1 Wednesday, 28th October 1998
2 (Open session)
3 --- Upon commencing at 4.05 p.m.
4 JUDGE JORDA: Please be seated. Can we have
5 the accused brought in, please?
6 (The accused entered court).
7 JUDGE JORDA: First of all, I would like to
8 apologise for this delay. The day has been extremely
9 busy. We are going to resume with the new witness.
10 Will it be Mr. Hayman? Let us have the witness brought
11 in, please.
12 (The witness entered court).
13 JUDGE JORDA: Can you hear me, sir?
14 THE WITNESS: Yes, I can.
15 JUDGE JORDA: Would you please give us your
16 name, your first name, your current status, your
17 professional status, your domicile, and after that we
18 will ask you to remain standing for a few moments in
19 order to take the solemn declaration. First of all,
20 your name and your first name.
21 THE WITNESS: My name is Matthew
23 JUDGE JORDA: Dundas-Whatley; is that right?
24 THE WITNESS: That right.
25 JUDGE JORDA: What is your profession and
1 current residence, please?
2 THE WITNESS: I'm currently in business in
4 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. The usher is going
5 to give you the solemn declaration, that is your oath.
6 Please read it while you are still standing.
7 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will
8 speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the
10 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Thank you very
11 much, Mr. Whatley, please be seated. You have been
12 called to appear, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, by the Defence
13 for General Blaskic in the trial which is being
14 conducted by the Prosecution. You are at the
15 International Criminal Tribunal. Please speak freely,
16 you are under oath.
17 First you will answer the questions that the
18 party which has called you in will ask you, that is the
19 Defence, and then you will be asked questions by the
20 Office of the Prosecutor, and finally the Judges will
21 have questions to ask you.
22 Mr. Dundas-Whatley, Mr. Hayman, we didn't get
23 the summary, but we will do it for the next witness;
24 but since we used a lot of time up we will dispense
25 with that and ask you to begin. I have the summary
1 here. Thank you very much.
2 WITNESS: MATTHEW DUNDAS-WHATLEY
3 Examined by Mr. Hayman:
4 Q. Mr. Whatley, you are a former officer of the
5 British army; is that correct?
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. Could you briefly describe your military
8 career of service to the Court?
9 A. I did approximately eight years with the
10 British army, and this started in 1985 where I attended
11 a three-day officer selection course. And when I
12 passed that, I then went to the Royal Military Academy
13 at Sandhurst where I trained for nearly a year to
14 become a British army officer.
15 At the completion of that course I joined my
16 regiment, and then for the next six years or so I was
17 posted in various countries in the world. I rose to
18 the rank of captain, and my final job in the army was
19 in Bosnia.
20 During my nearly eight years in the army I
21 attended many training courses in the United Kingdom.
22 Q. When you refer to your regiment, are you
23 referring to the Cheshire Regiment?
24 A. That's correct.
25 Q. What was your position in the regiment at the
1 time the regiment was ordered to Bosnia?
2 A. I was selected by my commanding officer, Bob
3 Stewart, to be a liaison officer.
4 Q. I will pause slightly after your answers, and
5 if you could do the same so the translators can
6 complete their work.
7 Before you were selected by Colonel Stewart
8 to be a liaison officer during the regiment's tour of
9 service in Bosnia, what had your position been in the
11 A. In the two years leading up to deployment to
12 Bosnia I had been the training officer, the operations
13 officer, and the second in command of a company.
14 Q. After your tour of service in Bosnia, did you
15 leave the British army?
16 A. Yes, I did.
17 Q. And under what circumstances did you leave
18 the army?
19 A. The army underwent a large scale reduction in
20 force, and that's when I left.
21 Q. Did you receive any medals or other
22 recognition for your service in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
23 A. Yes, I did. I got the United Nations Bosnia
24 Medal, and I was mentioned in dispatches by the British
1 Q. Had you received any prior medals for your
2 service with the British army?
3 A. Yes, I got the British Northern Ireland
5 Q. After you left the British army in roughly
6 1993, what was your employment?
7 A. I went back to the former Yugoslavia as a
8 humanitarian aid worker, firstly with a British NGO in
9 Belgrade, an organisation called OXFAM.
10 Q. When you say NGO, can you tell the Court what
11 you're referring to?
12 A. NGO means non-governmental organisation,
13 charity. I worked in Belgrade about seven months. I
14 then went back to Bosnia and worked in another British
15 NGO called "Feed the Children" for about ten months,
16 and then I did some consulting work with another
17 British NGO helping old people in Mostar.
18 After that, towards the middle of 1995, I
19 then went into business and self-employment.
20 Q. When you left "Feed the Children" what was
21 your position with that relief organisation?
22 A. Within two weeks of arriving with "Feed the
23 Children" I was promoted to be what was called the
24 Bosnia coordinator, which meant I was the director for
25 all their operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
1 Q. Now, let us turn to your tour, or service, of
2 duty in Bosnia-Herzegovina with the Cheshire Regiment.
3 Did the regiment receive any special training prior to
4 its deployment to Bosnia?
5 A. Yes, we did. The training for most of the
6 regiment I think lasted for about two months and took
7 place in Germany, because that is where it was based at
8 the time; but for me, I only had about two weeks
10 Q. Why was that?
11 A. Because I was part of the advance party. In
12 fact, I was part of what we call the pre-advance party
13 into Bosnia on October the 16th, 1992.
14 Q. There is a large map to your right on the
15 easel, it is Exhibit -- strike that.
16 Let's use that map, Exhibit 29, if you would,
17 there should also be a pointer in front of you, and my
18 question for you is how the liaison officers for the
19 Cheshire Regiment, which as we know in this Court was
20 principally based in Vitez, but also with detachments
21 in Tuzla and Gornji Vakuf; could you first tell us, and
22 if it is helpful, show the Court on the map how the
23 Cheshire Regiment divided the responsibilities of the
24 various liaison officers for the regiment?
25 A. Yes. I'm just trying to work out how best to
1 do this with the map.
2 Q. There is a microphone that can be moved and
3 made more convenient, and you may well need to stand in
4 order to point to the map.
5 First, perhaps you could tell the Court, and
6 if it is helpful, point out the locations involved.
7 A. Your Honours, before I point to the map
8 probably the best thing to do, to start with, is
9 explain the concept by which the liaison officers were
10 created and for what purpose.
11 Colonel Bob Stewart decided it was very
12 important, for him to be successful as the commander of
13 the British forces in Bosnia, that he had to have a
14 very good understanding and a very good liaison with
15 the military commanders fighting the war. Because our
16 main mission, as given to us by the United Nations, was
17 primarily to be concerned with transporting of food and
18 escorting convoys into Bosnia.
19 And so, he dedicated five captains, including
20 myself, with the task of keeping a constant liaison
21 with those people, the local commanders, and at the
22 same time, of course, he had to deploy the battalion
23 around Bosnia.
24 The way he did that was by putting a company
25 down in Gornji Vakuf, a company in Vitez, and a company
1 in Tuzla, and put with each of those some one or two
2 liaison officers. Two of us liaison officers were
3 based in Vitez, I was one of them. So, if I could now
4 just go to the map.
5 This is the town of Gornji Vakuf, down here,
6 where we stationed one liaison officer. This is the
7 town of Vitez, where I was stationed, and one other
8 captain. And the Tuzla is off the map, up here, where
9 two more captains were stationed.
10 Q. Now if Exhibit 183/1 could be placed on the
11 ELMO, please. I think you may be seated.
12 If we could zoom in a little more on the
13 map. Thank you very much to the technical staff.
14 Using this map, if it's helpful, and you may
15 point on the ELMO, and then your indications will be
16 indicated on the video monitors throughout the
17 courtroom, what your initial area of responsibility was
18 as a liaison officer.
19 A. The two liaison officers based here in Vitez,
20 myself and one other, our area of responsibility did
21 not extend into the purple, but limited to the green
22 and yellow.
23 Of course, my first, my initial area of
24 responsibility was what we call the Maglaj finger,
25 because there is the town of Maglaj, right down --
1 sorry, I moved it -- right down to a sort of shape like
2 this. The southernmost city was there in my initial
3 area, which was the city of Zenica.
4 Q. So, roughly it included the area stretching
5 from Maglaj to Zenica?
6 A. I can list the towns, if you like.
7 Q. Please do.
8 A. The towns in my initial area of
9 responsibility were Maglaj, Zepce, Zavidovici, Tesanj
10 and Zenica.
11 Q. During your tour of duty, first, did you have
12 occasion to cover other areas due to the absence from
13 the theatre of the other liaison officer based in
15 A. Yes, the arrangement made from the beginning
16 is the other captain and I would shadow each other's
17 responsibilities. If he needed support for something I
18 would come in and cover him, and vice versa, and when
19 he went on leave I would cover his area. And so, from
20 the very beginning I developed a very good
21 understanding of his area, and he of mine.
22 Q. Did he take any leaves or other absences
23 during the tour of duty that required you to cover his
24 area of responsibility on a more full-time basis?
25 A. Yes, he was away for two weeks in
1 December, '92, so I covered him during that period; and
2 then he went back to the United Kingdom in the first
3 week of March, '93, and so I then moved down
4 permanently and covered his area from then until May
5 the 16th when I left.
6 Q. And what area was it that you took over in
7 early March, 1993 from this other liaison officer who
9 A. I will point it out on the map for you. It
10 was the towns of Travnik, Novi Travnik, Vitez,
11 Busovaca, and I also retained responsibility for
13 Q. You touched on this briefly, but could you
14 tell the Court anything more concerning the principal
15 duty or duties of the liaison officers for the Cheshire
17 A. The primary responsibility of the liaison
18 officers, as defined by Colonel Bob Stewart, was that
19 we should maintain a constant link with the military
20 commanders, that we should be the passage, or we should
21 be the route through which information would flow to
22 UNPROFOR from the local factions, and to the warring
23 factions from UNPROFOR, that we had to develop a very
24 close relationship with the commanders, and indeed, on
25 occasions with the civilian leaders, develop a very
1 close relationship with them. And in our case it was
2 mainly the Bosnian army and the HVO, but on occasions
3 with the Serbs.
4 We also had additional duties, but I must
5 stress that was our overriding duty. Additional duties
6 were in the information collection areas, where we were
7 expected to gather a substantial amount of information
8 about the activities and structures of the local
9 warring factions.
10 Q. You have mentioned several different tasks;
11 were any of those multiple tasks in conflict?
12 A. It wasn't a conflict that was difficult to
13 handle, but it is important to point out, I think, that
14 maintaining the trust and maintaining the integrity of
15 ourselves when dealing with the local commanders,
16 required, quite logically, that we were not seen as
18 And so, any information that we were given,
19 which was on occasions quite substantial, by one side,
20 we did not pass to the other, but we kept it within the
21 United Nations information chain. And so, there was a
22 certain conflict there that we didn't want to be seen
23 to be spies, and so we didn't ask hundreds and hundreds
24 of questions about the details of their military
1 Q. How frequent was your contact with commanders
2 in the warring parties, the Bosnian army and the HVO,
3 during your work?
4 A. From the day I arrived until the day I left
5 that was my only task, and I was out at least six days
6 a week, and quite often for 12, 15 hours, dealing only
7 with local military commanders.
8 Q. Did the liaison officers for the regiment
9 have more contact with the commanders of the warring
10 parties than others in the regiment?
11 A. Yes, by far. The liaison officers and the
12 commanding officer were probably the only people that
13 had any detailed meetings with any of the local
14 military commanders. It was our full-time job.
15 Colonel Bob Stewart also took part in very
16 important meetings with very senior commanders. But
17 that was, we were out there the whole time and very few
18 members of the regiment had the contact that we had.
19 Q. Did the commanding officer of the regiment,
20 and perhaps other senior officers, obtain information
21 from the liaison officers about the warring parties?
22 And if so, how?
23 A. The way it worked was that we would leave in
24 the morning on our duties and come back at the end of
25 the day. If during that time, or in fact at any time,
1 we discovered information that was considered vital,
2 that would probably be radioed through straight away;
3 but more routinely at the end of the day we returned to
4 our base in Vitez, and if I had information that was
5 very important but sensitive, I would go to Colonel
6 Stewart's office and brief him personally. Or
7 alternatively, and this happened routinely, every day,
8 I would be debriefed by the military information
10 In addition, at five o'clock every evening we
11 had a conference where I was expected to speak about my
12 activities that day for the general audience.
13 Q. And who was the audience at that 5.00 p.m.
14 daily briefing?
15 A. The senior officers of the regiment and the
16 heads of department.
17 Q. You mentioned the MILINFOSUM; what product
18 did they produce, and to whom was it sent?
19 A. Every evening the military information office
20 produced a MILINFOSUM, which is a military information
21 summary, this was produced every day in the evening by
22 the office.
23 Q. And to whom was it sent?
24 A. The MILINFOSUM was transmitted firstly to
25 Kiseljak, which was the headquarters of UNPROFOR in
1 Bosnia. In addition it was sent to Split, which was
2 the headquarters of the British forces in the former
3 Yugoslavia. And I believe it was also sent directly to
4 Britain, as well.
5 Q. In addition to the meetings and contacts you
6 had with commanders of the warring factions, did you
7 also have contact with lower level soldiers in the BH
8 army and the HVO?
9 A. On a lower level my contact with the local
10 warring factions was checkpoints just like every other
11 member of the battalion who was travelling around.
12 Q. Did you travel a lot?
13 A. Oh, yes, I travelled a lot around Bosnia, and
14 I travelled through a lot of checkpoints.
15 Q. I take it you were travelling on a daily
17 A. All the time, every day.
18 Q. Now, I would like you to answer the following
19 question without divulging any information that might
20 be considered sensitive or confidential.
21 Did the British Battalion have an
22 intelligence apparatus in Bosnia-Herzegovina of the
23 type it would have were it to be at war with an enemy?
24 A. No, it didn't.
25 Q. Can you explain?
1 A. The British army trains for war, and I spent
2 many years training for war, and when the British army
3 goes to war, like I believe all NATO armies, it takes
4 with it a large intelligence gathering network.
5 To give you some idea how this would work, in
6 the British situation it would normally be run by the
7 intelligence corps, which is a department in the army,
8 and it would have an enormous array of assets for the
9 purpose of gathering information about the enemy; such
10 things as satellites, spy planes, equipment for
11 listening to the enemy's radio networks and decoding
13 We would conduct reconnaissance into enemy
14 territory, and we would conduct research into the
15 background of the personalities commanding the enemy.
16 We would use radar for spotting artillery and mortars,
17 and the information from that would all form part of
18 the intelligence collection which is vital in the
19 commander's plan for future operations.
20 In the case of Bosnia, we didn't have
21 anything like that. In the case of Bosnia we were not
22 at war. We had a military information office which I
23 believe had two members of staff, or possibly three.
24 Q. As a result, was there a difference between
25 the amount of information the British battalion
1 received about the BH army and the HVO from what it
2 would have received had it been at war with either one
3 of those parties?
4 A. Yes. I don't think the quantity of the
5 information is at issue here, it's the type -- it's the
6 information -- it's the type of information that we
7 were looking for and that we needed to conduct our
8 business. So you cannot really compare what we were
9 doing in Bosnia with what we would do in war, if we
10 went to war against the HVO or the Bosnian army.
11 Q. Let me to ask you to think back to your first
12 arrival in Bosnia in October 1992, and ask you whether
13 you, to your knowledge, your colleagues in the British
14 battalion, did you have any preconceptions about the
15 war and the parties to the conflict when you arrived?
16 A. We were the first regiment in from the
17 British army, and so consequently there was no -- there
18 was not a great deal of information available to us
19 before we went in, and we relied almost entirely upon
20 newspaper and television articles. So we built up an
21 impression in our minds, I think, which became our
22 established feelings prior to our arrival in Bosnia.
23 And the feeling we had then, back in October '92, was
24 that Bosnia-Herzegovina had a government in Sarajevo,
25 and this government, with its own assets, was at war
1 against a very large Serb army which had rebelled
2 against the authority of that government.
3 Q. When you arrived in country, did you find
4 that there was also a conflict between the BH army and
5 the HVO in progress?
6 A. Yes, there was. We were not aware of this
7 before we arrived, and it was on October 18th, two days
8 after I arrived in Split, on October 18th, after I
9 travelled for the first time into middle Bosnia, and if
10 I can refer to the map I can explain.
11 Q. Again, you're referring to Exhibit 29.
12 Please continue.
13 A. The route we travelled up to get into middle
14 Bosnia, this was in a Land Rover convoy of about, I
15 think, seven or eight Land Rovers, took us over the
16 mountains along roads which in the main were not made
17 up, were not covered with tarmac. We went past the
18 lake here Ramsko Lake, through the town of Prozor here
19 which was very tense, up over the mountain and down the
20 hill into Gorini Vakuf here, which was nice and
21 peaceful and quiet.
22 We then went up north here, up a valley road,
23 a very badly made road. And when we got into this high
24 area here. This is when we began to realise that the
25 problems in Bosnia were extended beyond just a Serb
1 problem. We went from checkpoint to checkpoint to
2 checkpoint. Prior to arriving in Prozor, I think we
3 had been through one or two checkpoints over the first
4 hundred miles of the journey. Here the checkpoints
5 were every mile or every two miles.
6 Some of the badges had "TO" on them, and some
7 of the soldiers had no badges and there were the
8 occasional HVO badges. It was rather difficult to tell
9 from the way they were dressed exactly what was going
10 on, but we had an interpreter. At all these
11 checkpoints we discussed what was going on, and if I
12 could very quickly explain what was happening.
13 Most of this area at the time, most of this
14 area was in the control of the TO, the Territorial
15 Defence, but some of the villages were Croat villages,
16 and they didn't consider themselves to be under the
17 control of the Territorial Defence, but under their own
18 control, the Croat control. When we got further north
19 to Novi Travnik, we left this village problem behind
20 and things changed again.
21 Q. When you and your colleagues arrived in
22 country, what then was your initial impression of the
23 HVO's relationship to this problem as you defined it,
24 that being a central government and a Serb rebellion.
25 How did the HVO fit into the initial thinking, at least
1 on your part, and perhaps if you can tell us, your
3 A. Certainly in those first few days, first two
4 days probably, we felt that the HVO was a rebel
5 organisation, that it was fighting against the
6 established government in Sarajevo, and it was a
7 traitor, it was a rebel organisation. That's how we
9 Q. As a result of your contacts with the BH army
10 and the HVO, after a period of weeks or months did you
11 come to have a different understanding of the problem?
12 A. Yes. After a few months in the country and
13 spending all my time talking to military commanders and
14 civil leaders, we began to see the situation rather
15 differently. We began to see Bosnia being made up of
16 three separate people with three separate armies, three
17 separate military structures and civilian structures,
18 and all three of them were united in their own national
20 Q. You mentioned these checkpoints on the road
21 between Gornji Vakuf and Novi Travnik. Was there a
22 pattern to the checkpoints, or was there a purpose that
23 you could discern to the checkpoints?
24 A. That was our first encounter with
25 checkpoints. The situation there was not unique at
1 all. The situation there had arisen as a result of
2 enormous mistrust between the Muslim villages and the
3 Croat villages.
4 Q. During your initial tour of duty did you keep
5 a diary?
6 A. Yes. Yes, I did.
7 Q. I'd ask you the following question, and if
8 you need to refer to your diary, with the Court's
9 permission you may, whether in the latter part of
10 October did you make a determination under whose
11 control the road south from Novi Travnik towards Gornji
12 Vakuf was, that is who controlled that road?
13 A. Yes. I've just described to you the
14 situation as we found it on the 18th of October. If I
15 could now refer to my diary of Saturday the 24th of
17 Q. 1992?
18 A. 1992. And if I could read it to you. "My
19 vehicle, followed by as Ander's Toyota, then Olie
20 Halstead's, very few roadblocks compared with
21 last time," I'm referring to the days before, "The Novi
22 Travnik road is indisputably in TO hands."
23 Q. Thank you. Based on your almost daily
24 contacts with HVO commanders and HVO commands during
25 late 1992 and in early 1993, can you tell the Court
1 what type of army was the HVO as you saw it, and
2 understood it and came to understand it?
3 A. The HVO and the Bosnian army, in my opinion,
4 were both peasant armies. They were made up of
5 villagers, most of whom had probably had experience in
6 the Yugoslav army as conscripts, but they were
7 ill-disciplined, they were drinking on the streets.
8 And they were organised on a territorial
9 village-by-village basis.
10 Q. Can you tell the court what the consequences
11 of that were, being organised on a territorial basis as
12 you put it, village-by-village basis?
13 A. The result of being organised in that way was
14 the loyalties of the soldiers were to the village, to
15 the local leaders and the local politicians, that
16 the -- that they were primarily concerned with the
17 defence of the village. And dealing with small units
18 of this nature whose raison dêtre was defence of the
19 village, it was almost impossible and very difficult at
20 least to organise them into what we would call a
21 military command structure.
22 Q. Why would the presence of these predominantly
23 local loyalties, as you put it, undermine the creation
24 of a military chain of command?
25 A. There was a conflict of interests between
1 defending the village you're living in and operating in
2 a greater or a grander military scheme, which may
3 require you to have to leave your village under the
4 command of somebody you've never met and go and fight
5 somewhere else.
6 MR. HAYMAN: You've mentioned the chain of
7 command, and I'd like to take a short detour from the
8 events of your tour of duty, and I would ask for
9 assistance in placing an exhibit on the ELMO and
10 distributing it, please.
11 THE REGISTRAR: This is D414.
12 MR. HAYMAN:
13 Q. You have before you on the ELMO Exhibit D414,
14 and my question for you is: You've mentioned chain of
15 command. Can you tell us, in the British army system,
16 what is the chain of command from the level of brigade
17 commander down?
18 A. When we talk about the chain of command in
19 the British army, we're talking about from one
20 headquarters to a subordinate one. In the case of this
21 chart here, we have a brigade headquarters here
22 commanded by a Brigadier. Under need him we have four
23 or five battalions, each of which will be commanded, in
24 the British system, by a Lieutenant-Colonel.
25 Q. Could the technical booth zoom in on the
1 picture slightly, please? Thank you. Please continue?
2 A. And under each one of those battalions, under
3 each one you could expect another four or five
4 companies, each commanded by a Major. So the chain of
5 command would go from the Brigadier, to the
6 Lieutenant-Colonel to the Major.
7 Q. Within that structure, who are the
8 commanders? Who would be known as a commander?
9 A. Commanders are the -- at the brigade level
10 with the Brigadier. In American it would be known as a
11 one-star General. At the battalion level it is the
12 Lieutenant-Colonel and at the company level it is the
14 Q. On this chart -- by the way, did you design
15 this chart?
16 A. Yes. I thought it might help explain the
17 confusion here.
18 Q. There's a box to the right of the brigade
19 labelled "Brigade Staff Officers". Who are, and are
20 Brigade Staff Officers commanders?
21 A. Brigade Staff Officers are not commanders.
22 The Brigade Staff Officers work for the Brigadier.
23 They are obviously junior to him in rank, Colonels,
24 Majors, Captains, and they are his specialists in
25 various fields and they advise him.
1 Q. What types of duties or areas would a Brigade
2 Staff Officer have responsibility over?
3 A. Generally -- of course, every brigade is
4 different with different purposes, but generally there
5 will be a chief of staff who at brigade level in the
6 British system would probably be a Major. And then
7 there will be probably maybe another Major dealing with
8 the administration side of life or re-supply. There
9 will be a Captain -- or probably a Captain dealing with
10 intelligence and another Captain dealing with the
11 operations. There will probably be, depending on the
12 side of the brigade and its purpose, you'll have
13 communications officers and transport officers.
14 Q. Thank you. Now I'd like to return to your
15 tour of duty and your observations of the HVO. Could
16 you tell the court how the HVO differed from the
17 British army?
18 A. It's very difficult to compare the HVO with
19 the British army. The British army has a highly
20 organised structure developed over many years, and
21 within that structure the commanders and the units have
22 a well-defined relationship based on training and
23 respect, and it's well understood throughout the whole
25 In the case of the HVO, that isn't exist.
1 The HVO was formed during the war, out of chaos, and
2 the structures were developed from the village
4 Q. Were there any other differences that you
5 noted as a result of your observations?
6 A. Another probably important factor is to
7 compare the command structure and the rank structure of
8 the British army with the HVO. In the British army,
9 officers and soldiers, senior NCOs, belong to a
10 meritocracy where they are promoted as a result of
11 being good at their job, getting good reports.
12 In the case of the HVO, people were given
13 appointments overnight, and people, who before the war
14 had almost no responsibility at all, found themselves
15 as brigade commanders. A very good example of this
16 would be commander Mario Cerkez, who commanded the
17 Vitez Brigade in the time I was there, in the HVO.
18 Before the war, I believe he had been a security guard
19 in the local ammunition factory and here he was, with
20 very little military experience and very little
21 education, commanding the Vitez Brigade of the HVO.
22 Q. On the exhibit which I think is still on the
23 ELMO, D414, we see a Brigadier who would command a
24 brigade in the British army. What type of experience,
25 or training or selection process would entitle someone
1 in the British army system to command a brigade?
2 A. A British brigade commander would typically
3 have about 25 years of professional, full-time military
4 training with many, many courses probably in that time,
5 with three or four years spent away on courses.
6 Q. You said 25 years of training. Did you mean
7 25 years of experience with the training courses you've
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Were there any other differences you noted
11 between the British army and the HVO?
12 A. Yes. I think we should look -- it's
13 important to look at the equipment which the HVO had.
14 When the British army trains and when the British army
15 goes to war, it is equipped with all the military
16 equipment required to fight that war. Communications
17 equipment, logistical equipment, re-supply equipment,
18 military hardware, artillery regiments, tank regiments,
19 aeroplanes, helicopters and this type of thing, radar
20 systems. The HVO had none of this.
21 Q. Was the HVO properly equipped to fight a
22 modern war or fight war in the modern style?
23 A. In middle Bosnia where I dealt with the HVO,
24 and I can only speak for middle Bosnia, there were very
25 few tanks, very little artillery in the HVO. It was
1 fighting a war in the late 20th Century in the style
2 which we were fighting a hundred years ago.
3 Q. And I take it you would say something similar
4 with respect to the BH army?
5 A. Oh, yes. It was exactly the same with the
6 Bosnian army as well. There is one other area where I
7 think I could -- I think it makes it so difficult to
8 compare the HVO with the Bosnian army, and I've alluded
9 to it already, but I think I should go into a little
10 bit more detail.
11 Q. You said HVO and Bosnian army.
12 A. Sorry, HVO and the British army. And this
13 was in the area of how people were selected and trained
14 for their positions. I've already mentioned one
15 example, but across the board, in the British army,
16 soldiers are selected, trained and promoted over a
17 period of time within a structure for the purposes of
18 conducting -- of carrying out a job, and over the
19 period of their careers, whether they're in the army
20 for three years or 30 years, that is an ongoing
21 process. In the case of the HVO, the men were
22 mobilised from the villages, from the streets, given a
23 rifle and told to get on with it.
24 For those reasons, I don't think you can
25 really compare the HVO or the Bosnian army with the
1 British army or any other NATO army.
2 Q. You mentioned the role of training in
3 building a professional army. Did you, during your
4 six-month or so tour of duty, did you ever see HVO
5 troops engaged in training?
6 A. No.
7 Q. On any occasions?
8 A. No, I didn't. And in the time I was in -- in
9 the time that I was in Bosnia, I never heard anyone
10 else talk about the training of either the HVO or the
11 Bosnian army.
12 Q. Was the HVO a disciplined, organised military
13 force or was it something else?
14 A. No, it was not a -- in my experience in
15 middle Bosnia, the HVO and the Bosnian army were not
16 disciplined and well-organised military forces. This
17 information was -- came to us as a result of their own
18 commanders telling us of the problems that they had
19 controlling the rogue gangs that they had as soldiers
20 and units underneath them.
21 Q. Did the HVO have a large headquarters well
22 equipped with staff? And I'm referring to the Hotel
24 A. We did not know -- or I did not know how many
25 trained staff officers they had in their headquarters.
1 In order to evaluate the ability of their headquarters,
2 we would need to -- we would need to know that, but
3 I've already given you some idea of how many trained
4 staff officers we would have in a British brigade
6 Q. Would a British brigade headquarters have any
7 type of communications unit?
8 A. Depending on its role, but it could expect to
9 have probably a signals squadron working within the
10 brigade. And it should be stressed also that I've been
11 talking about a brigade headquarters. In the case of
12 Hotel Vitez, there were many brigades under the command
13 of that headquarters. It was more of -- by the British
14 standard you could say a divisional command or even
16 Q. So I take it your testimony is you're not
17 able to answer the question whether the HVO
18 headquarters in Central Bosnia was -- functioned well
19 or functioned professionally because you do not know
20 how many professionally trained officers they had in
21 their headquarters?
22 A. That is correct.
23 Q. Did the HVO headquarters in the Central
24 Bosnia Operative Zone have access to secure fax or
25 other secure communications?
1 A. Not that I'm aware of, and our dealings with
2 them were over the telephone.
3 Q. Is it dangerous to use unsecured
4 communications in a military headquarters?
5 A. Yes, it would be very dangerous to try to
6 prosecute a war at that level without access and
7 without the use of secure communications. And the
8 reasons for this are that any radio transmissions or
9 telephone transmissions which are not coded can, of
10 course, be -- would probably be picked up by the enemy,
11 your enemy. In that situation, if you are giving
12 instructions to your subordinate units, your
13 subordinate brigades, orders of what they are required
14 to do, if the enemy heard those orders, the enemy would
15 have a very good understanding of your intentions.
16 And in the same way, if the subordinate units
17 were then reporting to you and telling them how they're
18 getting on, have they taken any land, have they taken
19 any casualties, have they lost any land, that
20 information, if that information went into enemy hands
21 they would have a very good understanding of where your
22 strengths and weaknesses were. So to operate without
23 secure communications, on that level, is very
25 Q. Did UNPROFOR use any secure communications?
1 A. I don't believe we did, but we were not --
2 certainly at the level I operated no, we did not, and,
3 in fact, we made no secret of our radio frequencies,
4 but we were not fighting a war.
5 Q. So I take it it was by design that UNPROFOR
6 did not attempt to shield their communications?
7 A. I don't know the reasons why we weren't given
8 secure communications, but it was not important for
9 what we were doing, because we were not fighting a
11 Q. Let me direct your attention forward in time
12 to April or perhaps March of 1993. At this time, I
13 take it, you were the sole liaison officer responsible
14 for the areas of Travnik, Novi Travnik, Vitez, Busovaca
15 and Zenica; is that correct?
16 A. Yes. In March and up to about the middle of
17 April I was the sole liaison officer for that area.
18 Q. Prior to April of 1993, did an entity known
19 as the 7th Muslim Brigade come to your attention, and
20 if so, in what regard?
21 A. The organisation which became known as the
22 7th Muslim Brigade came to our attention -- came to my
23 attention in about January 1993. It had rather a
24 destabilising effect from the moment we were aware of
25 it, and it is because of how destabilising it was that
1 it was brought to our attention that it existed.
2 The 7th Muslim Brigade was formed, I believe,
3 and it was what I believed at the time and I have no
4 reason not to believe it now, in a village called
5 Nemila, which I shall point out on the map.
6 Q. You're pointing above the map Exhibit 29; is
7 that right?
8 A. Yes. Unfortunately, your map is not big
9 enough for the purpose of this.
10 Q. Is it some place north of Zenica?
11 A. Yes. I believe about 15 kilometres north,
12 and it was known to us as the Nemila Brigade
14 Q. Can you describe the characteristics that
15 were reported to the British battalion concerning this
17 A. The 7th Muslim Brigade represented a new
18 dimension in the way the war -- the military situation
19 was going in middle Bosnia. They were paid as soldiers
20 and they were paid quite well. This was unusual,
21 because most of the normal Bosnian army, which
22 attracted most of the Muslims, were not paid or were
23 paid an absolute pittance.
24 In addition to being well paid, they were
25 well equipped. Instead of having to share rifles they
1 had one each, and they were given proper uniforms. In
2 addition to all this, they were also expected to stop
3 drinking and to attend the mosque, and most Bosnian
4 Muslims do not.
5 Q. You said that they were paid more, that is
6 the members of the 7th Muslim Brigade received higher
7 pay or salary than other BH army officers. Was it
8 known where these funds were coming from to pay members
9 of the 7th Muslim Brigade?
10 A. Of course, we never knew anything about them
11 for definite, but what we did -- what we were told is
12 that the money came from the Middle East, and the
13 effect of paying these soldiers was that it attracted
14 soldiers away from the normal Bosnian army units.
15 Q. Are you saying that soldiers actually left
16 the existing BH army units and joined 7th Muslim
17 Brigade as sort of as a competitor of the BH army?
18 A. That's what we believed at the time, yes.
19 Q. You said the 7th Muslim Brigade had a
20 destabilising effect on the military situation in
21 Central Bosnia. Why and how did it have a
22 destabilising effect?
23 A. To answer that question I'd like to use
24 Travnik as an example. I'll just point it out.
25 Prior to the war, Travnik -- the populations
1 of Muslims and Croats in the town of Travnik were
2 roughly equal, and the relationship in the town was
3 very good. And then as a result of the war there was a
4 huge influx of Muslim refugees from Serb territory.
5 This upset the balance of population in the town
6 enormously, and at the time we believed that the Croats
7 were probably out numbered by between three to one and
8 six to one in the town.
9 But the commanders of the Bosnian army in the
10 town, and the HVO in the town, maintained the alliance,
11 Colonel Alagic and Colonel Filipovic; Alagic from the
12 Bosnian army, and Filipovic from the HVO. And they did
13 everything they could to maintain the alliance and not
14 let the destabilising effects of a huge influx of
15 refugees detract from their ability to prosecute the
16 war against the Serbs.
17 But then, probably in about March 1993, and I
18 don't remember the date, the 7th Muslim Brigade opened
19 an office in the town and started attracting soldiers
20 to join them, you could hear, you could see them in
21 their slightly different uniforms.
22 This introduced a different type of
23 nationalism and different type of religious
24 fundamentalism which had not existed in Travnik in the
25 thousand year history of the town. The Croats in the
1 town were very frightened, as were the normal moderate
2 Muslims. This is not what they expected.
3 But when I questioned the Bosnian army
4 commanders about this, they told me the 7th Muslim
5 Brigade was not under their control. Its very presence
6 had a worrying effect on the Bosnian army commanders,
7 as well.
8 Q. Did the presence of the 7th Muslim Brigade,
9 for example, in Travnik, did it become an issue among
10 politicians in the town?
11 A. In the sense that -- yes, it did, in the
12 sense that the Croat politicians used the presence of
13 these extreme Muslims, dressing slightly differently,
14 to raise the, to raise the nationalist feelings of the
15 Croats in the town.
16 Q. When you say that, are you thinking of a
17 particular politician in Travnik?
18 A. During -- yes, there is a very good example,
19 the details of which I do not remember properly, but I
20 do remember a visit to the town by Mate Boban, who was
21 the president of, I believe the president of
22 Herceg-Bosna at the time.
23 As a result of his visit the tension between
24 the -- or shall I say not necessarily as a result of
25 his visit, but after his visit, the tension in the town
1 and the relationship between the Muslims and the Croats
2 in the town deteriorated rapidly; and there were
3 incidents of flag burning in the town, burning of Croat
4 flags and of Bosnian flags.
5 Q. Was the 7th Muslim Brigade present in any
6 other locations in Central Bosnia other than Travnik?
7 A. Yes, before they moved to Travnik, I have
8 already pointed out the village of Nemila, where we
9 believe they started; but they were in other towns, as
10 well. And if you like I can point them out on the map.
11 Q. If you can tell us or point out on the map
12 where else they established units.
13 A. Yes. Further north, this is the city of
14 Zenica here, further north I've already pointed out
15 the, approximately here, the village of Nemila, where
16 we first heard of this brigade.
17 Further north to that, there were the towns
18 of Zepce and Zavidovici, which unfortunately, again,
19 are not on this map. It was in Zepce that I first
20 became aware of the 7th Muslim Brigade. So, we had
21 Nemila, Zepce, Zavidovici, and later on we had Travnik,
22 Novi Travnik, down here approximately here, there is a
23 place called Ravno Rostovo, which is not even a
24 village, it's a collection of houses on this mountain
25 here. And over here the town of Kakanj. Those were
1 the locations that I was aware that the 7th Muslim
2 Brigade had offices and units.
3 Q. Was this in the first three or four months of
4 1993 that this unit or these units seemed to be
5 springing up in the region?
6 A. Yes, I think it probably all started at about
7 Christmas time, and by the end of March, the situation
8 was as I described just then.
9 Q. Do you recall any more specific information
10 concerning the presence of the 7th Muslim Brigade in
11 the town of Zepce?
12 A. Yes, Zepce was the town much further north on
13 the map, which in January 1993 that I first came
14 face-to-face with the 7th Muslim Brigade.
15 As a liaison officer for the town I always
16 visited both the Bosnian headquarters and the
17 headquarters of the HVO in the town. And on one
18 occasion, and I do not remember the date, both
19 commanders told me exactly the same thing; and they
20 told me that we are very worried, there is a new unit
21 in this town.
22 Now, I should point out that the commander of
23 the Bosnian army was a Muslim and a commander of the
24 HVO was a Croat, but they were both very concerned
25 about this new unit. And I went to have a look, and
1 the 7th Muslim Brigade had taken over a building
2 opposite the command headquarters of the HVO, and they
3 had erected a flagpole, and on the top of the flagpole
4 was a green flag with the crescent moon and the star,
5 which is associated with Islam.
6 The Croats, the HVO considered this to be
7 very antagonistic in the middle of the town, in a town
8 which boasted of having a mosque, a Catholic church and
9 an Orthodox church all together in a straight line.
10 And they considered this to be antagonistic.
11 But also, the Bosnian army commander told me
12 it was antagonistic. He also told me he could not
13 command them, they were not under his command, and he
14 also told me he was losing some of his soldiers who
15 were going to join them.
16 Q. Was there later fighting in Zepce?
17 A. Yes, after, I think in about May there was
18 very bad fighting in the town of Zepce, and the result
19 was it became a Croat enclave and all the Muslims were
20 kicked out of the town.
21 Q. After the fighting in Central Bosnia in the
22 January 1993 time period, and perhaps it was early
23 February, was there a cease-fire of some sort ordered?
24 A. Yes, I think, yes, there was, I know what
25 you're referring to, there was a cease-fire, I think at
1 the end of January. I can't remember, it may have been
2 in the 3rd or 4th week of January.
3 MR. HAYMAN: If I could have the assistance
4 of the usher in distributing a document,
5 Mr. President. There is an original and BCS and a
6 hand-written English translation. We have no French
7 translation at this time, Mr. President, my apologies.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Document D415, 415A for the
9 English version.
10 MR. HAYMAN: If you could examine that
11 document, and while we're doing that I would ask that a
12 map be marked and placed on the ELMO. It's a standard
13 Zenica 4 JNA map, and there are certain portions
14 highlighted which I think will fit on the ELMO so they
15 can be visibly seen. But first it needs to be marked
16 as an exhibit, please.
17 Q. Directing your attention to Exhibit D415A, do
18 you recognise this document?
19 A. Yes, I do.
20 Q. And approximately when did you first see it?
21 A. Probably on the day it was written, certainly
22 it would either have been that day or the day after.
23 Q. Did you receive both D415 and 415A in March
24 of 1993 in the course of your duties with UNPROFOR in
25 Central Bosnia?
1 A. Yes, I did.
2 Q. And did you provide these documents to me
3 prior to your testimony?
4 A. Yes, I did.
5 Q. And are these two exhibits authentic copies
6 of the documents you received at the time during the
8 A. Yes, they are.
9 Q. The hand-written English translation, do you
10 know how it was created, that is, what organisation or
11 entity created it?
12 A. Yes, it was created by the interpreter cell
13 in my battalion headquarters.
14 MR. HAYMAN: This document, Mr. President,
15 for the record, it is a protest signed by Dusko
16 Grubesic, and I would like to read portions and ask the
17 witness to help us all identify some of the locations
18 referred to in the document. If the map, which has a
19 number, I'm sure, by now --
20 THE REGISTRAR: This is D416 on the map.
21 MR. HAYMAN: If we could move it up slightly
22 and zoom in so we have a closer picture, that would be
23 very helpful.
24 MR. HAYMAN:
25 Q. The protest is dated 13 March, 1993.
1 "Protest because of breaking the cease-fire. We are
2 protesting to ECMM and UNPROFOR because Muslim armed
3 forces, instead of all agreements, still breaking the
4 cease-fire. On 12 March, 1993, at 2040 hours they were
5 shooting from machine gun, M-48, on our positions in
6 village Kula."
7 Could you please indicate the area known as
8 Kula? And are you indicating an area immediately to
9 the east, north-east of Busovaca?
10 A. Yes, that's Busovaca, there.
11 Q. And Kula, if you could indicate it, once
12 again? Thank you.
13 Second bullet point: "From regions Pezici
14 and Gornji Rovna, they provoced our units all night
15 from personal weapons on our positions in villages
16 Donja Rovna, Bare, and Roske Stijene. Muslim forces
17 were shooting from anti-aircraft machine gun about
18 05 --"
19 MR. HAYMAN: And here, Mr. President, it says
20 0503 hours in the translation, but I see in the
21 original it is 0530 hours.
22 Q. "On this same locations."
23 First, could you indicate the locations
24 identified as sources of fire on the 12th of March,
25 1993, namely Pezici and Gornji Rovna?
1 A. Pezici and Gornji Rovna are here on very high
2 ground, Pezici and Gornji Rovna.
3 Q. And could you indicate Donji Rovna and Bare
4 on this exhibit, Exhibit D416?
5 A. Donji Rovna is here and Bare is here.
6 Q. Third bullet point: "At 2230 hours they
7 opened the fire from direction of Merdani on our
8 locations in village Gavrne Kuce. They were using fire
9 munitions and burned two Muslim houses in this
10 location. Send this protest to ECMM, UN and BH army,
11 commander of brigade, Dusko Grubesic."
12 Could you indicate the village of Merdani?
13 A. Merdani is here.
14 Q. Thank you. There is a reference in this
15 document to use of an anti-aircraft machine gun for
16 ground assault. What is an anti-aircraft machine gun;
17 or is itself explanatory? Can you describe the type of
19 A. There are many different types, but in Bosnia
20 they generally used a 12.7 millimetre, which is about
21 half an inch, machine gun, which is designed for
22 shooting down aircraft. It has a very high rate of
23 fire, and obviously quite large calibre. And it has a
24 very long barrel which allows it to project these the
25 projectiles very high into the sky, they hit aircraft.
1 MR. HAYMAN: If the usher could assist,
2 Mr. President, I have another document to distribute.
3 It is a similar document, another protest, there is a
4 BSC original and a hand-written English translation.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Document D417, D417A for the
6 hand-written English version.
7 MR. HAYMAN:
8 Q. Could you examine these documents, please?
9 Do you recognise them?
10 A. Yes, I do.
11 Q. And are they also documents that you received
12 during your service in UNPROFOR in Bosnia during the
14 A. Yes, they are.
15 Q. And are they true copies or authentic copies
16 of those documents which you provided to me prior to
17 your testimony?
18 A. Yes, they are.
19 Q. On the BSC original there's a hand-written
20 notation in the upper right-hand corner; do you see
21 where it reads "This fax for the attention captain M. J.
23 A. Yes.
24 MR. HAYMAN: This is a shorter document,
25 Mr. President, and I will read it.
1 Q. It's again titled -- first of all, it is
2 dated 14 March 1993, a protest against the breach of
3 the cease-fire agreement.
4 "We protest to the ECMM and the UN because
5 the Bosnian army forces, despite everyday meetings
6 concerning the realisation of what has been agreed, are
7 breaking the truce. On 14 March, 1993 the BH army
8 forces were engaged in provocative fire from small arms
9 from the direction of Pezici and" --
10 MR. HAYMAN: And Mr. President, from the
11 original, I think it is reasonably clear, the second
12 location is Vranjska, V-R-A-N-J-S-K-A, although it is
13 very difficult to read, but I do believe it is
15 Q. "Towards the positions at Roske Stijene and
16 Kovacevac and Donji Rovna. From 1213 hours to 1300
17 hours they were firing from an anti-aircraft machine
18 gun. We are informing about this the gentlemen from
19 the ECMM, UN and the BH army." Signed brigade
20 commander, Dusko Grubesic.
21 I believe there is only one location
22 Mr. Whatley mentioned in this document which hasn't
23 already been identified for the Court -- well, actually
24 there are two. First of all, there's indication that
25 fire came from Pezici, which you; could you identify
1 that one more time? Thank you. And Vranjska, where is
3 A. (Indicating).
4 Q. Where is Vitez in relation to Vranjska? Can
5 you move the map slightly down? There we go. So Vitez
6 is where you're indicating now, and Vranjska is to the
8 The fire was towards the positions, among
9 others, of Donji Rovna, and Kovacevac. Do you see
10 Kovacevac, between Pezici and Bare? It is not
11 highlighted. Thank you.
12 Did you keep up your diary after you had been
13 in the country in Bosnia for a period of time, or was
14 there no longer time to keep a narrative diary?
15 A. I kept a diary from the day I arrived until
16 the beginning of January 1993.
17 Q. After January, 1993, did you keep any
18 abbreviated notes?
19 A. Yes, when I came back from leave at the -- I
20 was away for two weeks in January, and when I came back
21 towards the end of January I didn't keep a diary, so
22 all I maintained was my army notebooks.
23 Q. I would like to direct your attention to
24 specific events now in April of 1993. And if you need
25 to refer to your contemporaneous notes, with the
1 Court's leave, you may do so; but please indicate when
2 you are, so it is clear in the record.
3 First I would like to direct your attention
4 to the 7th of April, 1993. Did you meet with the BH
5 army commander in Kruscica on that day?
6 A. Yes, I did.
7 Q. Was the Vance-Owen Peace Plan mentioned by
9 A. Yes, it was.
10 Q. Is there a reference in your notebook to this
12 A. Yes, there are three things in my notebook
13 which relate to the Vance -- relate to this. The first
14 one, the commander, the Bosnian army commander in
15 Kruscica is asking me to provide him with a written
16 version of the Vance-Owen Plan, because he hadn't had
17 it. He then went onto say "Never under command HVO,"
18 and then he said, "Muslim provinces full."
19 Q. Did you have a lot of meetings on a daily
20 basis with different people, different headquarters and
21 so forth?
22 A. Yes, I did.
23 Q. Without your notebook, would you be able to
24 tell us that those things were said in this meeting on
25 the 7th of April, 1993?
1 A. Absolutely not. Without this notebook I can
2 remember very little of the details.
3 Q. From five years ago.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Five-and-a-half.
6 A. Five-and-a-half, yes.
7 Q. Let me direct your attention to the next day,
8 the 8th of April, 1993. Did you visit the town of
9 Travnik on April 8th?
10 A. Yes, I did. And I attended, this was my
11 third meeting that day, and I attended a joint meeting
12 of the Bosnian army and the HVO in Travnik.
13 Q. Did you learn of a troop movement on the 8th
14 of April, 1993?
15 A. Yes, I did.
16 Q. Wait one moment.
17 What did you learn in this meeting on the 8th
18 of April, 1993, concerning a troop movement?
19 A. Colonel Filipovic, the HVO commander in
20 Travnik, told me "five hundred soldiers from Visoko to
21 barracks in Travnik." He then went on to say "2100
22 hours," referring to the previous evening, "Flag
23 burned," in brackets, "Croat". He then told me that
24 the HVO command was now going to be in Dolac.
25 Q. Going back to the first thing you recounted
1 from your notebook, that 500 troops had moved from
2 Visoko to Travnik; were there any HVO troops in Visoko
3 that you knew of, at the time?
4 A. They --
5 Q. Or did you have an understanding as to whose
6 troops these were that would have moved from Visoko to
7 Travnik barracks?
8 A. There may well have been HVO troops in
9 Visoko, but this is not a reference to HVO soldiers.
10 Q. How can you determine that?
11 A. Because Filipovic told me about it, because
12 he was concerned about it. And in addition, because
13 they went to the barracks in Travnik, which was not a
14 HVO barracks, it was a Bosnian army barracks.
15 Q. Was a movement of 500 Bosnian army soldiers
16 to Travnik on the 8th of April, would that be
17 considered a large troop movement in the Lasva Valley?
18 A. Yes, it would. That would be quite a convoy
19 of buses.
20 Q. You mentioned that you learned at this
21 meeting that the HVO had moved its headquarters out of
22 the town of Travnik; is that right?
23 A. That's correct. I think they moved that
25 Q. I would ask that another map be marked,
1 unless --
2 MR. HAYMAN: I don't know, Mr. President,
3 what our hours will be for the balance of the day, but
4 if we're going to proceed I would be moving on to
5 another map.
6 JUDGE JORDA: We're going to stop at 5.30,
7 because the interpreters began working at 9.30 this
8 morning. We must stop at 5.30 if you want to begin
9 another subject, otherwise we can stop right now. As
10 you like.
11 MR. HAYMAN: We would probably consume a
12 couple of minutes getting this map situated on the ELMO
13 properly; so I suggest we break, and when we begin
14 tomorrow we will have it in place and save the time.
15 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. The Court stands
17 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at
18 5.27 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday,
19 the 29th day of October, 1998.