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  1. 1 Monday, 21st September, 1998

    2 (Open session)

    3 --- Upon commencing at 2.09 p.m.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Have the accused brought in,

    5 please.

    6 (The accused entered court)

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Let us resume our work for a

    8 long afternoon. Let me say hello to the interpreters.

    9 (Translation feed difficulties)

    10 MR. HAYMAN: Now I'm getting English,

    11 Mr. President. I was getting BCS, so perhaps it's

    12 sorted out now.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: You know that the French is

    14 always a martyr language, but everything has been

    15 restored to order, I hope.

    16 In that case, we can resume our work.

    17 According to the registry, the public gallery is not

    18 receiving transmissions. For the moment, we do not

    19 have video transmissions in the public gallery. It

    20 will be delayed. Can the public gallery hear us now

    21 when we're speaking? Normally, they should be able

    22 to. Let us resume work.

    23 Let me remind you that the

    24 examination-in-chief of the witness, Brigadier Ivica

    25 Zeko -- Ivica Zeko; is that right? Ivica Zeko.



  2. 1 Mr. Nobilo, we can continue. I think that

    2 you were in charge of the examination-in-chief.

    3 MR. NOBILO: Yes, Mr. President. Thank you.

    4 Could I ask the usher to bring in Brigadier Zeko?

    5 (The witness entered court)

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Can you hear me, Brigadier?

    7 MR. NOBILO: No translation. Channel six?

    8 JUDGE JORDA: Can you hear me now?

    9 THE WITNESS: Yes.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Please be seated. We're going

    11 to resume our work. May I remind you that on the 11th

    12 of September, you were questioned by counsel for the

    13 accused who called you to testify in the trial -- there

    14 seems to be a technical problem. I'm getting the

    15 English interpretation.

    16 Let me continue. Has it been corrected? Is

    17 it all right now? Yes. Let us continue with the

    18 examination-in-chief of the Brigadier.

    19 I wish to remind you that you are still under

    20 oath.

    21 WITNESS: IVICA ZEKO

    22 Examined by Mr. Nobilo:

    23 MR. NOBILO: Thank you, Mr. President.

    24 Before we continue with the examination-in-chief, in

    25 reviewing the transcript, we noted a number of



  3. 1 imprecisions or, rather, two to them, which probably

    2 occurred either due to the interpretation or to the

    3 transcript.

    4 The first mistake is on page 11677 in the

    5 first paragraph, and to eliminate any dilemmas, let me

    6 ask a question. It appears from this that part of the

    7 7th Muslim and 17th Krajina Brigades were in Gacice and

    8 Stari Vitez.

    9 Q. My question is: Were parts of these units in

    10 Stari Vitez and Gacice, or did those units direct their

    11 activities towards those villages and those localities?

    12 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, these units were

    13 acting in the direction of those villages. They were

    14 not in Stari Vitez or Gacice.

    15 Q. Another error of the same kind on the next

    16 page, 11668, also at the beginning, it says that the

    17 306th Brigade was within the zone of the village of

    18 Grbavica, and it tried to break communications between

    19 Vitez and Busovaca and Vitez and Nova Bila; is that

    20 correct?

    21 A. No. The 306th Brigade was directed along

    22 that axis.

    23 Q. Thank you. Also, when you were listing all

    24 the brigades, you drew my attention, after last week's

    25 testimony, that all the brigades of the 3rd Corps had



  4. 1 not been drawn in, that there had been an error made

    2 where the maps were drawn.

    3 Would you please tell us which brigades of

    4 the 3rd Corps on the table that you presented here, a

    5 copy of which has been handed to the Prosecution, which

    6 brigades have been left out?

    7 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, the diagram

    8 showing the structure of the 3rd Corps has omitted to

    9 mention two brigades from Visoko, the 315th and the

    10 316th Mountain Brigade, also the 370th Brigade from

    11 Donji Vakuf, and the 311th Brigade from Kakanj. And

    12 also in the command of the 3rd Corps, there was an

    13 additional unit, a company for electronic activities.

    14 Q. Thank you. Let us continue with your

    15 presentation.

    16 MR. NOBILO: Could we have the monitor

    17 switched on, please, and the lights dimmed slightly?

    18 Mr. Dubuisson, can the lights be dimmed, please? Thank

    19 you. Can the monitor also be switched on so we can

    20 look at this map?

    21 Q. Will you please, in your own words, describe

    22 this, but let us just go back for a moment to recall

    23 the range of artillery of the Serbian forces and the BH

    24 army forces?

    25 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, this map shows



  5. 1 in red the units of the army of Republika Srpska, then

    2 also, the zone of operations of artillery weapons from

    3 the region of Rakovica, the village of Potkraj, using

    4 122 millimetre weapons and 122 mortars.

    5 Q. Brigadier, does this mean that Serbs from

    6 Rakovica could shell Kiseljak and Visoko?

    7 A. Yes.

    8 Q. Let us go on to Mount Vlasic. What were the

    9 positions of the artillery and what was their range?

    10 A. On Mount Vlasic, the Vlasic Plateau, the

    11 position of the Hamajndzic (phoen) Platoon, artillery

    12 pieces of 155 millimetre calibre were positioned

    13 there. The region of Majokrnja (phoen) next to the

    14 village of Bijelo Bucje, 155 millimetre howitzers and

    15 130 millimetre guns.

    16 Q. The 155 millimetre howitzers and 130

    17 millimetre guns that the Serbs had on Mount Vlasic, do

    18 they cover the town of Zenica in terms of the range of

    19 those artillery weapons?

    20 A. Yes.

    21 Q. Let us proceed.

    22 A. In yellow, we see the communications within

    23 the Lasva River Valley, which was the key supply route

    24 for both units and the population in the Lasva Valley.

    25 Most of the battles were fought over this route.



  6. 1 Q. Brigadier, from Croatia and from Herzegovina,

    2 was it possible to reach the Lasva Valley without

    3 passing along this road?

    4 A. No.

    5 Q. Please proceed.

    6 A. The blue indicates the special purpose

    7 production in the Lasva Valley.

    8 Q. What do you mean when you say "special

    9 purpose production"?

    10 A. I mean the military industry.

    11 Q. Will you describe where the military

    12 factories were and what they manufactured and who

    13 controlled each of those military factories?

    14 A. The Slobodan Princep Seljo factory in Bugojno

    15 produced anti-tank and anti-infantry mines, all kinds

    16 of fuses for mines, and hand grenades.

    17 Q. Who had control of that factory?

    18 A. It was controlled by the BH army. Next, the

    19 factory Bratsvo in Novi Travnik manufactured all types

    20 of artillery pieces from 60 to 152 millimetre calibre,

    21 launchers of 128 millimetre calibre, and the Oganj and

    22 Vatra (phoen) systems.

    23 Q. Those are rocket systems?

    24 A. Yes.

    25 Q. Who controlled that factory?



  7. 1 A. It was also under the control of the BH

    2 army. Then the Technical and Maintenance Institute at

    3 Travnik mainly dealt with signals devices for this

    4 area, that is, where devices for control and command

    5 over a brigade were assembled. And those devices or,

    6 rather, vehicles, they happened to be in that

    7 institute, that is, there were more than 20 of such

    8 communications vehicles.

    9 Q. Who controlled that factory which produced

    10 vehicles for communication centres?

    11 A. They were command vehicles, and the factory

    12 was under the control of the BH army, and they had full

    13 control over those vehicles.

    14 Q. Did the HVO receive a single of those

    15 vehicles with all the communications equipment inside?

    16 What about Bratsvo, Novi Travnik, who

    17 controlled it?

    18 A. The BH army controlled it.

    19 Q. One of your answers is missing from the

    20 transcript, so allow me to repeat the question, and

    21 will you please repeat the answer? My question is:

    22 Did the HVO receive a single vehicle which represented

    23 a command and communications centre for a brigade?

    24 A. No.

    25 Q. Thank you. Let us proceed. Which was the



  8. 1 next military factory in Central Bosnia?

    2 A. The next one is the Slobodan Princep Seljo

    3 factory in Vitez.

    4 Q. What did that factory manufacture?

    5 A. It manufactured military explosives.

    6 Q. Was it the only one in this part of Europe?

    7 A. Yes, at the time, the only one.

    8 Q. Under whose control was it?

    9 A. It was under the control of the HVO.

    10 Q. The next factory?

    11 A. The next factory for the military industry

    12 was in the Zenica Ironworks which manufactured castings

    13 for shells and charges for all calibre shells.

    14 Q. Of course, the BH army controlled that in

    15 Zenica?

    16 A. Yes.

    17 Q. The next factory?

    18 A. The next factory is the IGM in Konjic, a

    19 factory of ammunition which manufactured ammunition

    20 from 7.62 millimetres to 12.7 millimetre calibre and

    21 shells for anti-air defences and anti-air guns, that

    22 is, guns of 20 and 40 millimetre calibres.

    23 Q. Tell me now, these factories obviously form a

    24 military industrial chain of the former Yugoslavia,

    25 most of which was concentrated in Central Bosnia. Is



  9. 1 it possible to establish production of artillery and

    2 everything artillery needs without gaining control of

    3 the Slobodan Princep Seljo factory of explosives in

    4 Vitez?

    5 A. No.

    6 Q. Therefore, the BH army had the whole chain of

    7 production, with the exception of the explosives

    8 factory?

    9 A. Yes.

    10 Q. Let us continue with the zones of

    11 responsibility within the territory of Central Bosnia,

    12 and who had control of this key supply route?

    13 A. Indicated in green are the zones of

    14 responsibility of the BH army. The zone of

    15 responsibility of the 3rd Corps was inclusive of Gornji

    16 Vakuf and including Visoko. The 2nd Corps did not

    17 exclude Visoko, and its zone of responsibility was in

    18 the direction of Tuzla. The 1st Corps did not include

    19 Visoko, and parts of its brigade covered Vares and

    20 Kakanj.

    21 Q. We have now indicated the zones of

    22 responsibility of various operative groups and corps

    23 that can be seen from the map, but let us hear what

    24 your conclusion is. Was it possible to use the key

    25 supply route without passing through zones under the



  10. 1 control of the BH army?

    2 A. No.

    3 Q. Let us please continue with the Mujahedin

    4 units. Where were they and what did they signify in

    5 this area?

    6 A. These green circles stand for Mujahedin

    7 camps.

    8 Q. In your understanding, or the understanding

    9 of the people in the Lasva Valley, what does the word

    10 "Mujahedin" mean? How would you describe them? What

    11 significance did you attach to them and what was the

    12 purpose of their coming to the area?

    13 A. Mr. President, Your Honour, Mujahedin is the

    14 word that they themselves used. That is what they call

    15 themselves and their appearance was such that they wore

    16 unusual garb. They wore a beard and their clothing in

    17 general differed from the others. It was not typical

    18 of the clothing worn by a soldier that we would come

    19 across in the area. Also, the Islamic rights included

    20 a prohibition on the use of alcohol. Also, there were

    21 instructions given to Muslim combatants containing -- I

    22 may say that they -- the texts were frightening,

    23 especially for the Croatian people.

    24 Q. The local Muslims who had lived with you for

    25 centuries, how did they react to these Mujahedins from



  11. 1 foreign countries?

    2 A. They too were afraid of them and they were

    3 not glad to see them in the neighbouring villages and

    4 other localities.

    5 MR. HAYMAN: Mr. President, just so this

    6 error in the transcript doesn't go uncorrected, the

    7 witness said "these texts were frightening," t-e-x-t-s,

    8 and it was transcribed as the attacks were frightening.

    9 He was referring to the written instructions given to

    10 members of these units and the word was text not

    11 attacks.

    12 MR. NOBILO: I would like now to ask the

    13 registrar to take the document we are going to produce

    14 now. These are the basic instructions given to a

    15 Muslim combatant.

    16 Q. While these are being prepared and

    17 distributed, can you please tell me whether these

    18 Mujahedins were blamed by the Croatian people for most

    19 of the crimes they had perpetrated against the

    20 civilians?

    21 A. Yes.

    22 Q. Did they introduce new customs, that they

    23 would kidnap a young woman and take her from the

    24 village and give some money to the father?

    25 A. Yes, they were taking not women, mostly young



  12. 1 women, age 14 to 15.

    2 THE REGISTRAR: The document is D184.

    3 MR. NOBILO:

    4 Q. I would like to draw your attention to the

    5 second paragraph where it says the relation towards the

    6 enemy civilians and also point to -- let me read it

    7 now to you -- and could you tell us whether you've

    8 already seen that document; if so, where and when? So,

    9 "the relations towards the enemy civilians, the women

    10 and the children, as well as all the other civilians

    11 that helped the enemy can be killed and they ought to

    12 be treated in the same way as the attackers." And

    13 towards the end there is a seal, which is a very

    14 specific and characteristic one.

    15 Now, Brigadier, tell me, did you see this

    16 document during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    17 A. Yes.

    18 Q. Could you please tell us where and when and

    19 how did you get this document?

    20 A. I received this document from the citizens of

    21 Travnik, who, at that time, received it from a

    22 neighbour of theirs, I mean this brochure.

    23 Q. Did the Croatian people in the Central Bosnia

    24 know about the deeds of the Mujahedins and about such

    25 instructions?



  13. 1 A. Of this particular document, yes.

    2 Q. Mr. President, apart from the Croatian text

    3 we've also got the A version in French and the B

    4 version of it, which is the English text translation.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you very much. Yes, I

    6 have got it here.

    7 MR. NOBILO: How much?

    8 THE REGISTRAR: The number is D184, 184A for

    9 the French translation and D184B for the English

    10 translation.

    11 MR. NOBILO:

    12 Q. Brigadier, where were the Mujahedins? Where

    13 were their centres and where did they live?

    14 A. The Mujahedin camps were near Novi Travnik in

    15 the Village of Duboka. It cannot be seen. On the map

    16 there is Ravno Rostovo, where they had a training

    17 centre. There was also the village of Mehurici. There

    18 was one at Podbrezje just at the outskirts of Zenica.

    19 Also, in the direction just on the outskirts of Zenica

    20 towards Zepce, there is a village of Arnauti. Above

    21 Busovaca in the village of Zivcici and above Kiseljak

    22 there was the facility and the village Podgorica.

    23 Q. Brigadier, do you know of Mujahedins living

    24 in groups, for example, in Sarajevo, or anywhere else

    25 outside from the Central Bosnian region?



  14. 1 A. No.

    2 Q. Those people who, according to your

    3 description, which I think corresponds, more or less,

    4 to the description of what we can see on the TV when we

    5 see the Taliban from Afghanistan. So what inference

    6 did it have to the civilians of Central Bosnia where

    7 there were half Bosnians, half Croatians?

    8 A. They were very frightened by it.

    9 Q. Thank you. Can we now move on to the

    10 following slide and see the routes in Central Bosnia.

    11 What was their importance? There were even new roads

    12 that were being built -- don't describe it -- but

    13 please tell us just symbolically what each colour

    14 represents?

    15 A. On this map we can see routes used by the BH

    16 army. Those are marked in green. These are the

    17 existing routes. And in red there are newly

    18 constructed roads used by the BH army. In blue routes

    19 used by the HVO and in light blue colour, the newly

    20 built roads used by the HVO.

    21 Q. Why did the HVO and the BH army construct new

    22 roads, isn't it an unusual situation in the war to

    23 build roads?

    24 A. All the roads were built only for the units

    25 and the supplying of units. The army of



  15. 1 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the newly built one, Travnik, Novi

    2 Travnik, used for supplies and also the units used for

    3 the units that transferred towards Novi Travnik via

    4 Duboko to Kruscica. They were going from Zenica down

    5 to the command post in Poculica down to Sivino Selo.

    6 And there was another going from Busovaca via to

    7 Grbavica.

    8 The later road was used for tank units, i.e.,

    9 to bring tanks to these positions; whereas, the other

    10 roads were used for units and supplies because they

    11 were unable to use the main communications and that is

    12 why new roads were built. The same goes for the

    13 light -- the roads marked in light blue which were

    14 built by the HVO, also because they were unable to use

    15 the main route. The main route being under fire and

    16 used by the units of the BH army.

    17 Q. Thank you. Now we move on to summarise and

    18 draw conclusions from what you've just told us. What

    19 can the conclusion be? What was the centre of

    20 activities of the BH army in the period relevant to us

    21 going from spring of 1992 -- '93 to February 1994?

    22 A. The conclusion can be the following: That

    23 the BH army managed to cut off and splitting off of the

    24 Operational Zone of Central Bosnia to divide it into

    25 five enclaves.



  16. 1 Q. So, in blue, mark the territories under the

    2 control of the HVO; green under the BH army and red

    3 under the Serbs?

    4 A. Yes.

    5 Q. Please proceed.

    6 A. We can see that at the very latest in

    7 January, 1993, up until the Washington Agreements, BH

    8 army was concentrated against the HVO using its 3rd

    9 Corps, plus some additional units from the 1st, the 5th

    10 Corps and the newly formed 6th Corps, newly formed

    11 somewhere during the summer of 1993, somewhere towards

    12 the end of July and early August.

    13 Q. Brigadier, we're now discussing the slide or

    14 the map No. 14. To the best of your knowledge, there

    15 were the 3rd Corps plus another 4 corps, so, all in

    16 all, some five corps were directed against the

    17 Operational Zone of Central Bosnia. Sir, how many men

    18 were directed against you in the spring of 1993?

    19 A. According to our assessments, the army of

    20 Bosnia-Herzegovina used some 82 to 84.000 soldiers

    21 during that period of the war.

    22 Q. Sir, the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina used some

    23 82 to 84.000 soldiers during that time period, how many

    24 soldiers were at the disposal of the HVO in the same

    25 period?



  17. 1 A. Around 8.200 soldiers.

    2 Q. Could you please tell us --

    3 JUDGE RIAD: Sorry, how many did you say?

    4 8.200 soldiers?

    5 A. Between 8.000 to 8.200.

    6 MR. NOBILO:

    7 Q. So if we could simplify the proportion, it

    8 would be 1 to 10 in favour of the army of

    9 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    10 A. Yes.

    11 Q. If we see the development of the BH army and

    12 its deployment over the territories and you compare it

    13 to the front they had towards the Serbs, could you tell

    14 us your conclusions?

    15 A. The positions and the deployment of the BH

    16 army was as follows: First of all, in the areas with

    17 mixed populations, then there was a very small front

    18 towards the defences of the Bosnian Serbs. And then

    19 that deployment showed us what the real objectives of

    20 the BH army were. Furthermore, the control of the

    21 communications as we could see in the previous slide --

    22 Q. Just a moment. You said such deployment

    23 should frontline with the Serbs. And also there was

    24 the deployment in perhaps in the areas with mixed

    25 populations show the real objectives of the army.



  18. 1 Could you tell us what these real objectives were?

    2 A. The real objectives were to take control over

    3 the areas where the HVO was.

    4 Q. Brigadier, you told us that there were over

    5 80.000 soldiers of the BH army that were used against

    6 the Croats then. That during those two years, the BH

    7 army moved its frontlines towards the Serbs for one

    8 single metre?

    9 A. No, neither did they undertake any offensive

    10 action against the Bosnian Serbs. On the contrary,

    11 during that time period, the BH army came into contact

    12 with the Bosnian Serb army in the region of Turbe,

    13 where they bought and sell weapons and armament as well

    14 as food.

    15 Q. Before I interrupted you, you were saying

    16 that the army wanted to gain control over the key

    17 communications in the Lasva River Valley, so it wanted

    18 to control territory. Can you now tell us your

    19 conclusions, why did they want to gain control over

    20 Central Bosnia?

    21 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, by putting

    22 Central Bosnia under their control, they could have all

    23 the military manufacturers under their control and have

    24 all the production of ammunition and weapons.

    25 Q. Did they manage to also join their cause in



  19. 1 one whole?

    2 A. Yes, the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina mananged

    3 to link up all the corps except for the 5th Corps,

    4 meaning the 2nd, the 3rd, the 1st, the 4th and the

    5 newly formed 6th Corps.

    6 Q. Could we now have the following slide which

    7 shows the Lasva River Valley after the Washington

    8 Agreement, once the peace arrived again in the Lasva

    9 River Valley?

    10 A. There are green arrows that show the

    11 direction of attack of the Bosnian army on the

    12 enclaves.

    13 Q. Let us go on, please. So, this is the

    14 territory inside the blue line would represent the

    15 territory under the control of the HVO?

    16 A. Yes. And what is inside a green line is

    17 under the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. What is

    18 outside the green line also represents the territory

    19 under the control of BH army and what is in red

    20 represents the position of the Bosnian Serbs.

    21 Q. So this is the position in the moment when

    22 the peace was reached?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 Q. Can we now go on to the following document,

    25 please.



  20. 1 Mr. President, we have got the original

    2 version, which is in Croatian. We have also received

    3 the English translation, but we would like to excuse us

    4 because we did not receive the French translation from

    5 the translation unit.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: I understand.

    7 THE REGISTRAR: So it's D184 for the Croatian

    8 version and D184A for the English translation.

    9 MR. NOBILO: Could you please correct the

    10 transcript because this document is marked D-185.

    11 Q. Brigadier, could you please tell us, did you

    12 see this document by the Municipal Staff of

    13 Municipality of Kiseljak from 1992, the 22nd of May --

    14 the judges have got the text, we're not going to read

    15 it. Could you please give us your comments, what did

    16 this document mean and what are its contents?

    17 A. It contains the preparation of the unit of

    18 the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, preparation for the

    19 attack.

    20 Q. And, please, could you correct the

    21 translation. Upon the answer whether -- upon my

    22 question whether the witness had already seen this

    23 document, the answer was yes.

    24 Could you please tell us, Brigadier Zeco,

    25 when did you see it? Was it yesterday or during the



  21. 1 war? Or much earlier? What does it mean during the

    2 war or after the war?

    3 A. During the war.

    4 Q. Does this document also give plans for

    5 blocking roads?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. The problem again is in the transcript.

    8 Could you please explain to us what is the plan of the

    9 army of Bosnia and Herzegovina of the 5th of August,

    10 1992?

    11 A. According to the information gathered by the

    12 army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which, at that time, was

    13 the Territorial Defence, was to continue collecting

    14 information about the HVO, which is already calling

    15 aggressors and to commit their units to reinforce

    16 action.

    17 MR. NOBILO: My colleague has informed me

    18 that the transcript does -- is senseless.

    19 I'll ask the question once again.

    20 JUDGE JORDA: Who is responsible for the

    21 transcript, please? We had the same problem earlier on

    22 before we interrupted our hearings, and we see the same

    23 thing today. What is going on? I know it is a very

    24 delicate type of work, but this is the first time that

    25 we are having so many difficulties. This is maybe the



  22. 1 first time that we have noted so many problems, because

    2 it is usually the parties that do it after the

    3 hearings.

    4 Well, I'm trying to just reply to the

    5 registrar. Normally, all the parties, I think the

    6 registry yourself, and, I think, even the Judges are

    7 invited to correct the transcript.

    8 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, that is correct. After

    9 each hearing, we give all the parties the transcript,

    10 either in English or in French, and so according to

    11 their wishes, and they have ten days to put all the

    12 corrections they want into the transcript.

    13 MR. HAYMAN: The problem, Mr. President, is

    14 not simply correcting the transcript. In the last ten

    15 minutes, we have had two answers by the witness that

    16 were not picked up at all. There was no answer in the

    17 transcript. We went back, I caught both of them. I

    18 heard the witness answer in BSC. There was no English

    19 answer picked up in the translation booth. There was

    20 nothing on the transcript to correct. So if we didn't

    21 stop in reading the transcript later, there just would

    22 be no answer, and the witness is gone at that point.

    23 So I'm concerned that, for whatever reason,

    24 the quality of the translation and/or transcription is

    25 not what we have had in this case to date. It is



  23. 1 important that this witness's testimony, like every

    2 witness's testimony, be transcribed and translated as

    3 accurately as possible.

    4 We need, perhaps, to slow down, and I'm

    5 advising my co-counsel of that, but I would ask the

    6 Court and the registrar to inquire into this matter.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: So we have got two problems

    8 here. One is the general problem of the correction of

    9 the transcript. So for that problem, I would like to

    10 ask all of you to very carefully read the transcript in

    11 the ten-day period. We, the Judges, we also do it, and

    12 we know that everything is going to be corrected in the

    13 ten days. All the parties are invited to put all the

    14 corrections to the transcript and give it to the

    15 registry.

    16 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, that's correct.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Which does not mean that a very

    18 important error may not be put forward -- pointed out

    19 straight away. That's the way we've been proceeding

    20 since the very beginning.

    21 Now we have a second problem which was raised

    22 by Mr. Hayman, which is if a reply has not been given,

    23 because otherwise the parties will not be able to

    24 correct it, which asks for a spontaneous intervention,

    25 as was just made by right now by Mr. Hayman. Thank you



  24. 1 Mr. Hayman, or thank you Mr. Nobilo.

    2 What is the reason for it? Are we maybe

    3 speaking too quickly? Have the transcripters got

    4 problems?

    5 THE REGISTRAR: We're probably going too

    6 quickly, because the counsel and the witness are

    7 speaking the same language. As for the interpretation,

    8 these are the same people that have been working with

    9 us for the past year, and I think that it is also

    10 sometimes -- there is a difference because we also hear

    11 the interpretation directly into French, so there can

    12 be differences in French and in English.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: So maybe we do not need to

    14 correct all the errors straight away, because we have

    15 ten days for it, and I know that our court reporters

    16 work very hard every evening, but if there is a major

    17 error, please correct it straight away and also please

    18 speak more slowly, but also we are going to have a

    19 pause in some ten or fifteen minutes, because we're

    20 going to work longer hours tonight.

    21 Please proceed, counsel.

    22 MR. NOBILO: Thank you, Mr. President.

    23 Certainly we shall all do our best to make the

    24 transcript as accurate as possible, and this applies to

    25 the Defence and to the witness, so we shall do our



  25. 1 best.

    2 Q. We have before us now a document of the

    3 municipal defence staff of Kiseljak dated 5th August,

    4 1992, D-185. So let us repeat the question. The

    5 question was: What was the purpose and intention of

    6 drafting this document? What were the aims of the BH

    7 army at that time, as can be seen from this document

    8 dated the 5th of August, 1992? Please focus on point 3

    9 of the document.

    10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please,

    11 witness.

    12 JUDGE JORDA: Will you please repeat your

    13 answer?

    14 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, the purpose of

    15 this document is to prepare TO units of the BH army for

    16 carrying out combat operations, reconnaissance,

    17 observation, collection of information in the field

    18 within the territory of the municipality, control of

    19 key communication lines, and that the facilities should

    20 be determined straight away, and especially the main

    21 points on the main communication routes, as well as on

    22 the auxiliary roads for blocking and cutting the

    23 territory. So we can see from this document what the

    24 intentions of the authors were.

    25 Q. So this is a document of the Territorial



  26. 1 Defence, the precursor of the BH army from Kiseljak?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 Q. Tell us, did the Territorial Defence, indeed,

    4 act in accordance with this document, and did it cut

    5 the main road running through Kiseljak?

    6 A. It did.

    7 MR. NOBILO: Could I ask the usher's

    8 assistance for the next document, please?

    9 THE REGISTRAR: This is document D186 and

    10 D186A for the English translation.

    11 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, the Defence has

    12 supplied the translation service with copies to be

    13 translated into both languages, and if the French

    14 translation is missing, it is not due to the Defence.

    15 Q. Brigadier, have you seen this notebook?

    16 A. Yes.

    17 Q. When, and how, and under which circumstances,

    18 and who is the owner?

    19 A. The owner of this notebook is Enes Varupa who

    20 was captured.

    21 Q. What was he?

    22 A. He was a Muslim.

    23 Q. What position did he hold?

    24 A. I know he was a commander of a unit in

    25 Ahmici.



  27. 1 Q. Enes Varupa. Could we please look at page 4,

    2 dated 11th of April, 1998. On the right-hand side

    3 marked with the date 11 April, 1993, and this is the

    4 fourth page of the original diary.

    5 What does this list of detachments mean,

    6 well-known villages are mentioned, Bila, Grabovica,

    7 Kruscica, Vrcerska (phoen), Tolovici, Sivrno Selo,

    8 Ahmici, Gacice. What do the names of these villages

    9 signify in this context?

    10 A. The names of these villages mean that units

    11 are being formed in each of these villages, units of

    12 the Territorial Defence.

    13 Q. And the date is the 11th of April, 1992?

    14 A. This means --

    15 Q. Just a moment. Something else,

    16 Mr. President, we have just established that the

    17 English translation has an error. In the English

    18 translation, we see the 11th of April, 1993, whereas,

    19 in the original document, it is 11th of April, 1992.

    20 So can this correction be made? I'm referring to the

    21 fourth page of the original text.

    22 So you said that this list of villages is, in

    23 fact, a list of villages in which Territorial Defence

    24 units were stationed?

    25 A. Yes.



  28. 1 Q. Very well. Will you please look at the next

    2 page, and this is page 5 of the Croatian original, and

    3 in the English translation, there is no date, but it

    4 begins Preocica squad. Perhaps it would be a good idea

    5 if the usher could switch on the ELMO and put this

    6 document on the ELMO.

    7 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters in the

    8 booth do not have any of these documents.

    9 MR. NOBILO: Could the ELMO be switched on,

    10 please? Please press the button for our witness so he

    11 can look, please.

    12 Q. Will you please explain the text? Again, we

    13 have the names of the villages, we have some numbers

    14 next to the names of villages. What does that mean?

    15 A. The numbers mean the number of troops, the

    16 number of soldiers, in those villages. And here we

    17 also have the unit indicated. For example, Preocica,

    18 is a company of 85, in Ljubic a platoon of 25, in

    19 Ljubic, sorry, 16. In Bukve, a platoon of 11, I

    20 think. In Bila, a company of 85, Preocica, also a

    21 company of 85. Vrhovine, a company of 85; Ahmici, a

    22 company of 85, but then the words Pirici Nadioci have

    23 been added.

    24 JUDGE JORDA: A little more slowly, please.

    25 A. These three hamlets, the two hamlets next to



  29. 1 Preocica are called Pirici and Nadioci, which means

    2 that within this whole region, there were 85 men or a

    3 company. Then, Tolovici the number 26; Kruscica a

    4 detachment of 200, Dubravica a platoon, he didn't have

    5 the numbers, but he said it was a platoon. Lupac a

    6 platoon of 25, Sadovaca a platoon of 25, Muratovici a

    7 platoon of 25, then Donja Veceriska a platoon of 25,

    8 Stari Vitez a detachment of 230, Vranska a company of

    9 85, Gacice a platoon of 25, Donja Dubravica a company

    10 of 69. A total of about 1.300 men, but for Sivrino

    11 Selo, he didn't have the figures either.

    12 Q. Will you please tell the Judges in which

    13 municipality are those villages and who were the

    14 inhabitants of those villages?

    15 A. These villages are in Vitez municipality. In

    16 1992, they were mostly inhabited by Muslims.

    17 Q. Let's go on to the next page, page 6, but the

    18 left-hand side, please? Could we ask the usher to

    19 assist us so that we can see page 6 on the ELMO?

    20 On page 6 and page 3 of the translation taken

    21 from the same diary of Enes Varupa we have a list of

    22 detachments. Can you tell us, within the system of

    23 Territorial Defence, how large were these detachments?

    24 What was their strength in 1992?

    25 A. Between 200 and 400 men.



  30. 1 Q. Can you list the detachments mentioned in

    2 Enes Varupa's notebook?

    3 A. There's the Bila detachment, and he lists the

    4 villages, Samovaca, Bukva, Divjake, Muratovici (phoen)

    5 then Vitez, the second detachment.

    6 Q. The detachment of Vitez?

    7 A. Yes. Which includes Rijeka, Kolonija, and

    8 Stari Vitez. This is the urban area. Then Kruscica,

    9 which covers Vranska, in addition to Kruscica.

    10 Q. The fourth detachment, what does it include?

    11 A. Poculica, it includes Vrhovine, Lupac,

    12 Preocica.

    13 Q. Then the fifth detachment?

    14 A. Ahmici, Dubravica, and Sivrino Selo.

    15 Q. Thank you. So this is a notebook of one of

    16 the commanders, Enes Varupa, one of the TO commanders

    17 captured by the HVO, and you saw that notebook during

    18 the Croatian Muslim war?

    19 A. Yes.

    20 JUDGE JORDA: Are you changing the subject

    21 now, Mr. Nobilo?

    22 MR. NOBILO: No. I'm going on to another

    23 document which is rather lengthy, and if you agree,

    24 this would be a convenient moment for the break.

    25 JUDGE JORDA: Yes. Let's have a ten-minute



  31. 1 break then.

    2 --- Recess taken at 3.15 p.m.

    3 --- On resuming at 3.30 p.m.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: The hearing is resumed. Have

    5 the accused brought in, please.

    6 (The accused entered court)

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Nobilo, please continue.

    8 MR. NOBILO: Thank you. Before we move on to

    9 another document, let us clear up something that we saw

    10 in the transcript. Enes Varupa, when was he captured

    11 please? What month and what year? The owner of this

    12 notebook that we've been discussing.

    13 A. Enes Varupa was captured at Grbavica in

    14 1993. I cannot recall the exact date.

    15 Q. Was it after a battle at Grbavica?

    16 A. Yes.

    17 Q. Enes Varupa was not a commander in Ahmici?

    18 A. No. He was commander at Grbavica, but he is

    19 a native of Bukve.

    20 Q. So you know him personally?

    21 A. No.

    22 Q. Has he survived, or was he exchanged?

    23 A. Yes. He was exchanged.

    24 Q. So he still is alive?

    25 A. Yes, as far as I know, yes.



  32. 1 Q. The next document that I would like the

    2 usher's assistance with, we have the text in Croatian

    3 and an English translation. The Croatian text has

    4 three pages.

    5 THE REGISTRAR: This is document D187 and

    6 D187A for the English version.

    7 MR. NOBILO: "A."

    8 Q. Brigadier, will you please take a close look

    9 at this document? It is apparently from Busovaca.

    10 Will you please look at it and read it?

    11 Brigadier, this document was issued by the

    12 Nikola Subic Zrinjski Brigade. That is what is stated

    13 in the heading. It is signed by assistant chief of

    14 staff of HOS, Zeljko Katava, signed. Will you please

    15 tell the Court, did you have this document in your

    16 possession during the Croatian/Muslim war, or just

    17 before it broke out in 1993?

    18 A. Yes.

    19 Q. Was it addressed to you?

    20 A. Yes.

    21 Q. So please correct me if I'm wrong when it

    22 says to the chief of VOS OZSBV Vitez, was that you?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 MR. HARMON: Excuse me, Mr. President, and

    25 Mr. Nobilo. The transcript says "HOS." In the



  33. 1 question he answers "yes," so.

    2 MR. NOBILO: I thank my learned friend for

    3 helping me with the transcript. It is VOS, not HOS.

    4 Q. So I would now like to ask the witness to

    5 explain what VOS means, what the acronym stands for?

    6 A. VOS means military intelligence service.

    7 Q. The document is addressed to the command of

    8 the operative zones for Central Bosnia, but also to the

    9 chief of the military intelligence for the Central

    10 Bosnia operative zone. Was that you?

    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. The document was addressed by the assistant

    13 chief of the military intelligence service, Zeljko

    14 Katava. Did you know him and is this his signature?

    15 A. Yes, I did know him, and this is his document

    16 and his signature.

    17 Q. Did you receive this document sometime in

    18 January 1993?

    19 A. I did.

    20 Q. How would you describe such a document? What

    21 does it represent?

    22 A. It represents the current situation of the BH

    23 army in this period of time and an assessment on the

    24 part of Zeljko Katava regarding the intentions.

    25 Q. The intentions of the BH army?



  34. 1 A. Yes, the intentions of the BH army.

    2 Q. Could you please look at point 2, item 2, and

    3 read and explain what are the routes of which the head

    4 of the military intelligence believes could be cut? So

    5 will you please read it very slowly so that it goes

    6 down in the transcript accurately.

    7 A. The routes that may be cut by the Muslim

    8 forces are as follows: Busovaca-Kiseljak, in the

    9 region of the village of Kacuni. Busovaca-Vitez in the

    10 region of the village of Ahmici and Busovaca-Zenica in

    11 the region of the village of Grablje.

    12 Q. So that was the assessment of the military

    13 intelligence service of the Busovaca Brigade in January

    14 1993?

    15 A. Yes.

    16 Q. The document is self-explanatory, especially

    17 page 1, where specific locations are indicated in

    18 Busovaca where units of the BH army were accommodated?

    19 A. Yes.

    20 Q. I should like to go on to the next document,

    21 please. This is Exhibit No. D188, Mr. Registrar, in

    22 the Croatian and English versions.

    23 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, 188 for the BCS and 188A

    24 for the English version.

    25 MR. NOBILO:



  35. 1 Q. Brigadier, this is a document dated 12th of

    2 February, 1993, from the 3rd Corps of the BH army

    3 compiled by the commander Enver Hadzihasanovic. Could

    4 you tell the Court whether you saw this document in

    5 1993?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. When and under which circumstances?

    8 A. I received this document from a source that I

    9 would not like to reveal.

    10 Q. Did this source copy this document from

    11 Hadzihasanovic's hard disc?

    12 A. Yes.

    13 Q. At the bottom of the page there is some

    14 handwriting in black ink and somebody has initialled

    15 it. Whose handwriting is this?

    16 A. It is the handwriting of Colonel Tihomir

    17 Blaskic at the time.

    18 Q. I will read to you from the middle of the

    19 text. So could you please tell me whether this was

    20 correct that Colonel Blaskic was indeed where the

    21 document says he was. So I quote: "The document which

    22 arrived as a reply was not signed by Tiho Blaskic but

    23 by somebody for us who was not authorised by you. We

    24 assume that Colonel Tihomir Blaskic is isolated in

    25 Kiseljak and that readiness has been expressed to deal



  36. 1 with the problem was a put-up affair and that the

    2 problems are, in fact, being resolved by somebody else

    3 and not Tihomir Blaskic, and that, therefore, there is

    4 no point in negotiating in this way because no results

    5 can be expected from such negotiations."

    6 MR. NOBILO: I would like to ask the usher in

    7 future to try and place the English version on the ELMO

    8 or the Croatian version so this will be of assistance

    9 to the interpreters.

    10 Q. Brigadier, will you tell us, is it true that

    11 at the time of the January conflict in Busovaca, and

    12 even during February, Colonel Blaskic was in Kiseljak

    13 and he couldn't come to the area of Busovaca and

    14 Vitez? Shall I repeat the question if you were not

    15 listening? My question is -- what I have just read --

    16 is it true that Colonel Blaskic, during the January

    17 conflict in Busovaca and later in the course of

    18 February, remained isolated in Kiseljak, and that he

    19 was unable in January and February to come to Busovaca

    20 and Vitez; is that right?

    21 A. No. The Colonel was in Vitez.

    22 Q. Why does Hadzihasanovic say that Blaskic was

    23 isolated in Kiseljak?

    24 A. That was his opinion.

    25 Q. Very well. Are you sure that Colonel Blaskic



  37. 1 was in Vitez at the time?

    2 A. I think he was, but I was based in Bila, so I

    3 didn't really pay attention to whether he was in

    4 Kiseljak or Vitez.

    5 Q. So you didn't see the Colonel at that time?

    6 A. No.

    7 Q. Thank you. Next document, please.

    8 THE REGISTRAR: This is document D189, 189A

    9 for the French version and 189B for the English

    10 version.

    11 MR. NOBILO:

    12 Q. Brigadier, this document, which also belongs

    13 to the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and which was issued

    14 on the 22nd of March, 1993, did you have it in your

    15 possession in 1993?

    16 A. Yes.

    17 Q. Who is Mustafa Hajrulahovic Talijan? What

    18 was his position?

    19 A. His position at the time was commander of the

    20 1st Corps.

    21 Q. Thank you, we won't comment because the text

    22 is self-explanatory. I should now like to go on to the

    23 next document, please?

    24 THE REGISTRAR: This is document D190 and

    25 D190A for the English version.



  38. 1 MR. NOBILO: Could the witness be given the

    2 Croatian version, please, because he doesn't read

    3 English?

    4 Q. Will you please look at this document

    5 closely, leaf through it, and then we shall comment on

    6 it. Brigadier, who compiled this document?

    7 A. This document was compiled by me or, rather,

    8 in my department.

    9 Q. Is it correct that it was compiled on the

    10 25th of March, 1993 as indicated?

    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. What does it represent? Will you describe it

    13 yourself? What does this document, as such, represent?

    14 A. This document represents an assessment of the

    15 situation in the Operative Zone of Central Bosnia, of

    16 the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    17 Q. But in essence, does it represent what the

    18 title says, "Assessment of possible aggressor

    19 activities within the territories of the Operative Zone

    20 of Central Bosnia"?

    21 A. Yes.

    22 Q. How was this document drawn up? What was it

    23 based on? Does it consist of facts, your analysis?

    24 Will you describe what it means amongst intelligence

    25 people when you talk of assessments?



  39. 1 A. You take into consideration all of the

    2 relevant indicators and developments on the ground, so

    3 on the basis of all data collected, that we were able

    4 to come by in the territory of the entire Operative

    5 Zone, we made an estimate of the possible activities of

    6 the aggressor within the territory of the Operative

    7 Zone of Central Bosnia.

    8 Q. May I ask you to turn to page 2, so we can

    9 focus on the subject of this indictment, that is,

    10 Busovaca-Travnik and Novi Travnik which is on the

    11 bottom of the page? Will you please read or comment

    12 what your estimate was on the 25th of March, 1993 as to

    13 what could happen in the municipalities of Busovaca,

    14 Vitez, Travnik and Novi Travnik. These figures on the

    15 bottom of page 2 and on page 3, so reading the note,

    16 will you please comment on your estimate?

    17 A. Our estimate was that the main conflict

    18 within the territory of the Operative Zone of Central

    19 Bosnia would be over the places covered by this

    20 territory, that is, the territory of Busovaca, Vitez,

    21 Travnik and Novi Travnik. There were many reasons for

    22 this, and we mentioned some of them, including the fact

    23 that extremely important military industry facilities

    24 were located in this area, that is, the factory of

    25 ammunition, that in this area, there was the command of



  40. 1 the Operative Zone for Central Bosnia, the logistics,

    2 that these areas, separate from Zenica and Visoko, the

    3 settlements of Konjic, Jablanica, Prozor, Gornji Vakuf,

    4 Bugonjo, and Travnik.

    5 Q. And on the next page, which is most important

    6 of all?

    7 A. The intentions of the potential aggressor are

    8 to place under his control this area, and to topple the

    9 HVO, and to link up with the fringe municipalities in

    10 the southern part of the Operative Zone of Central

    11 Bosnia.

    12 Q. Brigadier, what was your estimate at the time

    13 along which axis would the BH army attack, if they did

    14 so?

    15 A. It was our estimate that the offensives of

    16 the BH army would be directed against the areas of

    17 Busovaca and Vitez along the axis Kacuni-Busovaca,

    18 Kaonik-Vitez, Zenica-Kuber, along the Lasva River

    19 Valley, Kaonik-Vitez, Zenica-Preocica-Vitez, and that

    20 these operations would start from the Kacuni-Kuber

    21 areas.

    22 Q. Let us leave out Novi Travnik and Travnik

    23 that is referred to in this document, but we would like

    24 to focus on your conclusions in the last two

    25 paragraphs, beginning with following and analysing the



  41. 1 activities of the potential aggressor so far. They

    2 apply the aggressor tactics. What does that mean?

    3 A. It means that the BH army fully applied the

    4 same tactics as the army of Bosnian Serbs or, that is,

    5 the former JNA.

    6 Q. When you say the tactics of the army of

    7 Republika Srpska, is that what you said; that by its

    8 activities, the BH army would capture each part of the

    9 territory, regulate positions, move out the Croatian

    10 inhabitants, and take full control. So that was the

    11 tactics of the army of Republika Srpska that you were

    12 referring to?

    13 A. Yes.

    14 Q. In view of the time distance that has passed,

    15 that is, it is more than five years since that date in

    16 1993, was your assessment at the time -- has it been

    17 proven to be correct?

    18 A. Yes.

    19 Q. Did you submit that estimate to Colonel

    20 Blaskic on the 25th of March, 1993?

    21 A. Yes.

    22 Q. Can I ask the usher's assistance for the next

    23 exhibit? Is this your signature? Did you sign this

    24 document?

    25 A. No. This was signed by my deputy.



  42. 1 Q. Thank you.

    2 THE REGISTRAR: This is document D191, and

    3 D191A for the English translation.

    4 MR. NOBILO:

    5 Q. Brigadier, have you got the Croatian text?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. So this is document D191. Did you see this

    8 document in 1993?

    9 A. Yes, I did.

    10 Q. This is a document that comes from a meeting

    11 from several brigades of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina

    12 and the police of the ministry of the interior of

    13 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Could you tell the Court in which

    14 way did you come into possession of these documents of

    15 the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    16 A. I came into possession of this document

    17 through a man whose identity I would not like to

    18 reveal.

    19 Q. That person brought it to you at that time?

    20 A. Yes.

    21 Q. I will just read the introduction. We are

    22 not going to go through the document. I'm just going

    23 to ask you one or two questions. The heading says that

    24 it comes from the minutes on the 20th of March, 1993,

    25 from the joint meeting of the representatives of the



  43. 1 commands of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the

    2 brigades ^ Delic, Neretva, BDP 4th Corps of the

    3 Municipal Staff of Jablanica, as well as

    4 representatives of the Ministry of the Interior of

    5 Bosnia-Herzegovina. You saw this document also in

    6 1993. While reading this document, what could you

    7 conclude?

    8 A. When we were reading this document, we

    9 concluded that an attack would happen and also military

    10 operations towards Jablanica, Konjic, and Kresevo.

    11 Q. That means that these minutes are an

    12 agreement for military operation, but against whom?

    13 A. Against the HVO.

    14 Q. And after that meeting, did it occur?

    15 A. Yes, it did.

    16 Q. Thank you. Let us proceed. Please, could

    17 you show the next document now? This document exists

    18 in three languages, in Croatian, in French, and in

    19 English.

    20 THE REGISTRAR: This document is marked D192,

    21 192A for the French version, and 192B for the English

    22 translation.

    23 MR. NOBILO:

    24 Q. If we take a look at this document, we can

    25 see that it was issued by the command of the Vitez



  44. 1 Brigade on the 10th of April, 1993, so six days before

    2 the conflict between the Croats and the Muslims in the

    3 Vitez municipality. And it was compiled, again, by the

    4 VOS, that is, the military intelligence service, and

    5 precisely, Tomislav Krizanac. First of all, this

    6 document D192 as it was marked here, did you see this

    7 document in 1993?

    8 A. Yes, I did.

    9 Q. According to its contents, were the contents

    10 or the whole document, indeed, forwarded to the

    11 Commander Blaskic?

    12 A. Yes. It was through the assessment of my

    13 department.

    14 Q. In this document, it says that the 325th

    15 Mountain Brigade deploys four battalions and that these

    16 battalions are deployed in various villages, Pirici,

    17 Ahmici, Santici, Tolovici, Sivrino Selo, Kruscica,

    18 Gacice, Donja Vecerisko, and so on and so forth. Let

    19 us not numerate all the villages. Those villages that

    20 are stated here as places where parts of the 325th

    21 Brigades are deployed, are all these villages in the

    22 Vitez municipality?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 Q. These are the estimates made by Mr. Tomislav

    25 Krizanac. As his superior, were you completely -- did



  45. 1 you completely approve of his assessment or were some

    2 mistakes made?

    3 A. I think that there were some mistakes

    4 concerning the battalion in Bukve.

    5 Q. So he made a slight mistake in his estimates?

    6 A. Yes, he did.

    7 Q. As for the rest, did Tomislav Krizanac give

    8 correct estimates?

    9 A. Yes, he did.

    10 Q. So the document speaks for itself, so we're

    11 not going to continue reading it.

    12 Please, I would like to show the next

    13 document.

    14 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked D193,

    15 193A for the English translation.

    16 MR. NOBILO:

    17 Q. Brigadier, this document comes from the

    18 Brigade Nikola Subic Zrinkjski from Busovaca, and it

    19 was obviously compiled by the deputy chief of VOS, that

    20 is, the military intelligence service, Zeljko Katava.

    21 Did you see this document in 1993?

    22 A. Yes, I did.

    23 Q. The document was compiled on the 14th of

    24 April, 1993, that is, two days before the conflict

    25 broke out in the Lasva River Valley in the



  46. 1 municipalities of Vitez and Busovaca. In the English

    2 translation it says the 14th of March, 1993, and the

    3 Croatian text says that number 3 was corrected into

    4 number 4, so there was a mistake.

    5 Can you please help us, Brigadier, was this

    6 text written in March or April 1993?

    7 A. It comes from the 14th of March, 1993.

    8 Q. So this was wrongly typed. Could you please

    9 take a close look? Does it say the 14th of April,

    10 after all, because the text says during the

    11 mobilisation in Zenica?

    12 A. Yes. It was April.

    13 Q. So it means that it was written March -- so

    14 number 3, and somebody found a mistake and crossed it

    15 out and wrote 4. So can we be 100 per cent sure that

    16 it was in April, because it speaks about the general

    17 mobilisation in Zenica?

    18 A. Yes, it is the 14th of April.

    19 Q. In that case I'm right when I say that it was

    20 two days before the break-out of the war?

    21 A. Yes.

    22 Q. This report starts in the following way:

    23 During the proclamation of general mobilisation in

    24 Zenica, we estimate that the following might happen.

    25 Brigadier, do I understand this correctly when I say



  47. 1 that the military intelligence service, once it had

    2 found out that already on the 14th in Zenica, a general

    3 mobilisation was declared, that it made a correct

    4 estimate of what the BH army wanted to do, that is,

    5 where it wanted to attack; is that correct?

    6 A. Yes, it is.

    7 Q. Let me now read to you the first part of it,

    8 where it says: "The military intelligence service, the

    9 next offensive action could be made out of two parts."

    10 I'm going to read it now to see in what way this

    11 estimate was correct. So about the offensive action of

    12 the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And now I quote: "The

    13 army of Bosnia-Herzegovina could maybe try and attempt

    14 with a skillful manoeuvre to avoid the control of the

    15 HVO Cajdras by going through the territory under its

    16 control and that is Zenica-Vrazale-Dobriljeno (756)

    17 Vrhovine, and then an attack on Ahmici (because of the

    18 cutting off of Busovaca and Vitez) and then joining via

    19 Rovna with Vranjska."

    20 In the second part it speaks about activities

    21 in Novi Travnik. Could you please tell me, due to

    22 facts from this estimate, did they land on the table of

    23 the office of Mr. Blaskic on the 14th of April, 1994?

    24 A. This report first came to the department. It

    25 was status and then either as a report or as an



  48. 1 estimate, it was forwarded to the command of the

    2 operational zone of Central Bosnia.

    3 Q. Do you know in what way Colonel Blaskic

    4 worked? Was it possible that extremely important

    5 reports arrived at his office and that he would not

    6 have a look at them?

    7 A. No. That would not be possible. It was not

    8 possible that an important report would come to his

    9 office and that he does not read it. He was taking

    10 note of everything.

    11 Q. Could you tell me whether the attack towards

    12 Vrhovine went from Zenica?

    13 A. Yes.

    14 Q. So it really did happen?

    15 A. Yes, it did.

    16 MR. NOBILO: Could I ask you for some

    17 assistance now, please? The next document is also in

    18 Croatian and in English.

    19 THE REGISTRAR: This document is marked D194

    20 and D194A for the English translation.

    21 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, this is a

    22 document of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina which the

    23 Defence has received, kindly, from the government of

    24 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and after an order issued by this

    25 Trial Chamber.



  49. 1 This document comes from the 303rd Glorious

    2 Brigade from Zenica on the 16th of April, 1994, at

    3 midday. That was the day when the war broke out

    4 between the Croats and the Muslims in the

    5 municipalities of Vitez and Busovaca. I would like to

    6 draw the attention of the witness to paragraph 4,

    7 towards the end of the first page of the Croatian text

    8 in paragraph 4 where the commander says: "I have

    9 decided."

    10 Q. I will now read and quote, and after that,

    11 please listen carefully, I will ask you questions about

    12 it. "In order to carry out the order of the 3rd Corps

    13 command" -- and now we have the numbers, which means

    14 confidential, "number 02/33" -- then it cannot be

    15 read. I draw your attention to the 15th of April,

    16 1993. So the basis of this order is the order of the

    17 command of the 3rd Corps from the previous day, the day

    18 before the conflict broke out, to the units of the

    19 brigade to make the movement in the

    20 route "Zenica-Drivusa-Janjici," or something like

    21 that. It's not very legible. "Janjicki vrh-Gumanci,

    22 with the assignment of occupying a defensive area along

    23 the following line: Saracevica structure (trig point

    24 957) Kicin (trig point 921)," and then, Trebinje (trig

    25 point 567), where, after consolidating the defence, an



  50. 1 attack has to be made along the main communication

    2 route, Saracevica, Jelinak, Loncari, with the task to

    3 take control in the facilities Obla Glava, and then

    4 have an infantry attack along the lines Saracevica,

    5 Vrela, and to come to the trig point 393, Vrana

    6 Stijena, Bakije, Katici, and then be ready to continue

    7 towards the communication Vitez, Busovaca."

    8 Colleague Hayman has informed me that in the

    9 English text the date is wrong, the date of the command

    10 in the English text. When we see the Croatian text, it

    11 is very -- we can easily see it was the 15th of April,

    12 1993, and not the 4th of April. So it was translated

    13 in this Tribunal, but nevertheless, a mistake was

    14 made. So, please, could you focus on the ELMO at that

    15 particular line so that we can see the date.

    16 So the command issued by the 3rd Corps, the

    17 commander speaks of the attack. This command of the

    18 3rd Corps was issued on the 15th of April. You can see

    19 where the pointer is.

    20 Brigadier, this is the command of the 33rd

    21 Glorious Brigade from Zenica. This is its official

    22 name, which makes reference to a confidential command

    23 of the 3rd Corps from Zenica of the 15th of April.

    24 What does this document say to you? You haven't seen

    25 this document before.



  51. 1 A. This document says that the command was given

    2 to just one unit. In this case, everybody received the

    3 command, but the 303rd Brigade had to make an attack

    4 going from Zenica towards Busovaca. So its objective

    5 was to come to the communication line of

    6 Vitez-Busovaca.

    7 Q. So the 303rd Brigade, on the 16th of April at

    8 midday, is issuing to its units such a command, and the

    9 3rd Corps, the day earlier on the 15th of April? Did

    10 you know of it before?

    11 A. No.

    12 Q. But you had estimates that went along those

    13 lines?

    14 A. Yes. We had the information, but we had it

    15 much earlier. Somewhere around the 10th, we heard that

    16 preparations were made in order to carry out military

    17 operations in the Lasva Valley.

    18 Q. Brigadier, could you please stand up, take

    19 this piece of paper, and show these lines, according to

    20 what the text says? Could you please show it on this

    21 map, and then tell us whether it was really carried out

    22 in such a way.

    23 A. This is Zenica, the command of the 3rd

    24 Corps --

    25 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.



  52. 1 MR. NOBILO:

    2 Q. Could you please show to the Court the

    3 direction going from Zenica towards Loncari?

    4 A. So it goes from Zenica, Grevisa (phoen),

    5 which was not drawn here, then Janjicki, and this

    6 direction here towards Loncari, and then going around

    7 Kuber.

    8 Q. The question now is: Did the attack happen

    9 in that way, the attack on the municipality of

    10 Busovaca?

    11 A. One of the attacks was as described. There

    12 were various lines of attack. One came also from the

    13 village of Lasva and Dusina, and one of the lines of

    14 the attack was this one, and this was the main line of

    15 attack (indicating).

    16 MR. NOBILO: Could we please have the next

    17 document now?

    18 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked D195

    19 and D195A for the English translation.

    20 MR. NOBILO:

    21 Q. Brigadier, just to speed things up, I will

    22 read now the key sentences that are most relevant for

    23 the Defence, and I would like to ask you to comment.

    24 First of all, have you seen this document? Did you see

    25 it in April 1993?



  53. 1 A. Yes, I did.

    2 Q. The title here is the 22nd of April, 1992.

    3 Is this a mistake when it comes to the contents of the

    4 text?

    5 A. Yes. It is a mistake.

    6 Q. Yes. There are quite often such mistakes.

    7 So what it says "VOS," that is, the military

    8 intelligence service of the Vitez Brigade, and it

    9 says: "The command of the Operational Zone of Central

    10 Bosnia to the Military Information Service." That is

    11 your department. I quote and I'm reading from the

    12 second paragraph: "In the evening, a member of the

    13 army of Bosnia-Herzegovina was captured and an

    14 investigation was started." I'm now going to skip a

    15 paragraph, where he gave some intelligence information

    16 about the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and pass on to

    17 the relevant fourth paragraph.

    18 "We can see that in the region - Mahala,

    19 there are, all in all, some 300 members or soldiers

    20 very well-armed. Apart from light infantry weapons,

    21 they have got a large quantity of PMK-53 PAT IMB," and

    22 later on, I will ask you to explain what that means,

    23 "with some 60 boxes of shells," and there is also a

    24 mark which we'll explain after that. "The deployment

    25 of personnel, the trenches, and the shelters have been



  54. 1 made around every Muslim house. The strongest points

    2 are in Mahala Rakite near the cooperative building, the

    3 shop of Metal Borac near the cemetary, Donja Mahala,

    4 etc." About more detailed deployment, "We will forward

    5 the report on the following day according to the tables

    6 of deployment which is being compiled."

    7 So this is the information given by a

    8 prisoner of war, where you got the information that

    9 there were 350 soldiers with light infantry weapons and

    10 some heavier weapons. Could you please tell us what

    11 are these military abbreviations, "PMK-53"?

    12 A. This is a machine gun.

    13 Q. What does it mean, "PAT"?

    14 A. "PAT" means anti-aircraft gun.

    15 Q. It can be used also during fighting on the

    16 ground?

    17 A. Yes.

    18 Q. What does it mean, "MB"?

    19 A. That means mortar with some 60 boxes of

    20 shells.

    21 Q. How many shells are there in each box?

    22 A. Six, six shells.

    23 Q. So in every box, there are six shells, and

    24 they had 60 boxes. Also, they speak of something

    25 called "RB," hand-held launcher of 40 millimetres.



  55. 1 Therefore, this document that you obtained from the

    2 military intelligence of the Viteska Brigade on the

    3 22nd of April, 1993, did you familiarise Commander

    4 Blaskic with this document?

    5 A. Accompanying our regular reports or through

    6 our estimates, General Blaskic was informed about

    7 this.

    8 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, that ends our

    9 examination-in-chief, and we should like to tender the

    10 exhibits that we used today, from D184, 185, 186, to

    11 D193, as Defence Exhibits. I beg your pardon. 195,

    12 the last number is 195. Therefore, from D184 to D195.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: No objections? Mr. Harmon?

    14 MR. HARMON: If I could just review my notes

    15 for one minute, Mr. President?

    16 JUDGE JORDA: As the examination-in-chief is

    17 over, perhaps this is a good time to have a break, and

    18 we will resume at 5.00, which will give the Prosecutor

    19 a chance to review his notes and express his views when

    20 we resume. The hearing is adjourned.

    21 --- Recess taken at 4.37 p.m.

    22 --- On resuming at 5.07 p.m.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: The hearing is resumed. Please

    24 be seated.

    25 (The accused entered court)



  56. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, Mr. Nobilo, you wanted to

    2 tender the documents; isn't that so?

    3 MR. NOBILO: Yes. And in addition to what I

    4 have tendered, I should also like to tender the maps

    5 which were shown on the screen, maps 1 to 15. I think

    6 they are on the table now. Could all these maps be

    7 given a single number slash 1 through 15 for each of

    8 the maps?

    9 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Registrar?

    10 THE REGISTRAR: 283/1 (sic) through to /15.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Before beginning your

    12 cross-examination, I asked Mr. Harmon whether he had

    13 any comments regarding D183/1 through /15 and then D184

    14 to 195. That's right.

    15 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, I have no

    16 objection to any of the exhibits, with one exception.

    17 That is, I have an inquiry with respect to D186,

    18 because D186 appears, at least at first blush to the

    19 Prosecutor's office, to be a portion of the notebook

    20 and not the complete notebook. The question I have and

    21 I would ask of Mr. Nobilo, is this what has been

    22 presented as D186, a copy of the complete notebook that

    23 was seized, or are there other portions that have not

    24 been reproduced?

    25 MR. NOBILO: It is a copy of the whole



  57. 1 notebook, but we have translated into English only

    2 three pages which we consider to be relevant, but in

    3 the Croatian version, there's a copy of the whole

    4 notebook.

    5 MR. HARMON: Then I have no objection to 186,

    6 Mr. President.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. In that case, all

    8 of these documents have been admitted into evidence.

    9 It is now up to you, Mr. Harmon, to continue with the

    10 cross-examination, or someone else?

    11 MR. HARMON: I will conduct the

    12 cross-examination of Brigadier Zeko.

    13 Cross-examined by Mr. Harmon:

    14 Q. Good afternoon, Brigadier Zeko.

    15 A. Good afternoon.

    16 Q. You testified in your direct examination that

    17 you are a career military officer; is that correct?

    18 A. Yes.

    19 Q. What year did you graduate from the military

    20 academy in Belgrade?

    21 A. In 1987.

    22 Q. When did you go to Slovenia to serve your

    23 duty in that particular republic?

    24 A. The same year.

    25 Q. Did you remain there until you left for



  58. 1 Germany in 1992?

    2 A. In 1991.

    3 Q. You served, did you not, in the Postanje

    4 garrison in Slovenia?

    5 A. Yes.

    6 Q. Is that the same garrison where Colonel

    7 Blaskic served?

    8 A. Yes.

    9 Q. Did you know Colonel Blaskic when you were

    10 serving in Slovenia?

    11 A. I did.

    12 Q. Were you friends with Colonel Blaskic when

    13 you were serving with him in Slovenia?

    14 A. No.

    15 Q. Did you know him while you were serving in

    16 Slovenia?

    17 A. Yes.

    18 Q. In what capacity did you know him, sir?

    19 A. I know that he was the commander of a unit,

    20 and I was a commander of a reconnaissance company which

    21 was under the direct command of the brigade.

    22 Q. Were you under his command, or were you under

    23 the command of somebody else while you were serving in

    24 Slovenia?

    25 A. I was under somebody else's command.



  59. 1 Q. Was Colonel Blaskic the assistant commander,

    2 or a deputy commander, of a motorised battalion while

    3 he was in Slovenia?

    4 A. I can't remember.

    5 Q. Do you know what his duties were while he was

    6 in Slovenia, Brigadier Zeko?

    7 A. I know that he was a commander of a company

    8 in a battalion.

    9 Q. Was he also the assistant commander for

    10 political affairs?

    11 A. I do not remember that.

    12 Q. Now, you testified that you were called by

    13 the Defence Department in Novi Travnik in February of

    14 1992. Who called you?

    15 A. Zoran Matosovic from the Defence Department

    16 of Novi Travnik.

    17 Q. You reported in February of 1992 and were

    18 assigned to work at the TO in Novi Travnik; is that

    19 correct?

    20 A. Yes.

    21 Q. Was that at the municipal secretariat of the

    22 TO in Novi Travnik?

    23 A. No. The building was the same building where

    24 the MUP was housed and the TO staff.

    25 Q. When you arrived in February of 1992, what



  60. 1 position did you take and what were your specific

    2 duties?

    3 A. It wasn't any particular position. We all

    4 worked doing everything involved in the formation of

    5 units. I didn't have any specific assignment.

    6 Q. How long did you work without a specific

    7 assignment?

    8 A. All the time while I was working in the TO

    9 staff, there were no specific assignments.

    10 Q. What I'm trying to get at, and perhaps you

    11 can assist me, Brigadier, what specifically did you do

    12 there?

    13 A. Specifically, probably because I came as a

    14 career military man, I trained men in the use of

    15 mortars, of 60 and 82 millimetre calibre, in the

    16 village of Vezovici and Sakovici.

    17 Q. Was that your principal function between

    18 February of 1992, until the date when you left the

    19 Territorial Defence in Novi Travnik?

    20 A. Yes, yes.

    21 Q. I take it you have some degree of speciality,

    22 Brigadier, in respect to artillery pieces if you were

    23 engaged in the training of individuals with mortars; is

    24 that correct?

    25 A. Not a certain degree, but due to the work I



  61. 1 did before, I had to be familiar with everything,

    2 including artillery pieces.

    3 Q. Other than the training of the soldiers that

    4 you've just described, did you do anything else in

    5 terms of intelligence gathering, or did you do anything

    6 in respect of intelligence gathering while you were

    7 working at the TO?

    8 A. No.

    9 Q. Did you collect any documents from the TO

    10 while you were working at the TO in February of 1992

    11 until the time when you left the TO?

    12 A. No.

    13 Q. Did you collect any documents from the TO and

    14 take them with you when you left in March of 1992 and

    15 went to the municipal headquarters of the HVO?

    16 A. I didn't need to do that because I was

    17 familiar with them. I didn't take any documents at

    18 that time.

    19 Q. Did you prepare any notebooks in respect of

    20 information that you had seen at the Territorial

    21 Defence in Novi Travnik while you were there?

    22 A. I don't remember.

    23 Q. Now, what specific date, Brigadier, did you

    24 leave the Territorial Defence and transfer to the

    25 municipal headquarters of the HVO in Novi Travnik?



  62. 1 A. I don't remember exactly.

    2 Q. Why did you transfer from the Territorial

    3 Defence to the municipal headquarters of the HVO in

    4 March of 1993 -- I'm sorry, March of 1992?

    5 A. Because the municipal TO staff had simply

    6 become one single ethnic, and they were appointing

    7 people for commanders and chiefs of staff, and my name

    8 did not figure anywhere.

    9 Q. Now, you say that the Territorial Defence

    10 became monoethnic in Novi Travnik in February to March

    11 of 1992. Is that your testimony?

    12 A. I didn't say February/March. I said from the

    13 time I left, no one else was left there, except I can't

    14 recall whether there were any Serbs, but in any case,

    15 there were no Croats left.

    16 Q. While you were at the TO, did you work with

    17 an individual by the name of Ivica Kobanac?

    18 A. No. I don't know anyone by that name.

    19 Q. Now, you transferred to the municipal

    20 headquarters of the HVO in Novi Travnik sometime in

    21 March. Could you tell us, please, what your duties and

    22 responsibilities were at the municipal headquarters of

    23 the HVO in Novi Travnik?

    24 A. At first, I had operative tasks, that is,

    25 drawing up lists of units and that sort of thing.



  63. 1 Q. Lists of HVO units?

    2 A. I didn't understand the question.

    3 Q. If I understood your answer, you said when

    4 you first got to the HVO municipal headquarters in Novi

    5 Travnik, you drew up lists of units, and that sort of

    6 thing. That's what the answer shows on the monitor.

    7 My question is: Were those lists of units that you

    8 drew up lists of HVO units?

    9 A. Yes, yes. I mostly participated in

    10 organising the HVO headquarters.

    11 Q. So you did not draw up lists of Territorial

    12 Defence units; is that correct?

    13 A. I didn't need to do that because I knew them.

    14 Q. Now, in participating in the organisation of

    15 the HVO headquarters, did you have any other duties and

    16 responsibilities while you were at the TO headquarters

    17 -- I'm sorry, at the HVO municipal headquarters in

    18 Novi Travnik?

    19 A. Later, I was deputy chief of staff of the HVO

    20 of Novi Travnik, and when the commander of the

    21 municipal headquarters, Ljubas, was arrested by the

    22 army of the Bosnian Serbs, I became the commander for a

    23 short time.

    24 Q. When did you become the assistant chief of

    25 staff of HVO headquarters intelligence affairs?



  64. 1 A. Roughly in July 1992, July or August. I do

    2 not recall the exact date, but it was at the beginning

    3 of the formation of the command for the Operative Zone

    4 of Central Bosnia.

    5 Q. What were your principal tasks in that

    6 capacity?

    7 A. My principal tasks were to collect and

    8 process data about the army of Bosnian Serbs.

    9 Q. Did you also collect and process information

    10 about the Territorial Defence and the Armija?

    11 A. No.

    12 Q. When did you start collecting the information

    13 about the Armija and the Territorial Defence?

    14 A. When the first open attack began against the

    15 HVO.

    16 Q. When was that?

    17 A. That was on the 20th to the 21st of January,

    18 1993.

    19 Q. Before that, Brigadier, neither you nor your

    20 colleagues collected information about the ABiH or the

    21 Territorial Defence?

    22 A. I don't know.

    23 Q. Now, let me ask you about some of the

    24 testimony that you gave us last week, and that is, when

    25 you described the job that you had, you indicated that



  65. 1 you collected intelligence through three means. As I

    2 recall your testimony, Brigadier, teamwork,

    3 reconnaissance and observation. Those are the three

    4 means and methods of collecting intelligence data that

    5 you described.

    6 My first question is: What did you mean by

    7 "teamwork"? Did you be more explicit?

    8 A. Perhaps the interpretation was not quite

    9 good, when I used "teamwork," I meant the work of all

    10 of us, and in that joint effort, we all worked

    11 together. We all had a common enemy, that is, the

    12 Bosnian Serb army, and we were familiar with the units

    13 and the deployment of the BH army, as they knew our own

    14 forces and deployment of the HVO. This went on until

    15 the first open conflict erupted.

    16 Q. So in the course of collecting and compiling

    17 information about the Bosnian Serb units along the

    18 confrontation lines, I take it part of your job and

    19 responsibility was to plot, either on a map or in some

    20 way of recording, the locations of the opposition units

    21 that confronted the HVO and the Territorial Defence

    22 forces; is that correct?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 Q. Did you do that with a map, and would you

    25 have locations of particular units plotted on maps?



  66. 1 A. What units are you referring to?

    2 Q. I'm referring, Brigadier, to the enemy

    3 units. So along the Serbian lines, would you plot the

    4 locations of which brigades and which units were at

    5 which locations along the Serb/HVO/Territorial Defence

    6 confrontation line?

    7 A. Yes, yes.

    8 Q. At the same time, Brigadier, would you also

    9 be aware of where your own units were along that same

    10 confrontation line?

    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. Why is that?

    13 A. When collecting information, I said in my

    14 introductory statement, I said that I collected data

    15 and also did reconnaissance. So we had to know where

    16 the confrontation lines were.

    17 Q. Tell me if I'm correct, Brigadier, but not

    18 only do you have to know where the enemy is, but you

    19 also have to know where your own forces are, so you can

    20 avoid some vulnerable part of the line being taken by

    21 surprise; is that correct?

    22 A. No. I just needed to know the lines of

    23 confrontation when applying this method of gathering

    24 information.

    25 Q. Now, when you gathered the information,



  67. 1 Brigadier, you would do it, also, through means of

    2 reconnaissance?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. Would you explain in greater detail what you

    5 mean by "reconnaissance"?

    6 A. The notion of reconnaissance means collecting

    7 data by sending units to the other side, to the enemy

    8 side.

    9 Q. Did you have any difficulty in sending units

    10 to the other side to collect that data?

    11 A. Certainly, yes.

    12 Q. Would you send those -- were the units that

    13 you sent behind enemy lines specially trained units,

    14 specially trained soldiers who had been trained in the

    15 area of avoiding detection, how to, essentially,

    16 reconnoitre and remain concealed behind enemy lines?

    17 A. They weren't trained soldiers. These were

    18 mostly locals from those villages or soldiers who had

    19 been on that territory and had been driven out so that

    20 they were familiar with the routes, the communications,

    21 what the enemy had under its control, and what it

    22 didn't.

    23 Q. Did you use specially trained soldiers of the

    24 HVO to penetrate Serb lines?

    25 A. I didn't understand the word "penetrate."



  68. 1 Q. By the word "penetrate," Brigadier, I mean to

    2 go behind enemy lines?

    3 A. I said that mostly these were soldiers --

    4 actually, we didn't have time for the training of

    5 soldiers, so those of us who were a little braver, we

    6 explained to them what kind of data they needed to

    7 collect, and passages were discovered, concealed ways,

    8 and we trained them as we went along. We didn't have

    9 specially trained troops to do this.

    10 Q. Now, let me ask you about your headquarters

    11 that you had. You were initially -- your initial

    12 intelligence headquarters was located at the Hotel

    13 Vitez; am I correct?

    14 A. No.

    15 Q. Did you transfer to the Hotel Vitez?

    16 A. No.

    17 Q. Where did you leave after you transferred.

    18 I'm sorry. Where did you go after you left the

    19 municipal headquarters of the HVO in Novi Travnik?

    20 A. We went to Command B which, at that time, was

    21 in Kruscica, and after that I received a task by the

    22 commander to arrange and organise my own office at Nova

    23 Bila.

    24 Q. I see. Then I misunderstood your testimony.

    25 Thank you for correcting me. When did you leave



  69. 1 Kruscica and go to Nova Bila?

    2 A. Not at Kruscica. My office was not at

    3 Kruscica. I would go to Kruscica if there was a need

    4 for it, but I was in an office in Nova Bila. It was in

    5 the forestry building.

    6 Q. Just so I understand your testimony,

    7 Brigadier, you were in the municipal headquarters of

    8 the Territorial Defence in Novi Travnik. Then did you

    9 transfer to a forestry building in Novi Travnik or in

    10 Nova Bila?

    11 A. No.

    12 Q. Please just take me through the series of

    13 locations that you went after you were in the municipal

    14 headquarters in Novi Travnik.

    15 A. What I said was, after I was at the Municipal

    16 Staff at Novi Travnik, I became the head of the

    17 Intelligence Services in the Operational Zone of

    18 Central Bosnia which, at that time, was at Kruscica,

    19 which is in the municipality of Vitez and was in a

    20 motel, but my office, my department, was at Nova Bila.

    21 As I said, it was in the building of the forestry.

    22 There were offices there.

    23 Q. Thank you. Now, that office of yours,

    24 Brigadier, remained there throughout the remainder of

    25 the war; is that correct?



  70. 1 A. Yes.

    2 Q. Did Colonel Blaskic have an intelligence

    3 liaison officer in his main headquarters in 1993?

    4 A. I was the one.

    5 Q. How did you transmit your intelligence

    6 reports to Colonel Blaskic who was located some

    7 distance from Nova Bila?

    8 A. By courier, while it was possible, and later

    9 on, we used modem and fax, a telephone fax.

    10 MR. HARMON: Could I have Exhibit 173 placed

    11 on the -- I'm sorry, Mr. Usher. Could I have

    12 Exhibit 172 placed on the easel?

    13 Q. Brigadier, you may be able to help me on this

    14 or you may not be able to. Exhibit 172 is an aerial

    15 image that, I believe, takes in part of Nova Bila. If

    16 you could see and locate your headquarters on that

    17 aerial, if it's visible at all, I would ask you to

    18 please point it out.

    19 Brigadier, the image may not go down far

    20 enough south, and your headquarters may not be on that

    21 image, but if it is, would you take a look and help us

    22 out?

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Maybe you can leave some space

    24 for the Judges as well.

    25 MR. HARMON:



  71. 1 Q. Brigadier, perhaps I can assist you. I may

    2 be able to assist you, Brigadier, if I can orient you

    3 on this.

    4 A. Yes.

    5 Q. I'm pointing to the BRITBAT base. This is

    6 Stari Bila. The top of the photograph is in the

    7 direction of Vitez --

    8 A. No, no.

    9 Q. -- and this is in the direction of Nova

    10 Bila.

    11 A. If this is Nova Bila, then these two

    12 buildings here or ...

    13 Q. This is the direction of Vitez.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Harmon, what was the

    15 question that you've asked there because --

    16 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, I asked the

    17 witness if he could identify his headquarters location

    18 of Nova Bila on this particular photograph.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Brigadier, could

    20 you answer this question in the most precise way you

    21 can? I'm asking you.

    22 A. Mr. President, I don't see Nova Bila.

    23 MR. HAYMAN: If Nova Bila is on the map,

    24 perhaps counsel can assist him. That appears to be the

    25 stumbling point.



  72. 1 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, I indicated to

    2 the witness that his headquarters may not appear on

    3 that photograph. Apparently, it does not, and I'm

    4 prepared to proceed.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Proceed then, please.

    6 MR. HARMON:

    7 Q. Now, approximately how many kilometres away

    8 from the Hotel Vitez was your intelligence headquarters

    9 in Nova Bila?

    10 A. Some five to six kilometres.

    11 Q. On the main route between Nova Bila and the

    12 Hotel Vitez near the BRITBAT base, there was a

    13 prominent hill feature at Grbavica that was maintained

    14 and occupied by soldiers from the Armija; is that

    15 correct?

    16 A. Yes.

    17 Q. As I understood the testimony earlier, that

    18 feature resulted in the main road between Vitez and

    19 Nova Bila being a dangerous route for HVO personnel to

    20 travel upon?

    21 A. Yes.

    22 Q. Is it not correct, Brigadier, that a

    23 commander needs intelligence information and good

    24 intelligence information at his disposal in every

    25 circumstance?



  73. 1 A. I don't understand. What do you mean "under

    2 every circumstance"?

    3 Q. Is it important for a military commander to

    4 have at his disposal, and at his immediate disposal,

    5 intelligence information that relates to the location

    6 and movements of the enemy?

    7 A. It is.

    8 Q. You were a number of kilometres away from his

    9 headquarters and in a position where the Muslims could

    10 interdict the road between your headquarters and the

    11 Hotel Vitez; isn't that correct?

    12 A. Yes.

    13 Q. Did that present any problems for you in

    14 terms of relaying information, intelligence

    15 information, to Colonel Blaskic in the Hotel Vitez?

    16 A. No. I used other means, not only

    17 by messenger. There were other means too. As I've

    18 said, I forwarded the information by telephone, by

    19 telephone modem, or by fax.

    20 Q. Were these telephone modems or fax machines

    21 reliable?

    22 A. Mostly, yes. The modem was reliable, while

    23 faxes could have been intercepted.

    24 Q. The modem, did it have the ability to encrypt

    25 messages that were sent from Nova Bila to the Hotel



  74. 1 Vitez?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 Q. How about the fax? Did the fax have the

    4 ability to encrypt messages from your headquarters to

    5 the Hotel Vitez?

    6 A. No.

    7 Q. Was there any point in time in 1993 when the

    8 modem that could send encrypted messages from your

    9 headquarters to the Hotel Vitez did not work?

    10 A. There might have been circumstances where it

    11 did not work, but I couldn't give you an exact answer

    12 to it.

    13 Q. I take it if it did not work, it was put back

    14 in working order in a very short period of time because

    15 that would be critical to any military commander having

    16 access to coded information; am I correct?

    17 A. Yes, bearing in mind the possibilities at the

    18 time, whether we could repair it or not.

    19 Q. How big of a staff did you have at your

    20 headquarters in Nova Bila?

    21 A. It was not really a command. It was a

    22 department. We did not command at all. Our department

    23 had eight people.

    24 Q. Were those eight people intelligence officers

    25 or did that include clerical staff as well?



  75. 1 A. Yes. That was also clerical staff, and there

    2 were two people who were intelligence officers, another

    3 two.

    4 Q. Who were they?

    5 A. How do you mean, who were they? You mean the

    6 other ones or these other two or ...

    7 Q. What were their names, Brigadier?

    8 A. One was Zvonko Bajo, and the other one was

    9 Stefan Dujimacic (phoen).

    10 Q. Now, how often would you send reports,

    11 intelligence reports, from your headquarters in Nova

    12 Bila, from April of 1993 to the end of the war, to

    13 General Blaskic's headquarters in the Hotel Vitez?

    14 A. Daily. We were sending out reports every

    15 day, and the estimates would be sent depending on the

    16 needs and depending on the situation on the ground.

    17 Q. Where, in the Hotel Vitez, would General

    18 Blaskic receive those reports? In his office? In a

    19 different part of the Hotel Vitez?

    20 A. I think that the reports were arriving in the

    21 operational centre. The operational department

    22 received it and then forwarded it to General Blaskic.

    23 Q. Could you tell us where the operational

    24 centre was?

    25 A. I didn't mean the operational centre. I mean



  76. 1 the operatives. That's a different thing. The

    2 operatives is what I call the people who were on duty,

    3 and they were collecting reports that would arrive from

    4 the theatre, and then they would see how important they

    5 were and would inform the commander about them.

    6 Q. My question, Brigadier, is very simple:

    7 Where, in the Hotel Vitez, would the reports from the

    8 theatre be received?

    9 A. How can I explain? It was on the ground

    10 floor near the entrance on one side. To the right of

    11 the corridor was the office of General Blaskic, and on

    12 the left-hand side, that means just opposite, were the

    13 operatives who received these reports.

    14 Q. Were they located in a particular room near

    15 Colonel Blaskic where they received these reports? Was

    16 there a room that was devoted to the receipt of

    17 communications?

    18 A. Just on the other side of the corridor.

    19 Q. What kind of equipment did that room have in

    20 it?

    21 A. They had modem equipment and fax. The same

    22 things that I had to send it out.

    23 Q. (Question inaudible - answer being translated

    24 simultaneously)

    25 A. I don't know.



  77. 1 Q. You were the head of intelligence. You

    2 didn't know whether there were any radio equipment

    3 receivers in the Hotel Vitez?

    4 MR. HAYMAN: That wasn't the question,

    5 Mr. President. The prior question was whether there

    6 were radios where the duty officer sat in a particular

    7 room, and counsel is now turning that on its head, and

    8 we object. If he wants to ask the witness whether

    9 there were any radios in the Hotel Vitez, period,

    10 that's a different question, and he can ask that

    11 question.

    12 JUDGE JORDA: What is the question that you

    13 are going to ask with reference to the objection just

    14 made by Mr. Hayman?

    15 MR. HARMON: I'll ask the question again.

    16 Q. Brigadier, did the Hotel Vitez have radio

    17 receivers in it in 1993?

    18 A. I don't know.

    19 Q. Do you know what packet communications are,

    20 Brigadier?

    21 A. I know the modem ones because I saw them.

    22 They existed in my office.

    23 Q. Have you heard of the term "packet

    24 communications"?

    25 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me. Maybe I should ask



  78. 1 the interpreters. Is it what is called in French

    2 "communications par paquets"? What is it?

    3 What was your question, Mr. Harmon?

    4 MR. HARMON: My question was, is he familiar

    5 with the term "packet communications," and could he

    6 explain what they are?

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Well, I'm very happy you don't

    8 ask me that question because I'm very impatient. I

    9 would like to know the answer. What are packet

    10 communications?

    11 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, packet

    12 communications, at least what I saw, if that is what

    13 you mean, is to establish a connection with a radio

    14 receiver, and a computer that writes out the messages

    15 and sends them out.

    16 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you.

    17 MR. HARMON:

    18 Q. Did the Hotel Vitez, in 1993, have a packet

    19 communications system?

    20 A. I think it did.

    21 Q. Now, you were also familiar, Brigadier, were

    22 you not, with your subordinate -- did you have

    23 subordinates in the brigades who were intelligence

    24 commanders?

    25 A. No. There were not commanders for



  79. 1 intelligence duties. It was the deputies or the

    2 assistants. They did not have a commanding function.

    3 Q. I see. Did they report to you in the chain

    4 of command or did they report to somebody else?

    5 A. They reported directly to the commander, but

    6 professionally, they would also forward their reports

    7 from their units.

    8 Q. Now, let me ask you about the reconnaissance

    9 function of intelligence gathering. When you sent a

    10 reconnaissance team out into the field, how did they

    11 report back to you?

    12 A. These were mostly people from units, mostly

    13 five to six people, and they would have a direct link

    14 with my deputies, those people who were in the units,

    15 what we've just mentioned.

    16 Q. When you say "direct link," what do you mean

    17 by that?

    18 A. What I wanted to say was that we could not

    19 have the role of commanding, any commanding role. That

    20 was up to the unit. In the HVO, everything was

    21 organised according to units. The Operative Zone of

    22 Central Bosnia did not have its reconnaissance unit

    23 which would be subordinate to the commander of the

    24 Operative Zone.

    25 Q. Would your reconnaissance teams that went



  80. 1 behind enemy territory use any form of communication to

    2 communicate back directly to HVO units within the

    3 pocket? Did they use radios, hand-held radios? Did

    4 they have other means of communication back to the

    5 intelligence operatives inside the pocket?

    6 A. They should have had it, but at that time, we

    7 did not dispose of any such equipment, but the

    8 equipment like hand-held radios are very easy to

    9 detect. In that case, the mission would probably be

    10 jeopardised. So those units would go out in the field

    11 and then come back and report after that. It was very

    12 rare that we sent out reports from the field.

    13 Q. Did you, in addition to receiving

    14 intelligence information from the methods you've

    15 described, receive intelligence information from the

    16 Republic of Croatia?

    17 A. No.

    18 Q. Did you receive any intelligence information

    19 from Croatian army soldiers who were in Bosnia and

    20 Herzegovina?

    21 A. I do not know of them being in Bosnia and

    22 Herzegovina.

    23 Q. You do not know of any Croatian soldiers

    24 being in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1993?

    25 A. No. Personally, I don't know.



  81. 1 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, will we be going

    2 beyond 6.00 or will we conclude at 6.00?

    3 JUDGE JORDA: Normally, we would end, because

    4 this would be the end of our afternoon session, but

    5 maybe you have finished by now. How much time do you

    6 need still?

    7 MR. HARMON: I have some additional

    8 questions, Mr. President. I'll need at least another

    9 hour and a half or two hours.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: All right. In that case, I

    11 think that we can stop now, and we'll start again

    12 tomorrow at 10.00.

    13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

    14 5.59 p.m. to be reconvened on Tuesday,

    15 the 22nd day of September, 1998 at

    16 10.00 a.m.

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