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  1. 1 Wednesday, 18th November, 1998

    2 (Open session)

    3 --- Upon commencing at 2.43 p.m.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Have the accused brought in,

    5 please.

    6 (The accused entered court)

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Good afternoon to the Defence

    8 counsel, to the Prosecution. We will now continue with

    9 the direct examination. The witness is not protected;

    10 is that correct?

    11 THE REGISTRAR: No, no protective measures

    12 have been ordered.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, Mrs. Zeljka Rajic, can we

    14 have Mrs. Rajic brought into the courtroom, please?

    15 (The witness entered court)

    16 JUDGE JORDA: Do you hear me, Mrs. Rajic?

    17 THE WITNESS: Yes.

    18 JUDGE JORDA: Please be seated. Were you

    19 able to get some rest, Mrs. Rajic, relax a little bit

    20 after the difficult afternoon yesterday?

    21 THE WITNESS: Yes, yes.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: Do you feel all right? Can you

    23 continue?

    24 THE WITNESS: I can, I can.

    25 JUDGE JORDA: If you have any difficulty at

  2. 1 all, whether psychological or physical, don't hesitate

    2 to ask for a break, and, of course, the Judges will

    3 order that the break take place so that you can rest.

    4 The Victims and Witnesses Unit is available to you if

    5 you need anything at all, all right?

    6 THE WITNESS: Yes.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Yes.

    8 MR. NOBILO: Thank you, Mr. President. The

    9 Defence is not going to keep Mrs. Rajic much longer in

    10 direct examination, so we shall start immediately.


    12 Examined by Mr. Nobilo:

    13 Q. Mrs. Rajic, on the 27th of January, 1993, at

    14 around 9.00, you went to Zenica to see your parents; is

    15 that correct?

    16 A. Yes.

    17 Q. What happened after that? Where did you go

    18 to?

    19 A. I was transferred to Cajdras because they

    20 were following me. They wanted to have me killed.

    21 Q. You came to Cajdras on that very same day?

    22 A. Yes, on that very same day in the afternoon,

    23 around 4.00.

    24 Q. Tell me, after how many days did the funeral

    25 take place?

  3. 1 A. Eight days later.

    2 Q. The videocassette that we saw yesterday, the

    3 dead bodies, did you see it at that time? If you did,

    4 where did you see it, under what circumstances?

    5 A. No, not then, I didn't see it then. I saw it

    6 when I came to Busovaca.

    7 Q. Where did you see it in Busovaca?

    8 A. On television.

    9 Q. On TV Busovaca?

    10 A. Yes, on TV Busovaca.

    11 Q. Was the entire videocassette played on TV

    12 Busovaca, all these dead bodies?

    13 A. Yes, yes.

    14 Q. And now the funeral, how did it take place?

    15 Where were the bodies brought? Where did the people

    16 assemble, those who came to attend the funeral of your

    17 husband and the others? Could you describe it a bit?

    18 A. The funeral started in front of the house of

    19 the Croats, the Croatian Cultural Centre, towards

    20 Cajdras where the mass was held, and then straight to

    21 Busovaca.

    22 Q. Tell me, how many Croats had assembled at the

    23 mass in Cajdras? How many Croats came to bid farewell

    24 to the persons killed?

    25 A. Well, about 3.000 persons.

  4. 1 Q. Did they take buses to Busovaca?

    2 A. Yes, yes, buses, cars, all kinds of vehicles.

    3 MR. NOBILO: Could we please see the sequel

    4 to the videocassette. This is only the funeral in

    5 Busovaca, and there are no ugly scenes, so to speak.

    6 Could we please have the lights dimmed?

    7 (Videotape played)

    8 MR. NOBILO:

    9 Q. As we are watching this tape, since there's

    10 no soundtrack, there's no text, tell me, these scenes

    11 that we are watching now, was this taped in Busovaca as

    12 people were assembling before going to the funeral?

    13 A. Yes, it was in Busovaca and in Zenica, I

    14 imagine.

    15 Q. Tell us, how did this event resound among the

    16 Croats, and what did it mean in terms of the

    17 relationship between the Croats and the Muslims?

    18 A. Well, it did resound. People could not

    19 simply realise this. They knew that they could no

    20 longer trust the Muslims. They had to flee from their

    21 homes.

    22 Q. Was this the first crime --

    23 A. The first crime.

    24 Q. -- was this the first crime that occurred

    25 between the Muslims and the Croats in Central Bosnia?

  5. 1 A. Yes, it was the first crime, yes, that event

    2 which took place in Dusina.

    3 Q. Tell me, as we're watching these scenes, are

    4 there any Croats living in Dusina today?

    5 A. No, no, their houses were burnt down and

    6 destroyed. Muslims live in our houses.

    7 Q. And is somebody living in your house?

    8 A. Yes, Muslims are.

    9 Q. What about your property, did you manage to

    10 salvage anything out of your movable property?

    11 A. No, nothing. Everything was destroyed,

    12 looted, up to the very last rag we had.

    13 Q. And you are still a refugee until the present

    14 day?

    15 A. Yes, I am.

    16 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, I believe that we

    17 can now finish viewing this videotape, and we have thus

    18 concluded our examination-in-chief. Thank you.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Mr. Nobilo.

    20 Mr. Cayley? Mr. Harmon, good afternoon.

    21 Mrs. Rajic, you're going to be asked some

    22 questions by the Office of the Prosecutor to supplement

    23 the direct examination. Don't be shocked by this.

    24 This is the procedural rule which is followed in this

    25 Tribunal. It has to be this way.

  6. 1 Mr. Harmon, proceed, please.

    2 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, we have no

    3 questions of Mrs. Rajic.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Therefore, let me turn to my

    5 colleagues. Do you have any questions?

    6 THE REGISTRAR: I would like to know what

    7 number will be given or what will happen with the two

    8 exhibits that were presented.

    9 MR. NOBILO: We would like to have all these

    10 exhibits admitted into evidence, but the videotape

    11 could be a single exhibit, although we watched it twice

    12 or three times. So that would be D438 and D439, the

    13 newspapers, I mean. The tape is D438, and D439 are the

    14 newspapers that we saw yesterday.

    15 JUDGE JORDA: I believe that Judge Riad wants

    16 to ask a few questions.

    17 Mr. Harmon, you have no objections?

    18 MR. HARMON: We have no objection to the

    19 admission of the exhibits, Mr. President.

    20 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me, Mr. Harmon.

    21 Judge Riad?

    22 JUDGE RIAD: Good afternoon, Mrs. Rajic.

    23 Please be assured that the entire Tribunal sympathises

    24 with your pain. I would only like to ask you,

    25 according to what you said, the attack on your village

  7. 1 of Dusina was the first attack, the first crime?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 JUDGE RIAD: Were there any incidents that

    4 provoked the attack, as far as you know? I'm sure that

    5 you were well-informed, a woman of your culture. Did

    6 anything happen that provoked the attack?

    7 A. No, no, nothing could have happened to lead

    8 to that.

    9 JUDGE RIAD: Were there any declarations by

    10 politicians, any type of propaganda in the media,

    11 nothing?

    12 A. Nothing of the sort. Had all of that not

    13 happened, we would have all stayed at home.

    14 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much.

    15 JUDGE JORDA: Judge Shahabuddeen?

    16 Mrs. Rajic, I would like to join in fully of

    17 what Judge Riad said in respect of sympathy that the

    18 Tribunal has for what you have experienced and what

    19 happened afterwards and having to look at your

    20 husband's body. We hope that you can go back home and

    21 that you can resume if not a fully happy life, at least

    22 one that isn't too unhappy. That is what the Tribunal

    23 would like to say to you. We would like to thank you

    24 for having come to testify in this trial at the request

    25 of the Defence.

  8. 1 At this time, the usher will escort you from

    2 the courtroom.

    3 THE WITNESS: Thank you. Thank you.

    4 (The witness withdrew)

    5 JUDGE JORDA: I see that Mr. Hayman is

    6 standing up to represent the Defence for the next

    7 witness. I think I have a summary, do I not,

    8 Mr. Registrar?

    9 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, you should have one.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Is this a protected witness?

    11 MR. HAYMAN: It is not, Mr. President. The

    12 next witness is Mr. Leyshon.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Dubuisson, I don't seem to

    14 have ... do you have it, Mr. Dubuisson?

    15 THE REGISTRAR: It was distributed this

    16 morning. It should arrive shortly.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: I was just trying to ensure

    18 that Mr. Hayman doesn't have to repeat the summary

    19 which he's already given us.

    20 While you're looking for it, we'll ask

    21 Mr. Hayman to have the witness brought in. I know that

    22 I have it, so you don't have to do it now. We'll have

    23 the witness brought in.

    24 (The witness entered court)

    25 JUDGE JORDA: Good afternoon. Do you hear

  9. 1 me? Do you hear the Presiding Judge speaking to you?

    2 THE WITNESS: Yes.

    3 JUDGE JORDA: Please state your name, your

    4 given name, the date and place of your birth, your

    5 profession, and your current residence, and then please

    6 remain standing to take the oath. Proceed, please.

    7 The Judges are listening to you.

    8 THE WITNESS: My name is Chris Leyshon. I

    9 was born in London on the 14th of July, 1967. I

    10 currently work for an investment bank in London.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: For the sake of the

    12 interpreters and for myself as well, perhaps you could

    13 spell your name. Oh, no, if the transcript is correct,

    14 there's no need to do so. Is the transcript correct?

    15 I don't have a summary in front of me. Is that

    16 correct? I won't have the witness repeat it if it is

    17 correct. Very well. Thank you.

    18 Please remain standing for a few more minutes

    19 to read the solemn declaration.

    20 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will

    21 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

    22 truth.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. You may be seated,

    24 Mr. Leyshon. "Leyshon"; is that correct?

    25 THE WITNESS: Yes.

  10. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Now you're going to answer the

    2 questions that you'll be asked, since you agreed to

    3 come to testify for the Defence in the trial of General

    4 Blaskic, who was Colonel Blaskic at the time of the

    5 facts, who stands accused of serious violations of

    6 humanitarian law.

    7 Mr. Hayman?

    8 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, Mr. President.


    10 Examined by Mr. Hayman:

    11 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Leyshon. You are a

    12 former officer in the British army; is that correct?

    13 A. That's correct.

    14 Q. Could you briefly describe your career in the

    15 British army for the Court?

    16 A. I joined the army directly from leaving

    17 university, and I went to Sandhurst where I trained for

    18 one year. I then joined my regiment, which was an

    19 infantry regiment, and served with them for five

    20 years. It was a short-service commission which

    21 basically meant that after a period of time I left the

    22 army, which I did do in 1994.

    23 Q. When you say "short-service commission," did

    24 you agree to serve in the army as an officer for a

    25 period of time as part of that commission or how did

  11. 1 that work?

    2 A. That's correct. It was a contract basically

    3 to serve for three years, having graduated from

    4 Sandhurst, and I volunteered to extend for a further

    5 two years.

    6 Q. You look a bit back from the microphone.

    7 Perhaps you could pull your chair forward a bit and be

    8 comfortable.

    9 You said after you graduated from university,

    10 you went to Sandhurst for your officers training. From

    11 what university did you graduate in the United Kingdom?

    12 A. Exeter University.

    13 Q. After you joined your regiment, can you tell

    14 the Court something about the tours of duty that you

    15 performed and the position or positions that you had in

    16 the regiment?

    17 JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me. The university is

    18 Exeter.

    19 THE WITNESS: Exeter, yes.

    20 JUDGE RIAD: They wrote it "Exody." It's a

    21 famous university. It should be written properly.

    22 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, Judge Riad.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Judge Riad. We all

    24 know that under your Judge's robe is a great academic.

    25 Thank you very much.

  12. 1 MR. HAYMAN:

    2 Q. If you would continue, please?

    3 A. Having passed out of Sandhurst, I was posted

    4 to my regiment, the Cheshire Regiment, where I spent

    5 three months on an additional infantry training course

    6 in Warminster. I then rejoined my regiment, and three

    7 months later, we went to Northern Ireland for a

    8 six-month emergency tour of South Armagh. We then came

    9 back to England. The following year, we went out to

    10 Canada for three months live firing, and then we

    11 returned back to England once again where we were then

    12 posted to Germany to become an armoured infantry

    13 battalion where we spent two years. During that period

    14 of time, we were deployed for seven months to the

    15 former Yugoslavia.

    16 Q. When your battalion was in Germany, did you

    17 have a particular position in the battalion?

    18 A. When I joined the battalion in Germany, I was

    19 the intelligence officer.

    20 Q. Had you received certain specialised training

    21 before being given that position?

    22 A. Yes. I had --

    23 Q. That's fine. You don't need to elaborate,

    24 unless others feel it's necessary. I do not.

    25 From Germany, I take it your regiment went to

  13. 1 Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that correct?

    2 A. That's correct.

    3 Q. Did you serve with the regiment during the

    4 full regimental tour of duty in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    5 A. Yes.

    6 Q. Which was from roughly October 1992 until May

    7 '93?

    8 A. Correct.

    9 Q. When did you leave the British army?

    10 A. June '94.

    11 Q. Before you left, were you offered a regular

    12 or permanent commission as an officer in the British

    13 army?

    14 A. During my short-service career, I had been

    15 offered an opportunity to take a regular commission,

    16 which I declined, and then when I was leaving the

    17 regiment in July '94, I was offered the position of

    18 intelligence officer for another two-year tour of

    19 Northern Ireland. However, I felt that I had done all

    20 I'd wanted to do in the army, and it was time to start

    21 a new career.

    22 Q. You said that you now live in London. Are

    23 you married and do you have a family?

    24 A. Yes. I'm married and I have a son.

    25 Q. Other than your tour of duty with the

  14. 1 Cheshire Regiment, have you ever resided in the former

    2 Yugoslavia?

    3 A. No.

    4 Q. What position did you have in the Cheshire

    5 Regiment during its tour of duty in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    6 A. My role was as the information officer, and I

    7 was there to collate information in order for the

    8 regiment to carry out its mission as effectively as

    9 possible.

    10 Q. Were you the head of what was known as the

    11 milinfocell?

    12 A. That's correct.

    13 Q. And were you in charge of that cell?

    14 A. That's correct.

    15 Q. Was that true for the entire tour of duty in

    16 the Cheshire Regiment in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    17 A. Yes, until we handed over to the next

    18 regiment.

    19 Q. If you could pause ever so briefly after my

    20 questions, it will perhaps help divide the question and

    21 answer when it is translated, and aid in comprehension

    22 of the material we're discussing.

    23 How many personnel in the regiment were part

    24 of the milinfocell?

    25 A. It varied slightly, but it was approximately

  15. 1 seven personnel.

    2 Q. Could you tell the Court, what was the

    3 mission or work of the milinfocell?

    4 A. Our role was to collate information in order

    5 that we could carry out our mission effectively. Our

    6 mission was to support the UNHCR in the delivery of

    7 humanitarian aid, so our job primarily was to ensure

    8 where the routes were, how to deliver the aid, how to

    9 support the UNHCR, to identifying effectively where the

    10 frontline was so our units didn't cross the frontline,

    11 and to ensure the safety of those soldiers when

    12 escorting UNHCR convoys.

    13 Q. On what source or sources of information did

    14 the milinfocell draw to gather information pertinent to

    15 these topics?

    16 A. There were a number of sources, both internal

    17 and external. Obviously there were our own soldiers on

    18 the ground who would be feeding us information all the

    19 time. We had approximately six liaison officers who

    20 were specifically there to ensure relationships with

    21 local commanders were good at all times, and they

    22 supplied us with a lot of information.

    23 The UNHCR also supplied us with quite a lot

    24 of information on routes and where local populations

    25 were and refugee movements, and of course, there were

  16. 1 the local commanders, as well, the local Bosnian and

    2 Croatian commanders, who supplied us with a lot of

    3 information with respect to command structures, local

    4 commanders, frontlines, and information on Serbs, the

    5 Serbs, as well.

    6 Q. Did you personally participate in the work of

    7 the milinfocell, and if so, how?

    8 A. Our role was to collate the information on a

    9 daily basis, so obviously as various Cheshire call

    10 signs were going out on the ground and coming back, we

    11 would debrief them to get information from them. All

    12 the liaison officers would come speak to us at the end

    13 of the day to give us the information of who they had

    14 spoken to, if there were any issues or problems, and

    15 then we would collate all this information into a

    16 military information summary, and we would send it to

    17 Kiseljak, the headquarters for the U.N., and also to

    18 Split where the combritfor headquarters was.

    19 Q. You explained you received certain

    20 information from call signs; can you explain what you

    21 mean by the term "call sign"?

    22 A. Yes. A call sign is basically a unit on the

    23 ground, whether it's a Warrior vehicle, a Land Rover,

    24 it's basically any British army unit where it's a

    25 platoon, 30 men, or a liaison officer and his driver,

  17. 1 out on the ground, coming back and then giving us

    2 information.

    3 Q. Were the patrols or call signs, if one can

    4 equate the two, did they routinely travel out in the

    5 field with an interpreter?

    6 A. We had a limited number of interpreters,

    7 approximately six or seven, and they were normally

    8 dedicated to the liaison officers and to the command

    9 structure, the commanding officer, the second in

    10 command. So your soldiers on the ground would not

    11 normally have an interpreter with them.

    12 Q. When in the day were the milinfosums

    13 prepared?

    14 A. Well, as soon as we got the information we

    15 would obviously collate that information. But normally

    16 it would be at the end of the day, usually from 6.00

    17 onwards for a few hours, so they were normally

    18 completed by 9.00 or 10.00 every evening, and we would

    19 have all the information from that day's activity

    20 within that summary.

    21 Q. Would the milinfosum for a given day be

    22 transmitted to Kiseljak and Split on the same day or at

    23 some point on the following day?

    24 A. As long as the communications were available,

    25 which they were most of the time, it would always be

  18. 1 sent that evening.

    2 Q. How many days per week did you work in the

    3 milinfocell?

    4 A. It was a 7-day job, so the information was

    5 coming in every day. We didn't have days off so it was

    6 a fairly full-time job.

    7 Q. Did you personally debrief liaison officers

    8 in the course of your work?

    9 A. Yes, it would be either myself or my sort of

    10 main sergeant, Sergeant Connelly, who would have

    11 debriefed the liaison officers and the senior officers.

    12 Q. Would you review all the milinfosums before

    13 they went out on a routine basis?

    14 A. Yes, unless I wasn't in camp or was out on

    15 the ground.

    16 Q. Could one characterise the milinfocell as the

    17 centre of a wheel with spokes with information flowing

    18 towards the centre through various spokes?

    19 A. Yeah, that's quite a good description.

    20 Q. Were other routine or daily documents

    21 prepared by the regiment, such as a daily sitrep?

    22 A. Yes, we were obviously focused on

    23 information, but there was obviously the operational

    24 responsibilities as well. So the operations officer

    25 would complete a similar report, but it would reflect

  19. 1 operational activities, convoys escorted, various

    2 incidents, et cetera, et cetera, while we would be

    3 focusing more on the information where the frontline

    4 was, who the commanders were, what was happening.

    5 Q. Did you receive more information, in the

    6 course of an average day, than you could put in a

    7 milinfosum, or did all the information you receive go

    8 into the milinfosum?

    9 A. All the information that we received, which

    10 we thought was of value, went into the summary each

    11 day. However, obviously there was some pieces of

    12 information which would be missed, because certain

    13 people would have seen things, but they wouldn't come

    14 and tell us what had happened, because there was such a

    15 large volume of movement, soldiers out on the ground.

    16 It's obviously impossible to get every piece of

    17 information, but we had a very good idea as to what was

    18 going on most of the time.

    19 Q. Was there also, then, information gathered

    20 that wasn't deemed material or significant enough to

    21 put in the milinfosum?

    22 A. That's right, yes. Sometimes a liaison

    23 officer would think there would be something which

    24 would be important, as far as they were concerned, but

    25 when you actually weigh it with the bigger picture of

  20. 1 everything else going on, it was useful background

    2 information but it wasn't of real importance at a

    3 higher level.

    4 Q. Did most of the information that you deemed

    5 material and that was included in milinfosums, did it

    6 come from a particular source, and if so, what source?

    7 A. Well, it was, as you already mentioned, it

    8 was human intelligence, human information from mostly

    9 the liaison officers. They were a prime source of

    10 material. And we did get a reasonable amount of

    11 information from local commanders, as well, and from

    12 other soldiers on the ground. But obviously, if you

    13 haven't got an interpreter with you, the amount of

    14 information you can actually gather is very limited,

    15 but obviously the soldiers on the ground can still see

    16 what's going on and report that.

    17 So it was from all sides, but the liaison

    18 officers were really one of the key areas of giving us

    19 information, because they were talking to the

    20 commanders, they had the interpreters with them, and

    21 they really had a very good feel for what was going on

    22 in their area of responsibility.

    23 Q. As a result of your work heading up the

    24 milinfocell for the British Battalion in

    25 Bosnia-Herzegovina, did you come to a conclusion, or

  21. 1 did you form a conclusion concerning what kind of army

    2 the HVO was, say compared to the British army?

    3 A. Well, compared to the British army the HVO

    4 and the BiH were not professional armies. They were

    5 more like militias. They did not have very good

    6 command and control. Their soldiers weren't very well

    7 trained or equipped, and they were really, you know,

    8 very different. They were not professional armies,

    9 when you look at them compared to the British army.

    10 Q. Did you learn whether or not the HVO soldiers

    11 were typically housed in barracks?

    12 A. There weren't that many barracks around.

    13 There were some barracks in Travnik, which I believe

    14 some Bosnian army brigades were located in, but the

    15 majority of locations where the HVO and BiH were, were

    16 normally requisitioned buildings, whether it be the

    17 local hotel where you would find the headquarters, or

    18 normally buildings such as schools which were no longer

    19 being used.

    20 These would be locations where soldiers would

    21 meet and congregate, but they weren't normally housed

    22 there, because there wasn't that much space to house

    23 all the soldiers. So they would probably normally, or

    24 a large proportion of them would probably go back to

    25 their homes when they would finish their duties, or if

  22. 1 they weren't on duty.

    2 Q. Did that have an effect on the type of army

    3 the HVO was, that soldiers lived at home in the

    4 villages, not in barracks?

    5 A. Yes, I think it did. If you have soldiers

    6 who go home in their uniform and they have their

    7 weapons, and if they go out and have some drinks or go

    8 out drinking and have access to these weapons, what can

    9 start is simple arguments, or fracas can seriously

    10 escalate when people who are drunk have got access to

    11 weapons.

    12 Q. Does that not happen in a professional army

    13 where soldiers live in barracks and if not, why not?

    14 A. Well, if you look at the British army, if a

    15 soldier is off duty he hands his weapon in, he goes out

    16 in civilian uniform. If they do get into trouble,

    17 which sometimes they do, they are not perfect, you

    18 know, it is not a serious incident.

    19 If you have a soldier who goes out and gets

    20 drunk and he has a weapon with him and he loses his

    21 temper, obviously the effect of that can be much worse.

    22 Q. Again, based on the information you came to

    23 possess as the head of the milinfosum, did you reach a

    24 conclusion as to the degree of command and control that

    25 existed within the HVO in the Central Bosnia Operative

  23. 1 Zone?

    2 A. I would say the command and control was

    3 poor. These were not professional soldiers. It was

    4 untrained militias. A lot of soldiers weren't

    5 disciplined, they weren't well equipped.

    6 In order to have good command and control

    7 you've got to have good real-time communications. I

    8 didn't see much evidence of that. I didn't see a lot

    9 of radios on the ground. There was communication, so

    10 therefore, if you haven't got real-time communication,

    11 you don't have the opportunity to command and control

    12 your soldiers effectively.

    13 Q. Did you see indications on the ground of this

    14 lack of command and control and if so, what types of

    15 indications did you see as reported to you?

    16 A. The main area of command and control which we

    17 saw in many different areas throughout our period of

    18 time was the lack of the ability to enforce cease-fire

    19 agreements. There were numerous times where we would

    20 get local Croatian and Bosnian army commanders

    21 together. We would broker a cease-fire, we would agree

    22 there would be a cessation of hostilities, and yet,

    23 days afterwards, there would still be fighting going on

    24 in the area which was theoretically under their

    25 command.

  24. 1 This was because either they hadn't got the

    2 information there had been a cease-fire, or possibly

    3 they had, but they had decided to ignore it, because,

    4 you know, they were not professional soldiers. A lot

    5 of them were ill-disciplined, and a lot of them were

    6 sort of protecting their homes, as such. And a lot of

    7 things used to happen with a bit of sort of a tit for

    8 tat, someone would fire at someone and someone else

    9 would return fire and then things would escalate from

    10 there.

    11 Q. Let me direct your attention briefly to the

    12 16th of April, 1993, the day that a large scale

    13 conflict broke out in the Vitez and Lasva Valley

    14 areas. Did you conclude that the conflict that broke

    15 out on that day, on the 16th of April, that with

    16 respect to that conflict on the part of the HVO, the

    17 activity was organised? And if so, in what way was it

    18 organised?

    19 A. I don't know if it was organised. The

    20 tensions had been rising for the last few days. There

    21 had been a number of kidnappings on both sides. Who

    22 actually started the fighting is unclear, but there was

    23 basically a very short period of time across the

    24 confrontation lines where any Croatian and Muslim

    25 village bordered, sat next to each other, there was

  25. 1 some sort of fighting going on. So I don't know if it

    2 was organised and who initiated it, but it happened

    3 very quickly.

    4 Q. From the information you received, did you

    5 conclude that the fact there was fighting in Ahmici on

    6 the 16th of April, 1993, that it was likely known to

    7 the Operative Zone command of the HVO? And if so, can

    8 you explain?

    9 A. I should imagine the commander knew of the

    10 unit in that area. Whether or not he instructed them

    11 to attack Ahmici, I don't know. But I think there was

    12 a degree of organisation at a very low level, but

    13 whether or not it was a clear order is unclear.

    14 Q. Would you describe the situation on the 16th

    15 of April, 1993 in the Lasva Valley as chaotic? And if

    16 so, why?

    17 A. It was very chaotic. There was a lot of

    18 fighting going on across the Lasva Valley, on both

    19 sides. And when things are chaotic, even a

    20 professional army would have problems finding out what

    21 was going on. And we didn't know what was going on all

    22 the time in all the places, but we had a rough idea

    23 what was going on most of the time. I don't think

    24 local commanders on both sides would have had a clear

    25 idea of what was going on, because their lines of

  26. 1 communication were poor.

    2 So therefore, it was chaotic. I don't think

    3 they knew what was going on, and it was obvious when we

    4 had meetings with commanders that they didn't know

    5 exactly the dispositions of their soldiers or what they

    6 were doing all the time.

    7 MR. HAYMAN: I have no further questions of

    8 this witness, Mr. President. Thank you.

    9 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you.

    10 Mr. Kehoe?

    11 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President, may I have

    12 one moment just to pull an exhibit out with

    13 Mr. Harmon? Mr. President, if you will just bear with

    14 me one moment, I want to pull an exhibit up.

    15 JUDGE JORDA: You were surprised by the fact

    16 that the direct examination was so short. You see,

    17 we're not used to short direct examinations. I would

    18 like to take advantage of that in order to commend the

    19 Defence for the brevity and to have had the witness say

    20 what the Defence counsel wanted to have brought out.

    21 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, I can begin while

    22 Mr. Harmon pulls this exhibit out.

    23 Cross-examined by Mr. Kehoe:

    24 Q. Mr. Leyshon, good afternoon. My name is Greg

    25 Kehoe, I don't think we have had the pleasure of

  27. 1 meeting, sir. I know you know Major Cayley, over to my

    2 right. You had an opportunity to meet him before. And

    3 my other colleague with me is Mr. Hayman. Welcome.

    4 Excuse me, Mr. Hayman -- Mr. Harmon. It was a Freudian

    5 slip.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: You were worrying me. I

    7 thought that the witness knew everybody in the

    8 Prosecution's office.

    9 MR. KEHOE: Judge, I worry myself sometimes.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Well, we're not going to ask

    11 the witness to supplement the staff of the Tribunal.

    12 MR. KEHOE:

    13 Q. Mr. Leyshon, you say that you were working in

    14 the milinfocell and that you prepared these

    15 milinfosums, I take it, on a daily basis, getting

    16 information from other locales; is that right?

    17 A. That's correct, yes.

    18 Q. And sir, isn't it true that you spent

    19 virtually all of your time at the Vitez school, or the

    20 Bila school during the course of your tour?

    21 A. No, that's not true. I did have to spend a

    22 lot of time obviously working, but a lot of my

    23 responsibilities could be completed in the evening, and

    24 I spent a lot of time going out with liaison officers.

    25 I went up to Tuzla. I went to Sarajevo, and I spent a

  28. 1 lot of time in Travnik and Vitez.

    2 Q. It's clear, Mr. Leyshon, that you didn't

    3 spend, on a daily basis, out on the ground dealing with

    4 commanders --

    5 THE INTERPRETER: Please slow down.

    6 MR. KEHOE: I'm sorry.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: What happened? What happened

    8 there?

    9 MR. KEHOE: I think they were telling us to

    10 slow down, Judge. Both Mr. Leyshon and I speak the

    11 same language, so it's a little difficult on

    12 interpreters.

    13 Q. Now, Mr. Leyshon, let's go back to some of

    14 the statements that you made during the course of your

    15 direct examination in questions by the Defence and you

    16 stated that, compared to the British army, the HVO and

    17 the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina were not professional

    18 armies like the British army; is that right?

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Just a moment, please. Before

    20 the witness answers, I want things to be clear. You

    21 cannot use up more time than was used for the direct

    22 examination. Do we agree?

    23 MR. KEHOE: Reluctantly, Judge.

    24 JUDGE JORDA: I would like to tell you that

    25 right now. What did you say?

  29. 1 MR. KEHOE: I agree, Judge, but reluctantly.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: All right.

    3 MR. KEHOE:

    4 Q. Mr. Leyshon --

    5 MR. KEHOE: By the way, Judge, just for the

    6 record, so I know how to pace myself, what do I have,

    7 about 45 minutes?

    8 MR. HAYMAN: The direct was 25 minutes and

    9 Mr. Kehoe has 20 minutes left, if a 25-minute

    10 restriction is going to be placed on him.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: I think that the direct

    12 examination lasted for 20 or 25 minutes.

    13 THE REGISTRAR: It was 23 minutes and a few

    14 seconds.

    15 JUDGE JORDA: All right, 23 minutes. You

    16 began 3 minutes ago, therefore you have until the

    17 break, that is until ten to.

    18 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, this particular

    19 witness has come in with some very broad, sweeping

    20 claims concerning command and control. And while the

    21 direct examination may have only been 20 to 25 minutes,

    22 without a cross examination that goes into the

    23 documents and exploring the depths of Mr. Leyshon's

    24 knowledge, I submit to Your Honours and you,

    25 Mr. President, that Your Honours are not going to get a

  30. 1 full appreciation of what this witness does and does

    2 not know, with all due respect, sir.

    3 JUDGE JORDA: Twenty minutes, we have

    4 agreed. I understand your problem. The direct

    5 examination was short and only dealt with a specific

    6 number of points, so limit yourself to those points.

    7 We're wasting time. Go ahead, please.

    8 MR. KEHOE:

    9 Q. Mr. Leyshon, you said that compared to the

    10 British army that the HVO and the army of

    11 Bosnia-Herzegovina was not the professional army that

    12 the British army was; isn't that right?

    13 A. That's correct.

    14 Q. You would agree with me that the British army

    15 has, well, a pretty distinguished military career going

    16 back hundreds and hundreds of years, including the

    17 Cheshire Regiment, which I believe goes back to

    18 sometime in the 17th Century; is that right?

    19 A. That's correct, yes.

    20 Q. And the former Yugoslavia itself was only in

    21 existence from approximately 1945; is that right?

    22 A. I believe you're correct, yes.

    23 Q. I'm trying to let the interpreters catch up.

    24 Mr. Leyshon, what was the structure of the

    25 armed forces in the former Yugoslavia, the JNA?

  31. 1 A. When?

    2 Q. From 1945 until their decline and fall in

    3 1990 and 1991.

    4 A. Well, I don't know a huge amount about the

    5 JNA, apart from the fact they were trained and equipped

    6 with the Russian-style tactics. The majority of the

    7 JNA were of Serb decent, and when the country broke up

    8 the majority of equipment and experience ended up in

    9 Serb hands.

    10 Q. Well, my question is, what was the actual

    11 internal structure of the JNA? How did it operate?

    12 Was it based on a structure such as the British army?

    13 Was it based on a different structure that dealt with

    14 Territorial Defence units? How was it based, sir?

    15 A. Well, I don't know a huge amount about the

    16 JNA, but you can quite easily judge whether an army is

    17 professional or not by looking at its operations, the

    18 way it behaves, if soldiers are disciplined. And those

    19 are the qualities which I'm judging the HVO and the

    20 Bosnian army on in seven months experience.

    21 Q. Did HVO soldiers follow orders?

    22 A. I don't know. Some did, some didn't.

    23 Q. Give me an example of one where you know,

    24 based on your own personal experience, where an HVO

    25 soldier didn't follow an order.

  32. 1 A. I can show orders, I can't prove that,

    2 because obviously I didn't have access to the HVO

    3 command structure. But I can show examples of where

    4 HVO soldiers were undisciplined and obviously could not

    5 have been following orders.

    6 Q. Let me show you Defence object 267, 268 and

    7 269, if we could do that, Mr. Usher. And if I could

    8 ask the usher to run, that would be helpful.

    9 Have you seen these orders before you came

    10 here, Mr. Leyshon?

    11 A. Mr. Hayman showed them to me this morning.

    12 Q. Did he show you all of the orders that were

    13 executed by then Colonel Blaskic?

    14 A. I've only looked at a few of them.

    15 Q. Which ones did you look at?

    16 A. I've seen this one before.

    17 Q. Let's look at the next one.

    18 A. Yeah, well, I haven't read all this, but I

    19 have seen it.

    20 Q. Mr. Hayman showed you that?

    21 A. Yeah.

    22 Q. Did you see them when you were on the ground

    23 in Bosnia, in April of 1993?

    24 A. No, we wouldn't have seen any orders. These

    25 would have been secret.

  33. 1 Q. Well, sir, did you see any written orders at

    2 all that General Blaskic gave to his troops when they

    3 were on the ground?

    4 A. The only output I saw would have been at

    5 brokered peace agreements where both Mr. Blaskic and

    6 his counter party from the Bosnian army agreed to a

    7 cease-fire and the rules of the cease-fire.

    8 Q. Well, okay. Let's go with that. Would that

    9 be the cease-fire orders that were executed on the 13th

    10 of February of 1993? Did you see those?

    11 A. With respect to which area were they?

    12 Q. With respect to Central Bosnia. You were the

    13 intelligence officer at the time collating

    14 information.

    15 A. Part of Central Bosnia.

    16 Q. It was signed in Kakanj and dealt with the

    17 Busovaca and Vitez area; did you see those cease-fire

    18 orders?

    19 A. Busovaca, I believe there was -- I've got

    20 some milinfosums here, actually, so I can probably tell

    21 you exactly. What date did you say?

    22 Q. The 13th of February, sir.

    23 A. Yeah, I've got notes here saying preliminary

    24 meetings on the 5th of February.

    25 Q. Well, Mr. Leyshon, would you accept the fact

  34. 1 that Defence has admitted evidence of cease-fire

    2 agreements dated the 13th of February, 1993, signed by

    3 the accused, as well as General Enver Hadzihasanovic?

    4 A. Yeah, I'm sure you're right.

    5 Q. Did they stop fighting?

    6 A. In Busovaca?

    7 Q. In Vitez, after the 13th of February, 1993,

    8 did they stop fighting?

    9 A. As far as I can relate, probably not

    10 everywhere, no.

    11 Q. Did the troops stop the war? Barring for

    12 sporadic fire, sir, did the troops stop fighting with

    13 one another, army against army?

    14 A. In Busovaca, September 13 onwards?

    15 Q. February.

    16 A. February, sorry. I can't actually accurately

    17 answer that question.

    18 Q. Cease-fire worked, didn't it?

    19 A. No, I just said I can't accurately -- we had

    20 a number of cease-fires. We had a similar agreement in

    21 Gornji Vakuf at the same time; that cease-fire failed.

    22 And looking at my notes now, I'm sure I could probably

    23 pull out numerous examples of fighting in the Busovaca

    24 area, whether that be sporadic arms fire or actual

    25 artillery fire.

  35. 1 Q. Now, sir, you said that another indication of

    2 a lack of command and control and the difficulty of

    3 command and control is the fact that without proper

    4 communications the commanding officer doesn't know

    5 where his troops are and he can't communicate with them

    6 properly; is that right?

    7 A. If you haven't got real-time communications,

    8 you cannot command subunits on the ground if they are

    9 engaged in any sort of action.

    10 Q. Well, Mr. Leyshon, let me show you

    11 Prosecution Exhibit 456/45, as well as Defence Exhibit

    12 305 and Defence Exhibit 306. If we could show

    13 Mr. Leyshon first 356/45 to be followed by Defence

    14 Exhibits 305 and 306, that would be helpful.

    15 Do you see that sir? Did Mr. Hayman show you

    16 that Exhibit? I'm talking about Prosecution Exhibit

    17 456/45.

    18 A. Yeah, again, I've seen this but I haven't

    19 read it.

    20 Q. Take a look at it, and please note the time,

    21 and please note the time at which combat activities

    22 were to begin, and I refer you to paragraph 10 on page

    23 2?

    24 A. Who is this sent to?

    25 Q. Look at it, sir. Who is it sent to? It's

  36. 1 sent to the Ban Jelacic Brigade in Kiseljak. And, at

    2 that time, Mr. Leyshon, the road between Kiseljak and

    3 Busovaca was cut in half with the BiH army controlling

    4 between Kacuni and Bilalovac; is that right?

    5 A. Not on the 17th of April.

    6 Q. Oh, yes. I think that we will all stipulate

    7 on the 17th of April, that the army of

    8 Bosnia-Herzegovina was firmly ensconced, that's one

    9 thing that the Defence and the Prosecution will clearly

    10 agree on, firmly ensconced in the Kacuni area.

    11 Now, you take a look at that order, sir.

    12 A. Yes.

    13 Q. Take a look at the reply back, Exhibit 305

    14 and 306, and I will tell you that there's evidence been

    15 submitted to this Tribunal that the combat activities

    16 in Kiseljak municipality did, in fact, take place at

    17 0530 on the morning of the 18th of April.

    18 Take a look at the responding orders, 305 and

    19 306. Now, 305 is a report back at 1000 hours from the

    20 officer on duty from the Ban Jelacic Brigade discussing

    21 the execution of that order and combat activities,

    22 isn't it?

    23 A. Yes. He's issued some orders.

    24 Q. He's issued some orders, and the orders were

    25 followed, and this is a reply back coming from the Ban

  37. 1 Jelacic Brigade at 1000 hours the following morning

    2 concerning the update on those activities; is that

    3 right?

    4 A. Well, this is what the piece of paper in

    5 front of me is saying.

    6 Q. This is a Defence Exhibit, sir. Trust me.

    7 It's Defence Exhibit 305.

    8 A. Yeah, but I'm not saying that this is not

    9 inaccurate --

    10 Q. Okay. If this is accurate, sir, would you --

    11 MR. HAYMAN: Can the witness finish his

    12 answer, Your Honour? Mr. Kehoe is interrupting the

    13 witness.

    14 A. What I'm saying is I'm sure this is a correct

    15 piece of documentation. What I'm saying is it actually

    16 what actually happened on the ground? Is that a true

    17 reflection of what happened on the ground?

    18 MR. KEHOE:

    19 Q. Well, if this document is a true reflection

    20 of what happened on the ground, would you agree with

    21 me, Mr. Leyshon, that communications were pretty good?

    22 A. How was this documentation sent?

    23 Q. This has been submitted by the Defence as a

    24 document, submitted by a Defence witness in this

    25 Tribunal, Mr. Leyshon.

  38. 1 A. Yeah. But, again, we're talking about

    2 reports which are being sent. We've got a report here

    3 which is sent on the 17th of April at 2345 hours, and

    4 we have another report which is sent the next day at

    5 1000 hours. That's not real-time reporting. Yes, some

    6 orders have been issued, I agree, and there are

    7 responses being sent back. When did he receive this

    8 report back? This is not real-time communication.

    9 That is not a normal communication you would associate

    10 with a professional body of soldiers.

    11 Q. Mr. Leyshon, an order is given out on the

    12 evening of the 17th of April at 2345 to execute combat

    13 operations the next morning at 0530 on the morning of

    14 the 18th. The evidence before this Tribunal is that

    15 combat activities did commence at 0530 on the morning

    16 of the 18th of April. The evidence is also based on

    17 Defence witnesses. Defence Exhibit 305 is the first

    18 report received back from the Ban Jelacic Brigade

    19 concerning those activities.

    20 Given those facts, Mr. Leyshon, wouldn't you

    21 agree that the communications that the HVO possessed

    22 were pretty good?

    23 A. No.

    24 Q. Okay, sir, let's move ahead.

    25 A. Okay.

  39. 1 Q. Another thing you said is that, based on

    2 communications and some difficulties, if the commanding

    3 officer doesn't know where his troops are, it's awfully

    4 difficult to stay in control of them; is that right?

    5 A. Yeah. You've got to have real-time

    6 communications to know exactly what your subunits are

    7 doing on the ground.

    8 Q. And because where the attacks take place, you

    9 want to know where offensive and defensive positions

    10 are, et cetera; isn't that right?

    11 A. That's right. If you don't know what your

    12 subunits are doing, if they are achieving a task or

    13 not, you have to make command decisions from there.

    14 Q. Well, let me show you Prosecution Exhibit

    15 456/38.

    16 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, I see you looking

    17 at that clock.

    18 JUDGE JORDA: The Presiding Judge, like the

    19 other Judges, is not petty. We're trying to maintain

    20 an equitable balance here. You know, as regards the

    21 communications, go to the end of the questions that you

    22 want to ask. You've started a demonstration of

    23 something. Go to the end. That's fine. Thank you.

    24 Ask your questions calmly. If necessary, we

    25 will take a few more minutes. Give the witness time to

  40. 1 look at the documents and answer as he wants to, while

    2 I give the French version of this to my colleagues.

    3 MR. KEHOE: Excuse me. It should have been

    4 32, I apologise, 456/32, I apologise.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Go ahead, Mr. Kehoe.

    6 MR. KEHOE:

    7 Q. Now, let me turn you to these versions. This

    8 is a document that is executed by Colonel Blaskic on

    9 the 7th of May, 1993, and I would turn you to the page

    10 that says "Thrusts of the attack," and I think that is

    11 one, two, three, four, five, six pages in. Do you see

    12 that, sir?

    13 A. Just getting there.

    14 Q. Okay.

    15 A. Yes.

    16 Q. Now, that particular segment notes the

    17 thrusts of the attack and gives any number of locations

    18 where the attacks were taking place; isn't that right?

    19 A. These are attacks during what period of

    20 time?

    21 Q. This particular document deals with the

    22 attacks that begin on the 16th and go through until

    23 this report on the 17th -- on the 7th of May.

    24 A. 16th and 17th of April?

    25 Q. Correct.

  41. 1 A. Okay.

    2 Q. Would you agree with me, sir, that knowing

    3 what locations are being attacked, either offensively

    4 or defensively, indicates that a commander knows

    5 exactly what's going on in the field?

    6 A. Well, looking at this piece of paper here in

    7 front of me, is this a true reflection of what actually

    8 happened on the ground, it's very difficult to say.

    9 Q. Now, were you present in the meeting with

    10 Colonel Watters, General Halilovic, Colonel

    11 Hadzihasanovic, General Petkovic, and Colonel Blaskic?

    12 A. When was that?

    13 Q. On the 20th of April, 1993.

    14 A. I wasn't present at the whole meeting.

    15 Q. Well, if Colonel Watters, now the commander

    16 of the Cheshire Regiment, indicated that Blaskic was

    17 fully aware of the positions of all of his troops, as

    18 well as the troops of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

    19 would that indicate to you that General Blaskic knew

    20 what was happening, knew how to communicate with these

    21 people, and essentially knew what was going on?

    22 A. He might know where his soldiers are

    23 positioned at a certain point in time. Whether or not

    24 he has a real-time idea of where his soldiers are all

    25 the time, I would say that that would be less likely.

  42. 1 Whether or not he knows if those soldiers are carrying

    2 out his orders, if those soldiers are doing exactly

    3 what he is saying, again, I would say it would be

    4 unlikely.

    5 Q. Now, Mr. Leyshon, who do you think would have

    6 a better idea of how command and control functioned

    7 within the HVO? Would you have a better idea or would

    8 Colonel Blaskic?

    9 A. Colonel Blaskic would have a better knowledge

    10 of the HVO command and control structure, but I could

    11 still make an educated military opinion on what I saw

    12 on the ground during seven months, and that opinion is

    13 that there was not a good degree of command and control

    14 with their soldiers on the ground.

    15 Q. My question to you is: Who would have a

    16 better idea, you or Blaskic?

    17 A. A better idea of what?

    18 Q. Of command and control, whether or not

    19 command and control functioned properly?

    20 A. Well, I would have better real-time

    21 communications.

    22 Q. You would know better than Colonel Blaskic?

    23 A. I would have a more -- I may have had a

    24 better idea during the time that all the fighting was

    25 going on in the Lasva Valley, of where the fighting was

  43. 1 going on, because I had lots of call signs out on the

    2 ground all reporting into the Cheshire ops room telling

    3 us where the fighting was, who was engaged in what.

    4 All these call signs all had radios, and all the

    5 reporting was real-time.

    6 Q. Mr. Leyshon, you never saw an order written

    7 by Colonel Blaskic at the time, you never saw any of

    8 the deployment orders, you don't know what oral orders

    9 he was giving to the troops, and you're telling this

    10 Court, based on everything that you don't know, that

    11 you had a better idea of whether command and control

    12 was functioning properly than Colonel Blaskic?

    13 MR. HAYMAN: Asked and answered. That's an

    14 objection. To the witness, you wait for the Court to

    15 respond, please.

    16 My objection is asked and answered, the same

    17 question now three times.

    18 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, I think you've asked that

    19 question several times, Mr. Kehoe. That's true. Do

    20 you know who was the most likely to understand the

    21 value of the communication and the quality of the

    22 information, either the witness or the accused, in

    23 terms of the chain of command.

    24 MR. KEHOE:

    25 Q. Well, Mr. Leyshon, turn to the page on

  44. 1 conclusions. Now, the conclusion written by Colonel

    2 Blaskic to the supreme commander of the armed forces of

    3 the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna is the

    4 following: "Command and control function properly and

    5 all missions proceed in a planned fashion according to

    6 orders, with detailed knowledge of the situation, full

    7 coordination and control." Do you see that?

    8 A. Yes.

    9 Q. Have you seen that before you came in here

    10 today?

    11 A. Yeah, I have seen part of these documents

    12 before.

    13 Q. Mr. Hayman showed you that document as well?

    14 A. Yeah.

    15 Q. You discussed that document with him?

    16 A. He showed me some parts of it.

    17 Q. How about Prosecutor's Exhibit 380, if we

    18 could. Now, this document 380 is an article from an

    19 interview of the defendant Danas. Did you see this

    20 article before?

    21 A. Yeah, I saw this.

    22 Q. Mr. Hayman showed you that article as well?

    23 A. I saw it this morning.

    24 Q. Then we can move through it quickly. In this

    25 article again, in the first paragraph, the bottom line,

  45. 1 the last two sentences, Blaskic says, "All operative

    2 groups are under my command, and the chain of

    3 leadership and command function absolutely without

    4 interruption."

    5 Now, that particular statement is consistent

    6 with the statement that he gave to his own commanders

    7 in Mostar, isn't it?

    8 A. Who did he give this statement to?

    9 Q. To a newspaper article, sir?

    10 A. Right. Well, would you expect a military

    11 commander to say anything else to a newspaper? If he

    12 was to say, "I hadn't --" if we hadn't operated

    13 effectively, he would actually be saying, "I'm not a

    14 good commander."

    15 Q. Mr. Leyshon, is what he said in the newspaper

    16 article consistent with what he told his commanders on

    17 the 7th of May, 1993?

    18 A. Well, yeah, it's a very similar paragraph but

    19 is it consistent with what actually happened?

    20 Q. That's what he told to the people in charge,

    21 isn't it?

    22 A. The same answer, I'm afraid. You are going

    23 to tell your superior officer that you're doing a good

    24 job. It's human nature.

    25 Q. I understand, sir. So if command and control

  46. 1 didn't work in a particular platoon that you were under

    2 operation, you wouldn't tell the regimental commander

    3 that things weren't working? You would lie to him? Is

    4 that what you're saying?

    5 A. What I'm saying is that if a senior officer,

    6 like Colonel Blaskic, was reporting upwards, it's more

    7 likely that he's going to report that he's doing a good

    8 job, he's an effective commander, and that he's carried

    9 out his mission correctly.

    10 Q. Are you saying, Mr. Leyshon, that a

    11 commanding officer in the British army would tell his

    12 superior and lie to his superior about what was taking

    13 place? Is that what you're saying?

    14 A. No, I'm saying that it is likely that a

    15 commander will think he's doing a good job, and he will

    16 give the information upwards that he has good command

    17 and control of his unit. That might not necessarily be

    18 a true reflection of the facts.

    19 Q. So your conclusion is that Blaskic believed

    20 that command and control worked properly?

    21 A. He may have thought that by the standards of

    22 his units, which were unprofessional, ill-disciplined

    23 units, he had a level of command of control which is

    24 all that he could expect from those units. It was what

    25 he had. He was making the best of a poor situation.

  47. 1 Q. The system that you are comparing it to is

    2 that of the British army; isn't that right?

    3 A. That's right, a professional army with

    4 command and control. And you can only have command and

    5 control if you've got real-time communications, which I

    6 don't believe he had.

    7 Q. You would agree with me, Mr. Leyshon, that

    8 Blaskic believed that he had command and control over

    9 his troops, didn't he?

    10 A. He had the level of command and control, I

    11 should imagine, you could ever hope for with the

    12 resources available to him.

    13 Q. Because if something is wrong, generally, a

    14 commanding officer will ask for help, won't he?

    15 A. I don't know. It varies from army to army.

    16 Q. Well, in the British army, they would ask for

    17 help, wouldn't they, Mr. Leyshon?

    18 A. They would but that's a professional army.

    19 Q. Mr. Leyshon, let me show you Prosecution

    20 Exhibit 512, one of your milinfosums, and you can take

    21 a look at it while we're waiting. It's February 1,

    22 1993.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: This is the last exhibit that

    24 you're going to show the witness, the last question as

    25 well.

  48. 1 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, I just have one

    2 question after this particular exhibit, which will be

    3 very brief.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Very well.

    5 MR. KEHOE:

    6 Q. Mr. Leyshon, do you see the milinfosum of 1

    7 February, 1993?

    8 A. Yes.

    9 Q. That is a military information summary that

    10 sets out a chain of command, does it not? I turn to

    11 the third page of that milinfosum; do you see that?

    12 Did you write that or assist in the writing of it or

    13 review it or approve it or anything?

    14 A. Paragraph 7?

    15 Q. Paragraph 7.

    16 A. Yeah, I can't remember who wrote it, but I

    17 probably would have seen it.

    18 Q. So the HVO had a recognisable structure with

    19 a hierarchy and a chain of command that you set forth

    20 in that document; isn't that right?

    21 A. That's right.

    22 Q. And that is the structure and chain of

    23 command that Blaskic, himself, says worked; isn't that

    24 right?

    25 A. Well, I would disagree that it was an

  49. 1 efficient chain of command.

    2 Q. I understand, sir.

    3 A. I mean, it is written on paper, correct, but

    4 how effective that chain of command was is

    5 questionable.

    6 Q. I understand, sir.

    7 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, I beg to ask for a

    8 little bit more time. I have a little bit more to ask

    9 in this rather sweeping testimony.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: I would like to consult with my

    11 colleagues because this is a question of principle

    12 here.

    13 Mr. Kehoe, the Judges give you until 4.15 to

    14 complete your cross-examination. I apologise to the

    15 interpreters. We will work until a quarter after, and

    16 these few extra moments will not be counted as Defence

    17 time.

    18 MR. KEHOE: Thank you, Mr. President, Your

    19 Honours.

    20 Q. Now, Mr. Leyshon, when you were analysing the

    21 command and control within the HVO, did you analyse the

    22 background of HVO officers?

    23 A. I don't know. That wasn't our job.

    24 Q. It wasn't your job when you were making a

    25 decision about the command and control of HVO officers?

  50. 1 A. Well, our job wasn't to analyse HVO

    2 officers. Our job was to know who the commanders were,

    3 so when there were problems on the ground, we knew

    4 which commanders to talk to to try and broker

    5 agreements, cease-fire agreements, and ensure that we

    6 could complete our mission. Our mission, at the end of

    7 the day, was to ensure that humanitarian aid got

    8 delivered, not to collect intelligence on local

    9 commanders.

    10 Q. Well, would it be important for your

    11 consideration, Mr. Leyshon, to know the military

    12 background of HVO officers when you're making your

    13 decision on command and control?

    14 A. It would be a factor, definitely, yes.

    15 Q. But you didn't do that?

    16 A. I was judging what I saw on the ground over a

    17 long period of time. It wasn't a snap judgment. It

    18 was a judgment made -- I saw lots of incidents of

    19 ill-disciplined soldiers on all sides and poor command

    20 and control.

    21 Q. Mr. Leyshon, did you see HVO training

    22 manuals?

    23 A. No.

    24 Q. Did you see HVO training going on?

    25 A. No.

  51. 1 Q. Was HVO training going on?

    2 A. Well, I didn't see it, then I don't know.

    3 Q. Take a look at 456/32 and go back to that

    4 page we talked about in conclusions. Go back to that

    5 conclusions page.

    6 A. Yeah.

    7 Q. Look at paragraph 2 in the conclusions and

    8 read it for us out loud.

    9 A. "Training and education - younger troops

    10 (especially in Busovaca 38 killed and 108 wounded so

    11 far) are undergoing special training according to the

    12 submitted training plan."

    13 Q. So would General Blaskic know more about

    14 training of HVO troops or you?

    15 A. Well, he would know more about it.

    16 Q. Okay. And from that, he concludes that

    17 training is taking place; is that right?

    18 A. No. He's saying that they are undergoing

    19 special training.

    20 Q. Doesn't that mean that they are undergoing

    21 training, Mr. Leyshon?

    22 A. Not necessarily, no.

    23 Q. What does it mean?

    24 A. Well, it means that he's written on a piece

    25 of paper to his headquarter that they are undergoing

  52. 1 training.

    2 Q. No, wait a second, Mr. Leyshon. He is

    3 writing a report to his commanders in Mostar telling

    4 them that younger troops are undergoing special

    5 training according to the submitted training plan.

    6 Does the document say that?

    7 A. That's what the document says, yes.

    8 Q. And are you raising the question with this

    9 Court that, while Blaskic writes that on a piece of

    10 paper, he may not be telling his commanders the truth?

    11 A. What I'm saying is that the command structure

    12 below him may have been that this training might not

    13 have happened. Some of it might have happened; some of

    14 it might not have.

    15 Q. On what basis do you make that statement to

    16 these Judges? What factual basis do you have for that

    17 statement, sir?

    18 A. Well, I don't see how a huge amount of

    19 training could have gone on, looking at the quality or

    20 discipline of these soldiers. They were not

    21 professional soldiers, and they didn't appear to be

    22 very well-trained.

    23 Q. Mr. Leyshon, what facts do you have to

    24 support your allegation that no training was taking

    25 place and that this statement is incorrect?

  53. 1 A. I can only base it on the fact that I never

    2 saw any training, and I never had any reports of any

    3 training going on from any of the soldiers within our

    4 area of responsibility.

    5 Q. You don't know one way or the other, do you?

    6 A. Well, we had a lot of people out on the

    7 ground for seven months, and not once did we see any

    8 existence of any training going on.

    9 Q. Mr. Leyshon, did you receive reliable

    10 information that the HVO were burning houses of Bosnian

    11 Muslims?

    12 A. Yeah, there were examples of that.

    13 Q. Why don't you turn your attention to Gornji

    14 Vakuf on the 6th of February. Take a look at your

    15 milinfosums on the 6th of February. In the paragraph

    16 under Gornji Vakuf, did you write, "Last night, it was

    17 reported that HVO Commander Zrinko Topcic issued an

    18 ultimatum to the BiH forces to surrender their weapons

    19 to the HVO. If they refused, he would burn the town to

    20 the ground."

    21 A. I can't remember if I wrote it. It would

    22 have been reported to us from our milinfosum in Gornji

    23 Vakuf.

    24 Q. That would have been B Company under the

    25 command of Major Rule; isn't that right?

  54. 1 A. That's correct, yeah.

    2 Q. Do you have any reason to doubt the accuracy

    3 of this statement?

    4 A. No.

    5 Q. Did you also receive information concerning

    6 trench digging by the HVO of Bosnian Muslim civilians,

    7 and let me cut through this, and why don't you page up

    8 just one page and stay with the 6th of February in the

    9 Busovaca area.

    10 MR. HAYMAN: Beyond the scope,

    11 Mr. President. Counsel can go on regarding command and

    12 control, whatever, as the Court is going to permit him,

    13 but beyond the scope, I think, poses a different

    14 question.

    15 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, I believe that that's

    16 outside the scope of the direct examination. Once

    17 again, I take the liberty of saying to you that the

    18 witness was called by the Defence to testify about

    19 specific points. You can have him tell about the seven

    20 months of war, that's another option, but I believe

    21 that the Trial Chamber has given you additional time.

    22 Do you have one further question to ask,

    23 Mr. Kehoe?

    24 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.

    25 Q. You said during your direct examination that

  55. 1 the attack that took place on Ahmici was an organised

    2 attack; isn't that right?

    3 A. There was a degree of organisation, yeah.

    4 Q. Mr. Leyshon, that attack took place in

    5 Ahmici, Santici, Pirici, Donja Veceriska, and Stari

    6 Vitez all at the same time, didn't it?

    7 A. There was a lot of fighting going on across

    8 the Lasva Valley.

    9 Q. All those attacks took place on the morning

    10 of the 16th; isn't that right?

    11 A. I don't believe that there was the same level

    12 of activity in those other villages as there was in

    13 Ahmici.

    14 Q. And you concluded at the time that the HVO

    15 was the attacking force; isn't that right?

    16 A. Well, yeah, that's quite an easy assessment

    17 to make when it's a Muslim village.

    18 Q. And you noted in your conversation with Dai

    19 Morriss and with Mr. Cayley that it was unlikely that,

    20 given the number of soldiers involved, the HVO command

    21 did not have knowledge of what was going on?

    22 MR. HAYMAN: May I inquire and interrupt?

    23 Your Honour, if counsel is referring to a witness

    24 statement, we were never given a witness statement for

    25 this witness, although he was listed as a Prosecution

  56. 1 witness.

    2 MR. KEHOE: There's no signed witness

    3 statement. There is no signed witness statement of

    4 this witness.

    5 MR. HAYMAN: Your Honour, I know that to be

    6 false because I got it from the witness, and he signed

    7 it and faxed it to the Office of the Prosecutor, and

    8 they never gave it to the Defence. It's been filed

    9 with this Court and Your Honours have it.

    10 MR. KEHOE: I don't have it. I have an

    11 unsigned witness statement, unsigned, never executed,

    12 never reviewed by this witness at all.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, what did you say?

    14 You were relying on what document, on the report?

    15 MR. KEHOE: No. There were notes taken by

    16 Mr. Morriss that were put together in his interview

    17 that Mr. Cayley participated in. They drafted this

    18 up. This was never reviewed by this witness, nor was

    19 it signed in the possession of the Office of the

    20 Prosecutor at all, ever. It was never compiled for

    21 this particular person to sign, and the reason for that

    22 was that was relatively information-free. Now, if

    23 counsel has a signed copy, that is news to the

    24 Prosecutor, Mr. President, big news.

    25 MR. HAYMAN: It's already been filed with the

  57. 1 Court. It speaks for itself. Signed, faxed, in their

    2 possession. He was put on the Prosecutor's witness

    3 list. They had a signed statement. They didn't give

    4 it to us, and now the Court knows why, having heard the

    5 testimony of this witness.

    6 MR. KEHOE: Then I think that counsel should

    7 gladly put the statement in. Gladly put the statement,

    8 Counsellor, because I tell this Court --

    9 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, I would like you to

    10 ask your last question, and after that, the

    11 cross-examination will be complete.

    12 MR. KEHOE:

    13 Q. Mr. Leyshon, did you tell Mr. Cayley and

    14 Mr. Morriss that the commander, Blaskic, knew what was

    15 going on about these attacks? Did you tell them that?

    16 A. No.

    17 Q. Did you tell them that he had no knowledge

    18 about what was going on?

    19 A. I told him, I said that -- I couldn't say

    20 that Blaskic knew, because how could I know? Only he

    21 knows. I mean, I don't understand the question.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: Please turn to the Judges when

    23 you answer, please. You are answering the Judges.

    24 Thank you.

    25 Did you or did you not make that statement to

  58. 1 the investigators at the Office of the Prosecutor?

    2 A. I did make a statement that said I believed

    3 it was probably a platoon size group of soldiers, 30 to

    4 40 soldiers, that must have attached Ahmici, due to the

    5 size of the village and the operation that was carried

    6 out, and therefore, it was an organised attack at that

    7 level.

    8 Those 30 to 40 soldiers were all working

    9 together in a particular way, in an organised way.

    10 Whether that order came from above or who gave that

    11 order, I do not know.

    12 MR. KEHOE:

    13 Q. Mr. Leyshon, did you say it is unlikely that

    14 this number of soldiers were acting without the

    15 knowledge of the HVO command?

    16 A. I said that they would know, the HVO command

    17 would have known the location of those soldiers. But I

    18 doubt if they would have known real-time what actions

    19 those soldiers were carrying out.

    20 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, I could explore

    21 this area at length, because it is a fruitful area of

    22 questioning in this regard. I will say once again for

    23 the record, Mr. President, that the Office of the

    24 Prosecutor does not have a signed copy of this

    25 witness's statement. If Defence counsel has one and

  59. 1 the Honours want to see it, I would invite him to

    2 present one to Your Honours.

    3 MR. HAYMAN: It has already been filed under

    4 seal. The Court has it. The Court knows it was signed

    5 and sent to the Office of the Prosecutor.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: I'm sorry, I didn't get the

    7 interpretation on that. Very well, we're going to

    8 suspend the hearing. We will take a 30-minute break.

    9 --- Recess taken at 4.19 p.m.

    10 --- On resuming at 4.58 p.m.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: We will now resume the

    12 hearing. Have the accused brought in, please.

    13 (The accused entered court)

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, this is now the

    15 time for your re-examination. You can have between 10

    16 to 15 minutes to do so, maximum.

    17 Re-examined by Mr. Hayman:

    18 MR. HAYMAN: Yes, Mr. President.

    19 Q. You were asked on cross-examination

    20 concerning when and if the road from Vitez and Busovaca

    21 to Kiseljak was cut off. After January, 1993, was the

    22 road along that route closed to U.N. traffic?

    23 A. No, it wasn't. We regularly travelled to

    24 Kiseljak.

    25 Q. And is that what you were referring to

  60. 1 earlier in your testimony?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 Q. Was it closed to HVO transportation, to your

    4 knowledge, during a large portion, at least, of that

    5 time period?

    6 A. Yes, I believe a portion of the road was

    7 controlled by the Bosnian army, and therefore, the HVO

    8 couldn't travel through to it.

    9 Q. During the last break I showed you a copy of

    10 the statement that was discussed during your

    11 cross-examination; does that statement bear a

    12 handwritten note from you to the Tribunal Prosecutor to

    13 whom you sent it?

    14 A. Yeah, it had a comment and a fax confirmation

    15 on it.

    16 Q. Does it have a fax confirmation line

    17 indicating that you sent it from where you were then

    18 working to the Office of the Tribunal Prosecutor?

    19 A. It was sent to Dai Morriss.

    20 Q. You were shown three orders issued by Colonel

    21 Blaskic, for the record, Defence Exhibits 267, 268 and

    22 269, and I will read the operative paragraph for

    23 purposes of my question from Defence Exhibit 267, page

    24 2, paragraph 2.1, which is directed to the 4th

    25 Battalion of the military police, and states, having

  61. 1 already assigned to that unit the security of the road,

    2 Busovaca Vitez, quote:

    3 "In the event of a rather strong attack by

    4 the Muslim extremist forces from the direction of the

    5 villages Nadioci, Ahmici, Sivrino, Pirici, inform me.

    6 And if the fire is opened directly at you, return the

    7 fire and neutralise the attacker."

    8 Now, I want to direct your attention to

    9 Defence Exhibit 280, which is a report which is not on

    10 the ELMO. I will place it on the ELMO.

    11 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, again, this is

    12 beyond the scope. I didn't talk about Exhibit 280.

    13 This is beyond the scope of cross-examination, if we're

    14 going to keep limitations on it.

    15 MR. HAYMAN: He asked him, Mr. President,

    16 about the order.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, what do you want to

    18 say?

    19 Mr. Kehoe, it seems to me that you, yourself,

    20 referred to orders from the accused, Colonel Blaskic.

    21 At least that seems to me; therefore, it's natural for

    22 the Defence to use the same orders.

    23 MR. KEHOE: I agree, Mr. President. He used

    24 267, and when Mr. Hayman used 267 I didn't object.

    25 That was the first document. Now he's moving to 280.

  62. 1 If this was information he wanted to bring out, he

    2 should have brought this information out on his direct

    3 and not wait until redirect.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: We're going to let him ask his

    5 question first. First ask your question, Mr. Hayman.

    6 MR. HAYMAN:

    7 Q. Mr. Leyshon, Exhibit 280 is the report

    8 received in the Operative Zone Central Bosnia from the

    9 commander of the unit who was given the instructions I

    10 just described.

    11 Now, the evidence in this case has been that

    12 on the morning of the 16th of April a hundred or more

    13 civilians, Muslim civilians, were killed in the village

    14 of Ahmici and scores of homes were burned. Are those

    15 facts reflected in the report which is Exhibit 280?

    16 MR. KEHOE: My objection remains the same.

    17 That subject has not been discussed at all in

    18 cross-examination. Counsel can talk about Exhibit 267,

    19 which is the document that I discussed on cross. If

    20 we're going to move into another area on redirect, I

    21 would ask the Court for another opportunity to cross.

    22 MR. HAYMAN: Your Honour.

    23 MR. KEHOE: Excuse me, Counsel.

    24 MR. HAYMAN: Mr. Kehoe is talking to consume

    25 my time. He has been talking for three or four minutes

  63. 1 now, stating his objection. So for starters, I would

    2 ask time be ceased. I haven't been able to get a

    3 question out yet. That's why he's not limiting his

    4 statements to objection grounds, he is talking to

    5 consume my time.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, don't waste your

    7 Honourable colleague's time. Let him ask his question.

    8 MR. KEHOE: I won't, Judge. What I'm saying

    9 is, my objection still concerns with Exhibit 280, which

    10 we shouldn't be going into in redirect at this point.

    11 MR. HAYMAN: I will answer the objection,

    12 Your Honours. What he showed the witness was the

    13 order. What he doesn't want the witness shown is the

    14 report. And the reason it needs to be shown to the

    15 witness is, to have command and control you have to

    16 have orders followed and accurate reports given.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: I think that -- well, I'll

    18 speak with my colleagues, because I don't want to

    19 impose my own point of view. I'm going to consult with

    20 my colleagues.

    21 We were all surprised by the brevity of the

    22 direct examination, and you saw that things became a

    23 little bit complicated when it came to trying to ensure

    24 an equitable trial.

    25 We were not very demanding with you,

  64. 1 Mr. Kehoe. You were more or less allowed to do what

    2 you wanted to with the witness. The Judges consider

    3 that Mr. Hayman can ask his question in respect of this

    4 document, so long as there is a connection with the

    5 orders that were given. This is the very heart of a

    6 question which is of great interest to the Judges, and

    7 I'm sure they are going to ask the wrong questions

    8 about this same subject.

    9 So Mr. Hayman, ask your question about that

    10 document. And of course, you will be given an extra

    11 three minutes for your re-examination.

    12 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you.

    13 Q. Mr. Leyshon, Exhibit D267 is the order, the

    14 order to defend, and if attacked, notify Colonel

    15 Blaskic and then neutralise the attacker. Exhibit

    16 Exhibit D280 is the report.

    17 Now, the report does not contain any

    18 information concerning murdered civilians or burned

    19 homes. Let's assume, for purposes of this question,

    20 that civilians were murdered and homes were burned on

    21 the morning of the 16th of April, 1993. That being the

    22 case, what are the consequences for command and control

    23 if a commander receives orders such as Exhibit D280?

    24 A. This report doesn't show a true reflection of

    25 what happened in Ahmici.

  65. 1 Q. You need your microphone on, please. Could

    2 you start over?

    3 JUDGE JORDA: Please face the Judges when

    4 you're answering.

    5 A. This report doesn't show a true reflection of

    6 what happened in Ahmici; therefore, if you are

    7 receiving inaccurate reports, the command cannot make

    8 the right decisions. Good command and control needs

    9 real-time reporting. But also something which is

    10 obviously important is the accuracy of the reports.

    11 Q. Is it fair to say that without accurate

    12 information the commander is in the dark?

    13 A. Absolutely.

    14 Q. Now, you were also asked about Prosecution

    15 Exhibit 456/45, which is an order to capture Gomionica

    16 and Svinjarevo, issued on the evening of the 17th of

    17 April, 1993.

    18 Defence Exhibits 305 and 306 are reports

    19 submitted back to the Operative Zone from the Kiseljak

    20 brigade. The order to capture those two villages was

    21 to indicate that action should be commenced at 0530 in

    22 the morning.

    23 Now, the first report, Exhibit D305, reflects

    24 a time of drafting at the top of 1000 hours, 10.00 in

    25 the morning. What does that mean with respect to the

  66. 1 information that Colonel Blaskic had between 0530, when

    2 apparently fighting started, and 10.00 in the morning

    3 on this day, the 18th of April, 1993?

    4 A. It means the communication. He doesn't know

    5 what's going on for that period of time.

    6 Q. If he doesn't know what's going on for

    7 four-and-a-half hours, while fighting is ongoing, is

    8 that consistent with command and control standards in a

    9 professional armed force?

    10 A. No.

    11 Q. The position of the Prosecutor is that this

    12 village of Gomionica was burned to the ground. Do you

    13 recall, I don't want you to look at them again, but do

    14 you recall the reports, D305 and 306? Is that fact

    15 reflected in those reports, to your recollection?

    16 A. I'm not sure, actually.

    17 Q. Very well.

    18 A. I will have to see the evidence again, sorry.

    19 Q. We won't take the time to do that.

    20 Now, you were also shown Exhibit P456/32, and

    21 while we're discussing this, if the registrar could

    22 retrieve Exhibit P490.

    23 P456/32 is the report from Colonel Blaskic to

    24 the Mostar supreme command dated 7 May, 1933 and

    25 includes the statement that command and control

  67. 1 function properly and so forth.

    2 Now, you weren't asked about the prior page,

    3 paragraph 6, and I'd like to read to you the second

    4 half of that paragraph. Quote: "All units are

    5 carrying out their tasks, except for the battalion in

    6 Fojnica, which is engaged in personnel reshuffling and

    7 taking a neutral position, vis-a-vis the Muslims, so

    8 that the Muslim forces are attacking on Busovaca

    9 unimpeded from the area of Fojnica."

    10 Now, if Exhibit P490, could be placed on the

    11 ELMO and the ELMO could be moved closer to the witness

    12 so that he can see it. Can you see this exhibit?

    13 A. Yes.

    14 Q. This exhibit is titled "Decision" from the

    15 HVO battalion in Fojnica, the HVO, civilian authority,

    16 the Franciscan monastery and others, and it states in

    17 short that an order of the Operative Zone command is

    18 being completely rejected.

    19 What does that mean, for command and control,

    20 when a subordinate unit rejects an order of a superior

    21 command?

    22 A. Well, obviously there is no command and

    23 control.

    24 Q. Now, you have brought with you in your

    25 notebooks, copies of the milinfosums you were

  68. 1 responsible for producing; is that correct?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 Q. I would like you to turn to milinfosum 165,

    4 paragraph 3. Now you were asked about another

    5 milinfosum by the Prosecutor, and specifically asked

    6 whether in fact there was a structure of command within

    7 the HVO, and one that you reported in a milinfosum.

    8 Could you read paragraph 3 of this milinfosum, which,

    9 for the record, is dated the 13th of April, 1993?

    10 Could you read it to the Court?

    11 A. It's headed Tuzla.

    12 Q. And read it slowly, please, because my

    13 apologies, the interpreters cannot see it, so please

    14 read it slowly.

    15 A. "Open source material collated by milinfo

    16 Tuzla contains an extensive article on the 7th

    17 operational group (Doboj). The article clearly states

    18 the 110th Usora Brigade is under the command of 2

    19 Corps. Comment, the Usora Brigade is located within

    20 the 2 Corps, AOR; however, this unit is listed by HVO

    21 Central Bosnia as being subordinate to the 3rd ops

    22 group, HVO." Comment ends.

    23 Q. Now, my question is: If that is true, that

    24 the HVO brigade in Usora was subordinate to the 2nd

    25 Corps of the BH army, what does that mean concerning

  69. 1 command and control within the HVO in the Operative

    2 Zone Central Bosnia?

    3 A. Well, if the HVO command had seconded that

    4 unit to the 2nd BH corps, that would be fine; but if

    5 both headquarters are reporting that they control that

    6 unit, again, there would be some confusion as to the

    7 command and control structure.

    8 Q. Some confusion? Is that an understatement?

    9 A. Yes.

    10 Q. Did the cease-fire across the Operative Zone

    11 declared on April 18th, 1993, was that respected?

    12 A. This is the one which was drawn up in Vitez?

    13 Q. Yes.

    14 A. There were numerous cease-fire violations

    15 throughout the whole of the Lasva Valley for, I

    16 believe, the following four or five days, to varying

    17 degrees.

    18 Q. Are those violations detailed in the

    19 milinfosums you were responsible for producing?

    20 A. That's correct.

    21 Q. Is the same true -- I'm not going to ask you

    22 to refer to specific sections. I don't think there is

    23 time. Is the same true of other cease-fires, including

    24 the cease-fire brokered in Gornji Vakuf earlier in

    25 1993?

  70. 1 A. Yes.

    2 Q. Let me ask you to turn to milinfosum 15,

    3 paragraph 1, dated the 14th of November. Paragraph 1

    4 pertains to Travnik Turbe. Could you read the portion

    5 beginning "The detailed situation"?

    6 A. This is 14th of November, '92.

    7 Q. Yes.

    8 A. "The detailed situation on the ground is

    9 unclear, with poor passage of information back to both

    10 the HVO and BiH headquarters in Travnik."

    11 Q. Are the milinfosums that you have brought

    12 with you here today, are they replete with examples of

    13 orders not followed and other indicia of uncontrollable

    14 or independent units or criminal elements operating

    15 within both the HVO and the BH army during the relevant

    16 time period?

    17 A. Yes, there were numerous cease-fire

    18 agreements which were broken, not only in the Lasva

    19 Valley, but also in Gornji Vakuf and other areas. And

    20 there are numerous examples, as well, of actions by

    21 ill-disciplined soldiers on both sides, and what I

    22 believe to be lots of examples of poor command and

    23 control from the command structures on both sides.

    24 MR. HAYMAN: I have no further questions, Mr.

    25 President. Thank you.

  71. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. Let me now turn to

    2 my colleagues, Judge Riad?

    3 JUDGE RIAD: Good afternoon Mr. Leyshon.

    4 A. Good afternoon.

    5 JUDGE RIAD: If I understood you correctly,

    6 your mission was to help the UNHCR delivery of human

    7 aid to Bosnia.

    8 A. That's correct.

    9 JUDGE RIAD: And how long did you stay there?

    10 A. Seven months.

    11 JUDGE RIAD: Seven months. What did you call

    12 the milinfosum, what does this mean?

    13 A. It's military information summary. It is

    14 shortened to milinfosum but it means it was a daily

    15 summary.

    16 JUDGE RIAD: What did you mean by helping the

    17 UNHCR?

    18 A. Our role was to support the UNHCR in

    19 delivering aid. So that meant ensuring they had free

    20 passage to all the locations they wanted to go to and

    21 the routes they took were safe.

    22 So in order to do that, by escorting them, we

    23 could ensure they had free passage to the checkpoints

    24 and we had accurate information as to where the

    25 frontline was, in order to ensure the safety of both

  72. 1 ourselves and the UNHCR at all times.

    2 JUDGE RIAD: Did this put you in contact

    3 often with the regional authorities, or the BiH?

    4 A. In order to carry out our mission it was

    5 important to have good relationships with both the BH

    6 and HVO command structures in our area of operations.

    7 So yes.

    8 JUDGE RIAD: I would appreciate you shedding

    9 more light on some of your general affirmations. You

    10 said you had a good idea -- I'm almost quoting you --

    11 you had a good idea of what was going on all the time.

    12 So you think that you had the necessary means to know

    13 what was going on all the time?

    14 A. We had a good idea of what was going on in

    15 most of the areas of conflict, most of the time. No

    16 one could say that they knew everything that was going

    17 on all the time, but we were a regimental size group.

    18 We had over 200 vehicles. We had a lot of soldiers out

    19 on the ground. We had good procedures for reporting.

    20 And in all the locations, the areas where we were

    21 positioned, we did have a good idea as to the situation

    22 at the time, and that was reported through the military

    23 information summaries.

    24 JUDGE RIAD: What was going on in all the

    25 Lasva Valley?

  73. 1 A. Yes.

    2 JUDGE RIAD: And you also mentioned,

    3 generally, that commanders did not know exactly the

    4 disposition of their soldiers. Did you have the chance

    5 to talk to commanders and to know that from the source

    6 itself, or was it some kind of rumours?

    7 A. Well, it was the assessment of the situation

    8 at the time. If you have a large number of soldiers

    9 situated in an area, and in order to know what they are

    10 all doing all the time, all the subunits have to have

    11 real-time lines of communication to their various

    12 command structures.

    13 If those real-time communications don't

    14 exist, which we believe was the case with a lot of the

    15 subunits, then it is impossible for a command structure

    16 to have an accurate picture of a situation all the

    17 time.

    18 JUDGE RIAD: Did you have, by any chance, an

    19 opportunity to meet with General Blaskic and to know

    20 from him first-hand information?

    21 A. I did meet General Blaskic, but I did not

    22 deal with him directly. It was more my commanding

    23 officer and the liaison officers who would speak to him

    24 and had that relationship with him.

    25 JUDGE RIAD: Who was your commanding officer?

  74. 1 A. Colonel Bob Stewart.

    2 JUDGE RIAD: And you stressed that the

    3 soldiers were unprofessional and what you could call

    4 homing soldiers. They were homing soldiers, like

    5 homing birds. They would just go to their nests in the

    6 evening. Would that imply that they would not obey

    7 orders?

    8 A. No, that was more a circumstance of the

    9 situation. As you mentioned before, there weren't

    10 established barracks for these soldiers. They did have

    11 headquarters. They had requisitioned hotels and

    12 schools. But at the end of the day if you have local

    13 forces raised from a local area, it's a natural

    14 progression that these people would return back to

    15 their homes in the evening.

    16 JUDGE RIAD: Would this make out of them --

    17 of course, I'm not comparing them to the British army

    18 which one day, which once ruled the world -- but would

    19 that mean they were undisciplined militias?

    20 A. No, the fact that they haven't got a barracks

    21 to live in and they go home doesn't make them

    22 undisciplined. It's the fact that a lot of soldiers

    23 had had no, had not had a high level of training, the

    24 fact that they weren't located in barracks, the fact

    25 they did go home in the evening, the fact that a lot of

  75. 1 them did take their weapons with them when they went

    2 home, and if there was an incident or they had

    3 something to drink, the situation would obviously flare

    4 up more than if they are in a normal situation where a

    5 normal soldier would not take his weapon home.

    6 JUDGE RIAD: But if they were told by their

    7 superiors not to do something, would they just

    8 disregard it, or were they sufficiently aware of their

    9 responsibilities?

    10 A. There were numerous occasions where we saw

    11 acts of ill discipline, where there were incidents of

    12 vehicles being stolen, people being robbed, not

    13 agreeing or not following orders with respect to

    14 cease-fire agreements from commanders. You know, there

    15 were numerous examples throughout our period of time

    16 there which reflected a lack of discipline.

    17 JUDGE RIAD: Was there any means of bringing

    18 them to justice, to punish them, or were they just left

    19 to do what they like?

    20 A. I think there was a lack of accountability

    21 for their actions. In a professional army, a soldier

    22 knows he is accountable for his actions and if he does

    23 something wrong he will get punished for it, and that

    24 is clearly understood by the British army.

    25 However, if you don't enforce those rules,

  76. 1 then you will never have that level of discipline. I

    2 don't believe they had the resources or, the correct

    3 resources available to correctly discipline a large

    4 group of soldiers. That's on all sides.

    5 JUDGE RIAD: But was there a serious attempt

    6 to correct them or to keep them under, not to punish

    7 them but at least to have a follow-up of their, let's

    8 say, not crimes, but whatever illegal action they

    9 took? Any serious attempt by the commanders?

    10 A. There were incidents where certain thefts,

    11 say, for instance, a theft of an UNHCR vehicle would

    12 take place, where we would eventually get the vehicle

    13 back with the help of the local command, whether it be

    14 the HVO or the BH command.

    15 So there was help in trying to resolve some

    16 of these solutions, but I can't say whether or not

    17 these soldiers were reprimanded afterwards.

    18 JUDGE RIAD: You definitely said you have a

    19 good idea of what was happening. Was anybody punished

    20 or even reprimanded for burning houses, for certain

    21 acts which go beyond stealing or that sort of thing,

    22 crimes?

    23 A. Not that I'm aware of, that I can recount

    24 now. I'm sure there was some sort of discipline and

    25 some soldiers were reprimanded, but I can't give you

  77. 1 any specific examples that I know of.

    2 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much.

    3 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Judge Riad. Judge

    4 Shahabuddeen? He will ask you any questions he feels

    5 are appropriate.

    6 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Witness, I'm going to

    7 ask you what may well be a rhetorical question, and I

    8 anticipate your answer but I will ask it anyhow.

    9 You are not saying that there can be no

    10 command and control in an army unless the organisation

    11 of that army measures up to the standards of the

    12 British army?

    13 A. I'm not -- you're right. I'm not saying that

    14 just because they don't have the level of control as

    15 the British battalion in Vitez, that they have no

    16 command and control. There are lots of different

    17 levels.

    18 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Yes. As my colleague,

    19 Judge Riad, suggested, the British army is one of the

    20 best in the world; is that right?

    21 A. I would like to think so.

    22 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Still there are

    23 incidents of indiscipline and disobedience to orders,

    24 even in the British army?

    25 A. That's correct.

  78. 1 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Do you accept that the

    2 mere existence of incidents of disobedience and

    3 indiscipline does not, by itself, negate the existence

    4 of command and control?

    5 A. No, but if you see consistent incidences

    6 happening for a period of time and there's no

    7 improvement in the situation, then I believe there's a

    8 very low level of command and control.

    9 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Give me the benefit of

    10 your experience. The JNA of Yugoslavia was one of the

    11 most formidable armies in Europe, was it?

    12 A. I know it was quite a big army. It was

    13 well-equipped. It was based on Russian equipment,

    14 Russian tactics, Russian style, and the defence of

    15 Yugoslavia was very important. They had a large number

    16 of weapons factories spread all over the country, so

    17 they were self-sufficient in being able to produce all

    18 their own weapons. They weren't dependent on anyone

    19 else, so it was well-equipped.

    20 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Did you know, I take it

    21 you knew, that Colonel Blaskic and other HVO officers,

    22 not all but some, had come out of the JNA structure?

    23 A. I knew Colonel Blaskic was an ex-JNA officer,

    24 and I knew of several other officers who were ex-JNA,

    25 but I didn't know of that many.

  79. 1 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Would you say that it

    2 was your impression that he, himself, understood as

    3 well as you the concept of command and control?

    4 A. I should imagine he did. If he's an ex-JNA

    5 officer and having seen the reports that he sent, he

    6 would understand the concept, yes.

    7 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Would you say that he

    8 had that concept in mind when he wrote to the effect,

    9 that all units were operating satisfactorily? I do not

    10 now recall the exact words.

    11 A. To have a concept and to have an accurate

    12 reflection of what's actually happening are two

    13 completely different things.

    14 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Let me ask you about the

    15 cease-fire agreements. I think you said that you had

    16 to know which officers to broker cease-fire agreements

    17 with?

    18 A. That's correct.

    19 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Would you broker

    20 cease-fire agreements with an officer who, you knew,

    21 lacked command and control so as to be unable to

    22 implement the agreement?

    23 A. We would broker cease-fire equipment --

    24 sorry, cease-fire agreements with the highest ranking

    25 officers available who would come in order to broker

  80. 1 that agreement. So if it was involved in the Lasva

    2 Valley, it would be Colonel Blaskic, and on the Bosnian

    3 army side, it would be normally the commander of 3rd

    4 Corps. Whether or not we doubt their ability to then

    5 enforce that cease-fire agreement, it's somewhat out of

    6 our control. All we can do is initiate it and then try

    7 to help enforce it.

    8 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: You speak of their

    9 ability. May I ask you for your considered answer to

    10 this question: Were some of the frequent breakdowns in

    11 implementation of cease-fire agreements perhaps

    12 attributable to a lack of will on the part of the

    13 senior officer in command to implement the agreement in

    14 the first place?

    15 A. I don't think I could comment on that.

    16 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Okay. Now, I think you

    17 said, I should imagine -- you were speaking of Ahmici.

    18 You said, "I should imagine that the commander knew of

    19 the unit in that area. Whether or not he instructed

    20 them to attack Ahmici, I don't know." What commander

    21 were you referring to?

    22 A. I was referring that the HVO command in Vitez

    23 would know of all of the HVO units under their

    24 command.

    25 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Who would that be?

  81. 1 A. Well, Colonel Blaskic.

    2 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Yes. Now, from your

    3 experience as a military man, observing the situation

    4 on the ground, even from your collation centre, when

    5 would you say he first knew, putting aside the

    6 documentation you've seen, when would you say he first

    7 knew of the attack on Ahmici?

    8 A. I mean, that's a very difficult question to

    9 answer.

    10 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Then don't answer it.

    11 A. No, I mean, it's very hard for me to say.

    12 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: I wouldn't press you to

    13 answer.

    14 A. I mean, he knew that there was fighting going

    15 on because --

    16 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: How far is Ahmici from

    17 Vitez where, I think, his headquarters were?

    18 A. It's a couple of kilometres down the road.

    19 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: How many kilometres?

    20 A. Well, off the top of my head, I would say

    21 it's probably about three.


    23 A. But I would have to check a map or someone

    24 would have to check a map.

    25 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Do you believe or do you

  82. 1 not believe that he would have had means of acquainting

    2 himself with developments at Ahmici outside of an

    3 independent of the official report which he received

    4 later on?

    5 A. He could may have well got information from

    6 some soldiers on the ground who had been in the area or

    7 from people who were leaving that area, general

    8 information.

    9 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Tell me, what is

    10 real-time? I beg your pardon. Would you explain it a

    11 little for me?

    12 A. It means that you have constant radio contact

    13 with your subunits. You know exactly wherever they

    14 are, what they are doing, what their progress is. So

    15 if, at any one time, you were to ask for the status of

    16 a situation, for instance, ourselves, we would be able

    17 to tell the colonel exactly where every unit that was

    18 out on the ground was and what it was doing. So you

    19 have a very good accurate picture within the last five

    20 or ten minutes of what was going on.

    21 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: I see. It imports, in

    22 practical terms, immediacy of two-way communication,

    23 does it?

    24 A. Yes.

    25 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Is it your understanding

  83. 1 that without immediacy of two-way communication, there

    2 can be no command and control?

    3 A. If you have a non-static situation, yes.

    4 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Would that apply also,

    5 in your judgment as a military man, to the question of

    6 punishing infractions of military discipline

    7 subsequently?

    8 A. Again, yes, if they don't find out what's

    9 going on or what's gone wrong.

    10 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Suppose they find out

    11 two days afterwards or two weeks afterwards --

    12 A. Well, if there's been some improper action,

    13 then it's not too late to --

    14 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: It wouldn't be too late?

    15 A. No.

    16 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: So in that case,

    17 although there's no real-time two-way communication,

    18 the concept of command and control would not, in your

    19 judgment, apply to prevent the imposition of subsequent

    20 disciplinary action; is that right?

    21 A. You need real-time two-way communication in

    22 order to manage subunits on the ground. In order to

    23 punish soldiers or units who have committed something

    24 wrong, you do need to find out as quickly as possible,

    25 but if you find out several days later, you can still

  84. 1 carry out the necessary action.

    2 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Yes. What I would like

    3 the benefit of your views on is this: Should we then

    4 understand you to mean that command and control may

    5 have a variable content depending on the specific

    6 purpose in view. If the specific purpose is to wage

    7 war on the battlefield, command and control may have

    8 one meaning. If the purpose is different, could it

    9 have a different meaning?

    10 A. Yes.

    11 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Yes. Thank you,

    12 Witness.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Judge Shahabuddeen.

    14 Many questions have been asked by my colleagues which

    15 attracted my curiosity. I only have one question which

    16 has to do with the report that you received in which it

    17 says that the chain of command was functioning

    18 perfectly.

    19 What drew my attention was when the

    20 Prosecutor asked you whether that seemed normal to you

    21 in respect of your previous statements when you said

    22 that the chain of command did not function well, and

    23 then the Prosecutor asked you whether you considered it

    24 normal for people to say or for someone to say, when he

    25 is the commander of an Operative Zone in Central

  85. 1 Bosnia, to say to his superiors or to his superior that

    2 things are going pretty well, that the formations are

    3 going well, that everything is moving well. And you

    4 said that it was perfectly natural for a commander to

    5 say that everything was going just fine. It surprised

    6 me from a member of a professional army, I don't know

    7 how it works in the British army, but I was a bit

    8 surprised.

    9 So this is my question: What was the

    10 interest to the accused in saying to the commanding

    11 general at the headquarters in Mostar, to say that

    12 everything was going along just fine when, in your

    13 opinion, things were not going along well? What would

    14 be the reason for a high military personality with many

    15 responsibilities to say that everything is fine when,

    16 in the end, really nothing was going very well? I

    17 suppose that's a risk. If there was a military defeat,

    18 he would have to bear the consequences. If there were

    19 actions, he would be responsible for them.

    20 What would the interest be in his having said

    21 that, and do you believe that that's a very

    22 professional thing to have said?

    23 A. Well, obviously, if he is reporting to his

    24 commander something which I believe is inaccurate, then

    25 it is not professional, but I was referring, in my

  86. 1 statement, that I can understand in a less professional

    2 army where you have only certain lines of command and

    3 communication, where a statement like that could be

    4 made. He is the commander on the ground. He is

    5 responsible for that area. Things may not be as

    6 disciplined. He might not have the command and control

    7 that he believes, for instance, a unit -- you know,

    8 units not doing exactly what he is saying, but possibly

    9 he doesn't want to report back to his commander.

    10 I'm not sure of the motives for why that

    11 happened.

    12 JUDGE JORDA: You're not really answering my

    13 question. You said that it was natural at that level

    14 of responsibility for someone to say to his superior,

    15 "Everything is fine." My question was, what interest

    16 would he have in saying that everything was going well

    17 when, in fact, it seems to me that if I were in that

    18 kind of situation, I'm not a military man, but I would

    19 tell my superiors, "Be careful. Things are not going

    20 very well. I have no control over this army. I have

    21 no maneuverability. There are thugs and criminals

    22 here. I don't have resources to punish them. There

    23 are crimes being committed."

    24 Do you think that it's better to say

    25 everything is just fine? That's really rather

  87. 1 distressing for the headquarters because that's how

    2 very significant military errors are made.

    3 A. Absolutely. I mean, I can't really answer

    4 your question. I saw that report this morning. The

    5 report said that things were going well, that they were

    6 carrying out their orders. I disagree with that

    7 assessment from what I saw on the ground. Possibly, he

    8 felt he was responsible and, therefore, you know, he

    9 felt he should give that statement. It's quite hard,

    10 really, to answer. All I can recount is my experience

    11 from what I saw.

    12 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. What do you do

    13 now? You say you work in a bank?

    14 A. That's right.

    15 JUDGE JORDA: In what specific sector? Do

    16 you have a specialisation, if it isn't a professional

    17 secret that I'm asking you to reveal here?

    18 A. I work for an investment bank, and currently

    19 I'm working on a project in preparation for the Euro.

    20 Do you want me to expand on that? Sorry. As you know,

    21 the Euro currency --

    22 JUDGE JORDA: No, no, no, that's all right.

    23 In fact, the Tribunal would like to express its

    24 gratitude to you for having come to The Hague and for

    25 having taken you away from your work. We would like to

  88. 1 thank you.

    2 Before you are escorted out of the courtroom

    3 and we finish with today's work, I would like to thank

    4 the interpreters who have worked very hard today under

    5 somewhat difficult situations at times. Once again, we

    6 express all of our gratitude.

    7 Are we starting tomorrow at 10.00,

    8 Mr. Registrar?


    10 JUDGE JORDA: We are not meeting on Friday,

    11 so we will have all day tomorrow.

    12 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, just one note, and

    13 I just ask that Mr. Leyshon's statement, the signed

    14 statement, of which we don't have a copy be received in

    15 evidence. We haven't seen it with his notations on it,

    16 but if counsel can put it in evidence, that would be

    17 fine.

    18 MR. HAYMAN: I'll put the cover page in as an

    19 exhibit reflecting that they got it, Mr. President.

    20 Mr. Kehoe, I don't know what he's asking for, but he

    21 has no right to move other documents in. We haven't

    22 admitted other statements of witnesses. I object and I

    23 object to the fact that he attempted to cross-examine

    24 the witness with a statement that they wrongfully

    25 withheld from the Defence.

  89. 1 JUDGE JORDA: All right. The Judges are

    2 going to express themselves and make demands. Does

    3 that statement exist within the Office of the

    4 Prosecutor? Very simple question: Does it exist?

    5 Where does it come from? Who was it sent to? Who

    6 prepared it? We're going to use Rule 98.

    7 This statement was made to whom, Mr. Hayman?

    8 To whom was it made? To whom was the statement made?

    9 Please, to whom was it made?

    10 MR. HAYMAN: Mr. President, there was an

    11 interview apparently. The Office of the -- if you

    12 could back up the picture, please, so we can have the

    13 full picture in view on the monitor. Thank you. We

    14 need more, please. We need to see more, please. Could

    15 the technical booth back up?

    16 JUDGE JORDA: Who is Morriss? No, it's

    17 backwards now. Mr. Hayman, it's backwards. You're

    18 making things even more complicated. No, no, you've

    19 turned it upside down. Who is Dai Morriss?

    20 MR. KEHOE: Mr. Dai Morriss works in the

    21 Office of the Prosecutor as an analyst.

    22 MR. HAYMAN: There was an interview,

    23 Mr. President, with Mr. Cayley and the investigator.

    24 They typed up a statement. They faxed it to the

    25 witness. The witness corrected and changed the

  90. 1 statement. He faxed it back. If you move the page up,

    2 you'll see the handwritten -- up, please, up, up, no,

    3 yes, keep going, there you go. You'll see at the

    4 bottom of the page, "Dai, please fine enclosed, signed,

    5 thanks, Chris." That's the witness's notation, having

    6 executed and corrected the statement.

    7 Now, if you move the page down, please --

    8 JUDGE JORDA: So, theoretically, you have

    9 that statement, Mr. Kehoe?

    10 MR. KEHOE: I don't have this,

    11 Mr. President. That's what I'm saying to you. What I

    12 have and only have --

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Before we make any statements,

    14 you have to speak with Mr. Morriss to ask whether he

    15 has that statement or not. He should know what he's

    16 received and what he hasn't received.

    17 All right. We're going to postpone our

    18 decision until later on.

    19 Mr. Hayman?

    20 MR. HAYMAN: Just to note, Mr. President, the

    21 top of the page is the fax confirmation line, the fax

    22 confirmation line from the witness's place of

    23 employment --

    24 JUDGE JORDA: Who's fax is this?

    25 MR. HAYMAN: This is going to 31-70-415-5300,

  91. 1 a fax number in the Office of the Tribunal Prosecutor.

    2 And the date, you'll see on the top, is the 3rd of

    3 June. That's when the witness returned the statement.

    4 The date it was first sent to the witness is the 26th

    5 of March, 1996, reflected by the notation written by

    6 the Tribunal investigator on the face page.

    7 MR. KEHOE: My point is simple,

    8 Mr. President: I do not have this document.

    9 Mr. Harmon doesn't have this document. Mr. Cayley

    10 doesn't have this document. What we simply have --

    11 excuse me, Counsel. What we simply have is something

    12 that's marked on the bottom "draft." That's the only

    13 document that we have.

    14 Now, if Mr. Hayman has a signed copy that

    15 Mr. Leyshon has approved of, sight unseen, all I'm

    16 asking is, and the Court now has it, all I'm asking is

    17 that that particular statement that Mr. Leyshon has

    18 signed be received in evidence. That's all.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: All right. I suggest that we

    20 speak about it with the witness not being here. You

    21 will ask Mr. Morriss what he received and what was

    22 corrected. After that, we will make our ruling, but

    23 that will be another day.

    24 We will simply ask Mr. Hayman whether he has

    25 a signed statement from the witness. You continue to

  92. 1 say that the signed statement was received by the

    2 Office of the Prosecutor. That's what you're saying,

    3 is it not?

    4 MR. HAYMAN: Here's what he faxed to the

    5 Office of the Tribunal Prosecutor, Mr. President. He

    6 signed it. They got it. They put him on their witness

    7 list, and they didn't give us the statement. And now

    8 you've heard the testimony.

    9 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, I don't know how

    10 simply I can put it. I wish I had the statement. I

    11 have a draft statement. I haven't seen the signed

    12 statement. I am asking, sight unseen, for Mr. Hayman

    13 to take this copy of this statement and give it to Your

    14 Honours as evidence. That's all. I haven't seen the

    15 signed copy. I wish I had.

    16 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, do you want us to

    17 go back to this incident at another time and ask

    18 Mr. Kehoe to conduct an investigation to find out

    19 whether we have it or not, or can you talk about a

    20 sense of collegiality and say that you are prepared to

    21 give the statement to the Office of the Prosecutor?

    22 You don't have to. If you say no, well, then we will

    23 ask the Prosecutor to speak with Mr. Morriss and ask

    24 him whether he, at some point, did not receive that

    25 statement. You can answer me tomorrow morning.

  93. 1 MR. HAYMAN: I can answer now,

    2 Mr. President. We gave the statement to the Court.

    3 It's under seal. We're not afraid of this statement.

    4 We are confidant and proud, quite frankly, that this

    5 witness came in and gave the candid and honest

    6 testimony that he did, but having withheld the

    7 statement from us, I am not going to voluntarily give

    8 this statement to the Office of the Tribunal

    9 Prosecutor. That would be, my goodness, to reward what

    10 has occurred here.

    11 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, I thought that

    12 this was a search for the truth, and if he is not

    13 afraid of the truth, what's the problem with putting in

    14 his evidence?

    15 MR. HAYMAN: Where is the sanction, Mr.

    16 President, when they violate the discovery rules and

    17 they put a witness's name on their witness list and

    18 they don't give us the witness statement? Where is the

    19 sanction? We shouldn't be rewarding them. They should

    20 be punished.

    21 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. It's very simple.

    22 You said that the Trial Chamber has that document. Is

    23 that what you're saying, Mr. Hayman?

    24 MR. HAYMAN: You do. You have it. It was

    25 filed under seal.

  94. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Registrar, does the

    2 Registry have that statement under seal?

    3 THE REGISTRAR: I suppose so.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: All right. You will check on

    5 that. The Judges will take the definitive decision in

    6 the trial. The Judges have the statement. The

    7 questioning of the witness has been completed. The

    8 discussion is over. We will resume tomorrow at 10.00.

    9 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

    10 5.52 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday,

    11 the 19th day of November, 1998 at

    12 10.00 a.m.