1 Wednesday, 23rd September, 1998
2 (Open session)
3 --- Upon commencing at 2.08 p.m.
4 JUDGE JORDA: Please be seated.
5 Mr. Registrar, you will have the accused brought in,
6 please?
7 (The accused entered court)
8 JUDGE JORDA: Good afternoon to the
9 interpreters, those who transmit, transfer, translate
10 our words. We will pick up where we stopped after I
11 have asked the registrar to be kind enough to bring in
12 Brigadier Zeko.
13 Mr. Nobilo, a brigadier, that's a general of
14 the brigade, isn't it?
15 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, I'm not a
16 military expert, but this is the rank following the
17 rank of colonel in the Croatian army. Therefore, in
18 some armies, it is considered to be brigadier general,
19 and in other armies, the rank is called brigadier, but
20 it is the rank above colonel.
21 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Let me ask you, Mr.
22 Nobilo, a question. What is a colonel general?
23 MR. NOBILO: A colonel general is a much
24 higher rank than the brigadier, because we have major
25 general, colonel general, and general of the army, a
1 five-star general.
2 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Mr. Zeko, General
3 Zeko, Brigadier General Zeko, please be seated. We're
4 going to resume where we broke off with your
5 cross-examination. Please be seated.
6 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Mr. President.
7 JUDGE JORDA: We have nothing to hide from
8 you. I was just asking the correspondence of your rank
9 of brigadier. You're a General, in fact?
10 THE WITNESS: Yes, Mr. President.
11 JUDGE JORDA: In that case, if we call you
12 "General," you won't mind. On the contrary, I hope.
13 THE WITNESS: No. That is my future.
14 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, General. We can now
15 continue with the re-examination where we stopped.
16 Mr. Nobilo?
17 MR. NOBILO: Thank you, Mr. President.
18 I won't take long, and I shall try to finish this off
19 within a short period of time.
20 WITNESS: IVICA ZEKO
21 Re-examined by Mr. Nobilo:
22 Q. Brigadier, while you were working in Slovenia
23 in the JNA, you were working in the same area as
24 Tihomir Blaskic. Were you privately friends,
25 acquaintances?
1 A. No.
2 Q. Tell me, please, your education. You
3 completed the academy, but, as far as I know, you also
4 had speciality training as an intelligence officer
5 following the academy; is that correct?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Is it also true that you are the only
8 educated intelligence officer, one with specialist
9 training in 1993, not only in Central Bosnia, but in
10 the HVO as a whole?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. The Prosecutor has asked you about
13 reconnoitring, and you used two terms; once you said a
14 unit, then you said a group. Can you tell us how many
15 people go to reconnoitre behind enemy territory, enemy
16 lines?
17 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, three to five
18 men go on reconnaissance missions, and during this
19 reconnoitring, they should use concealed approaches,
20 those concealed from the enemy, and they usually use
21 inaccessible terrain where the enemy least expects
22 anyone to come from, concealed from the enemy. This
23 infiltration into enemy territory takes a lot of time,
24 depending on the assignment given.
25 Q. Do you use various types of camouflage that
1 we know from films, like branches and twigs and
2 crawling along the ground?
3 A. Yes. All types of camouflage are used,
4 adjusted to the season. If not clothing, then you use
5 other devices to be found in the terrain.
6 Q. Is that dangerous? Have there been any
7 deaths and woundings?
8 A. Yes. There were people who were wounded.
9 Q. Let us go on to the questions of the
10 Prosecutor regarding communications, telephone and fax
11 use. Your command was in Bila. The Operative Zone had
12 its command in the Vitez Hotel. Between you in Bila
13 and the Vitez Hotel, was there an underground telephone
14 cable?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Did that telephone link go through territory
17 under the control of the HVO?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. What about the telephone exchange, was it in
20 Vitez?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Would it be correct to say that, within the
23 Vitez-Busovaca enclave, there was a reliable telephone
24 link and a telefax which the enemy could not intercept?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Therefore, you had no problems with regard to
2 telephone communications with the command?
3 A. No.
4 Q. Tell us, what was the situation like with
5 regard to Kiseljak? Where did the underground
6 telephone links go from Vitez-Busovaca to Kiseljak?
7 A. Those underground cables went via
8 Busovaca-Kiseljak and between Kacuni and Bilalovac to
9 Kiseljak.
10 Q. From January 1993, who controlled the area
11 between Kacuni and Bilalovac?
12 A. It was under the control of the BH army.
13 Q. Would it be right to say that the telephone
14 lines passed through territory which was under the
15 control of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. In your opinion, what about this telephone
18 line to Kiseljak, passing through territory under BH
19 army control, was it safe from interception and the
20 tapping of faxes?
21 A. No. It was not safe.
22 Q. Did you observe that and did that prompt you
23 to stop using it? If so, when?
24 A. Yes. We noticed this already in March of
25 1993, that there were disturbances which prompted us to
1 believe that our messages were being tapped and
2 intercepted, those being conveyed along that route.
3 Q. At the beginning of the war, I think there
4 were five lines, and all of them were operational.
5 After that, at least four broke off, and one was being
6 intercepted. When the war started in April, would any
7 commander, in your opinion, decide to use that line
8 going through enemy territory to convey precise
9 information about the deployment of its units?
10 A. No.
11 Q. Why not?
12 A. Because he would be disclosing the position
13 of units, the deployment of units, and the activities
14 being undertaken by those units, which, of course,
15 would be to the benefit of the enemy.
16 Q. Is it correct to say that inexperienced HVO
17 soldiers frequently used hand-held radio transmitters,
18 speaking over those phones, after which, this would be
19 followed by the heavy shelling of units?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. You mentioned the technology of a modem and
22 packet links. Could you explain to the Court, this
23 computer technology that you used, those software
24 programmes, were they specialised military programmes
25 or regular computer programmes that you can buy in any
1 civilian store selling computers?
2 A. Those are civilian programmes that were
3 commercially available, and those are the ones we
4 used.
5 Q. What I understood was that modem links and
6 packet links are more or less the same. I don't know
7 anything about computers, so please correct me if I'm
8 wrong. You would write a text, you would store it in a
9 file, and to open the file, you would determine a
10 certain number or a group of numbers; is that correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And you didn't encrypt the text?
13 A. No.
14 Q. Therefore, if anyone wanted to intercept your
15 telephone conversations or from the air, all he needed
16 to do was to have the password to enter the file and to
17 read everything that you were sending?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Isn't that being done nowadays by
20 14-year-olds who are finding it very simple to discover
21 those passwords?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. So this is nothing specially designed for
24 military purposes?
25 MR. HARMON: I object, Mr. President. Mr.
1 Nobilo is testifying, and he is asking only for a "yes"
2 or a "no" answer. I think it would be more appropriate
3 to have the witness asked the questions and explain, in
4 his own words, the answers to these particular
5 questions.
6 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President --
7 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Nobilo, I know you're doing
8 military training in the area of communications, but
9 that is not the purpose of this hearing. Please, put
10 your questions, avoid comments, and then tonight you
11 can see what was being said regarding military
12 matters. Please pose your questions directly.
13 MR. NOBILO: Certainly, Mr. President. I was
14 only trying to save time, and I learned about this
15 method of questioning in this courtroom. It is not
16 permitted in my country.
17 JUDGE JORDA: Please don't do something that
18 you seem to be doing on purpose. That's what you're
19 telling me.
20 MR. NOBILO: It's only for the sake of
21 expediency, Your Honour.
22 Q. How many people were there in your
23 intelligence department for the Operative Zone of
24 Central Bosnia?
25 A. Only eight.
1 Q. You said that, apart from you, there were two
2 more officers. Were they officers with military
3 academy training?
4 A. No. They did not graduate from the military
5 academy.
6 Q. Why was your office dislocated to Bila in
7 relation to the command?
8 A. Primarily because of space considerations,
9 because in the Vitez Hotel, there wasn't enough room,
10 and also for safety reasons. We didn't want to have
11 the whole command in one place, because shelling was
12 quite frequent.
13 Q. The Prosecutor asked you whether you worked
14 with officers from the Croatian army. You said no. He
15 asked you whether there were Croatian army troops in
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina. You said no. My question is:
17 During the Croat and Muslim war in 1992/1993, which is
18 the period covered by this indictment, did you see
19 Croatian army troops or a Croatian soldier in that
20 period?
21 A. No.
22 Q. Did you go outside the Operative Zone of
23 Central Bosnia in that period?
24 A. I did not in that period.
25 Q. When you say that you didn't see any Croatian
1 soldiers, you mean you didn't see them in Central
2 Bosnia, because you didn't go anywhere else?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Did anyone wear uniforms with "HV" insignia
5 in the Busovaca-Vitez enclave?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Who were they?
8 A. These insignia were worn by soldiers who were
9 living in Central Bosnia but who, during the war in
10 Croatia in 1991, went to the battlefront at the
11 beginning of the war in Bosnia. They returned to their
12 homes where they joined the struggle, and they didn't
13 take off those HV insignia, wishing to prove, thereby,
14 that they were superior to the locals and that they had
15 some wartime experience, more experience than people
16 who had not been on the front until then.
17 Q. But this applied to a limited number of
18 individuals only?
19 A. Yes, only individuals.
20 Q. In a document yesterday, there was mention of
21 2.300 soldiers from Mehurici, 160 were engaged on the
22 front against the Serbs. Can you tell the Court,
23 because that is what the Prosecutor asked you on
24 several occasions, on a day when the front with the
25 Serbs was not moving, and it wasn't in 1993, how many
1 BH army soldiers, in all, were engaged on the front
2 against the Serbs?
3 A. At that time, at these frontlines that were
4 not moving, a total of 1.000 to 1.500 soldiers of the
5 BH army were engaged on the front.
6 Q. My next question has to do with the
7 Prosecutor's question about the shelling of Zenica from
8 Serb positions. Tell the Court, according to the
9 sources of the BH army, as well, was there repeated
10 shelling of Zenica from Serb positions?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. My next question is linked to the order of
13 Colonel Blaskic of the 17th of April, mentioned by the
14 Prosecutor and which you had not seen. Linked to that
15 order, I'm asking you the following: Immediately prior
16 to the April war between the Croats and Muslims, where
17 were the most significant forces of the BH army
18 concentrated in Kiseljak municipality, including their
19 command, military police, and so on?
20 A. They were concentrated in the area of
21 Gomionica, Svinjarevo.
22 MR. NOBILO: Next, Prosecution Exhibit 472,
23 can it be shown to the witness, please?
24 Q. This is a document which the Prosecution
25 showed you, and it has to do with a report by Franjo
1 Nakic, Chief of Staff of the Headquarters, addressed to
2 Colonel Blaskic in Kiseljak on the 30th of January,
3 1993.
4 When you were shown this report, which you
5 confirmed the authenticity of and the signature of
6 Franjo Nakic, can you, indeed, confirm that he was in
7 Kiseljak?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Can you explain to the Court how come you
10 didn't know that Blaskic was in Kiseljak and not in
11 Vitez?
12 A. At first, when I introduced myself, I said I
13 was assistant chief of staff for intelligence affairs
14 and that my superior was the chief of staff.
15 Q. Do you mean to say that you were in contact
16 on a daily basis with the chief of staff?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. From this document, document 472, it emanates
19 that you were at the meeting on the 27th of January '93
20 with Mr. Flemming, and that Mr. Flemming said, among
21 other things, and I quote, these are the last four
22 lines of this text regarding Lasva and Dusina, he
23 says, "... that it was hard to avoid the feeling that
24 something terrible had happened." Do you remember
25 that?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Could you explain to the Court what is the
3 terrible thing that happened in Lasva and Dusina, as
4 far as you remember?
5 A. The villages of Lasva and Dusina were the
6 first targets of attack by the BH army carried out by
7 the Lasva operative group under the command of Nehru
8 Ganic.
9 MR. HARMON: I'm going to object to this.
10 This is beyond the scope of the examination. The fact
11 that it's mentioned in an exhibit, and there are no
12 questions about that, Mr. President, does not invite
13 thorough examination of what happened in Lasva and
14 Dusina, without the ability of the Prosecutor, in my
15 view, to come back and ask questions about what is
16 newly tendered evidence. The document speaks for
17 itself. The testimony of Brigadier Zeko is new on this
18 particular subject.
19 JUDGE JORDA: That is true, that we are going
20 outside, considerably, the scope of the questions put
21 during the cross-examination.
22 Mr. Nobilo, what was the meaning of your
23 question?
24 MR. NOBILO: The meaning of the question was
25 an explanation of these words which appear in the
1 document that were shown to our witness yesterday, and
2 that is that Mr. Flemming said that something terrible
3 had happened in Lasva and Dusina. So my question is a
4 clarification, what does this word "terrible" mean,
5 because it is all a relative issue. If the Court feels
6 that we should go on, we would be glad to do so.
7 JUDGE JORDA: But now that the question has
8 been rephrased, will you please briefly answer what the
9 word "terrible" implies?
10 A. It means that the BH army captured those
11 villages and expelled the inhabitants of those
12 villages.
13 MR. NOBILO:
14 Q. Was there any killing of civilians?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Shall we go on to the next question now? You
17 told the Prosecutor that the BH army was
18 well-equipped. When you say "well-equipped," could you
19 clarify this? This is a relative concept. Does it
20 mean "well" compared to modern armies, such as the NATO
21 army, or in relation to the Serbs, or in relation to
22 the Croats? What does a well-equipped BH army in April
23 '93 mean for you?
24 A. "Well-equipped" means as compared to the HVO,
25 and poorly equipped compared to the Bosnian Serb army
1 and NATO standards.
2 Q. Was the greatest shortage in the equipment of
3 the BH army clothing and footwear?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. In 1993, did the HVO, on any occasion,
6 voluntarily abandon the front against the Serbs?
7 A. No, it did not, until the BH army carried out
8 an attack from behind in the region of Travnik and Novi
9 Travnik against the HVO.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 MR. NOBILO: And now can I call for the
12 usher's assistance with the document, please?
13 THE REGISTRAR: The document is D197, 197A
14 the French translation, 197B in the English
15 translation.
16 MR. NOBILO: This is the last document and
17 the last question that we are going to have,
18 Mr. President. I feel obliged to explain something to
19 you personally. When the witnesses from Ahmici were
20 here at some point, you warned me against some
21 questions which you considered not to be relevant, and
22 I answered that three months later I will be able to
23 explain that to you. Unfortunately not three, but nine
24 months have elapsed since, but I will be able to
25 explain everything today.
1 This is a diary found in Ahmici, and it
2 obviously belongs to somebody from Ahmici. One day we
3 call a witness who found that diary. Here there is a
4 plan with all the positions, all the names of the
5 people.
6 JUDGE JORDA: Just a moment, Mr. Nobilo.
7 Just before you continue with your cross-examination, I
8 suppose that the document that you are distributing is
9 within the scope of this cross-examination.
10 You know that during re-examination you can
11 bring new documents, this is your right; but I just
12 want to know that this is within the scope of the
13 cross-examination. I don't know anything of it, but
14 I'm asking you the question.
15 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, we would request
16 that we have the opportunity to inspect this document
17 and also have the opportunity to ask any questions
18 about it that have been raised in the redirect
19 examination.
20 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President.
21 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Harmon, you're going to ask
22 questions -- only we see that this document is outside
23 of the scope of the cross-examination. In that case,
24 the Judges will refuse, and that is why I made this
25 caution to Mr. Nobilo.
1 He told to us Judges that he was sure of his
2 position. And now, Mr. Harmon, if this document is
3 interesting to the Judges, but if it, nevertheless, is
4 outside of the scope of the cross-examination, we will
5 give you the right to reply.
6 But for the time being, we are not there,
7 yet, and Mr. Nobilo is now using his right to
8 distribute documents.
9 According to the good principles, it is
10 better to be safe than sorry. I thought it was better
11 to warn you against it beforehand.
12 MR. NOBILO: Thank you, Mr. President. Yes,
13 we always should be cautious, that is why I made this
14 introduction. We are offering as evidence only what
15 was written on the 11th of April, 1993, and it concerns
16 a telegram that arrived and that said that the units of
17 the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be put in a
18 state of readiness, and that was five days before the
19 beginning of the conflict.
20 The witness was telling us about the
21 intentions of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina to attack
22 the Lasva Valley, and putting the units into combat
23 readiness is the last stage. So, what was written on
24 the 11th of April, that is the only thing that we want
25 to tender as evidence from this diary.
1 Later on, we will come back and use this
2 diary, as well. As you can see, here it says "Sunday,
3 the 11th of April, 1993," that was five days before the
4 war broke out. Thank you.
5 JUDGE JORDA: For the moment we are not
6 concerned with the totality of this document,
7 Mr. Prosecutor, but only with the six or seven lines,
8 at least, that is the case in the French version. For
9 those of you who follow the French version, this is on
10 page 6.
11 Mr. Nobilo, please, now present this part of
12 your document.
13 MR. NOBILO:
14 Q. Brigadier, let's make this thing clear. You
15 have never seen this journal, this diary before?
16 A. No.
17 Q. I will read the entry for the 11th of April,
18 1993.
19 MR. HARMON: Excuse me, Mr. President, if
20 this witness has never seen this document before he is
21 not the appropriate witness to introduce this
22 document. Furthermore this document has never been
23 authenticated.
24 JUDGE JORDA: Just a moment, Mr. Harmon.
25 MR. NOBILO: But he knows the contents of it.
1 JUDGE JORDA: Please, Mr. Harmon, let
2 Mr. Nobilo finish, and I suppose he will see whether
3 this witness can or cannot identify this document.
4 This is a rule that we have adopted here with my
5 colleagues, Judge Riad and Judge Shahabuddeen. In
6 general, when one or the other party makes an
7 objection, we should at least let the other party
8 present its point of view first.
9 First, Mr. Nobilo, and after that, Mr.
10 Harmon. If you want you can still make your objection,
11 but later on.
12 Now, Mr. Nobilo, you can talk to your witness
13 concerning those six lines.
14 MR. NOBILO:
15 Q. Let me now read the six lines, and now you
16 will answer to me whether you know of this event, what
17 you know of the circumstances which caused that event,
18 and what you know of that event, or if you don't know.
19 "The 11th of April, 1993, Sunday, at five
20 o'clock, a meeting was held at the school Zumara. The
21 agreement was made where the lines will be formed in
22 case there will be any shooting. I kept the watch
23 between 10 and 12, and around 11 o'clock I heard that a
24 telegram had arrived." And then the quotation about
25 putting of the units in the first stage of combat
1 readiness. And the rest is not relevant.
2 Now, I'm asking you: Do you know about
3 telegrams of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina which,
4 on that day, were forwarded to the units telling them
5 to prepare for the first stage of combat readiness?
6 Were you aware of that in April of 1993?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Can you explain that?
9 A. Yes, I can explain that. On the 10th of
10 April we received a telegram of the corps command about
11 an organisational command for all units, and this is a
12 telegram sent to one of the units.
13 Q. So, what you want to say, is that you used
14 technical measures like tapping?
15 A. Yes, we received a telegram through -- it is
16 an organisational command that was sent to all units,
17 and we decrypted it, and then we followed the situation
18 on the ground with the units that observed and followed
19 and monitored the movements of the army of
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina.
21 Q. Well, this is all that I had to ask about
22 this particular document, and this has been my last
23 question to the witness.
24 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Harmon, would you like to
25 make an objection?
1 MR. HARMON: I would make an objection to the
2 admissibility of this document, Mr. President. It has
3 not been authenticated.
4 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Nobilo, can you give us
5 some elements that could help this witness to identify
6 this document? Because it is true that this document
7 -- well, the Prosecutor is going to have
8 inconveniences if he is later going to reply. We
9 cannot know where these pages come from.
10 Can you say that or you cannot say that for
11 the moment, and in that case we can postpone its
12 admissibility for the moment. What would you prefer?
13 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, another witness
14 will authenticate this document. At this moment we
15 wanted just to authenticate the six lines written on
16 the 11th of April.
17 At this stage we are not asking to
18 authenticate this Serb document through this witness.
19 We can postpone it to the moment when the witness will
20 come here, the witness who had actually found this
21 diary.
22 JUDGE JORDA: As the Defence does not, in
23 particular, wish this document to be admitted, this
24 document has not been admitted into evidence for the
25 moment, so, we will not give it a number. But it will
1 probably be authenticated through another witness.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Mr. President, this document
3 has already been marked for identification, but it has
4 not been admitted.
5 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, I agree with you, I
6 believe everybody is agreeable on that. So, I think
7 that we have finished now with all the questions by the
8 Defence, by the Prosecution, and by the Defence, and
9 now I'm turning to my colleagues.
10 Judge Riad, do you have any questions you
11 would like to ask? Please do.
12 JUDGE RIAD: Good afternoon, Brigadier Zeko.
13 A. Good afternoon.
14 JUDGE RIAD: I would like to clarify some
15 general points, and I hope that the knowledge that you
16 have and you've given us, proof up to now, you will be
17 able to clarify these points.
18 What interests me is whether the army of
19 Territorial Defence, the army that had existed before
20 the HVO was formed, were the members of that army, were
21 the members both Croatian and Muslim?
22 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, before the
23 conflict between the Muslims and the Croats, there was
24 an army that was a joint army. There was the
25 Territorial Defence and the HVO. And at the beginning
1 the TO had both Croatian and Muslim members.
2 I, myself, was one of the members of that army.
3 JUDGE RIAD: And later, they split up. You
4 said that the BH army had something between 80.000 to
5 82.000 soldiers and the HVO had 8.000 soldiers. How
6 can you explain this difference? Was it that the
7 soldiers that were in the initial army were mostly
8 Muslim? If they both belonged to the same army, they
9 should have been more or less in the same proportions
10 and not such a huge number of Muslims and such a small
11 number of Croats.
12 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, we spoke about
13 the territory of Central Bosnia, and what I was
14 speaking of is that apart from the existing population
15 of the Central Bosnia. The greatest part of the
16 refugees that came from the Krajina region and from
17 other regions with Muslim majority, they were coming to
18 Central Bosnia. And that is why the proportions have
19 such a big difference; whereas the Croats that had been
20 expelled by the Bosnian Serb army, they mostly left for
21 Croatia.
22 For example, from the Krajina region, all of
23 them, they went to Croatia.
24 JUDGE RIAD: Yes, but even the soldiers had
25 gone? Were there only 8.000 soldiers left? All the
1 others, the soldiers had gone to Croatia. How come
2 there was only 8.000 Croatian soldiers? The only
3 explanation that you gave was that Central Bosnia had a
4 Muslim majority. Is that the explanation?
5 A. Not only that, but, as I've said, from those
6 areas under the control of Bosnian Serbs, the refugees
7 from those areas were coming to Central Bosnia.
8 JUDGE RIAD: And they belonged to the army?
9 A. Not all of them were in the army. The
10 displaced persons were also civilians and children.
11 But apart from the Bosnian Krajina and all the eastern
12 part, Eastern from Doboj, everything, there was a great
13 flow of refugees into the Central Bosnian region, which
14 was not under the control of Bosnian Serbs.
15 JUDGE RIAD: In that Bosnian army were there
16 Mujehadeen? You told us the Mujehadeen came from
17 Afghanistan and Iran.
18 A. Yes.
19 JUDGE RIAD: And how come? What caused the
20 Mujehadeen to come there? Why were they made to come
21 to Bosnia?
22 A. The real reason I could not explain to you
23 now, but they used as an excuse to provide help to the
24 Muslim brothers. That was the slogan of those people.
25 JUDGE RIAD: Who made them come? Was it the
1 state, or did they just come to the country, or did the
2 government call them so that they would help with the
3 defence?
4 A. Had the government asked them to help, I
5 don't know. I cannot give you an exact answer. But
6 they did not come all at the same time. They used to
7 come gradually through various humanitarian
8 organisations that, at the time, were arriving in the
9 Central Bosnian region.
10 JUDGE RIAD: You call these humanitarian
11 organisations. What do you mean by that? Did the
12 humanitarian organisations bring combatants?
13 A. No, they did not organise the combatants'
14 arrivals, but that is the way, that is how they would
15 mostly be arriving. That is what my colleagues were
16 telling me, that they would go across Croatia and then
17 come to Bosnia. Those Mujehadeen, those that called
18 themselves Mujehadeen.
19 JUDGE RIAD: According to the report by
20 Colonel Blaskic, and I even notice here the
21 translation, the Bosnian army was poorly equipped.
22 What you said was that, on the contrary, that army was
23 well-equipped. How come that army was so well-equipped
24 when their sanctions, there was an arms embargo on the
25 whole of Yugoslavia; so how come that army would be so
1 well-equipped? One that interests me, first of all, is
2 the Bosnian army, BH army.
3 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, when I said
4 "well-equipped," what I had in mind was well-equipped
5 from the point of view of weapons, and compared to the
6 HVO.
7 When it comes to comparison with the army of
8 Bosnian Serbs, that army was poorly equipped; but BH
9 army did not pay great attention to the clothing of the
10 soldiers. So, they paid more attention to armaments
11 and ammunition.
12 JUDGE RIAD: Where did those weapons come
13 from?
14 A. I cannot give you a precise answer as to
15 where the weapons came from.
16 JUDGE RIAD: Through Croatia or through
17 Serbia, or through where?
18 MR. HAYMAN: I apologise, Your Honour, it's a
19 rare day that the Defence will interrupt any of your
20 question, but we need the witness's passport. His visa
21 expires today and I believe he has his passport with
22 him. We need to extend it through tomorrow so he will
23 be able to go home and return to his duties. May I ask
24 the witness if he has his passport to give it to me?
25 JUDGE RIAD: When I have finished he can.
1 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Judge. Obviously we
2 are not going to try and keep Brigadier as hostage at
3 this Tribunal. So, please, can you assist Mr. Hayman?
4 THE REGISTRAR: We need your passport,
5 Mr. Zeko.
6 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, Your Honour, and
7 again, I apologise.
8 JUDGE RIAD: I would like to -- I thought for
9 a moment that the witness had to go. I would like to
10 continue with my questions.
11 You are a member of the intelligence service,
12 and I suppose that you knew what was going on. How
13 come the BH army, for which you claim it was
14 well-equipped, where did they get the weapons from?
15 And later on I will ask you the same
16 question for the HVO. I will not ask for the Serb army
17 because you're not a specialist on that.
18 A. The supply of arms during the war depended on
19 how one could manage. Partly it was taking the
20 armaments and equipment from the former JNA that was on
21 the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that
22 armament had remained there. There were other channels
23 and I think the only way was through Croatia.
24 JUDGE RIAD: And Croatia provided equipment
25 for the BH army?
1 A. I don't know whether Croatia armed them, but
2 I know that they both, the Muslims and the Croats,
3 could receive any armament via Croatia. But I cannot
4 say that it was Croatia who supplied that armament and
5 that equipment.
6 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much.
7 JUDGE JORDA: Judge Shahabuddeen is going to
8 ask some questions.
9 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN:
10 A. Brigadier, I am one of those slow speakers.
11 I hope that does not trouble you too much. Let me ask
12 you the first question like this.
13 You were talking about October, 1992. You
14 were mentioning a roadblock, which I thought you said
15 the BiH put up to stop HVO forces from going to Jajce
16 to fight the Serbs. You were saying that the HVO was
17 going to Jajce to fight the Serbs, but I understood you
18 to say that the BiH put up a roadblock to stop them.
19 Is my recollection correct?
20 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, the first
21 incident that happened and that you mentioned was the
22 putting up of roadblocks by the then Territorial
23 Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At that time the
24 army had not been formed as yet. There were the HVO
25 units that were going for a tour of duty in Jajce where
1 the frontlines were of the Bosnian Serbs.
2 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Do I understand you to
3 mean that the territorial units were the predecessors
4 of the BiH?
5 A. Yes.
6 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: So, there were Muslim
7 forces?
8 A. Yes.
9 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, tell me this; why
10 would Muslim forces stop the HVO from going ahead to
11 fight the Serbs?
12 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, the reason why I
13 cannot explain, but I know that at that time we still
14 worked together, and that after that incident an
15 agreement was reached. There was a meeting, and then
16 two or three days later those soldiers managed to get
17 through to Jajce. But why it happened at that time, I
18 don't know.
19 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Tell me about the
20 Mujehadeen. Were they present during the period when
21 the relations between the HVO and the Muslim forces
22 were good or did they arrive afterwards? That is to
23 say, did they arrive after relations had soured?
24 A. The arrival of the Mujehadeen in the region
25 of Central Bosnia happened in mid 1992, but at that
1 time, they were still working illegally in a
2 clandestine way, and they would mostly go to villages.
3 The first destination in Central Bosnia was the village
4 of Mehurici, which means that when it came to the
5 escalation or, we can say, when the conflict broke out
6 between the HVO and the BiH army, at that moment, quite
7 openly, the Mujehadeen units started to participate.
8 There were units such as Abdul Latif and El Mujahed.
9 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: What do you say about
10 this: Did the HVO receive any reinforcements by way of
11 personnel from any of the former republics of
12 Yugoslavia?
13 A. As far as I know, and in the time period when
14 I was there in that region, that is, the Operative Zone
15 of Central Bosnia, I have no knowledge of it. I do not
16 know that any units arrived from other republics.
17 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Would you be so kind as
18 to answer the same question in relation to the BiH?
19 Did they receive reinforcements in the form of
20 personnel from any of the former republics of
21 Yugoslavia?
22 A. Not that I know of.
23 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, can you describe
24 the relations between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian
25 Croats in this sense: Was there any period during
1 which the Serb military forces were in a state of
2 cooperation with the Croat military forces?
3 A. In that period, whether there was any
4 cooperation, I know, personally, nothing of, because in
5 the Lasva River Valley where I was, in that enclave of
6 the Lasva Valley, there was certainly no cooperation.
7 As for other enclaves that were separate from ours, I
8 cannot claim anything, because I was not there at that
9 time.
10 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, as my colleague,
11 Judge Riad, has had occasion to observe, you drew a
12 comparison between the size of HVO military forces and
13 the size of BiH military forces, and I think the ratio
14 you gave was roughly 10:1 as against the HVO; is that
15 correct?
16 A. Yes.
17 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Can you also describe
18 matters in such a way as to present the picture of the
19 HVO being contained in two relatively small
20 geographical pockets and surrounded on all the sides by
21 BiH forces. Was that the picture you presented?
22 A. Yes.
23 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, tell me about
24 this: You were an intelligence officer, and you were
25 concerned with evaluating the strength and the
1 positions of the opposing forces; is that correct?
2 A. Yes.
3 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, Brigadier, could
4 you meaningfully evaluate the strength of the opposing
5 forces without, at every stage, making comparisons with
6 the strength of the forces on your side?
7 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, it is quite
8 obvious that a comparison cannot be made if we do not
9 know how many forces, what was the personnel strength
10 on the other side. Otherwise, you can't establish a
11 proportion.
12 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Did you make a schematic
13 of the HVO forces and of their distribution?
14 A. No. The total amount is given by the command
15 or by the operatives. They are the ones who give the
16 full personnel strength.
17 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, with this huge
18 advantage of forces, how do you explain the fact, I
19 believe it is a fact, that the BiH did not succeed in
20 overwhelming the HVO and in taking over these two
21 relatively small pockets?
22 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, apart from those
23 two pockets existed another three pockets, because
24 there were five enclaves under the command of the
25 Operational Zone of Central Bosnia. We were speaking
1 of the Lasva River Valley, where you've noticed there
2 were two pockets which are relevant for this particular
3 case.
4 How can we say that the army of
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina could not take control? It did in
6 quite a great deal, because this enclave was split up
7 into five parts. And could the army of Bosnia and
8 Herzegovina, it probably could have taken control over
9 the whole region, had a peace agreement not been
10 reached. So we cannot claim that the BH army was not
11 able to win control over it, but I think what is
12 crucial is to know the time period.
13 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: We're talking about
14 April 1993, more or less. What proportion of the BiH
15 strength, would you say, was directed to the Serbs and
16 to the other HVO pockets to which you have referred?
17 A. Talking about the balance of forces in the
18 time period that we are referring to, it was not
19 possible to establish precisely the balance of forces,
20 because there were people on a daily basis. For
21 example, an entire brigade would come from Jajce to the
22 Central Bosnia area, which immediately changes the
23 balance.
24 At the time of the conflict between the HVO
25 and the BiH army, the ratio of forces was the one that
1 I presented in my estimate. Sometimes it may have been
2 lower, and, according to some estimates, their number
3 went up to 97.000, occasionally. But while the
4 conflicts were ongoing between the HVO and the BiH
5 army, the frontlines towards the Serbs were not moving,
6 and so I already gave you this ratio of forces.
7 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: If the frontlines
8 towards the Serbs were not moving, would I be right in
9 supposing that the frontlines were not moving because
10 they were opposed by the BiH?
11 A. Are you referring to the front-line between
12 the Bosnian Serb army and the BiH army?
13 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: No.
14 A. Yes, because on those frontlines in that time
15 period, the front-line did not move between the Bosnian
16 Serb army and the lines held by the BiH army.
17 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: I know, Brigadier. I
18 know that you have said that the frontlines did not
19 move. I'm asking you this question: Is it the case
20 that the frontlines did not move because the BiH was
21 opposing the Serbs?
22 A. I would say that, in this period, that was
23 not so, because the BH army had established contact
24 with the Bosnian Serb army in the area of Meokrnje and
25 in the area of Turbe, and I'm referring to the enclave
1 of the Lasva Valley.
2 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: If the BiH had not
3 established contact with the Serbs, as you said, would
4 the Serbs have been in a position to advance even
5 further?
6 A. This is a question that I don't know how to
7 answer. I don't know whether the Serbs would have
8 started an offensive. In my personal opinion, the
9 Serbs, in this time period, did not, themselves, want
10 to join in, probably waiting for the outcome of the
11 conflict between these two belligerents, the HVO and
12 the BiH army.
13 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Let me put my last
14 question on this phase to you: Was any part of the
15 total BiH forces, amounting to some 82.000 people,
16 directed to the Serbs?
17 A. Yes, yes.
18 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Would you like to say,
19 since you have been dealing with estimates, what
20 portion of the 82.000 men, Muslim BiH men, would have
21 been concentrating on the Serbs?
22 A. On the defence lines, I have already said
23 there were between 1.000 and 1.500 men.
24 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: I see. What part of the
25 82.000 men would have been concentrating on the other
1 HVO pockets to which you have referred?
2 A. In military terminology, this is a ratio of
3 1:10, as we have already said. However, these 84.000
4 were not all, at the same time, waging war. These are
5 units that the BiH army had at its disposal within the
6 territory of the Operative Zone of Central Bosnia.
7 They were the units of the 3rd Corps, the entire 3rd
8 Corps, parts of the 1st Corps, parts of the 2nd Corps,
9 and parts of the 4th Corps.
10 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Let's turn to the
11 business of resupply. Is my impression correct that
12 you have said that the BiH got their resupplies through
13 territory held by the HVO? If I'm wrong, do correct
14 me.
15 A. Yes.
16 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Would that mean, then,
17 that the HVO was in a position to control the extent of
18 military supplies reaching the BiH?
19 A. I wouldn't say that. I don't know. Whatever
20 I were to give could not be authentic, because I was
21 not in a position to be able to see whether it could
22 control it or not. But the fact is that the supplies
23 went through territories under the control, among
24 others, of the HVO.
25 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Let me put the question
1 a little hypothetically to you. If the HVO was in a
2 position to control the extent of military resupplies
3 to the BiH, was it, in your judgement, likely that the
4 HVO would permit the BiH to be better equipped than the
5 HVO itself?
6 A. Logic tells us that no one would allow it,
7 but I'm talking about the period of the conflict, not
8 while we're operating together.
9 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, you made certain
10 estimates and assessments for the HVO, and I take it
11 that your assessments and estimates were made on an
12 objective basis; would that be correct?
13 A. My estimates were made on the basis of
14 information gathered in the ways I have presented and
15 on the basis of the situation on the ground during this
16 war.
17 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: What I mean is, the
18 estimates you presented to the HVO authorities would
19 enable the HVO to decide, on the basis of those
20 estimates, whether they wanted to attack or to defend?
21 A. The estimates made were certainly used to
22 take steps in relation to the situation on the ground.
23 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: I'll put it slightly
24 differently. Your estimates would not vary, depending
25 on whether the objective of the HVO authorities was
1 offensive or defensive. Estimates would remain the
2 same. Somebody else would decide whether, on the basis
3 of your estimates, they wanted to take offensive action
4 or defensive action?
5 A. Yes.
6 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, I'm a little
7 unclear. Your evidence was quite extensive. I have a
8 problem with pronunciation, and this could mislead
9 you. I remember some talk about Gomionica, does that
10 ring a bell for you, and of an attack being ordered by
11 General Blaskic on the 17th of April, 1993. Do you
12 recall that area of testimony? I think you said you
13 didn't remember it yourself.
14 A. At that time, I did not because I said that I
15 did not have information from Kiseljak at that time.
16 But according to information I had before, units of the
17 BiH army were situated in the area between Gomionica
18 and Svinjarevo, with their command post in Gomionica.
19 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: What about Stara Bila,
20 was there an HVO attack there in September 1993?
21 A. In Stara Bila, an active defence was carried
22 out, and this was at the feature known as Grbavica, to
23 prevent the breakthrough of the BiH army towards the
24 explosives factory.
25 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: You are not aware of any
1 attacks mounted by the HVO; is that correct?
2 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, to carry out an
3 attack, there must be a certain depth, which means
4 moving the defence by about 800 metres. In military
5 terms, this is described as an active defence, because
6 there wasn't any operation in strategic or operative
7 terms. This was strategic movement of units.
8 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: What is the standard
9 military wisdom about the proportionalities involved in
10 mounting an attack? The attackers must have a certain
11 ratio of advantage. What is that, 3:1, 2:1?
12 A. In the army I was serving, it was 2:1.
13 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: So if a party mounted an
14 attack, we could suppose that that party had a 2:1
15 advantage or thought it had a 2:1 advantage?
16 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, in this case, in
17 this war, the principles that we referred to were not
18 respected. I'm talking about the principles that were
19 started at the academy at which I studied. In this
20 case, the ratio could have been much higher or much
21 lower.
22 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Things were unorthodox?
23 A. Yes, yes.
24 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Let me ask you a little
25 about some documentation. I begin with Exhibit 195.
1 It is dated, let me see, it begins during the day, the
2 Mujehadeen. I wonder whether you have seen it. I
3 would ask the registrar to show it to you, in case you
4 haven't seen it recently. It speaks of the
5 Mujehadeen. Did you receive a copy of this document at
6 the time?
7 A. Yes, yes.
8 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: When did you go into the
9 area?
10 A. At the time it was issued, yes.
11 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: When did you go into the
12 area? When did you assume command of your particular
13 post?
14 A. This is a document that refers to a period
15 much earlier, but I had it in my files. It was in the
16 archives of the command.
17 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: The document is dated
18 the 22nd of April, 1992; is that right?
19 A. This is a mistake. I think it should be
20 '93.
21 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Does "1992" appear in
22 the original?
23 A. Yes.
24 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: And the month is April,
25 the 22nd of April?
1 A. Yes.
2 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Let me ask you a
3 question like this: Have you experienced a certain
4 risk that early in the year, say, January, you tend to
5 carry over the previous year and write that year in,
6 instead of writing in the new year? If you pass from
7 1991 to 1992, in January, you still tend to write, now
8 and then, the previous year. Have you experienced
9 that?
10 A. No.
11 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: No? Do you think that
12 well into the year, in April of a given year, you would
13 write in the previous year for the current year?
14 A. Let us understand one another. This is not a
15 document drafted by me or my department. It was sent
16 to me by the assistant for intelligence from the
17 Viteska Brigade. This text, the contents, refers to
18 1993. It may have been an error, a typewriting error.
19 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: I understand. I retract
20 any suggestion that you, yourself, might have written
21 it. I was only speaking rhetorically. I understand
22 very fully that your testimony is that you didn't write
23 this, you only received this.
24 Let me rephrase the question by asking: Does
25 your experience suggest to you that the writer of a
1 memorandum who is writing in April of a year would
2 write in the previous year for the current year, he
3 might do that in January and maybe early February, and
4 do you think he would do that in April?
5 A. Whether he may have done it, according to
6 what I see, the mistake was made. Whether it could
7 have been done, I -- the year has been typed
8 erroneously. Instead of "1992," we have "1993."
9 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Brigadier, if we could
10 turn to 194, it's a document dated the 16th of April.
11 The Prosecutor read out some parts of paragraph 1 to
12 you. Roughly, in paragraph 1, the BiH was saying that
13 the HVO were committing brutal aggression. Was that
14 correct or not correct?
15 A. As far as I know, and judging by the
16 activities I engaged in, for me, this is not correct,
17 that the HVO was carrying out a brutal aggression.
18 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: So, you recognise that,
19 according to your assessment of the document, there
20 could be a problem of determining what parts are
21 correct and what parts are not correct?
22 A. In this document, and the sentence that you
23 quoted, I just expressed my personal opinion regarding
24 this document.
25 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Would you turn to
1 paragraph 4 and help me? Not being a military man, I
2 cannot interpret all the formulations correctly. I see
3 that this paragraph speaks of an attack; does any
4 particular part of it speak directly or indirectly of a
5 BiH attack on Ahmici?
6 A. No mention is made of the attack on Ahmici.
7 The only thing mentioned is communications between
8 Busovaca and Vitez.
9 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, let us turn to
10 Defence Exhibit 193, that is the one with the
11 controverted date, 14 March or 14 April.
12 Now, if you look at the third full paragraph,
13 there's a reference there to an attack on Ahmici, the
14 precise words being that "The BH army may attempt to
15 launch an attack on Ahmici." Do you see what I'm
16 talking about?
17 A. Yes, I see what you are asking me to look at.
18 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, at that date, the
19 14th of March, or even the 14th of April, would you say
20 that Ahmici was a BiH controlled area?
21 A. On the 14th of April 1993, yes.
22 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Well, would you say
23 there's a difficulty in the idea of the BiH attacking a
24 BiH held area?
25 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, this document
1 speaks about the intentions of the army. It is an
2 assessment by the assistant for military intelligence
3 from the Busovaca Brigade. So, he is assessing along
4 which axis the BiH army may be acting.
5 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: As a military man, would
6 you say that it is more usual to speak of one military
7 force attacking an area held by another military force?
8 A. Is it more customary for an army controlling
9 a particular territory to attack another territory
10 under the control of another army, or one of the
11 armies? That is logical.
12 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, would you say that
13 the effect of this warning that the BH army was likely
14 to launch an attack on Ahmici should have put the HVO
15 on guard as to possible developments in Ahmici, that
16 because of this warning which the HVO received, the HVO
17 should have been taking a particular interest in
18 Ahmici?
19 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, in assessments
20 which are made, this is the assessment of one brigade.
21 So, similar such assessments probably came in from
22 other brigades. So, then, all the assessments are
23 given to the commander, or rather the Chief of Staff
24 who forwards them on.
25 What the commander would do upon receipt of
1 that assessment is up to him to decide, whether he will
2 use the units against which target, and along which
3 axis. We were not those to judge about that, where the
4 HVO units would be used.
5 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Last document, 475E, I
6 think. I think the Prosecution produced this. Am I
7 right, Mr. Prosecutor, the Prosecution produced this?
8 MR. HARMON: Yes.
9 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Yes, the Prosecution
10 produced this. Brigadier, do you see the document?
11 A. Yes.
12 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Do you recognise the
13 document?
14 A. Yes, the one, I recognise it from yesterday.
15 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, look at paragraph
16 one. This is a BiH document, is it?
17 A. Yes.
18 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: On the 7th line of
19 paragraph numbered one we see that the commander of the
20 303rd Brigade is being ordered to provide assistance to
21 our forces in the village of Putis, Jelinak, Loncari
22 Nadioci and Ahmici, he is being ordered to provide
23 assistance. Do you see those words?
24 A. Yes.
25 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Would you say those
1 words are different from words which direct the making
2 of an attack on Ahmici?
3 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, this order, as
4 far as I can understand it, this commander order is
5 issued once the units are already undertaking combat
6 activities in those villages. And now this is simply
7 stated as the assistance that has to be provided to
8 them, as to which unit.
9 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Thank you very much. I
10 return the matter to the Presiding Judge.
11 JUDGE JORDA: I would just like to organise
12 ourselves, first of all. I know that the interpreters
13 have been working since 2 o'clock. I haven't got many
14 questions to ask you, because many of the questions I
15 wanted to ask were asked by my colleagues. I have two
16 or three questions I would like to ask you, but before
17 that, even though it's going to be short, I wonder
18 whether the interpreters will agree with me.
19 First of all, maybe we could finish with this
20 witness and then maybe have a half an hour break,
21 because this has been a very strenuous session, and
22 then we will have the Status Conference.
23 Do the interpreters agree with me? Yes? All
24 do accept. In that case, you must be tired, Brigadier,
25 but I have got a few questions to ask you.
1 My first question is the one to which I
2 authorise you not to answer; or even if you want to,
3 you can confer with counsel for Mr. Blaskic, in case
4 you don't want to answer.
5 The documents, all the documents that you
6 have brought to this Tribunal, is it the result of your
7 personal sources only, or did the Ministry of Defence
8 of Croatia give them to you?
9 Please think over my question well. The
10 reason why I would like to know is that I wondered
11 maybe that you can consult the Defence counsel. I
12 remind you, you are under oath, but maybe if you don't
13 want to answer it, don't answer. In any case, the
14 Judges will draw conclusions, whatever your answer is.
15 My question, I repeat, is: Were these only
16 your own notes, or did Croatia open its military
17 archives to you? So, this is a very clear and personal
18 answer, you can either not answer or consult with the
19 Defence counsel; but in any case, I would like an
20 answer.
21 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, Defence counsel
22 would like the witness to give an answer according to
23 his personal conscience.
24 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you very much, Defence
25 counsel. I understand.
1 You can answer, but you are under oath, I
2 remind you.
3 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, all the
4 documents which were at my disposal and which were
5 presented here I have personally, with my notes and
6 according to my recollections, that is the form in
7 which I gave it to this Tribunal, that is, to the
8 Defence.
9 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you very much.
10 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, I apologise, the
11 English answer is, the translation into English was,
12 does not make too much sense. Maybe he can say how,
13 who gave him the documents, and what were his personal
14 notes. It was not clear in English.
15 JUDGE JORDA: What I understood was that all
16 the documents that were brought by the witness was the
17 result of his personal notes and his personal
18 recollections. That is what I understood, and I did
19 not want to ask any other questions of him about that
20 particular matter.
21 MR. NOBILO: When we speak about documents,
22 these are the orders. This is just one source, and his
23 notes and his recollections represent another source.
24 JUDGE JORDA: Yes. I did not mean the orders
25 here. These are the documents of the Defence, I have
1 not, I cannot interfere with. But what I meant were
2 the maps and the schematics and so on. For all the
3 rest is confidential between the witness and the
4 Defence.
5 My following question, which might probably
6 be the last one, or the one before the last. When you
7 worked with the intelligence service, did you have any
8 political activities in the sense that you would give
9 to your hierarchical superiors information about the
10 atmosphere in the population, the general feeling, the
11 context? Or else, you only satisfied yourself with
12 military information?
13 A. Only the information, intelligence of
14 military type.
15 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. And when in the
16 military hierarchy there were various, when various
17 officers had some political positions that they
18 expressed, were you aware of that, or not?
19 A. During my work, and even today, I can say
20 that I never engaged in any political activities, and I
21 have been solely concentrating on my profession and on
22 the job that I have been doing. I never had any impact
23 or influence on the political activities. The tasks
24 that I receive, I receive from my commander, and that
25 concerns the military.
1 JUDGE JORDA: Maybe I can rephrase my
2 question. During the weeks and the months before the
3 attack on the 16th of April, did you have the feeling
4 that in the HVO, which is a military organisation, so,
5 it is something that you are familiar with, that the
6 HVO could have a propaganda activity?
7 Now we speak about your field of competence.
8 Did you have the feeling that, in the months and weeks
9 preceding the attack that is mentioned in this
10 indictment, the HVO actively participated in a
11 propaganda campaign against the Muslims?
12 A. I don't know that it took part in that.
13 JUDGE JORDA: Taking into account your
14 position, your job, your high responsibility and
15 intelligence activities, you had no knowledge of some
16 form of propaganda that could have been in the HVO,
17 that the HVO could be distributing?
18 A. I cannot claim that it did not exist, that
19 propaganda did not exist; but as a military man, I did
20 not deal with such propaganda. My job was to gather
21 information about the BH army in that time period, and
22 also I had to make certain estimates.
23 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. And now I will ask
24 you the last question: From what you've said, I can
25 draw a conclusion that in fact you wanted to tell us
1 that there was some kind of a civil war between
2 military forces, very organised military forces on both
3 sides.
4 A. Yes.
5 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Brigadier, you have
6 been very patient. You have been for quite a while
7 with us, and thank you very much for your coming here
8 to give us evidence. I would like to thank the
9 interpreters, and now we are going to have a longer
10 break, for half an hour, after that a Status Conference
11 which will be in closed session, and that is why we are
12 going to meet now at 16.30. And after that we will
13 have a Status Conference which will be in closed
14 session
15 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at
16 3.54 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday,
17 the 24th day of September, 1998 at
18 10.00 a.m.
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