1. 1 Wednesday, 9th June, 1999

    2 (Open session)

    3 --- Upon commencing at 10.06 a.m.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Please be seated. First of

    5 all, good morning to the interpreters, to be sure that

    6 everybody can hear me. Good morning to Prosecution

    7 counsel, to Defence counsel, and I would ask the

    8 registrar to have the accused brought into the

    9 courtroom.

    10 (The accused entered court)

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Since everybody can hear, let

    12 me remind you that this is a new phase -- I am saying

    13 this for the public -- a new phase of the trial

    14 conducted by the Office of the Prosecutor against

    15 General Blaskic, and we are going to have witnesses

    16 called by the Trial Chamber. I would like to have the

    17 first witness brought in, who is General Enver

    18 Hadzihasanovic.

    19 (The witness entered court)

    20 JUDGE JORDA: Do you hear me, General? Can

    21 you hear the Presiding Judge? Please remain standing

    22 for a few moments. I would first like for you to tell

    23 us your name, your first name, your date and place of

    24 birth, your profession, today your residence, and then

    25 you will take an oath. After that, of course, you will

  2. 1 sit down.

    2 THE WITNESS: Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

    3 I hear you very well -- Mr. President. I am Enver

    4 Hadzihasanovic, General Enver Hadzihasanovic. I was

    5 born on the 7th of July, 1950, in the municipality of

    6 Zvornik in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I work at the Defence

    7 Ministry of the army, at the Federal Defence Ministry

    8 of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I am the deputy assistant

    9 minister for chief inspection in defence matters.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Did you keep your rank in the

    11 army, General? Shall we continue to call you General?

    12 THE WITNESS: That's correct, yes.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Where do you live? If you

    14 could tell us, that would be good. You don't have to

    15 tell us.

    16 THE WITNESS: (redacted)

    17 (redacted).

    18 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. I would like you to

    19 take an oath, and then you may be seated.

    20 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will

    21 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

    22 truth.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, General. You may

    24 now be seated.

    25 THE WITNESS: Thank you.


    2 [A witness called by the Trial Chamber]

    3 JUDGE JORDA: I would like to give you a few

    4 words of introduction. You know what the origin and

    5 the reason for your coming today is. We thank you for

    6 coming, and we would also like to thank your government

    7 which demonstrated its cooperation with the

    8 International Criminal Tribunal.

    9 You are before the International Criminal

    10 Tribunal having been called by this Trial Chamber. You

    11 are therefore one of the witnesses called pursuant to

    12 the discretionary powers of the Judges pursuant to Rule

    13 98 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence in the trial

    14 at the International Tribunal of General Blaskic who,

    15 at the time of the facts, was a colonel, and who is

    16 present to your left. I suppose you recognise him. To

    17 your right is the Office of the Prosecutor and Defence

    18 counsel to the left.

    19 At this trial, and at a point where this

    20 trial is coming to an end, the Judges wished to hear a

    21 certain number of major witnesses who occupied

    22 important positions at the time of the facts when the

    23 General was a General in Central Bosnia.

    24 Through this summons that was given to you on

    25 the 21st of May, 1999, we asked that you concentrate on

  4. 1 three or four themes which I will now point out to you

    2 in rapid fashion, that is, the origin and development

    3 of the situation, of the conflict, since there are two

    4 versions which are completely opposed, one to the

    5 other.

    6 We are also speaking about the organisation

    7 and structure of the forces of the army that you were

    8 the commander of, that is, its importance in respect of

    9 the HVO.

    10 You saw that there was also a third subject

    11 which has to do with all of the meetings and

    12 correspondence and discussions about organisations or

    13 non-organisations in respect of cease-fires, civilian

    14 populations, humanitarian assistance, and you saw that

    15 in your summons.

    16 There is also a fourth subject, which is the

    17 perception that you have of the accused personally and

    18 professionally.

    19 The Trial Chamber especially would like for

    20 you to provide a synthesised envision of the questions

    21 since this is a two-year trial and the Trial Chamber

    22 has already heard a great number of testimonies and

    23 read many documents both from the Prosecution and the

    24 Defence. This is why your testimony will be limited to

    25 a certain time period which is relatively -- I say

  5. 1 "relatively" -- short so that it will be directed in

    2 the way that you want to present the facts, about an

    3 hour and a half or an hour and fifteen minutes. I

    4 think that if you have to take a little bit longer, of

    5 course, you can.

    6 Your testimony will be free. You can use

    7 notes, but you cannot make a prepared statement. If

    8 you are tired -- I know that you had an accident. If

    9 you are tired, you can ask for a break. Ordinarily,

    10 the break comes in at about 11.30.

    11 Therefore, you will begin to testify in

    12 respect of the things that were assigned to you in your

    13 summons. After that, for about an hour, hour and a

    14 half, the Prosecutor will ask you some questions, and

    15 then questions will be asked by Defence counsel, and

    16 finally, most likely, the Judges will ask you some

    17 questions as well.

    18 Please try to relax. You are before

    19 international judges, professional judges. You can

    20 speak without any hatred, without any fear, and we are

    21 expecting you to tell us about what you experienced but

    22 in a synthesised manner with all of the confidence that

    23 we expect from a witness testifying before an

    24 International Tribunal.

    25 It is a quarter after ten, and we will now

  6. 1 begin to hear your testimony. If I interrupt you, it

    2 will only be in order to bring you back to the major

    3 themes that the Judges asked you to deal with. But

    4 unless there are a few clarifications necessary,

    5 theoretically, you will be able to speak freely. Thank

    6 you very much.

    7 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honours. Thank

    8 you, Mr. President. I shall try to stay within the

    9 frameworks that I have to say which you expect of me.

    10 I should like to remind you that before I

    11 came to Central Bosnia and taking over as commander of

    12 the corps, I was the chief of staff in the 1st Corps in

    13 Sarajevo, and partially, on two occasions, I was an

    14 operative in the staff of the supreme command of the

    15 Bosnia-Herzegovina army. So from that aspect, I knew

    16 of the documents that defined the defence of the State

    17 of Bosnia-Herzegovina as such and the constitution and

    18 the law on defence, which underwent changes and

    19 amendments, and I was also well aware of the structure

    20 of the armed force of Bosnia-Herzegovina at that time

    21 in order to wage a successful defence against the

    22 aggressor.

    23 As such, I was involved in Central Bosnia, I

    24 was included not as a corps commander -- and perhaps

    25 this is something that you're going to hear for the

  7. 1 first time -- but I went with one more man from Central

    2 Bosnia. I was entrusted with preparing several units

    3 at brigade level to help the city of Sarajevo which was

    4 under siege, in a complete encirclement and a very

    5 difficult situation. When I say the city of Sarajevo,

    6 I mean the people of Sarajevo. The order which came

    7 from the supreme command to form a corps in the region

    8 of Bosnia-Herzegovina was not implemented in Central

    9 Bosnia, so those kinds of brigades had not been

    10 established in that way for this task to be

    11 implemented.

    12 In addition to me, four other men came with

    13 the same intention from the direction of Igman, Mount

    14 Igman, and two individuals came from the axis of

    15 Trnovo, that is from the Neretva River Valley. I wrote

    16 my report quite normally and said that I could not

    17 carry out my task because the corps had not been set up

    18 and such units had not been formed. Then I was told to

    19 set up the 3rd Corps in Central Bosnia. That was my

    20 assignment. The intention was the same, to define

    21 units which would, as soon as possible, be capacitated

    22 and organised and to assist Sarajevo, first of all, and

    23 soon after, to form and conceive units which would hold

    24 the line of the front on the front line against the

    25 aggressor. Those were the basic tasks in that period

  8. 1 of time when I came on the scene.

    2 The principles of organisation for the BH

    3 army, I am going to give you. I just want to remind

    4 you that the law provided for the fact that the armed

    5 forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina are made up by the army of

    6 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croatian Defence Council, and

    7 all other armed formations which, in the system of the

    8 chain of command, command and control, were used to

    9 defend Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    10 I can give you here excerpts because I have

    11 copied out excerpts from these provisions if that is

    12 necessary. But as we had not defined, in general

    13 terms, the status of the HVO, we adopted an amendment

    14 and a decree, having the force of law, a decree law,

    15 which defined the HVO and that it was a component part

    16 of the army, and it was a valid part of the defence

    17 system of Bosnia-Herzegovina but under a united

    18 command.

    19 Coming to Central Bosnia, the system of

    20 organisation for the units was based upon the

    21 following: We applied the principles of organisation

    22 and the establishment of an army as we had been taught

    23 at military academy. I completed the military academy

    24 in Belgrade for four years after my gymnasium, and

    25 after I spent a certain amount of time in the JNA, I

  9. 1 also went to a staff academy which lasted for two

    2 years, as a supplementary academic course. I knew the

    3 principles well, and I had to implement them.

    4 The problem of the entire region of

    5 Bosnia-Herzegovina lay in the fact that the previous

    6 law envisaged a Yugoslav People's Army as an operative

    7 army and the system of territorial defence as units to

    8 protect an area if there should be an aggression

    9 against the former Yugoslavia. But in view of the fact

    10 that the JNA, at that moment in time, joined, that is

    11 to say, was the army of the aggressor, it remained in

    12 the territory of -- just the structure of territorial

    13 defence remained in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and when an

    14 immediate danger of war was proclaimed, territorial

    15 organisations started, according to the principles and

    16 laws. So these units of territorial defence were

    17 commanded by the wartime presidencies of the

    18 municipalities and districts and the political and

    19 economic system of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In that way,

    20 there was no united command because each unit had its

    21 own area and territory, and nobody was able to

    22 dislocate it and remove it from one region to another.

    23 In view of the fact that the law provided for

    24 the creation of an armed force in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

    25 that is to say, the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was

  10. 1 necessary to have this territorial principle translated

    2 into the principle of an army which was able to

    3 function and manoeuvre according to requirements and

    4 the assessments of the danger that existed and towards

    5 the axes from which the danger came, and that was

    6 precisely my task.

    7 I, at that time, for the first time, met

    8 General Blaskic. I had not met him before that. I am

    9 going to say something about him later on, and if I

    10 recall, that was the last subject matter in the

    11 summons.

    12 I formed the 3rd Corps with a lot of --

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Sometimes we would ask you to

    14 provide some dates, please. For example, the first

    15 time you met him, perhaps you can give us some dates.

    16 That would help us. Thank you very much.

    17 THE WITNESS: I don't know whether I have the

    18 exact date in my other notebook, but I think we met for

    19 the first time when we toured the military factory, or

    20 perhaps it was a little earlier. But I do recall that

    21 date, and the reason was that it was the 22nd of

    22 December, and we would make jokes because that was

    23 Yugoslav People's Army Day, the 22nd of December. So

    24 we would joke about it and say, how come we were

    25 touring this factory on that particular date?

  11. 1 At that time, those were the problems that I

    2 encountered. I had to form a corps and to set it on

    3 its feet. After I met General Blaskic, I offered him

    4 the opportunity of doing this together with me. I even

    5 ensured, and we came to my headquarters, that is to

    6 say, the command of the 3rd Corps, that was just being

    7 prepared to function as a group of professionals, of

    8 experts, people that were capable of doing certain

    9 tasks and knew how to set up units and elaborate the

    10 documents necessary, and Blaskic, Mr. Blaskic, did not

    11 promise anything on that occasion, but he said he'd

    12 think about it.

    13 From that day on, it was difficult to discuss

    14 this subject. I soon saw why, came to realise why,

    15 because I had already worked in that area, and I knew

    16 the problems that existed in the area, and that was

    17 that I was disillusioned by the fact that the Bosniaks,

    18 in some towns, had already been expelled, and they were

    19 towns in which the Serbian army, the army of the

    20 aggressor, was not even close by. I learnt about

    21 Stolac, Capljina, and Prozor at that time had already

    22 been definitely ethnically cleared because there were

    23 no Bosniaks in it at all.

    24 From the local civilian leaders, I received

    25 information that they had a certain number of Bosniaks

  12. 1 who served to clean the streets and do auxiliary work

    2 of that kind. I never received a list of those people,

    3 I didn't ask for it either, because that was not the

    4 task of the army. That was the task of the civilian

    5 organs of power and authority, that is to say, to solve

    6 those problems in other ways.

    7 I also arrived at the time when the town of

    8 Jajce was taken control of by the aggressor, and my

    9 first, second, or third day there, I spent in Travnik,

    10 actually, where I encountered enormous columns of

    11 people who had been expelled, like what is happening in

    12 Kosovo today, something similar. I do not have any

    13 documents, but it is claimed that an agreement existed

    14 that the town of Jajce be turned over to the Serbs for

    15 some reason.

    16 Following instructions issued by the supreme

    17 command and attending what had been happening on the

    18 political arena, I know that the Vance-Owen Plan was

    19 currently being dealt with and that, in that

    20 connection, efforts were being made to create

    21 conditions to halt the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In

    22 that climate, there were three sides taking part, and I

    23 was disillusioned by that once again because I

    24 considered that the HVO and the BH army was one side

    25 and that the JNA and the extremist portion of the

  13. 1 Serbian people in Bosnia was the other side.

    2 I know that the plan contained -- could I

    3 just refer to my notes, please?

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, of course.

    5 THE WITNESS: It contained four major

    6 documents: the agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina; the

    7 second document was an agreement on peace for

    8 Bosnia-Herzegovina, that was a document offered on the

    9 30th of January already; the third document was a map

    10 for the provinces; the fourth document was an agreement

    11 on transitional solutions offered on the 25th of March,

    12 1993.

    13 I know that these agreements were, in part,

    14 signed at different periods of time and that a point of

    15 contention was always the maps, the map for the

    16 provinces and the transitional period, and in that

    17 transitional period, the definition of military

    18 relationships.

    19 In January, in Geneva, it was also a

    20 well-known fact that all sides had signed two

    21 documents. The agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina was one

    22 and the other was -- most of the documents related to

    23 peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Also in March, in New

    24 York, negotiations continued on the remaining

    25 documents. I know that at that time, the

  14. 1 representatives of the Soviet Union and the United

    2 States of America were present in addition to England,

    3 France, and others. I know that there were some

    4 reinforcements.

    5 In Geneva, the HDZ leader signed, as far as I

    6 know, three documents, so it is only the document on

    7 the transition period that remained for them. The

    8 president of the presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, on

    9 the 8th of March, signed the military document. So the

    10 pending issues remained the following: Some

    11 constitutional arrangements, the map of the provinces,

    12 and the transitional arrangements.

    13 The assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, at its

    14 meeting on the 15th of March, in its conclusions, gave

    15 its support to the negotiators in New York, as far as I

    16 can remember, because I was present at the assembly.

    17 It was also said that the Vance-Owen Plan was

    18 considered to be acceptable basically, however, with

    19 certain modifications as regards the status of

    20 Sarajevo, the protection of borders, the authority of

    21 the government at the level of all of

    22 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that its implementation should

    23 be an integral part of the agreement.

    24 The Serbs held an assembly of their own, or

    25 they had some kind of meeting, and I remember that they

  15. 1 tried to undermine the entire plan. So the New York

    2 round of negotiations -- I found this in documents --

    3 was concluded on the 25th of March with Alija

    4 Izetbegovic's signature on the maps agreement and on

    5 the transitional arrangements agreement, and also the

    6 leader of the HDZ signed the transitional arrangements

    7 agreement, and thirdly, the leader of the SDS refused

    8 to sign the two mentioned documents.

    9 I remember that the Security Council reacted

    10 by a resolution and brought pressure to bear on the SDS

    11 leader to sign this document. They signed it but said

    12 that this was on the condition that the assembly in

    13 Pale accepted this. As far as I can remember, the

    14 assembly did not adopt this and they opted for a

    15 referendum, and the referendum did not vote in favour

    16 of this. So this document was not received as valid.

    17 I think that the main problem was in these

    18 solutions that the Croatian people, that is to say, the

    19 HDZ, as far as I can remember, they wanted to have

    20 Provinces 8 and 9 -- lest I make a mistake, could I

    21 please use the map from the Vance-Owen Plan?

    22 JUDGE JORDA: Yes. Go ahead, General. If

    23 you would like to put it on our ELMO, the usher will

    24 help you, and this will also allow the public gallery

    25 to follow your presentations because this is a public

  16. 1 hearing and you didn't ask for any other protective

    2 measures. Therefore, it would be best for you to put

    3 it onto the ELMO, if that's possible.

    4 THE WITNESS: Actually, I suggest that this

    5 be seen because I think that the core of the conflict

    6 lies in some decisions of this nature.

    7 The military plan part of the Vance-Owen

    8 Plan -- well, I'm not criticising the plan. I was not

    9 authorised then or now to criticise it. I'm just

    10 trying to adopt an analytical approach and to base my

    11 conclusions on this basis, that is to say, why the

    12 military conflict took place.

    13 First of all, the Vance-Owen Plan exclusively

    14 envisaged three provinces respectively for each

    15 majority people with a certain minority of the other

    16 people. The Bosniaks got Province 1, 5, and 9; the

    17 Croatian people, with a different minority, got

    18 Provinces 3, 8, and 10; and the Serb people, 2, 4, and

    19 6. That is where the problem was precisely.

    20 When this was being signed, in the military

    21 part, the solution for the military was the following:

    22 That the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina exclusively, at

    23 the point when this programme is to be implemented, if

    24 it is to be adopted, that is to say, this plan, be

    25 withdrawn into Province 1; the Croatian Defence Council

  17. 1 into Province 3; the Serb army, the army of Republika

    2 Srpska, to Provinces 2, 4, and 6; and, together, the

    3 Armija and the HVO would withdraw into Provinces 5, 6,

    4 8, and 10.

    5 The problem was as follows: These joint

    6 parts -- I can't hear anything. I can't hear anything.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: There seems to be an

    8 interpretation problem here. I didn't hear the

    9 interpretation. Is there a problem in the booth?

    10 Yes, if you would please repeat the last

    11 sentence? You were talking about the withdrawal of

    12 each of the peoples according to the Vance-Owen Plan.

    13 If you don't mind repeating that, because there was a

    14 technical problem in the booth. Thank you.

    15 THE WITNESS: According to this plan, the

    16 Armija and -- the Armija and the HVO should together

    17 withdraw into Provinces 5, 9, 8, and 10. Since

    18 Provinces 8 and 10, just like 3, was supposed to belong

    19 to the Croatian people, according to this plan, given

    20 that there would be certain minorities of other

    21 peoples, there was a problem here as well. If this

    22 were to be implemented, the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina

    23 would have to be subordinated to the Croatian Defence

    24 Council in Provinces 8 and 10, and the law that was in

    25 force at that time, and documents speak in favour of

  18. 1 this, that the HVO was within the composition of the

    2 army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I am going to show a

    3 document later on.

    4 I did not see this order, but I heard General

    5 Petkovic commenting on this order, the Croatian side

    6 had signed this plan, and an order was issued that the

    7 army of Bosnia-Herzegovina would have to surrender to

    8 the HVO in this area.

    9 So I think the key problem with regard to the

    10 signature of this plan was, all the other problems that

    11 existed within this area of Central Bosnia, and as you

    12 can see, they belong to Provinces 8 and 10.

    13 I think that the HVO did not have any

    14 interest in the front lines at Province 2 and also

    15 vis-à-vis Sarajevo, and that is why some kind of

    16 systematic control began behind the front line through

    17 various points, various expulsions, various

    18 provocations of incidents with the army of

    19 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    20 I wanted to say another thing. I know that

    21 General Petkovic spoke in public and explained on

    22 television that, in this area, the army of Bosnia and

    23 Herzegovina was supposed to surrender to the HVO

    24 because there was an order of the main staff to that

    25 effect. I haven't got this document, but I think

  19. 1 there's also an order of Mr. Boban.

    2 I had grave problems. Many people complained

    3 about what the HVO did, starting from humanitarian

    4 organisations to civilians, because they saw, in the

    5 army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, some kind of a protector,

    6 and objectively we could not be that 100 per cent

    7 because we had just been organised and we were very

    8 poorly armed.

    9 Secondly, we were estimating what valid

    10 military objectives were. According to our own customs

    11 and according to international regulations, civilians

    12 were not supposed to suffer. At any rate, there was a

    13 general problem concerning civilians in Central Bosnia.

    14 As in Sarajevo in 1991, 1992, 1993, these

    15 problems came into being mainly in 1992 and they

    16 started at the end of 1992 and 1993, but they actually

    17 started at the beginning -- at the end of 1991. At

    18 that time, it was not clear to me why the area of

    19 Kiseljak took part in the blockade of the town of

    20 Sarajevo. I did not understand that. Because the only

    21 part that was not held by the Serb army was that area.

    22 There were many convoys where permission had to be

    23 sought, they were supposed to pass through that area,

    24 and also other military and logistics convoys, and many

    25 of them did not even pass through this area.

  20. 1 I see the cause of these conflicts in the

    2 decisions made by political leaders and in relation to

    3 this plan which, in fact, was never accepted nor ever

    4 became valid, and I see a cause in the decisions made

    5 by certain persons who did not abide by the laws of

    6 Bosnia-Herzegovina and its constitution as it was, and

    7 it was only the future and democracy that could change

    8 it.

    9 As regards the causes of the conflict between

    10 the Armija and the HVO and how they came into being,

    11 that is my view. We expected that plan to be signed,

    12 and I was au courant, and I was expecting many things.

    13 Then the conflicts broke out openly.

    14 At the end of 1992, when I came in October, I

    15 wanted many times, behind the front line, with the

    16 assistance of international organisations, to resolve

    17 problems, and these were problems that were behind the

    18 front lines and those were the problems I mentioned:

    19 the freedom of movement, humanitarian assistance, not

    20 touching civilians, et cetera.

    21 In relation to this, several meetings were

    22 held, and the HVO attended, namely, General Blaskic. I

    23 attended several such meetings, and the following

    24 issues were invariably discussed: I know that in

    25 January, an agreement was signed between the staff of

  21. 1 the HVO and the general staff of the army of

    2 Bosnia-Herzegovina to stop hostilities and also to

    3 remove checkpoints and basically to resolve these

    4 problems behind the front line and to try to organise a

    5 joint command, at least in the area of Travnik, which

    6 was supposed to be a touchstone, and joint operations

    7 were supposed to be carried out against the Serb

    8 aggressor. Many things had been agreed upon, but they

    9 were implemented with great difficulty. The reasons

    10 were probably in a lack of willingness or perhaps

    11 because such instructions were not received from higher

    12 instances.

    13 There are many details involved in these

    14 conflicts. Mr. Chairman, you said that many witnesses

    15 were heard and there are probably many documents. If

    16 I'm supposed to clarify any of this, I'm here and I'm

    17 ready to do so. I don't know if I took care of

    18 Questions 2 and 3 --

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Well, feel free to say what you

    20 want to say, but we would like to know in general how

    21 the conflict was carried out or what the enclaves were,

    22 what was the relationship of the forces. All through

    23 these two years, we've heard that the fighting was in

    24 the enclaves, who was besieged, who was carrying out

    25 the siege. As the 3rd Army Corps, we would like to

  22. 1 have your feelings about that question.

    2 THE WITNESS: Certainly. I don't know who

    3 explained the siege of the enclave; however, there is a

    4 valid military assessment in the area of Bosnia and

    5 Herzegovina, and that was to keep the territory and to

    6 strengthen the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina and

    7 to start liberation, and that is how we re-oriented

    8 ourselves in all areas in that period, including

    9 Central Bosnia.

    10 The 3rd Corps, as a corps at that time, had

    11 about 32.000 men, soldiers, and they were organised in

    12 brigades and later on in operative groups, and they

    13 were made up of people who belonged to the former

    14 structure of the Territorial Defence. Most members of

    15 the army, 80 or 90 per cent even, were oriented towards

    16 the front line against the aggressor. Those were their

    17 assignments.

    18 Bearing in mind the problems that were there

    19 previously, Stolac, Capljina, Prozor, everything I

    20 mentioned, Jajce, and also certain symptoms that had

    21 already prevailed in Central Bosnia and that were

    22 present there as well and that ended with expulsions of

    23 people, those were those problems that I mentioned:

    24 the freedom of movement, various checkpoints, controls,

    25 stopping convoys, mistreating people, and, finally,

  23. 1 killing people or detaining people.

    2 A decision was made in respect of the danger

    3 that was coming from behind, that is to say, that such

    4 action should not be permitted to expand because these

    5 actions did not take place in the Lasva Valley when

    6 Stolac and Capljina were taking place. This happened

    7 only later successively. Our only objective was to

    8 prevent a further expansion and to create such an area

    9 so that we could communicate with the front line,

    10 towards the front line, and with the 2nd Corps,

    11 because, as regards our general assessment, when I left

    12 my post, I knew that there was a plan and I knew from

    13 earlier on that the main idea was to bring the corps

    14 together to help Sarajevo.

    15 After the order relating to Provinces 8 and

    16 10 was not accepted, then there was a conflict between

    17 the army and the HVO, and this open conflict meant the

    18 following: stopping troops that were moving to the

    19 front line, removing them in part, detaining them in

    20 part. And then Ahmici happened.

    21 As far as I know, before April, in sections

    22 of the front, there was a smaller portion of the HVO,

    23 according to the different maps which I haven't got

    24 here with me, but as I was convinced, as I had been

    25 convinced by people, witnesses from Jajce, fighters who

  24. 1 were there, that part of the HVO in Jajce, that the

    2 Serbian aggressor had gone into and passed through

    3 Jajce, I was afraid that this would happen in Central

    4 Bosnia where the HVO was also present, and I was

    5 right. Prior to the conflicts in April, on no part of

    6 the front line against the Serb aggressor was there a

    7 single HVO unit. They had been withdrawn.

    8 Blocking this area with a smaller portion of

    9 forces, we wanted to prevent expansion, quite simply,

    10 expansion of the conflict to engulf other regions.

    11 Nobody can claim here that the army of

    12 Bosnia-Herzegovina did not trust the Croatian people.

    13 It did. It also trusted the HVO. It had confidence in

    14 them, but there could be no agreement, and I can

    15 ascribe to that.

    16 For the greater portion of 1991 and 1992,

    17 there were Croats within the structure of the BH army

    18 because the army was considered to be a united armed

    19 force for the defence of the state of

    20 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I, myself, as a commander was not

    21 bothered by that. My personal driver was a Croat. My

    22 administrative worker at my headquarters, for example,

    23 a lady there, she was of Croatian ethnicity, and I had

    24 full confidence in her receiving documents, bringing me

    25 the documents, and dispatching them. She one day left

  25. 1 me, crying. She said, "I apologise, Commander, but I

    2 have to leave. I have been threatened and been called

    3 by the HVO, both myself and my husband, and I have to

    4 leave the army," and her name, the woman's name was Ana

    5 Kurevija. She left the army, but she didn't go the

    6 HVO. She went to a third country. I think she has now

    7 returned to Bosnia.

    8 There are a series of other examples that I

    9 could quote to illustrate the situation in Central

    10 Bosnia and in the 3rd Corps zone.

    11 I think that these exclusive conclusions and

    12 the orders, military orders that followed were at the

    13 crux of the conflict, and in those conflicts, it is

    14 quite logical to say, and I know that General Blaskic

    15 was the commander in Central Bosnia, just as I was the

    16 commander in Central Bosnia.

    17 Is that enough on that topic?

    18 JUDGE JORDA: In part, but only in part. We

    19 would like to know, starting with the significance of

    20 your forces in the conflict with the HVO, what was the

    21 chain of command within the HVO? Also, when the

    22 conflict broke out, did you speak with Colonel Blaskic

    23 at that time? You saw the conflict arising with the

    24 army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. You had the impression

    25 that HVO troops or HVO soldiers were deserting the

  26. 1 front line against the Serbs who were your common

    2 enemy. That's part of the second theme that we've

    3 asked you to speak to us about. If you could try to

    4 concentrate on that, before you speak about the

    5 cease-fires and meetings and also the crimes that were

    6 committed inter alia at Ahmici.

    7 Before you talk about that, we would like to

    8 know how, at the time that the conflict was about to

    9 become very, very serious, that is, the end of 1992 and

    10 the beginning of 1993, how you saw the HVO chain of

    11 command, what were the relationships between General

    12 Blaskic and the political leaders, how the HVO command

    13 exercised its authority over the special units or the

    14 military police, and then we will take up, if you

    15 agree, the question of Ahmici and the different

    16 meetings, the cease-fires, and the organisation of

    17 humanitarian assistance. Do you agree with that?

    18 Could you concentrate on that type of question?

    19 Then if you wish to take a break, just tell

    20 us. Ordinarily, our break is around a quarter after

    21 eleven or twenty after eleven. Can you continue now?

    22 THE WITNESS: I shall continue up to that

    23 time.

    24 JUDGE JORDA: Please proceed.

    25 THE WITNESS: I think you understood me when

  27. 1 I said that General Blaskic and myself attended and

    2 graduated from the same schools, me perhaps at a

    3 somewhat higher level, but the principles and standards

    4 that we were taught, the chain of command was the

    5 same. Whether they were applied in the HVO, I was not

    6 able to check, but I think they were, and that is, we

    7 knew the structure of the units, and we knew in each

    8 unit the structure of command, who was the superior,

    9 who was the subordinate, who issued orders to whom, who

    10 was in command, and who received orders from whom.

    11 To put it in simpler terms, in the BH army,

    12 it was as follows: Tasks and assignments came from the

    13 main staff, the headquarters, and the headquarters was

    14 the headquarters in command of the presidency of

    15 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and orders of this kind would come

    16 down to the corps who then elaborated them, assessed

    17 them, determined the forces and the materiel,

    18 battalions, support, and so on, and everything else in

    19 line with the resources and manpower it had. Then it

    20 would issue orders downwards, what their assignments

    21 were in performing the individual tasks. I think that

    22 that was the same principle in the HVO.

    23 If a unit was given to me from other areas,

    24 from another corps, for example, then I commanded that

    25 unit up until -- as long as it was in my area and that

  28. 1 particular task or mission was being implemented. Once

    2 this was over, it would be returned.

    3 If there was a superior command and if a

    4 superior command wanted to bring in more units to a

    5 given area and to use those units in that area, on that

    6 territory, then the rule was that that superior command

    7 should form a provisional command to command the

    8 mission in that area where the units were mixed, units

    9 from two compositions. That was done when

    10 approximately the same number of forces was being

    11 brought in as existed in the area already. Then the

    12 higher command would establish a forward command post.

    13 If the number was smaller, if it was a

    14 smaller number of forces compared to the existing

    15 number of forces already deployed in the area, then

    16 those units were placed under the command of the

    17 commander in the region, already in the region. That

    18 is what we call attachment. Those were the principles

    19 and standards that we were taught.

    20 JUDGE JORDA: I would like you to concentrate

    21 on a very important point for the Judges, that is, once

    22 the conflict had become open between you and the HVO,

    23 from your point of view, what was the chain of command

    24 of General Blaskic in relation to what seemed to be his

    25 own hierarchy? So long as there was not an open

  29. 1 conflict, I understand, but I would like you to help us

    2 in respect of the chain of command within the HVO.

    3 Could you say something to us about that, starting with

    4 the conflict?

    5 THE WITNESS: I apologise for repeating.

    6 They were the standards and principles that we were

    7 taught at school. If General Blaskic was in command in

    8 Central Bosnia, I do believe that he applied them, as I

    9 myself did.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me. I'll be more

    11 specific. The Judges, over quite a long time during

    12 this trial, at least from the Defence, received the

    13 idea, frequently supported by documents, that there

    14 were units that were not part of the direct hierarchy

    15 of General Blaskic, that is, the special units, the

    16 Vitezovi, the military police, and that these units

    17 were very frequently engaged in atrocities that were

    18 committed in that area. If you would prefer that we

    19 speak first about Ahmici, that would be fine, but we

    20 would like to have your idea on this question.

    21 You will be asked questions by the Defence

    22 and by the Prosecutor. I did not want to interrupt

    23 you, but if you prefer, I can guide you in respect of

    24 this summons that was sent to you and for which we

    25 would like to hear your point of view.

  30. 1 THE WITNESS: Perhaps I wasn't clear enough,

    2 but I think I was precise. If the Operative Zone of

    3 Central Bosnia had a number of soldiers, as far as I

    4 know, at the time, if they had about 21.000 soldiers

    5 and if units were brought in numbering 500 or 600 or

    6 1.000 soldiers, doesn't matter, then the commander of

    7 the military structure numbering 21.000 is in command

    8 over that unit which has been brought in. There is no

    9 logic that he should not command them. They were the

    10 standards and principles that we were taught and

    11 applied, and it is as I say. Had there been 5.000

    12 soldiers there and 7.000 brought in, then the logic

    13 would be that the person who had 7.000 would be in

    14 command, that is, a superior command would define

    15 that.

    16 I think that those units which were there,

    17 that Blaskic knew about them and that he should have

    18 and must have commanded them. If he did not know, let

    19 me be precise, and if he could not, then he should have

    20 undertaken measures to prevent them from doing what

    21 they did because that is what I would have done.

    22 The reason: In Central Bosnia, I had

    23 problems with a group of foreigners that they called

    24 the Mujahedin, and they came from different countries

    25 of the world. I did not want them in the army

  31. 1 structure, but in cooperation with the Internal Affairs

    2 Ministry, we expelled them and disarmed them, and this

    3 was brought in a parallel position with the 7th Muslim

    4 Brigade. Those foreigners were never within the

    5 composition of that particular brigade, and while I was

    6 the commander, they were never within the composition

    7 of the Armija.

    8 A written document or paper, a written

    9 statement was given by me to Ambassador Thebault, the

    10 head of the European Monitoring Mission, a document to

    11 that effect. I don't know whether he has it and

    12 whether he can present it, but that is how it was, and

    13 he can confirm that.

    14 This part, referring to me and the 3rd Corps,

    15 I mention because I want to say that that or something

    16 similar should have taken place within the HVO. I

    17 could not have turned a blind eye if somebody

    18 complained to me and said that somebody from the Armija

    19 was making problems. I had to take measures to prevent

    20 that from being so. As for the military conflicts,

    21 that is another matter altogether. Those are different

    22 questions, different problems.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Please continue, starting with

    24 the third subject that we asked you to deal with, that

    25 is, starting from April, the crimes, the atrocities

  32. 1 that have been recognised and objectively considered to

    2 have been recognised in this trial, that is, in Ahmici

    3 and Nadioci, and in other villages.

    4 You were a major player at the time of those

    5 events. What is your feeling? What were the

    6 responsibilities in respect of the units that came into

    7 those villages? Did those villages have strategic

    8 interest? How did you experience that period, starting

    9 with the 15th of April through the 16th of April? If

    10 you could also tell us your feelings about the

    11 political pressures that were brought to bear during

    12 the preceding weeks, that is, the offensive that

    13 started on the 16th of April in the morning, early in

    14 the morning.

    15 THE WITNESS: On the 14th of April, Mr. --

    16 Ambassador Thebault came to my office and he asked me

    17 quite openly, "Do you know that the HVO is preparing an

    18 attack on the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina?" He did not

    19 say where or how; he just asked the question that way.

    20 I said that I assumed so, that I did not know the day

    21 or date but that I did assume that this could happen

    22 very quickly.

    23 He asked me further, "How are you going to

    24 defend yourselves?" And my answer was that a commander

    25 would be mad to want two fronts. I was in a very

  33. 1 difficult position. I did not wish that conflict to

    2 take place, but in analysing with my associates the

    3 overall situation, we could have assumed that something

    4 of that kind was going to happen, but I could not have

    5 supposed that it would be in villages between Zenica

    6 and Vitez, so far in the rear.

    7 The day before that, I had a telephone

    8 conversation which bore that out, and I can only

    9 suppose that the Court would not have accepted it

    10 because it was on a tape. But from that telephone

    11 conversation, I recognised General Blaskic's voice, the

    12 second voice I think was the voice of Dario Kordic, and

    13 the reason was because they referred to each other as

    14 Kum or best man, godfather, and people who knew them

    15 told me that they, in fact, took part in each other's

    16 marriage ceremonies and were Kum.

    17 The conversation was as follows: "You start

    18 out from the east," and I can only suppose that that

    19 meant Kiseljak, "and I will go here from Vitez and

    20 we'll march towards Zenica."

    21 I listened to that tape, and it was later

    22 published after the events in Ahmici, and it was

    23 broadcast by Radio Zenica and on Radio Sarajevo. I was

    24 not able to get the tape and I don't know whether it

    25 would be valid in a court of law, but it is convincing

  34. 1 enough for me, that is to say, that there would be an

    2 open conflict in the region; but that it would have

    3 taken place in the way it did, I could not have even

    4 assumed that.

    5 The military directives of the BH army did

    6 not exist in any of the villages. We were armed, that

    7 is to say, we had a third of the weaponry we would have

    8 needed in 1992 and the beginning of 1993. All the

    9 weapons were always left in the trenches and in the

    10 bunkers when the shifts would change and when the

    11 soldiers would be replaced.

    12 Second, we didn't have as many barracks as we

    13 needed to house all our soldiers and the people that

    14 did not have weapons, and so a part of the people would

    15 go home to rest for a certain period of time.

    16 I did not have information, nor was it ever

    17 confirmed, that in Ahmici and the other villages,

    18 anybody who was armed and a member of the BH army was

    19 there. Possibly, when we conceived the BH army, each

    20 municipality staff received a portion of the army with

    21 a little weaponry, and they were detachments or

    22 platoons of Territorial Defence for which, by law, the

    23 wartime presidency of the municipal council had at

    24 their disposal. But I know there were none in those

    25 regions.

  35. 1 In concrete terms, there was a Territorial

    2 Defence detachment in Zenica. First and foremost, it

    3 was in charge of defending the plateau above the

    4 Vranduk tunnel, because at that time we expected a

    5 dissent attack by the Serbian army in the area, and

    6 there was a -- had there been a helicopter attack,

    7 there would have been great problems in Central Bosnia.

    8 I don't know whether I have been sufficiently

    9 clear, Your Honours.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, you were clear. You can

    11 continue about the events as you experienced, starting

    12 with the 16th of April. We would appreciate your doing

    13 that.

    14 THE WITNESS: When I received the news of

    15 Ahmici, naturally it was very hard for me. There was a

    16 particularly complex issue involved, and that is, the

    17 people who belonged to the army of Bosnia and

    18 Herzegovina, who were soldiers and whose families were

    19 killed or wounded, particularly people from the

    20 neighbouring villages, were afraid whether they would

    21 be next. I heard about all of this through the

    22 relevant organs of authority, that is to say, the local

    23 communes, municipalities, et cetera, and the question

    24 was being put to me: "Commander, what are you going to

    25 do?" I even unwillingly went to attend a press

  36. 1 conference to say publicly that the army of Bosnia and

    2 Herzegovina would not persecute Croats and destroy

    3 Croat villages but that it would take measures to

    4 prevent such events in the future.

    5 Part of the forces at this very complex front

    6 were set aside so that they would prevent such things

    7 from taking place further on in the other villages, and

    8 that is why this entire position was such in 1993 until

    9 the cease-fire was signed, that is to say, that the area

    10 of Busovaca and Vitez was under some kind of a siege.

    11 At that time, had anyone wanted to wage war

    12 against the HVO, various things had to be assessed.

    13 The most important thing was the following: Since the

    14 conflict had already been provoked, had we wanted to

    15 disarm the HVO, as was already done in Zenica because

    16 the HVO brigade in Zenica surrendered, they didn't want

    17 to do what the rest were doing, we had to create this

    18 buffer zone in order to prevent an escalation of

    19 further open conflicts.

    20 JUDGE JORDA: I would like to go back to

    21 Ahmici. Perhaps we'll take a break now. I would like

    22 you to focus, General Hadzihasanovic, on what happened

    23 after April on the crimes, how you learned about the

    24 crimes that were committed, to tell us, in your

    25 opinion, which units were engaged in that, and how you

  37. 1 were able to manage what happened afterwards since

    2 there were many discussions about cease-fires, and what

    3 was the impression that you received from the accused,

    4 what was the level of cooperation that you could count

    5 on, what was the role that the international

    6 organisations played as well as Ambassador Thebault and

    7 UNPROFOR commanders. That's the third subject of your

    8 testimony that was assigned to you and that the Judges

    9 asked you to testify about.

    10 All right. We'll take a 20-minute break.

    11 Thank you very much.

    12 --- Recess taken at 11.19 a.m.

    13 --- On resuming at 11.45 a.m.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: We can now resume the hearing.

    15 Please be seated.

    16 General, Hadzihasanovic, were you able to

    17 rest a little bit? Do you feel all right?

    18 THE WITNESS: Quite well. Thank you.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: We asked you to focus on the

    20 third subject, which is rather general, about the

    21 various meetings in which you participated, all having

    22 to do with -- excuse me. I will repeat this for the

    23 accused.

    24 (The accused entered court)

    25 JUDGE JORDA: We were so used to seeing him

  38. 1 in front of us that we have to get used to the change.

    2 Excuse me, General Blaskic. I apologise. We

    3 can now resume.

    4 We asked you to focus on the third subject of

    5 your testimony, that is, all of the meetings during

    6 which you were able to hold discussions either with the

    7 accused or his representatives about the organisation

    8 of cease-fires, the correspondence that had been

    9 exchanged; we would like to go back to Ahmici, the

    10 crimes committed there; and, lastly, all of the matter

    11 having to do with the transport of humanitarian

    12 assistance, maintenance of order, discipline within the

    13 HVO, if you have any idea about how military sanctions

    14 were organised that were taken; that is, all of the

    15 contacts that you had with the accused inter alia

    16 starting with the 16th of April. Thank you. Please

    17 proceed.

    18 THE WITNESS: Had there been a true intent to

    19 cooperate and had Sarajevo been the first and foremost

    20 objective -- well, I would like to give you a document

    21 that I found because it shows the chronology of

    22 events. This is a document from December. It shows

    23 that I sought cooperation so that we organise ourselves

    24 together and help Sarajevo. I got an answer that this

    25 was not possible, that talks were being awaited between

  39. 1 Mr. Sefer and Mr. Petkovic, the 2nd of February, 1993;

    2 that is to say, that this intent was there regardless

    3 of the talks that were under way.

    4 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, if the witness is

    5 going to use a document, the Defence would like to have

    6 a look at that document, please.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, you are right. Registrar,

    8 have these documents copied, and they need to be

    9 supplied both to the Defence and to the Prosecution.

    10 THE REGISTRAR: Yes. And this will be C3,

    11 the document that was submitted earlier this morning

    12 will be C2, and a copy has already been made and has

    13 been distributed.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: All right. Right after the

    15 comment, I will ask the registrar to be sure that the

    16 documents are copied for both of the parties present.

    17 Please continue.

    18 THE WITNESS: The first part of the document

    19 is the letter of the HVO submitting our request.

    20 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter asks for

    21 the witness's microphone to be adjusted, please.

    22 THE WITNESS: "In view of the combat

    23 operations taking part around Sarajevo and in Sarajevo,

    24 it would be a good thing if we were to have you take

    25 part in active combat and --"

  40. 1 JUDGE JORDA: I ask the usher to be sure that

    2 the documents provided by the witness are put on the

    3 ELMO, which will allow the interpreters to work with

    4 greater ease since these documents have not yet been

    5 distributed. Mr. Usher, please try to do that, and

    6 also position it in such a way that the document can

    7 remain -- the witness can make comments about it. But

    8 stay where you are, please, Mr. Usher, because we may

    9 still need you. Yes. Thank you.

    10 THE WITNESS: This is the participation of

    11 units of the HVO in combat operations, and then comes

    12 the following:

    13 "In view of the combat operations in

    14 Sarajevo and around Sarajevo, it would be a good thing

    15 if you would accept this, and we propose that you take

    16 part in active combat, and it is for that purpose that

    17 during the course of tomorrow -- the following day,

    18 that is to say, the 29th of December, 1992, you should

    19 come to the command of the 3rd Corps by 8.00 a.m."

    20 We don't have to read this. You can just

    21 have a look at it. This is just an accompanying letter

    22 of the HVO. And this is --

    23 THE INTERPRETER: Can we ask the Presiding

    24 Judge, please, to turn his microphone off?

    25 JUDGE JORDA: What is the number?

  41. 1 THE REGISTRAR: This would be C4.

    2 THE INTERPRETER: The Judge's microphone

    3 needs to be turned off.

    4 THE WITNESS: It says here:

    5 "In connection with your request regarding

    6 the participation of our units for offences operations

    7 at Kobiljaca, we hereby inform you that, from the main

    8 staff in Mostar we received an answer that the outcome

    9 of the Geneva talks is awaited at which Mr. Sefer and

    10 Mr. Petkovic are taking part on the 2nd of February,

    11 1993."

    12 I kept it there, so if you don't need it, I

    13 can put it away.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Please continue.

    15 THE WITNESS: After the chief of staff

    16 agreed, I think that on the 11th of December, General

    17 Blaskic and I met in Kakanj, I think, with the

    18 participation of international organisations, and we

    19 signed seven documents or, rather, seven orders which

    20 spell out, in precise terms, the prevention of

    21 conflicts that had already broken out. Before I came,

    22 there were conflicts in Novi Travnik, Bugojno, Travnik,

    23 Busovaca, Kiseljak, already at the beginning of 1992.

    24 We signed seven documents on the basis of

    25 this agreement, and these documents defined -- well,

  42. 1 I'll have to be very accurate about this.

    2 The withdrawal of units from positions, this

    3 is an order that General Blaskic and I signed until the

    4 13th of February, 1993, and in January, the agreement

    5 was reached. Then the document we both signed, the

    6 return of the population to their own homes, this is

    7 also an order for those villages where people had been

    8 expelled. Then that detained persons be released, that

    9 checkpoints be removed. These are all separate orders,

    10 so there is a document to prove each and every one of

    11 these details. Then to remove roadblocks and

    12 barricades from roads, and then the resolution of

    13 incidents, and this is defined by the establishment of

    14 commissions that are going to resolve each and every

    15 incident, smaller incident on the territory of each and

    16 every municipality. Then also an order to cover up all

    17 trenches or possibly bunkers that were dug in those

    18 areas, and an order to allow convoys with humanitarian

    19 aid and other things to pass.

    20 We signed all these documents in the presence

    21 of international organisations, and the European

    22 Monitors were there, the UNHCR, and, to the best of my

    23 recollection, the International Red Cross.

    24 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Nobilo?

    25 MR. NOBILO: I apologise for interrupting

  43. 1 once again, but I noticed, from where I'm sitting, that

    2 the witness had copies of these documents. The Defence

    3 would like to have that too because he wasn't reading

    4 from his notes now. He had the documents.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe?

    6 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. I certainly

    7 would like those documents as well, and if we could

    8 clarify, I believe the General was talking about

    9 documents dated the 13th of February, 1993.

    10 I think the transcript might have had some

    11 confusion on that, General, but if we can clarify that,

    12 I believe we are talking about a series of documents

    13 that, for the most part, are in evidence, but

    14 nevertheless, I think it would be helpful to have the

    15 General's copies as well. It was the 13th of February,

    16 1993.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Registrar, once again, I

    18 would like the usher to remain near the ELMO. I don't

    19 want to have to repeat that, Mr. Usher. When a

    20 document is ready, this is a particular type of

    21 testimony, because this witness is not going to testify

    22 for three weeks, each of the parties has to have the

    23 documents in question.

    24 Registrar, if necessary, be sure that once

    25 the comment is finished being discussed, have it sent

  44. 1 for copying, so at the beginning of the afternoon, the

    2 Prosecutor is in a position to question the witness,

    3 and then later the Defence as well. Let me remind you

    4 that the witness's time is limited, and his government

    5 asked that he not be here for several days in a row. I

    6 want things to be properly organised. Mr. Registrar,

    7 organise things that way.

    8 We would like to be sure that we understand

    9 things correctly. You are talking about the order of

    10 13 February, 1993, are you not?

    11 THE WITNESS: Yes. I asked that I read the

    12 authentic document so that I would not make a mistake,

    13 and I could have had in my own notebook only the titles

    14 of the documents.

    15 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, go ahead.

    16 THE WITNESS: I am presenting this for the

    17 following reason: All the meetings that followed were

    18 related to these matters in terms of the subject matter

    19 that was discussed there, and whether these orders were

    20 carried out or not, who did not carry them out, why

    21 would they not carry them out. On several occasions,

    22 joint commissions were informed of this, together with

    23 international representatives, and they were supposed

    24 to have a look and see whether this was carried out or

    25 not. That is why I am presenting this, and I only read

  45. 1 the titles of the documents. However, there's no

    2 problem. If you want me to, I can read out the entire

    3 documents.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Give us your comment on the

    5 carrying out of the orders, please, your comment on the

    6 carrying out of the orders.

    7 THE WITNESS: All the following meetings,

    8 until the open conflict broke out, had on their agenda

    9 these matters, the implementation of these matters,

    10 because they were not being carried out.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Please proceed.

    12 THE WITNESS: When I'm saying that they were

    13 not being carried out, I'm saying that the army of

    14 Bosnia-Herzegovina did carry them out and the HVO did

    15 not carry them out. Because when you analyse these

    16 documents, you will see that many things were handed

    17 over to the Ministry of the Interior as regards

    18 checkpoints and other obligations and also civil

    19 defence and also the commissions that were supposed to

    20 take all of this, and these seven issues were discussed

    21 at all the subsequent meetings of the commission.

    22 The first document, conditionally speaking,

    23 the first one, this was a set of seven documents, I

    24 believe, the withdrawal of units from positions, this

    25 is an order that was signed both by General Blaskic and

  46. 1 myself. I don't know if I have to read it out.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: No, absolutely not. The

    3 documents will be given to the Office of the Prosecutor

    4 and to the Defence and may be the subject of questions,

    5 but I want to say for both the Defence and the

    6 Prosecution, these are Trial Chamber witnesses

    7 testifying under a special status, and let me remind

    8 you that if you don't have time in your final

    9 conclusions, you can discuss these documents in written

    10 briefs that will be considered by the Judges.

    11 Do you have any further comments about those

    12 documents?

    13 THE WITNESS: I do.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Please continue.

    15 THE WITNESS: I swore that I would speak the

    16 truth.

    17 At these meetings that were attended by

    18 General Blaskic, always, or in 90 per cent of all

    19 cases, there would be a representative or a political

    20 leader, as far as I could understand this, by the name

    21 of Ignac Kostroman. He never uttered a word at any one

    22 of these meetings, but at certain points in time,

    23 because he always sat next to General Blaskic, he would

    24 whisper quite a bit into his ear, and the General took

    25 part in the meeting itself and explained certain

  47. 1 events.

    2 At any rate, these were troublesome meetings,

    3 that is to say, once I was claiming that somebody had

    4 done something and the other side was not claiming that

    5 they had not done that, so my conclusion was that there

    6 was no will to do this. International organisations,

    7 headed by the monitors of the European Union, were

    8 always supposed to have someone present to register

    9 what had been done and whether everyone had done what

    10 they were supposed to do. That is what I wanted --

    11 that was the reason for the presentation of these

    12 documents.

    13 Next, the return of the population to their

    14 homes. Because already in the beginning, that is to

    15 say, the beginning of January and February 1993, there

    16 were villages where the Bosniak population had left

    17 their homes, and also there were some Croats who had

    18 left their homes, but some were expelled and others

    19 fled because of their own fear, so that document also

    20 had to be defined. Their return was a complex affair

    21 because if somebody would go back, others

    22 would threaten them. With this document, we tried to

    23 define the role of the HVO and the Armija, and it was

    24 the Ministry of the Interior that was supposed to take

    25 care of security matters, at least as far as

  48. 1 Bosnia-Herzegovina was concerned.

    2 The next document, that is the release of

    3 imprisoned and detained persons. That is also an order

    4 that all persons who were possibly brought into

    5 custody, detained, or imprisoned be released, and there

    6 are deadlines there too, but I'm not going to read the

    7 document now.

    8 Next, the removal of checkpoints. Among

    9 other things, it is these checkpoints that created the

    10 greatest problems because there was not freedom of

    11 movement, that is to say, it was fully restricted. The

    12 checkpoints were supposed to be taken over by the MUP,

    13 if they were supposed to exist and if there was

    14 supposed to be any checkpoint at all, and some were

    15 supposed to be abolished altogether. This also

    16 pertains to certain roadblocks and barricades.

    17 The next order, the problem of resolving

    18 incidents. Reference is actually made to those

    19 situations when groups or individuals would, without

    20 any orders from their superiors, create problems, and

    21 these persons had to be dealt with immediately.

    22 At certain areas, apart from the front line,

    23 there were some shelters, trenches, and foxholes, and

    24 there were orders then to remove all of this and to

    25 cover it up, fill it in, and since there were quite a

  49. 1 few problems in terms of letting convoys pass, there

    2 was also an order as to how to ensure the freedom of

    3 movement for these convoys.

    4 All of this was done on the basis of

    5 documents that were co-signed by the commander of the

    6 general staff of the army and the chief of the main

    7 staff of the HVO, and then we translated this into

    8 orders. There were meetings that followed, about ten

    9 approximately, I cannot say for sure, and they always

    10 had to deal with the problems involved in the

    11 implementation of these matters.

    12 Then from the 15th onwards, there was a

    13 problem of the open conflict because of the order that

    14 was issued that the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina should

    15 surrender to the HVO in that area, and on the basis of

    16 the law of Bosnia-Herzegovina, we could not do this and

    17 we did not want to do this, and that is why an open

    18 conflict broke out.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, General. Would you

    20 now move to the point having to do with the crimes that

    21 were committed in Ahmici? When did you learn of the

    22 crimes? How were they managed or investigated by the

    23 HVO party? What were your relations with the HVO after

    24 the crimes had been committed at Ahmici?

    25 THE WITNESS: After the atrocities were

  50. 1 committed in Ahmici, I lost all contact with General

    2 Blaskic. Before, we communicated personally at

    3 official meetings -- let me correct myself. At first,

    4 this was done through personal requests and then at

    5 official meetings in the presence of international

    6 representatives, and after Ahmici, we lost contact.

    7 Perhaps an occasional fax would arrive by telephone.

    8 Whether the HVO investigated these crimes,

    9 that, I do not know because this area was now under HVO

    10 control, but I saw pictures of the crime on television,

    11 the picture that Bob Stewart sent to the world, the

    12 General, rather, the Colonel who was the commander of

    13 the battalion in Vitez, of the international forces in

    14 Vitez, of UNPROFOR.

    15 I already said that enormous pressure was

    16 being brought to bear against me, that the ordinary

    17 people were terribly upset, and I said what I said at

    18 the press conference, and they expected us to retaliate

    19 in the same way. However, the conflict spread to

    20 Gornji Vakuf, Bugojno. Our communications and help

    21 from Central Bosnia, from Zenica to Gornji Vakuf was

    22 made more difficult, so valid military objectives had

    23 to be sought and communication for the purpose of

    24 assistance. The choice made was via Guca Gora to

    25 Travnik and then from Travnik across the mountains to

  51. 1 Gornji Vakuf, because Gornji Vakuf was held by Serb

    2 forces, so we could not pass through there.

    3 I already explained earlier on that our next

    4 objective was to contain the internal conflicts so that

    5 it would not spread further.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Did Ahmici have a military

    7 interest?

    8 THE WITNESS: No.

    9 JUDGE JORDA: What information can you give

    10 us about your contacts with Colonel Stewart or

    11 Ambassador Thebault in respect of Ahmici? You no

    12 longer had any relations with General Blaskic, who was

    13 a colonel at the time, but you did have relations with

    14 the commander of the British battalion and also with

    15 Ambassador Thebault, who was responsible for the

    16 European Mission. What complaints did you have? What

    17 did you tell them? What did you demand? First of all,

    18 when did you receive information about Ahmici, and then

    19 what were your complaints that you made to Colonel

    20 Stewart?

    21 THE WITNESS: The first information I

    22 received unofficially or, rather, officially on the

    23 morning of the 16th from the first people who were

    24 fleeing the area, and this information was brought to

    25 me by the head of the Civil Defence from Zenica. The

  52. 1 municipality of Zenica and the Civil Defence had taken

    2 in the first refugees. I asked Bob Stewart to help so

    3 that at least the victims could be brought out.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: You spoke to Bob Stewart

    5 immediately? Are you the one who spoke to him

    6 immediately?

    7 THE WITNESS: Not immediately. A few days

    8 later. As for Ambassador Thebault, I talked to him not

    9 specifically about Ahmici but about what would happen

    10 later. I told him that I would do whatever it took so

    11 that the conflict would not escalate further.

    12 After that, Ambassador Thebault was there for

    13 only a short period of time, and he was replaced by

    14 another man and I can't remember his name. I think

    15 that about two months later, the ambassador was

    16 replaced by someone else. I don't know whether this is

    17 certainly that way, but I know he left.

    18 Another problem that I asked Ambassador

    19 Thebault to deal with, and especially Mr. de la Mota,

    20 is the problem of helping people in Stari Vitez because

    21 there was a group of civilians, a large group of

    22 civilians, and they were totally encircled all the

    23 time, and the assistance sought was along the following

    24 lines: to send them food, medicines, and other things

    25 that the man in the street would need.

  53. 1 Otherwise, in Central Bosnia, valid military

    2 objectives existed for which already, perhaps in 1991,

    3 incidents broke out and conflicts, and those were the

    4 military factories. If that can help the Trial

    5 Chamber, then I could enumerate them and perhaps locate

    6 them.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Speak to us about the military

    8 targets and tell us whether you remember anything about

    9 the truck bomb. But I would like you to finish first

    10 with Ahmici. Did your intelligence services tell you

    11 more specifically who the perpetrators of the crimes

    12 committed in Ahmici were?

    13 THE WITNESS: Yes. Well, I don't have very

    14 many details, but I do know that it was stated that

    15 this was done by the special forces of the HVO, the

    16 military police, the Jokers, I think they were, too,

    17 and the Apostles, or something of that kind, but they

    18 were special forces of the HVO, special purposes

    19 forces, because we didn't have insight into that, and

    20 the Vitezovi I think as well, something like that.

    21 JUDGE JORDA: Let's go back to Vitez and

    22 Stari Vitez, the explosives factory, the factory and

    23 the truck bomb. Could you give the Judges any

    24 information about that?

    25 THE WITNESS: The factory in Vitez was an

  54. 1 explosives factory, a factory which belonged to the

    2 military industry of the former JNA. It produced all

    3 types of explosives and rocket fuel for multiple-barrel

    4 rocket launchers.

    5 Up until my arrival, I know that at the staff

    6 of the supreme command in Sarajevo, they discussed the

    7 stockpiles in the factory and how they were to be

    8 distributed once the factory had stopped producing.

    9 Perhaps, in 1992, it still functioned on a partial

    10 basis.

    11 In view of the fact that it was a factory

    12 having exclusively chemical technology, it was highly

    13 susceptible to any military procedure; but when I came

    14 to Central Bosnia, nobody from the structure of the BH

    15 army could enter it or visit it, and the explanation

    16 given was that it had ceased to function.

    17 The other military factory was Bratstvo,

    18 called Bratstvo, in Novi Travnik. That was also owned

    19 by the former Yugoslav People's Army and the army

    20 industry, and it produced the following items and

    21 weapons: guns for tanks, the T-55 type; guns for

    22 tanks, M-84; it manufactured multiple-barrel rocket

    23 launchers of the following type -- three types, that

    24 is: multiple-barrel rocket launcher with 32 barrels of

    25 a range of 10 kilometres which had to be tractored,

  55. 1 that is to say, a vehicle, heavy-duty vehicle, was used

    2 to transport it; the same type with a 20-kilometre

    3 range whose lancer was on the outer shell of the car;

    4 and the third, Orkan, as it was called, at 50

    5 kilometres with 12 barrels which used cassette bombs.

    6 The next thing it produced were recoilless

    7 guns, the type of guns used --

    8 JUDGE JORDA: You don't have to go into all

    9 those details, General. We don't have a lot of time,

    10 and I suppose that you are very familiar with that,

    11 better than we are. So that the factories had a very

    12 important military and strategic function; is that

    13 correct?

    14 THE WITNESS: What I want to say is that the

    15 conflict existed over that factory when I arrived that

    16 year. Let me enumerate some others: Bugojno produced,

    17 in a portion of it, a civilian factory produced fuses

    18 for grenades and mines, for example. Also there was

    19 the Klokoti at Bilalovac where fuel was produced, and

    20 this was a target because it was used in the process of

    21 production in producing the mechanical part of a

    22 grenade, for the welding of steel and so on and so

    23 forth. So in the area, there were a number of military

    24 targets that were of interest, and the HVO and the

    25 Armija, we thought that it belonged to us jointly, that

  56. 1 it was joint property.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: Please continue if you have any

    3 other comments to make. The Prosecutor and the Defence

    4 and the Judges will ask you some questions, but I would

    5 not like to ask you questions right now. But if you

    6 prefer, we can ask you questions. I would like you to

    7 ask for your interpretation and feelings about this

    8 truck bomb. Were there snipers on the

    9 Bosnia-Herzegovina side? Did you use "babies"? All of

    10 this was dealt with in this trial, General

    11 Hadzihasanovic. Could you tell us something about

    12 that? If not, the Prosecutor or the Defence will

    13 certainly ask you questions about it.

    14 THE WITNESS: Yes. There were attempts from

    15 one axis to help Stari Vitez, and that was also a valid

    16 military objective. We tried but did not succeed.

    17 Second, you asked whether there were any

    18 snipers. There were snipers in every unit on both

    19 sides. The question is only how much and what targets

    20 they aimed at. So there were snipers, yes.

    21 JUDGE JORDA: General, we asked you to tell

    22 us, at the end of your testimony, what perception you

    23 had, at least during the time you were in contact with

    24 him, the perception that you had of the accused with

    25 whom you worked throughout a period of time against the

  57. 1 Serbian aggressor, and what was your perception of that

    2 same accused after the start of the conflict and after

    3 what happened, particularly in January and then in

    4 April of 1993?

    5 THE WITNESS: Mr. President, I shall repeat.

    6 I did not know General Blaskic previously. I met him

    7 for the first time when I came to Central Bosnia, and I

    8 have known him to the extent that we attended meetings

    9 together and had talks.

    10 His military knowledge, I don't know how far

    11 it extended. Had we worked together at the front line,

    12 then perhaps I would have been aware of his and he

    13 would have known mine. But I was not clear why

    14 everything that had been done under the command of the

    15 Operative Zone of the HVO in Central Bosnia, behind the

    16 front line, why that was being done. I have presented

    17 my assessments. The reason for the situation and who

    18 issued the orders, I'm sure General Blaskic has said or

    19 will say. I cannot claim anything because I was not

    20 present anywhere nor did I hear anybody issue orders to

    21 Blaskic, but I do know that that kind of thing did

    22 happen, and we suffered the consequences, those of us

    23 from the Armija and the ordinary man in the street,

    24 ordinary people. That is how much I know about

    25 Mr. Blaskic.

  58. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, General. Your

    2 testimony is now complete.

    3 Let me turn to the Prosecutor. We'll stop at

    4 1.00. Mr. Prosecutor, you can begin to ask questions,

    5 if you have any you want to ask.

    6 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President, one or two.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: You don't have six weeks to do

    8 so, let me remind you of that, and I'll also remind

    9 Mr. Hayman of the same thing. We heard Generals who

    10 testified here for six weeks. I'm not talking about

    11 General Blaskic.

    12 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. Thank you.

    13 I understand.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Be brief, and I will ask

    15 Mr. Hadzihasanovic to answer succinctly when he's asked

    16 questions.

    17 When the questions are asked, look at the

    18 person who is asking them, but when you give your

    19 answer, please face the Judges.

    20 Very well, Mr. Kehoe.

    21 MR. KEHOE: Thank you, Mr. President.

    22 Examined by Mr. Kehoe:

    23 Q. Good morning, General. You and I have met

    24 before, and welcome to The Hague, sir.

    25 General, I would like to go back with you

  59. 1 just for a little bit and talk to you a little bit

    2 about some of the things that were happening when you

    3 were in Sarajevo when you first joined the Armija and

    4 when it was being turned from the TO to the Armija, so

    5 we have that time frame in 1992.

    6 Let's go back to that time frame, General,

    7 and during this time frame, the Croatian Community of

    8 Herceg-Bosna and the HVO was being formed; is that

    9 correct, sir?

    10 A. Let me be as brief as possible. Yes, they

    11 were being formed. Do you need an explanation? I can

    12 give it if you do.

    13 Q. Well, if you could, General, and can you give

    14 the Tribunal the benefit of your views as to what the

    15 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna was attempting to

    16 do, what they were attempting to accomplish.

    17 A. I personally think, following the political

    18 scene at the time, because I gave a lot of thought to

    19 myself and what I thought and to my state, my country,

    20 and Bosnia, as I saw it, so let me say briefly the

    21 following: There were people who wanted Bosnia and

    22 there were those who loved it. Those who wanted it

    23 formed different types of associations, military

    24 powers, to ensure that Bosnia would belong to someone

    25 else, and I think that that was Herceg-Bosna because it

  60. 1 did not exist in the structure of state organisations

    2 and the legal laws that existed in Bosnia-Herzegovina

    3 which had, in fact, been internationally recognised.

    4 Q. Well, General, can you be more specific? I

    5 mean, who did Herceg-Bosna want to belong to?

    6 A. There were assessments, that is to say, that

    7 Herceg-Bosna could belong to the Croatian people in

    8 Herceg-Bosna and the community there and probably a

    9 referendum at some time in the future and to become a

    10 part of the State of Croatia. That is my assessment,

    11 my evaluation.

    12 Q. Now, General, you talked to us a little bit

    13 about your knowledge of events in the Kiseljak area

    14 when you were in Sarajevo, and while you were not in

    15 Kiseljak, I would like to talk to you a little bit

    16 about what was happening in Kiseljak in mid 1992 when

    17 you were in Sarajevo. Could you tell us, and tell the

    18 Judges, what the HVO was doing and whether or not

    19 Blaskic was the commander at that time in Kiseljak?

    20 A. I was in the main staff of the Republic of

    21 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the general staff, and I dealt with

    22 operations, that is to say, I helped devise plans to

    23 stop the aggression on the territory of

    24 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I know that information arrived

    25 about the problems in Kiseljak, and that is when I

  61. 1 heard about the name and surname of Tihomir Blaskic for

    2 the first time because Vahid Karavelic, the present

    3 general who had gone to military academy with him, had

    4 known him and he said "I know the man. I went to

    5 school with him."

    6 The commander of the HVO in Kiseljak at the

    7 time was Mr. Blaskic; I don't know if he had a rank or

    8 not. I know that it was a problem, that the HVO had

    9 surrounded the municipal staff of the Territorial

    10 Defence and asked them to surrender and to give up

    11 their weapons, and I think that was done at the time.

    12 I did not have any influence as an operations man on

    13 the process of decision making and reactions that

    14 followed, but I do know that because I was present when

    15 that was discussed.

    16 Q. General, were you receiving information as to

    17 what was happening with the Bosnian Muslim population

    18 in the Kiseljak municipality when Blaskic was the

    19 commander?

    20 A. Yes. The population was expelled.

    21 Q. Now, General, did you learn at a certain

    22 point that Blaskic was promoted to the commander of the

    23 Central Bosnia Operative Zone? Without giving us a

    24 date, did you learn that that event took place?

    25 A. I don't know the date because when I came to

  62. 1 Central Bosnia, Blaskic was already the commander in

    2 Central Bosnia, and because he was successful in his

    3 work, he was probably promoted to a bigger assignment.

    4 MR. HAYMAN: Mr. President, motion to strike

    5 the prior answer. If the witness doesn't know when the

    6 accused left Kiseljak, then he doesn't know whether he

    7 was the commander in Kiseljak when "the population was

    8 expelled."

    9 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, counsel can draw

    10 any conclusions he wants in argument or ask questions.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Could you explain what you

    12 mean, Mr. Hayman? I didn't really understand what you

    13 just said. You're saying there's an error in the

    14 transcript?

    15 MR. HAYMAN: I'm asking the Court to strike

    16 the prior answer of the witness because, in this most

    17 recent answer, he has demonstrated or admitted he

    18 doesn't have a foundation for --

    19 JUDGE JORDA: You can argue that at the

    20 appropriate time, but let the witness answer as he

    21 chooses.

    22 Please continue, Mr. Kehoe.

    23 MR. KEHOE: Yes.

    24 Q. General, when you say "the reasons for his

    25 promotion," could you elaborate that a little bit and

  63. 1 share with the Judges why you think Blaskic was

    2 promoted from Kiseljak to take over control of the

    3 entire Operative Zone?

    4 A. I think because he had done his previous work

    5 well. Usually, you are promoted for good work. Now,

    6 whether it was good work, I don't know. I leave

    7 that -- not for me. Perhaps for somebody else it was.

    8 Q. Now, General, you noted for us that you came

    9 to the Central Bosnian Operative Zone to form 3 Corps,

    10 I believe you said, sometime in October or early

    11 November of 1992; is that accurate? Again, we're not

    12 talking about an -- just an approximation, General,

    13 would be satisfactory.

    14 A. Yes, that's correct, and I can tell you the

    15 exact date. Yes, that's right.

    16 Q. General, you gave us some view to this, but

    17 could you give us a little bit more detail on the state

    18 of the military affairs within the army of

    19 Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time that you took over, with

    20 regard to weaponry, ammunition, combat readiness of

    21 your troops, et cetera?

    22 A. Let me start with the following details:

    23 Before the war broke out, the former JNA ordered that

    24 the weapons belonging to the Territorial Defence be

    25 handed in to the barracks of the JNA, and the

  64. 1 warehouses were on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

    2 and they were, for the most part, empty.

    3 When, by a decision of the presidency -- when

    4 the presidency made its decision to proclaim a state of

    5 war, that is to say, the imminent danger of war and the

    6 proclamation of the Territorial Defence as the

    7 legitimate force for the defence of the State of

    8 Bosnia-Herzegovina, there was very little weaponry

    9 because all the stores had been depleted. What existed

    10 at the beginning was scant. If I were to give you a

    11 percentage, it might have been ten per cent of the

    12 overall amount that existed. Once again, everything

    13 depended on the area concerned within

    14 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    15 The Territorial Defence, in 1992, did get

    16 some weapons when the barracks of the JNA were emptied,

    17 and the weapons that were seized on those occasions

    18 went up to, say, 20, 30 per cent, and we also got some

    19 from other sides, by seizing weapons, et cetera.

    20 Q. General, would you give us an approximate

    21 percentage of how many of your soldiers actually had

    22 weapons? I'm talking about the time frame when you

    23 were formulating 3 Corps.

    24 A. At that time, up to a third, at maximum. If

    25 the brigade had 1.200 men, perhaps there were 400

  65. 1 rifles, or 1.500 at maximum, although not everybody had

    2 that.

    3 Q. Let me ask you the same question, General, as

    4 we move into 1993 and the events that took place in

    5 1993. What was your status of weaponry within the

    6 brigades going through 1993? Was it the same? Was it

    7 different? Did it improve? Did it get worse? Can you

    8 give the Judges an idea about that?

    9 A. The situation was the worst in 1993. There

    10 were no improvements then, so there was a status quo.

    11 Q. Now, General, we were talking about

    12 weaponry. Let's talk a little bit about ammunition.

    13 What were your ammunition stores like at that time, in

    14 1992 and 1993?

    15 A. We didn't have any ammunition stores. If

    16 there were any anywhere, they were very poor. I know

    17 that my men at the front line asked for cigarettes and

    18 bullets, and they were satisfied with that too. I know

    19 there were some with ten bullets, up to 30 at maximum,

    20 that is to say, one clip per rifle.

    21 Q. Now, these soldiers that you had on the front

    22 line, tell us a little bit about the front line. Who

    23 was this front line against and how long a front line

    24 was this, how many kilometres?

    25 A. The front line that I talked about related to

  66. 1 the aggressor, and there's another thing I did not say

    2 in respect of the front line before with regard to the

    3 1st Corps and the 2nd Corps, and that was 500 to 600

    4 kilometres.

    5 Q. The aggressor that you're talking about are

    6 the Serbs, is it not?

    7 A. Yes.

    8 Q. Of this front line that you are covering,

    9 between 500 to 600 kilometres, how much of that front

    10 line was the Armija covering and how much was the HVO

    11 covering?

    12 A. In percentage terms, I mean, I only know the

    13 area, so let me not make a mistake, there was very

    14 little. There was the area around Zepce, the area

    15 towards Gornji Vakuf, and then the rest was outside my

    16 own zone. There was the Neretva Valley, I don't know

    17 if that was part of the area facing the Serbs, and then

    18 there was the area in Kiseljak.

    19 Q. Let us concentrate, General, on the area that

    20 you know about, which is the area covered by 3 Corps.

    21 Again, give us the amount of front line you were

    22 covering, how much you were covering, and how much the

    23 HVO was covering on that front line against the VRS?

    24 A. Would it be sufficient if I gave you

    25 percentage terms? I cannot recall the numbers.

  67. 1 Q. That's fine, General. That's fine.

    2 A. I don't know if it was ten per cent, but

    3 before the conflict, it wasn't even a kilometre, in

    4 April.

    5 Q. Now, let us talk about the series of

    6 conflicts that came up, General, after you became the

    7 commander of 3 Corps in October and November of 1992.

    8 You had a conflict in Gornji Vakuf that commenced in

    9 January of 1993; is that correct, sir?

    10 A. That is correct. It started in January, but

    11 it escalated in June.

    12 Q. Let's talk first about the January conflict,

    13 and give the Court your views as to what that conflict

    14 was all about, in your opinion?

    15 A. In that conflict, I think that what was

    16 needed was to create incidents to keep the army of

    17 Bosnia-Herzegovina busy, and then the decision was

    18 awaited in respect of the Vance-Owen Plan, and then it

    19 would be thrown onto its knees, and then it would no

    20 longer exist. That was the end of January. However,

    21 the conflict escalated in June, and I am linking this

    22 to what was happening in the area of Mostar and in the

    23 Lasva area.

    24 Finally and definitely, Gornji Vakuf had to

    25 be seized, but in Lasva, problems were supposed to be

  68. 1 created so that the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina could

    2 not intervene from Central Bosnia, from Zenica. That

    3 was the military assessment.

    4 Q. Let's talk first about January of 1993, and

    5 I'd like to show you a report, General, that I believe

    6 you authored on the 17th of January, 1993, if I may.

    7 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, I have another

    8 couple of copies for the booths which may make life

    9 more easier.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Usher, would you give copies to

    11 the booths, please?

    12 The Judges have decided that the exhibits

    13 that were presented by the witness to the Prosecution

    14 or the Defence would be marked as Prosecution or

    15 Defence Exhibits. We are not going to set up a third

    16 set of numbering, except for documents directly

    17 produced by the witness.

    18 Is this a Prosecution document?

    19 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, this is Prosecution

    20 Exhibit 731, 731A for the English version, and I could

    21 point out that the copies of the exhibits provided by

    22 the witness have been copied and will be distributed

    23 shortly, and there are 11 of them up to this point.

    24 JUDGE JORDA: Do the booths have the

    25 documents?

  69. 1 Mr. Kehoe, please proceed.

    2 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. I'm just

    3 waiting for the witness to get the document.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: All right. Mr. Usher, please

    5 put a copy on the ELMO so that the public can see it.

    6 This is a public hearing. Thank you very much.

    7 Mr. Kehoe, please proceed.

    8 MR. KEHOE:

    9 Q. General, this is a document that you authored

    10 concerning the negotiations for the resolution of a

    11 conflict in Gornji Vakuf. The report is dated the

    12 17th, and the negotiations took place on the 16th. If

    13 we might read through this.

    14 MR. KEHOE: If we might read through this, as

    15 it's not in French, Mr. President. We only have an

    16 English copy and an B/C/S copy. This is a report --

    17 JUDGE JORDA: You seem surprised, Mr. Kehoe.

    18 MR. KEHOE: No, Mr. President, I'm not

    19 surprised. I deeply apologise.

    20 JUDGE JORDA: Yes. Please continue.

    21 MR. KEHOE: You caught me, Judge.

    22 Q. This is a report for the attention of the

    23 chiefs of the supreme command of the Republic of

    24 Bosnia-Herzegovina armed forces.

    25 "During the night of 15/16 January there was

  70. 1 intermittent artillery fire although less intense than

    2 the previous day. The surrounding Muslim villages of

    3 Voljevac, Here and Pridvorci were shelled with heavy

    4 artillery. These places were shelled because the

    5 movement of our troops towards Crni Vrh (trig point

    6 1303) had allegedly been detected. The shelling of the

    7 city was somewhat less intense than during the

    8 preceding two days, although it intensified as night

    9 fell.

    10 "Around 1730 hours the HVO representatives,

    11 colonels Miro Andric and Zeljko Siljeg, arrived. The

    12 preceding night at around 2200 hours they had gone to

    13 Prozor for consultations with General Slobodan

    14 Praljak. They were accompanied by Mr. Ivica Lucic from

    15 the Information Bureau of the Croatian Community of

    16 Herceg-Bosna (we learned his real name once the talks

    17 were over, outside the building; when the talks

    18 started, he introduced himself as Mirko Radic). During

    19 the meeting they set forth an explicit position with

    20 the demands they wanted to be carried out, as described

    21 below:

    22 - The HVO decision on the organisation of

    23 provinces is a temporary decision based on

    24 reciprocity;

    25 - If there are changes in the final agreement

  71. 1 in Geneva, the Croats will abide by them;

    2 - The HVO forces explicitly demand that the

    3 Armed Forces:

    4 - withdraw units towards the villages;

    5 - return all units to the places from

    6 which they set out (this refers to the

    7 units from Jajce);

    8 - The HVO guarantees that it will do nothing

    9 against Muslim soldiers or civilians who have

    10 not perpetrated war crimes;

    11 - Equality will be respected in all areas,

    12 although the Armed Forces must be

    13 subordinated to the HVO and their direct

    14 commander will be the HVO commander;

    15 - Abandon the trenches, especially the

    16 repeater, and fill them in;

    17 - The Army can no longer be commanded or

    18 influenced through Topcic, Agic and Prijic;

    19 - They are willing to accept a commander

    20 designated by Commander Merdan, and who will

    21 be subordinated to the HVO in his command

    22 capacity;

    23 - Establish a joint checkpoint, with a

    24 proportional number of Muslims and Croats.

    25 It is also necessary to determine a specific

  72. 1 number of military policemen from both sides;

    2 - All militant units should be withdrawn to

    3 villages, and the town of Gornji Vakuf must

    4 not have a single soldier with long weapons

    5 with the exception of a mixed military police

    6 patrol;

    7 - They demand a denial over the radio that

    8 they have torched mosques, massacred

    9 civilians and soldiers and killed civilians.

    10 It should also be added that a civilian was

    11 killed, the driver of an ambulance wounded, a

    12 soldier butchered and another soldier killed

    13 as he was assisting in carrying the wounded

    14 soldier into the ambulance.

    15 - Unless these requirements are carried out,

    16 they shall not be responsible for any

    17 consequences of a refusal to meet these

    18 demands, which are intended to lessen

    19 tension, halt the conflict and introduce law

    20 and order in the area in which disturbances

    21 have emerged.

    22 "This envisages that everything must be

    23 completed by tomorrow. If it is clear that these

    24 demands will not be carried out by tomorrow at around

    25 2400 hours, or if there is no desire to carry them out,

  73. 1 they will not wait for the following day. If the will

    2 exists, the demands are carried out and they are duly

    3 informed, they will check, with UNPROFOR mediation if

    4 they are willing, whether everything has been

    5 completed, the units withdrawn and the trenches

    6 filled. The borders are closed and the Army is already

    7 prepared to move. The borders will not be opened for

    8 anything until the problem is resolved.

    9 "When I pointed out that I was not

    10 authorised to resolve all the requirements set forth

    11 and that I needed to receive the necessary instructions

    12 and directions, I was told to transmit the requirements

    13 by packet communications to the superior command for a

    14 reply. We were warned that the death of a single Croat

    15 in the meantime could cause the deadline for the

    16 execution of requirements to be shortened.

    17 "In the part of the texts relating to the

    18 influence on the Army, the reference is to Abdulah

    19 Topcic, President of the Party of Democratic Action for

    20 Gornji Vakuf and Deputy in the BH Assembly, Fahrudin

    21 Agic, Commander of the Gornji Vakuf Municipal Defence

    22 Headquarters, and Hanefija Prijic - Paraga, Commander

    23 of the Military Police unit.

    24 "Irrespective of their interpretation that

    25 these demands do not represent an ultimatum but a

  74. 1 categorical position, I consider the demand an

    2 ultimatum and believe they are prepared to use force if

    3 we do not accept their demands, since they have already

    4 grouped their forces from the direction of Prozor and

    5 have carried out preparatory combat activities on this

    6 axis.

    7 "During the day two civilians were killed in

    8 the Pridvorci village. The Army suffered no losses.

    9 There was extensive material damage.

    10 "Kindly reply IMMEDIATELY regarding the

    11 demands; we would then transmit the reply to the HVO

    12 representatives.

    13 "Kindly inform the President of

    14 Bosnia-Herzegovina and President Izetbegovic of these

    15 demands through the competent organ. We also suggest

    16 that the demands be broadcast, as necessary, in the

    17 media and especially over BH Radio and Television."

    18 Now, General, do you recall this document,

    19 sir?

    20 A. Yes.

    21 Q. And were these particular demands given to

    22 you by Colonels Andric and Siljeg?

    23 A. In the territory of Gornji Vakuf at that

    24 time, after the agreement, there was a commission for

    25 resolving incident situations. On behalf of the 3rd

  75. 1 Corps, Mr. Merdan worked in this commission. As the

    2 head and representative of the Armija in that

    3 commission, he sent this information; and the points

    4 that you quoted, that are marked by a dash, those were

    5 the requests of the HVO, and I only sent this

    6 information further on to the general staff in

    7 Sarajevo, and I ordered in another document, which I

    8 haven't got here, that the commission continue their

    9 work and try to prevent incident situations.

    10 Q. Now, did Merdan inform you that he was told

    11 that Andric and Siljeg had been consulting with General

    12 Praljak during the course of these events?

    13 A. Yes, that's what he wrote.

    14 Q. At this time, General, did you know that

    15 General Praljak was a General in the army of the

    16 Republic of Croatia?

    17 A. I did not know that. I found out later. At

    18 that time, no, not in January.

    19 Q. Did you know at this time that Colonel Andric

    20 was an officer in the army of the Republic of Croatia

    21 at this time?

    22 A. I am talking about January. At that time, I

    23 didn't know, but I found out later.

    24 Q. Now, General, did you abide by this ultimatum

    25 or did fighting continue in Gornji Vakuf?

  76. 1 A. We did not abide by this ultimatum. The

    2 fighting continued, first, of lesser intensity and

    3 then, I don't know the exact date, I think it was the

    4 26th or 27th of June, there was full intensity with

    5 regard to these attacks, and there was a conflict going

    6 on non-stop.

    7 Q. General, my time is limited, so I'm going to

    8 shift topics a bit, and I'm going to move ahead

    9 chronologically but I'm going to move to a different

    10 topic, and the topic that I'd like to talk to you about

    11 just briefly -- and we will come back to combat

    12 activities -- but one topic that I want to discuss with

    13 you that follows chronologically is your comments to

    14 the Chamber about Blaskic being in attendance at

    15 meetings with Ignac Kostroman who, you noted for us,

    16 sat next to Blaskic and whispered in his ear from time

    17 to time. And I would like to show you a document, yet

    18 another report of yours, General, from the 1st of

    19 February of 1993.

    20 THE REGISTRAR: This is Prosecution Exhibit

    21 732, 732A for the English version.

    22 MR. KEHOE:

    23 Q. General, take a look at this. We are not

    24 going to read this whole document. This is a document

    25 that reflects minutes, if you will, of a meeting that

  77. 1 you attended on the 1st of February, 1993, a meeting

    2 that was chaired by General Morillon and also by

    3 Mr. Fleming of ECMM.

    4 Do you recall this document, General, or this

    5 meeting?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. Now, General, in the sequence of individuals

    8 in this meeting, number 9, of course, is the accused in

    9 attendance, Colonel Blaskic, and number 10 is Ignac

    10 Kostroman, the general secretary of the Croatian

    11 Community of Herceg-Bosna.

    12 Is that the man that you were talking about

    13 that attended these meetings with Blaskic?

    14 A. Yes. When I talked about him here, I did not

    15 remember -- I did not mention this exact title, but I

    16 said that he was a leader of the HDZ.

    17 Q. I understand, General. And, General, at how

    18 many meetings that you attended with Blaskic was

    19 Kostroman in attendance with Blaskic? How often?

    20 A. Almost all that I attended. I don't know,

    21 perhaps one or two, but mostly all.

    22 Q. Now, based on your knowledge in the area,

    23 what was Blaskic's relationship with these political

    24 leaders? Was he in opposition with them? Did he seem

    25 to agree with them? Did he say anything to oppose some

  78. 1 of their nationalistic views? What's your assessment

    2 of the situation, General, if you could tell the

    3 Chamber?

    4 A. I can present my conclusion on the basis of a

    5 specific event because I did not have an opportunity to

    6 communicate with the political leaders of the HDZ, that

    7 is to say, with the leaders.

    8 This was in 1993, when I was invited as a

    9 guest to the HVO staff in Vitez and this was at

    10 Christmastime. That's when I saw Dario Kordic as well,

    11 when I saw Ignac. That is the first time I saw Praljak

    12 too.

    13 According to what was said while they were

    14 extending Christmas greetings, it was obvious that they

    15 had a close relationship, close relationships. I spent

    16 only a short time there. I thought that I was supposed

    17 to attend as a guest, but I spent only a short time

    18 there. I didn't listen to all the talks. But in the

    19 greetings they extended, they only spoke about Croatia,

    20 about the Croatian people, et cetera.

    21 Q. When you say "they had close relationships,"

    22 General, could you be specific? Who are you talking

    23 about had close relationships? Who are the individuals

    24 you're talking about?

    25 A. The ones I saw there and then. I repeat,

  79. 1 Ignac, Dario Kordic, Praljak; and I cannot remember,

    2 there were some other people there too. But these

    3 others were at municipal level, whereas these were

    4 representatives who, on the occasion of this holiday,

    5 sat at the top of the table, and that is where Blaskic

    6 was too; that is to say, at the head table, and then

    7 the other guests sat elsewhere.

    8 Q. So Blaskic was there as well?

    9 A. He was.

    10 Q. Now, General, you noted this was -- was this

    11 Christmas 1992 or Christmas 1993?

    12 A. '93, because in '92, I was in Sarajevo.

    13 Q. Well, if you -- that's fine, General. Was it

    14 after you took over as your 3rd Corps commander that

    15 this took place?

    16 A. Yes.

    17 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, I'm about to go

    18 into another topic. It is 1.00.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: All right. We'll resume at

    20 2.30, and you have about an hour, an hour and fifteen

    21 minutes left; is that right?

    22 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: All right. The court stands

    24 adjourned and will resume at 2.30.

    25 --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.00 p.m.

  80. 1 --- On resuming at 2.35 p.m.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: We will now resume the

    3 hearing. Please be seated.

    4 Mr. Prosecutor, we decided that you would

    5 have until about a quarter after three -- twenty after

    6 three, about twenty-five after three, of course, unless

    7 you finish earlier. Then the Defence will have about

    8 one hour and twenty minutes, and counting the breaks,

    9 we will finish with the Judges' questions which will

    10 take about 30 minutes.

    11 Without any further ado, I now ask you to

    12 continue.

    13 MR. KEHOE: Yes. Thank you, Mr. President,

    14 Your Honours, counsel.

    15 Q. Good afternoon, General. General, I would

    16 like to ask you a couple of questions about some of the

    17 things you said this morning, in particular, how they

    18 bear on the outbreak of the conflict in the Lasva

    19 Valley as of the 16th of April, 1993.

    20 Now, you talked to us about the conversation

    21 that you had with Ambassador Thebault where you noted

    22 that you didn't want to open up a second front. Can

    23 you tell the Judges, why was it not in your interest to

    24 open up a second front? Can you explain that to the

    25 Judges?

  81. 1 A. Mr. President, it would be normal to have

    2 responded in this way. The first and primary reason

    3 was that we, indeed, did not want the second front.

    4 The second front, even if somebody had forced us to

    5 open it, we again feared it. We did not want it

    6 because we did not have enough to open it up, and when

    7 I say "not enough," I mean not enough ammunition or

    8 materiel. But I think that what we were involved in

    9 was the pure, physical protection, and the second front

    10 would not have been right for us for this very reason.

    11 Q. General, in your opinion, as an officer and

    12 as the commander of 3rd Corps, what would have been the

    13 result in your line of defence against the Serbs had

    14 you decided to open up a second front against the HVO?

    15 A. Mr. President, can I have the question,

    16 please, repeated because I did not understand whether

    17 this was --

    18 JUDGE JORDA: Would you rephrase your

    19 question, please, Mr. Kehoe?

    20 MR. KEHOE: Certainly. Certainly.

    21 Q. General, as a military man and as the

    22 commander of the 3rd Corps, in your opinion, what would

    23 have been the result or the effect in your front line

    24 against the Serbs if you had -- if you had -- decided

    25 to open up a front against the HVO?

  82. 1 A. Mr. President, first of all, there was no

    2 decision to open up the second front. Second, our

    3 objective was to hold the front line against the Serbs

    4 at the time, in other words, maintain it, stop losing

    5 more territory, and regroup the army so that in the

    6 future, it would be able to engage in liberation

    7 operations, and had it happened in '94 -- what did then

    8 happen in '94 and '95, this would have been different.

    9 Q. During this period of time, General, April of

    10 1993, were conflicts and major conflicts taking place

    11 between the Armija and the VRS in Eastern Bosnia, and

    12 by that I mean Srebrenica and some of the other

    13 enclaves in Eastern Bosnia?

    14 A. I have no detailed information on Eastern

    15 Bosnia, but there were conflicts in Central Bosnia, but

    16 they were of lesser intensity. Our assessment was that

    17 there probably were some agreements between the HVO and

    18 the Serb forces in order not to move from the lines

    19 which they had kept. These were our estimates. But as

    20 far as Eastern Bosnia is concerned, I could not really

    21 tell you because I did not follow that situation as

    22 much.

    23 Q. That's fine, General. I would like to show

    24 you a series of your reports, if I can, Mr. Registrar,

    25 and this is a series of reports from the 3 Corps

  83. 1 headquarters, your regular combat reports, General, and

    2 the series I have, Mr. President, are April 10, 11, 12,

    3 13, 14, 15, and 16 of 1993.

    4 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, with your

    5 permission, I'm not going to go through these

    6 documents, as I went through the documents this

    7 morning. I would like to show the witness all of these

    8 documents at once and ask one general question.

    9 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Prosecutor, I want to say

    10 that we absolutely agree with you. Had you not said

    11 that, we would have asked you to do it that way. These

    12 are documents from General Hadzihasanovic himself. He

    13 merely has to identify them, say that he recognises

    14 them, and then you would get to the central point, and

    15 if necessary, the Defence, once it's read them, can

    16 make comments it chooses to.

    17 Mr. Registrar?

    18 THE REGISTRAR: These are documents 733, 734,

    19 735, 736, 737, 738, and 739 for the Prosecution, and

    20 the English version has an "A."

    21 JUDGE JORDA: Are you going to start with

    22 733, Mr. Kehoe?

    23 MR. KEHOE: No, Mr. President. I'm just

    24 going to have the witness take a quick look at all of

    25 them --

  84. 1 JUDGE JORDA: All right. It's a set. He can

    2 look at them as a set.

    3 MR. KEHOE: Yes.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Does the Defence have all these

    5 documents? No, it doesn't, and it has to be able to

    6 question the witness, so the documents have to be

    7 provided to it immediately.

    8 MR. KEHOE: Excuse me, Mr. Usher. I would

    9 like to show the witness all of them at once, from 733

    10 to 739. I just think this will move more

    11 expeditiously, Mr. President, if he just looks at all

    12 of them, and we can ask the General questions and move

    13 from there.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Do you remember these

    15 documents, General Hadzihasanovic? Do you remember

    16 them all?

    17 THE WITNESS: Yes.

    18 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, the witness remembers

    19 them. Now that the witness has all of the documents,

    20 and the Defence does as well, you can ask your

    21 questions.

    22 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, if I can just take

    23 one more moment to just allow the witness to just take

    24 a quick look at the balance of the document, it's not

    25 going to take long.

  85. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. All right. That

    2 will also give the Defence the chance to have a quick

    3 look at them also.

    4 Have you been able to look at them, General?

    5 THE WITNESS: Yes.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. Mr. Kehoe, please

    7 proceed.

    8 MR. KEHOE:

    9 Q. General, just a little background concerning

    10 these documents. What are these documents?

    11 A. These are regular daily combat reports which

    12 were the practice in the BH army, and every unit in the

    13 BH army had to have one sent to its superior command

    14 within 24 hours. In some of these documents, there is

    15 my signature; in some, there is not. This is not

    16 essential, but sometimes my chief of staff signed some

    17 because the commander sometimes is not around, but

    18 these are the type of documents that have been produced

    19 by my command.

    20 Q. I was just waiting for the translation,

    21 General. General, are these documents based on

    22 information that you learned yourself and that you

    23 learned from others?

    24 A. These documents are based on the reports of

    25 the subordinate units which were compiled throughout

  86. 1 the area of responsibility in the course of the day,

    2 and then the essential information is then reduced to

    3 these reports, and individual units then gather

    4 information in different ways from its own members, by

    5 reconnaissance and monitoring and by reporting and so

    6 on.

    7 Q. General, in these reports, which date from

    8 the 10th of April, 1993 to the all important day of the

    9 16th of April, 1993, is there anything in any of these

    10 reports that reflect that the Armija is preparing

    11 offensive operations against the HVO? Is there

    12 anything to reflect that?

    13 A. It is certain that there are no such things

    14 in these documents because the army did not prepare for

    15 any such events.

    16 Q. Well, General, on the 16th of April, 1993,

    17 who commenced offensive operations: the HVO or the

    18 Armija?

    19 A. It was the HVO.

    20 Q. Where?

    21 A. The beginning was in the village of Ahmici in

    22 the early morning hours. I don't know exactly -- I

    23 don't remember exactly when, about 4.00, 5.00 in the

    24 morning.

    25 Q. General, I would like to show you a document

  87. 1 that has been admitted into evidence and was signed by

    2 the defendant, Colonel Blaskic.

    3 Mr. Registrar, I'm looking for 456,

    4 Prosecutor's 456/100.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Let me remind you that these

    6 exhibits should be prepared before the hearing begins.

    7 We're wasting some time here.

    8 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, this is my fault,

    9 it's not the registrar's fault. However ...

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Let me remind you that you have

    11 already done this. This is a recurrent misdemeanour.

    12 MR. KEHOE: However, the good news is, Judge,

    13 the good news is I am almost through.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Well, of course, we're

    15 delighted, but you do have time if you want to ask any

    16 further questions, which will have nothing to do with

    17 the time given to the Defence. We're not using the

    18 same system for testifying as we did previously.

    19 Four fifty-six, that is a Prosecution

    20 Exhibit; is that correct?

    21 MR. KEHOE: That's correct.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: Defence? Defence or

    23 Prosecution?

    24 MR. KEHOE: Prosecution.

    25 JUDGE JORDA: Prosecution. Very well.

  88. 1 MR. KEHOE: Just for the record, if I'm not

    2 mistaken, Mr. Nobilo, I do believe the Defence admitted

    3 this document as well under a Defence Exhibit, but I'm

    4 not positive. Nevertheless, we can just use it as a

    5 Prosecution Exhibit.

    6 Q. General, this is a document signed by the

    7 defendant, sent to your headquarters, 3rd Corps

    8 headquarters, on the secession of attack operations.

    9 The opening line of this says:

    10 "This morning your forces launched an attack

    11 on the Central Bosnia Operative Zone Command. We are

    12 surprised and outraged by such an act, on top of

    13 everything else that your members have recently done."

    14 General, is that true? Is what Blaskic is

    15 writing in this on the morning of the 16th of April,

    16 1993, true?

    17 A. Mr. President, this is not true.

    18 Q. Why is it not true, General?

    19 A. Because it wasn't so, and there are other

    20 similar documents in that regard as well as media

    21 appearances, both in television and radio, which were

    22 launched by the HVO as propaganda on the eve of the

    23 attack. Our judgement was that this was all done to

    24 justify the event which was then committed by the HVO

    25 on the 16th of April.

  89. 1 Q. General, let me show you another document,

    2 which is a letter that you sent on the 19th of April to

    3 Monsignor Puljic, and once again, I do have several for

    4 the booth.

    5 THE REGISTRAR: This is Prosecution 740,

    6 Prosecution Exhibit 740, and 740A for the English

    7 version.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: Do the interpreters have the

    9 documents? Very well. You can proceed now, Mr. Kehoe.

    10 MR. KEHOE:

    11 Q. General, this is a letter dated the 19th of

    12 April, 1993, that you sent to Monsignor Vinko Puljic.

    13 Do you remember this letter, sir?

    14 A. Yes, I do recall this letter.

    15 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, this is the last

    16 document we have, we are almost through, and we would

    17 like to read this document. It is a significant

    18 document and by the --

    19 JUDGE JORDA: That is your absolute right,

    20 Mr. Kehoe.

    21 MR. KEHOE: Thank you.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: Please proceed. Are the booths

    23 ready? Is the document on the ELMO so that the public

    24 can follow? Mr. Usher, is it on the ELMO? Very well.

    25 Let's proceed.

  90. 1 Go ahead, please, Mr. Kehoe.

    2 MR. KEHOE:

    3 Q. This is a letter sent on the 19th of April,

    4 1993, to Monsignor Vinko Puljic, the Archbishop of

    5 Bosnia, by the witness, Commander Enver Hadzihasanovic.

    6 "We are witnessing these days in Central

    7 Bosnia and in Herzegovina further armed conflicts with

    8 tragic consequences between HVO and BH Army units. We

    9 turn to you as a leader of the Croatian people and

    10 someone in whom we believe, whose many previous

    11 comments about Bosnia and Herzegovina as our only

    12 homeland and the possibility of living here together we

    13 fully support. We call upon you to use all of your

    14 authority to prevent the rupturing of the centuries-old

    15 ties between Muslims and Croats.

    16 "The HVO leaders in Central Bosnia and

    17 proponents of an extremist policy, Kordic, Blaskic,

    18 Kostroman, Valenta, Sliskovic and Sakic, all want to

    19 leave the impression at home and abroad of being

    20 civilised people who are prepared to compromise while

    21 secretly preparing and encouraging their units to

    22 instigate terror, conflict and civil war with

    23 unpredictable consequences for the Croatian and Muslim

    24 peoples. They want to declare these territories, which

    25 have been Bosnian for centuries, as Croatian

  91. 1 territories, because they believe that the time has

    2 come to realise this idea, which so far they have been

    3 skilfully hidden behind a smokescreen of verbal

    4 support for a united, independent and sovereign Bosnia

    5 and Herzegovina.

    6 "While the HVO leaders are declaring their

    7 support for an agreement and a peaceful solution of all

    8 problems between the BH Army and the HVO, on the ground

    9 the HVO is actually pursuing a policy of force,

    10 constantly attacking and harassing the Muslim

    11 population.

    12 "All previous efforts to overcome the

    13 misunderstandings have failed due to this kind of

    14 conduct by the HVO leaders. The BH Army units have

    15 always been tricked. Their members have a very

    16 difficult time explaining why they negotiate at all

    17 when obligations agreed to in writing are usually never

    18 complied with in practice, which is entirely the fault

    19 of the HVO and their leaders.

    20 "The open aggression of the HVO against

    21 parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been continued

    22 these days with the most brutal and heinous means,

    23 whose application is most clearly seen in Vitez and the

    24 surrounding villages.

    25 "In the village of Ahmici on 16 April 1993,

  92. 1 HVO soldiers committed an unprecedented massacre. They

    2 killed all human beings who were in the houses,

    3 including even children in their cradles. According to

    4 statements of eyewitnesses who managed to escape by

    5 running away, about 200 people, including women and

    6 children, were killed. We would mention that this

    7 behaviour of the HVO soldiers was unnecessary as there

    8 were no military formations in the village and no

    9 resistance was offered.

    10 "Many Muslims from Vitez, Busovaca and Novi

    11 Travnik have had similar experiences, but so have

    12 Croats who disagreed with this policy of genocide

    13 committed against people solely because they are of a

    14 different ethnic and religious background.

    15 "In this situation and in order to push the

    16 Croatian people into committing new crimes, the HVO

    17 leaders /illegible/ the BH Army and the Muslim people

    18 in Central Bosnia.

    19 "No one from the Croatian people has given

    20 the HVO leaders authority for such destructive conduct,

    21 the goal of which is to spread distrust and to stir up

    22 hatred between the two peoples, for which they will be

    23 held responsible before history and above all before

    24 their own Croatian people.

    25 "Deeply convinced that this is not a policy

  93. 1 of the Croatian people, but rather of extremist

    2 leaders, we once again appeal to you on behalf of the

    3 Croatian and Muslim peoples to use your authority as

    4 soon as possible to try to prevent the widening of the

    5 artificially created gap between them.

    6 "Not doubting for a moment that you will as

    7 soon as possible prevent the catastrophe which has

    8 clouded relations between Muslims and Croats, we

    9 gratefully invite you on this occasion to visit the

    10 Command of the 3rd Corps, where you will always be more

    11 than welcome."

    12 Signed Commander Enver Hadzihasanovic.

    13 General, do you still stand by these

    14 statements that you wrote in this letter on the 19th of

    15 April, 1993?

    16 A. Yes, I do.

    17 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, if I might have

    18 one moment?

    19 Mr. President, I have no further questions of

    20 this witness.

    21 General, thank you very much.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. It's 3.00. We will

    23 apply an objective rule for the Defence. If it wants

    24 to use its hour and twenty minutes, it can.

    25 Would you prefer that we take a ten-minute

  94. 1 break, Mr. Hayman or Mr. Nobilo? We don't have a great

    2 deal of time, so we won't take longer than ten-minute

    3 breaks, but just long enough in order for you to become

    4 familiar with all of the documents that were given to

    5 you. But you will only have an hour and twenty

    6 minutes. That will also allow the Judges to ask

    7 questions.

    8 All right. We will resume at ten after

    9 three.

    10 --- Recess taken at 3.02 p.m.

    11 --- On resuming at 3.14 p.m.

    12 JUDGE JORDA: The hearing is resumed. Please

    13 be seated.

    14 Mr. Nobilo, will it be you or Mr. Hayman?

    15 Mr. Nobilo, you have the floor.

    16 MR. NOBILO: I will be asking the questions,

    17 Mr. President.

    18 Examined by Mr. Nobilo:

    19 Q. General Hadzihasanovic, good afternoon. You

    20 probably know that we are the Defence counsel for

    21 General Blaskic, my colleague, Mr. Russell Hayman and

    22 myself, Anto Nobilo. In keeping with the Rules of the

    23 Tribunal, I should also like to ask you a few

    24 questions, as did my learned friend, the Prosecutor,

    25 before me.

  95. 1 Let us go back to the beginning of your

    2 testimony. Can you tell us, before you came to Central

    3 Bosnia, where were you in the BH army, what place?

    4 What function and post?

    5 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, for the

    6 witness.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: You can switch your microphone

    8 on, please, General.

    9 A. As far as I was able to understand, you're

    10 asking me what function I performed before. I was the

    11 chief of staff in the command of the 1st Corps in the

    12 city of Sarajevo. As chief of staff, I also had the

    13 task of territorial defence in Sarajevo and to reorient

    14 it, that is to say, to turn it into the armed forces of

    15 the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    16 MR. NOBILO:

    17 Q. So you, quite obviously, were a high ranking

    18 officer of the BH army. Tell us, please, in the JNA,

    19 which rank did you have when you came to the BH army?

    20 A. From the BH army, I was lieutenant colonel.

    21 Q. How do you see yourself as an officer of the

    22 BH army and before as an officer of the JNA? Are you

    23 exclusively a military man, a soldier, or were you both

    24 a soldier and a politician? How do you view yourself?

    25 A. Before and today, I see myself as a soldier.

  96. 1 I have always been that.

    2 Q. To be a soldier, as you understood it, does

    3 that mean that you can meddle in political decisions?

    4 Can you influence political decisions, decisions made

    5 by politicians, or as a soldier, do you execute the

    6 orders of the higher command? How do you understand

    7 that?

    8 A. As a soldier, it is not my business to meddle

    9 in the decisions of the official politicians. It is my

    10 duty, as a soldier, if decisions are outside the law,

    11 outside the constitution, that the civilian leader and

    12 politician be cautioned of that, and it is up to me not

    13 to carry things of that kind out, not to implement

    14 them.

    15 Q. Now, which decisions you're going to

    16 implement or not, that is, decisions made by the

    17 politicians, do you assess that yourself and do you

    18 consider that to be within the constitutional conduct

    19 of a military man?

    20 A. Mr. President, that is, according to the

    21 constitution, the professional conduct of a soldier,

    22 that is to say, if a politician makes a decision which

    23 is not in line with the constitution and orders me to

    24 carry that decision out, then as a professional, I am

    25 duty-bound to say that it is not in conformity with the

  97. 1 constitution and is a violation of other laws, for

    2 example, international ones, et cetera.

    3 Q. General Izetbegovic signed the Vance-Owen

    4 Plan and, within that framework, the attachment of the

    5 BH army in Provinces 10 and 8 to the HVO and vice

    6 versa, the HVO in Provinces 9 and 5. Was that rejected

    7 by the BH army? Was it contrary to the constitution?

    8 What is your opinion on that?

    9 A. Attachment and a decision on that was never

    10 signed. In the document of the Vance-Owen Plan, it's

    11 stated that there should be a joint withdrawal into

    12 these provinces of the military effectives, and the

    13 order on attachment emanated from the structure of the

    14 HVO and not President Izetbegovic. Before that, there

    15 was a law in force, I have a copy of that law on

    16 defence, which states what precisely the structure of

    17 the BH army was.

    18 Q. We are going to read something in relation to

    19 this, we are going to read a document, but before that,

    20 the law on the defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who

    21 passed it and when? The representatives of the Croat

    22 people, did they vote for it? Did the representatives

    23 of the Serb people vote for it?

    24 Perhaps you didn't understand this as a

    25 question. I actually put a question. When was the law

  98. 1 on national defence passed, in which year, and did the

    2 representatives of all three peoples take part in

    3 this? We don't need a date, just approximately.

    4 A. Mr. President, may I again have a look at the

    5 documents I have here with me so that I would be as

    6 accurate as possible?

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, do so.

    8 A. I have here a copy of the decree with the

    9 force of a law on taking over the law on armed forces

    10 and its application in the Republic of

    11 Bosnia-Herzegovina as a republican law.

    12 MR. NOBILO:

    13 Q. Sorry. Just tell me which year this was.

    14 A. Let me have a look. The 15th of November,

    15 1992.

    16 Q. We are not going to go into all of that now.

    17 I'm interested in something else. What do you think?

    18 If, according to the Vance-Owen Plan, an international

    19 agreement that was signed, at least in part, by the

    20 president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, recognises the HVO as

    21 one of the components of the armed forces and also puts

    22 them into certain provinces, does this give legality to

    23 the HVO? What do you think?

    24 A. I wish to answer this question on the basis

    25 of a document, yet again. The armed forces of the

  99. 1 republic consist of, I'm reading the law on the armed

    2 forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina: "The army of the

    3 republic hereinafter 'the army' and also the Croatian

    4 Defence Counsel units, as well as other armed forces

    5 that are under the unified command of the army --"

    6 Q. However, my question was something

    7 different.

    8 A. The point is that this law says where the HVO

    9 belongs.

    10 Q. All right. But I'm asking you something

    11 else. Would you answer my questions, please, because

    12 my time is restricted? Please, could you strictly

    13 answer my questions?

    14 A. Mr. President, I don't think I've finished

    15 answering yet.

    16 Q. I would like to draw your attention to the --

    17 MR. KEHOE: Excuse me, Mr. President. I'm a

    18 spectator here, as the Court, but if counsel asks the

    19 witness a question and the witness wants to answer the

    20 question, I think counsel should let the witness answer

    21 the question before he goes to his next question.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: This is not always easy to do,

    23 not always easy to do.

    24 MR. NOBILO: Exactly, but he has to answer my

    25 question, not move in a different direction.

  100. 1 JUDGE JORDA: The witness answered you. I

    2 can sense that your time is limited. I see that you're

    3 trying to get to the core of your questions, and I

    4 congratulate you for that. Let's not waste any further

    5 time, but allow the witness, as we did previously, to

    6 familiarise himself with everything, as I did for the

    7 Prosecutor. All right. Please continue, and let's not

    8 waste any further time.

    9 MR. NOBILO:

    10 Q. All right. I would like to put a question to

    11 you, General. The Vance-Owen Plan establishes that the

    12 HVO forces and the BH army forces are being deployed in

    13 certain provinces. The Vance-Owen Plan was aware of

    14 the situation that the HVO was not part of the BH army,

    15 as the national law of Bosnia-Herzegovina had said.

    16 Don't you think that an international agreement that

    17 was signed by the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina

    18 supersedes national legislation, "Yes" or "No"?

    19 A. This international agreement was not legally

    20 valid yet.

    21 Q. A new question: Which constitution are you

    22 invoking? Which is the constitution that was in force

    23 in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992? Could you tell this

    24 Court that?

    25 A. I am saying how a military professional, a

  101. 1 soldier, is supposed to be behave towards the

    2 constitution and towards his state. I have not been

    3 dealing with the --

    4 JUDGE JORDA: You're not answering the

    5 question, General. Try to answer it. It was more

    6 specific than that. Try to focus on the question

    7 that's asked. Thank you. Perhaps you could provide

    8 the decree that you referred to for the Trial Chamber.

    9 If you have one, a copy can be made of it, and it will

    10 become an exhibit for the Trial Chamber. But first,

    11 concentrate on the specific question that Mr. Nobilo

    12 asked you because you haven't answered it.

    13 MR. NOBILO: I shall repeat the question.

    14 Q. Which was the constitution that was in force

    15 in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992?

    16 A. I don't know exactly which official gazette

    17 this was and where this was, but there was a

    18 constitution. I don't know whether it was taken over

    19 from the previous republic or whether it was

    20 corrected. I don't know.

    21 Q. If it was taken over from the Socialist

    22 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who then, according

    23 to the constitution, was the army of Bosnia and

    24 Herzegovina, according to the constitution? According

    25 to the constitution of the Socialist Republic of

  102. 1 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    2 A. I don't know. I didn't read this

    3 constitution.

    4 Q. Do you agree that according to the

    5 constitution of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and

    6 Herzegovina, as an integral part of the Socialist

    7 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the JNA was the only

    8 legal armed force, that is to say, the army of that

    9 state was the JNA? Do you agree with that?

    10 A. Yes, I agree with that, but I don't know

    11 whether that law was taken over or whether it was

    12 changed. I don't know. I never read it.

    13 Q. You said that you were not involved in

    14 politics, not during this war, not while you were a JNA

    15 officer. However, you completed high party schools of

    16 the former communist government; is that correct? And

    17 you were educated in Marxist doctrine; is that correct?

    18 A. It is correct that I was in the high party

    19 school.

    20 Q. In Kumrovec?

    21 A. Yes, in Kumrovec.

    22 MR. NOBILO: Can we please have this document

    23 distributed and then let's go on?

    24 JUDGE JORDA: I think that the usher is very

    25 busy.

  103. 1 MR. NOBILO: All right. Perhaps we can move

    2 ahead and just leave these documents aside and let's go

    3 on because we're in quite a hurry.

    4 Q. General, a few words about the fall of

    5 Jajce. Can you tell us who gave you this information

    6 that the Croats had sold Jajce, that they had handed it

    7 over to the Serbs without any fighting? Who said that?

    8 A. Mr. President, I did not say that the Croats

    9 handed it over. At the time of the fall of Jajce, I

    10 was getting out of Sarajevo, I was travelling, and I

    11 received orders to go towards Travnik to see what could

    12 be done so that more territory would not fall.

    13 The people who had fled were saying that, and

    14 they were saying very derogatory things about this

    15 matter. That is what I heard from the masses that were

    16 passing by, and I compare this to the current situation

    17 in Kosovo.

    18 Q. In such situations, is it often the case that

    19 people say "They've sold us down the river"? And

    20 didn't you hear things like that on all sides in

    21 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    22 A. No, there were other cases as well.

    23 Q. You said, in Kiseljak, that the Territorial

    24 Defence was expelled from Kiseljak while Blaskic was

    25 there. Can you say specifically whether the

  104. 1 Territorial Defence was expelled from Kiseljak before

    2 August 1992 or after August 1992?

    3 A. I think it was expelled before that.

    4 Q. I would like to show you Defence document

    5 D132. We're not going to read the document. It has

    6 already been tendered and everybody is familiar with

    7 it. You can read it, though. This is an order of the

    8 commander of the supreme command of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

    9 Sefer Halilovic, and he is writing to the commander of

    10 the municipal defence of Kiseljak. He is sending an

    11 order on the 8th of August, 1992.

    12 A. And where was this staff? In Kiseljak?

    13 Q. That is what I'm asking you.

    14 A. I don't think it was.

    15 Q. You think that the order went to Kiseljak and

    16 that the staff was not in Kiseljak?

    17 A. Yes, that's what I think. There were other

    18 staffs that were deployed elsewhere, outside their own

    19 territory.

    20 Q. Wouldn't it be logical then to say that this

    21 was a forward command post or deployed elsewhere or

    22 redeployed, whatever?

    23 A. No. They were kicked out, expelled.

    24 Q. Very well. Do you think that the civilians,

    25 the population of Kiseljak, were expelled from Kiseljak

  105. 1 in 1992, or do you think that this pertains only to the

    2 Territorial Defence?

    3 A. And quite a bit of the civilian population,

    4 the majority.

    5 Q. Would you be surprised if you heard that we

    6 heard quite a few Bosniaks from Kiseljak here, that

    7 before April and notably June, nobody had been

    8 expelled? Would you be surprised if you heard that?

    9 In 1993.

    10 A. I don't think that's correct.

    11 Q. Can you tell us one village where Bosniaks

    12 were expelled from in Kiseljak in 1992?

    13 A. I do not have specific data about Kiseljak

    14 because I was not involved in Kiseljak, and while I was

    15 commander of the 3rd Corps, Kiseljak was not related

    16 there.

    17 Q. At one point this morning, you said that you

    18 did not understand -- of course, I cannot quote you

    19 exactly but I can interpret what you were saying --

    20 that you did not understand why Kiseljak, which was

    21 under HVO control, took part in the blockade of

    22 Sarajevo. Do you remember having said something to

    23 that effect?

    24 Well, then I'm asking you the following:

    25 Where was the HVO of Kiseljak in touch with the

  106. 1 defenders of Sarajevo so that it could take part in the

    2 blockade of Sarajevo? Please go ahead.

    3 A. The HVO of Kiseljak was together with the

    4 Chetniks in the area between Kiseljak and Sarajevo.

    5 They never wanted to carry out combat operations

    6 together with us vis-à-vis Sarajevo, that is to say,

    7 via Kobiljaca.

    8 Secondly, they created problems from Hadzici,

    9 conditionally speaking -- it's really Tarcin and

    10 Pazaric -- to pass via Fojnica to Kiseljak towards

    11 Central Bosnia and Visoko, and then people had to go

    12 elsewhere, roundabout, because they could not pass this

    13 way. So, in fact, in my estimate, they took part in

    14 the blockade. Perhaps I'm mistaken.

    15 Q. In order to put the question very precisely,

    16 did the HVO of Kiseljak have a front line with the

    17 defenders of Sarajevo? Were they in touch? Were they

    18 facing them? Did they have territorial contact with

    19 the territory that was defended by the defenders of

    20 Sarajevo?

    21 A. I'm going to answer with a counter-question.

    22 On the other side, from Sarajevo, in the region of

    23 Stup, in the area facing Kiseljak, that is where an HVO

    24 unit was. Why did they not establish contact? So

    25 physically they did not have contact. But with the

  107. 1 defenders of Sarajevo, this could have been done.

    2 Q. So did I understand you correctly, that the

    3 HVO of Kiseljak did not have physical contact with the

    4 defenders of Sarajevo; is that what you said just now?

    5 Territorial, physical contact?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. Is it correct that between the HVO of

    8 Kiseljak and the defenders of Sarajevo, there was the

    9 army of Republika Srpska?

    10 A. Yes.

    11 Q. Did I understand you correctly that the key

    12 question of cooperation or differences between the HVO

    13 and the BH army in the first part of 1992 and possibly

    14 afterwards was to agree on the deblockade of Sarajevo

    15 or, rather, that the HVO did not agree to that? Was

    16 this a key point for you in terms of the differences

    17 between you and the HVO?

    18 A. The beginning of '92?

    19 Q. All of 1992. Was this the key issue for you

    20 personally and in relation to the HVO?

    21 A. I did not make any decisions to that effect

    22 and I did not plan such matters. I personally did not.

    23 Q. However, did you suggest this to the HVO,

    24 that you deblockade Sarajevo?

    25 A. I am telling you, I did not take part in such

  108. 1 a plan. Other commands did. And probably the staff of

    2 the supreme command. I personally did not. I shall be

    3 lying if I tell you anything.

    4 Q. However, this morning you said that you

    5 proposed to Blaskic that you go and deblockade

    6 Sarajevo.

    7 A. But on this side, when I came here to be the

    8 commander of the corps.

    9 Q. Yes, well, that's what I am saying, when you

    10 came in 1992 to command the corps.

    11 A. Yes, that we participate in this and that he

    12 help and that we take part in it together, yes.

    13 Q. But this is January 1993. That is not 1992.

    14 Or the end of December, something like that.

    15 A. And you were asking me about the beginning of

    16 1992. In the beginning of 1992, I did not take part.

    17 Q. I shall be more specific. I was referring to

    18 all of 1992. When you became commander of the 3rd

    19 Corps and onwards, was this a point of contention

    20 between you and the HVO, their refusal to go and

    21 deblockade Sarajevo or, rather, was it your wish to

    22 have this carried out?

    23 A. This was not a special point of contention

    24 but this is what we wanted. We wanted to act

    25 together. When I'm saying "we," I'm talking about the

  109. 1 3rd Corps and the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

    2 because I got out of Sarajevo and I know exactly what

    3 the people in Sarajevo were experiencing, how they died

    4 and how they were famished, and that is why I suggested

    5 that we move on this together.

    6 Q. And now tell the Court: Ever, until the end

    7 of the war, was Sarajevo deblockaded by the force of

    8 arms, ever? Or was this done by way of an agreement?

    9 A. No, but it could have been done had there not

    10 been obstacles. That is my assessment.

    11 Q. What about this encirclement of Sarajevo; was

    12 this a professional military siege, encirclement?

    13 A. Yes.

    14 Q. Did you have a lot of casualties when you

    15 attempted the deblockade of Sarajevo?

    16 A. I don't know exactly what the fatalities

    17 were.

    18 Q. Well, just give me an estimate: small,

    19 medium, large?

    20 A. There were casualties, but it is relative,

    21 what is small and what is big. There were greater

    22 casualties because we did not have anything to act

    23 with. We did not have anything to act with, and we

    24 could not obtain what we needed because others were in

    25 the way.

  110. 1 Q. Now we are going back to January, February

    2 1992 [as interpreted]. You told us here about the

    3 joint orders that you made with Blaskic in Kakanj on

    4 the 13th of February, 1993 -- and the transcript says

    5 February '92 but it's supposed to say February 1993.

    6 So we have several joint orders that you presented to

    7 us here and that we are going to read because they are

    8 now part of the evidence.

    9 Tell us, why was it necessary to negotiate?

    10 What happened before the 13th of February, 1993? You

    11 didn't tell us a thing about the conflict between the

    12 HVO and the BH army in Busovaca in January 1993. What

    13 is it that happened there in January 1993? Can you

    14 tell us about that in a few sentences, please?

    15 A. The conflict in Busovaca was not only in

    16 January 1993, it began in 1992.

    17 Q. Was there any conflict on the 6th?

    18 A. The Bosniaks were expelled to Kacuni and the

    19 Croats remained in Busovaca.

    20 Q. Were the Croats expelled from any villages

    21 perhaps, as far as you know?

    22 A. I don't believe they were expelled, but I do

    23 believe that somebody fled because there were

    24 conflicts, because there was shooting going on. But

    25 that the intention was to expel anybody, no.

  111. 1 Q. Were any Croatian houses burned, possibly?

    2 What do you think about that?

    3 A. You're asking me questions and,

    4 Mr. President, I have to answer them in the following

    5 way: Just as if I was the commander of a platoon

    6 there, I was the commander of a corps, and that is very

    7 small tactics, but I cannot keep everything in my

    8 head. Quite possibly there was.

    9 Q. Well, 400 houses, that is small-scale

    10 tactics, is it, when you set fire to them and several

    11 hundred people are ethnically cleansed from the

    12 Kacuni-Bilalovac area, the Croats disappeared? Is that

    13 petty tactics? What do you think about that, General?

    14 A. When was that?

    15 Q. After the conflict in January 1993. You know

    16 nothing about that.

    17 A. That wasn't then.

    18 Q. Well, let me help you then, and D450, the

    19 document, would it be -- could it be shown, please?

    20 D98? May I have D98 first, please, and we'll try to

    21 work with that document first.

    22 Take a look at these documents, General,

    23 please. For example, in document 98, you will see a

    24 list of villages and the heads of households, the

    25 owners of the houses that were destroyed and burned.

  112. 1 They're different places, Kacuni, Nezirovici, Zirovici,

    2 Poculica, Bukovci, Kula, Prosije, Gusti Grab --

    3 MR. KEHOE: Excuse me, which is that?

    4 MR. HAYMAN: D450/98.

    5 MR. NOBILO: 450/98.

    6 MR. KEHOE: Excuse me, counsel. We were

    7 pulling 98.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: Would you make it clear what

    9 document we're talking about, please, Mr. Nobilo?

    10 MR. NOBILO: I'm now looking at document

    11 D450/98, so it's "/98."

    12 Q. Then we come to the village of Bakije,

    13 Jelinak, Putis, Kovacevac, I'm not going to go on

    14 reading, but they are lists, as you can see from the

    15 other documents as well, of the individuals whose

    16 houses were burnt, and in all those villages, there

    17 were no more Croats. Did anybody inform you about

    18 that? Do you know anything about that?

    19 A. Mr. President, these are documents dating to

    20 1996 and 1997 that somebody had compiled and made lists

    21 of. They do not date from 1992 and 1993.

    22 Q. The witnesses spoke about that, sir. I'm

    23 asking you whether you know that, in January, these

    24 villages were burnt and the Croats expelled?

    25 A. That is not correct.

  113. 1 Q. And ought you to know about that, or do you

    2 consider, in view of your position, that you don't have

    3 to know about that?

    4 A. No, I'm saying that I consider that that is

    5 not correct.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: General, I didn't understand.

    7 The interpretation I got was that it's not right.

    8 What, that the villages were burned or that you should

    9 have known? Could you make your answer clearer for us,

    10 please.

    11 A. It is not true that in 1992 and 1993, January

    12 1993, that these villages were burnt then.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you.

    14 MR. NOBILO:

    15 Q. General, I'm going to ask you the following

    16 question: Tell us, please, when you issued these joint

    17 orders, we have the return of the population, we speak

    18 about checkpoints, we speak about limitations to the

    19 free passage, did this exist in the BH army and in the

    20 HVO or only in the HVO? Did phenomena of this kind

    21 exist? Were these things taking place?

    22 A. Yes, in the army as well, but at certain

    23 regular points which led up to the front line, and to

    24 the rear, for the most part, that was the HVO.

    25 Q. General, you didn't hear about the villages

  114. 1 that I enumerated. Did you hear about the first crime

    2 that was committed in the area of Central Bosnia, about

    3 Dusina, the village of Dusina, Lasva, where people had

    4 been taken prisoner and where a woman who viewed that,

    5 whose husband was killed and his heart pulled out, that

    6 it was the HVO soldiers that were taken prisoner and

    7 killed and civilians taken prisoner and killed? I'm

    8 sure you know where the village is, that is to say, in

    9 the territory under your control. Did you hear about

    10 that event that took place in January 1993, about the

    11 23rd of January, 1993?

    12 A. In January 1993, there were certain groups in

    13 existence still which did not enter the structure of

    14 the BH army, because the process of forming corps took

    15 three to four months, and as the brigades grew, so the

    16 reports were sent out that, one by one, the brigades

    17 were set up, and as to the alleged crime in Dusina, I

    18 do not know about that.

    19 Q. Did you ever hear about the crime, from that

    20 day to the present?

    21 A. This alleged crime in Dusina was mentioned by

    22 the HVO, but I don't know, I did not order or command

    23 anything of that kind, any crime of that kind to take

    24 place, and I don't want to feel as if I am the accused

    25 here by the way the questions are being posed, if

  115. 1 possible.

    2 Q. I'm sorry. I'm speaking about crimes. I did

    3 not consider that the commander of the 3rd Corps had

    4 ordered anything in this regard, and if you understood

    5 it that way, then I apologise. I'm just speaking about

    6 crimes and whether you heard about them.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: No. There was no ambiguity

    8 here on this point, General. On the part of counsel,

    9 there was absolutely no desire to do that, but the

    10 Defence can ask whether, in respect of other crimes

    11 that were committed, including Ahmici, you might have

    12 heard about what had happened. That's how the question

    13 should be interpreted. That's how I interpreted it.

    14 Please continue, Mr. Nobilo.

    15 MR. NOBILO:

    16 Q. A moment ago, I don't know if you really

    17 wanted to say that, you said that up to the present

    18 day, you heard about the crime in Dusina by the HVO or

    19 the BH army?

    20 A. No, I didn't mention the HVO. I didn't

    21 mention anybody. I said that there were rumours about

    22 the crime in Dusina, but I don't know who perpetrated

    23 it, nor did I order it.

    24 Q. The husband of the woman, that is to say, she

    25 said that this was done by the 7th Muslim Brigade and

  116. 1 that she said that it was done by Serif Patkovic who,

    2 at the time, was an officer in the 7th Muslim Brigade

    3 and that she recognised him on a photograph. What do

    4 you have to say to that? Is that possible?

    5 A. I don't know. That kind of thing was never

    6 planned or ordered or, indeed, possible. I don't

    7 believe it.

    8 Q. But did you ask at joint meetings? Were

    9 there any comments with regard to burnt villages

    10 between Bilalovac and Kacuni in Dusina? Did you bring

    11 anybody to justice? Did you conduct an investigation?

    12 A. Why should I conduct an investigation?

    13 Because I didn't know.

    14 Q. I agree. I'm now going to read you a

    15 document, 732. It is a document dated the 1st of

    16 February, 1993. You submitted it today as evidence,

    17 and I'd like to read something under point 4, the one

    18 but last section above your own signature, where you

    19 are ordering your own forces "to prevent the members of

    20 the BH army to loot and pilfer and burn, and the

    21 protagonists should be detained and brought to justice

    22 immediately. For the implementation of this

    23 assignment, I make responsible the commanders of the

    24 brigades and staff."

    25 General, if soldiers under your command did

  117. 1 not loot and pilfer and burn, because it is forbidden

    2 by law, why then do you have to write this down in an

    3 order? If they did not do that, what prompted you to

    4 write an order of this kind?

    5 A. In war, there are always people that make use

    6 of war for their own ends, and there is profiteering

    7 and looting, and then they say that was done by the

    8 army, the soldiers. To prevent that from taking place,

    9 I just issued a warning.

    10 Q. Were there no such instances before this

    11 order was compiled?

    12 A. The army is also accused of doing things like

    13 that, whereas it is the profiteers that make use of the

    14 situation, and I felt duty-bound to issue this

    15 warning.

    16 Q. So we understand you, and you must be

    17 commended, but were you prompted by incidents of this

    18 kind or were there no incidents of this kind and you

    19 took this measure to prevent them from occurring?

    20 A. Do you want me to answer you a third time?

    21 Q. Yes, please, because I didn't understand

    22 you.

    23 A. As I say, in every war, just as in this one,

    24 there were profiteers who did things like that. There

    25 were those who looted convoys of the UNHCR, for

  118. 1 example, and didn't belong to any military formation

    2 whatsoever, just to take the goods, seize the goods, to

    3 engage in black marketeering, and so on, and I just

    4 cautioned that this must not be done by any member of

    5 the army.

    6 Q. Let us move forward then, General. At the

    7 negotiations of the 13th of February, 1993, you

    8 negotiated with Colonel Blaskic. How did you find

    9 him? Was a commander in control of the situation,

    10 sovereignly in command of his units, or not? At those

    11 negotiations, what was your opinion of him?

    12 A. Colonel Blaskic was a very balanced man, a

    13 highly built-up professional man, and very precise and

    14 detailed.

    15 Q. Did you consider him to be a person of

    16 relevance with whom you could negotiate and achieve a

    17 peace agreement?

    18 A. Mr. President, I was not able to assess

    19 individuals representing the HVO with whom to sign an

    20 agreement. He was the representative of the HVO, and

    21 that is how my relationship was.

    22 Q. So you had no comments?

    23 A. No.

    24 MR. NOBILO: D188 is the next exhibit that we

    25 would like to discuss, please.

  119. 1 Q. General, would you read this document,

    2 acquaint yourself with it, and I am going to read out

    3 just one sentence from the document in a minute or

    4 two.

    5 This is your document, a document of the 3rd

    6 Corps, dated the 12th of February, 1993, where you, in

    7 the second paragraph, state the following, and in the

    8 English text, it is the third paragraph, in fact. You

    9 say:

    10 "We assume that Colonel Tihomir Blaskic is

    11 isolated in Kiseljak and that his readiness to resolve

    12 the problems is a lie, that somebody else is solving

    13 the problems instead of Tiho Blaskic and that there is

    14 no point in negotiating as whatever is agreed upon will

    15 not have any result."

    16 General, did you write that?

    17 A. Yes.

    18 Q. Do you then alter what you said before the

    19 Tribunal, and can you tell us --

    20 A. This is the 12th of February. This is a

    21 concrete meeting at which this occurred when Mr. -- I

    22 can't find his name and surname. Just one moment,

    23 please. The document was signed by an unauthorised

    24 person, in our view, and it was our assumption that at

    25 that meeting, at that particular time, Tiho was

  120. 1 isolated in Kiseljak, and in the previous statement, I

    2 speak about our other meetings and the following

    3 meetings and how I experienced him during those

    4 meetings.

    5 Q. If he was isolated in Kiseljak, who then

    6 commanded, in Busovaca, the troops that were fighting

    7 there?

    8 A. Just a minute, Mr. President. That is my

    9 assumption. It need not be a correct assumption.

    10 Q. Yes, but what did you base your assumption

    11 on?

    12 A. I say this because the number two man signed

    13 the document, not Tihomir.

    14 Q. So who signed the document, General?

    15 A. I can't remember.

    16 Q. The situation that Blaskic was isolated in

    17 Kiseljak, what did you assume, that he was not master

    18 of the situation in Kiseljak? Was that the essential

    19 point?

    20 A. I'd like to read through this document

    21 slowly. You just read out one paragraph.

    22 Q. We don't have much time, so we have to move

    23 forward. I have one more question that I want to ask

    24 you. Did you consider that Blaskic --

    25 JUDGE JORDA: What do you mean when you say

  121. 1 that you're withdrawing your question, Mr. Nobilo?

    2 MR. NOBILO: No, no, Mr. President, I just

    3 asked the questions I asked, but I said that I'd like

    4 to move forward.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: I heard in the answer that the

    6 witness doesn't have the time to read the document. Is

    7 it a long document? Because we don't have the English

    8 version on the ELMO. What would you prefer to do,

    9 Mr. Nobilo?

    10 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, we have obtained

    11 an answer, we're satisfied with the answer, and we'd

    12 like to move forward because our time is limited, of

    13 course.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. We're going to take

    15 a break at a quarter after four, and we will resume at

    16 4.35, and then you can finish around 5.00, which means

    17 that you have about 35 more minutes, unless you're like

    18 Mr. Kehoe and you finish earlier. That would be

    19 another problem. You have the right to use all your

    20 time, Mr. Nobilo. Proceed, please.

    21 MR. NOBILO: Thank you, Mr. President. We'll

    22 see how things proceed and whether we'll be able to end

    23 before time. Why not?

    24 Q. You said this morning, General, that the 3rd

    25 Corps had 32.000 soldiers and that a third was armed.

  122. 1 Do you maintain that now?

    2 A. Yes, at that time, yes.

    3 Q. What time was that? Can we be more specific?

    4 A. I should like to remind you that I was

    5 commander of the corps from the end of 1992 up until

    6 October or November of 1993, and I'm speaking about

    7 that time and in that name.

    8 Q. So if my calculations are correct, a third of

    9 32.000 is about 10.300 -- 10.600, 10.700 soldiers under

    10 arms; is that it?

    11 A. Yes, at the front line, a big front line, a

    12 big number.

    13 Q. The front line, you said, was 500 kilometres?

    14 A. A lot of time has gone by, Mr. President, and

    15 I apologise, so I can't remember everything. I'm just

    16 seeking confirmation.

    17 Q. So we said a third, did we?

    18 A. Yes.

    19 Q. After that --

    20 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, that is what you said.

    21 MR. NOBILO:

    22 Q. First of all, you said this morning that in

    23 Vitez and in the villages around Vitez, there were no

    24 military formations, and you used the term "military

    25 effectives." Is that correct? Before the open

  123. 1 conflict, the 16th of April.

    2 A. No.

    3 Q. So there were not. We can understand your

    4 answer in two ways. Are you saying that there were no

    5 military effectives in the villages around Vitez before

    6 the conflict of the 16th of April, 1993?

    7 A. Yes.

    8 Q. Furthermore, you said that in Stari Vitez,

    9 the civilians found themselves in an encirclement, from

    10 the 16th of April onwards, 1993. Do you maintain that

    11 now still?

    12 A. Civilians in an encirclement?

    13 Q. Yes, that is what you said this morning.

    14 A. Yes, I maintain that now. I also said -- I

    15 don't know whether you noticed that -- that when people

    16 would go home to rest, what happened was that some of

    17 them would take their rifles with them; and also, when

    18 there was a reconstruction of the Territorial Defence

    19 and when it became the Armija in the municipality, as a

    20 structure of Territorial Defence, under the competence

    21 of the wartime presidency president of the

    22 municipality, then there were platoons and so on which

    23 were not within the army structure.

    24 Q. Was that true for the Vitez municipality as

    25 well, what you have just described?

  124. 1 A. I think there was something like that. There

    2 were some people there.

    3 Q. The 325th Brigade, Mountain Brigade, was it

    4 within the composition of the 3rd Corps?

    5 A. Yes, it was.

    6 Q. And where was the command post on the eve of

    7 the conflict of the 16th of April, 1993?

    8 A. I'd have to take a look at the map. I can't

    9 recall.

    10 Q. Do you accept that it was in the village of

    11 Kruscica near Vitez, the 325th Mountain Brigade command

    12 post?

    13 A. Yes, possibly above Vitez.

    14 Q. Do you accept that in Stari Vitez, according

    15 to the words of Sefkija Dzidic, who was in command of

    16 the forces there, that there were 250 soldiers and

    17 policemen in Stari Vitez?

    18 A. I don't know about the policemen, how many

    19 there were, but no soldiers. That was not possible.

    20 Q. What about Ahmici; were there any units of

    21 Territorial Defence there or BH army?

    22 A. No.

    23 Q. I should like to ask the usher to show the

    24 witness the following document: 196. Please check

    25 whether it is under seal. I don't think it is.

  125. 1 General, please look at this map, this map,

    2 and tell me only whether you agree or disagree with the

    3 forces deployed as they are here.

    4 Just give it to the General.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Just a moment. I would like

    6 the Judges to see the map as well. It should be on the

    7 easel. This cannot be a dialogue between Mr. Nobilo

    8 and the witness. The usher will put it on the easel,

    9 and we will ask the technical booth to ensure that both

    10 the Judges and the public gallery can be participants

    11 in these proceedings.

    12 MR. NOBILO:

    13 Q. General, I suggest that you get closer to the

    14 map. It is very difficult to see the letters, they are

    15 so small --

    16 JUDGE JORDA: I think that there is a

    17 microphone that the witness can use with the map, isn't

    18 there? You can stand, General Hadzihasanovic, but we

    19 are going to give you another microphone and another

    20 headset, and if you wish to approach the map,

    21 Mr. Kehoe, please do so, and Mr. Nobilo will ask his

    22 questions.

    23 Mr. Nobilo, if you want to approach the map,

    24 you can, but be careful and be sure that the Judges can

    25 see.

  126. 1 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, we have a copy

    2 here, so perhaps you would like to have it. Perhaps it

    3 would be of help to you.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you.

    5 MR. NOBILO:

    6 Q. General, the question is a simple one: Do

    7 you agree with the facts that are depicted on this map?

    8 A. First I have to have a look.

    9 JUDGE JORDA: Take your time. These are

    10 sensitive questions that are being asked. I want the

    11 witness to reflect carefully about what he is going to

    12 say, Mr. Nobilo.

    13 General --

    14 THE WITNESS: Mr. President?

    15 JUDGE JORDA: General Hadzihasanovic, you

    16 have seen the map.

    17 What is the question, Mr. Nobilo? Perhaps

    18 the witness may have to concentrate again when

    19 answering your question. Oh, the witness doesn't hear.

    20 MR. NOBILO: Can you hear me, General?

    21 JUDGE JORDA: Do you hear me? Do you hear

    22 me, General?

    23 What's your question, Mr. Nobilo? Perhaps

    24 the witness will need to concentrate on the map once

    25 he's heard the question.

  127. 1 MR. NOBILO:

    2 Q. My question: The deployment of forces of the

    3 BH army and the HVO, on this map, at this given point

    4 in time, does it match what you know about this subject

    5 matter?

    6 A. This is my answer: I would have to collate

    7 this map with a map from the headquarters where I was

    8 in command.

    9 JUDGE JORDA: I would like you -- well, so

    10 that everyone can follow what you're saying, I would

    11 like you to mention the colours of the different

    12 fronts, Mr. Nobilo.

    13 MR. NOBILO: I have to get closer too. It's

    14 a bit too far for me. I think that blue is the army of

    15 Bosnia-Herzegovina and red is the HVO.

    16 JUDGE JORDA: So that the proceedings are

    17 clear. The blue is the Bosnian army, the orange

    18 represents the HVO forces; is that right?

    19 MR. NOBILO: That's right. That's right,

    20 Mr. President.

    21 JUDGE JORDA: And then the Serbs are in red.

    22 MR. NOBILO: In red, red, that's right.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Now, General Hadzihasanovic,

    24 this is an exhibit being given to you by Mr. Nobilo.

    25 The question is ...

  128. 1 MR. NOBILO:

    2 Q. To the best of your recollection, is this map

    3 a truthful one?

    4 A. Mr. President, in order for me to give a

    5 precise answer, this map would have to be collated to a

    6 map from the headquarters where I or my associates had

    7 maps. Generally speaking, it could be accepted, if we

    8 look at the HVO positions, but all the details, I don't

    9 know if I can say for sure, and I would need time to

    10 check this out and to give you an accurate answer.

    11 Q. I'm going to put a very precise question to

    12 you. Look at Ahmici. It doesn't say so there -- I

    13 mean, you can't see the actual letters -- but you know

    14 where Ahmici is by Nadioci, and tell me, what was the

    15 army that was there?

    16 Right by Nadioci, on the left-hand side, and

    17 what is the designation there? What is the army

    18 there: the BH army or the HVO, according to this map?

    19 With your permission, Mr. President, perhaps

    20 I can show it to him?

    21 A. The print is very fine. It's very hard for

    22 me to tell.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, it's very difficult to see

    24 Ahmici on the map, Mr. Nobilo.

    25 Mr. Kehoe, if you want to approach the

  129. 1 map ...

    2 MR. NOBILO:

    3 Q. Could you please give us an answer?

    4 A. Yes. I just wanted to give you an answer,

    5 Mr. President. The circle is in blue. There is no --

    6 there is nothing else that it says there. I don't know

    7 who drew this, and I said, this really has to be

    8 checked out. I don't know who drew this. I didn't.

    9 Q. Thank you, General. Could you please sit

    10 down? And I would like you to see document 475.

    11 Before that, you said that in Ahmici, there were no

    12 military forces, and in that connection, I'm asking for

    13 document 475 to be given to you. That is a Prosecution

    14 Exhibit.

    15 General, you wrote this order on the 16th of

    16 April, 1993, and you ordered the units of the 3rd Corps

    17 to take positions. After the words "Order," after the

    18 word "Order," point number 1, line number 5 in the

    19 Croat language reads as follows -- I am going to read

    20 it. You are asking for a battalion and you are asking

    21 for it to be sent, and now I'm quoting:

    22 " ... in order to give assistance to our

    23 forces in the village of Putis, Jelinak, Loncari,

    24 Nadioci, and Ahmici."

    25 The point is, "our" forces in Ahmici. What

  130. 1 do you say to that, General? Is this order in line

    2 with what you testified before this Honourable Court?

    3 A. The order has to be read in its entirety, not

    4 only partially.

    5 Q. Well, please go ahead.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: If you agree, perhaps we should

    7 take a break. It's a quarter after four. That will

    8 give the witness time to read the order, take a

    9 20-minute break, and resume at about twenty-five to.

    10 All right. Court stands adjourned until

    11 then.

    12 --- Recess taken at 4.17 p.m.

    13 --- On resuming at 4.39 p.m.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: We will now resume the

    15 hearing. Have the accused brought in, please.

    16 (The accused entered court)

    17 JUDGE JORDA: You're not too tired, General?

    18 All right. Let's continue.

    19 MR. NOBILO:

    20 Q. General, the question is related to document

    21 475. How do you explain your testimony before this

    22 Honourable Court that in these villages around Vitez,

    23 there were no army troops, especially not in Ahmici,

    24 and in this order that we read now, this is your own

    25 order, you are talking about helping "our" forces in

  131. 1 Ahmici, Nadioci, et cetera.

    2 A. This map, Mr. President, as it stands here,

    3 is December 1992, January 1993. If this is a working

    4 map that follows the situation as it is on the ground,

    5 there should be a precise date on it. The document

    6 that I am holding in my hands now, my document,

    7 pertains to the 16th of April, and it says very nicely

    8 on it "Urgent." And part of the troops are supposed to

    9 move from Zenica, that is, the direction from Zenica to

    10 Ahmici, because since Ahmici had already happened, the

    11 Territorial Defence detachment was already running from

    12 Zenica towards Ahmici, towards Ahmici. That is what

    13 this order refers to, not this map. I don't know who

    14 drew this map.

    15 Q. I forgot too, to tell you the truth. We are

    16 concentrating on your order of the 16th of April --

    17 forget about the map. That was for a certain period.

    18 On the 16th of April, you said that when the

    19 conflict breaks out in April 1993, when the conflict

    20 broke out, there were no forces of yours there, and on

    21 the basis of this order, it says that you are sending

    22 help to "our" forces, I quote. You are saying that you

    23 are sending someone to help "our" forces in Ahmici and

    24 in other villages. So ...

    25 A. Mr. President, after the events in Ahmici, I

  132. 1 repeat, the detachment from Zenica was the first one to

    2 react, the Territorial Defence detachment, in order to

    3 prevent a further escalation, and I wrote the order in

    4 the morning to this unit to prepare a unit and to move

    5 it, if necessary, if help is necessary. So we are

    6 talking about after Ahmici. There was no army in

    7 Ahmici. And then when you move the army, you're

    8 supposed to give them grid points, et cetera, to go

    9 here, and that is not to say that there was an army in

    10 Ahmici at that time. Ahmici has an area of its own.

    11 Q. But, General, you are saying "our" forces in

    12 Ahmici, your forces are in Ahmici. That is what you

    13 say in this order.

    14 A. I am interpreting this to you, what it means,

    15 and please look at the map, see in which direction they

    16 are moving and who is exactly supposed to help the

    17 Territorial Defence detachment, the first one that went

    18 out after the massacre in Ahmici.

    19 Q. But at what time in the morning did you write

    20 this order?

    21 A. I cannot remember, but if you would check the

    22 signal system, you would be able to find out when it

    23 was sent.

    24 Q. So, General, the document is

    25 self-explanatory. And now I'm asking you the

  133. 1 following: On the 16th of April, were there any forces

    2 of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina or of the Territorial

    3 Defence in Ahmici?

    4 A. No.

    5 Q. There is something else I wish to ask you.

    6 On the 16th of April, 1993 [as interpreted], Ambassador

    7 Thebault told you about the intentions of the HVO to

    8 attack you. Did you take the ambassador seriously or

    9 did you think that he was joking or what?

    10 A. I had estimates and information, intelligence

    11 information, that something like that was being

    12 prepared. So Ambassador Thebault did not surprise me

    13 greatly. As a matter of fact, it is correct that on

    14 the 15th of April and on the 14th, we were preparing

    15 ourselves to commemorate the first anniversary of the

    16 army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Our activities were

    17 considerably within the scope of our possibilities,

    18 symbolically focused on those activities, and we hoped

    19 this would not happen.

    20 MR. NOBILO: There is a mistake in the

    21 transcript in my question. I was asking about

    22 Ambassador Thebault and his warning. I said that this

    23 took place on the 14th of April, 1993, not the 16th, as

    24 it says here in my question.

    25 Q. So you had intelligence reports, and

  134. 1 Ambassador Thebault confirmed this. Did you inform

    2 your subordinate units about this information that you

    3 had received?

    4 A. I warned subordinate units that this might

    5 happen, but precisely where and when, in which time and

    6 place, no, because the previous conversation I had was

    7 turned to Zenica.

    8 Q. General, you said that you had under your

    9 control all the units in the 3rd Corps except for

    10 certain groups of Mujahedin, and now I'm asking you the

    11 following: These groups of Mujahedin, were these

    12 smallish groups of foreigners or is this the El Mujahed

    13 detachment?

    14 A. Mr. President, groups or units of Mujahedin

    15 were not within the composition of the BH army. The

    16 El Mujahed detachment was established only in 1994.

    17 Q. What about these Mujahedin, foreigners,

    18 whatever you choose to call them? When did you disarm

    19 them and expel them? When did that happen?

    20 A. I did not say that I disarmed them. I did

    21 not say that I expelled them. There were individuals

    22 and groups that made problems, even in the town of

    23 Zenica, and the MUP had to deal with them. When they

    24 sought our help, then we took part in their disarmament

    25 as well. They were not members of the BH army in '92

  135. 1 and in '93. For me, they were outside the structure of

    2 the army.

    3 Q. How many such armed persons were there within

    4 the zone of responsibility of the 3rd Corps, these

    5 people who were armed but not under your control?

    6 A. Perhaps about 30, perhaps 35.

    7 Q. And all the rest, the 7th Muslim in its

    8 entirety, was it under your command, under your chain

    9 of command and your control?

    10 A. The 7th Muslim was in the chain of command of

    11 the 3rd Corps.

    12 Q. You said that you ordered to control the

    13 Zenica-Travnik route so that you could go around Vitez

    14 and ensure supplies and communication; is that true?

    15 A. This was in June when Gornji Vakuf was

    16 attacked.

    17 Q. Are you aware that in June 1993, the 7th

    18 Muslim, along with some local forces of the army of

    19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, was from Zenica to Travnik and that

    20 they ethnically cleansed 50 Croat villages of the

    21 municipalities of Zenica and Travnik and the entire

    22 population was expelled from there? Have you ever

    23 heard of this piece of information? These houses are

    24 burned until the present day, and they were not

    25 repaired at all.

  136. 1 A. The army did not carry out ethnic cleansing.

    2 Because there was a war, who went where is a different

    3 matter. Do you know that the Croat population, on the

    4 instructions of the HVO, had to leave these areas, that

    5 is to say, this was not done by the army.

    6 Q. You are not aware of the mass graves, for

    7 example, near Bikosi? Over 30 people were shot by the

    8 7th Muslim, that those were Croat men, mostly

    9 civilians, some of them prisoners of war. Do you know

    10 about that? A man testified here who escaped his own

    11 shooting. Did you hear that?

    12 A. No. No, I don't know that.

    13 Q. Do you know that these villages between

    14 Zenica and Travnik, all Croat villages were burned, all

    15 of them?

    16 A. They were not burned.

    17 Q. Did you perhaps complain in 1993 that you did

    18 not have the 7th Muslim under your own control?

    19 A. No. Only once, in a conversation, I think I

    20 told Blaskic that there were foreigners that were not

    21 under my control and that could create problems, and

    22 those are the foreigners I talked about.

    23 Q. Very well. I would like to read a document

    24 to you, that is, Prosecution Exhibit 242. It is in

    25 English, so perhaps we could put it on the ELMO, annex

  137. 1 D, Prosecutor's Exhibit.

    2 MR. NOBILO: In order to speed things up, we

    3 can put a copy of this document on the ELMO.

    4 MR. HAYMAN:

    5 Q. General, this is a portion of a report

    6 prepared by the European Community Monitoring Mission,

    7 and it proports to memorialise an interview that

    8 Charles McLeod had with you on or about the 7th of May,

    9 1993. I'm going to read you the second paragraph, and

    10 the question is: Did you, in substance, state what is

    11 recounted here in that interview?

    12 "Regarding the movement of troops,

    13 Hadzihasanovic said that this was only a rotation.

    14 Access to the prison is no problem for ECMM or Fr

    15 [Friar] Stepin. He claimed no knowledge of the other

    16 prisons such as the music school and MUP. He did say

    17 that there were other forces at work."

    18 MR. NOBILO:

    19 Q. Tell me, the music school, who held that

    20 prison under its control?

    21 A. I don't know that this was a prison.

    22 Q. Were there imprisoned and detained Croats

    23 there?

    24 A. I do not have such information.

    25 Q. Did you say this? What my colleague just

  138. 1 read out to you, did you say this to Charles McLeod?

    2 A. This was taken out of context of a particular

    3 conversation.

    4 Q. But do you recall having said that?

    5 A. Could you translate this sentence once

    6 again? I don't want to give an inaccurate answer.

    7 MR. HAYMAN: Paragraph 2, I quote:

    8 "Regarding the movement of troops,

    9 Hadzihasanovic said that this was only a rotation.

    10 Access to the prison is no problem for ECMM or Fr

    11 [Friar] Stepin. He claimed no knowledge of the other

    12 prisons such as the music school and MUP. He did say

    13 that there were other forces at work."

    14 A. What does this mean, "other forces at work"?

    15 I don't understand that.

    16 MR. NOBILO:

    17 Q. We're asking you. Did you say that?

    18 A. But look, I am the one who is supposed to

    19 answer this question, and I don't understand the

    20 question.

    21 JUDGE JORDA: I'm asking you to concentrate,

    22 General Hadzihasanovic. I think the question is

    23 clear. We're talking about a report of a meeting where

    24 allegedly you said this sentence. We don't have to

    25 read it for the third time, especially since Defence

  139. 1 time has almost come to an end. We want to see what

    2 your answer is.

    3 A. Mr. President, I agree, and I am going to

    4 give an answer, but I'm afraid that I'm going to make a

    5 mistake. The last sentence in this paragraph is

    6 unclear to me.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: I think there were two

    8 questions, Mr. Nobilo, one on the prisons and one on

    9 the last sentence which, in fact, isn't really very

    10 clear.

    11 MR. NOBILO: Yes. The key question is

    12 whether he said it. If the General doesn't remember,

    13 we're satisfied with that, and we can move on. So a

    14 simple question: Did he say it? That's the first

    15 thing we wish to know. Does he remember saying this?

    16 JUDGE JORDA: Are you talking about the

    17 prison or are you talking about the last sentence,

    18 Mr. Nobilo?

    19 MR. NOBILO: Everything that was read out,

    20 both sentences, both with regard to the prison in the

    21 music school and the last sentence.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: All right. We will repeat it

    23 for you a third time.

    24 Mr. Hayman, please, I will give you another

    25 five extra minutes. Actually, I don't -- well, I

  140. 1 didn't cause the electricity to go out. I can assure

    2 you that I'm not the one.

    3 We do have to try to clarify this point.

    4 Mr. Hayman will read it for the third and last time.

    5 Try to answer. You know, you don't know, or you don't

    6 remember.

    7 MR. HAYMAN: "Regarding the movement of

    8 troops, Hadzihasanovic said that this was only a

    9 rotation. Access to the prison is no problem for ECMM

    10 or Fr [Friar] Stepin. He claimed no knowledge of the

    11 other prisons such as the music school and MUP. He did

    12 say that there were other forces at work."

    13 A. Apart from the last sentence, the rest is

    14 probably correct, but I do not understand the last

    15 sentence and what it means, and so my answer does not

    16 apply to the last sentence because I don't understand

    17 it. What other forces and what does this --

    18 MR. NOBILO:

    19 Q. But, General, two minutes ago, you said that

    20 there was no prison at the music school.

    21 A. I said that again here. I said the ECMM was

    22 going to check out and see whether there was one or

    23 not.

    24 Q. Before you came to the Tribunal, General, did

    25 you talk to the representatives of the Office of the

  141. 1 Prosecutor from The Hague? Did you make a statement to

    2 them?

    3 A. You mean me personally?

    4 Q. Yes.

    5 A. I gave an initial statement on the 6th or

    6 7th.

    7 Q. General --

    8 JUDGE JORDA: I would be interested in

    9 knowing that. When did you make that prior statement?

    10 [Technical difficulty]

    11 JUDGE JORDA: I didn't get the interpretation

    12 in French for that. Please continue. There was no

    13 interpretation in French. All right. Let me ask the

    14 question again. When did you make your statement to

    15 the Office of the Prosecutor, General Hadzihasanovic.

    16 [Technical difficulty]

    17 A. I haven't got the documents with me, but I

    18 think it was 1996 or 1997.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Is there interpretation in

    20 French now? Do you hear me? Can the interpreters

    21 follow?

    22 All right, Mr. Nobilo, please continue.

    23 [Technical difficulty]

    24 MR. KEHOE: Excuse me. We're not getting any

    25 translation from the English booth.

  142. 1 MR. HAYMAN: Only five more minutes.

    2 THE INTERPRETER: Can you hear this side?

    3 Can you hear this microphone?

    4 JUDGE JORDA: The technical problem is solved

    5 now. We will give you the equivalent amount of time

    6 that you need. Don't worry. We will work like in

    7 football games and we'll take into account the pauses.

    8 But I'd like to know why there was a translation

    9 problem. Do you need another three or four minutes?

    10 Help us, Mr. Registrar.

    11 THE REGISTRAR: There is no more problem.

    12 The technical problem has been solved.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: No further problems. Is the

    14 French booth all right? Okay. We can resume. You

    15 have until five minutes after five.

    16 MR. NOBILO: Yes.

    17 Q. General, did you say on that occasion --

    18 JUDGE JORDA: You know, this is taking up the

    19 Judges' time. Go ahead.

    20 MR. NOBILO:

    21 Q. General, in that talk, did you say that you

    22 had under your command 87.000 people and not 32.000, as

    23 you said before this Trial Chamber here today?

    24 A. The 3rd Corps numbered at that time 32.000,

    25 but it kept growing. However, I solved problems for

  143. 1 almost 87-odd-thousand people, because from the staff

    2 of the main command, I was given the responsibility

    3 that because the 2nd Corps with the 7th JUG Group could

    4 not command, and it had physical links with me in

    5 Tesanj, Teslic, towards Doboj, and I had to solve the

    6 problems which they had asked me to solve.

    7 Q. We're going to read out the sentence, and

    8 tell us, please, whether you said that or did not say

    9 it.

    10 MR. HAYMAN: Page 3, paragraph 3, third

    11 sentence:

    12 "In the 3 Corps area, I had 87.000 soldiers

    13 and approximately one third had weapons."

    14 MR. NOBILO:

    15 Q. Did you say that or did you not?

    16 A. I don't know how this was typed out. I am

    17 explaining to you how it was. I am explaining the

    18 sentence, making it clearer. Thirty-two thousand is

    19 correct, and I was added an operative group. It was

    20 called the Istok Group, East Group, 7th JUG Group, 7th

    21 South Group, and if I were to look at my documents

    22 again, then this surpassed 80.000 men.

    23 Q. So you did command over 80.000 men, did you

    24 not?

    25 A. I did not command them. I solved the

  144. 1 problems when they referred those problems to me, and

    2 the most frequent problems were of a logistic nature

    3 because there were no roads or communications.

    4 Q. So you do not agree with the assertion that

    5 you had so many people in the 3rd Corps.

    6 I am now going to read you another

    7 quotation. You said that you did not have any

    8 knowledge about the internal structure of the special

    9 purpose units and the military police, that you do not

    10 know whether they got orders from anybody else and that

    11 you assume that they must have received their orders

    12 from Blaskic because that was the case in the JNA and

    13 that was the case where you were commanding, and now I

    14 am going to read what you told the investigators. I'll

    15 do it in Croatian. It's quicker.

    16 "Always, when I would talk to him, Blaskic

    17 maintained that those units were under the command of

    18 somebody higher in the chain, and I believe him. But

    19 he was always conscious of the existence of the

    20 operations of those units."

    21 Did you say that or did you not?

    22 A. Yes, I did, and I also said that he should

    23 have known about that. Read it once again, if the

    24 President will allow you to do so.

    25 Q. Let's move forward. Did you state:

  145. 1 "Kordic could have ordered the gathering of

    2 the special purposes units. The special purposes units

    3 that I'm talking about are the military police and the

    4 intelligence people. The military police was led by

    5 the command at Grude together with the intelligence

    6 officers."

    7 Did you say that?

    8 A. I said that and I wrote it down. Do you need

    9 an explanation?

    10 Q. No. I want to know whether you did say that

    11 or not. Next document --

    12 A. Well, you will have to hear me out. Please,

    13 Mr. President, would you hear me out?

    14 MR. NOBILO: Well, this will be at the

    15 Court's time, not on our time, Defence time.

    16 JUDGE JORDA: Well, you're persuasive. By

    17 asking a question, we are wasting even more time.

    18 Well, anyway ...

    19 Yes, go ahead.

    20 MR. NOBILO:

    21 Q. Do you agree with this sentence:

    22 "Commanding of HVO units and special HVO

    23 artillery, weapons, and rocket launchers is disturbed

    24 and that this not under the HVO commander's Operative

    25 Zone control."

  146. 1 It is the alleged shelling of Zenica on the

    2 26th of March, '93, from a multiple-barrel rocket

    3 launcher.

    4 A. What date, did you say?

    5 Q. The 26th -- 1993. Is that your signature,

    6 and do you agree with that statement?

    7 A. This is the English version.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: General Hadzihasanovic, try to

    9 concentrate. It is a new judgement, a new document.

    10 The Judges have to have it and the witness has to be

    11 able to see it so that he can think about the answer

    12 that he is going to give.

    13 MR. HAYMAN: Mr. President, it is an original

    14 in English signed by the witness, we believe, but it is

    15 in English, so it has to be read to him so there is a

    16 translation. Unless he reads English. I don't know.

    17 MR. KEHOE: I think counsel noted that this

    18 was March of 1993. It appears, counsel, to be June of

    19 1993.

    20 MR. HAYMAN: He said June.

    21 MR. KEHOE: He said March. He said March.

    22 It doesn't make any difference. The document speaks

    23 for itself. It's June.

    24 MR. HAYMAN: We agree. We agree.

    25 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, let's not transform

  147. 1 this procedure into something it isn't, into one with

    2 direct examination and cross-examination. Things have

    3 been made clear. You can bring out anything you like

    4 in your final arguments.

    5 I want the sentence to be re-read carefully

    6 for the witness, I want him to be familiar with it

    7 before he gives us an answer, and then your questions

    8 will come to an end, Mr. Nobilo.

    9 THE REGISTRAR: This will be D585.

    10 MR. HAYMAN: I suggest, Mr. President, I read

    11 the introductory paragraph for context and to remind

    12 the witness of what this is, and then I'll read the

    13 paragraph about which we asked our question.

    14 The document is entitled, "Report about

    15 shelling Zenica" to UNPROFOR Vitez, ECMM, RC Zenica."

    16 Paragraph 1:

    17 "The meeting held in Stara Bila Vitez

    18 (UNPROFOR camp) on 21.06.1993, between representatives

    19 of a B&H and HVO shelling Zenica on 20.06.1993 were

    20 discussed."

    21 Then six lines from the bottom --

    22 MR. KEHOE: Excuse me, counsel. Given the

    23 fact that this is in English and it's one page, I

    24 think, in deference to the witness, Mr. President, it

    25 would be helpful for him just to read the whole

  148. 1 document. It is simply one page.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: All right. Then read the

    3 entire text.

    4 MR. HAYMAN: "3 Corps Command Komission for

    5 finding consequences of shelling found out that this

    6 shelling was done from south-west direction, using a

    7 rocket launcher.

    8 "Considering a rocket range, from which

    9 fragments at the ground were found, we can say for sure

    10 that those rockets were sent by HVO side most probably

    11 from large region south-east from Vitez. We know for

    12 sure that HVO units in this region have such a rocket

    13 launcher and they move it from one to another region.

    14 "After this today held meeting Zenica was

    15 shelled again with 9 missiles. A B&H observers

    16 informed us that this shelling was done from S. Bucici

    17 and Mali Mosunj direction and using two kinds of

    18 weapons."

    19 There appears to be a word missing and

    20 then ...

    21 "Will inform you about that next day.

    22 During this shelling two civilian were wounded very bad

    23 and few civilian were easier wounded. We are asking

    24 you to send to HVO command a very strong protest

    25 because of shelling Zenica and because of those wounded

  149. 1 people. There are Croats among them also. Yesterday,

    2 during shelling Zenica," someone, perhaps "Merkic Amir

    3 was killed, and bad wounded are: 1. Hronic Dragica.

    4 2. Crnkic Zahid. Easter wounded are 1. Sunjic

    5 Mirjana. 2. Sunjic Vincenc. 3. Predojevic Bozica.

    6 "We think that commanding of HVO units and

    7 specially HVO artillery weapons and rocket launcher is

    8 disturbed and that is not under HVO commanders

    9 OZ MB control.

    10 "This artillery HVO attacks which hurt

    11 innocent people provocate a B&H member, special armed

    12 civilian group which will maybe use their weapons but

    13 not under 3 Corps Command Control."

    14 General, did you write this letter?

    15 A. I signed the letter as it's an English

    16 version. This is a little perplexing, this sentence,

    17 "All the artillery was under the HVO control." But

    18 whether it was under direct control of General Blaskic

    19 or it came -- those were our assumptions.

    20 Q. One more question: Did you know that the

    21 Jokers, the military police, when they were used in

    22 combat, were under the command of the Ministry of

    23 Defence of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna,

    24 according to the laws of Herceg-Bosna; did you know

    25 that fact?

  150. 1 A. I did not know of that fact, but General

    2 Blaskic, at our meetings, told me that that was not

    3 under him, and I was not able to check that.

    4 Q. We have a problem here with the

    5 interpretation. Do you say that Blaskic told you that

    6 those units were not under his command in 1993?

    7 JUDGE JORDA: No, no, no. It's not -- let's

    8 be very clear here. We're talking about the sentence

    9 which is signed by you, General, which has to do with

    10 knowing whether the artillery command was perturbed and

    11 was not under HVO control.

    12 What's the question, Mr. Nobilo? Ask the

    13 question clearly; then we will come to an end because I

    14 would like to release the witness tonight. It is an

    15 important question. Take your time. Explain to the

    16 witness what it is you are expecting from him, and then

    17 I'm asking the witness to concentrate so that he can

    18 give a very specific and clear answer. Mr. Nobilo,

    19 please go ahead.

    20 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, we have finished

    21 with the document and have asked a new question. This

    22 is a new question. And in that question, I asked

    23 General Hadzihasanovic the following: Whether he knew

    24 that, according to the laws of Herceg-Bosna, only the

    25 defence minister can use the Jokers and other military

  151. 1 police for combat purposes.

    2 Q. And, please, General, would you repeat your

    3 answer?

    4 A. I did not know the laws of Herceg-Bosna. I

    5 was not acquainted with those laws, and I did not know

    6 whether that was so under those laws. But Blaskic told

    7 me this at one point during a pause in the meetings,

    8 Blaskic told me that, but I was not aware of the laws

    9 of Herceg-Bosna.

    10 Q. Was that in 1993, during the war?

    11 A. Well, if I were to look at my notebooks, I

    12 would find a date, but it was at one of our meetings.

    13 Q. Did he tell you, and did you know, that the

    14 special purposes units, such as the Vitezovi, the other

    15 ones in the -- were under the direct command of the

    16 defence minister of Herceg-Bosna?

    17 A. No, he did not mention the names to me.

    18 MR. NOBILO: General, the Defence thanks you

    19 for being so kind and answering sometimes boring

    20 questions, but that is our business here. Thank you,

    21 Mr. President.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: Strange sentence, like the

    23 Judges' questions.

    24 Judge Shahabuddeen, perhaps you have a

    25 question. We'll try to release the witness this

  152. 1 evening.

    2 Questioned by the Court:

    3 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: General, very few

    4 questions. Possibly two or three.

    5 My recollection is that you were saying that

    6 in January 1993, there were some armed groups fighting

    7 on the side of Bosnia-Herzegovina who were still

    8 outside the structure of the Armija. Did you say

    9 something to that effect?

    10 A. We turned the Territorial Defence into the

    11 army, and the Territorial Defence was based at a

    12 different conception. In addition to the Territorial

    13 Defence, there were some people who were coming in from

    14 foreign countries, various countries, who had weapons,

    15 but as we conceived the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

    16 we did not want these people in because they were

    17 groups and small groups. It was easy to put a

    18 Territorial Defence detachment of a city, for example,

    19 into a brigade. It was not possible and I did not wish

    20 that because I did not know their status. Their status

    21 was defined only in 1994, and I don't know how many of

    22 them there were then because I didn't take part in this

    23 then.

    24 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Apart from these armed

    25 foreigners, were there any other armed groups who were

  153. 1 outside of the structure of the Armija?

    2 A. No, no, except perhaps a criminal or two.

    3 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Well, there may be --

    4 A. There was -- but this was before the army was

    5 established, as far as I can remember, in Zenica.

    6 There was a group of armed persons called the HOS.

    7 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: And the HOS were on the

    8 side of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    9 A. I insisted that they should be on that side

    10 too, but the commander of this group, I don't know

    11 whether he had a rank at that time, was Mr. Holman. He

    12 kept telling me that he was commander of all the

    13 members of HOS on the territory of all of

    14 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And then I referred him to

    15 Sarajevo. If he is such a personality, if he seeks

    16 cooperation with the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that

    17 he should do so through the general staff. He never

    18 appeared after that, and later I heard that he joined

    19 the HVO structure. I am not aware of his future.

    20 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Did he take with him the

    21 whole of the HOS or some elements of it over to the

    22 side of the HVO?

    23 A. I think that all of HOS left Zenica because I

    24 think that it existed there, and elsewhere I did not

    25 have any information that there were such units.

  154. 1 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, let us talk a

    2 little about what happened at Dusina. You said, I

    3 believe, that you heard about it. I think you used the

    4 word "rumours." And you also explained that you did

    5 not inquire. Did you feel that although what reached

    6 you reached you by way of rumour, that the matter was

    7 sufficiently grave to warrant investigation by you as

    8 the commanding officer of the 3rd Corps?

    9 A. It's customary in Bosnia that when you say

    10 "rumour," you are talking about what the man in the

    11 street is saying when they are retelling events, when

    12 they have heard of some kind of an event.

    13 Honourable Judge, I did not receive any

    14 official information from anyone that anything had

    15 happened in Dusina so that I would officially take

    16 action, any action.

    17 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: One last little

    18 question: Was there, at any stage, any degree of

    19 cooperation between the Armija and the Serbs?

    20 A. No.

    21 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Did the 3rd Corps ever

    22 buy fuel or equipment from the VRS?

    23 A. When I said "no," I'm referring to the 3rd

    24 Corps. In that period of one year, when I was there,

    25 no, we got fuel from the authorities of the

  155. 1 municipality of the district or some of the companies

    2 that had some kind of reserves of their own.

    3 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Thank you, General.

    4 A. Thank you too, sir.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Judge Shahabuddeen.

    6 Judge Rodrigues?

    7 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Thank you, Mr. President.

    8 General, further to Judge Shahabuddeen's

    9 question, I would like to ask you somewhat the same

    10 thing. In relationship with the Croatian army, did you

    11 have any cooperation, you in the army of

    12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, did you have any cooperation from

    13 the Croatian army? I'm speaking about the conflict

    14 between the army of the HVO and the Bosnian army.

    15 A. Cooperation is a broad notion; however, I do

    16 not remember any form of cooperation with the Croatian

    17 army, because that's what you're asking about, the

    18 Croatian army, right?

    19 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Another question: You

    20 spoke about the relationship between General Blaskic

    21 and several politicians, Dario Kordic and Kostroman, as

    22 well as others, and you used an image, if I've

    23 understood correctly, when you said that Kostroman

    24 would frequently say to Blaskic or he would frequently

    25 speak with Blaskic, was there a connection between the

  156. 1 military man that Blaskic was and the politician that

    2 Kostroman was and also Dario Kordic? Did you

    3 understand that there was any type of relationship

    4 between the political and the military levels?

    5 A. Your Honour, as for Dario Kordic, there were

    6 cases when we sought to resolve an incident, and then

    7 we would receive an answer from General Blaskic saying,

    8 "I have to consult Kordic," and I physically saw, that

    9 is to say, with my very own eyes, that Ignac at

    10 meetings sat right next to General Blaskic. He did not

    11 speak publicly at meetings. He just whispered into his

    12 ear, and what he whispered to him, that, I could not

    13 hear.

    14 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Therefore, if I've

    15 understood you correctly, General, at least in the

    16 examples that you gave us, there was some type of

    17 subordination to Kordic by Blaskic; is that correct?

    18 A. One could draw that conclusion.

    19 JUDGE RODRIGUES: But it is true that at

    20 times, in order to resolve a problem, Blaskic would

    21 answer and say, "Now, just a moment. I've got to

    22 consult with Dario Kordic." Is that correct?

    23 A. Right.

    24 JUDGE RODRIGUES: I have another question.

    25 The problem that was being resolved was a military,

  157. 1 economic, cultural, social, or other type of problem;

    2 is that correct? What kind of a problem was it?

    3 A. Yes, I understood. Well, on several

    4 occasions, the nature of the problem was the

    5 following: Vehicles that were taken, convoys, bigger

    6 or smaller, that were stopped, things that were taken

    7 away, perhaps persons brought into custody, those were

    8 the problems, by and large.

    9 JUDGE RODRIGUES: So there was an

    10 organisational side in respect of how the military

    11 operations were conducted; is that correct or is that

    12 not correct?

    13 A. Yes.

    14 JUDGE RODRIGUES: You spoke about your

    15 conversation about Ahmici, and you said that you had

    16 contacts with Colonel Stewart. Do you remember the

    17 date that you spoke about Stewart about Ahmici?

    18 A. I don't remember the date, but it was a talk

    19 without writing anything down in a notebook or anything

    20 else, but several days did elapse. I can't remember

    21 the date exactly.

    22 JUDGE RODRIGUES: General, you said that you

    23 learned about Ahmici on the same day, in the morning.

    24 About how many days passed before you had that

    25 conversation with Colonel Stewart? Do you have an idea

  158. 1 of that?

    2 A. Perhaps several days, 10 or 15, because I

    3 asked him to have the bodies taken out so that they

    4 could be buried.

    5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: You also said about Ahmici,

    6 that it was under HVO control. I would like to ask you

    7 something. From your perspective, was it reasonable

    8 for Blaskic to be familiar with the events in Ahmici

    9 only on the 22nd of April, that is, almost a week

    10 later? Is that reasonable or not? There was

    11 communication. There was possibility of information

    12 circulating. What is your opinion on that?

    13 A. I think that Blaskic had to know on that very

    14 same day or perhaps even earlier, in my opinion.

    15 JUDGE RODRIGUES: That's your opinion. Thank

    16 you. Another question: You spoke about your

    17 invitation to celebrate Christmas at General

    18 Blaskic's. There were many people, including Dario

    19 Kordic, Kostroman, General Praljak. Ordinarily, under

    20 the circumstances of that type, there are speeches.

    21 Were there any speeches on that occasion?

    22 A. I've just said that the first speech that was

    23 made was made, I think, by Dario Kordic, and it was

    24 unacceptable to me, so I apologised and left. Probably

    25 there were other speeches as well.

  159. 1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: I would like to go back to

    2 that question. When you say, "it was not acceptable,"

    3 the speech was not acceptable to you, why?

    4 A. Because in that speech, it was said that this

    5 part of Bosnia-Herzegovina is eternally Croatian and

    6 that that is what it was today and that that is what it

    7 will be in the future.

    8 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Thank you, General. I have

    9 no further questions. I would have a lot of questions,

    10 but we have to respect my colleague's time, especially

    11 in respect of what the President said, so that's all I

    12 will ask you.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: We decided that this testimony

    14 would synthesise things because, for the last two

    15 years, the Judges have received a great deal of

    16 documentation from both sides. But I will give the

    17 floor once again to Judge Shahabuddeen who has another

    18 question to ask.

    19 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Who has half a question

    20 to ask, General. It's my way of clarification of an

    21 answer you gave to my brother, Judge Rodrigues.

    22 I think you said to him that General Blaskic

    23 had to know of what happened at Ahmici on that same day

    24 or earlier. When you said "on that same day," to what

    25 day were you referring?

  160. 1 A. The 16th of April.

    2 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Thank you.

    3 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Judge Shahabuddeen.

    4 I'll ask you a quarter of a question because many

    5 questions were asked by my colleagues.

    6 When Colonel Blaskic at that time said to you

    7 that some of the units were subordinate to Mostar, that

    8 was before Ahmici; is that correct? They came under

    9 the authority of the Ministry of Defence?

    10 A. I think, yes.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: When you learned that at

    12 Ahmici, there were special units that had committed

    13 crimes or that there were suspicions that there were

    14 special units there, were you surprised or not?

    15 A. I did not know immediately which units had

    16 done it, but I knew that it was the HVO. After some

    17 time, comments were being made about these units, that

    18 they had done it.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: When Colonel Blaskic said to

    20 you that they were uncontrollable units or could not be

    21 directly controlled by him, did you make a parallel

    22 with your own Mujahedin, who, according to you, were

    23 also not very easy to control?

    24 A. These people who were called the Mujahedin,

    25 at that time, were not a military formation, and they

  161. 1 were not my Mujahedin. Sorry for having given such an

    2 answer, but that is correct.

    3 JUDGE JORDA: In general, do you think that

    4 in the structure, as it existed at that time, where

    5 there was the issue of the HVO policy that Judge

    6 Rodrigues referred to and military personnel, was it

    7 conceivable that the commander of the Operative Zone of

    8 Central Bosnia was simply a military man and was not at

    9 all involved on any political level, or to the

    10 contrary, do you think that at that level of

    11 responsibility, one must accept the political plan of

    12 the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna?

    13 A. I think that he was a participant at the

    14 political level, although he was commander of the

    15 Operative Zone. To what extent, that, I could not

    16 assert.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: In a military structure, which

    18 is ordinarily hierarchial, units like the military

    19 police in wartime fall under the responsibility of the

    20 operative command, or could it be conceived that they

    21 would be under the authority of the Ministry of

    22 Justice? You, as a professional, what do you think?

    23 In wartime.

    24 A. If principles from training in the former

    25 Yugoslav People's Army were being applied, and I

  162. 1 believe that they were, there were units of the

    2 military police at different levels. So, for example,

    3 a brigade would have some kind of a unit of its own of

    4 the military police. The commander of the brigade,

    5 with his military police, would resolve problems within

    6 his own brigade.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me. I thought that you

    8 had finished.

    9 A. Excuse me. Just an addition. If there was a

    10 corps for example, the corps could also have a military

    11 police unit which would make it possible for the

    12 commander of the corps to resolve problems within the

    13 corps, problems of the corps. He could give such a

    14 unit to his subordinate commander of the brigade too.

    15 If he would give such a unit to the commander of the

    16 brigade, then the commander of the brigade would have

    17 to be in a position to command it. He never would give

    18 the entire unit.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Did you ever report crimes to

    20 the military police, crimes or other offences, when you

    21 were the commander of your army corps, that is, to your

    22 own military police?

    23 A. I'm sorry. I did not quite understand the

    24 question. I mean, the word "denounced," that, I did

    25 not understand.

  163. 1 JUDGE JORDA: During your command, did you

    2 ever ask your military police to investigate crimes

    3 that had been allegedly committed by your subordinates?

    4 A. I would send things to be checked out on the

    5 ground, and very often, the returned information would

    6 be that there was no crime, and when I say "very

    7 often," I'm saying to the extent to which I asked for

    8 things to be checked out. But I always tried, in

    9 addition to the military police, to have the

    10 international organisations participate in the

    11 investigation too, and in Zenica, there were quite a

    12 few of them.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: When you would ask for that

    14 type of information, would you follow up on them?

    15 Would you ask for periodic reports so that you would

    16 know the results of the investigations, the

    17 investigations that the military police carried out?

    18 A. Naturally, after such a task is completed, it

    19 is only natural to write out a report and to say what

    20 had happened and what had not happened.

    21 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, General. This was a

    22 long day for you, but that will prevent you having to

    23 come back tomorrow. I think I can speak for my

    24 colleagues when I say how grateful we are to you and

    25 for all the information that you were able to give to

  164. 1 us about the events that you experienced at the time of

    2 the facts ascribed to the accused. We wish

    3 you bon voyage back to your country. Once again, thank

    4 you.

    5 Court stands adjourned, and we will resume

    6 tomorrow, Mr. Registrar, at 10.00, is that correct,

    7 with a witness who is Colonel --

    8 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. Colonel

    9 Koricic.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Court stands

    11 adjourned.

    12 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

    13 5.41 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday,

    14 the 10th day of June, 1999, at

    15 10.00 a.m.