1. 1 Friday, 28th May, 1999

    2 (Open session)

    3 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Please be seated.

    5 Mr. Registrar, have the witness brought in, please.

    6 (The accused/witness entered court)

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Nobilo -- first of all, I

    8 would like to say good morning to the interpreters, to

    9 Defence and Prosecution counsel, good morning to the

    10 witness, General Blaskic, who is testifying today as

    11 well.

    12 Mr. Nobilo, you may begin to exercise your

    13 right to redirect after the cross-examination which was

    14 conducted by the Prosecutor. Please proceed.

    15 MR. NOBILO: Thank you, Mr. President.


    17 Re-examined by Mr. Nobilo:

    18 MR. NOBILO: Yesterday we finished with

    19 Prosecutor's Exhibit 38, which is actually Narodni List

    20 or, rather, a decree that regulates disciplinary

    21 proceedings in the Croatian Defence Council, and now we

    22 would like to discuss Article 67.

    23 In order to be sure that this is properly

    24 translated into all three languages, because I believe

    25 this Article to be of key importance for understanding

  2. 1 the responsibility of General Blaskic in proceedings, I

    2 shall read this, with your permission, very slowly,

    3 very clearly, so that every word can be understood.

    4 We are going to put the French version on the

    5 ELMO. Perhaps it has not been properly translated

    6 because obviously my colleague, Mr. Hayman, and I do

    7 not know French well enough. After that, I am going to

    8 put my questions.

    9 THE INTERPRETER: Can the interpreters please

    10 receive copies in other languages?

    11 MR. NOBILO: We shall try to give the

    12 interpreters the English text at least.

    13 So we have the French and the English texts

    14 on the ELMO. In addition to that, I'll be reading it

    15 out in Croat. So I am reading Article 67 of the

    16 disciplinary Rules of Procedure:

    17 "The commander of the operative zone - for

    18 non-commissioned officers and officers up to the rank

    19 of brigadier serving in units or institutions which are

    20 subordinate to the operative zone commander --"

    21 JUDGE JORDA: Could we have a very precise

    22 translation? You are repeating the word which in

    23 French is said "qui en relevent" it says in French.

    24 Could we have -- it's important. We have to be very

    25 careful about that expression, "qui en relevent." Is

  3. 1 it "subordinate" or "falling under the jurisdiction

    2 of"? What is the term in Serbo-Croatian that's used?

    3 Could you repeat the Serbo-Croatian term, and I'll ask

    4 that it be interpreted?

    5 MR. NOBILO: It is about units that are

    6 subordinate, "subordinate" in English, to the commander

    7 of the Operative Zone.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you.

    9 MR. NOBILO: So I am reading once again.

    10 "The commander of the operative zone - for

    11 non-commissioned officers and officers up to the rank

    12 of brigadier serving in units or institutions which are

    13 subordinate to the operative zone commander, and

    14 non-commissioned officers and officers up to the rank

    15 of colonel," of brigadier, "serving in administrative

    16 agencies and enterprises, and other legal entities

    17 within the area under the authority of the operative

    18 zone commander."

    19 JUDGE JORDA: And the second term "for the

    20 administrative organs and the companies and other

    21 persons," "se trouvent," "who are," what does that

    22 mean, "se trouvent," "who are"? It's not that they are

    23 under the authority of or subordinate to but that they

    24 are; in French "se trouvent," "are."

    25 MR. NOBILO: Yes, but these are not units,

  4. 1 these are institutions, enterprises, and we are going

    2 to explain that now. We have two principles, the

    3 territorial and the personal. The personal is related

    4 to units and the territorial is related to enterprises

    5 and institutions.

    6 However, now I would like to put a question

    7 to General Blaskic.

    8 Q. Yesterday that Article was read to you at

    9 light speed. Please tell the Court, while you were

    10 commander of the Operative Zone, how did you interpret

    11 your powers on the basis of Article 67? When I say

    12 "powers," I'm talking about disciplinary proceedings.

    13 A. My interpretation was that I was in charge of

    14 units or, rather, officers and non-commissioned

    15 officers from units that are directly subordinate to me

    16 in the Operative Zone of Central Bosnia.

    17 Q. Tell me, in this Article, what are the two

    18 principles upon which your authority is based?

    19 A. It is based on the principle of

    20 subordination, that is to say, subordinate and

    21 superior, in respect of units and the territorial

    22 principle vis-à-vis institutions, vis-à-vis military

    23 enterprises and legal entities. For example, military

    24 enterprises, factories.

    25 Q. Now we are going to elaborate the territorial

  5. 1 principle, that is to say, those entities over which

    2 you have disciplinary authority only because they are

    3 within your area.

    4 Tell the Court, what could this

    5 administration, military administration, be?

    6 A. It can be the administration for health, the

    7 administration for construction, civil engineering, and

    8 other administrations that may be in the Operative

    9 Zone, or parts of these administrations, perhaps.

    10 Q. Another entity that was subordinate to you,

    11 according to the territorial principle, in terms of

    12 disciplinary authority, are enterprises. What would

    13 that be?

    14 A. Those would be military enterprises. There

    15 were some in that area, military enterprises like, I

    16 don't know, the military factory of explosives, of

    17 weapons, the depots, et cetera.

    18 Q. And this term, "other legal entities," what

    19 would that actually mean? Could you give us an

    20 example?

    21 A. These could be different military institutes,

    22 schooling institutions, military, universities,

    23 academies, schools, et cetera.

    24 Q. All of those were subordinate to you,

    25 according to the territorial principle, only because

  6. 1 they are in the Operative Zone. And now I'm asking you

    2 the following: Which units were subordinate to you and

    3 how do you interpret the expression saying that you are

    4 in charge of disciplinary proceedings against officers

    5 that are in units which are subordinate to the

    6 Operative Zone commander?

    7 A. Units that were within the structure of the

    8 Operative Zone of Central Bosnia were subordinate to

    9 me, and that is how I interpret that principle, that I

    10 had authority only over these directly subordinate

    11 units.

    12 Q. Tell me, in the JNA, where there was the

    13 principle of unity of command, when the commander

    14 commands all who are within his area, could this kind

    15 of a text have existed in the disciplinary rules of the

    16 JNA or was it at all?

    17 A. At any rate, in the JNA, the basic principle

    18 was the principle of the unity of command and the unity

    19 of responsibility. This was a fundamental principle

    20 upon which the disciplinary rules were based, and all

    21 military formations that would be in the zone of

    22 responsibility of the commander were directly

    23 subordinate to him.

    24 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Nobilo, in respect of

    25 translation problems, could we be sure that 52.2 is

  7. 1 properly translated, which seems somewhat different to

    2 me? Article 52.2 of that same regulation which deals

    3 with the problems of the military -- deals with the

    4 problems of the military tribunal and uses terms which

    5 are somewhat different. Do you see where I am? I want

    6 to also show it to my colleagues. I'll show it to

    7 Judge Rodrigues here. I would like you to put 52.2 on

    8 the ELMO.

    9 MR. NOBILO: Very well.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Does everybody see where we

    11 are? Does the Prosecutor see where we are? 52.2?

    12 Mr. Nobilo, could you read that for us,

    13 please, and I'll ask the interpreters to be very

    14 careful and to look at the text on the screen.

    15 MR. NOBILO: There is an ambiguity here, and

    16 we have to be very careful about this.

    17 This is the authority of the disciplinary

    18 court, the authority of the disciplinary court, Article

    19 52, paragraph 2:

    20 "Operative zone military disciplinary courts

    21 shall try non-commissioned officers and officers up to

    22 the rank of brigadier in units or institutions that are

    23 subordinate to the operative zone commander or are in

    24 units or institutions within the area under the

    25 operative zone commander's authority, as well as

  8. 1 non-commissioned officers and officers up to the rank

    2 of brigadier serving in the administrative bodies of

    3 enterprises and other legal entities."

    4 Mr. President, I don't know how the term

    5 within the authority --

    6 JUDGE JORDA: In French, it says, "ressort,"

    7 R-E-S-S-O-R-T.

    8 MR. NOBILO: That is the problem. The words

    9 "in the area under the authority of" does not

    10 necessarily mean territory. It means part of the

    11 authority. It is ambiguous. It can refer to

    12 territory, but it can also refer to part of the scope

    13 of his authority.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: The problem is not one of

    15 taking sides. The Judges don't take sides. I'm simply

    16 pointing out that in this text, which refers to the

    17 command responsibility under the angle of the military

    18 tribunal, what is interesting is to see that we have a

    19 first level of subordination which is found exactly the

    20 same way under 52.2 and 67.2, we have the level of

    21 enterprises and other legal entities, like in 67.2, but

    22 the precision which is different is that you have the

    23 units or establishments in the sector of the operative

    24 zone commander. I'm not taking sides. That's not my

    25 role. I'm simply here to listen, and I'm asking you

  9. 1 only for information about what you're questioning the

    2 General on, the General who has a legal specialist with

    3 him. I would like to know that when you put those two

    4 articles together, didn't it provide enough ambiguity

    5 in respect of interpretation that it would not require

    6 that the high command would have a very specific

    7 definition of his command?

    8 It's very important for all of us to be clear

    9 on this point, because here, there is a definition

    10 which is additional to what is provided in 67.2, and

    11 they're not talking about explosive factories or

    12 military schools, and they are not speaking about

    13 units, and here, I think we agree, that are

    14 subordinate. We still have to know what is meant by

    15 "subordinate." "Subordinate" means under the orders

    16 of. But here there is an addition. There are units

    17 within the sector, and that's why I would like you to

    18 ask the witness questions about that.

    19 I think that Judge Rodrigues also would have

    20 a question. Perhaps counsel could answer first.

    21 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Mr. Nobilo, I would like to

    22 ask another question. I would like to know what are

    23 the authorities, the competencies of the prosecutor in

    24 the military tribunal, and by that, I mean if the

    25 prosecutor only issued indictments or if he had

  10. 1 authority or jurisdiction over carrying out

    2 investigations as well?

    3 MR. NOBILO: Your Honour, these are

    4 disciplinary proceedings, and the prosecutor does have

    5 the authority to investigate, just as the officer does,

    6 but in disciplinary proceedings -- however, before we

    7 move further on, I would like to seek the advice of the

    8 interpreters, perhaps.

    9 It is being said here "the sector of

    10 authority." "Sector" implies territory, whereas "area

    11 of authority" in Croat does not necessarily imply

    12 territory. Because had they thought territory, they

    13 would have said "the area" or "the territory" over

    14 which the commander has authority. So the word

    15 "territory" itself would have been used, the area in

    16 which he has responsibility. But here "area," it is

    17 realm, it is ambiguous, because the definition is not

    18 precise.

    19 Q. However, I would like to go back to Article

    20 67, and I wish to ask you the following, General: If

    21 you are told that you are the superior officer in the

    22 Operative Zone to the units that are subordinate to

    23 you, does that mean that in the Operative Zone, there

    24 are units whose superior officer you are not? How do

    25 you interpret that?

  11. 1 A. Yes. Certainly, in every operative zone of

    2 the HVO, there were units that were not directly

    3 subordinate to the commander of the operative zone. So

    4 such units did exist, and I did not have authority over

    5 such units in military disciplinary proceedings.

    6 Q. Let us disregard the factual situation for a

    7 moment, and let us concentrate on Article 67. When you

    8 are told -- we're talking about you -- when you, the

    9 commander of the Operative Zone, have authority over

    10 subordinate units, how do you interpret that in

    11 relation to units that are attached to you?

    12 A. Such authority was not given to me over units

    13 that were attached, because had the legislator wished

    14 to give such authority, then he would, proceeding from

    15 the principle of the unity of command which did not

    16 exist in the HVO, he would have defined my authority

    17 according to territorial principle.

    18 However, it is precisely because of the

    19 existence of units that were not directly subordinate

    20 to the commander, there are these two principles: the

    21 principle of subordination and the principle of

    22 territorial authority over institutions, enterprises,

    23 and legal entities.

    24 Q. Let us be specific. In the sense of Article

    25 67, were the units of the military police and the

  12. 1 special purpose unit, Vitezovi, subordinate to you, and

    2 were you in charge of military disciplinary proceedings

    3 in that respect?

    4 A. No.

    5 Q. Now we are going to move on to something

    6 else. General, Witness G, on page 3855, mentioned that

    7 in Ahmici, in addition to the Jokeri, there were also

    8 the Vitezovi and HVO units. What is your knowledge

    9 about this? Which units were there? Where were the

    10 Vitezovi, to the best of your knowledge, and where were

    11 the HVO units?

    12 A. According to the report that I received and

    13 the reports which I received in the area and sector of

    14 Ahmici, the 4th Battalion of the military police was

    15 present. The Vitezovi, the Vitezovi unit, had a very

    16 precise assignment, to block and protect the hotel from

    17 the direction of Stari Vitez and to prevent an attack

    18 by the BH army. Part of the units, that is to say, the

    19 forces of the Vitez Brigade also had precise

    20 assignments, to set up a blockade of the axes of attack

    21 by the BH army south of Ahmici, south of the main road

    22 running from Vitez to Busovaca, and it did not perform

    23 mobilisation, nor did it perform any assignments in the

    24 Ahmici sector.

    25 Also, from document 250, it can be seen that

  13. 1 the Vitezovi arbitrarily performed the action of the

    2 attack on the petrol pump, and they took over the Kalen

    3 petrol pump later on, in fact. But the unit had a

    4 precisely defined assignment, and according to the

    5 reports that I received, it was located in front of the

    6 hotel, that is to say, between the hotel and Stari

    7 Vitez.

    8 Q. In document 691, it states that a soldier,

    9 who was not a member of the military police, was

    10 wounded on the 16th of April somewhere in Santici, that

    11 is to say, near Ahmici. What are your comments to

    12 that?

    13 A. I have already stated that the Vitez Brigade

    14 had precisely defined assignments south of the road,

    15 that is to say, south of Ahmici. Ahmici is to the

    16 north of the road, and I believe that it was a question

    17 of a non-mobilised soldier of the Vitez Brigade who

    18 happened to find himself that morning in the direct

    19 vicinity of his house and who was wounded, and

    20 confirmation about this wounding he received in order

    21 to be able to regulate his invalidity status and other

    22 benefits that he would accrue from that.

    23 Q. Just one sentence, please, linked to document

    24 693, 694. In the spring of 1993, did the home guard

    25 units, the Domobrani, exist in the Central Bosnia --

  14. 1 A. No, the home guard units did not exist.

    2 Q. Was there a corps of command or did you have

    3 an assistant for the home guards?

    4 A. Yes, we were in a stage where we had

    5 determined and appointed commanders for the home guard

    6 units and in the process of establishing the home guard

    7 units, but the war with the BH army, in the spring of

    8 1993, stopped us in this process, and we were not able

    9 to implement that project, that is to say, we never

    10 actually organised and formed the home guard units.

    11 Q. On several occasions in this Tribunal, from

    12 various witnesses, an individual named Miroslav Bralo,

    13 "Cicko," was mentioned. What do you know about him?

    14 A. I knew that he was a killer who had committed

    15 a crime by killing his next-door neighbour, a Bosniak

    16 Muslim, and afterwards he placed an explosive and the

    17 body in his house and activated the explosive and blew

    18 everything up. He was a pathologically disturbed

    19 individual with maniacal characteristics in his

    20 behaviour.

    21 And I know that after that act and as a

    22 decision by the military district court, following a

    23 decision by the military district court, he was placed

    24 in the military district prison and locked up, he was

    25 imprisoned, and at the insistence of myself and the

  15. 1 involvement of Ante Sliskovic, the SIS security

    2 assistant, he was imprisoned in the military district

    3 prison.

    4 Q. According to the best of your knowledge,

    5 where was he when the crime in Ahmici took place?

    6 A. He would have had to have been in the

    7 military district prison of Kaonik, imprisoned there,

    8 locked up there, in the pre-trial proceedings

    9 undertaken by the military district prosecutor, the

    10 military district court in Travnik.

    11 Q. Who set him free and what importance does

    12 this have? What do you think about that today?

    13 A. I said here in this -- I heard in this

    14 Tribunal from the Prosecution witnesses that he was in

    15 Ahmici on the 16th of April. I do not know who set him

    16 free, but at all events, the individual who is behind

    17 his freeing quite certainly is behind what happened in

    18 Ahmici.

    19 Q. In the time after Ahmici --

    20 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Excuse me, Mr. Nobilo, for

    21 interrupting you. I heard a reference made to the

    22 Domobrani. Excuse me for going back to that. But I

    23 hadn't seen -- I didn't see the expression in the

    24 transcript, I only saw "home guards," but not the words

    25 "Domobrani." I would like to be sure that the witness

  16. 1 is saying that in the Operative Zone of Central Bosnia,

    2 there were no Domobrani. I would like to be clear

    3 about that issue because I have the idea that at least

    4 in the Busovaca region, they were there. So I would

    5 like to be sure about that.

    6 A. Your Honour, we did try to establish the

    7 Domobran units.

    8 THE INTERPRETER: "Domobran," the

    9 interpretation in English is "home guards."

    10 A. And we had determined the commanders for the

    11 home guard units but we never implemented the project,

    12 we did not form home guard units in the Operative Zone

    13 because the war broke out, the war with the BH army in

    14 April '93.

    15 JUDGE RODRIGUES: But at least de facto did

    16 they exist or did they not exist within your region?

    17 A. Your Honour, at the end of 1994 sometime, we

    18 did establish them. There were home guard regiments.

    19 But before that, that is to say, in April and in the

    20 spring of 1993, we had not established them yet.

    21 JUDGE RODRIGUES: In particular, did they or

    22 did they not exist in the Kaonik prison?

    23 A. In the Kaonik prison?


    25 A. I do not have data of that kind. As far as I

  17. 1 know, they did not exist.

    2 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Thank you very much.

    3 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Judge Rodrigues.

    4 MR. NOBILO: Perhaps we could clarify

    5 something.

    6 Q. Amongst the people, the members of the

    7 Busovaca Brigade who were not professionals, did they

    8 perhaps call them the Domobrani? So not the official

    9 term.

    10 A. Well, not only in Busovaca, they called them

    11 that everywhere, and it is the local term for soldiers,

    12 Croats, and it is a traditional term, the Domobrani, a

    13 traditional name.

    14 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter notes English

    15 translation, "home guards."

    16 A. So that is what they were called. But the

    17 military unit of the home guards did not exist up until

    18 sometime in 1994. Later on, in Busovaca, there was the

    19 home guard regiment. But the people used to call them

    20 the Domobrani, particularly the elderly people from 50

    21 to 65 years of age. That was the term generally used.

    22 Q. Let us return to Ahmici. The Prosecutor, on

    23 several occasions, said more or less the following,

    24 that everybody knew that what had happened -- everybody

    25 knew about what had happened in Ahmici except you, and

  18. 1 he quoted an example for this. What do you say to

    2 that?

    3 A. As far as Ahmici is concerned, with regard to

    4 combat activities between the BH army and the battalion

    5 of the military police, I learnt about that on the 16th

    6 of April, 1993, at 11.42. However, today, when we talk

    7 about Ahmici, they have become a synonym for crime; and

    8 at the time, that is, on the 16th, 17th, 18th, and 19th

    9 of April, that was not the case. At that time, Ahmici

    10 was a synonym for the victory of the members of the HVO

    11 over the members of the BH army.

    12 Q. At that time, was anything known about the

    13 crime, on the 17th and 18th?

    14 A. No, and we could see from some evidence put

    15 forward by the Prosecutor, I think they were

    16 videotapes, although I don't know whether the videotape

    17 was ever shown on local television, that it spoke about

    18 a military victory of the HVO over the BH army and that

    19 not a single word is mentioned about a crime.

    20 Q. Apart from that television footage, the

    21 Prosecutor mentioned several other events or

    22 individuals as, by way of an example, of people who

    23 knew something about Ahmici and you did not know. How

    24 do you view that?

    25 A. Mention was made that Mr. Valenta knew about

  19. 1 Ahmici. I believe that Mr. Valenta did know about the

    2 fighting going on there because what was quoted was two

    3 days after Ahmici. I learnt about the fighting in

    4 Ahmici two days before Mr. Valenta.

    5 Q. Did Valenta mention a crime in his quotation?

    6 A. No, I never heard at any point that Valenta

    7 mentioned a crime.

    8 Q. A European Monitoring Mission report was

    9 mentioned. What do you have to say to that?

    10 A. I believe that the European Monitors at that

    11 time were in the region of Ahmici under the protection

    12 of their Warriors, the BritBat, and they arrived at

    13 certain knowledge concerning a burnt corpse, a burnt

    14 body, and I think several facilities as well, but they

    15 did not share that information with me, that is to say,

    16 I did not receive information of that kind from them.

    17 Q. Reading UNPROFOR's reports, the milinfosum

    18 for the 16th of April, 1993, where mention is made of

    19 the casualties in Ahmici.

    20 A. Yes, UNPROFOR had its patrols with its

    21 armoured vehicles, known as the Warriors, and their

    22 mobile communication devices, and this was deployed in

    23 Ahmici, and they sent their operative centre, at their

    24 base in Nova Bila, information about the events in

    25 Ahmici. However, that information was not sent to me,

  20. 1 and to the best of my recollection, Colonel Stewart

    2 made a statement for the press and said that he learned

    3 about Ahmici after being warned by the soldiers of the

    4 BH army and after he had gone to the Ahmici area on the

    5 21st or around the 22nd of April when he sent me the

    6 letter.

    7 Q. Colonel Stewart's letter, was that the first

    8 news that you received from UNPROFOR related to Ahmici?

    9 A. That letter was the first news that was

    10 concrete news and clear news and informed me that a

    11 tragedy had taken place and that a war crime had taken

    12 place in Ahmici.

    13 Q. How can you, and can you at all, explain the

    14 fact that UNPROFOR, for six days or for five days, hid

    15 information about the crime in this way? How can you

    16 explain that? Can you explain that?

    17 A. It is difficult for me to find an explanation

    18 for that action because there was a lot of fighting at

    19 about 22 positions, in fact, because they were combat

    20 activities in built-up areas. There were a large

    21 number of casualties. But I don't know why, on the

    22 16th, they did not share their information with me.

    23 Q. We heard mention of the Bosniak president of

    24 the Muslim wartime presidency of Vitez, that is to say,

    25 the highest power and authority of the Bosniaks in

  21. 1 Vitez, Dr. Mujezimovic, and his information and

    2 knowledge. Can you comment on that?

    3 A. Dr. Mujezimovic was the president of the

    4 wartime presidency, that is to say, he was the top

    5 military and political organ of power and authority in

    6 the Vitez area for the Bosniak Muslims, and in a direct

    7 conversation with his medical staff, nurses, living in

    8 the region of Ahmici, he learnt on the 19th of April

    9 about the crime in Ahmici. Therefore, it is obvious

    10 that he too learnt about this thanks to the fact that

    11 he was in direct communication with the inhabitants of

    12 Ahmici.

    13 Q. Finally, on that same day, the 19th of April,

    14 the Prosecutor quoted a statement by Dr. Mujezimovic on

    15 page 1706 where Cerkez and two or three members of his

    16 command mentioned Ahmici. May we have your comments on

    17 that?

    18 A. Well, from that particular comment, we can

    19 see that Cerkez was not speaking about the crime in

    20 Ahmici but he was speaking about the fighting that had

    21 taken place in Ahmici, and I've already said that

    22 Ahmici at that time was synonymous with military

    23 victory over the BH army and not a synonym of crime as

    24 has become the case today or later on when the whole

    25 thing was uncovered.

  22. 1 Q. Can you tell us when you received the first

    2 information about some civilian casualties in the Vitez

    3 municipality and what were your reactions to that,

    4 please?

    5 A. I received this information, the first

    6 information that I received, that is to say, on the

    7 16th of April, 1993, from the representative of the

    8 negotiating delegation, Mr. Prskalo and Bilicic, who

    9 had returned from negotiations from the UNPROFOR base,

    10 at the UNPROFOR base; and already, in the course of the

    11 night, sometime around 0400 hours on the 17th of April,

    12 issued an order in which I clearly defined and stated

    13 that civilians must be protected and that any use of

    14 force towards civilians was a crime, and I particularly

    15 underlined that and underscored it in my order.

    16 I also issued an order on the 18th of April

    17 linked to the protection and safety of civilians and

    18 also on the 21st of April along with the demand that

    19 these orders be acknowledged by signatures of the

    20 individual commanders, the commanders of brigades, and

    21 that the commanders of the brigades should inform me

    22 thereof. I endeavoured to ensure a dual chain so as to

    23 be absolutely sure and certain that these orders would

    24 be conveyed down the chain of command.

    25 Q. The next information that associated you in

  23. 1 your mind to a location around Ahmici was the

    2 information you received from Dzemo Merdan on the 20th

    3 of April from Zenica. Can you tell us, please, how you

    4 understood this information and what you undertook?

    5 A. It was a meeting in Zenica on the 20th of

    6 April, 1993, and in a heated atmosphere, when everybody

    7 took the floor when they saw fit at the meeting, Dzemo

    8 Merdan made his statement, also in a heated fashion,

    9 and I suggested that a joint commission be engaged to

    10 determine and ascertain the facts with regard to his

    11 allegations.

    12 When I received this information, I made a

    13 note of it, and once I returned to my headquarters, I

    14 issued a demand that all reports from the terrain

    15 should be collected, and once I was informed that none

    16 of the reports went to support that claim and when I

    17 became conscious of the fact that the representatives

    18 of the BH army, the top representatives at the meeting

    19 in Zenica, had immediately passed over that allegation,

    20 I then came to understand that it was not a serious

    21 allegation but that, quite simply, in a heated

    22 discussion of that kind, it was probably something that

    23 was stated to improve the negotiating powers of the

    24 moment, positions of the moment.

    25 Q. What about Bob Stewart? When you learned

  24. 1 about Ahmici from Bob Stewart and you sent him the

    2 emotional letter that you sent him requesting that a

    3 joint commission work together, tell us, please, what

    4 were your priorities in a situation of that kind? What

    5 did you think was the most important thing? The crime

    6 had occurred. "Now what shall I do?" What were your

    7 thoughts along those lines?

    8 A. I sent the letter to Bob Stewart requesting a

    9 joint commission and also requesting a meeting of the

    10 top representatives of the army and the HVO. On the

    11 occasion, I did believe that the absolute priority was

    12 to ensure a cease-fire, that is to say, to halt the

    13 hostilities between the BH army and the HVO and, if

    14 possible, to have a separation of forces, to prevent a

    15 repetition of the Ahmici crime, and to undertake a full

    16 and complete investigation into the crime.

    17 Q. To prevent a new crime and the speed of an

    18 investigation, what would you say came foremost, the

    19 way in which you thought at the time?

    20 A. The absolute priority, of course, was to

    21 prevent a fresh evil and a new crime. That was the

    22 absolute priority.

    23 Q. The Prosecutor, on several occasions, asked

    24 you, "Why did you not call Pasko Ljubicic in his office

    25 and ask him what had happened?" Can you tell us, can

  25. 1 you tell the Trial Chamber, if you go back in time to

    2 the situation you were in then, why did you not do

    3 that?

    4 A. I did not do that because none of his reports

    5 even intimated the crime that had taken place in

    6 Ahmici, and I had to protect the investigation into the

    7 crime, first and foremost. It was not a disciplinary

    8 error or offence which would demand a discussion with

    9 him to criticise him or to give him any suggestions.

    10 What we had before us was a very serious and grievous

    11 crime, and everything had to be done to protect the

    12 investigation into that crime.

    13 Q. How did you understand, methodologically

    14 speaking, this matter? When do you talk to a suspect,

    15 at the beginning of an investigation or at the end of

    16 an investigation? What do you think about police or

    17 investigative methodology?

    18 A. I never attended courses on the subject, and

    19 I am not professionally trained to conduct an

    20 investigation, but I considered it necessary, first of

    21 all, to collect facts and evidence, and only then, once

    22 that had been done, to confront the suspects with this

    23 evidence and these facts.

    24 Q. Why did you not undertake an investigation

    25 yourself? Why did you not interview people and

  26. 1 investigate generally? Why?

    2 A. First of all, I endeavoured, as commander of

    3 the Operative Zone, the position I held, to work within

    4 the system. I was not a professional nor was I trained

    5 during my years of schooling in matters of

    6 investigation and conducting investigations, and I

    7 considered that it was my duty to ensure that the

    8 system functioned properly, and that means that the

    9 investigation be conducted by the competent authorities

    10 and by the trained and professional authorities in that

    11 sphere, and that was the security service.

    12 Q. Tell us, please, from the time the crime in

    13 Ahmici occurred on the 16th up until the beginning of

    14 the investigation, somewhere around the 24th, eight

    15 days had elapsed. Do you consider that this passage of

    16 time, some eight, ten, fifteen days, had any vital

    17 effect or could have had a vital effect on the quality

    18 of the investigation? How do you view that problem,

    19 the problem of the passage of time?

    20 A. I personally think that that problem of the

    21 passage of time did not have any significant reflection

    22 on the quality of the investigation, particularly if we

    23 keep in mind the situation that we were in at the

    24 time.

    25 First of all, data was collected about the

  27. 1 corpses, and there was a medical investigation with a

    2 description of the causes of death. The homes that

    3 were burned more or less remained in that area, and I

    4 think that the most important part of the investigation

    5 was to collect personal evidence, i.e., to carry out

    6 interviews with the suspects and to find out who

    7 commanded, planned, and committed the crime. These

    8 were the most important questions, as far as I

    9 understand.

    10 Q. Why did you choose SIS, the Security and

    11 Information Service, to conduct an investigation on

    12 Ahmici?

    13 A. By law, its authority was the only authorised

    14 body to conduct an investigation of the members of the

    15 military police. So it was the only service that had

    16 such authority and that had the expertise and the

    17 capability to conduct such an investigation. I could

    18 not request the military police to conduct an

    19 investigation of itself.

    20 Q. You stated that your absolute priority after

    21 Ahmici was to prevent a new crime from taking place.

    22 We won't be producing any documents, but can you

    23 remember what you did in the days of the 22nd of April

    24 and on, after you found out about the crime in Ahmici

    25 from Colonel Stewart?

  28. 1 A. I issued a series of orders which I tried to

    2 implement on the ground, and I will cite just a number

    3 of those orders. These are Defence Exhibits 318, 334,

    4 336, 338, 353, 361, 362, 364, 365, 366, 370, 374, and

    5 376.

    6 I also said at a press conference, I

    7 condemned the crime, and I think that this had an

    8 exceptional influence on public opinion, all the more

    9 so because that condemnation of mine reached each home

    10 and each family in the Lasva pocket through the local

    11 media. I also asked representatives of international

    12 humanitarian organisations, representatives of the Red

    13 Cross, the UNHCR, to clarify their mandate and to

    14 address, through the local television, the people and

    15 the refugees who were living in that area so that they

    16 could also have an effect, at least to alleviate the

    17 hatred that was present amongst the refugees which made

    18 the situation more difficult and more complex.

    19 Personally, also at meetings with commanders

    20 of the brigades, I checked and tried to make sure that

    21 each order reached each soldier on the ground.

    22 Q. We talked a lot about document 456/58, and

    23 this is the order that you sent to Colonel Stewart at

    24 the general staff and to the head of the Croatian

    25 Community of Herceg-Bosna. We will not look at this

  29. 1 document, but could you just please define what this

    2 document represents? How do you define it? What is

    3 that supposed to represent?

    4 A. The document is called "Information about the

    5 meeting with Colonel Bob Stewart," and I would dispatch

    6 information about meetings to my superiors, as well as

    7 this information, and I would usually state what I got

    8 from the participants at the meeting, what I stated,

    9 and a proposal for certain measures.

    10 Q. Would you please tell us whether that

    11 document represents a report on the crime in Ahmici?

    12 A. No, not in any case does that document

    13 represent that. It's exclusively information about the

    14 meeting with Colonel Stewart. All reports of my

    15 activities regarding the investigation and everything

    16 that is connected to Ahmici, I would usually -- I would

    17 always send that along.

    18 Q. How do you interpret that this information

    19 was sent by regular fax to Mostar and not by packet

    20 link, which was the usual manner of communication, and

    21 it was protected in a way, as we heard yesterday?

    22 A. In that information about the meeting, of

    23 course, the third party, Bob Stewart himself who

    24 participated in the meeting, was informed. There was

    25 nothing in the contents of the meeting that needed to

  30. 1 be protected, and for documents that were not orders or

    2 did not contain operative information, I tried to send

    3 those documents by fax because the communications were

    4 quite burdened, and I believed that there was no need

    5 for such protection.

    6 Q. In the course of this trial, a question kept

    7 coming up, at least I felt it that way, and we could

    8 formulate it in the following way: Bob Stewart and

    9 other representatives of the international

    10 organisations, why did you not inform them about your

    11 information about Ahmici, which unit committed it, the

    12 chain of command of the unit, the persons who were

    13 possibly responsible, in accordance with that chain of

    14 command, who would have issued the orders, and also

    15 about your problems with the military police? Why did

    16 you not at that time, in April or May of '93, not

    17 present that to the International Community? Maybe

    18 your fate would have been different.

    19 A. My fate may have been different in that case;

    20 however, there were legal regulations which I

    21 respected. They are about military secrets. I never

    22 talked about weaknesses within the HVO, the problems

    23 with dual command and unified responsibility and other

    24 weaknesses, I never shared those problems with

    25 international representatives because I was aware

  31. 1 myself that both they, as well as their interpreters to

    2 a certain extent, would convey such information later

    3 to the other side, to the enemy, to the BH army or the

    4 HVO.

    5 On the other hand, I did not have

    6 authorisation, after I realised that international

    7 institutions did not participate in the investigation,

    8 that I could not share such information with

    9 unauthorised persons. I did not convey these

    10 weaknesses and all of these problems to them because I

    11 would thereby be violating the military secret

    12 regulations. Also, it would have made it more

    13 difficult regarding survival because the BH army would

    14 find out all about our internal weaknesses, and this

    15 could then come to the fore when they were carrying out

    16 their attacks in their attempts to take over that

    17 territory.

    18 Q. Contrary to the regulations on military

    19 secrets and contrary to the orders that you had, this,

    20 that you have now -- if you had said to the

    21 representatives of the International Community what you

    22 have just told this Court, who were not members of the

    23 HVO, what would have happened to you? What would this

    24 have meant?

    25 A. Well, I would have violated internal rules of

  32. 1 the HVO. That was for sure. But it is difficult to

    2 forecast what it would have meant further because

    3 probably the consequences of it all would have been

    4 different.

    5 Q. Could you please tell the Court how you

    6 conducted yourself in front of international factors

    7 and the B and H army? What was the HVO picture that

    8 you presented to them; could you explain that?

    9 A. From the first meeting in Sarajevo, the

    10 tripartite meeting where U.N. representatives were

    11 present and also representatives of the UNHCR and other

    12 international institutions, together with

    13 representatives of the B and H army and representatives

    14 at that time of the army of Republika Srpska, at that

    15 time everybody who took the floor took the floor in an

    16 attempt to protect all internal weaknesses and

    17 concealing, to a certain degree, all the problems that

    18 were present among the ranks of the army and the HVO

    19 regarding structure. This was an army, an armed

    20 peoples -- an army that just needed to be organised and

    21 structured. But regardless of that, fighting and

    22 combat activities needed to be conducted. But in any

    23 case, this was a monolithic-structured military

    24 formation, and in that way, we wanted to leave the

    25 impression in front of the others and also taking upon

  33. 1 ourselves a little bit the responsibility regarding the

    2 implementation of our responsibilities despite all of

    3 the internal problems.

    4 Q. Judge Rodrigues, at one moment, asked you,

    5 Why did you not resign? Your officers lied to you,

    6 they committed a crime behind your back, and yet you

    7 are sitting here because of that today. Were they

    8 worth such a sacrifice? That was the question of Judge

    9 Rodrigues.

    10 Today, now that you think about it, what

    11 would your answer be?

    12 A. Perhaps those who lied to me, I'm sure that

    13 they are not worth my sacrifice. However, the people

    14 who lived there and who fought for their survival,

    15 their biological survival, they were worth my

    16 sacrifice. And in spite of everything, I stated then

    17 also that I wanted to stay with those people; and, in

    18 spite of everything, achieve my three priorities,

    19 meaning: survival, prevention from a crime happening

    20 again, and carrying out the investigation. I don't

    21 believe that any captain of a sinking ship would leave

    22 that ship first and abandon it.

    23 Q. If you had resigned, what would have

    24 happened? Who would have been the commander? How

    25 would events have proceeded? Do you have any idea

  34. 1 about that?

    2 A. The radio, the media, under the authority of

    3 the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, published at one

    4 moment that a new commander of the Operative Zone was

    5 Zarko Andric and his deputy was Darko Kraljevic. I

    6 believe that events would have become even more radical

    7 and that perhaps there would have been much more, much

    8 greater chaos, and perhaps Ahmici would have happened

    9 again and perhaps members of the B and H army, if they

    10 had entered Busovaca and Vitez, would have committed

    11 even greater crimes since it was very difficult to

    12 control their hatred, just as it was in their entry in

    13 Buhine Kuce, Krizancevo Selo, and other areas that the

    14 HVO was losing and then managing to take back. Perhaps

    15 there would have been even more massacres.

    16 Q. On several occasions -- Mr. President, should

    17 we stop now?

    18 JUDGE JORDA: Yes. I would like to ask

    19 General Blaskic whether you still maintain that 456/58

    20 is incomplete?

    21 A. Yes, of course. It's not a document that I

    22 wrote and that I sent; it's incomplete.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: I was a little surprised

    24 because you said so often during the cross-examination

    25 that you didn't remember today, that the essential part

  35. 1 of that document did not really express what you really

    2 thought, and I was wondering whether you had changed

    3 your argument in the meantime.

    4 MR. NOBILO: I did not ask him that. The

    5 sense of my question was: What was the nature of the

    6 document? A report from a meeting. We spoke a lot

    7 about that.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Nobilo -- but I remember it

    9 so clearly, when there was that very long conversation

    10 about 456/58, that everything would have been different

    11 if we had been able to see in that document all of the

    12 nuances that had been introduced into it. Remember in

    13 456/58, you remember your client even said to us that

    14 it seemed ridiculous to him, the document seemed

    15 ridiculous, because it seemed that it was putting into

    16 Colonel Stewart's mouth words about the meeting with

    17 Mate Boban whereas, in fact, the dash was missing which

    18 would remind us that the General, et cetera. So I was

    19 surprised that today your client didn't remember the

    20 discussion about that document, and I want to be sure

    21 that you still claim what you said before, that is,

    22 that the document is incomplete.

    23 I suggest that we take a 15-minute break.

    24 --- Recess taken at 10.15 a.m.

    25 --- On resuming at 10.35 a.m.

  36. 1 JUDGE JORDA: We will now resume the

    2 hearing. Please be seated.

    3 Mr. Nobilo, you can continue.

    4 MR. NOBILO: Thank you, Mr. President.

    5 Q. General, what about your closest associates?

    6 Who were the persons and what posts were involved?

    7 A. It was the chief of staff, who was my deputy

    8 at the same time, that is to say, that he held two

    9 posts, and he was in charge of all operative staff

    10 activities and practically all combat documents that he

    11 elaborated and then made proposals of various

    12 solutions. Then there were the assistants for

    13 personnel affairs, the assistants for organisation,

    14 mobilisation and the establishment, then the assistant

    15 for logistics, for the security service, for

    16 information and propaganda activity, and other

    17 assistants. These are a commander's closest associates

    18 that comprise that body.

    19 Q. In this trial, the Defence presented as

    20 evidence your order dated the 10th of May, 1992,

    21 concerning the investigation of the crime in Ahmici.

    22 You said that you gave an oral order to the assistant

    23 for SIS earlier, on the 24th of April, 1993. My

    24 learned colleague, the Prosecutor, asked you at one

    25 point, "Do you have any proof except for your own word

  37. 1 that you issued this earlier order orally concerning

    2 Ahmici?" What do you say to this Honourable Court?

    3 A. The very fact that a member of one's

    4 immediate staff is given an order in writing is telling

    5 proof of an exception, that something had to happen

    6 before that that I was not fully satisfied with and

    7 that this was additional pressure that was brought to

    8 bear against my immediate associate so that the

    9 assignment that was given earlier could be carried out

    10 fully; that is to say, that this body works in a

    11 team-like fashion, these are my closest associates, and

    12 during the day, we usually have one or -- several

    13 briefings and then assignments are issued orally, but

    14 they are registered in an official document which was

    15 called the personal war diary of each and every

    16 officer. I had such a personal war diary myself as

    17 well as all my associates. Every task would be

    18 registered, written down there, and then it would be

    19 commented upon very briefly at these briefings.

    20 I am claiming before this Court that I do not

    21 recall having ever issued an order in writing to my

    22 deputy, who was also chief of my staff, or any other

    23 associates. This was truly very rare and an exception,

    24 that to give this closest team of closest associates

    25 orders in writing except in these exceptional

  38. 1 situations that I already mentioned which were telling

    2 proof in their own right that I was not fully satisfied

    3 with the action that I ordered previously. The very

    4 fact that the order in writing was issued on the 10th

    5 of May showed that something had happened earlier

    6 between me and the security assistant, something that I

    7 was not pleased with, and that this was additional

    8 pressure on him.

    9 Q. In addition to this being additional pressure

    10 on him, what does it mean when you give your assistant,

    11 whom you sit with together at the same table every day

    12 and who works with you in team-like fashion, when you

    13 give him a written order? What does that mean for your

    14 personal relationship and what does that mean in an

    15 official sense too?

    16 A. As far as personal relations, it certainly

    17 means that this is a statement of mistrust or

    18 dissatisfaction with the extent to which a previous

    19 assignment had been carried out, but it is also a

    20 warning to a commander or an assistant to whom such an

    21 order was given that he should bear in mind that he has

    22 to carry out that assignment and that otherwise this

    23 order, like previous orders, would be additional

    24 material proof if such an associate is held accountable

    25 or is made to answer for his actions. So this is an

  39. 1 additional warning or additional pressure that one

    2 cannot just give up on one's assignments.

    3 JUDGE JORDA: Was there a verbal order given

    4 to General Marin; is that what you mean? Is that what

    5 you're saying, Colonel Blaskic? To which associate?

    6 You said -- I don't remember. I don't remember. I

    7 just want to refresh my memory. Did you give it to

    8 General Marin? I'm talking about the order.

    9 A. General Marin?

    10 JUDGE JORDA: [interpretation cuts in]

    11 ... what General Marin said.

    12 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, this -- no, no,

    13 no. No. This is an order issued orally to the SIS

    14 assistant for the investigation in Ahmici, and the

    15 witness is trying to say that he gave an oral order

    16 before the written order. Proof that an oral order was

    17 given is the fact that he gave a written order because

    18 he would never do that to his own assistants.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, I understand. I couldn't

    20 remember to whom the verbal order had been given. Yes,

    21 it was Mr. Slisovsky, something like that, isn't it?

    22 MR. NOBILO: Sliskovic, yes. Yes,

    23 Mr. President.

    24 JUDGE JORDA: I also don't remember, General

    25 Blaskic, when General Marin came, did he confirm your

  40. 1 verbal order -- well, we can find it in the

    2 transcript -- but did he confirm the order or not, or

    3 don't you remember? Judge Rodrigues says he didn't

    4 confirm it.

    5 A. General Marin is not a member of this team

    6 within the command.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: I thought he was your deputy.

    8 I thought he was your deputy. Not at that time?

    9 A. No, no, no. He was never my deputy, Your

    10 Honour. He was subordinate to the chief of staff, that

    11 is to say, he is three levels below me. He is

    12 subordinate to the chief of staff.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: But he participated in the

    14 meetings, didn't he, when the verbal orders were

    15 given? He was at the meetings every day, was he not?

    16 A. Not at my meetings. He is not a member of my

    17 team, Mr. President.

    18 JUDGE JORDA: He was the commander of the

    19 operations, he was the chief of staff of the operations

    20 in the midst of the war. Didn't he come to your

    21 meetings every morning? I don't understand. He came

    22 for six weeks and he said that he would participate in

    23 meetings every morning. Well, what meetings was he

    24 participating in?

    25 A. Mr. President, I'll try to do this in the

  41. 1 right order. First of all, he took part in meetings

    2 when the chief of staff was not present, that is to

    3 say, when the chief of staff was absent, then

    4 ex officio the chief of operations replaces him. But

    5 my deputy was always the chief of staff, Mr. Franjo

    6 Nakic, and he was always present at the meeting of this

    7 team within the command, and only when Nakic would not

    8 be there, then Mr. Slavko Marin would come in as

    9 Nakic's deputy.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: However, in the midst of the

    11 war, did Mr. Marin come to the meetings in order to

    12 speak about war operations? You're saying he never

    13 came? He was downstairs with the map and he would

    14 never come upstairs to see you? You have to admit that

    15 that's very surprising.

    16 A. Marin is a member of the staff. I can show

    17 this very easily. I can draw a diagram for you and I

    18 can show you his exact position.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: No, that isn't necessary.

    20 We'll find it all in the transcript. I don't want to

    21 take up Defence time. I was just a little bit

    22 surprised. But it's not important. It was just a

    23 clarification. I wanted to refresh my memory.

    24 MR. NOBILO: I am going to use my own

    25 questions --

  42. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Please let the General answer.

    2 I'm asking him a question.

    3 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, only in a

    4 situation when the chief of staff was not there, when

    5 he was present, it is only then that his deputy comes

    6 to attend the meetings of this team within the command,

    7 that is, Slavko Marin. There were such situations.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: Okay, I understand.

    9 A. As to regular situations, regular situations,

    10 when the chief of staff is in headquarters, he is a

    11 member of this team of mine, and Slavko Marin is his

    12 subordinate. He does not take part in the meetings of

    13 my team.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Yes. I was trying to help you,

    15 General, because basically you're looking for proof of

    16 the verbal order, which you can't demonstrate because

    17 it was a verbal order, and that's true, that's

    18 difficult for you.

    19 I was saying to myself that if Ahmici was a

    20 war operation, which is what you said to us a little

    21 while ago, Ahmici was a combat operation, since you

    22 even said Anto Valenta said that there was a victory,

    23 Ahmici was a victory, so it was part of combat. For

    24 you, it was not a crime. First of all, it was a place

    25 where combat took place. Do we agree on that?

  43. 1 A. It was synonymous at that time, they thought

    2 that these were combat operations between the army of

    3 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Yes. Thank you. So I was

    5 moving ahead to see if you couldn't somehow improve the

    6 existence of the verbal order in a different way, and I

    7 was saying to myself that since we were talking about

    8 combat operations, around Colonel Blaskic, they must

    9 have spoke about combat every day. I would assume that

    10 one speaks about combat in the midst of a war. At your

    11 staff meetings, you would talk about combat, I assume.

    12 No?

    13 A. In headquarters, everything that was said in

    14 the operative centre was registered in the operations

    15 logbook, that is to say, every activity.

    16 JUDGE JORDA: But you can't show us the

    17 logbook. I would have been very happy for you to

    18 present it to us. Unfortunately, you never found your

    19 own log. Let me remind you that you never found it,

    20 not even when you were involved with the Operation

    21 Spider. You didn't find the log, and I was very sorry

    22 that you didn't. It seemed to me that all chiefs in a

    23 war would preserve traces of their own diaries or

    24 logs. You know, this is something which happens in

    25 every country. All chiefs have traces of what they

  44. 1 did. But I put myself in your place, and I say that

    2 this verbal order, which is a very important one for

    3 you, on the 20th of April or the 21st of April, you

    4 gave a verbal order, and I was saying that, after all,

    5 in the meetings where there were many members of the

    6 staff and you were involved in speaking about the

    7 combats, didn't you speak about the fighting in Ahmici,

    8 and didn't somebody say, "Oh, yes, the fighting in

    9 Ahmici, it didn't go well. There were people killed.

    10 There were crimes," et cetera. It must have happened

    11 that way.

    12 A. No, not that way. I got a letter from

    13 Colonel Stewart about what had happened in Ahmici, and

    14 after the letter, I had a meeting with Colonel Stewart,

    15 and I reacted by issuing an order --

    16 JUDGE JORDA: General Blaskic, I was trying

    17 to reason along with you, but I think that this diary

    18 is lost, and we only have your word as a soldier and

    19 your word as a sworn statement. I think that's all we

    20 can say for now. I'm not asking any further

    21 questions. I was just thinking that in a general staff

    22 meeting with General Marin, who was involved with the

    23 operations, you were in the middle of war, Ahmici was

    24 being spoken about, you spoke about it as being a

    25 victory, if this has a connection, a consistency, and I

  45. 1 was saying perhaps by looking through all of these

    2 elements, General Blaskic would be able to show us the

    3 probability of the existence of that verbal order.

    4 No, you can't, and you're simple saying, "I

    5 gave a verbal order and, believe me, it's true." The

    6 Judges will see what they have to do.

    7 Mr. Hayman is also going to help you, and

    8 Judge Rodrigues also has a question he'd like to ask.

    9 I'm not going to ask any further questions. I think

    10 that you don't have any, General, and that's that.

    11 Be careful of your microphone, Mr. Hayman.

    12 Mr. Hayman, did you want to make a comment? Yes, go

    13 ahead.

    14 MR. HAYMAN: We do, of course, disagree with

    15 some of your comments, Mr. President, that the only

    16 evidence is his word that there was no order, and we

    17 have some follow-up questions that I've asked Mr. Nobilo

    18 to ask the witness.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: You're right. You're

    20 absolutely right. But Judge Rodrigues also has

    21 questions. I agree with you -- I know that you

    22 wouldn't be in agreement with what I said, but it's my

    23 right to ask the General whether, instead of repeating,

    24 as he has been repeating when he said I gave a verbal

    25 order, whether there wasn't a way through other

  46. 1 channels in order to corroborate. I am in a system,

    2 Mr. Hayman, in which one does not have written proof,

    3 one tries to corroborate. That's all I'm trying to

    4 say. For the time being, I have some trouble in

    5 following this, and I'm trying to reason the way your

    6 client is reasoning to see whether, through another

    7 approach, through the meetings of the general staff,

    8 one could have some type of real probability of the

    9 existence of the verbal order. That's all I'm saying,

    10 and it's my right to ask that question. That's what I

    11 was saying.

    12 I think that Mr. Nobilo wants to say

    13 something. Yet first I'd like Judge Rodrigues to ask

    14 his question, and then we can give you the floor.

    15 MR. NOBILO: Yes. Mr. President, we have

    16 proof, but you just have to give us the floor. We have

    17 an explanation. We have a different method.

    18 JUDGE JORDA: I'll give the floor to Judge

    19 Rodrigues. I'm not going to take the floor away from

    20 Judge Rodrigues, but I saw Mr. Hayman with such ardour

    21 and conviction saying that -- reacting to my questions,

    22 I have to respond to that, and this is your time.

    23 We're not going to take it away from you.

    24 I'll give the floor to Judge Rodrigues.

    25 JUDGE RODRIGUES: I'll ask this question very

  47. 1 quickly so as not to take away Defence time. Here is

    2 my question, General.

    3 More or less, approximately, how many general

    4 meetings took place between the 16th of April and the

    5 22nd of April, more or less?

    6 A. Until the 22nd of April, every day, we were

    7 sitting in one room.

    8 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Therefore, every day, even

    9 on Saturdays and Sundays?

    10 A. Yes. Yes, every day.

    11 JUDGE RODRIGUES: My second question: There

    12 were at least five meetings. At any meeting, did you

    13 speak about the victory in Ahmici?

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Judge Rodrigues. I

    15 didn't express myself well, but that's what I was

    16 trying to get at. Thank you.

    17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: At some point in some

    18 meeting, did you speak about the victory in Ahmici?

    19 A. I only requested, when I arrived from Zenica,

    20 I think this was around the 20th of April, late at

    21 night, to have all the reports on combat operations

    22 submitted to me in Ahmici, Nadioci, Sivrino Selo, all

    23 these places along the road. I never -- I personally,

    24 if you're asking me -- I never thought this was a

    25 victory, because basically we were --

  48. 1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Excuse me, General. You

    2 said that for the HVO it was a victory. Today, Ahmici

    3 means crime, but at that time, it meant victory.

    4 Therefore, I can ask you the question in another way:

    5 At any of the meetings that you had together, did you

    6 speak about the fighting in Ahmici?

    7 A. About the fighting according to the reports

    8 that I had received, the BH army and the military

    9 police, yes. About combat, combat was mentioned,

    10 combat operations, positions that were taken, things

    11 like that.

    12 JUDGE RODRIGUES: And while speaking about

    13 the combat, even in respect of the military police with

    14 the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, did somebody speak

    15 about the fighting, that is, how that could be

    16 translated as being a victory, that is, how the

    17 fighting occurred and what the consequences were?

    18 A. In that period of time, these were still

    19 situations while the fighting was ongoing, so the

    20 discussions were based on the reports that we had

    21 received, on the basis of the information I received

    22 about momentary positions, about combat operations with

    23 the army --

    24 JUDGE RODRIGUES: But, General, I'm speaking

    25 especially about Ahmici. Did you speak or did somebody

  49. 1 speak about the fighting which had taken place in

    2 Ahmici?

    3 A. Specifically, at that point in time, I

    4 personally did not speak about this. I asked for the

    5 report to be checked out, and when they told me that

    6 the reports were about momentary positions and there

    7 was nothing unusual as compared to things that were

    8 happening at some 20 places or so, there were no other

    9 discussions in that point in time.

    10 JUDGE RODRIGUES: I have to ask you another

    11 question. I believe that I know there were about five

    12 or six people at that meeting. How many people

    13 participated at that daily meeting, team meeting?

    14 A. At different times, well, it differed, five

    15 to six and depending on the subject matter that was to

    16 be discussed, and there were people who had various

    17 engagements. At first --

    18 JUDGE RODRIGUES: General, it was five to

    19 six. I understand that on one day there might be a

    20 meeting with four people and another day there would be

    21 six people. But between the 16th of April and the 22nd

    22 of April, nobody present at the meeting spoke about the

    23 fighting in Ahmici, or did somebody, in fact, speak

    24 about it?

    25 A. At that time, the fighting was still ongoing,

  50. 1 and we received reports and we reacted to the reports

    2 that we received. This can be seen from --

    3 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Excuse me, General. I

    4 think you understand my question. I'm speaking about

    5 the reports and the information in respect of Ahmici.

    6 I'm not speaking about others. I'm speaking about

    7 Ahmici, specifically about Ahmici.

    8 A. Well, I'm talking about the same, Your

    9 Honour, Ahmici, that fighting was taking place there,

    10 that units of the BH army were fortified, I remember

    11 around the school and around the mosque, and that there

    12 was combat going on over there, that the front line was

    13 being suppressed and that the BH army is moving to

    14 their reserve positions about 50 metres above the

    15 village, that there were combat operations going on

    16 over there too, so there was such information coming

    17 in, that is to say, such military reports. Yes, I did

    18 receive them.

    19 JUDGE RODRIGUES: And the information for you

    20 and for those people who were present at the meeting,

    21 was the information positive or negative?

    22 A. The information spoke of how heavy the

    23 fighting was, and I think they were sort of half/half.

    24 The front was moving towards the north, it went to the

    25 north of the village, but at least from a tactical

  51. 1 point of view, it had not reached such a level --

    2 JUDGE RODRIGUES: General, if somebody spoke

    3 about violent activity, perhaps that person spoke about

    4 the violence in the sense of winning or losing a

    5 battle, do you have any idea about this violence which

    6 would entail a positive or a negative attitude? I'm

    7 talking about the HVO side, positive or negative

    8 reactions from the HVO side?

    9 A. Well, the fighting went on practically all

    10 day between HVO units and BH army units, and the

    11 fighting was rather static, operations were rather

    12 static, and only in the coming period did the front

    13 line move a bit. Even at a tactical level, this was

    14 negligible. So this negligible movement was to the

    15 detriment of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina but that

    16 was only temporary.

    17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Excuse me. When you say

    18 that the fighting went on all day, what day are you

    19 speaking about?

    20 A. I'm speaking about the 16th of April.

    21 JUDGE RODRIGUES: And the fighting was taking

    22 place on that day in Ahmici; is that correct?

    23 A. According to the information I had, sometime

    24 between 11.45, when I received it, in Ahmici.

    25 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Excuse me, General, for

  52. 1 insisting on this point, but I would like you to answer

    2 my questions directly. When somebody spoke about the

    3 fighting which was going on with a great deal of

    4 violence on the 16th of April in Ahmici, did the idea

    5 of violence bring out a negative or a positive attitude

    6 on the side of the HVO?

    7 A. According to the reports and according to my

    8 memory --

    9 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Excuse me. My question is,

    10 the idea of violence that somebody mentioned at the

    11 meeting, and you said that there was violent combat

    12 going on, my question is, and the answer, in my

    13 opinion, should either be "Yes," "No," or "I don't

    14 know." This is the question: The idea of violence

    15 entailed a positive idea or a negative reaction, that

    16 is, a reaction of success or failure in respect of the

    17 HVO?

    18 A. I'll try to give you the most accurate answer

    19 possible, Your Honour. I believe, according to those

    20 reports, and as far as I can remember now, that this

    21 fighting was one on a footing of equality --

    22 JUDGE RODRIGUES: According to what was said

    23 at the meeting, not according to the reports, but

    24 according to what was said at the meeting.

    25 A. Yes, according to what was said at the

  53. 1 meeting, this was static fighting that was ongoing,

    2 without any movement of the front line. This went on

    3 on both sides, static fighting.

    4 MR. NOBILO: Your Honour, the interpretation

    5 is the problem. General Blaskic uses the word "silina"

    6 which is being interpreted into English as "violence."

    7 These are two different words. They have a different

    8 meaning. We are talking about the intensity of

    9 fighting, and violence is something different.

    10 JUDGE RODRIGUES: In any case, according to

    11 what you say, I'll change the way I express myself.

    12 Instead of using the word "violence," I'll use the word

    13 "intensity."

    14 So, General, when somebody at the meeting

    15 spoke about the fact that the fighting was intense, was

    16 fierce, was there the possibility of concluding or did

    17 somebody actually say or express a positive or negative

    18 idea from the point of view of the HVO? So when I say

    19 "positive," "negative," what I mean by those words,

    20 I'm connecting them with success or probability of

    21 success for the HVO.

    22 A. On that day, the 16th, when we're talking

    23 about the 16th, this was static combat. There were no

    24 movements, and there were no successes. I'm talking

    25 about both sides. The two sides were confronting one

  54. 1 another and they were firing at one another on the

    2 16th. The next day, there was some movement, perhaps

    3 100 or 150 metres.

    4 JUDGE RODRIGUES: The next morning at what

    5 time?

    6 A. If you allow me to have a look at my

    7 chronology? I mean, we're talking about minutes, Your

    8 Honour. I don't know. I can't say just off the cuff.

    9 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Was it 8.00? Was it

    10 11.00? Was it 5.00 in the morning? What time? At

    11 what time were you speaking that way?

    12 A. I'll have a look in my chronology and I'll

    13 tell you.

    14 JUDGE RODRIGUES: I don't think that's

    15 necessary. You simply have to say at 9.00, 10.00,

    16 11.00. You have no idea?

    17 A. Well, it's hard for me to engage in

    18 guesswork. We are talking about 22 different places

    19 where there was combat activity going on, and from one

    20 minute to another, these actions were taking place all

    21 over, and I can look at my chronology and tell you very

    22 precisely.

    23 JUDGE RODRIGUES: So as not to take up too

    24 much of the Defence time, perhaps you could look at

    25 that during the break. I think that for right now, I

  55. 1 have no further questions.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Judge Rodrigues. I

    3 would like the Defence to understand, and I insist on

    4 that, that for the Judges, these are very important

    5 moments in respect of the charges and all of us are

    6 looking for the truth. This means if, at some time on

    7 the 22nd of April, for the first time Colonel Stewart

    8 informed your client of the atrocities which had taken

    9 place on the -- that's on the 22nd of April, informed

    10 him of the atrocities and said, as early as the 22nd of

    11 April, you were given verbal orders which apparently

    12 were corroborated by the written order of 10 May --

    13 that's the interpretation -- it is true that the Judges

    14 are seeking, in all of your client's words, a way to

    15 find corroboration for that since there is no formal

    16 proof. But we all know that in all legal systems,

    17 formal proof, of course, is the best. But it is not

    18 absolutely necessary. In all legal systems, people

    19 know that the Judges come to decisions in relation to

    20 written proof but also through all types of other

    21 considerations. It was simply this search for the

    22 truth that we have been entrusted with finding.

    23 Thank you, Judge Rodrigues, for trying to

    24 contribute something.

    25 Judge Shahabuddeen, do you wish to say

  56. 1 something?

    2 Thank you. Mr. Nobilo, you can continue.

    3 MR. NOBILO: Thank you, Mr. President. After

    4 a question about Ahmici, I will go back to the

    5 substance, and that is to say, that there is other

    6 evidence apart from the written type that the order had

    7 been given for an investigation into Ahmici previously.

    8 Q. General, I'm going to ask you this now: In

    9 the army, among the people, Ahmici was considered to be

    10 a victory. You, as a strategist, what do you consider,

    11 staying in the village for one day, did this prove

    12 advantageous to the HVO or not and where should the HV

    13 have been for that one day? So was it a victory or not

    14 a victory?

    15 A. It, of course, was not a victory. I said

    16 that the people understood it in this way, the layman

    17 spoke about it in that fashion, but on a tactical

    18 level, a trained professional commander of a platoon

    19 even wouldn't have assessed this as a victory, a

    20 trained soldier.

    21 Q. General, when you led the operation -- had

    22 you led the operation in the village of Ahmici, what

    23 would you have done on that day, the 16th of April?

    24 What would your manoeuvre have been?

    25 A. At all times, the principle is to manoeuvre,

  57. 1 that is, to avoid combat activities in a built-up area

    2 at all costs, and there is no commander whatever who

    3 would agree to planning an operation and forget the

    4 fact that it would be fighting in the centre of a

    5 village. Perhaps Grbavica is the best example.

    6 Q. Our time is running out, so I am beginning to

    7 think like my colleague, Mr. Kehoe, so let's stop

    8 there. Could you explain to the Judges what you mean

    9 by "manoeuvre"? Where should you have gone and arrived

    10 at had you led the operation?

    11 A. The hill above the village and taken it from

    12 the left and right, that is to say, quite certainly to

    13 avoid any fighting in the village. That is the tactic

    14 that professional soldiers apply.

    15 Q. After 11.42, when you had learnt about

    16 fighting in Ahmici, what did you ask Pasko Ljubicic,

    17 who led the operation, to do?

    18 A. On several occasions, once again, I said "Go

    19 to the hills. Take to the hills. On the left and

    20 flank, go up and take the hills." And that was a

    21 similar situation in Gomionica, Grbavica, et cetera.

    22 Q. Let us return to the order about Ahmici.

    23 Tell us, please, once again, was Slavko Marin a member

    24 of your team?

    25 A. No.

  58. 1 Q. Tell us, in the days of the war, the first

    2 days of the war, the 16th of April, the 17th of April,

    3 the 18th of April, was Nakic at the headquarters?

    4 A. No.

    5 Q. Did Marin replace Nakic on that occasion?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. When did Nakic turn up for the first time?

    8 A. I think it was on the 20th of April, and I'm

    9 quite certain that it was on the 21st of April. It

    10 might have been 20th but certainly the 21st.

    11 Q. After Nakic, the chief of staff of the

    12 Central Bosnia Operative Zone, succeeded in turning up

    13 at the command, did Slavko Marin attend the meetings of

    14 your team?

    15 A. No, he never attended the meetings of the

    16 team when Franjo Nakic was in the headquarters. So

    17 Slavko Marin never attended meetings of my team at that

    18 time.

    19 Q. A demand for a request into the investigation

    20 into Ahmici and for punishment, is that part of combat

    21 operations? Does that come under Slavko Marin's field

    22 of activity or not?

    23 A. No.

    24 Q. Tell us once again, please, in concise terms,

    25 why do you consider that the fact of issuing a written

  59. 1 order to your assistant for investigation into Ahmici

    2 was, at the same time, proof that before a written

    3 order was issued, an oral order was issued? Why do you

    4 consider that that is proof in itself?

    5 A. Because all the commands of all armies, as

    6 far as I know, work as a team, they have teamwork and a

    7 team approach to their work and function in similar

    8 ways, that is to say, they issue oral orders which are

    9 then recorded in personal war diaries, and the fact

    10 that a written order is issued shows that the superior

    11 commanding officer is not satisfied with the results so

    12 far or wishes to accelerate those results.

    13 Q. Could you enumerate for us and tell us, when

    14 you give a written order to a member of your own team,

    15 what drastic cases are these when that is done?

    16 A. They are cases when a trust has been upset,

    17 the balance of trust, or cases when something truly

    18 dramatic occurs between the commander and his immediate

    19 assistant, direct assistant, but these are

    20 exceptionally rare, very rare cases indeed.

    21 Q. If somebody refuses to carry out an order,

    22 would that be a case in point?

    23 A. Yes. Not only refusal but obstruction. You

    24 don't have to refuse to carry out an order; you can

    25 receive an order and then tell your superiors that this

  60. 1 has not been done fully, accomplished fully, so it can

    2 be that an order is obstructed in being carried out but

    3 threats and warnings to your subordinates that they

    4 must implement the order issued.

    5 Q. If a written order is a threat and warning,

    6 what do you think? Is it, militarily speaking, logical

    7 that somebody who you have asked for the first time to

    8 carry out an investigation, to send out threats and

    9 cautions?

    10 A. That practically never happens at the level

    11 of the brigade or the team of the brigade commander.

    12 What always happens is that oral orders are issued to

    13 the team, the immediate team, and personal wartime

    14 diaries are, of course, official documents as well, and

    15 then only if something dramatic takes place or if a

    16 commander expresses a certain amount of distrust, only

    17 then is a written order issued, but that is truly the

    18 exception.

    19 Q. Tell us, please, you have described the order

    20 for an investigation of the 10th of May, 1993 as an

    21 exception, but you issued another order, once again in

    22 writing. Could you tell us what happened in that

    23 continuity? Have you noted down how many times and

    24 when you asked for, called for an investigation into

    25 Ahmici, if you have those notes at hand? If not, we

  61. 1 can look into it during the break. But tell us, why

    2 did you give a second order in writing as well?

    3 A. The first report was fairly superficial, and

    4 the investigation and the first report did not bring in

    5 any concrete results, but it's stated that the

    6 investigation would continue. I continued to insist on

    7 several occasions -- and in my chronology, I had that

    8 -- when I asked for the additional results of the

    9 investigation to be sent in to me, and I wanted to

    10 create a better climate for the investigation itself,

    11 which meant to break down the command structure of the

    12 military police and to take over via the commander,

    13 Palavra, the military police and a complete change of

    14 cadres in the military police, that is, to remove those

    15 with criminal records and to create a better security

    16 and safety situation for the implementation of a

    17 comprehensive investigation.

    18 Q. Let us now move on to something else related

    19 to Ahmici. Tell us, please, whether the assistant for

    20 security, Ante Sliskovic, was under your exclusive

    21 orders and control?

    22 A. No, he was directly subordinate to the chief

    23 of the Mostar administration for security, and the

    24 orders that he received directly from his superiors had

    25 absolute priority compared to my own orders and

  62. 1 demands.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: General Blaskic, in the order

    3 of the 10th of May, what's the "ONO"? I see "ONO,"

    4 chief of operations and training, "ONO." Could we give

    5 the document to the General, please? I've got the

    6 document in French.

    7 Do you have the document?

    8 A. I have it, Mr. President, and it is the

    9 operations and training organ of the military district

    10 of Vitez.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Is that Mr. Marin?

    12 A. Yes. He was the head of the operations and

    13 training department or office of the military district

    14 of Vitez.

    15 JUDGE JORDA: Therefore, I deduce that in the

    16 order of 10 May, further to what -- I called him

    17 General, but I made a mistake, I mean Judge Rodrigues

    18 -- further to what Judge Rodrigues said to you, at

    19 some point a relationship was made in your mind between

    20 the atrocities, the crime that was committed in Ahmici,

    21 and the combat operation in Ahmici. There must have

    22 been a connection, and I assume you made that

    23 connection. Perhaps you don't understand my question.

    24 Let me repeat it.

    25 My concern is always to learn how we can

  63. 1 corroborate the verbal order. You're saying that "I

    2 gave a written order and that it was exceptional

    3 which proves a contrario that I gave the order."

    4 Therefore, I had the order of 10 May given to me by the

    5 registrar, and in the order, you designate, as the

    6 person responsible for the investigation, the SIS, the

    7 S-I-S, and you say that the SIS took its orders in

    8 Mostar. That's possible. Nonetheless, you are the one

    9 who was in charge of the investigation; do you agree?

    10 You were in charge of the investigation.

    11 A. Mr. President, I requested an investigation

    12 of the assistant for security.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: No, no, no, not at all. I've

    14 already pointed out to you already during the

    15 cross-examination that the number 1 point in the order

    16 was to gather all information. When it says "gather

    17 information and submit a report about the events," that

    18 is a way of conducting an investigation, of considering

    19 that one is responsible for an investigation.

    20 If what you said is true and if it was

    21 consistent with what you've been saying, you would have

    22 only issued order 2, "that I appoint the assistant to

    23 be responsible for that task." But your assistant is

    24 responsible for executing your order under point 1.

    25 I'm also speaking for your Defence counsel.

  64. 1 But that is not my question. I wanted to

    2 ask, but I don't want to use up the Defence's time. We

    3 can consider that you yourself took responsibility for

    4 the operation. But that doesn't matter. That is not

    5 my question. My question is further to comments by

    6 Judge Rodrigues. You are obliged, when you designate

    7 the assistant at the SIS, the security service, you

    8 have to make the connection with Marin who was the

    9 chief of operations. You had to have been, "Yes" or

    10 "No"?

    11 A. It was customary that all documents were also

    12 sent to the operative section, so all the documents I

    13 have here I'm sure they do in the operative section.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: I'm not talking about what is

    15 habitual. I'm speaking about this particular

    16 document. When you designate a service which has

    17 nothing to do with Ahmici, that is, the security

    18 service, you remember you did not want to designate the

    19 military police commander for the investigation because

    20 you considered that they would not carry out the

    21 investigation objectively. I accept that. And so you

    22 designate a service which knows nothing about the

    23 fighting in Ahmici. They don't know anything about the

    24 fighting in Ahmici; you agree with that. In fact, you

    25 chose them for that reason, so that they would be

  65. 1 objective. Do you follow what I'm saying?

    2 A. They were the professional service for

    3 conducting investigations over all institutions,

    4 including myself.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Yes. Well, don't answer me in

    6 theoretical terms. Please answer precisely. You chose

    7 them because they were not the military police, about

    8 whom you had suspicions. So they knew nothing about

    9 the fighting in Ahmici. Nothing. They were not

    10 competent.

    11 A. I'm not getting any interpretation, Your

    12 Honour.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: I think perhaps there was an

    14 interpreter problem here. I'm speaking slowly on

    15 purpose so they can be very careful that everything I

    16 say is interpreted correctly.

    17 You designate the assistant from SIS because,

    18 in your eyes, he matches the conditions necessary for

    19 complete objectivity; is that true or is it not true?

    20 A. Yes, complete objectivity. Above them is

    21 only the joint commission.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: They did not know what had

    23 happened in Ahmici at the point that you designated

    24 them. They didn't know.

    25 A. I don't know exactly what information they

  66. 1 had at their disposal. The security service is in

    2 charge of internal security, but I do believe that they

    3 did not know all the details.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: But they did not have

    5 jurisdiction over combat matters; that's what I meant.

    6 A. They did not have jurisdiction over combat,

    7 no.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: Well, that's clear. Therefore,

    9 in my opinion, you were obliged to tell them to contact

    10 the people or the person responsible for the

    11 operations, that's Marin, "Yes" or "No"?

    12 A. I consider that I was not duty-bound to tell

    13 them that, Your Honour. They have power and authority

    14 to exert control over everything --

    15 JUDGE JORDA: But you did. You designated

    16 them as addressees in the order; that is, you

    17 considered that there was a relationship that should be

    18 made between the two. Is that true or not?

    19 A. They are independent in conducting

    20 investigations. They are professional individuals and

    21 independent and autonomous in conducting

    22 investigations.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Well, I'm sure that

    24 [interpretation cuts out] ... but if you want to share

    25 your conviction with us and you have a very strong

  67. 1 conviction, when you say that you wanted to ascertain

    2 the truth, when you designated SIS, you had to say to

    3 them in some way, "Get information about what happened

    4 in that well-known victory in Ahmici, at the intense

    5 and fierce combat in Ahmici." That's what you said to

    6 Judge Rodrigues. You had to make the connection,

    7 didn't you?

    8 A. Perhaps I don't understand the question

    9 properly, Mr. President, but my knowledge is that

    10 SIS --

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Okay. I'll repeat it. You ask

    12 an investigative service, which is independent, to

    13 gather evidence about what you know on the 10th of May

    14 about Ahmici, but you know that there had been

    15 atrocities that you learned about in Colonel Stewart's

    16 letter. You said that you gave verbal orders between

    17 the 20th of April and the 10th of May. My question has

    18 to do with the written order of 10 May. I would like

    19 to know whether you made a connection between General

    20 Marin, the chief of your operations, and the assistant

    21 at SIS, "Yes" or "No"?

    22 A. I personally did not connect him because I

    23 thought that the assistant for SIS has the authority to

    24 have insight into all documents, not only operative

    25 ones, but all documents related to the military

  68. 1 district.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: Your own document is

    3 contradicting you because you made that connection,

    4 it's indicated in the addressees -- just a moment,

    5 please, Mr. Nobilo. You're talking about the operation

    6 officers and you said that it was Marin.

    7 A. Yes, because all the documents go to the

    8 operative department, all documents issued go to the

    9 operative.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. All the documents

    11 are transmitted. Therefore, my question, which I'm

    12 asking in order to corroborate the verbal order which

    13 you allegedly issued, in the team meetings that you

    14 had, at some point did you say to Marin, "Marin, I'm

    15 going to entrust SIS with the investigation. You're

    16 going to be questioned by them in order to find out

    17 what happened in Ahmici." Did you do that or did you

    18 not do that?

    19 A. I did not do that because Marin was never a

    20 member of my team. Should that have been done, it

    21 would have been done by the chief of staff.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: You are the officer in that

    23 headquarters. There's a war, it was an atrocious war,

    24 and you're answering in terms of an organisational

    25 structure. What I'm trying to find out is a way of

  69. 1 corroborating your moral concern about the atrocities

    2 in Ahmici. I'm trying to find out whether, in

    3 accordance with your order of 10 May, you said at some

    4 point to Marin, in fact, "Make available to yourself

    5 SIS in order to find out everything you can about

    6 Ahmici." Did you do that or didn't you?

    7 A. The file regarding Ahmici was made with the

    8 chief of staff on the 22nd, I think, of April.

    9 Everything that existed was at their disposal, and I

    10 was at the disposal of SIS. So SIS had the power and

    11 authority, independent of my own will, to conduct

    12 investigations over the whole of the HVO.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Well, we'll reread the entire

    14 transcript of General Marin. I want to know whether,

    15 at some point, you said to Marin, in fact, "Do you

    16 remember that on the 20th of April I gave an order in

    17 order to find out what happened about the crime in

    18 Ahmici? I'm going to repeat the order of 10 May.

    19 You're one of the addressees. Did you give all the

    20 information about the combat in Ahmici, that is,

    21 military activity in Ahmici?"

    22 A. I did not have any discussion with Slavko

    23 Marin about that in particular but I did with Franjo

    24 Nakic, the chief of staff, and this was about the 22nd

    25 of April. I had a meeting with Franjo Nakic, I

  70. 1 compiled the file of all reports, and that file was at

    2 the disposal of the security service. So all the

    3 operations reports and orders from the 15th, 16th, up

    4 until the 22nd of April. That was a file containing

    5 about 80 to 100 documents placed at the disposal of the

    6 security service.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Then the file was pretty well

    8 done, it was compiled properly. Therefore, my last

    9 question is, why re-issue an order on the 10th of May?

    10 You've got 180 (sic) documents which unfortunately

    11 disappeared. So work was done. Now you're saying that

    12 in the order of 10 May, gather or collect all

    13 information for several days. There's been rumours in

    14 the public -- well, these were not rumours because

    15 you're telling me that on the 25th of April, you had a

    16 file with 80 or 100 documents in it about the

    17 atrocities in Ahmici. That's what you said.

    18 A. Mr. President, that was a file about all the

    19 operations, all the reports, all the orders, not a file

    20 on the crime in Ahmici on the 22nd of April, 1993. The

    21 rumours --

    22 JUDGE JORDA: [interpretation cuts in]

    23 ... file on Ahmici. All right. I have no further

    24 questions. Judge Rodrigues?

    25 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Very quickly, General. Is

  71. 1 there a difference between the addressee in your oral

    2 order and the addressee in your written order?

    3 A. Your Honour, if I issue an oral order, the

    4 recipient must write it down in his personal log, in

    5 his official document. I also have it written down in

    6 my logbook. If I issue a written order, then it must

    7 go to the addressee. A copy also should go to the

    8 archives, and one copy should go to the operations and

    9 training centre which then distributes all of these

    10 documents, and then one of the officers of that

    11 department will monitor the implementation of all the

    12 issued orders.

    13 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Therefore, General, the

    14 conclusion must be that your assistant for security

    15 knew what it was about when he received the written

    16 order.

    17 A. Yes, he knew that if he was given a written

    18 order, that I was not satisfied with the result of the

    19 oral order.

    20 JUDGE RODRIGUES: And General Marin?

    21 A. This is not an order to act for Brigadier

    22 Marin. He receives this order, gives it to his

    23 assistant of operations, and then he would classify

    24 this document, saying that it was issued on that date,

    25 and then he would set it aside for the security service

  72. 1 to act upon it. So he only needs to enter it into the

    2 logbook to note that it has been issued. He does not

    3 act upon it.

    4 JUDGE RODRIGUES: I don't know whether he was

    5 a General or a Brigadier, but Slavko Marin became aware

    6 for the first time when he received the written order?

    7 A. It's possible if the chief of staff had not

    8 informed him about my oral order or the person who

    9 attended the team meeting. So it's possible that he

    10 personally learned about that task for the first time.

    11 JUDGE RODRIGUES: I want to use this time to

    12 ask you another question. When you came back to the

    13 team meeting on the 16th of April, when somebody spoke

    14 about the intensity of the fighting in Ahmici, somebody

    15 in that meeting spoke about the intensity of the

    16 combat; do you remember that you said that?

    17 A. That there was fierce combat activity, yes, I

    18 remember that.

    19 JUDGE RODRIGUES: But did you know that you

    20 had HVO units in Ahmici?

    21 A. Units of the military police, their commander

    22 informed me that he was in Ahmici in the morning at

    23 about 11.42 on the 16th of April.

    24 JUDGE RODRIGUES: The intensity that somebody

    25 spoke about at the meeting on the 16th, didn't that jog

  73. 1 curiosity, or perhaps your duty as a commander of the

    2 Operative Zone, to learn what the results of the

    3 combat -- of the static combat that you mentioned

    4 were? So that on the 16th, you learned that there had

    5 been intense fighting. On the 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th,

    6 21st, did you never ask what the results of such

    7 intense fighting were?

    8 A. Not only had I asked but I asked for written

    9 information, to receive written information, to get

    10 specific reports about the outcome, the results of all

    11 the fighting, and I tried to get information because

    12 there wasn't only fighting in Ahmici but in 20 other

    13 places as well. So there was intense fighting in other

    14 places, including the hotel which was hit that

    15 morning.

    16 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Excuse me for interrupting

    17 you, General. I'm trying to be as direct as possible

    18 so we don't use up too much time. But when you said,

    19 "Not only did I ask, but I asked for written reports,"

    20 I think that you're saying that you made an oral

    21 request and a written request. That's what I've

    22 understood.

    23 A. I was in touch with the commanders, in

    24 telephone touch, and I asked for information and

    25 reports about the events in Busovaca and Vitez.

  74. 1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: When, for the first time

    2 after the 16th, or maybe even on the 16th, after having

    3 spoken about the intensity of the fighting, when did

    4 you ask for information about the results of the

    5 fighting?

    6 A. I can't remember precisely, but my demands

    7 and requests for information and reports, it's all

    8 there in my chronology. It was minute-by-minute

    9 information. The telephone was ringing every five

    10 minutes about the outcome, the result, the intensity,

    11 and all the other things.

    12 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Yes, General. I can

    13 understand your answer. But for a commander of an

    14 operative zone, when somebody says that there was

    15 intense fighting on the 16th, it seems natural to me to

    16 try to find out on the same day or the next day or

    17 would you only find out about what happened a month

    18 later?

    19 A. Your Honour, at that time, combat was going

    20 on, and it was presented here, combat was going on in

    21 22 places, intense fighting in 22 places, total

    22 encirclement in 22 places. I did everything that I

    23 could in order to receive as complete information as

    24 possible, and even at that time, I asked for specific

    25 and complete information.

  75. 1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Thank you, General. Let me

    2 give the floor to Mr. Nobilo.

    3 MR. NOBILO:

    4 Q. Defence Exhibit D280, which represents a

    5 written report from Ahmici which arrived on the 16th of

    6 April, 1993, General, except that written report, did

    7 you receive oral reports in the course of the day about

    8 the combat in Ahmici? Before that report, did you

    9 receive oral reports about the fighting in Ahmici on

    10 the 16th of April, 1993?

    11 A. No. The first report I received was at 11.42

    12 on the 16th of April, 1993.

    13 Q. After that, did you receive further oral

    14 reports about the events in Ahmici from Commander Pasko

    15 Ljubicic by telephone?

    16 A. Yes.

    17 Q. Did you ask for written reports as well,

    18 besides that?

    19 A. Yes, and you can see that from this document,

    20 D220, where he cites the order that I issued, and also,

    21 in subsequent days, I did not only issue orders but

    22 warnings that I had to have complete and true

    23 information about the events.

    24 Q. So on the 16th of April, out of all the

    25 numerous oral reports and from this written report, did

  76. 1 information reach you from anywhere that a crime had

    2 been committed in Ahmici?

    3 A. No.

    4 Q. Another thing. The documents, the orders

    5 that you issued of any kind, do they automatically go

    6 to the operations and training department or is this

    7 specific only for some orders or is this a matter of

    8 routine?

    9 A. Yes, it's a matter of routine. All orders go

    10 there because one person has the task of recording and

    11 also monitoring the deadlines for the implementation of

    12 the orders. I would sign over 400 orders a month, and

    13 I couldn't monitor all of them, and that is why there

    14 was a person in the operations and training department

    15 who used to record the orders and monitor their

    16 implementation. He would possibly remind those who

    17 were supposed to implement the orders about the

    18 deadline for the implementation of that order.

    19 Q. So sending all orders to the operations and

    20 training department, did that have anything to do --

    21 whether it had to do with combat or administration

    22 matters?

    23 A. No. This was strictly an administrative

    24 procedure and it had nothing to do with any kind of

    25 combat operations.

  77. 1 Q. Oral orders for investigations and the

    2 written orders for investigations in the case of

    3 Ahmici, were they given to one in the same person?

    4 A. Yes.

    5 Q. The weight of an oral and a written order, is

    6 it the same or is it different? Must they be

    7 implemented?

    8 A. It's the same. It has to be implemented. As

    9 far as a soldier is concerned, there is no difference

    10 there. Both of them have the same weight, the same

    11 value.

    12 Q. After the completion of the investigation,

    13 when the SIS commander, head of SIS, Ante Sliskovic,

    14 told you that the file was sent to Mostar on orders,

    15 could you, did you have the legal authority, to order

    16 him to act differently?

    17 A. No. The priority, precisely because of the

    18 dual chain of command, his priority as a superior, the

    19 head of SIS in Mostar, these were priority tasks, and

    20 regardless of what I ordered, he had to act in

    21 accordance with the tasks that he received from his

    22 superiors. I was not authorised nor did I have the

    23 legal option of changing that decision or that task.

    24 Q. When the head of SIS, Ante Sliskovic, told

    25 you that he received an order from his superiors for

  78. 1 the investigation files regarding Ahmici be sent to

    2 Mostar, so to higher military command, what did you

    3 believe would happen at that time? What did you

    4 believe would happen?

    5 A. At that time, I believed that the authorised

    6 persons from the SIS administration will continue to

    7 process this and that the military top command would

    8 carry out the processing and they would deal with those

    9 suspected of committing the war crimes.

    10 Q. Did you think that the military command would

    11 end this investigation in a better or worse way than

    12 you would?

    13 A. Well, better, of course, because their powers

    14 were greater and there was a need to detain a larger

    15 number of suspects, and obviously my command power at

    16 that time was much smaller.

    17 Q. After receiving the news that the file was

    18 sent to Mostar, did you receive any signals or

    19 indications based on which you could conclude that

    20 something positive or negative was happening? Did you

    21 see anything which would point to you that something

    22 was happening?

    23 A. I received information that high officials

    24 from the SIS administration on two occasions, in

    25 October and November, they went and made the final

  79. 1 controls of the results of the investigations, and I

    2 believed that they would carry on with the prosecution

    3 of the suspects.

    4 Q. What did you believe, that there would be

    5 court proceedings in Vitez, in Mostar? Did you think

    6 about that?

    7 A. I believed that the only possible and the

    8 surest way would be to hold the trial in Mostar due to

    9 the overall situation that was prevalent in the area of

    10 Vitez at that time.

    11 Q. Parallel with the investigation, which was

    12 obviously completed, did you take any measures to

    13 prevent those who had taken part in the crime in

    14 Ahmici, the military police, that they do not repeat

    15 such a crime? I'm talking about especially prevention

    16 with regard to military police, and if so, what was

    17 that?

    18 A. Yes, in the conditions of total encirclement,

    19 in a situation that had no way out, I spent a lot of

    20 time, first of all, to effect a change in the command

    21 structure within the military police, and then with

    22 Mr. Palavra, who in the former army was a plain

    23 soldier, to work to enable him and to enable his

    24 command to carry out very large changes in the

    25 structure, especially regarding those who were subject

  80. 1 to punishment in the military police. I was trying --

    2 my attempts to have those persons dismissed from the

    3 military police were not fruitful.

    4 Q. In that whole period, did you ever find any

    5 single name or had any proof that any person had

    6 committed a crime in Ahmici? Do you have any single

    7 names?

    8 A. No.

    9 Q. Could you then initiate disciplinary

    10 proceedings?

    11 A. No, because the biggest problem was the

    12 problem of getting the names of the perpetrators.

    13 Q. I would like to ask you something now about

    14 something that we did not discuss in the course of this

    15 trial and that I believe is significant. Could you

    16 please explain to the Court what atmosphere or how did

    17 public opinion, among the army and the people in these

    18 enclaves on the model, what was the public opinion

    19 regarding the crime that was committed in Ahmici in

    20 1993? If you could please tell us about that?

    21 A. Well, there were objective problems and

    22 difficulties, naturally. If only Ahmici had happened,

    23 I believe that there would have been general

    24 condemnation by all of those who lived -- all of the

    25 peoples, the citizens, who lived in that area, and that

  81. 1 there would have been general support for this crime to

    2 be investigated and to be wholly processed.

    3 Q. Could you please explain to the Trial

    4 Chamber, I think this is important, did the public

    5 support an investigation or not? And you requested the

    6 investigation.

    7 A. No, it did not.

    8 Q. And why didn't it? Could you please explain

    9 that?

    10 A. There were a lot of reasons. I already said

    11 that. I think that one of the reasons was, of course,

    12 that this was not the first crime that happened, crimes

    13 had happened before, but it seemed to the public that

    14 some had an exclusive right for information to be

    15 published and to sacrifice while the others did not.

    16 There was a large number of refugees and they kept

    17 arriving daily, and I said that there were about 35.000

    18 people. These were desperate people who were forced to

    19 watch from that enclave how their houses were burned

    20 down every day. They pulled out at the same time as

    21 the HVO troops pulled out, under pressure of the

    22 B and H army.

    23 Q. Did these refugees contribute towards a

    24 positive or a negative attitude towards the

    25 investigation of the Ahmici case?

  82. 1 A. Well, it was negative. If we take that the

    2 total number, 70.000 population in the enclave,

    3 including the 35.000 refugees, so then we would have 50

    4 per cent of desperate people, the rest would be the

    5 local population, and, of course, these were desperate

    6 people. They mainly came just carrying a little bag in

    7 their hand. Recently, I was watching refugees from

    8 Kosovo that were coming on tractors. I don't remember

    9 seeing anybody who managed to come with a tractor or on

    10 a truck.

    11 Q. What else had an effect to radicalise the

    12 situation and create resistance towards an

    13 investigation of the Ahmici case?

    14 A. Well, there were a lot of children and older

    15 people and victims of, most often, sniper activity and

    16 shelling, including activities by tanks in town, such

    17 as Busovaca and Vitez.

    18 Q. And what happened to these children?

    19 A. Well --

    20 Q. Tell us.

    21 A. The children were killed by snipers and by

    22 mortar shells, so this also made the situation more

    23 radical. Children were also wounded. There were cases

    24 where a whole family was wiped out. We had 80 children

    25 who did not have either both parents or did not have a

  83. 1 mother or a father, one of the parents.

    2 Q. How many were there killed in the enclave?

    3 A. There was about 1.300 soldiers and the total

    4 number of casualties was around 2.000, and only in the

    5 area of Vitez, there were 650 soldiers killed.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Nobilo, it's a long

    7 morning. Ordinarily, we take two breaks. Do you want

    8 to ask another question on that point?

    9 MR. NOBILO: Just one question in order to

    10 round this off.

    11 Q. In spite of this situation and your efforts

    12 to have an investigation, did anybody seriously support

    13 your efforts to carry out an investigation about

    14 Ahmici?

    15 A. Apart from my own personal efforts and the

    16 efforts made by the security officials, there wasn't

    17 any support, I did not feel anybody's support, and even

    18 more so because the struggle for survival went on for

    19 almost a year in that area and there was not a single

    20 safe position; that is to say, when a soldier was not

    21 in a trench, he knew that there was not a single safe

    22 place where he could rest even for an hour. The

    23 question was for how long we could survive and how long

    24 we could endure in that area.

    25 MR. NOBILO: Thank you, Mr. President. We

  84. 1 can take a break at this point.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: I think we will take a

    3 20-minute break. It's been a long morning and we're

    4 all beginning to get tired. We'll start at about a

    5 quarter after twelve.

    6 --- Recess taken at 11.55 a.m.

    7 --- On resuming at 12.20 p.m.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: We will now resume the

    9 hearing.

    10 I am convinced that the Judges' questions

    11 have moved you forward, Mr. Nobilo, so that you can

    12 finish by 1.30. I'm convinced of that. Now let me

    13 reassure you that if it isn't finished, we will take

    14 that time necessary when Judge Shahabuddeen comes

    15 back. We want things to be very clear. You have to

    16 carry out your mission; we have to carry out ours as

    17 completely as possible. If you finish, all the better;

    18 if you don't, we'll continue at another time, because

    19 we interrupted you.

    20 Mr. Nobilo, please proceed.

    21 MR. NOBILO: Thank you for your

    22 understanding, Mr. President.

    23 Q. General, on several occasions, the Prosecutor

    24 put rhetorical questions to you. "Give us at least one

    25 name of a person who was punished for this or that

  85. 1 offence." So could you please explain to the Court how

    2 you, as commander of the Operative Zone, viewed your

    3 role in the process of punishing the perpetrators of

    4 crimes?

    5 A. Well, I issued clear instructions and orders

    6 to my subordinates that I would not tolerate the

    7 commission of crimes, and my positions were quite clear

    8 in that respect and I should say that they were

    9 generally known to all my associates. If, after the

    10 investigation, I would receive information about the

    11 perpetrators of crimes, I would also act in accordance

    12 with a system: I would either file a criminal report

    13 or I would ask the competent authorities to do that

    14 through the district military prosecutor.

    15 Q. Did you think that, as commander of the

    16 Operative Zone, it was your duty to personally conduct

    17 investigations of individual crimes?

    18 A. I did not think that was my duty, and it was

    19 not at that level where it was possible for me to do so

    20 either. I tried to work in accordance with a system

    21 and to make sure that a system be established that

    22 would function and where competent expert professionals

    23 would carry out investigations and also initiate

    24 proceedings.

    25 Q. During your schooling, did you receive any

  86. 1 training as an investigator of crime?

    2 A. No. In the former JNA and also in the HVO, I

    3 always tried to make sure that the system operated and

    4 that everyone, in keeping with his own abilities and

    5 legal responsibilities, carries out his duties.

    6 Q. In the case of prosecuting criminal offences,

    7 what was the most important thing and what was the most

    8 difficult thing?

    9 A. The most difficult thing was to discover the

    10 perpetrators of criminal offences, that is to say, to

    11 arrive at the name and surname of the perpetrator of a

    12 crime.

    13 Q. In the Operative Zone of Central Bosnia, in

    14 keeping with the decree on armed forces and other laws,

    15 which bodies did you have at your disposal that did

    16 have the power to investigate crime?

    17 A. The military police and the security

    18 service.

    19 Q. What could you do in respect of criminal

    20 offences? What could you do and what could you ask the

    21 security service and the military police to do?

    22 A. I could request that they be engaged in the

    23 efforts aimed at discovering the perpetrators of

    24 criminal offences. However, I already said that due to

    25 the dual change of command, the orders of their direct

  87. 1 superiors from Mostar always had priority.

    2 Q. Did you issue orders to these organs and did

    3 you ask in that way to investigate the perpetrators of

    4 all crimes, including war crimes?

    5 A. Yes, I did that and I insisted on that, and

    6 sometimes I would even repeat orders and sometimes I

    7 would issue orders in respect of orders, and I would

    8 inform my superiors about all the problems that I was

    9 facing in such activities.

    10 Q. Do you know whether they, within their own

    11 hierarchy, received the same kind of orders from their

    12 superiors? Do you know what kind of orders they

    13 received from their superiors?

    14 A. I don't know what kind of orders they

    15 received. In that sense, they were quite autonomous

    16 and independent of me, in that respect.

    17 Q. Do you agree with the assertion that the

    18 military police is the biggest, and then there is SIS

    19 also, that they were inefficient in investigating

    20 crimes in the Lasva River Valley in 1993?

    21 A. Yes.

    22 Q. When a body is inefficient, could you have

    23 changed the structure of the military police or of the

    24 SIS?

    25 A. I did not have such powers, and I could only

  88. 1 repeat my requests, my insistence, and I would write

    2 and ask that the structure of the establishment of the

    3 HVO be changed.

    4 Q. If you cannot change the bodies that are

    5 supposed to discover the perpetrators of crimes and

    6 they don't do that well, what could you do in that

    7 situation?

    8 A. The only thing I could do in that situation

    9 -- or, rather, I could not punish anyone. I could

    10 only ask for the structure, the organisational

    11 structure, to be changed, primarily of the military

    12 police, so that later I would manage to achieve changes

    13 within the military police.

    14 Q. So when you came to the conclusion that --

    15 the organ that is supposed to discover crimes, did you

    16 reconcile yourself to that or did you try to do

    17 something and did you manage to do something? Tell the

    18 Court about that.

    19 A. I did not reconcile myself to that, and I

    20 insisted that the structure of the establishment of the

    21 military police be changed. And already from August

    22 1993, thanks to the appointment of Palavra as head of

    23 the military police, I managed, together with him,

    24 within a very short period of time, to achieve changes

    25 in the military police, to train it to the extent to

  89. 1 which this was possible under those circumstances, and

    2 thus perpetrators of crimes were discovered more easily

    3 but also public law and order were enhanced and also

    4 crime suppression was improved.

    5 Q. Do you remember a name, a single name of a

    6 single case when the military police or SIS gave you

    7 the name of a perpetrator and that you did not take

    8 disciplinary action or that you did not ask for

    9 criminal proceedings to be initiated?

    10 A. There was certainly no such case. There was

    11 not a single case that I received a name and surname

    12 and that I did not react, either in terms of criminal

    13 proceedings or in terms of disciplinary proceedings,

    14 and this was generally known not only to the members of

    15 my command but also to my immediate associates.

    16 Q. My colleague, the Prosecutor, had been

    17 cross-examining you for weeks and this trial has been

    18 going on for two years. Do you remember a single piece

    19 of evidence that was presented to this Court on the

    20 basis of which we could conclude that you found out who

    21 the perpetrators of a crime were and that you did not

    22 want to initiate proceedings against such a person? Is

    23 there any such evidence?

    24 A. No.

    25 MR. NOBILO: Please, could this group of

  90. 1 exhibits that we have prepared, these are Defence

    2 Exhibits, could they please be shown? We are not going

    3 to read all of them. We would just like to see D220,

    4 D219, D221, D222, D223, D224, D225, D226, D227, D228,

    5 D229, D230, D231, D232, D233, D234.

    6 Q. Could you just take a quick look at this?

    7 Could you please give him all the documents

    8 so that he could see them all very quickly?

    9 And could you please tell the Court what

    10 these documents are and what they prove? All together,

    11 not one paper by one paper, one document by one

    12 document, all together what do these documents show?

    13 A. All these documents show that there were

    14 accurate records about the disciplinary measures that

    15 were pronounced, about disciplinary punishment that was

    16 taken, that is to say, that if measures were

    17 pronounced, that the sentence had to be served and --

    18 JUDGE JORDA: For the method here, I'd like

    19 to make two comments. I would like to congratulate

    20 the rapidity with which the General is able to

    21 familiarise himself with the documents, that's

    22 different than what it was in the past, and you have to

    23 admit that the Judges don't have the documents in front

    24 of them. So we're listening to the witness who is

    25 saying what he wants to say, but there has to be a

  91. 1 method. I know it's a little longer. We don't have to

    2 look at all the details of the documents, but at least

    3 let us define the documents, whether it be either

    4 Mr. Nobilo or the witness, at least give us the number

    5 of the document that you're talking about; otherwise,

    6 it's really simply an argument and your client is

    7 saying what he wants to say. Thank you.

    8 MR. NOBILO: We have enumerated the documents

    9 and they are in the transcript, and they just show how

    10 intensively disciplinary proceedings were carried out.

    11 We just wanted to recall that. We don't want to go

    12 into each and every document, but we just wanted to put

    13 together in one place all the documents that speak of

    14 disciplinary proceedings that were taken.

    15 JUDGE JORDA: That is your right, and I think

    16 it's a good method to make a comment, you, the Defence

    17 attorneys, but not to have your client say "This

    18 document proves this or that." We couldn't use that

    19 kind of method.

    20 Please continue.

    21 MR. NOBILO: Thank you.

    22 Q. One more question related to disciplinary

    23 proceedings. The Prosecutor quoted Article 29 to you

    24 from the decree on disciplinary action, that is to say,

    25 that even when criminal proceedings are initiated, that

  92. 1 you are authorised to take disciplinary proceedings,

    2 and you said that you didn't do that. Why? Could you

    3 explain this to the Court?

    4 A. Theoretically, this was possible, and

    5 practically, if it was established that a soldier had

    6 committed a criminal offence, on the instructions of

    7 the district military prosecutor, he was put into the

    8 investigative prison, investigative military prison,

    9 and then an investigation was started, and then he

    10 would receive a sentence, one to five years of

    11 imprisonment, I can't remember the exact range, and the

    12 maximum that he could get in disciplinary proceedings

    13 would be up to 60 days of military detention. So from

    14 a practical point of view, it was not exactly

    15 expedient, because this soldier, if he was the

    16 perpetrator of a criminal offence, he had even

    17 previously been removed from a unit and his issued

    18 weapons were taken away from him, and he would be

    19 prosecuted by the district military prosecutor for the

    20 commission of a crime.

    21 Q. Tell us, what were your possibilities -- what

    22 was your authority in criminal proceedings?

    23 A. Well, if I would receive the names of the

    24 perpetrator of a criminal offence, that is to say, if

    25 the military police service or the security service

  93. 1 provide me with the names of the perpetrator of a

    2 crime, I could file a criminal report against that

    3 perpetrator, and I did file criminal reports against

    4 perpetrators of crimes.

    5 Q. Who decided whether criminal proceedings

    6 would be instituted or not?

    7 A. It was exclusively within the authority of

    8 the military district prosecutor. I did not have any

    9 authority in that respect. I could not influence the

    10 decision of the district military prosecutor.

    11 Q. And now a few words about the authority of

    12 the civilian and military police. Can you tell us how

    13 this authority was exercised? When was the civilian

    14 police in charge and when was the military police in

    15 charge?

    16 A. If the perpetrator of a crime was a civilian,

    17 then the investigation was carried out by the civilian

    18 police; if the perpetrator of a crime was a soldier,

    19 then the investigation was carried out by the military

    20 police; and if the perpetrator of a crime was unknown,

    21 then the investigation was carried by the authorities

    22 of the civilian police force. They would establish a

    23 file and they would work until it was established,

    24 possibly, that the perpetrator was a military man, and

    25 then the entire file would be handed over to the

  94. 1 military police for their further processing. But it

    2 is primarily the civilian police that carried out

    3 on-site investigations and carried out the

    4 investigation in general if the perpetrator was

    5 unknown.

    6 Q. In respect of criminal investigations of the

    7 civilian police, did you have any authority in that

    8 respect?

    9 A. No. There was an entire system of the

    10 civilian police. They had their own commander, they

    11 had their own superior, so to speak, and I did not have

    12 any authority over the civilian police.

    13 Q. What about the administration of the civilian

    14 police? Did it function throughout the war in the

    15 enclave where you were, in the Lasva River Valley?

    16 A. Yes, the administration was in charge of all

    17 of Central Bosnia and it functioned in Travnik until

    18 the fall of Travnik and later it was moved to Vitez,

    19 and it was in charge of all the police stations within

    20 the territory of Central Bosnia, all civilian police

    21 stations.

    22 Q. Did anything change in the powers of the

    23 civilian and military police over civilian and military

    24 persons because there was a war going on, in respect of

    25 war and peace?

  95. 1 A. No.

    2 MR. NOBILO: Thank you. Mr. President, now

    3 we would like to move on to a different area, that is,

    4 whether the conflict was international or internal,

    5 this is a matter that the Court will certainly be

    6 interested in, and the Prosecutor presented here as

    7 evidence an entire series of orders issued by Croatian

    8 General Bobetko, and, therefore, we would like to look

    9 into this very important area now.

    10 Could the Judges and the witness please be

    11 given the following documents: Defence Exhibit (sic)

    12 406/6, 406/7, 406/8, 406/9, 406/10, 406/11, 406/12,

    13 406/13, 406/14, 406/15, 406/16, 406/19, 406/20, 406/21,

    14 406/22. Prosecutor's Exhibits.

    15 JUDGE JORDA: Wasn't that indicated before,

    16 Mr. Registrar? It's taking quite a lot of time here.

    17 It's taking a long time.

    18 THE REGISTRAR: I apologise, Your Honour.

    19 MR. NOBILO:

    20 Q. Well, General, would you take a quick look at

    21 these documents? Don't read through them all, we

    22 aren't going to discuss them in detail, but just look

    23 at the dates. Take a look at the dates to see when

    24 they were issued and make a note of the earliest date

    25 and the latest date, please.

  96. 1 Well, General, have you taken a look at the

    2 documents, General Bobetko's documents, his orders and

    3 the other documents from his book, and what time span

    4 are they?

    5 A. According to the documents that I received,

    6 April, May, and June 1992.

    7 Q. Tell us, do you know General Bobetko?

    8 A. Yes, I do know General Bobetko.

    9 Q. Have you read his book?

    10 A. I've read his book.

    11 MR. NOBILO: I'd now like to ask a document

    12 to be passed round before the rest.

    13 THE REGISTRAR: This is D574 and D574A for

    14 the English version.

    15 MR. KEHOE: We haven't got the document.

    16 MR. NOBILO: You haven't?

    17 MR. KEHOE: No.

    18 THE REGISTRAR: The usher has gone to make a

    19 copy for the Prosecutor.

    20 MR. NOBILO:

    21 Q. Tell us, General, according to the best of

    22 your knowledge, in reading General Bobetko's books and

    23 according to your general knowledge, why did General

    24 Bobetko, with the troops of the Croatian army, enter

    25 the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

  97. 1 A. Quite obviously he had a goal and an

    2 assignment, that is to say, to stop the invasion of the

    3 southern portion of Croatia, above all, Dubrovnik and

    4 Split, and to stabilise the defence on a broad base, so

    5 as to create the prerequisites necessary to stop a

    6 complete occupation, to prevent a complete occupation.

    7 And he entered Bosnia-Herzegovina with his troops in

    8 order to have the necessary operative depth in which to

    9 develop and deploy the HVO units in the defence.

    10 Q. Who did he enter into conflict with? Who was

    11 included into that armed conflict during the time that

    12 General Bobetko was located in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    13 A. On the one side, in that part, we had the

    14 Croatian army, supported by local Croats and Muslims,

    15 and on the other side, there were the members of the

    16 Yugoslav People's Army, or the Yugoslav army as it was

    17 called at the time, supported by the local Serbs who

    18 the Yugoslav army had mobilised into its composition,

    19 into its ranks.

    20 MR. NOBILO: I'd now like to ask that the map

    21 be distributed.

    22 THE REGISTRAR: This is D575.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Does everybody have the maps?

    24 Does the Prosecutor have the maps? Let's try to move

    25 forward. I hope that the military breakthroughs of the

  98. 1 army are more rapid than the distribution of

    2 documents.

    3 MR. NOBILO: The maps are Defence Exhibits

    4 D575/1, D575/2, D575/3, and so on, in order.

    5 Q. General, I should now like to ask you briefly

    6 to explain these maps to us. They are photocopies

    7 taken from General Bobetko's book, and as the map is in

    8 colour, the original map, I just used a marker to

    9 denote the positions of the Yugoslav army. So the

    10 colour you see in there are the front lines and the

    11 axes in which the Yugoslav army moved. I'd like to ask

    12 you to read out the title of the map, what it

    13 represents, and to tell us briefly what the map

    14 represents. So, first of all, read out the text on the

    15 first map, Defence Exhibit D575/1.

    16 A. And I'm reading the title: "The planned and

    17 implemented operations of the forces of the JNA and the

    18 Chetnik units," on the 10th of April, "10/04/1992.

    19 Legend: The focal points of Serb uprising, the axes of

    20 attack by the JNA forces, and the Chetnik units

    21 realised and those planned. The secret activities of

    22 the enemy."

    23 Q. Can you, because the map is not a very

    24 detailed one, indicate the borders of Croatia and

    25 Bosnia-Herzegovina in the southern portion? Take up

  99. 1 the pointer, please, to give an indication to the Court

    2 where the frontier of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina

    3 was.

    4 A. The border was this dotted line (indicating),

    5 and it goes via Azan, Imotska, towards Vervovac,

    6 Capljina, Metkovic, Neum.

    7 Q. Tell us, so in the south, it is right near

    8 the coastline. When you look at the arrows which

    9 indicate the axes of attack of the Yugoslav People's

    10 Army, what are you able to conclude? For them, the

    11 battleground in both states, is it a unified

    12 battleground, or are the combat operations conducted in

    13 such a fashion that they would have to take into

    14 account where the republican borders lay?

    15 A. The battleground was treated as a unified

    16 whole, regardless of whether -- regardless of the

    17 republican borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia,

    18 and that can be seen from the operations realised by

    19 the JNA in the valley of the River Neretva and in the

    20 region behind Dubrovnik, as well as in the north by the

    21 forces of the Knin Corps.

    22 Q. Which state is Knin in?

    23 A. Knin is in the Republic of Croatia. And

    24 those forces were halted north-west of Livno, north of

    25 Livno as well, and north of Tomislavgrad, that is to

  100. 1 say, in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So those forces treated a

    2 uniform battleground from Split to Dubrovnik up until

    3 Kupres.

    4 Q. Tell us, what were the JNA's plans, according

    5 to this deployment of forces? The JNA on the

    6 right-hand side of the map, did they want to join up

    7 with the JNA on the other side of the map, and had that

    8 occurred, what would that have meant?

    9 A. At all events, the operations that were

    10 conducted in the Neretva valley, the delta of the River

    11 Neretva, moving towards the south and Dubrovnik, should

    12 have continued to the right bank of the River Neretva,

    13 and there we have the force -- this was done by the

    14 Herzegovina forces of the JNA, and the forces of the

    15 Knin Corps were contained in the existing positions and

    16 operations were to have continued along the general

    17 axis toward Sinj and to have a joining up of forces

    18 with the forces of the Herzegovina Corps.

    19 Q. Had that joining up taken place, what would

    20 that have meant for Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    21 A. Had that joining of forces taken place, then

    22 that would have meant a complete occupation and

    23 encirclement of Bosnia-Herzegovina because the forces

    24 of the Herzegovinian corps would have come out at

    25 Ploce, and the Knin corps forces would have been about

  101. 1 the town of Split itself.

    2 Q. Would it have been possible in that case to

    3 bring any logistics and the military materiel to the BH

    4 army and the HVO in Central Bosnia? Would that have

    5 been possible?

    6 A. No, it would not have been possible. Not

    7 only would no logistics have been possible but the

    8 evacuation of refugees and aid and assistance generally

    9 would have been impossible because the pliers around

    10 Bosnia and Herzegovina would have been completely

    11 closed, the town of Livno towards Neum, and this would

    12 have been a completely occupied area. It wouldn't have

    13 been occupied 70 per cent, but Bosnia-Herzegovina would

    14 have been occupied 100 per cent.

    15 Q. May we have a look at the next map after the

    16 10th of April, when Croatian forces entered

    17 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    18 Once again, we have a map copied from General

    19 Bobetko's book, and the pink denotes the forces of the

    20 Yugoslav army. Can you tell us what this map

    21 represents?

    22 A. This map represents the attacks implemented

    23 by the forces of the Yugoslav army and the

    24 counterattack by the Croatian army in between the 23rd

    25 up until the 27th of April, 1992. In the legend, the

  102. 1 legend states the first phase of the implementation of

    2 the assignments on the southern front, a successfully

    3 thwarted attack of the enemy with significant losses.

    4 Then it says "Counterattacks" and part of the territory

    5 lost fortifying the defence of HB, breaking down the

    6 enemy attack core, nucleus, and forcing the enemy to

    7 defend the occupied -- and it doesn't say what.

    8 Q. Let us see, once again, who the conflicting

    9 sides are. Who fought against whom?

    10 A. On the side of the attacker, we have the

    11 forces of the Yugoslav army, and here we see that it

    12 was the 13th Partisan Brigade. Then we have the TO

    13 detachment of Ljubina and the TO of Danilovgrad.

    14 Q. On the other side, who was on the other side?

    15 A. On the other side, we had the forces of the

    16 Croatian army ...

    17 Q. We don't need to know the units, General.

    18 Let us take a look at the next map and look at the

    19 dates that this refers to.

    20 A. This map shows the defence line of the

    21 southern battlefront on the 10th of April, 1992.

    22 Q. So this is the front line before the

    23 breakthrough?

    24 A. Yes, that was the front line before the

    25 attack by the Yugoslav army and the counterattack by

  103. 1 the Croatian army, and you can see clearly from Mostar,

    2 along the Neretva River Valley, through Hutovo, that's

    3 the front line.

    4 Q. Could we look at the next map, please?

    5 A. This map shows the attacks by the Croatian

    6 army in the second stage of the implementation of the

    7 tasks on the southern front in the period from the 18th

    8 of May until the 30th of May, 1992. On one side, we

    9 have the forces of the Yugoslav army once again, helped

    10 with mobilised persons from Montenegro and other

    11 areas. On the other side, we have the forces of the

    12 HV.

    13 Q. Thank you. Can we look at the next map?

    14 A. This map shows the attacks by the Croatian

    15 army in deblocking Dubrovnik in the period from the

    16 27th of May until the 19th of October, 1992, and on one

    17 side, we have forces of the Yugoslav army and on the

    18 other side are forces of the Croatian army.

    19 Q. Do we have another map? Let's look at the

    20 last map.

    21 A. This is a decision of the commander of the

    22 southern front, code name "Tiger," to carry out the

    23 liberation of Dubrovnik and the terrain right behind

    24 it. Forces of the Croatian army are participating in

    25 that action. On the other side, we have members of the

  104. 1 Yugoslav army and mobilised Serbs and Montenegrins.

    2 Q. Thank you. General, could you please tell us

    3 how long General Bobetko was in Bosnia-Herzegovina with

    4 his troops? How long did the battle on the southern

    5 front last?

    6 A. It lasted until October, I think, of '92, and

    7 after that, the HV forces and General Bobetko were

    8 transferred to another area.

    9 Q. In that period, from the 10th of April 1993

    10 until October 1993, during the time General Bobetko and

    11 the Croatian army were in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was

    12 there a conflict between the army of Bosnia and

    13 Herzegovina, meaning the TO, and the HV?

    14 A. No. They participated together in most of

    15 the actions, the Croatian forces and the Bosniak Muslim

    16 forces.

    17 Q. How do you explain the fact that in that time

    18 period, General Bobetko not only stayed with the

    19 Croatian troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but he was

    20 obviously, on HVO letterheads, issuing orders to

    21 certain groups of the HVO in Herzegovina?

    22 A. He issued orders by the very fact that

    23 neither the Territorial Defence nor the units of the

    24 HVO, they were not structured or organised at that

    25 time, and earlier, I had a document in my hands where

  105. 1 he issued an order, that's document 574, where he says

    2 in item 2, he orders units of the Territorial Defence,

    3 it's headed to the general staff in Hrvatska Grude, and

    4 then it also includes units of the Territorial

    5 Defence. Neither the Territorial Defence nor the HVO

    6 were structured. This was not completed. They mostly

    7 were active at the level of municipalities under the

    8 crisis committees, the crisis staffs. They were only

    9 beginning to get organised at that time.

    10 Q. Would you please tell the Court when the law

    11 was adopted, the law on the armed forces, which was the

    12 basis for the organisation of the HVO as an army?

    13 A. This was done at the beginning of July 1992,

    14 I think it happened on the 3rd of July, 1992, and only

    15 in the second half of August of '92 were the officers

    16 named for the defence department of the HVO, which

    17 later grew into the Defence Ministry as a body which

    18 would be in charge of creating and organising the

    19 military structure.

    20 Q. In your opinion, as an expert, at the time

    21 that General Bobetko and the Croatian troops were in

    22 Herzegovina, did the HVO exist at all as an organised

    23 armed force?

    24 A. No. These were local groups, and only the

    25 beginnings, the first attempts to structure these

  106. 1 groups were being made.

    2 MR. NOBILO: I would like the usher to

    3 distribute a new document and to give it a number, a

    4 new exhibit.

    5 THE REGISTRAR: This will be D576, D576A for

    6 the English version. Let me say that the previous

    7 document, that is, the maps, that was 575/1, 2, up to

    8 6. There were six maps.

    9 MR. NOBILO:

    10 Q. I would like to read parts of the letter by

    11 General Bobetko to Franjo Tudjman which were published

    12 on pages 137 and 138 of his book. The letter is

    13 addressed to the president of the republic, Franjo

    14 Tudjman:

    15 "Mr. President, the offensive operations on

    16 the southern front of the Croatian Army forces,

    17 numbering 1.475 soldiers, have begun on July 1st 1992.

    18 Until July 5th 1992, the following results were

    19 achieved," and then the results are enumerated.

    20 At the end, the assessment right at the end

    21 of the letter:

    22 "I assess that this is one of the most

    23 difficult attacks, one of the toughest attacks I had on

    24 this front. I take it that it has been performed

    25 well. We have created conditions for final liberation

  107. 1 of this part of Croatian territory.

    2 "Sincerely, Commander of the Southern Front

    3 Army, General Janko Bobetko, Dubrovnik, July 5th

    4 1992."

    5 A. I made a mistake. I saw that operations were

    6 completed in July, and I think I stated that they had

    7 been completed in October of 1992. But Konavle and the

    8 rear was liberated, and that was completed in October.

    9 MR. NOBILO: Could we look at the next

    10 document?

    11 THE REGISTRAR: This is D577, D577A for the

    12 English version.

    13 MR. NOBILO:

    14 Q. We translated only the section that was

    15 marked, that was highlighted, so I'm going to read

    16 that, and then I will ask you a question, General.

    17 This is a photocopy of page 267 from General

    18 Bobetko's book. He is talking about the results of the

    19 Croatian army:

    20 "Number one, we have managed to defend and

    21 preserve for good the existence of Croatian people in

    22 Herzegovina.

    23 "Number two, we have created favourable

    24 circumstances in order to establish an army. In the

    25 context of events that go on these days regarding the

  108. 1 forming of the federation and the confederation, it

    2 stands to question what our position would be" without

    3 these victories, what would that mean for our

    4 international as well as local position?

    5 "The operation itself has created very

    6 favourable operative conditions for final operations on

    7 the southern front, the main purpose of which is to

    8 expel the Montenegrin aggressor and to deploy forces to

    9 the area of Prevlaka," meaning to deblock

    10 Dubrovnik, "... and reclaiming the entire territory

    11 which has been under enemy occupation for over two

    12 years, and which has been considered by the enemy to be

    13 the final solution for borders of Great Serbia in these

    14 areas."

    15 General, General Bobetko states that these

    16 actions that you have just talked about which we showed

    17 on the maps, among other things, created favourable

    18 conditions to create an army of the future federation.

    19 How do you interpret that, and is that consistent with

    20 what you know about those operations?

    21 A. I interpret that to mean that these actions

    22 prevented the complete occupation of the only territory

    23 through which Bosnia and Herzegovina could receive any

    24 kind of help and that conditions were created to

    25 organise both the HVO and the army of Bosnia and

  109. 1 Herzegovina and, in some way, to continue with the

    2 process of the structuring of the federal army of the

    3 Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    4 Q. Can we conclude from that, what you stated

    5 earlier, that there was no HVO army at that time when

    6 the Croatian army entered the territory of Bosnia and

    7 Herzegovina?

    8 A. No. These were mostly armed formations or

    9 several armed formations which were managed by

    10 municipal crisis staffs. There were no brigades.

    11 There was no order on the creation of armed forces.

    12 There was no law. There was no formal defence

    13 department at that time. In some documents, the

    14 general staff is mentioned, but what they meant by that

    15 was mostly the administration, the administrative tasks

    16 in order to create an army.

    17 Q. The relationships that are evident from

    18 Prosecution Exhibits, which are orders of General

    19 Bobetko illustrating relations between the HV and the

    20 HVO in April, May, and June of 1992, are these

    21 relationships, according to your knowledge, contained

    22 in the second half of '92 and went on into '93, the

    23 relationship of superiority and subordination?

    24 A. No. It will be clear, if you look at the

    25 book of General Bobetko, that after the final

  110. 1 operations and the liberation of Dubrovnik and the

    2 Dubrovnik hinterlands, he withdrew, and there was a

    3 regrouping of those forces and that there was no

    4 more -- such relationship no longer existed, but the

    5 HVO structured itself and was organised just like the

    6 army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    7 MR. NOBILO: I would like to look at another

    8 document. It's also a copy from General Bobetko's

    9 book, it's page 419.

    10 Mr. President, I still have two questions on

    11 this document, and then after that, we can stop, or do

    12 you believe that we need to break now?

    13 JUDGE JORDA: You won't be finished this

    14 morning then?

    15 MR. NOBILO: No. I don't have more than 20

    16 or 30 minutes.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: You still have another 30

    18 minutes. All right. Then we'll start again when Judge

    19 Shahabuddeen returns.

    20 We said that we would take advantage of

    21 having Mr. Fourmy here for a few moments so that we can

    22 see what the schedule is going to be for next week and

    23 the week after that. I don't know whether it's

    24 Mr. Fourmy or Mr. Hayman who can give us clarification

    25 for next week, during which ordinarily we should sit in

  111. 1 a bench accepted by the Defence pursuant to Rule 71 but

    2 conditional on there being a witness, which is not

    3 perhaps certain.

    4 Mr. Hayman, perhaps you could shed some light

    5 on that issue for us?

    6 MR. HAYMAN: Mr. President, we don't have any

    7 more information about the witnesses that we were

    8 trying to get here on Monday, and because we think they

    9 will be short, we would request that we keep them as a

    10 block and that we not plan on hearing them next week

    11 but we'll slot them in when the Court indicates. We

    12 think half a day will be sufficient for the three

    13 "sentencing phase" witnesses. Again, we apologise for

    14 the disorganisation.

    15 JUDGE JORDA: Well, all of us have problems

    16 with witnesses that we have to bring in, especially

    17 given the context of what's going on now.

    18 Let me turn to Mr. Fourmy and then I'll hear

    19 what the Prosecutor has to say.

    20 Mr. Fourmy, I suppose that you've contacted

    21 the appropriate people. Are you going on vacation

    22 or ...

    23 MR. FOURMY: Well, I would be very pleased to

    24 suggest that the Trial Chamber take advantage of the

    25 time when Judge Shahabuddeen will not be here for the

  112. 1 other two Judges and the parties to have a free week

    2 next week, which would allow the Defence to use the

    3 time to verify where things stand for the three

    4 witnesses.

    5 The following week, we can bring in the

    6 witnesses depending upon their availability; that is,

    7 the Trial Chamber's witnesses.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: Therefore, I understand,

    9 Mr. Hayman, that you think that your three witnesses

    10 will be available not next week but the week after

    11 that, which would allow us to sit in a full bench,

    12 which, of course, would be a good thing.

    13 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, we suggest that

    14 our three witnesses be heard on the 7th of June. We

    15 could hear them all on the afternoon of the 7th of June

    16 without any problem.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Monday, the 7th of June. All

    18 right. There's no problem with that. That would give

    19 us the opportunity to use next week. We had thought

    20 about bringing in some of the Trial Chamber's witnesses

    21 next week and we had hoped you would make contact with

    22 those people.

    23 MR. FOURMY: We are trying to find out

    24 whether four of the witnesses will come during the week

    25 of the 7th to the 11th of June.

  113. 1 JUDGE JORDA: All right. Next week, Judge

    2 Rodrigues and I will devote our time to other cases

    3 before the Trial Chamber. We know that Judge

    4 Shahabuddeen will be in Arusha with the Appeals

    5 Chamber. Now I suggest that we adjourn, unless the

    6 Prosecutor has any comments to make about that

    7 schedule.

    8 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, Your Honours,

    9 we're satisfied with the schedule. Thank you.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: If everybody's satisfied, we

    11 will adjourn, and I will see you during the week of the

    12 7th of June. Thank you very much. The court stands

    13 adjourned.

    14 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

    15 1.29 p.m., to be reconvened on Monday,

    16 the 7th day of June, 1999, at 2.00 p.m.