home from church on a Sunday.

    5 The HVO responded to these murders with the

    6 approval of Tihomir Blaskic, who felt it was his

    7 responsibility to do something to protect innocent

    8 lives that were being lost due to the sniper positions

    9 on Grbavica. On the 7th of September, the HVO launched

    10 a military action against the BH army positions on

    11 Grbavica. A battle ensued that spanned, approximately,

    12 two days. It was a well-planned, well-executed

    13 military action. Despite the fact that there were

    14 civilian residents of the village, there were either no

    15 or virtually no, there may have been one, civilian

    16 casualties in the course of those two days of

    17 fighting.

    18 Unlike the Ahmici attack on the 16th or the

    19 Stari Vitez assault in July, this action against the

    20 Grbavica BH army snipers in military positions was

    21 approved by the Operative Zone headquarters. The

    22 evidence will show it was a proper military action.

    23 After the attack was over, the BH army had

    24 withdrawn, and the frontline moved forward to a new

    25 location. Sometime after the battle was over,

  19. 1 scavengers started to arrive in Grbavica. Individual

    2 and private looting occurred in which scavengers, for

    3 example, stripped the wood off of houses to use for

    4 firewood, such as the window frames. Desperate people,

    5 desperate times, Your Honours.

    6 Looting or burning portions of Grbavica after

    7 the military conflict had concluded was not directed or

    8 sanctioned by the Operative Zone headquarters in any

    9 way. Any HVO soldiers who engaged in such conduct did

    10 so contrary to express orders from Tihomir Blaskic, and

    11 those orders were issued prior to the Grbavica

    12 operation.

    13 After the mid April conflict, if I could have

    14 the next slide, please, Tihomir Blaskic issued the

    15 following order on the 22nd of April, 1993. It's not a

    16 coincidence that this is the day or at about this time

    17 that he was apprised of the nature of the massacre and

    18 the burning of homes in Ahmici. He ordered on the

    19 22nd, and I quote:

    20 "In order to prevent incidents in which

    21 houses and other commercial facilities are set on fire

    22 and looted, I hereby issue the following order: 1) I

    23 strictly prohibit the torching of houses and other

    24 commercial facilities and looting in the zone of

    25 responsibility of the command of the Central Bosnia

  20. 1 Operations Zone controlled by HVO units. The most

    2 stringent measures shall be taken against violators of

    3 this order pursuant to the regulation book on military

    4 discipline in HVO units."

    5 He had issued a second specific order, this

    6 order on the 19th of June, 1993, again, to HVO units,

    7 forbidding the lighting of houses or other objects on

    8 fire or the theft of property, and he warned those

    9 units that such conduct would be punished through

    10 military discipline and the military courts.

    11 Thus, prior to Grbavica, Tihomir Blaskic

    12 issued at least two specific orders directed to the

    13 type of conduct which is alleged to have occurred in

    14 the indictment. The Grbavica incident, that is,

    15 following the battle, was the first and last of its

    16 kind charged in the indictment in the Vitez-Busovaca

    17 enclave following the mid April 1993 conflict.

    18 What else is alleged to have occurred after

    19 the April 1993 conflict in the Vitez-Busovaca enclave?

    20 There are no specific acts of unlawful destruction of

    21 sacral objects after April 1993 in the Vitez-Busovaca

    22 enclave. There are charges of such acts in 1993 with

    23 no month specified in the indictment with respect to

    24 Busovaca and Stari Vitez.

    25 If the allegation as to Stari Vitez refers to

  21. 1 damage due to the truck bomb, then I have already

    2 discussed it. If the allegation pertains to the firing

    3 of rifle or anti-aircraft fire at the mosque in Stari

    4 Vitez at some other time in 1993, the evidence will

    5 show that damage to the mosque from such fire was minor

    6 and was the result of a single incident, not a plan or

    7 an operation directed from or acquiesced by the

    8 Operative Zone headquarters.

    9 The fact is, the HVO could have destroyed the

    10 mosque in Stari Vitez by fire, artillery fire, or what

    11 have you at any time. It never did so, and the fact

    12 that it did not do so was consistent with the orders

    13 and directives of Tihomir Blaskic on that subject.

    14 For example, on the 19th of June, he directed

    15 that special protection, this was a direction to all

    16 HVO units, and I quote: "Special protection is to be

    17 provided for sacral objects." The order specifically

    18 lists mosques and other religious sites as locations to

    19 be afforded special protection.

    20 What did he do when he learned of damage to

    21 religious sites by suspected HVO perpetrators? If I

    22 could have the next slide, please. He reacted

    23 strongly. That's what he did. On the 17th of August,

    24 he issued the following order to the commander of the

    25 Kiseljak brigade. Again, this was Ivica Rajic, who we

  22. 1 were discussing earlier, who is in a different enclave

    2 from the Vitez-Busovaca enclave, an enclave connected

    3 through Serb territory with the HVO main command in

    4 Mostar.

    5 What did that order say? I quote: "On 17

    6 August 1993, we learned that a religious building in

    7 Kiseljak had been demolished. In order to establish

    8 the facts and conduct an investigation, I hereby

    9 order: 1) Send a precise report about the demolition

    10 of the religious building. 2) What have you done to

    11 start an investigation and find the perpetrator? 3)

    12 What have you found out and what will be your next

    13 steps in this case?" The religious building that was

    14 the subject of this order was a Muslim site.

    15 Now I would like to address briefly the siege

    16 of Stari Vitez. BH army units in Stari Vitez were

    17 blocked by the HVO from mid April on, and frontlines

    18 developed between the two involving bunkers and

    19 trenches and the like. These lines did not move during

    20 the balance of the war.

    21 As I have said, Stari Vitez as well as

    22 Kruscica were points from which sniper and other fire

    23 were routinely directed at the HVO and civilians in

    24 Vitez.

    25 The HVO sought to contain these units and to

  23. 1 prevent any breakout action from them. Tihomir Blaskic

    2 never directed an attack on Stari Vitez. His contact

    3 with Stari Vitez was limited to the fact that his

    4 headquarters, the Hotel Vitez, was under intermittent

    5 sniper fire from BH army positions in Stari Vitez. He

    6 never went into Stari Vitez during the war. If he had,

    7 he would have been almost certainly killed.

    8 There were, as one would expect, exchanges of

    9 various forms of fire on the frontline around Stari

    10 Vitez. Those exchanges were of a local nature. There

    11 were casualties in both Stari Vitez and Vitez as a

    12 result of those exchanges. The entire population of

    13 Stari Vitez was mobilised by the BH army. Women bore

    14 arms in Stari Vitez, and in those circumstances,

    15 soldiers and civilians in the able-bodied population

    16 became virtually indistinguishable.

    17 When there were casualties in Stari Vitez,

    18 they were invariably presented to UNPROFOR as civilians

    19 by Sefkija Dzidic. It was a shrewd and successful

    20 propaganda effort.

    21 Where a warring party deliberately blurs

    22 military and civilian objects, an attacking commander

    23 cannot be blamed for collateral civilian consequences

    24 and casualties. The BH army in Stari Vitez mixed and

    25 collocated civilian and military sites. Private

  24. 1 cellars and homes were used to house munitions and

    2 military supplies. Military installations were

    3 unmarked in order to reduce the likelihood that they

    4 would be targeted. In other words, there was a

    5 deliberate blending of military and civilian objects in

    6 Stari Vitez.

    7 Tihomir Blaskic promoted the delivery of aid

    8 into Stari Vitez as well as free access for relief

    9 organisations in areas under HVO control, which

    10 included the perimeter of Stari Vitez and the southern

    11 perimeter of Kruscica. We will introduce his many

    12 directives on that subject, and there were many.

    13 He promoted the evacuation of the wounded and

    14 he declined suggestions, as I have said, for an attack

    15 on Stari Vitez. Repeated offers were made for

    16 civilians to temporarily leave Stari Vitez, if they

    17 wished.

    18 But keeping aid routes open into Stari Vitez

    19 and Kruscica was not fully within the control of

    20 Tihomir Blaskic. Angry and hungry civilians posed a

    21 threat to relieve convoys throughout

    22 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    23 I would like to return briefly,

    24 Mr. President, to the issue of population movements

    25 during the war.

  25. 1 There were dramatic population movements in

    2 Central Bosnia during the war. In fact, far more

    3 Bosnian Croats were displaced as a result of the war

    4 than were Bosnian Muslims, although that is not of

    5 particular relevance. An important issue for this

    6 Court will be: Why did these movements occur?

    7 The evidence will show several important

    8 facts on this topic.

    9 First, Tihomir Blaskic never directed the

    10 forcible movement of civilians from their homes.

    11 Never.

    12 Second, civilians requesting, wishing to

    13 relocate, was a subject that was principally a civilian

    14 matter. Tihomir Blaskic was concerned with the defence

    15 of the enclaves of Central Bosnia, principally the

    16 Vitez-Busovaca enclave after he was isolated, and with

    17 protecting the enclaves against BH army units within

    18 their borders. He had no interest in the movement of

    19 civilian populations.

    20 What was his position on civilian movements?

    21 Because movements sometimes involved

    22 frontline crossings, he was called upon from time to

    23 time to address that issue. Could a group of civilians

    24 cross a military boundary, a military frontline? He

    25 had one position on this issue: freedom of movement.

  26. 1 He had the same position, he had this position, prior

    2 to April 1993, when tens of thousands of Muslim

    3 refugees and displaced persons migrated into the Lasva

    4 Valley. He had the same position after April when many

    5 of those same persons wished to leave. He had the same

    6 position with respect to Croats and Muslims. When

    7 thousands of Croats wished to return to Zenica, at

    8 least hundreds -- I don't have a number for the Court

    9 at this time -- in late April, he approved and

    10 facilitated their crossing the frontlines to return to

    11 Zenica.

    12 Why did these ethnic populations tend to move

    13 during the civil war? The same question applies to

    14 both Croat and Muslim displaced persons.

    15 To be sure, there were persons driven from

    16 one place to another by violent acts. That certainly

    17 occurred in Ahmici when people fled for their lives, it

    18 occurred in Dusina, it occurred in Miletici, and there

    19 were persons whose homes were destroyed either as a

    20 result of combat operations or for no legitimate

    21 purpose whatsoever, and hence they had no home to

    22 return to.

    23 Although less dramatic, the evidence will

    24 show there are far more important reasons that explain

    25 these large population movements, at least four

  27. 1 reasons.

    2 First, many persons moved prior to the

    3 outbreak of open war in a particular area in order to

    4 avoid exposure to the fighting.

    5 Second, many persons moved when war or active

    6 fighting broke out in their area. They moved to get

    7 out of a war zone. An example here would be in

    8 Grbavica when, after the military operation there

    9 began, UNPROFOR evacuated the civilian population at

    10 some point during the battle. There is nothing wrong

    11 with that, it's normal, and lives may have been saved.

    12 A third reason for these movements was when

    13 the HVO or the BH army exerted control over a

    14 particular area, many persons wished to relocate to an

    15 area under the control of their national army. Again,

    16 that is neither good nor bad, but it was a fact, and we

    17 will so demonstrate.

    18 Fourthly, many of these movements were due to

    19 the fact that when able-bodied men, soldiers, were

    20 detained, such as in Zenica and Vitez, and then were

    21 exchanged, frequently their families wished to move

    22 with them and did.

    23 What did Tihomir Blaskic do to try and ensure

    24 freedom of movement for civilians so that no one was

    25 forced to leave their homes?

  28. 1 He never targeted civilians or civilian

    2 objects for any military action. He repeatedly ordered

    3 HVO soldiers to protect, that is, HVO subordinate

    4 commanders, to order their soldiers to protect

    5 civilians and civilian homes during combat operations.

    6 He did his best to ensure public security and order for

    7 all citizens, and he specifically ordered that persons

    8 not be expelled from their homes, and I would like to

    9 show the Court one of these orders.

    10 If I could have the next slide, please?

    11 On the 24th of April, 1993, he directed that

    12 the military police and the civil police should work

    13 together to the following end. Mr. President, this is

    14 a longer quote. There is a written French translation

    15 of this quote which, although it won't be on the

    16 screen, you should have it in the materials you have

    17 before you.

    18 I quote from the order of Tihomir Blaskic of

    19 24 April, 1993:

    20 "Because a large number of flats temporarily

    21 vacant which are being forced into by persons carrying

    22 arms -- soldiers of the Croatian Defence Force and

    23 other persons -- and in order to enforce public order

    24 and peace in the town of Vitez as well as to prevent

    25 such negative developments, I ORDER:

  29. 1 Unlawful taking of the flats and stealing of

    2 property from the flats which belong to citizens who,

    3 for different reasons, are temporarily not present, is

    4 to be prevented by all means, including by use of

    5 force ..."

    6 He gave this task principally to the 4th

    7 Battalion of the military police, although he asked

    8 that the civil police work together to implement this

    9 goal.

    10 With thousands of displaced persons and high

    11 emotions in the enclaves of Central Bosnia, this was a

    12 difficult order to enforce. There were also criminal

    13 elements within the HVO to be dealt with. But Tihomir

    14 Blaskic did not give up.

    15 When he learned that his orders were not

    16 being effectively implemented, what did he do?

    17 Could I have the next slide, please?

    18 The earlier order, as I said, was issued to

    19 the military police of the HVO. In May, the end of

    20 May, the 31st, 1993, he issued the following

    21 extraordinary order, and I quote. Again, there is a

    22 French translation in hard copy, Mr. President, of this

    23 order, of this passage from the order. The order in

    24 its entirety will be presented to Your Honours in our

    25 case.

  30. 1 "On 30 May, 1993, the officer on duty in the

    2 Operative Zone Central Bosnia informed me that

    3 Mr. Fringe Ramljak and Mr. Slavko Hrgic, both members

    4 of the military police, were expelling Muslim families

    5 by force. This was despite the order which bans such

    6 actions and for which the above-named gentlemen are

    7 responsible."

    8 A reference to his prior order directing the

    9 military police to ensure that Muslim families are not

    10 expelled from their homes and their property is not

    11 looted.

    12 I continue quoting this passage:

    13 "In order to prevent further actions that

    14 hinder the execution of orders and the correct

    15 behaviour of Military Police members carrying out their

    16 assignments, I HEREBY ORDER:

    17 1. Conduct an investigation into this case

    18 and take disciplinary measures against the culprits in

    19 this incident.

    20 2. Report to me explaining why, despite a

    21 number of warnings, certain members of your unit --"

    22 Again a reference to the military police

    23 unit.

    24 " -- are still causing such negative

    25 occurrences instead of protecting public order, and

  31. 1 suggest further actions to prevent such occurrences in

    2 the future."

    3 Tihomir Blaskic himself never took an

    4 apartment in Vitez. He had no apartment in Vitez. He

    5 felt there were many others who needed one more than

    6 he. He lived in a small room in the Hotel Vitez

    7 throughout the war.

    8 The last topic I will address, Your Honours,

    9 is that of the evidence we will present on the issue of

    10 whether the conflict between the HVO and the BH army,

    11 was it a civil war or was it an international armed

    12 conflict as that term is used in international law.

    13 The issue here is not whether there were HV

    14 troops, that is, troops of the Republic of Croatia, the

    15 army of the Republic of Croatia, in Prozor or Gornji

    16 Vakuf or even in the Lasva Valley, although the

    17 evidence will show that there were no HV units in the

    18 Lasva or Kiseljak Valleys at all relevant times.

    19 The issue we will address in our case is

    20 whether unity of identity existed between the HV and

    21 the HVO; namely, did the HV exercise effective military

    22 control over the HVO? That is the test. The evidence

    23 will answer that question with a resounding "No."

    24 Croatia was a steadfast supporter of the

    25 territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croatia

  32. 1 was the first country to recognise Bosnia-Herzegovina

    2 as a sovereign and independent nation. Indeed, it was

    3 critical for Croatia that the newly formed borders of

    4 Bosnia-Herzegovina be accepted and respected. Were

    5 those borders to become subject to negotiations as a

    6 result of war activity, Croatia, with substantial

    7 territory at the time occupied by the Serbs, would

    8 itself have been in greater jeopardy of never regaining

    9 its own territory. In other words, if international

    10 borders were up for grabs, Croatia was in a very bad

    11 situation with 40 or 50 per cent of its own territory

    12 occupied by Serbia and the JNA.

    13 Croatia was an ally of Bosnia-Herzegovina

    14 during the war against the Serbs. Serb attacks on

    15 Croatia were staged from Bosnia, from the territory of

    16 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatian troops did venture

    17 into Bosnia-Herzegovina to defend against Serb

    18 aggression.

    19 The strategy of the Bosnian Serbs was

    20 simple: to encircle Central Bosnia in a pincer move,

    21 if you will, that would run all the way to the

    22 Dalmatian coast and cut off supply routes from which

    23 Central Bosnia could receive materiel and aid, and

    24 indeed they attempted to do this in 1992.

    25 If we could have Map A on the video, please?

  33. 1 The army of the Republic of Croatia did enter

    2 Bosnia, and as the Court can see from the map -- if we

    3 could stay with "A," please, Map A?

    4 As Map A depicts, had the JNA and Bosnian

    5 Serb militia, which were located again in the pink or

    6 purple areas -- if the Court will focus on the large,

    7 dark blue area in Herzegovina, below the light green

    8 area of Central Bosnia which is marked in small ABiH,

    9 if that area of Herzegovina had fallen and had been

    10 encircled; in other words - and I'm drawing with the

    11 pen - if the JNA and Bosnian Serb militia had been able

    12 to complete their move to the coast and to cut

    13 Bosnia-Herzegovina at that point, Central Bosnia, all

    14 of Central Bosnia, would have been entirely encircled,

    15 and without re-supply, it would have collapsed.

    16 All munitions and materiel that went to the

    17 BH army and the HVO passed through that window, the

    18 window I have indicated with the large arrow from the

    19 Adriatic Sea, pointing through Dalmatia and into

    20 Herzegovina.

    21 So the HV, the army of the Republic of

    22 Croatia, they did enter Bosnia-Herzegovina, and what

    23 did they do? Where I'm drawing dark black lines, they

    24 blocked the JNA and Bosnian Serb advance and they kept

    25 that window open. They saved Central Bosnia as a

  34. 1 result.

    2 Croatia also trained and equipped troops to

    3 fight in the BH army. Entire units of Muslim refugees

    4 who came to Croatia were trained and equipped in

    5 Croatia and then went to Bosnia-Herzegovina where they

    6 fought as part of the BH army against the JNA and the

    7 Bosnian Serb militia.

    8 I will now conclude my remarks.

    9 I spoke earlier of the orders Tihomir Blaskic

    10 issued after he learned, on approximately the 22nd of

    11 April, that a massacre had occurred in Ahmici. One of

    12 these orders addressed the issue of command and control

    13 directly.

    14 If I could have the next slide, please?

    15 Again, there is a French translation in hard

    16 copy, Mr. President.

    17 In this order on the 24th of April, Tihomir

    18 Blaskic made the following extraordinary assessment,

    19 and I quote:

    20 "After an assessment carried out in the

    21 field, it is apparent that the lower commanders and

    22 their units are acting outside the chain of command.

    23 They are not executing orders from superiors and are

    24 independently making decisions contrary to the received

    25 orders. They plan and execute their own combat

  35. 1 activities, exert pressure on civilians, and disrupt

    2 the work of UNPROFOR, the International Red Cross, and

    3 ECMM, which has negative consequences for the HVO and

    4 those soldiers who execute the received tasks

    5 consistently .... I ORDER:

    6 3. The individuals and groups who are

    7 completely out of control are to be arrested

    8 immediately and warrants are to be delivered to the

    9 commander of the Military Police unit.

    10 4. You are in charge of preventing, with all

    11 available means and with the use of force, the most

    12 extreme individual and groups who are out of control

    13 and who are not protecting civilians, who are

    14 demolishing and setting fire to civilian facilities and

    15 whose activities are nothing but terrorism."

    16 Tihomir Blaskic issued this order to HVO

    17 units on the 24th of April, 1993. But he was not

    18 sophisticated in media relations or diplomatic

    19 relations. He addressed issues of command and control

    20 internally and confidentially within the HVO. He

    21 didn't lobby BRITBAT, he didn't lobby the European

    22 Monitors, he didn't show them orders such as these.

    23 The British battalion responded to these

    24 events and to a lack of information such as this, lack

    25 of response such as the order of the 24th of April,

  36. 1 with suspicion, frustration, and even anger, and the

    2 Court has seen that here in the courtroom.

    3 The Defence does not fault those members of

    4 BRITBAT for those views. We simply will point out in

    5 our case that had Tihomir Blaskic been more

    6 sophisticated at dealing with these entities, query if

    7 he would be here today.

    8 The Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal in The High

    9 Command Case described the parameters of command

    10 responsibility at page 76 of volume 12 of The High

    11 Command case, and I quote briefly:

    12 "Criminal acts committed by [subordinates]

    13 Cannot, in themselves, be charged to a commander on the

    14 theory of subordination ... There must be a personal

    15 dereliction that can occur only where the act is

    16 directly traceable to him or where his failure to

    17 properly supervise his subordinates constitutes

    18 criminal negligence on his part. In the latter case,

    19 it must be a personal neglect amounting to a wanton,

    20 immoral disregard of the action of his subordinates

    21 amounting to acquiescence. Any other interpretation of

    22 International Law would go far beyond the basic

    23 principles of criminal law as known to civilised

    24 nations."

    25 I have tried, in this opening statement, to

  37. 1 describe for you some of the steps that Tihomir Blaskic

    2 took. There will be more described to you in our

    3 case. He did anything but acquiesce in crimes or

    4 criminal conduct by HVO units or soldiers. Under what

    5 were the most desperate of military circumstances, he

    6 diligently attempted to instill professional standards

    7 of conduct in what was, in essence, a peasant militia.

    8 You will hear from our witnesses that Tihomir

    9 Blaskic was a professional soldier, a man free of

    10 ethnic prejudice or hate, a man who tried to protect

    11 those who could not protect themselves from the horrors

    12 of war.

    13 At the same time, he is not a forceful

    14 person, and he may have been the wrong man for the

    15 command that he was given. If that is true, that is

    16 not a crime. He did his best.

    17 He is not guilty of the charges the

    18 Prosecutor has brought against him and the totality of

    19 the evidence will so demonstrate.

    20 That concludes my opening statement,

    21 Mr. President. Thank you.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Mr. Hayman. We are

    23 going to take a break after this lengthy opening

    24 statement.

    25 I would like to ask you if you intend to file

  38. 1 this with the Court. Is it going to be filed in the

    2 two languages of the Tribunal? It has been drafted.

    3 Can it be supplied to the Judges as a document?

    4 MR. HAYMAN: All of the maps and printed

    5 quotations that I have referred to will be marked as

    6 exhibits, with your leave, Mr. President. The relief

    7 model we will also ask be marked as an exhibit.

    8 Although it is bulky and heavy and a burden on the

    9 court staff, we think it is important that it be an

    10 exhibit and remain with the court.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Therefore, you are already

    12 asking that the model and the various maps as well as

    13 the orders that you have mentioned in your statement be

    14 tendered as evidence. Are you asking that this be

    15 tendered as evidence today?

    16 But I will go back to my original question,

    17 the first question today. Are you asking that the

    18 model, the maps, and even the other documents that you

    19 cited, be tendered as evidence?

    20 The second question is: Do you intend to

    21 tender your opening statement as evidence to the Judges

    22 or do you prefer that this remain in the transcript and

    23 that we can then read through the transcript through

    24 the interpretation? It seemed to me you had a

    25 document.

  39. 1 So first question: Are you asking that it be

    2 tendered, the model, the maps, and the other documents

    3 that you have cited?

    4 MR. HAYMAN: The model and maps, Your Honour,

    5 I think they should be marked so the record is

    6 complete, but there will be witnesses who will come and

    7 testify about the maps, about the orders, and I think

    8 that's when they should properly be admitted; and even

    9 at that time, we can go back, if necessary, and admit

    10 the demonstrative aids that I have used in my

    11 statements.

    12 I did have, Mr. President, a written copy of

    13 my opening statement, but I have cut portions out of it

    14 and strayed from it from time to time, so I think that

    15 it would be most appropriate that we use the transcript

    16 as the record of my opening statement.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. That's what will be

    18 done.

    19 Judge Riad?

    20 JUDGE RIAD: The orders of Colonel Blaskic,

    21 you would like to submit them now as exhibits or wait

    22 for the witnesses?

    23 MR. HAYMAN: I think, Your Honour, we won't

    24 wait very long, but we would like to wait a few days,

    25 and then every order I have referenced in my statement

  40. 1 will be presented to Your Honours in their entirety.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: We are now going to take a

    3 20- to 25-minute break since Mr. Hayman spoke for quite

    4 a while.

    5 --- Recess taken at 11.25 a.m.

    6 --- On resuming at 11.55 a.m.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: We will resume the hearing.

    8 Have the accused brought in, please? Everybody be

    9 seated.

    10 (The accused entered court)

    11 JUDGE JORDA: I think that Mr. Nobilo is

    12 going to question the first witness.

    13 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, thank you.

    14 Mr. President, Your Honours, the first Defence witness

    15 in the case against General Blaskic will provide a

    16 historical framework within which the events that are

    17 under discussion took place. This historical expert

    18 should describe the background to the conflict in the

    19 former Yugoslavia, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, and

    20 thereby provide a good introduction to an understanding

    21 of the war that broke out in the territory of

    22 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    23 Our expert witness will not start with the

    24 6th century, because we consider this to be unnecessary

    25 and a waste of time, but we begin his testimony with

  41. 1 the creation of nationalist ideas in the former

    2 Yugoslavia. He will describe the relationship between

    3 the Croats, Serbs, and Muslims in the first Yugoslavia,

    4 that is, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

    5 He will describe the relations among those

    6 three peoples during the Second World War. He will

    7 depict the internal relations in Tito's Yugoslavia,

    8 that is, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

    9 and he will provide an explanation for the dissolution

    10 of Yugoslavia. He will provide the causes of constant

    11 conflict among the peoples living in the territory of

    12 the former Yugoslavia, and he will answer the question

    13 why Yugoslavia was the most conflict-ridden state in

    14 Europe in the 20th century.

    15 Finally, he will provide the findings of his

    16 research, which could be summed up as an answer to the

    17 question whether, in view of the internal conflicts

    18 which Yugoslavia was unable to overcome in the '70s,

    19 could it have survived in a democratic system.

    20 Your Honours, the expert witness who will be

    21 appearing shortly is, in the opinion of many, the best

    22 expert on history in the former Yugoslavia. This

    23 person represents a part of history himself. He

    24 personally knew, talked to, and collaborated with all

    25 the relevant political figures in the former Yugoslavia

  42. 1 in the last 50 years, ranging from President Josip

    2 Tito, with whom he cooperated, to President Franjo

    3 Tudjman, with whom he has also cooperated. Our expert

    4 is a member of the Croatian Academy of Arts and

    5 Sciences.

    6 His name is Professor Dusan Bilandzic, and I

    7 would like to now call the witness and ask the usher to

    8 bring him in.

    9 JUDGE JORDA: That's what we're going to do.

    10 Usher, have the witness brought in. I'm not sure I got

    11 the name. Dusan Bilandzic; is that correct?

    12 Bilandzic, Dusan Bilandzic.

    13 (The witness entered court)

    14 MR. NOBILO: Be careful, please.

    15 JUDGE JORDA: Do you hear me, Professor?

    16 THE WITNESS: Yes, I do.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Please remain standing. Please

    18 give us your given names, your profession, and then

    19 remain standing as long as it takes to read your solemn

    20 declaration. After which, you will be seated and

    21 answer Mr. Nobilo's questions. Please introduce

    22 yourself. You are?

    23 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Mr. President. My

    24 name is Dusan Bilandzic. Currently, I'm retired, but

    25 by occupation, a university professor and member of the

  43. 1 Academy of Sciences and Arts. I was born --

    2 JUDGE JORDA: For the time being, that will

    3 be sufficient. Please read your solemn declaration

    4 which is on the piece of paper which the usher has

    5 given to you. Please go ahead.

    6 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will

    7 speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the

    8 truth.

    9 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Professor. You may

    10 be seated now.

    11 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Mr. President.

    12 JUDGE JORDA: You have come to testify as

    13 part of the trial initiated by the Prosecutor of the

    14 International Tribunal against the accused present in

    15 this courtroom, General Blaskic. You know the

    16 procedure that we use here. First, Mr. Nobilo is going

    17 to ask you some questions, and then you will testify

    18 freely and, of course, go to the essential points.

    19 Mr. Nobilo, you will, I assume, get to the

    20 essential points that you want the witness to testify

    21 to. Please proceed.

    22 MR. NOBILO: Thank you, Mr. President.


    24 Examined by Mr. Nobilo:

    25 Q. Good morning, Professor. On behalf of the

  44. 1 Defence, I thank you once again for coming. At the

    2 outset, as is customary, will you please introduce

    3 yourself to the Court? You were born in 1924 in

    4 Croatia, and first you went to a Franciscan secondary

    5 school and studied to be a clergyman. What happened

    6 later on in your life and career?

    7 A. Mr. President, it is a rather long career.

    8 After the Franciscan school, which I did not graduate

    9 from, I switched to a state gymnasium or secondary

    10 school, and from 1938 to 1941, I studied there.

    11 In 1941, I joined the partisan movement. I

    12 took part in the uprising of 1941, and from 1941 until

    13 1945, I took part in the war and was wounded four

    14 times.

    15 After the war, I stayed on in the Yugoslav

    16 People's Army for 15 years with the rank of colonel and

    17 professor of high military schools, at which I taught

    18 the history of warfare, with particular reference to

    19 the Second World War and the partisan war in

    20 Yugoslavia.

    21 In 1960, I left the Yugoslav People's Army

    22 and started to study social processes and, in the first

    23 place, the internal social system of Yugoslavia, the

    24 political, economic, and legal systems. Gradually, my

    25 studies focused on the most recent period of history,

  45. 1 so that in 1967, I became the director of a historical

    2 institute in Zagreb.

    3 From then on, I focused mostly on research

    4 into contemporary history and contemporary social

    5 systems, while, at the same time, as a kind of

    6 volunteer, I was very active in the political life of

    7 Croatia and Yugoslavia. I was a kind of consultant to

    8 the highest echelons of the Yugoslav Communist Party as

    9 an expert on political processes, and I was a member of

    10 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of

    11 Croatia.

    12 I took part in the reform of the Yugoslav

    13 political system from the beginning of the '60s until

    14 the collapse of Yugoslavia. After that, on behalf of

    15 the Croatian opposition, I was appointed vice-president

    16 of the Republic of Croatia, a position I held for seven

    17 months only, but after that, this position was

    18 abolished by the collective leadership of the former

    19 state. This was the beginning of 1991, and I held that

    20 position until the new year.

    21 Since then, I have been writing books. I

    22 have published a history of Yugoslavia from its

    23 foundation, that is, in 1918 until 1986. I have

    24 published a book entitled "Yugoslavia after Tito," and

    25 today I'm working on a new book which should come out

  46. 1 next year and deals with the history from the collapse

    2 of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918 until the

    3 break-up of Yugoslavia in 1991 and the new balance of

    4 forces that was established in Croatia and so on.

    5 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that you have

    6 published eleven books on the history of Yugoslavia?

    7 A. Mr. President, in addition to my main field

    8 of interest, there are some specific areas, for

    9 example, management, the mechanism of management. In

    10 Yugoslavia, it has been translated into six languages,

    11 including Chinese. Then there's the theory and

    12 practise of self-management. If we count all those

    13 books, then there are eleven.

    14 Q. And more than a hundred articles have been

    15 published by you, and you're a member of the Academy of

    16 Arts and Sciences, the highest scientific institution

    17 in the Republic of Croatia?

    18 A. Yes.

    19 Q. Finally, you're a member of the most powerful

    20 opposition party, the Social Democratic Party of

    21 Croatia?

    22 A. Correct.

    23 Q. And you have no position in the organs of

    24 authority?

    25 A. No.

  47. 1 Q. Thank you, Professor. Would you now go on to

    2 your testimony, your presentation. If you have any

    3 notes, feel free to use them.

    4 A. Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, it

    5 is an exceptional honour for me to be able to present

    6 here one possible interpretation of the beginning of

    7 the crisis, the collapse of the first Yugoslavia, the

    8 crisis and break-up of the second Yugoslavia. Of

    9 course, this interpretation cannot be, in my personal

    10 judgement, absolutely satisfactory because, to date, we

    11 do not have a single written history in the form of a

    12 synthesis. There are many books, but no real synthesis

    13 of this period.

    14 Naturally, in my presentation, I cannot, nor

    15 should I, as that would be contrary to the principles

    16 of science, to be -- I cannot be biased, but if,

    17 occasionally, one of my theses may appear to be

    18 prejudiced, I ask that this be accepted as something

    19 that is unavoidable, but I hope to be able to avoid

    20 that.

    21 Q. Thank you, Professor. Let us go back to the

    22 period before the formation of the first Yugoslavia.

    23 What were the national ideas of the peoples inhabiting

    24 the territory of the former Yugoslavia before the end

    25 of the First World War, that is, before 1918 and before

  48. 1 the foundation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia?

    2 A. If I may be allowed to make a few

    3 observations which I consider to be rather important

    4 and which go back a little bit further into history?

    5 First of all, history created a community in

    6 1918 which, throughout the period of its existence, had

    7 certain permanent characteristics which are essential

    8 for an understanding.

    9 Unfortunately, I am hearing the French

    10 interpretation.

    11 Q. Press number 6, you will get -- to your

    12 right, number 6. You have number 6 to your right,

    13 channel number 6.

    14 A. I should like to avoid listening to any

    15 interpretation.

    16 Those constant characteristics of Yugoslav

    17 society, precisely because they are constant,

    18 determined its overall social life, and those were, in

    19 the first place, Yugoslavia is a multi-ethnic state in

    20 which nations were formed, or at least the three of

    21 them, the three more important ones, were formed

    22 roughly at the same time when Bismark created Germany

    23 or when Garibaldi created Italy but with quite opposing

    24 ideologies. Secondly, it is a multi-religious entity,

    25 the three large religions: the Catholic, the Orthodox,

  49. 1 and Muslim.

    2 Fourth (sic), it is a country in which the

    3 differences in the level of economic and social

    4 development are so vast that they are comparable to the

    5 differences between the most developed and least

    6 developed European states after the Second World War.

    7 Also, various legal systems were inherited

    8 from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, from the Ottomans, so

    9 that this melting pot was such that in a very small

    10 territory --

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me. Could I ask you to

    12 speak a little bit more slowly so that the interpreters

    13 can be sure that everything is accurate in the

    14 interpretation? Thank you very much.

    15 THE WITNESS: Yes, I will do that,

    16 Mr. President.

    17 I think that, in the world, there is no

    18 similar case of such contradictions being in evidence

    19 in such a small area.

    20 The main contradictions of contemporary

    21 civilisations were manifest here in the Balkans, and if

    22 those constants are correct - and they are indeed

    23 correct - then the problem that arose was: Is it

    24 possible for such contradictions which are manifest in

    25 such a small area, can they enable or prevent the

  50. 1 creation of a sound, normal, stable state?

    2 My hypothesis, which is close to a thesis, is

    3 that that state put to the test all known social

    4 systems. It tested parliamentarianism of the Western

    5 type in the first ten years of its existence. That

    6 model could not be sustained. Then it tried out

    7 dictatorship, a military monarchist dictatorship, which

    8 lasted for five or six years. That too collapsed.

    9 Then it renewed what remained of parliamentarianism

    10 from 1935 until 1941. Then there was a four-year civil

    11 war, which is a wealthy treasury regarding behaviour of

    12 ethnic groups, political parties -- I'm referring to

    13 this four-year war -- and then came a dictatorship

    14 modelled on the Stalinist system. It then evolved into

    15 a confederation, and even that was not successful.

    16 That brings me to the end of my introduction, after

    17 which I will answer your question.

    18 Let me add that at the same time, with these

    19 constant changes that occurred in terms of social

    20 system, capitalism, socialism within capitalism,

    21 dictatorship on the one hand and the parliamentary

    22 system on the other; within Communism, Stalinism on the

    23 one hand and anti-Stalinism on the other; centralism

    24 and confederalism; and none of these succeeded.

    25 Simultaneously with this quest for a social

  51. 1 system which would preserve the community, and as those

    2 attempts failed, wars broke out in the south Slav

    3 areas. Over a period of 100 years, there were six

    4 wars, which are also an indicator of the same

    5 characteristics; that is, this quest for a system

    6 entailed also wars, and these wars were an instrument

    7 for finding a solution to the internal contradictions

    8 within Yugoslavia, the wars that occurred within the

    9 country and around the country.

    10 That was what I wanted to say as an

    11 introduction prior to your question.

    12 MR. NOBILO:

    13 Q. But let us go back to the beginning. How

    14 come these ethnicities should find themselves in a

    15 common state and what ideas did they bring with them to

    16 that common state?

    17 A. That is precisely the proper question, Your

    18 Honours.

    19 To make it clear that the Balkans was not the

    20 only territory that was packed full with such

    21 contradictions which needed to be pacified, I must say

    22 that, unfortunately, ever since the French revolution,

    23 the ideas of large nation states dominated in Europe.

    24 There was Bismark's idea of a Greater Germany, the idea

    25 of a Great France, the idea of a Great Russia, the idea

  52. 1 of a Great Hungary, a Great Italy, a Great Bulgaria, a

    2 Greater Serbia, a Greater Croatia, and even very small

    3 national communities of a million or two inhabitants,

    4 did not manage to resist this disease of creating a

    5 larger nation state.

    6 This cost Europe two World Wars which

    7 destroyed Europe, making it fall to its knees before

    8 others. Suffice it to remind ourselves that two great

    9 nations, France and Germany, during a single lifetime,

    10 waged three wars: Bismark, Kaiser William, Hitler, and

    11 that this made Europe an invalid because nationalist

    12 ideologies destroyed the achievements of civilisations

    13 which should have served as a foundation for the

    14 construction of Europe.

    15 I just wish to point out that there were

    16 similar situations among the nations of Yugoslavia;

    17 namely, the Serb nationalist ideology came into

    18 being precisely during the time of the so-called spring

    19 of European peoples. That was 1848; that is, the mid

    20 19th century.

    21 German ideology at the time, Safarik, Kollar

    22 and others, established a theory that all citizens

    23 speaking one language, one and the same language,

    24 belong to the same nation. According to them, no other

    25 criteria was taken into consideration: history,

  53. 1 culture, or anything else.

    2 A great Serb reformer who has great merit,

    3 acknowledged by history, the linguistic reformer Vuk

    4 Karadzic, a researcher into the questions of language,

    5 found that the Croats, Muslims, Montenegrins, and Serbs

    6 speak the same language, and indeed they did speak the

    7 same language; the Stokavski, as it was called. About

    8 10 per cent of Croats used a different dialect. The

    9 others all spoke the same language.

    10 Proceeding from the German linguistic theory,

    11 he said, here in the Balkans, from the Austrian borders

    12 or, rather, from the Austrian Alps, this entire area of

    13 the Balkans, this Slav area, speak either the same

    14 language or a similar language, and therefore, they are

    15 one nation.

    16 What nation are they?

    17 "My nation," said he, "the Serbs, they are

    18 all Serbs." Responding to the observation that they

    19 were Catholics, he said, "Yes, Serbs, but of Catholic

    20 religion." What about the Muslims? "Well, they are

    21 Serbs of Islamic faith." And that is how this

    22 linguistic theory led to a theory that all of them were

    23 Serbs from the Alps to Salonika and Constantinople.

    24 Q. Professor, perhaps this would be a good time

    25 to pay attention and look at the map that we have on

  54. 1 the screen and on the computer screens. Could you

    2 please tell us what this map is, how did you come by

    3 the map, and who issued the map?

    4 A. This is a map which was issued in Belgrade in

    5 1873, and it was used in schools, primary schools,

    6 military academies, and other institutions to show, in

    7 pictorial form, the Serb people and how they were

    8 spread out across the territory according to that

    9 linguistic theory.

    10 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, if I may, may I

    11 come up to the laptop computer to show a new map, and

    12 then this map will be clearer to you?

    13 A. On the map, you can see the following: the

    14 boundaries of Socialist Yugoslavia, of the Republics of

    15 Socialist Yugoslavia. When they are posed on an ethnic

    16 map which was issued, as I said, in 1873 in Belgrade,

    17 you will be able to see that the Serb nation covers

    18 almost all of Croatia, without Zagreb and the Zagroria

    19 area; of course, the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

    20 Vojvodina, part of Romania, part of Bulgaria, of course

    21 Macedonia, right up to Salonika.

    22 Jovan Cvijic, the President of the Serb

    23 Academy of Science, Professor of the Sorbonne and

    24 Member of the French Academy of Science, who was

    25 otherwise a very distinguished and renowned, recognised

  55. 1 expert, spoke about this state of affairs and said that

    2 it was a question of the Slav lack of crystallisation

    3 of mass which spread out from Austria to Greece and to

    4 Salonika, to Salonika, including Salonika, and even

    5 Constantinople, and that there were 9.625.000

    6 inhabitants. The Kingdom of Serbia - the article was

    7 written in 1908, during the annexation of

    8 Bosnia-Herzegovina - at that particular time, Serbia

    9 had 2.750.000 inhabitants. So that what Cvijic says

    10 were Serbs, in fact, was more than three times a

    11 greater number, and this created the conviction on the

    12 power and strength of the Serbs.

    13 So that is the ethnic criteria.

    14 Every nation passes through this phase. It

    15 is a phase of nationalism which turns into chauvinism

    16 and leads to war. Every nation is to apply another

    17 principle in addition to the ethnical principle, at

    18 least one, and that is the principle of historic

    19 right. "I have the right, as a leader of a nation, to

    20 establish borders along those countries who, at some

    21 time in history, say a thousand years ago, were within

    22 the composition of my one-time ruler." The Serbs had

    23 the famous Czar Dusan - I take my name after him; it is

    24 my name as well - and Czar Dusan ruled over a large

    25 portion of Greece, Albania, Serbia of course, Bulgaria,

  56. 1 and so on and so forth, and the Serb Prime Minister,

    2 Garasanin, who was a statesman of Serbia, established

    3 the right of Serbia to what belonged at one time to the

    4 empire of Czar Dusan.

    5 So those are the two criteria, and with that,

    6 I conclude the Serb ideology.

    7 Q. Can I ask you whether Bosnia and Herzegovina

    8 for the most part belonged to the empire of Czar Dusan?

    9 A. That is difficult to say. I don't know the

    10 precise borders, the frontiers. It is the Middle Ages,

    11 and I don't want to enter into the field of the Middle

    12 Ages, which is not my field of expertise.

    13 Q. Can you please tell us now what nationalist

    14 ideas existed with the Croats at the end of the First

    15 World War, prior to the formation of the Kingdom of

    16 Yugoslavia?

    17 A. Croatia developed in a quite different

    18 manner. The Serb state was born within the Ottoman

    19 Empire, and the Ottoman Empire was decadent, it

    20 suffered a disease for several hundred years, and

    21 therefore, it was a decadent empire, a disintegrating

    22 empire, where the legal order was breaking up.

    23 Croatia, on the other hand, lived within the

    24 composition of the Habsburg monarchy, and the essential

    25 difference, the vital difference, lies in the fact that

  57. 1 Croatia had, for about 800 years, the status of limited

    2 sovereignty.

    3 After the disintegration of the Kingdom of

    4 Croatia, it entered a personal union with the Kingdom

    5 of Hungary, but it retained four elements of

    6 sovereignty, and this is exceptionally important in the

    7 context of the future Yugoslavia.

    8 It retained its name, it was a kingdom, and I

    9 shall remind you here --

    10 JUDGE RIAD: There is a mistake here.

    11 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Your

    12 Honour. Microphone.

    13 MR. NOBILO: If there is a mistake -- it must

    14 be "Croatia."

    15 JUDGE RIAD: Croatia, yes.

    16 A. Therefore, they are two kingdoms, two states,

    17 Hungary and Croatia, with one king.

    18 In Zagreb, there was a viceroy who was called

    19 the Ban, and one of these Bans, in a polemics within

    20 the Hungarian parliament, the Prime Minister said

    21 "Regnum regno non praescribit leges": "Therefore, one

    22 kingdom does not have right --"

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me. Like Judge Riad, I

    24 like to understand everything. There were two states,

    25 Hungary and Croatia; is that correct? It was Hungary

  58. 1 and Croatia?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me. Please make it

    4 clear.

    5 A. According to an agreement between Hungary and

    6 Croatia, a personal union was set up in 1102 which this

    7 contract was noted and --

    8 JUDGE JORDA: Let me go back to my question.

    9 Excuse me. Let me turn to the interpreters. So

    10 "Bulgaria" is "Hungary"; is that what you're saying.

    11 THE INTERPRETER: No, "Hungary."

    12 JUDGE JORDA: Hungary. "Bulgaria" is

    13 "Hungary"? Perhaps it's an interpretation question.

    14 I thought you were talking about Hungary. Are you

    15 talking about Bulgaria?

    16 Let me turn to the interpreters here. So

    17 "Hungary" is not "Bulgaria." Bulgaria. Bulgaria.

    18 All right. Excuse me, interpreters -- I thought that

    19 "Hungary" meant "Hungary." So we're talking about

    20 Bulgaria and Croatia; that's right?

    21 Professor, if you would please speak more --

    22 if you would speak more slowly, that would avoid any

    23 errors.

    24 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, quite the

    25 contrary. The contract was between Croatia and

  59. 1 Hungary, Hungary, which was called Ugarska, Hungary,

    2 Hungary, and together they entered into the

    3 Austro-Hungarian Empire. So it is Hungary.

    4 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: There is no physical

    5 contiguity between Bulgaria and Croatia, is there?

    6 There is a physical contiguity between Croatia and

    7 Hungary, so one would expect any arrangements would be

    8 between Hungary and Croatia; is that correct?

    9 MR. NOBILO: Yes.

    10 A. So they were two feudal states, and these two

    11 feudal states elected a joint king, in this case he was

    12 a Hungarian, and this went on until the year 1526 when

    13 both those states took on Habsburg as their king, as

    14 their sovereign. Croatia retained the status of a

    15 kingdom with its borders, with its Sabo or assembly of

    16 the Middle Age type, something that could resemble a

    17 parliament today, and executive power, led by the Ban,

    18 as the viceroy, and it always had a set territory,

    19 state territory.

    20 So that is the situation with Croatia up

    21 until 1918.

    22 Now let us look at the nationalist ideology.

    23 That was the question. What was it like? What was the

    24 Croatian nationalist idea within the composition of the

    25 Habsburg monarchy?

  60. 1 The Habsburg monarchy had 52 per cent Slavs

    2 in its composition and two ruling nations, the

    3 Hungarians and the Germans, Austrian Germans, 48

    4 per cent of them. That means that the majority were

    5 Slav.

    6 With regard to the fact that this was one of

    7 the best ordered and civilised, legally most highly

    8 developed empires of Europe at the time, it was fairly

    9 successful. The Habsburgs were successful in dealing

    10 with this complex monarchy. But within the Habsburg

    11 monarchy itself, which some called the Danubian

    12 monarchy and later on, after 1867, it became known as

    13 Austro-Hungary, so within this Habsburg monarchy,

    14 nationalist movements began to develop, the Croatian,

    15 the Serb, the Hungarian, the German, the Czech, the

    16 Polish, the Slovak, the Italian. So these were the

    17 national movements that began to emerge. It was a

    18 patchwork of nations.

    19 Croatia as a kingdom, in the realistic

    20 political life, was subjugated to Budapest, under the

    21 rule of Budapest, because in Budapest, the joint

    22 king reigned, and the real political position of

    23 Croatia was in the fact that it was subordinated to

    24 Hungary, although it had its own partial sovereignty,

    25 restricted sovereignty.

  61. 1 There was rivalry between Germany, that is to

    2 say, Austria -- let me make one point clear. At that

    3 time, the Austrians were part of the German nation and

    4 they considered themselves to be Germans and not

    5 Austrians. So that is why we sometimes say they are

    6 Germans, sometimes Austrians. But, in fact, their

    7 national consciousness was that of Germany. They were

    8 German, together with Prussia, and they fought with

    9 Prussia in deciding which would be the hegemonist to

    10 unified Germany. But we won't go into that question at

    11 this point.

    12 Q. Let us go back to the Croatian idea and

    13 ideals of the day.

    14 A. Yes. Just one moment, Mr. President.

    15 Counsel Nobilo has asked me a question. I will try to

    16 explain that in the briefest terms possible.

    17 In view of the fact that in the mid 19th

    18 century, or at least the process -- the forming of

    19 nations was drawing to a close, the Croatian nation,

    20 just like all the other nations in Europe, set itself

    21 the overall ideal to create a national state, as was

    22 done by Bismark in Germany, by Cavour in Italy, by any

    23 other state.

    24 However, Croatia at that time made up 5.26

    25 per cent - that is a little over 5 per cent - of the

  62. 1 population of the Habsburg monarchy, and it would be an

    2 act of suicide, it would be tantamount to a tragedy, an

    3 adventuristic undertaking, if Croatia were to follow

    4 the road of Serbia. It went in quite a different

    5 direction.

    6 The leading idea of Croatia, of the

    7 spiritual, intellectual elite in Croatia at the time,

    8 was that Croatia, by many years of political struggle,

    9 should win for itself the status of the third, let us

    10 call it, the third unit within the composition of

    11 Austro-Hungary. In other words, that Croatia should

    12 have the same status that Austria and Hungary hold,

    13 and, of course, in that connection, that it be the

    14 pivotal point of rallying everybody around and to

    15 include Slovenia, Vojvodina, Istria, Dalmatian, and

    16 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    17 Q. May we now move forward towards the end of

    18 World War I and look at the disintegration of

    19 Austro-Hungary?

    20 A. Well, we won't be able to understand that if

    21 I don't add what I am going to say right now, and that

    22 is that this concept of Croatia, to be permanently

    23 within the composition of Austro-Hungary, came to be

    24 called and known as trialism because what existed

    25 previously was dualism, and we must know about dualism

  63. 1 if we are to explain the subsequent disintegration, and

    2 along with that idea, to be permanently within the

    3 Austro-Hungarian Empire, there was an openness within

    4 the Croatia elite for two other variations. One of

    5 these variations and options was with Starcevic at the

    6 head of it, and later on the Ustashe would -- the state

    7 of Croatia, independent state of Croatia, as a quisling

    8 state of Hitler's Germany, would rely on that option.

    9 He asked that that be a completely independent state,

    10 and he considered that Serbianism was the greatest

    11 danger to the Croatian people.

    12 Another faction, the third variation or

    13 option or concept, was a pro-Yugoslav concept. That is

    14 to say, Croatia, at certain points, would agree,

    15 together with Serbia, Montenegro, Slovenia, to

    16 undertake the formation of a joint Yugoslav state,

    17 state of Yugoslavia, as a federation or a

    18 confederation.

    19 So those were the three basic trends in

    20 Croatia at the time.

    21 Q. Professor, may we now briefly look at the end

    22 of the Second World War and the emergence of the First

    23 World, and the emergence of the SHS, the Serbs, Croats,

    24 and Slovenes, how did they come to be together at the

    25 end of World War I?

  64. 1 A. Let me just add, before I go into an

    2 important fact, that the First World War lasted for

    3 four years and three months. Perhaps the European

    4 nations would have gone on fighting for five more

    5 years, had it not been for President Wilson who sent

    6 several million American soldiers who, in 1918,

    7 disembarked in Europe to stop the war and the mutual

    8 annihilation of the nations of Europe, but that's a

    9 long story.

    10 What we must bear in mind here is that for

    11 four years and three months, the Croats, the Slovenes,

    12 the Muslims and, what will be surprising to you,

    13 perhaps, the Serbs, and 40 per cent of them, that is,

    14 Serbs from the Vojvadina region, Bosnia and Croatia

    15 were, for four years and three months, in the war

    16 against Serb Montenegro. When you have this

    17 phenomena before you, and it is a phenomena which is

    18 astounding and which frightens, if nations are called

    19 to unite after four years and three months of warfare,

    20 of mutual killing, not only to unite, say, in a period

    21 of ten years, but to unite the very moment that the

    22 bells rang heralding, declaring an end to the war would

    23 enter into a new state without any preparation

    24 whatsoever.

    25 Q. You had in mind the First World War because

  65. 1 you said the Second World War?

    2 A. I apologise. The First World War. Now I

    3 come to your question. We have, therefore, as far as

    4 the formation of Yugoslavia is concerned, to look at it

    5 as follows: Serbia, its elite, its government, the

    6 monarch had a war goal, a war objective. They had a

    7 vision, a project of what they wanted, a very precise

    8 one. Serbia had to demand of the allies, Great

    9 Britain, France, Italy, and Russia, an expansion of its

    10 territory.

    11 In view of the theory of ethnic kinship, this

    12 expansion of Serbia had to move towards Bosnia,

    13 Vojvodina, Croatia, Dalmacija, the expansion, I'm

    14 talking about. But as up until 1918 in the spring, the

    15 powers of the entente did not have it in their plan to

    16 break up Austro-Hungary. In the Habsberg monarchy, a

    17 small state of Croatia remained within the composition

    18 of Austro-Hungary. When I say "a small state of

    19 Croatia," it is Zagreb, part of Slavonia, but the whole

    20 of Bosnia, the greater portion of Dalmacija, a good

    21 portion of Slavonia would come under this expanded

    22 Serbia.

    23 In that vein, the London Treaty was signed

    24 between the governments of Serbia, Great Britain,

    25 France, and Russia. It was called the Secret London

  66. 1 Treaty on the Creation of a Greater Serbia. Russia

    2 suggested to Serbia that it avoid joining the whole of

    3 Croatia into this new state, this expanded Serbia,

    4 because it would have problems because the Croats are

    5 Catholics.

    6 What happened was the following: Serbia,

    7 with the Treaty of London, gained the right to expand

    8 towards the west. Croatia, at that time, wished to

    9 retain Austro-Hungary, that is, to help retain the

    10 Austro-Hungarian Empire, to preserve it, because of the

    11 idea of trialism. However, as the possibility was seen

    12 of the downfall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, another

    13 solution had to be sought.

    14 In 1918, the Croats on the 20th of October

    15 broke all state ties with the Habsberg monarchy. They

    16 proclaimed Croatia a state, an independent. They

    17 proclaimed their autonomy and independence. And we

    18 arrive at the phenomena that you mentioned, and that is

    19 the 40-day phenomena, the events of the 40 days.

    20 Guided by the idea on trialism, that is to

    21 say, a state of the south Slavs, a south Slav nation

    22 within the composition of the Habsberg monarchy, the

    23 representatives of four future federal units, of Tito's

    24 federal units, formed a state in Zagreb. The

    25 composition was Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,

  67. 1 Dalmacija, and Vojvodina. The hegemon was Croatia, of

    2 course. Being the strongest in all respects,

    3 demographically, culturally, politically, it became the

    4 hegemon. But that state was to retain the governments

    5 in Slovenia, Vojvodina, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and

    6 Dalmacija and was built up as a federation.

    7 Simultaneously, a portion of Croatia's

    8 politicians who, in the first days of the war in 1914,

    9 emigrated to the west, first of all, to Italy and then

    10 to France and Great Britain, formed a board, a group of

    11 intellectuals which proclaimed themselves the Yugoslav

    12 Council for the Creation of Yugoslavia. They wanted a

    13 Yugoslavia as a federation or a confederation of

    14 nations, and this state created in Zagreb at the end of

    15 October 1918, which I mentioned a moment ago, got the

    16 name of the state of the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs.

    17 After the breakdown of Austro-Hungary, we,

    18 therefore, had three states. Everything is very

    19 complicated. You have the Kingdom of Serbia, a state,

    20 the Kingdom of Montenegro, also a state. In Zagreb,

    21 you have the state which was known as the SHS, the

    22 state of the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. So three

    23 states there. Of course, Macedonia was not mentioned.

    24 That was a case that had been resolved.

    25 Now what happened was the following: There

  68. 1 were negotiations between Belgrade and Zagreb or, to be

    2 more precise, between the national council, which was

    3 what the new parliament appointed in Zagreb was called,

    4 composed of delegates from Slovenia, Vojvodina,

    5 Dalmacija, Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was the national

    6 council, and it negotiated with Serbia and Montenegro

    7 as to the type of relationships they would be

    8 establishing, what kind of state they would be

    9 forming.

    10 Under pressure, and it would take me a long

    11 time to explain all of this, but the Serb prime

    12 minister, the famous politician Nikola Pasic, on the

    13 9th of November, 1918 signed a declaration. It was

    14 called the Geneva Declaration. It was signed in

    15 Geneva. Those two states, that is to say, Serbia on

    16 the one side, a kingdom which annexed Montenegro --

    17 there was no longer any Montenegro now. It was

    18 annexed.

    19 At the beginning of November, I don't

    20 remember the date exactly, but its dynasty was

    21 abolished by the Serb government, and it did not

    22 allow King Nikola, who was the reigning king, Nikola

    23 Petrovic, to return to Montenegro. He remained in

    24 Italy.

    25 Now you have only Serbia, a kingdom, the

  69. 1 Kingdom of Serbia, and you have a state in Croatia, and

    2 the negotiation were to begin. The Geneva Declaration

    3 recognised the status quo, that is to say, that you

    4 have two states. We're going to create a sort of

    5 confederation. We are going to have the most necessary

    6 departments of a joint state, the army, foreign

    7 affairs, and so on. Those were the two major

    8 departments. As I say, this happened on November the

    9 9th.

    10 At the same time, according to the logics of

    11 the Treaty of London, which was still in force, the

    12 Italian army entered Dalmacija, Istria, and Slovenia to

    13 implement the Treaty of London. Simultaneously with

    14 that, the Serb army, together with the French army,

    15 in expelling the Austrian army, which was moved towards

    16 Vojvodina, Bosnia, Croatia, Slovenia, Dalmacija, and

    17 Istria, on the one hand, to stop the Italians from

    18 moving further inwards and, on the other hand, as this

    19 new state that was formed from the states of

    20 Austro-Hungary, had no army or police or an apparatus,

    21 an administrative apparatus, whereas there were

    22 rebellions throughout the country of the Bolshevik

    23 type. That is to say, the peasants set fire to the

    24 palaces and looted the warehouses of clothing and

    25 footwear. There was general panic in Zagreb that the

  70. 1 Bolshevik revolution had come to Croatia.

    2 In order for the feudal lords to save

    3 themselves from this, on the one hand, and to prevent

    4 Italy from penetrating further, it sent a delegation to

    5 Belgrade and, on the 1st of December, 1918, signed the

    6 creation of a unitarian, not a federal, but a unitarian

    7 centralist Yugoslavia as a country of an expanded

    8 Serbia.

    9 So let me add in closing this section --

    10 Q. We have arrived at the formation of the first

    11 Yugoslavia, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. As we have

    12 reached that point, Mr. President, I would like to

    13 suggest that we break for lunch.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. We will resume at

    15 2.30.

    16 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.59 p.m.










  71. 1 --- On resuming at 2.37 p.m.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: We will now resume the

    3 hearing. Usher, have the accused brought in, please.

    4 (The accused entered court)

    5 JUDGE JORDA: We are going to ask the usher

    6 to have our witness brought in.

    7 (The witness entered).

    8 JUDGE JORDA: Please be seated. All right.

    9 Dr. Bilandzic, did you have a bit of a rest?

    10 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Mr. President, yes.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Mr. Nobilo, the

    12 floor is yours to continue to ask your questions.

    13 MR. NOBILO: Thank you, Mr. President.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Go directly to the purpose, to

    15 your objective. Don't let the witness stray too far

    16 from the objective. Thank you very much.

    17 MR. NOBILO: Yes, Mr. President.

    18 Q. Professor, we have come to the Kingdom of

    19 Yugoslavia, and we won't talk about the history of the

    20 Kingdom of Yugoslavia, but you will only dwell on a few

    21 points.

    22 In your introduction, you said that the

    23 formation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia meant also the

    24 introduction of parliamentarianism, but it was not

    25 successful, so could you explain to the Court why the

  72. 1 parliamentary system did not function in the Kingdom of

    2 Yugoslavia and how that parliamentary era, a kind of

    3 democratic era, came to an end in the Kingdom of

    4 Yugoslavia?

    5 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, the first few

    6 years after the formation of Yugoslavia, the country

    7 was put to the test to see whether it could develop as

    8 a parliamentary country. I must pay tribute to the

    9 government of Serbia also which introduced the

    10 parliamentary system. It was limited in scope, but it

    11 was a parliamentary system.

    12 However, a fatal mistake was made; namely,

    13 proceeding from an ideology which expresses Vrbis

    14 claimed that this was a state of a single people, that

    15 there weren't any other peoples but just one people,

    16 the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes; and proceeding from

    17 this premise, all the historical entities were

    18 abolished; that is, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and

    19 Herzegovina, Vojvodina, Dalmatia, even Serbia and

    20 Montenegro in the administrative sense of the word.

    21 Instead of that, the country was

    22 administratively divided up into 33 regions with a

    23 centralised system of government. The Croats and, to a

    24 certain extent, the Slovenes, reacted to this by a

    25 large-scale nationalist movement demanding the

  73. 1 restoration of historical entities; actually, a return

    2 to the Geneva declaration, also requiring that the

    3 negotiations that were actually interrupted in Geneva

    4 should be resumed.

    5 Serbia's reply was: One people cannot

    6 negotiate with itself because there is only one single

    7 entity; in fact, an expanded Serbia.

    8 What occurred was a very severe political

    9 parliamentary struggle which gained in intensity.

    10 There were rallies, there was a struggle through the

    11 mass media or, rather, the newspapers, various

    12 organisations were formed to carry on the struggle,

    13 and, when this heated debate came to a climax, the

    14 regime in Belgrade killed in parliament a group of

    15 leaders of Croatia headed by a charismatic leader,

    16 Stjepan Radic, whereby the parliamentary system was

    17 actually defeated.

    18 King Alexander was faced with a dilemma as

    19 to what to do next. The killing of three leading

    20 Croatian politicians in the parliamentary benches, and

    21 two others who were injured, was a very significant

    22 political act, and the question was: What should be

    23 done with Yugoslavia?

    24 But let me go back to your question, why

    25 parliamentarianism failed. I think there are several

  74. 1 reasons: First, the economic strength in the newly

    2 created state was greater in Slovenia and Croatia than

    3 in Serbia. Serbia did not have the capabilities, the

    4 potential, the results to achieve leadership in the

    5 economy, culture, education because it was insufficient

    6 in that respect, deficient in that respect.

    7 Secondly, demographically too, it could not

    8 achieve democracy. Why? The Serbs accounted for about

    9 36 to 38 per cent of the population at the time, and if

    10 we assume that, in parliamentary elections, all the

    11 Serbs - and that is impossible, but let us go on that

    12 assumption - if all the Serbs were to join one

    13 political party and achieve the highest possible

    14 concentration, then they would have only 36 per cent of

    15 the votes, 36 per cent deputy seats in parliament,

    16 which means that they would not have a majority. Since

    17 the concept behind Yugoslavia was a Greater Serb

    18 concept, it could not accept parliamentarianism.

    19 Q. Professor, how did King Aleksandar try to

    20 save that Yugoslavia?

    21 A. King Aleksandar, together with the Crown

    22 counsel, had two alternatives for a resolution of the

    23 Yugoslav crisis. The first alternative was to break up

    24 Yugoslavia, to give up on the idea of a Yugoslavia.

    25 Then the question arose: If Yugoslavia needs to be

  75. 1 disbanded, and it did because it could no longer

    2 survive, what should be done?

    3 His idea was to amputate the whole of

    4 Slovenia, because there was no territorial link between

    5 Serbia and Slovenia, and amputate a part of Croatia.

    6 Here on the map we can see that the line of

    7 the amputation went in such a way that almost the whole

    8 of Dalmatia would be attached to Serbia as well as the

    9 whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a large part of

    10 Slavonia and Baranja, so that the Kingdom of Serbia

    11 would be expanded and the old concept of a Greater

    12 Serbia would become reality.

    13 However, the Croats and the Slovenes and, I

    14 must add, the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina

    15 as well, or, rather, their leaders, opposed the cutting

    16 off of Croatia, as did the big powers of the Versailles

    17 system.

    18 Why did the superpowers suggest to the King

    19 or advise the King not to do this?

    20 According to the Versailles system, one of

    21 the reasons why Yugoslavia was formed in 1918 was that

    22 it had two functions: First, to serve as a country

    23 that would stand in the way of the possible renewal of

    24 German imperialism, Drang nach Osten, because

    25 Yugoslavia's geopolitical position was such that if

  76. 1 Germany wanted to spread to the east, it had to cover

    2 Yugoslavia; and the other function that Yugoslavia had

    3 at the time was that, together with a group of

    4 countries, the Baltic states, Poland, Czechoslovakia,

    5 Hungary -- Hungary less so -- to be a kind

    6 of cordon sanitaire against the export of Bolshevism

    7 and the Soviet revolution.

    8 This amputation proved to be impossible and

    9 he adopted a second alternative, the alternative of a

    10 dictatorship. He set up a government of generals,

    11 headed by General Petar ^ Dzerkovic, who was the

    12 commander of his guards, and he believed that the

    13 melting pot would, after all, succeed. That is, that

    14 the Yugoslav idea would, after all, prevail, and that

    15 it needed to be imposed by force. So he again divided

    16 Yugoslavia up into nine banovinas or counties in such a

    17 way that not one of those counties had the

    18 characteristics of an historical entity but were merely

    19 administrative units.

    20 Counting on the fact that the future would

    21 prove him right, he would save Yugoslavia, and

    22 gradually he would manage, with the help of the

    23 International Community, to preserve and develop it on

    24 the basis of the idea of Yugoslavianism.

    25 Q. Professor, how did that dictatorship end?

  77. 1 A. King Aleksandar was killed in Marseilles in

    2 October 1934.

    3 Q. By whom?

    4 A. This problem remains unresolved. It was done

    5 by Croatian emigres, the Ustashes and Macedonian

    6 émigrés, but an important research of the German Reich,

    7 an historian, Eduard Calic, who wrote three volumes on

    8 Hitler and Germany, claims that it was the New Germany

    9 that was behind this because Hitler came into power in

    10 1933 and the assassination was the work of

    11 ultra-rightist forces, pro-Ustashe and pro-Macedonian,

    12 extremist Macedonian forces.

    13 Q. After the killing of King Aleksandar in

    14 Marseilles, what was being done in Yugoslavia? What

    15 efforts were made to save it?

    16 A. Let me make one more remark regarding the

    17 dictatorship. Regardless of the fact that the King was

    18 killed, murdered, it became clear that a dictatorship

    19 could not be maintained for long because again the

    20 Communists or the Communist Party, in my opinion, came

    21 forward with the wrong thesis, claiming that it was a

    22 fascist dictatorship headed by a monarch.

    23 However, fascist dictatorships, based on the

    24 principle of one nation, one party, one Fuehrer could

    25 not succeed in Yugoslavia because it was a multi-ethnic

  78. 1 state and it simply lost its force, its strength. Not

    2 only were the Slovenes and Croats against it but the

    3 bourgeois parties in Serbia were against the

    4 dictatorship, and it fell. So that in 1935,

    5 parliamentarianism was renewed, a kind of Balkan-type

    6 parliamentary system with bribes, corruption, fraud,

    7 election fraud, et cetera, and second elections were

    8 held in 1938, parliamentary elections; but, in fact,

    9 those elections enabled an anti-centralist movement, a

    10 federalist movement, so that a situation set in of a

    11 stalemate, because the forces with the regime and the

    12 forces in the opposition were almost in balance.

    13 The new Croatian leader, Mrgic, in 1938 won

    14 97 per cent of the votes.

    15 Q. Can it be said very roughly that the three

    16 peoples that we are talking about, because we are

    17 discussing here an event that occurred in Bosnia, that

    18 is, the Croats, Muslims, and Serbs, formed ranks behind

    19 their nationalist leaders as they did in those days?

    20 A. I must say that these nationalist

    21 concentrations were more intense as the years passed.

    22 Why? Because the national question became the crucial

    23 political question and because the non-Serbs were

    24 opposed to centralism and, naturally, they all -- not

    25 all of them but most of them -- sided with nationalist

  79. 1 parties.

    2 The regime, resorting to various means,

    3 managed to win over the pro-unitary factors in Croatia,

    4 Dalmatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the

    5 fact remains that the grouping was mainly based on

    6 nationalism.

    7 Q. The regime in Belgrade tried to save

    8 Yugoslavia once more, eight days before the beginning

    9 of the war in Yugoslavia, in Europe, that is, I'm

    10 referring to the Second World War, it tried to resolve

    11 the Croatian national question by offering the Croatian

    12 leader, Mrgic, the formation of a Croatian banovina or

    13 county. Can you tell us something about that?

    14 A. Yes, just two or three words about this. In

    15 the meantime, Austria was annexed, Czechoslovakia was

    16 run over, and it was clear that this was the prelude to

    17 the Second World War.

    18 On the 1st of September, 1939, Germany

    19 attacked Poland. The West, Great Britain, France,

    20 America to some extent, wanted to stabilise Yugoslavia

    21 as a country which would join the coalition against

    22 Hitler, and they exerted pressure on the Belgrade

    23 regime to deal with the problem of Yugoslavia in such a

    24 way as to make major concessions to the Croats because,

    25 in size, they were the second largest people in

  80. 1 Yugoslavia.

    2 Negotiations were conducted between the

    3 Croatian leader Mrgic on the one hand and the leader of

    4 the bourgeoise parties, there were several in Serbia at

    5 the time, but they couldn't agree on anything. Then

    6 the monarch intervened -- not the King, but Prince

    7 Paul, who acted as the monarch, on behalf of the

    8 monarch -- and he ordered the government - he was a

    9 regent and as a regent he was able to do so - he

    10 ordered the government to come to an agreement with the

    11 Croats, and that agreement was reached eight days

    12 before the beginning of the Second World War in such a

    13 way that Croatia, which had been divided into two

    14 banovinas, Primorska and Savaska, and there were parts

    15 also in Vrbaska and some other banovinas or counties,

    16 was united but the problem of Bosnia and Herzegovina

    17 then arose. When the banovina of Croatia was formed,

    18 the question that immediately cropped up was what to be

    19 done with Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    20 The position taken was that Bosnia and

    21 Herzegovina should be divided, that Belgrade and

    22 Zagreb, or, rather, Serbia and Croatia, should divide

    23 Bosnia and Herzegovina up.

    24 An agreement was reached, according to which

    25 Croatia acquired, to use the terms used in court here,

  81. 1 the provinces of Travnik and Mostar, and several local

    2 communities in northern Bosnia, in the Savska river

    3 valley, including Brcko, Derventa, Odzaci, Orasje.

    4 Also, in relation to socialist Yugoslavia, it won Sid

    5 in the region of Srijem. So that was their division.

    6 Q. Let me ask you, did this save Yugoslavia, and

    7 were the Croats satisfied with this concession? And

    8 when Germany attacked, was proper resistance put up or

    9 did Yugoslavia fall apart when Germany and Italy

    10 attacked?

    11 A. In view of the fact that that state was

    12 already undermined from within, on the one hand, and,

    13 on the other, the ruling class in the country was aware

    14 of the fact that it was weak, that it lacked power, and

    15 so with the assistance of the Croats and the Slovenes,

    16 it accepted Hitler's demand for Yugoslavia to join

    17 the Tri-partite pact signed on the 25th of March, 1941

    18 in the hope that it will manage to survive without a

    19 war, because Hitler did not ask Yugoslavia to

    20 participate in its war campaigns.

    21 However, a group of generals in Belgrade,

    22 encouraged by Great Britain and the United States,

    23 carried out a coup d'etat, dismissed the government,

    24 and Hitler responded by declaring war. Having broken

    25 up Yugoslavia which, in view of its historical regions,

  82. 1 was relatively easy to do, Hitler rewarded the Croats

    2 by creating a puppet, pro-fascist state, which

    3 introduced racial laws with the aim of, one day, making

    4 it an ethnically pure state.

    5 Srijem was annexed to Croatia, the whole of

    6 Bosnia-Herzegovina, so that the ethnic structure of the

    7 NDH, Independent State of Croatia, was such that, as a

    8 state, it was untenable. Why? Out of the 6.300.000

    9 inhabitants of that state, 50 per cent were Serbs and

    10 Muslims, not quite 50 per cent. To be more precise,

    11 there were about 3.300.000 Croats, and the other two

    12 peoples and other minorities accounted for three

    13 million. So a state in which the nationalist tension

    14 was high could not have survived.

    15 However, irrespective of that, in the long

    16 run, the Croats would have been punished because they

    17 would have shared the destiny of the Slavs, and one

    18 day, they would have melted in with other Slav peoples

    19 under the heading of Germany. Because it is well-known

    20 that Hitler's design was to create a thousand-year-long

    21 Neue Ordnung, a new order, according to which the fate

    22 of the Croats was sealed.

    23 Slovenia was divided into two entities, one

    24 of which was proclaimed an integral part of the Third

    25 Reich. The other half was next to Italy. Most of

  83. 1 Vojvodina was attached to Hungary. Serbia was

    2 occupied. Macedonia was attached to Bulgaria; Kosovo

    3 to Albania. And Montenegro was to have been a puppet

    4 state of Italy's. Similarly, Croatia became a

    5 satellite of Berlin and Rome.

    6 Q. Professor, you will agree with me that

    7 fascist Italy annexed the best parts of Croatia, that

    8 is, Dalmacija, Istria, and the islands. In that

    9 situation, in the area of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which we

    10 are particularly interested in, a quisling entity was

    11 set up, the independent state of Croatia. Can you tell

    12 us what the response was of the people in Croatia and

    13 Bosnia who did not except the Ustashe regime? Was

    14 there any other movement in Croatia and Bosnia?

    15 A. I'm afraid the answer to that question is a

    16 little more complex. I will come back to that a little

    17 later to say that Dalmacija, almost 100 per cent, the

    18 people of Dalmacija joined the Partisan Army.

    19 Q. Let us clear it up for the benefit of their

    20 Honours. Dalmacija is the coastal part of Croatia.

    21 A. But we come to a far more serious question.

    22 As Yugoslavia was broken up and segmented, as I have

    23 just explained, a new historical situation was

    24 created. The internal forces within Yugoslavia, the

    25 monarchy, the Serbian bourgeois parties, the Croatian

  84. 1 parties, in the first place, the Croatian's peasant

    2 party, in view of this, the question that arose was

    3 what should be done and how during the occupation?

    4 The second question, and it was a much more

    5 important question, that is, how the Second World War

    6 would end and how they should prepare for the situation

    7 that would ensue after the end of the Second World War

    8 and for renewing Yugoslavia then.

    9 It should be noted that the big powers of the

    10 anti-fascist coalition decided that all the lands which

    11 Hitler had destroyed and broken up had to be renewed,

    12 Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and so on. In that

    13 respect, Yugoslavia's renewal was secured, regardless

    14 of what would happen during the Second World War. But

    15 in the interests of understanding the situation, two

    16 projects of the future Yugoslavia are essential,

    17 because the quisling entities would fall when the

    18 Wehrmacht fell. That was clear. But the question then

    19 was who would then rule Yugoslavia?

    20 There were two visions. One was the Greater

    21 Serbia vision and the other was a communist vision.

    22 The Communist Party of Yugoslavia organised an

    23 insurrection in Yugoslavia. In 1941, it had about

    24 80.000 men under arms; in '42, 150.000; and in 1943,

    25 about 300.000 combatants. So that in addition to the

  85. 1 eastern front with the Red Army, this was the only

    2 front until Italy landed, the Italian forces landed.

    3 The Greater Serbian forces felt that

    4 Yugoslavia was destroyed by the Croats, and that is why

    5 they had to be punished. That is one point. The

    6 other, Serbia must correct a disastrous error made,

    7 according to the authors of this project, and that was

    8 that it had missed its chance to define the western

    9 borders of Serbia. Because unless the Second World War

    10 was taken advantage of to define those western borders

    11 of Serbia, in that case, we would, again, melt into

    12 some kind of an undefined Yugoslavia, impersonal

    13 Yugoslavia.

    14 The Communist Party, after the capitulation

    15 of Yugoslavia, set in motion a national all-Serb

    16 movement which, in the first few days, had been

    17 designed to wage a struggle against the occupiers, to

    18 wage a liberation war. But at the end of the war, it

    19 was designed to achieve a Greater Serbia, according to

    20 this map, on which we see that Croatia virtually no

    21 longer exists; Slovenia acquires Trieste, Istria, Fume,

    22 Rijeka, a part of the Croatian coast. It is being

    23 rewarded. Serbia gained Vojvodina, Montenegro,

    24 Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dalmacija. And being an

    25 allied state, it counted on getting from Hungary, Bajo

  86. 1 and Pec, this yellow triangle that you can see, a bit

    2 of Bulgaria, a bit of Romania. So that would mean the

    3 transformation into reality of the Greater Serb

    4 project.

    5 Q. You said that the Serb nationalist

    6 movement was liberated to begin with. Can we name it

    7 as the Chetniks, and can you tell us what it turned

    8 into?

    9 A. They called themselves, at the beginning, the

    10 Chetnik Army. Later on, in order to achieve political

    11 legitimacy, when they grew in size, their leader,

    12 Drazan Mihajlovic was accepted as prime minister in

    13 London. He was, of course, in the country, and he was

    14 promoted from rank of colonel to rank of general. The

    15 royal government in London, that is to say, the ruling

    16 Serb government, said to the allies that he was

    17 waging a war only against the Germans, that is to say,

    18 the occupiers, including the Bulgarians and so on. And

    19 Drazan Mihajlovic was said to be the Robin Hood of the

    20 Balkan mountains in the American press which was

    21 fighting the German divisions. And the myth was

    22 created in 1941, 1942, and 1943, the myth about Drazan

    23 Mihajlovic as the greatest warrior against fascism.

    24 However, what did happen in actual fact? I

    25 have to add here that the war broke out between the

  87. 1 Partisan Army, Tito's army and Mihajlovic's Chetnik

    2 army which, I repeat, was called the Yugoslav Army and

    3 which incorporated 100.000.

    4 The communists started out from the fact that

    5 the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had to be broken up, that is,

    6 that it was not to be renewed. For that reason,

    7 immediately in 1941 on the first day of the uprising,

    8 they formed a federal, military, and political

    9 structure for waging the war. That means that every

    10 future republic had its own central political

    11 institutions and bodies, that every republic already in

    12 1941 had its own national partisan armies. That meant

    13 that Serbia, should the communists win, would be

    14 brought back to within the boundaries, its boundaries,

    15 of about -- that is to say, the boundaries which it had

    16 up until 1918, that is to say, the beginning of the

    17 First World War, up to 1914, in fact.

    18 However, the question arises as to how the

    19 communists could revive a country which was destroyed

    20 so much internally, within itself. How could they

    21 revive this? They did something extraordinary. They

    22 made a sort of Yugoslavia synthesis, and this synthesis

    23 aspired towards giving each people within Yugoslavia

    24 the maximum possible and to retain Yugoslavia in the

    25 bargain. That meant that, to the Serbs, they

  88. 1 guaranteed that they would live in one state which, for

    2 the Serbs, was a sine qua non condition, in fact.

    3 They promised the Croats a state, not an

    4 independent one, but a republic, a state republic

    5 within the frameworks of Yugoslavia. That was also

    6 true for the Slovenes, the Macedonians, the

    7 Montenegrins, and the nations, the peoples of

    8 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So from the very first day of the

    9 uprising, a federal, political, and military structure

    10 was set up.

    11 Now, the question arises -- let me say here

    12 that the Partisan Army, I was, in 1942, the commander

    13 of some 200 partisans. I was a young man of 18 at the

    14 time, and all of us were aged between 18 and 25. We

    15 were all young men and women. There was nobody older

    16 in that war. That was the generation.

    17 The communists succeeded in doing something

    18 that had never been done before, and that is that, as

    19 opposed to the NDH, the Chetniks and the others who

    20 based their future on myth, on the myths of history and

    21 on hatred towards other nations, the communists taught

    22 their partisan fighters that there was no history

    23 before them and that history was, in fact, a

    24 misconception. It was a barbarianism of the capitalist

    25 type, and that for that reason, it should be struck

  89. 1 from the political vocabulary, everything that is

    2 national. That is one point.

    3 The second point is the following: As

    4 opposed to hatred towards other peoples, the communists

    5 taught their partisans that we were all class brothers,

    6 and not only must there be no hatred towards other

    7 peoples, but they also taught brotherhood and unity

    8 amongst the nations. This utopia on the part of the

    9 communists began to rule over the majority of that

    10 young partisan generation who fanatically laid down

    11 their lives. They were tremendously brave fighters.

    12 Then a second question arose, that is, how

    13 the individual nations accepted this synthesis, how

    14 they reacted to it. There are great differences on

    15 that particular point with regard to the participation

    16 that the nations of Yugoslavia took in the anti-fascist

    17 report, which, I repeat, in 1943 had reached the number

    18 of 300.000 partisans.

    19 Serbia, in 1941, launched an uprising and

    20 played the leading role in raising that uprising. This

    21 was also done by Montenegro. But after three to four

    22 months, the insurrection in Serbia and Montenegro was

    23 stifled. On the contrary, the non-Serb people

    24 joined the partisans, because they came to realise that

    25 this would no longer be the Kingdom of Yugoslavia,

  90. 1 Greater Serbia, but that it would come to be a

    2 federation.

    3 In that way, the Croats, that is, the Croats

    4 with the Serbs in Croatia, who had a great share in the

    5 partisan war because they were persecuted by the

    6 Ustashe regime, and the main commander of the Croatian

    7 army had in his units, under his command, from the

    8 summer of 1942 until the summer of 1944, that is to

    9 say, two years, he had 50 per cent of all the partisans

    10 of Yugoslavia under him. That is, in these Croatian

    11 units, half of them were there and half of them were

    12 made up of all the other nations of Yugoslavia.

    13 Bosnia-Herzegovina was also markedly

    14 pro-partisan, because the Serbs outside Serbia

    15 supported Tito's movement strongly, so that the

    16 partisan movement in Serbia would be revised at the

    17 final stages of the war.

    18 The war ended in such a way, and I'll be as

    19 brief as possible here and I'll condense the Second

    20 World War in Yugoslavia, in such a way that the

    21 communists had an army of 800.000 soldiers in the final

    22 operations for the liberation of Yugoslavia in

    23 1944/1945, that they had total power and authority in

    24 their hands. They had the party powers, the party

    25 police and army, and party rule. It was secret because

  91. 1 the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was a conspiratorial

    2 party, whereas formal power and authority was in the

    3 hands of organisations which led the war.

    4 The war for the Serb people, for the

    5 Serb nationalist ideology, ended in a catastrophic

    6 manner. The army of 1941 was lost in the confrontation

    7 with the Wehrmacht. The army was defeated. Drazan

    8 Mihajlovic's army was defeated in 1944. Immediately

    9 after the war, the monarchy was liquidated, so that

    10 Serbia was returned back into the frameworks of the

    11 ones it had before the Balkan wars, before Montenegro

    12 and Macedonia became republics. So it lost those two

    13 regions.

    14 The communists were more lenient on two

    15 points towards Serbia, that is to say, Kosovo, which

    16 the communists promised self-determination, guided by

    17 Lenin's thesis, which means the right to link up with

    18 Albania. So that decision was refuted and Vojvodina

    19 came back within the frameworks of Serbia.

    20 Q. Professor, on the one hand, in that

    21 anti-fascist war and, on the other hand, I think that

    22 you will agree with me when I say it was a civil war as

    23 well, what were the positions of the Muslims? Who did

    24 they side with, because we're speaking about

    25 Bosnia-Herzegovina here, for the most part.

  92. 1 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, Counsel Nobilo

    2 has asked a question, without which we cannot have a

    3 whole picture unless we provide an answer. I maintain

    4 that in Yugoslavia there were four wars being waged,

    5 the liberation war against the occupier, which was led

    6 by the communists and the partisans; second, the war

    7 between the individual nations of Yugoslavia, in

    8 practical terms, the war between Serbia and Croatia or,

    9 let me say, a war between a part of the Serbs in the

    10 Chetnik movement and all the other nations.

    11 Then, and this is important, within each

    12 nation, you had a civil war. The Croats, you had the

    13 partisans waging wars against the Croat Ustashes. The

    14 Serb partisans waged a war against the Serb Chetniks or

    15 Chetnik Serbs. The Slovene partisans waged a war

    16 against the military units which were fighting for a

    17 revival of a bourgeois Yugoslavia. This was a small

    18 force, but it existed. So you had four different types

    19 of war being waged.

    20 But the wave led by the Communists was

    21 victorious, and I might say that Stalin helped Tito in

    22 such a way that in 1944, in August or the beginning of

    23 September, he gave him nine divisions of the Red Army,

    24 one motor mechanised corps, four divisions, airborne

    25 divisions, and Tito accepted the offer that the second

  93. 1 Bulgarian army should enter Serbia, and therefore, the

    2 resistance in 1944 was completely broken down.

    3 Q. But let us return to the Muslims. Where were

    4 they?

    5 A. So the Second World War ended in the fiasco

    6 of the idea of Greater Serbia but also the idea of a

    7 Greater Croatia with the Ustashes. The partisans were

    8 divided into three factions: one was the pro-partisan

    9 faction, and they had Muslim brigades. We even had a

    10 Czech brigade, a Hungarian brigade, the Sandor Potefi

    11 brigade, and the Muslim, the Muslim one, the Hungarian

    12 one, some small German units, the Tilman unit, the

    13 Ziska Czech unit, and so the Communists were very

    14 skilful in using the national burgeoning forces to

    15 strengthen their own forces, although, and this is a

    16 paradox of history, the Communists were, to a certain

    17 extent, anationalist, they were globalists,

    18 cosmopolitans, and therefore, they could allow

    19 themselves to solve these questions simply.

    20 The Muslim practice, tied to the NDH, the

    21 other faction, and the third faction, particularly

    22 amongst the intellectuals of the day, asked, on several

    23 occasions of Hitler, that Bosnia and Herzegovina become

    24 an autonomous state under the immediate, under the

    25 direct rule or hand of Hitler's Germany.

  94. 1 Q. If I have understood you correctly, and I'll

    2 try and summarise, the Muslims, in the political sense,

    3 went into three factions: one joined the

    4 anti-fascists, the second joined the Ustashes, and the

    5 third was, let us call it the Muslim autonomous idea.

    6 But in the military sense, they belonged to two

    7 military formations: the Ustashes and the partisans.

    8 Is that correct?

    9 A. Yes, it is.

    10 Q. Thank you. Therefore, not to go on at too

    11 great a length, we come to Tito's socialist

    12 Yugoslavia. Could you please tell us the ideals upon

    13 which that Yugoslavia was built up and how Tito tried

    14 to solve the national question, although you've already

    15 mentioned that. You said how he placed this question

    16 during the liberation -- but when he came to power, how

    17 did he solve the national question and what experiments

    18 did he introduce to retain Yugoslavia?

    19 A. Tito's policy, or the policy of the Communist

    20 Party of Yugoslavia, to be more exact, had a drama of

    21 its own kind; that is to say, it was triumphant and was

    22 heady with this victory and it thought that a new era

    23 of civilisation had begun, The era led by the Soviet

    24 Union. It said that the West was decadent and that it

    25 would disappear as a regime, as a system, as a social

  95. 1 order.

    2 Yugoslavia copied everything that Stalin, in

    3 the institutional sense, had established. It abolished

    4 and banned the multi-party system, it abolished private

    5 ownership, private property. It established state

    6 ownership. It moved towards a policy of

    7 industrialisation and electrification, a rapid change

    8 of social structures, and blindly followed the policies

    9 and politics of the Soviet Union, of the USSR; and in

    10 the peaks of power of the Communist Party of

    11 Yugoslavia, they thought that Yugoslavia would one day

    12 enter into the Soviet Union as one of its republics,

    13 and you have with that with two members of the

    14 politburo: Kardelj, who was, along with Tito, from

    15 1937 to his death, he was always the No. 2 man in

    16 Yugoslavia after Tito.

    17 As far as the national question is concerned,

    18 there was a utopian vision that nations would wither

    19 away, and as socialism was being built up, that nations

    20 would disappear, would wither away, the withering away

    21 of the nations.

    22 In view of the war, intra-nationality war in

    23 Yugoslavia during the Second World War, and with regard

    24 to the mistrust that was created, any expression of

    25 national symbols was banned, nationalist songs and so

  96. 1 on, and a great deal of care and attention was paid to

    2 prevent any one nation or citizen. There were draconian

    3 laws to upset intra-nationality relations. This was

    4 very severely punished.

    5 This system lasted from the confrontation

    6 with Stalin in 1948, when the conflict with Stalin came

    7 about. We all know Tito's historical "No" stated to

    8 Stalin and the struggle against Stalinism, against

    9 Stalin, strengthened Tito's regime. Why? Because the

    10 bourgeois forces who ruled in the course of World War

    11 II thought that Tito would not be able to tackle Stalin

    12 and that his regime would perhaps disintegrate and that

    13 Yugoslavia would move towards the West.

    14 But, as time went by, the ideological

    15 consciousness of the Communists changed to such an

    16 extent that those people who said that the Soviet Union

    17 was a flourishing garden of a new civilisation, in 1952

    18 they stated at the congress that that was the darkest

    19 system ever to be encountered in the history of

    20 civilisation, and a complete severance, a new ideology

    21 started, the ideology of self-management.

    22 In this connection, the whole attitude

    23 changed, the attitude towards market mechanisms, market

    24 mechanisms had to be revived, planning of the Soviet

    25 type was abolished, greater autonomy was given to the

  97. 1 work organisations, autonomy to the communes, and a

    2 radical reduction in the federal government took place,

    3 about 100.000 white collar workers were lost in the

    4 reforms, the power of the republics was strengthened,

    5 and then, along with this wave of anti-Stalinism, the

    6 movement emerged for the transition to a multi-party

    7 system, and the links between the leading ideologists

    8 of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Milovan Djilas,

    9 with Bevan, Bevan with the British Labour Party, with

    10 the Socialists and so on and so forth, and Yugoslavia's

    11 slow movement towards the West, the West's aid and

    12 assistance to Yugoslavia in helping it resist the

    13 Soviet aggression, led to a spiritual climate in which

    14 Yugoslavia moved towards the Western model, and it said

    15 it would establish a model according to Western

    16 Europe.

    17 Djilas was -- not only Djilas but many other

    18 people, stood on the threshold of setting up an

    19 opposition party and, for example, Djilas's idea of 37

    20 communes, Kardelj and Slovenia, 35 were in favour of

    21 Djilas's concept. The party, although it was a weak,

    22 uneducated intelligentsia, accepted the idea. However,

    23 the party piques, Tito, Kardelj, Rankovic, and the

    24 other leaders, assessed, and I think they were right in

    25 doing so, realistically speaking - it is quite another

  98. 1 matter because I personally supported Djilas, I was

    2 alongside Djilas in 1953 when he started to raise his

    3 platform of this multi-party system.

    4 However, through later analysis, I became

    5 convinced that Tito was right. He liquidated Djilas

    6 politically and, at a meeting of the central committee,

    7 stressed the Crown thesis that if Yugoslavia

    8 was democratised in the direction of a multi-party

    9 system, a civil war in Yugoslavia would be

    10 unavoidable. Of course, he did not say that there

    11 would be a civil war amongst the Communists, but he

    12 considered that the defeated anti-Communist forces in

    13 the Second World War, that is, the Croatian rightist

    14 pro-Ustashe forces and the bourgeois forces as well as

    15 the Chetniks of Drazan Mihajlovic, would use this

    16 situation to their own ends and overthrow the regime,

    17 the regime would not allow itself to be overthrown, and

    18 a civil war would be unavoidable so that we could not

    19 move towards democracy at that point, Western

    20 democracy.

    21 A substitute was found in self-management

    22 democracy which was a sort of ideological terminology

    23 used which meant none other than the democratisation of

    24 the party dictatorship, the democratisation of existing

    25 dictatorship and not a change of dictatorship.

  99. 1 Q. Professor, you said that Tito already, at

    2 that time, in the 1950s, came to realise that any kind

    3 of democratisation in Yugoslavia would necessarily lead

    4 to its disintegration. You also said that, through a

    5 later analysis, you came to realise this yourself. Was

    6 this confirmed by the events that began with the

    7 reforms in 1965 and ended with the Croatian Spring in

    8 1971 when they moved towards liberalisation and further

    9 decentralisation? Were the trends towards

    10 disintegration burgeoning at that time?

    11 A. Concerned about the signs of conflict within

    12 the Communist party of Yugoslavia, Tito, on the 13th

    13 and 14th of March, 1962, convened a kind of summit, a

    14 secret meeting, which went on for three days, rallying

    15 about 70 people.

    16 His introductory statement was, and I quote:

    17 "Monitoring the situation, I have come to the

    18 conclusion that there is the threat of the

    19 disintegration of Yugoslavia. Why did we wage war for

    20 four years when our country is beginning to fall

    21 apart?"

    22 This was 18 years before his death, and 28 or

    23 27 years prior to the actual disintegration of

    24 Yugoslavia. What was it that prompted Tito to be such

    25 a good prophet of a bad future? One reason was that he

  100. 1 wanted to scare the republican leaders, to force them

    2 to obedience because otherwise they would lose power.

    3 The other was that, indeed, the disintegration of the

    4 Communist party of Yugoslavia had begun.

    5 The leading Communist, the Communist leader

    6 of Serbia, at a meeting, and I consider this as most

    7 instructive, said, "I have read a paper by the Secret

    8 Police on what the intelligentsia has on its mind as

    9 well as our Communist cadres," and I compared this

    10 analysis with an analysis of the Secret Police from

    11 1945, and if the vocabulary has changed slightly, it

    12 boils down to the same thing, which means, that from

    13 within, this disintegration had started, and the

    14 Communists were gradually shifting to nationalist

    15 positions, and the republics, being formerly states, in

    16 fact, according to the constitution and the law, the

    17 republics struggled to allow as little funds as

    18 possible to go to Belgrade and to get as much as

    19 possible from the joint treasury, and the federal

    20 government was paralysed; the federal government was

    21 unable to meet because of these conflicts.

    22 Three years later, Kardelj, that is the No. 2

    23 man in Yugoslavia, said, "Comrades, our vision on the

    24 withering away of nations is utopian. Not only are the

    25 nations not withering away, in fact, they are

  101. 1 strengthening because they are becoming modern

    2 industrial nations, and the more modern and the more

    3 developed a nation is in the economic, cultural,

    4 educational and every other sense, the stronger it

    5 becomes. Therefore, our thesis on the withering away

    6 of nations should be rejected. We must accept

    7 reality."

    8 He proposed a project with two principal

    9 premises: Yugoslavia can be saved only as a

    10 confederation or as a union of sovereign states, and

    11 the federal government and the federal institutions

    12 must become no more than green tables at which the

    13 republics will negotiate, reach agreements, and decide

    14 jointly. That was the first premise.

    15 The second was, "We are wrong with regard to

    16 the market," and again I'm quoting him, because I

    17 remember it well, "The market mechanism is the law of

    18 survival of human society," and then he went on to say,

    19 and I'm not quoting him anymore: Therefore, without

    20 respect for market mechanisms, we will fall apart.

    21 Therefore, these two things, are market mechanism of

    22 the Western type and, number 2, a confederation.

    23 But then, Mr. President, you will ask: Why

    24 didn't he come forth with a third premise on a

    25 multi-party system when he had resigned to accept these

  102. 1 two? Answer: It was not possible. Again, there was

    2 fear of disintegration of the country and of the

    3 Communist authorities losing power. They were powerful

    4 and they thought that, in time, they would achieve

    5 their goal without a multi-party system.

    6 And then a non-party democracy was proclaimed,

    7 a self-management democracy.

    8 Q. Let us digress to make things clearer. Could

    9 we call your positions of the '50s and '60s as being

    10 the positions of a man believing in Yugoslavia and the

    11 chances of that state functioning properly?

    12 A. I was a member of two commissions because

    13 after Kardelj, Rankovic was removed, he was the

    14 vice-president of the republic, and, in fact, he had

    15 control over the Secret Police, the UDBA, and then the

    16 central committee decided -- or, rather, a year before

    17 that, that Yugoslavia should adopt the market

    18 mechanism, and a commission was formed, of which I was

    19 a member, to draft a project of transition from the

    20 economic system in force at the time into a new kind of

    21 economic system in which the market would be the

    22 dominant force. That was the one commission.

    23 On the day that Rankovic fell, by decision of

    24 the central committee, I became a member of another

    25 commission, the task of which was to study the question

  103. 1 of the future of the League of Communists, and a year

    2 later, we came to the conclusion that the party should

    3 be withdrawn from enterprises, that it should become a

    4 kind of educational, ideological propaganda

    5 organisation without having actual power.

    6 Riding on that wave of democratisation of the

    7 party and market mechanism on the other hand,

    8 nationalist feelings were given vent to, in Croatia --

    9 a nationalist movement came into being in Croatia in

    10 favour of a settlement of accounts; in Slovenia as well

    11 as in Serbia, a wave of liberalism came to the fore;

    12 and I must say that for six years, there wasn't a

    13 single case of arrest for any political offences

    14 because there was this wave of democracy which

    15 overpowered the police and the party, and that

    16 democratic wave also tended towards the same goal.

    17 Q. A multi-party system and disintegrating

    18 processes?

    19 A. Yes.

    20 Q. Can you explain why Tito interrupted that

    21 democratic wave or what is known as "the Croatian

    22 Spring"?

    23 A. Tito was a rare politician, an autocrat but

    24 an enlightened autocrat who had been through the Second

    25 World War, he was wounded in it, he had seen the

  104. 1 killing of the Second World War, he had witnessed the

    2 people of Yugoslavia, he understood all those things

    3 very, very well, and he came to the conclusion that in

    4 Yugoslavia, another conflict was in the offing.

    5 Kardelj imbued him with fear by saying that

    6 things rather like the Potefi clubs in Hungary were

    7 emerging or something like the Czech Spring and that

    8 two dangers were threatening: the danger of an

    9 internal conflict and the danger of a Soviet

    10 intervention, and that is why all processes should be

    11 brought to a halt except one, except one. Even the

    12 market mechanism should be halted, the process of

    13 democratisation, the withering away of the party. Some

    14 of the power that had been taken away from it was

    15 restored, but there was one thing only that shouldn't

    16 be touched, and that was the course of creating a

    17 confederation as the safest way of preserving

    18 Yugoslavia; and in that context and in line with those

    19 policies, the 1974 constitution was promulgated which

    20 has very many confederate elements of which I should

    21 like to name three:

    22 First, the right of veto of each member of

    23 the federation which meant, in practice, that an

    24 Albanian who later became the president of Yugoslavia

    25 could veto any federal decision, even an initiative

  105. 1 could be vetoed.

    2 Secondly, strict parity, the so-called ethnic

    3 key. In Yugoslavia, the differences between the

    4 smallest and the largest republic is 16, between

    5 Montenegro and Serbia, for instance. But they had an

    6 equal number of members in the government, in the state

    7 presidency, even ambassadorial posts. This ethnic key

    8 was applied throughout in the belief -- this was

    9 something that both he and Kardelj were aware of --

    10 that things should be developed towards a

    11 confederation; and then later on, if the republics

    12 wanted a multi-party system, they would have one. But

    13 the most important thing was to prevent an inter-ethnic

    14 conflict, and in their view - they were naive in their

    15 belief, as history will show - they believed that it

    16 could be saved if this confederate system was

    17 established. The 1974 constitution was promulgated,

    18 the process of liberalisation was halted, and a

    19 bureaucratic blow was inflicted or a firm-hand policy

    20 was applied which lasted until his death.

    21 But it is noteworthy, it was not the federal

    22 centre that applied this firm-hand policy, it was the

    23 republican centres. They applied this course, and

    24 thereby strengthened the powers of the republics

    25 against the federation.

  106. 1 Q. So we now come to the beginning of the end.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: Perhaps -- it is ten to four.

    3 We could perhaps have a break, unless your next

    4 question is very brief. If not, we will have a break

    5 now.

    6 MR. NOBILO: I think, Mr. President, this is

    7 the best time to break because we have just come to a

    8 new heading, which I have noted for myself, "The

    9 beginning of the end of Yugoslavia." Thank you.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: All right. We will suspend the

    11 hearing.

    12 I remind you, Professor, you have

    13 mentioned -- you said you have given three examples but

    14 I've only put down two. You said three points, and I

    15 only put down two: equality and the ethnic

    16 distribution of all post -- I forgot the third. You

    17 can remind me when we come back.

    18 --- Recess taken at 3.52 p.m.

    19 --- On resuming at 4.17 p.m.

    20 JUDGE JORDA: Please be seated. Have the

    21 accused brought in, please?

    22 (The accused entered court)

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Nobilo?

    24 MR. NOBILO: Thank you, Mr. President.

    25 Q. So we come to something that can be called

  107. 1 the beginning of the end of Yugoslavia. During Tito's

    2 lifetime, a group of Serb politicians tried to gain

    3 some important changes from him and a revision of the

    4 1974 constitution. What happened?

    5 A. I must explain to the President of this

    6 Honourable Court and give him an answer to the question

    7 that he put to me regarding confederation and

    8 federation. The constitutional definition of the state

    9 of Yugoslavia and the constitutional definition of the

    10 republics was worded such that the republics were

    11 states with the right to secession. And proceeding

    12 from such a constitutional definition, it was logical

    13 that constitutional provisions should be passed which

    14 implemented that concept, and those are the right to

    15 veto from the level of initiatives onwards; secondly,

    16 not a proportionate, but a parity principle of

    17 representation in federal bodies; and third, a special

    18 procedure which determined the process of negotiation

    19 among the republics and provinces within the

    20 federation.

    21 Such a constitutional structure met with

    22 resistance in Serbia. The leaders in Serbia, two years

    23 after the 1974 constitution was adopted, launched an

    24 initiative for a minor revision of the constitution

    25 along two main lines. First, the things that were

  108. 1 overly decentralised should be reduced so that the

    2 greater rights should be restored to the federation;

    3 secondly, that the autonomy of Serb provinces, that

    4 is Kosovo and Vojvodina, should be limited, but Tito

    5 rejected this idea in 1976 when he was 85 years old.

    6 And, of course, political shrewdness told the

    7 initiators of the reform that Tito's days were numbered

    8 and that they should wait. He had vast powers, so that

    9 no one could halt the process of confederalisation

    10 while he was alive, he and Kardelj. And they were

    11 quite old at the time.

    12 Q. What happened after Tito's death?

    13 A. After Tito's death, a serious economic crisis

    14 broke out. A 20-billion-dollar debt was incurred. The

    15 state of Yugoslavia was no longer able to service those

    16 debts. Basic raw materials, especially fuel and oil,

    17 could not be imported. This economic crisis, in

    18 itself, forced the ruling class in Yugoslavia to come

    19 to grips with the problem.

    20 Secondly, in 1981, a revolt broke out in

    21 Kosovo and, as a result, the Serb question emerged

    22 into the front, and the leadership of Serbia renewed

    23 its idea of a constitutional revision. As it was not

    24 possible to amend the constitution without the

    25 agreement of all the republics, including both

  109. 1 provinces, a six-year-old tug-of-war started between

    2 Serbia and the other republics and provinces, when all

    3 the republics and the provinces of Serbia took up a

    4 position warfare, if I may call it that. They dug

    5 their heels into the constitution, and they completely

    6 blocked Serbia's initiative for an amendment or a

    7 revision of the constitution.

    8 In the meantime, led by the widespread

    9 conviction that, as a confederation, Yugoslavia had

    10 become an anti-Serb state which does not recognise

    11 what is Serbia's by right because of its strength, and

    12 in the belief that Serbia was the only one that had

    13 been broken up into three states, that is, Serbia

    14 proper and two provinces which had the status of

    15 federal units; thirdly, that in all the republics, the

    16 first signs were emerging of what was then called

    17 particularism, separatism. In Slovenia, a liberal

    18 movement started to develop. In Croatia, too, there

    19 were certain signs, but it was rather passive, on the

    20 whole. It just firmly held on to the 1974

    21 constitution.

    22 In short, all the republics defended the

    23 constitution so that a popular movement started in

    24 Serbia against the constitution on the grounds of the

    25 premise that the constitution meant the putting into

  110. 1 effect of the old idea of the Komintern to break up

    2 Yugoslavia. As you know, the Komintern asked the

    3 Communist Party of Yugoslavia to break up Yugoslavia,

    4 and the leading politicians in those days were Croats

    5 and Slovenes, Kardelj, Tito, Bakaric, and others.

    6 It was in response to this movement that

    7 Milosevic appeared and who set in practice -- said and

    8 implemented the principle that he would no longer

    9 negotiate an amendment of the constitution with the

    10 republics. He said, "I may negotiate, but I must go

    11 outside the existing institutions." And a large scale

    12 movement developed which enjoyed the absolute support

    13 of the Serb Orthodox Church, the Serb Academy of

    14 Sciences which, in 1985, drafted the famous memorandum

    15 which, in fact, was a project designed to eliminate the

    16 decentralisation in Yugoslavia. So that a movement

    17 rallying hundreds of thousands of people were held, two

    18 of which, one in Belgrade, one in Kosovo, rallied more

    19 than a million people.

    20 Milosevic said, "Unless we can achieve it

    21 otherwise, we will have to resort to force." Milosevic

    22 reckoned that he had at least four or five aces in his

    23 hand, which were so powerful and so frightening for the

    24 other republics. First of all, he had international

    25 support, that is of both the west and the east, not

  111. 1 support of him as a person, but support of Yugoslavia,

    2 which was a pet of the west and the east. So that

    3 anyone defending Yugoslavia, in this case, Milosevic,

    4 would surely enjoy the support of the whole world until

    5 the very end of both the Warsaw treaty countries and

    6 the NATO treaty countries. That was the first ace he

    7 held.

    8 Secondly, "I can count on the Communist Party

    9 of Yugoslavia," he thought, the party that had created

    10 Yugoslavia and in which the Yugoslav spirit has not

    11 died. Thirdly, I have created a popular national

    12 movement to deal with the Serb question in

    13 Yugoslavia. Fourthly, he thought, "I have the JNA,"

    14 which had raised to the highest possible level of

    15 socialism and Yugoslavia. It was at the top of the

    16 pyramid of its beliefs, and that army would defend both

    17 socialism and Yugoslavia, and this was confirmed by the

    18 army leadership. "Also, I have the Yugoslav capital

    19 and the bank of issue." Having that very, very strong

    20 hand of cards in his hand and very powerful arguments

    21 to support his views, it would be possible to achieve

    22 his goals without an armed struggle, because the

    23 balance of forces was such that the other republics had

    24 much lesser strength and would have to give way. That

    25 is how he reckoned.

  112. 1 In the meantime, a Copernik-like

    2 about-turn took place. The International Community

    3 developed in such a way that, in the east, communism

    4 fell in 1989. The League of Communists broke up in

    5 January 1990. All that remained was the JNA, and the

    6 all-Serb national movement. Those two instruments

    7 were still in evidence. The others had collapsed.

    8 After Milosevic took over power, he

    9 continued -- you may not know this. When, in Croatia,

    10 the new forces of the HDZ won and when, in Slovenia,

    11 the old regime fell, a series of sessions started among

    12 the new heads of state or, rather, new heads of

    13 republics and provinces in those days. When Milosevic

    14 continued with his prior policy of trying to persuade

    15 the republics to carry out a reform, while at the same

    16 time preparing for other alternatives, in specific

    17 terms, for struggle. I could almost end there,

    18 because, as far as I know, you will be hearing another

    19 testimony that follows on from what I have said.

    20 Your Honours, I can say the following: I'm

    21 not here to defend anybody's views, because I would be

    22 betraying my profession if I did, but I must say that

    23 when I reviewed everything, once again, I came to the

    24 conclusion that, from the beginning, Yugoslavia was in

    25 a crisis and that it eternally lived in a crisis, but

  113. 1 that it survived, to a great degree, thanks to the big

    2 powers. Because Tito, in 1945, joined the Soviet bloc

    3 without any reservations. When he left the Soviet

    4 bloc, and as Stalin did not wage war against him, he

    5 then sought not to join NATO or the Warsaw Treaty, and

    6 he opted for the policy of non-alignment, managing in

    7 1961 to hold the first non-aligned summit, and that was

    8 his policy.

    9 But regardless of the fact that Yugoslavia

    10 was a non-aligned country, it could not emerge from the

    11 grips of the Cold War. The tendencies towards a

    12 multi-party system, which could have provoked a civil

    13 war, would have been an ideal excuse for Soviet

    14 intervention. So that he had to hold on to power

    15 firmly so that the country would not break up.

    16 That is my professional conviction. I have

    17 tried to be impartial, and I hope, maybe wrongly, that

    18 I have succeeded.

    19 Thank you, Mr. President and Your Honours.

    20 Q. Thank you, Professor. If I have understood

    21 well, your main conclusion emanating from the research

    22 that you have done, not for the needs of this Court,

    23 but for your own scientific studies was that Yugoslavia

    24 was not a natural entity and it could not survive

    25 without dictatorship. Under conditions of democracy,

  114. 1 Yugoslavia, as a state, could not survive.

    2 A. Let me add, that was a clash of ideas, ideas

    3 as to what Yugoslavia is. For the majority of the

    4 ruling class in Serbia, the rule was, either Yugoslavia

    5 over which we shall dominate or no Yugoslavia at all.

    6 The state ideas of Croatia, Slovenia and, later on,

    7 Macedonia were quite the contrary. Either a federal or

    8 confederate Yugoslavia or no Yugoslavia at all. So

    9 these are two different approaches to Yugoslavia,

    10 Yugoslavianism, two concepts which were contrarily at

    11 war with one another. And the end came as the way we

    12 know it did.

    13 MR. NOBILO: Thank you, Professor.

    14 Mr. President, we have completed our

    15 examination-in-chief. I have several maps here that we

    16 have shown you on the monitor. I have one copy of

    17 each, but by tomorrow, we will have small copies for

    18 the Judges, Your Honours, and the Prosecution.

    19 Could the usher please take these maps from

    20 me. The Defence is tendering these exhibits into

    21 evidence.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Registrar, these maps have

    23 been presented by the Defence as evidence. I suppose

    24 that you're going to number them. I also suppose there

    25 is no objection on the part of the Prosecution to that.

  115. 1 MR. KEHOE: No objection, Mr. President.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Once the registrar

    3 has given each of these maps a number -- you don't have

    4 to do it, of course, right now, Mr. Dubuisson.

    5 Now, Professor, you are now going to be asked

    6 questions by the Office of the Prosecutor. That is,

    7 Mr. Kehoe is going to conduct the cross-examination.

    8 MR. KEHOE: Thank you, Mr. President, Your

    9 Honours.

    10 Cross-examined by Mr. Kehoe:

    11 Q. Good afternoon, Doctor. I haven't had the

    12 pleasure to meet you. My name is Greg Kehoe. My

    13 colleagues to my right are Mr. Andrew Cayley, and to

    14 his right is Mark Harmon. On behalf of the Office of

    15 the Prosecutor, welcome.

    16 A. Thank you.

    17 Q. Doctor, I sat with interest on the historical

    18 level of your recitation, and I'd like to ask you a

    19 couple of questions, if I may, concerning some aspects

    20 of your testimony.

    21 If we can go back, initially, to the question

    22 that was asked by my learned friend, Mr. Nobilo, at the

    23 end of his direct examination, and that had to do with

    24 your ultimate conclusion concerning the survival of

    25 Yugoslavia.

  116. 1 Tell me if I'm incorrect in this regard,

    2 Doctor, please. Your conclusion would appear to be

    3 that Yugoslavia could only survive either as a

    4 dictatorship or as some type of loose confederation; is

    5 that correct?

    6 A. Well, the fact is, I would ask another

    7 question, and that is that there were a lot of actors,

    8 political actors on the scene in Yugoslavia, all the

    9 republics, the provinces, the International Community

    10 and so on and so forth.

    11 Had Ante Markovic, the Prime Minister of the

    12 day, who had strong support from the United States of

    13 America in concrete terms, President Bush, and Baker,

    14 and the European community, the International Community

    15 did what it could at the time to save Yugoslavia.

    16 The idea was, which was accepted by Markovic,

    17 that a transition take place into a pluralistic state

    18 of the western democracy type, but that the federal

    19 set-up should remain.

    20 Had Milosevic and the leaders of Serbia taken

    21 long-term negotiations as an option, perhaps a solution

    22 could have been found. But it, too, one day would have

    23 to end in the way that such a state would enter the

    24 European Union, which would, once again -- which would

    25 bring it peace.

  117. 1 Q. Nevertheless, Doctor, after 1990 and the

    2 first free elections in the former Yugoslavia and the

    3 setting up of republics, there was a series of meetings

    4 between the republics, including President Milosevic,

    5 where very vigorous attempts were made to save

    6 Yugoslavia; isn't that right?

    7 A. I think that those negotiations were more

    8 a ruse than the truthful desire to retain Yugoslavia.

    9 In fact, Milosevic wanted to break down Markovic, the

    10 Prime Minister, because he thought that Markovic wanted

    11 to establish capitalism and break down socialism.

    12 Slovenia and Croatia wanted to overthrow

    13 Markovic because they considered that he was the pillar

    14 of Yugoslavia, which it would be difficult to maintain;

    15 and through coordinated action on the part of Serbia,

    16 Croatia and Slovenia, he did not succeed in what he set

    17 out to do.

    18 Therefore, in Yugoslavia, there are still

    19 polemics to this day. Polemics have started. Was it

    20 possible to avoid the disintegration of Yugoslavia and

    21 the war? Well, in science, in the realm of science,

    22 not social sciences, but science, we can do the test

    23 again, repeat the test and see if something succeeds or

    24 not.

    25 But in a society, you cannot repeat your

  118. 1 experiments, and it is difficult to turn the film back

    2 to the pre-war situation, to see whether something

    3 could have worked or not.

    4 I think that the thesis remains that

    5 Milosevic stuck to the course of either having a

    6 socialist Yugoslavia or no Yugoslavia at all. That was

    7 his key opinion and key stand on political orientation

    8 and concept. And he considered that Serbia had really

    9 come to a position of inequality and that had to be

    10 changed, altered. And the fact that that meant a

    11 deterioration for the other republics, I think that a

    12 conflict was imminent.

    13 And the actors in this Yugoslav drama

    14 aspired, either to gain time, or through negotiation to

    15 achieve what they wanted, rather than having truthful

    16 ideas about Yugoslavia. And the Yugoslav forces were

    17 less strong than the anti-Yugoslavia forces in the

    18 sense of defending a federate or confederate

    19 Yugoslavia. The balance of power was negative for

    20 those forces who wished to retain Yugoslavia as a

    21 confederate unit, state unit.

    22 Q. You mentioned, Doctor, again in one of your

    23 last answers in response to questions by my learned

    24 friend, that when Milosevic was deciding what to do, he

    25 had five aces that he could use -- I should live to see

  119. 1 the day when I have five aces. Nevertheless, he had

    2 five aces, and I think you called them -- I think one

    3 of the ones that you mentioned was he had the

    4 nationalistic movement behind him; is that right?

    5 A. Yes, that's right.

    6 Q. So after these free elections in 1990 and

    7 after these meetings, including these six republic

    8 meetings during 1991 where the republics were

    9 attempting to hold Yugoslavia together, Milosevic was

    10 fuelling the nationalistic passions of the Serbs which

    11 led to the concept of a Greater Serbia; is that right?

    12 A. Yes, that's right.

    13 Q. Now, was this also taking place: The JNA was

    14 making entrees into various regions such as the

    15 Krajina?

    16 A. Yes. But you are going to have a separate

    17 expose on that. I think that the military piques of

    18 the JNA, up until the outbreak of the war, the military

    19 piques were not decided and they wavered between being

    20 an instrument of Serbia straight-away or to attempt to

    21 save Yugoslavia in a way that was not able to succeed.

    22 Let me remind you of a discussion I had with

    23 a group of some 10 to 15 Generals, the top army

    24 leadership in Zagreb, General Kolsak, I came to them

    25 for talks -- in fact, they were not talks but a

  120. 1 ceremonial occasion, and I said, "Comrades Generals, I

    2 know that you would like to have socialism, both

    3 socialism and Yugoslavia, and I have nothing against

    4 you remaining with those goals in mind, but be careful

    5 because one man will destroy both, both sacred ideals,

    6 and that is Slobodan Milosevic." None of the Generals

    7 had anything to say against that.

    8 I am not going to attach great importance to

    9 this chance meeting with the Generals of the JNA on

    10 that particular occasion, but you know that the

    11 Generals did try to convince Milosevic not to amputate

    12 Slovenia because, allegedly -- and as an historian, I

    13 haven't got documents to bear this out -- but it seems

    14 to be the widespread opinion, public opinion, that

    15 Serbia, before the war, agreed to have Slovenia step

    16 down from Yugoslavia and that Serbia would do nothing

    17 to prevent Slovenia from leaving Yugoslavia. However,

    18 that is outside the realm of history.

    19 Without documents, as a historian, I would

    20 not venture to give an opinion on that, how far that is

    21 true and how far it isn't.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: I have a question of form I

    23 would like to ask. When you answer, Professor, I would

    24 appreciate your facing the Judges.

    25 THE WITNESS: I do apologise.

  121. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Please continue.

    2 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.

    3 Q. Doctor, bear with me. At the outset of your

    4 testimony, you noted that you were giving one possible

    5 interpretation to the break-up of Yugoslavia, and I

    6 would just like to ask you about some other aspects of

    7 possible interpretations as well, okay, if that's

    8 okay?

    9 Nevertheless, the passions that were being

    10 fuelled on a nationalistic level affected Croatia with

    11 the formation of the Kninska Krajina; is that right?

    12 A. I apologise, but I did not understand your

    13 question. In Croatia, it is true that nationalism

    14 developed on the basis of the idea of creating a

    15 national state and in response to the danger which came

    16 from Serbia. That is certain.

    17 Q. In the Krajina, Doctor, the Serbs that were

    18 in the Kninska Krajina, which is in the Republic of

    19 Croatia, rejected the constitution that was voted upon

    20 in the Republic of Croatia?

    21 A. I apologise. The Cazinska Krajina is almost

    22 100 per cent Muslim and not Serb, Cazinska Krajina.

    23 Q. The part of the Krajina that incorporates

    24 Knin, if I'm mispronouncing this.

    25 A. Ah, yes. That is true then.

  122. 1 Q. Now, sir, during that, the Serbs in around

    2 Knin attempted to set up their own state; is that

    3 correct?

    4 A. Yes, that's correct.

    5 Q. And you wrote a paper along with various

    6 other individuals in 1991 called "Croatia - Between War

    7 and Independence" where you discussed the creation of

    8 that state in conjunction with the rise of Serb

    9 nationalism; is that correct?

    10 A. Yes.

    11 Q. And to be fair, Doctor, you are not the only

    12 author of that, there were several of your colleagues

    13 who were also authors of that piece; is that right?

    14 A. I can't quite recall the article you have in

    15 mind, but if you tell me the substance of the article,

    16 I will be able to say whether it was mine or not.

    17 Q. Certainly. It is a paper that came from the

    18 University of Zagreb, it is in English, the document is

    19 called "Croatia - Between War and --"

    20 A. Yes, yes, I know it, and that's right.

    21 Q. You are the first author in a list of

    22 authors.

    23 A. Yes, that's right.

    24 Q. And, Doctor, in that paper, you concluded

    25 that the formation of a state, such as the Serbs in

  123. 1 Krajina, within the Republic of Croatia, was an

    2 intolerable situation for the Republic of Croatia, did

    3 you not?

    4 A. Yes, I did.

    5 Q. And I think you stated in that paper that

    6 "the territorial integrity of the present Republic of

    7 Croatia has its historical and political legality and

    8 the ethnic structure of its individual parts does not

    9 provide any arguments for any kinds of territorial

    10 changes at the cost of Croatia."

    11 Now, you wrote that in 1991. Do you believe

    12 that now, sir?

    13 A. Yes.

    14 Q. So, sir, disagreements between -- I'm sorry,

    15 go ahead. Sorry.

    16 A. We are not dealing here with what I want to

    17 be and whether I agree with the process or not, but if

    18 an analysis leads to the fact that a movement or a

    19 political party wishes to step down, we're talking

    20 about the Knin Serbs from the composition of Croatia,

    21 then objectively speaking, this leads to war.

    22 Let me remind you that this has a long

    23 historical background. The Serbs in Knin, especially

    24 in the Knin area, Serbs in Croatia, in the partisan

    25 war, had, apart from the Knin Serbs, had a lofty role.

  124. 1 They were all within the Communist Party and supported

    2 it.

    3 However, the Serbs in Knin, in 1939, when the

    4 well-known banovina of Croatia was formed, asked for

    5 secession, the Knin Serbs. Second, when the

    6 disintegration of Yugoslavia came about, the Knin

    7 Serbs - in fact the Chetniks - asked to be separated

    8 from Croatia and attached to Italy. This was in 1941.

    9 Furthermore, in 1944, there was an uprising,

    10 a revolt against the partisan Croatia. So this is a

    11 long-standing tendency, for Serbs in Croatia not to see

    12 the possibility of a livelihood outside the protection

    13 of Belgrade, and they are ready to lay down their lives

    14 in order to retain Yugoslavia.

    15 As this process of the disintegration of

    16 Yugoslavia was more or less obvious, they counted

    17 upon - and they did this in 1990 - some texts were

    18 written, they thought they would form their autonomous

    19 province which would become part and parcel of Serbia

    20 immediately. However, Serbia was not able to take them

    21 in or accept a solution of this kind.

    22 Q. Just going back, Doctor, to the Serbs in the

    23 Krajina. They first announced their unification as a

    24 culturally autonomous entity; correct?

    25 A. Yes. For the most part, yes.

  125. 1 Q. And thereafter, they brought into the Knin

    2 area the formulation and the establishment of the

    3 Republic of Serb Krajina, and with that, all of the

    4 trappings of a government?

    5 A. Yes, a state.

    6 Q. This particular situation, according to the

    7 paper that you wrote in 1991, was an intolerable

    8 situation for the Republic of Croatia, was it not?

    9 A. That's right.

    10 Q. To magnify the problem, Doctor, you

    11 discussed, in that paper, the issue of and the

    12 participation of the Yugoslav People's Army, the JNA;

    13 is that right?

    14 A. Yes.

    15 Q. And it was your opinion, at the writing of

    16 this, that the JNA in the Knin area was merely acting

    17 as an army for the Serbs and to protect the Serbs and

    18 was participating in the ethnic cleansing of Croats

    19 from the Krajina area; is that right?

    20 A. That's right.

    21 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, I would like to

    22 remain within the scope of the examination-in-chief.

    23 MR. KEHOE: If you can bear with me,

    24 Mr. President, I am offering -- it was a possible

    25 interpretation offered by the witness concerning the

  126. 1 decline and fall, and if you bear with me during my

    2 cross, I will take this around and complete the circle.

    3 JUDGE JORDA: But what was stated here -- the

    4 articles we are talking about were not tendered in

    5 evidence. We don't have to really go through an

    6 exegesis of what the Professor wrote in all the various

    7 articles. Please remain within the scope -- as much as

    8 possible at least, remain within the scope of the

    9 examination-in-chief.

    10 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. I'm just

    11 going into another interpretation of events.

    12 Q. You noted in your article, and I quote: "A

    13 problem of ethnic cleansing should be stressed here;

    14 that is, firstly, forcing Croats and all other ethnic

    15 groups to flee so that only Serbs remain; and secondly,

    16 settling Serb colonists in the emptied areas." Do

    17 you remember writing that, sir?

    18 A. Yes. Yes, I do.

    19 Q. You concluded that this use of the armed

    20 forces to move the Croats out of the Krajina and the

    21 subsequent resettlement of those areas by the Serbs was

    22 ethnic cleansing; is that right?

    23 A. Well, we'd have to clarify what we mean,

    24 Mr. President, by "ethnic cleansing." If an ethnic

    25 group is forced to relocate itself on another area,

  127. 1 then I think that this could be qualified as "ethnic

    2 cleansing."

    3 Q. Doctor, I don't disagree with you. I'm just

    4 asking you some questions based on what you wrote. I

    5 agree with you that it is ethnic cleansing, and I'm

    6 simply asking you the questions as an expert, as a man

    7 that knows more than I do.

    8 A. Thank you.

    9 Q. Doctor, let's turn, if you will, you talked

    10 about the -- part of your enviable five aces, you

    11 talked about the rise of nationalism that was happening

    12 with the Serbs and Milosevic's playing on that rise of

    13 nationalism, and I'd like to talk to you now about the

    14 nationalistic movement in Croatia.

    15 Now, while there was a nationalistic movement

    16 in Serbia that Milosevic was fuelling, there was also a

    17 large nationalistic movement in Croatia as well; is

    18 that right?

    19 A. That's right.

    20 Q. There were individuals in Croatia at that

    21 time that wanted to reform Croatia to make it look like

    22 something similar to the banovina plan of 1939, the

    23 sporasom of Cvetkovic-Macel in 1939; isn't that right?

    24 A. I don't know what period the Prosecutor has

    25 in mind. In Croatia, there did exist the idea of

  128. 1 following Macek's concept of a solution of the

    2 relationships between Serbia and Croatia on the basis

    3 of the division of Bosnia. That idea did exist.

    4 However, one must be aware of the fact that

    5 at times like that, when war is imminent, in the air,

    6 then the actors of that war have a whole spectrum of

    7 different ideas and concepts which are unrealistic and

    8 rational and irrational alike which are a ruse to trick

    9 the enemy, but precise documents have still not come to

    10 view, we still don't have them on a concept of that

    11 kind and who wished to realise this.

    12 Q. Bear with me one moment, Doctor.

    13 Mr. Dubuisson, may I have Prosecutor's

    14 Exhibit 16, please? I'm not sure -- well, Prosecutor's

    15 Exhibit 16. I'm not sure if the Defence just had an

    16 exhibit up there of the banovina, but we can use theirs

    17 as well. It's the same. What we're talking about is

    18 the banovina of 1939. I'll gladly use your map or

    19 mine. Yeah, that's the one.

    20 If we can take Exhibit 16 out and just put it

    21 on the ELMO, it would be helpful.

    22 Doctor, I realise that's not precisely an

    23 exhibit that you saw before today, but I think you will

    24 agree with me it's similar to other copies of a

    25 banovina plan as various cartographers have etched it

  129. 1 out.

    2 Doctor, if this is incorrect in any fashion,

    3 I'll gladly use the Defence copy. It really don't make

    4 a difference.

    5 A. This is the map of the banovinas of Croatia,

    6 and it is correct.

    7 Q. Okay.

    8 A. Correct.

    9 Q. Doctor, with the nationalistic movement that

    10 was rising in Croatia, there were politicians that

    11 wanted a reformation of Croatia so it would absorb much

    12 of Bosnia, so it would look like the banovina; is that

    13 right?

    14 A. Both yes and no. In fact, Croatian policy,

    15 during negotiations up to the downfall of the old

    16 regime and after the old regime, it had a clear-cut

    17 rigid stand, that the results of the Second World War

    18 should not be infringed with regard to the boundaries

    19 of the republic. So what the constitution of 1974

    20 confirmed as the results of the Second World War,

    21 Croatian policy considered this to be its primary goal,

    22 to retain them. Of course, there were some secret

    23 negotiations, and if this went further, I, as an

    24 historian, would have to have a document on that. But,

    25 of course, a lot was written about the subject and

  130. 1 spoken about the subject, that an idea of that kind did

    2 exist, and we would require documentation from the

    3 Vance-Owen Commission, secret talks with the Serb

    4 side, with the Kosovo side, and so on. This is a

    5 current political problem for which I am not competent

    6 because, as a historian, I would have to have documents

    7 to bear that out.

    8 Q. Doctor, one of the proponents for a carving

    9 up of Bosnia in the early '90s was President Tudjman,

    10 wasn't he?

    11 A. In formal terms, no, because at the

    12 beginning, he insisted on a confederation but

    13 respecting all the republics. This was at first. What

    14 happened later -- and I repeat -- secret and

    15 confidential exchanges of ideas and talks, one should

    16 wait for the documents to appear. Nowhere in any

    17 Croatian official documents passed by the parliament or

    18 any documentation issued by the government or even

    19 Tudjman himself, you cannot find anything beyond the

    20 view that Croatia cannot agree to a change of the

    21 borders of the former republics. That was the official

    22 position.

    23 Q. Doctor, bear with me one moment. If we can

    24 go to the first tape, and if I could ask the

    25 interpretation section to translate a portion of the

  131. 1 English into French and Bosnian/Serbo-Croatian, and the

    2 discussions, some of the discussions in any event, are

    3 in Bosnian/Serbo-Croatian. This is a tape,

    4 Mr. President, called "Dispatches," which was a show

    5 that was exhibited in the United Kingdom in January of

    6 1994. There will be two segments, and I'd like to talk

    7 about the first segment first.

    8 If we can dim the lights and, Doctor, if you

    9 can look at the monitor?

    10 (Videotape played)


    12 never given in the media, the complete truth about

    13 this. (Subtitles follow thereafter)

    14 MR. KEHOE:

    15 Q. Now, Doctor, what you are discussing during

    16 that is the secret meetings in Karadjordjevo on the

    17 10th and 11th of March, 1991, between President

    18 Milosevic of Serbia and President Tudjman of Croatia;

    19 is that right?

    20 A. Mr. President, I would like to stick to

    21 everything that I have said, that these were secret

    22 talks, that nothing is known about them, and I would

    23 just add that I think that this is a problem with

    24 several aspects to it. One of the aspects is, let us

    25 call it tactics or rules to avoid, a direct clash

  132. 1 between the two largest nations to come to some sort of

    2 an agreement, but I never saw any maps on the division

    3 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, nor did I have any such maps.

    4 These talks between the so-called

    5 delegations, they were so-called expert groups,

    6 transformed themselves into a sharp dialogue or

    7 confrontation so that the only topic was whether

    8 Croatia or Serbia or both or either of them would agree

    9 to the inviolability of the results of the Second World

    10 War. That was the crux of those talks. The Serb

    11 side did not clearly and emphatically ever say that it

    12 would respect the borders of the existing republics,

    13 because if they had, the war would not have occurred.

    14 Q. Well, Doctor, you attended a meeting, and

    15 pardon me if I mispronounce the name of this town,

    16 excuse me, Tikves, T-I-K-V-E-S, which is near Osijek,

    17 on about the 10th of April of 1991, as part of a

    18 Croatian delegation that met with a Serb delegation to

    19 examine maps and to determine which part was going to

    20 go to Serbia and which part was going to go to Croatia;

    21 isn't that right?

    22 A. No, it is not right. What is right is that

    23 meetings were held. I repeat that 95 per cent of the

    24 talks centred around the recognition of the 1974

    25 constitution, and the borders formed as a result of the

  133. 1 Second World War, as regards maps and any concrete

    2 divisions, they did not exist. There were only ethnic

    3 maps, which is quite natural that this should be

    4 discussed too, but I repeat, there are no other

    5 documents, as far as I know. We did not at all discuss

    6 a division in the sense of delineating borders between

    7 Serbia and Croatia in Bosnia-Herzegovina because I and

    8 my colleagues did not at all believe, and this was

    9 before the war, we did not believe in the realism of

    10 such a policy, and we thought that we shouldn't enter

    11 into it at all.

    12 Q. If I may, Doctor, and I can just move to this

    13 exhibit, which is -- whatever the next Prosecution

    14 Exhibit is?

    15 THE REGISTRAR: This is 464 and the other was

    16 463, for the video.

    17 MR. KEHOE: Mr. Dubuisson, just for

    18 record-keeping purposes, there is another clip on the

    19 same tape. I don't know if we want to give that second

    20 clip another number or make it A or B, whichever is

    21 easier.

    22 THE WITNESS: Mr. President, may I add

    23 something?

    24 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, of course.

    25 THE WITNESS: From my presentation, you were

  134. 1 able to see that for 150 years, continuously, Bosnia

    2 was appropriated, both by the Serbs and by the Croats.

    3 I spoke about the Austrian trialism and I omitted to

    4 mention that Stjepan Radic said the following. He

    5 wrote a book in 1908, a book entitled "Cvijic", in

    6 which he said that Bosnia and Herzegovina was the

    7 central Serb land.

    8 If you look at the map, you will see that

    9 Bosnia is west of Serbia and not a central Serb

    10 land.

    11 He added: It is not an Alsace and Lorraine,

    12 between France and Germany. Bosnia and Herzegovina is

    13 for Serbia what Podmoskovlje, the Moscow area, is for

    14 Russia.

    15 And Radic wrote a book, "The Vital Croatian

    16 Right to Bosnia-Herzegovina," within the concept of the

    17 creation of a third federal or confederate unit within

    18 the framework of Austro-Hungary. Ever since then,

    19 there has been an idea which has never disappeared, the

    20 idea of dividing Bosnia. These ideas existed on both

    21 the Serb and the Croatian side. Within that

    22 context, it is possible, but I repeat, I have no

    23 documents to that effect, and I cannot judge, but as an

    24 expert, I cannot express my views on such a document

    25 except by saying that in history there was a tendency

  135. 1 on the part of both Serbia and Croatia to divide Bosnia

    2 up or even to appropriate the whole of it.

    3 Q. Doctor, you gave an interview to the

    4 periodical Nacional that was published on the 25th of

    5 October, 1996, and that article is before you. I

    6 direct your attention to the second page of that

    7 article on the lower left-hand corner where it begins,

    8 and on to the headline, "The Greatest Disagreements."

    9 It begins, "Nacional" -- do you see that, Doctor? I

    10 don't want to move ahead until you have that. There is

    11 a BCS version contained in there. Excuse me, Doctor,

    12 this page. That's the page. It begins in the lower

    13 left-hand corner, Doctor, with "The Greatest

    14 Disagreements." The question from Nacional reads as

    15 follows -- and pardon me, Judge, this is an article I

    16 have yet to get translated into French.

    17 "Nacional: Could you say now who these

    18 people were? Answer: The Croatian Generals Fabijan

    19 Trgo, Ivan Kukoc. However, the greatest disagreements

    20 that Tudjman and I had occurred during the talks on

    21 Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the beginning of 1991,

    22 following his negotiations with Milosevic, it was

    23 agreed that two commissions should meet and discuss the

    24 division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Tudjman then told

    25 us that he had made an agreement with Milosevic in

  136. 1 principle and that we would have to work on the maps to

    2 work out the practical details.

    3 On the Serb side, the talks were attended

    4 by a member of the Serb academy, Kosta Mihajlovic,

    5 Milosevic's Chief of Cabinet, Kupresic, and pardon my

    6 pronunciation, Smilja Avramov and the deputy prime

    7 minister of Serbia. Three rounds of talks were held

    8 lasting ten hours each in Tikves and in Belgrade.

    9 However, these talks did not produce any results. One

    10 of the members of our delegation, Josip Sentija,

    11 resigned considering such talks absurd.

    12 I also tried to warn Tudjman that such talks

    13 were pointless. I told him that even if they had

    14 agreed in principle, it was impossible to implement the

    15 agreement, since there were problems with the maps

    16 which, in my opinion, could not be resolved.

    17 Endless talks ensued on which side some small

    18 valley belonged to, whether it was Serb or Croatian,

    19 who had the majority in the town. Moreover, they only

    20 let us have western Herzegovina. I warned Tudjman that

    21 there were three major obstacles to the division of

    22 Bosnia-Herzegovina and that only one obstacle was

    23 enough for their agreement to fall through. First of

    24 all, the problem of deciding on Croatian and Serb

    25 areas; second, the problem of what the Muslims would

  137. 1 say to everything. Tudjman replied that they would

    2 have nothing to say if the Croats and Serbs agreed.

    3 I pointed out the third problem, which was

    4 not as serious as the first two, but still remained a

    5 problem: What will the International Community say to

    6 the agreement? Tudjman replied that the world would

    7 accept any agreement coming out of this region."

    8 Do you remember giving that interview,

    9 Doctor?

    10 A. I have to tell you that in the next Nacional,

    11 it was stated that I denied some of the statements

    12 because this was an off-record conversation while we

    13 were having a whiskey. So I denied the reference to

    14 the generals and some other pieces contained in this

    15 article.

    16 I think that this is, how shall I put it,

    17 intellectual talk among relatively well-known

    18 intellectuals who gave themselves the freedom, the

    19 license of academics, and that this was no serious

    20 discussion. As you know, we gave up the idea and it

    21 failed. It was political tactics to delay the war and

    22 to gain time. Any day or month gained would justify

    23 these kind of tactics.

    24 Therefore, until we have official documents

    25 from the state, legal documents, all this remains

  138. 1 within the limits of guesswork.

    2 Q. Did you have this discussion with President

    3 Tudjman?

    4 A. Yes, but not in this form, and I repeat that

    5 the journalist took advantage of much of what was

    6 said. It was not an official interview. It was a talk

    7 with a group of journalists who gave themselves a lot

    8 of freedom in their interpretation of this.

    9 Tudjman had a principled position that an

    10 agreement needed to be achieved with Serbia, but

    11 specifically what should belong to whom, that never

    12 came up. This was just speculation, that the ethnic

    13 structure of Bosnia was such. You had the Trezin

    14 enclave, the Croat majority here, the Serb

    15 majority over there, but I repeat, maps did not exist

    16 on the division of Bosnia. That is what I claim under

    17 all possible oaths.

    18 Q. Doctor, President Tudjman wanted to divide

    19 Bosnia with President Milosevic, didn't he?

    20 A. I cannot confirm that. I repeat that

    21 Croatia's policy, from the first day, was that the

    22 republican borders must not be changed at any cost.

    23 Apart from that, there was just debating, arguing, so

    24 as to avoid war, so as to reach some sort of an

    25 agreement among two relatively large peoples and to

  139. 1 avoid a direct conflict between them. And maybe that

    2 was the design behind this whole action in connection

    3 with the talks over Bosnia.

    4 Q. Nevertheless --

    5 A. No documents. Without any documents, I

    6 think --

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Yes. We have understood,

    8 Professor. You've said it several times. I think we

    9 understood what you said.

    10 Would you please move to another question,

    11 Mr. Kehoe?

    12 MR. KEHOE:

    13 Q. Nevertheless, Doctor, nobody from the

    14 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina participated in these

    15 discussions in Karadjordjevo between President

    16 Milosevic and President Tudjman, and nobody from the

    17 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina participated in your

    18 discussions with the Serbs that took place less than a

    19 month after the meeting in Karadjordjevo; isn't that

    20 right?

    21 A. Yes. That is what I said, as far as I know,

    22 but whether there were talks between Milosevic and

    23 Izetbegovic and also between Tudjman and Izetbegovic, I

    24 don't know. But I do know, for instance, that in 1991,

    25 a delegation of Muslims sponsored by very prominent

  140. 1 figures from Bosnia-Herzegovina went to Belgrade to

    2 reach a compromise with Belgrade regarding the future

    3 position of Bosnia-Herzegovina. So that, too, is part

    4 of the political struggle containing elements of ploys

    5 and tactics.

    6 Q. Doctor, you were there in Tikves and in

    7 Belgrade, and nobody from the Bosnian government was

    8 there.

    9 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, the Prosecutor

    10 obviously doesn't like the answer, but Professor

    11 Bilandzic has, three or four times, said exactly what

    12 he knows about the whole problem. He is just repeating

    13 things, and this is a waste of time.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Yes. The objection is

    15 sustained. It's almost 5.30, in any case. I think

    16 we're going to break now, and we will resume tomorrow

    17 at 2.00.

    18 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Mr. President.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: The Court has been adjourned.

    20 You may not speak once the Court has been adjourned.

    21 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

    22 5.29 p.m. to be reconvened on Wednesday,

    23 the 9th day of September, 1998 at

    24 2.00 p.m.