Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 325

1 Monday, 16 April 2007

2 [Prosecution's Opening Statement]

3 [Open session]

4 [The accused entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 AM

6 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning.

7 Could the case be called, please.

8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this is case number IT-04-82-T, The

9 Prosecutor versus Ljube Boskoski and Johan Tarculovski.

10 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much.

11 We have had appearances, but I think as this is the commencement

12 of the opening, we will take them again so that those watching are aware.

13 Mr. Saxon, you appear.

14 MR. SAXON: Good morning, Your Honours. Dan Saxon for the

15 Prosecution, together with my colleagues, Ms. Joanne Motoike;

16 Mr. Matthias Neuner; Ms. Meritxell Regue; and our case manager to my

17 left, Ms. Lakshima Walpita.

18 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much.

19 Ms. Residovic.

20 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honour. For

21 the Defence, Edina Residovic, the defence counsel; Guenal Mettraux,

22 co-counsel, Dragan Godzo, legal consultant; and Jesenka Residovic is

23 legal assistant and case manager.

24 Thank you.

25 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much.

Page 326

1 Mr. Apostolski.

2 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honour.

3 For the Defence of Johan Tarculovski, appearing Antonio Apostolski, head

4 counsel; Jasmina Zivkovic, co-counsel; and Jordan Apostolski, case

5 manager.

6 Thank you.

7 JUDGE PARKER: I will just confirm that firstly Mr. Boskoski is

8 able to hear the proceedings in a language he understands?

9 THE ACCUSED BOSKOSKI: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. I

10 understand the language.

11 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

12 Mr. Tarculovski?

13 THE ACCUSED TARCULOVSKI: [Interpretation] I can understand it

14 too, Your Honour.

15 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much.

16 The purpose of this morning is to hear opening statements in this

17 case, and I would therefore turn, first of all, to Mr. Saxon.

18 MR. SAXON: Thank you, Your Honours.

19 Very briefly, before I begin my remarks today, I would just like

20 to give you an outline of what the Prosecution intends to do.

21 I will commence the Prosecution's opening remarks with a

22 discussion regarding the existence of an armed conflict in the Republic

23 of Macedonia during 2001. Then my colleague, Ms. Motoike, will describe

24 the events that occurred in and around the village of Ljuboten between

25 the 10th and 12th of August, 2001; as well as the criminal responsibility

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1 of the accused Tarculovski.

2 I will then complete the remarks by a discussion of the evidence

3 pertaining to the criminal responsibility of Mr. Boskoski.

4 Before I begin, Your Honour, the Prosecution has prepared a

5 number of copies of the court binder which we showed and discussed with

6 the Trial Chamber at the pre-trial conference, and these binders have now

7 been bound and copies have been made, and I'm wondering, with the

8 assistance of the usher, whether copies could be distributed to the

9 Judges and to co-counsel, because my colleague will be referring to one

10 or more photographs in that binder during her remarks today.

11 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

12 MR. SAXON: Thank you very much.

13 Your Honour, there are several -- at least one or two, if not

14 more, legal criteria which the Prosecution must establish in order to

15 prove that an armed conflict, within the definition of international

16 humanitarian law, existed in Macedonia at the relevant time period of the

17 second amended indictment. First of all, the Prosecution must prove that

18 there was sufficient organisation and structure of the belligerent Armed

19 Forces so that each participating force had the ability to carry out

20 military operations.

21 Second, the Prosecution must demonstrate that the intensity of

22 the armed violence or combat, if you will, rose to a certain level; that

23 is, that the level of armed violence was something greater than mere

24 banditry, common crime, or a disorganized or short-lived insurrection or

25 terrorist activities, which are not subject to international humanitarian

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1 law.

2 Thirdly, there is at least some authority that suggests that

3 territorial control on the part of dissident armed groups, sufficient to

4 enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and

5 to implement the additional protocol of the Geneva conventions might also

6 be a legal requirement to establish the existence of an armed conflict.

7 The Prosecution does not subscribe to this requirement, but, in

8 any event, the Prosecution's evidence will establish that in this case

9 the insurgent group that was fighting with the security forces of the

10 Government of Macedonia, the National Liberation Army, took control of as

11 much as 20 per cent of territory of Macedonia during 2001. The

12 Prosecution's evidence will also establish the requisite nexus between

13 the criminal conduct alleged in the second amended indictment and the

14 armed conflict.

15 Your Honours, the Republic of Macedonia, bordering Serbia and

16 Albania, managed to avoid direct involvement in the armed conflicts which

17 engulfed the Balkan region during the 1990s. It was only in 2001 that

18 simmering inter-ethnic tensions between the Slavic-speaking ethnic

19 Macedonian majority and the ethnic Albanian minority in Macedonia

20 culminated in an internal armed conflict within the Macedonia borders.

21 The parties to the conflict were the security forces of Macedonia the

22 Government of Macedonia, comprising the Army of the Republic of Macedonia

23 and the forces of the Ministry of Interior; and the ethnic Albanian

24 National Liberation Army, also known by its acronym, the NLA in English.

25 Armed clashes between the parties commenced in January 2001 and

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1 rapidly developed into a protracted armed conflict, during which the NLA

2 seized control of at least 20 per cent of the national territory.

3 Following months of fierce fighting and unable to eliminate the NLA by

4 force, the Macedonian government was forced to seek a negotiated

5 political settlement.

6 On the 13th of August, 2001, the Ohrid Framework Agreement was

7 signed which precipitated the process of NLA disarmament and

8 demobilization in exchange for constitutional and legislative amendments

9 favourable to the ethnic Albanian minority.

10 The NLA's Supreme Commander, Ali Achmete formally announced the

11 NLA's dissolution on the 27th of September of 2001.

12 Let me briefly describe to you some of the Prosecution's evidence

13 pertaining to the first legal requirement, the level of organisation and

14 structure of the participating Armed Forces.

15 Your Honours, the Army of the Republic of Macedonia made up the

16 bulk of the Macedonian government's forces and comprised more than 10.000

17 active-duty soldiers and a reserve contingent of up to 24.000 men. The

18 army's weaponry included around 100 tanks, up to 100 armoured personnel

19 carriers, several hundred cannons, Howitzers and mortars, as well as

20 combat aircraft and antiaircraft weaponry.

21 The army deployed all categories of conventional weapons during

22 the armed conflict in 2001, including light weapons, artillery, armoured

23 personnel carriers, tanks, combat helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft.

24 Of course, all of these army forces responded to a unified and

25 functioning chain of command.

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1 I would like to show you two short video clips that demonstrate

2 the use of some of the weaponry by the army of the Republic of Macedonia

3 during the armed conflict in 2001. These clips are from Prosecution 65

4 ter number 985. They'll be shown without any sound.

5 We see a tank firing at what are apparently NLA positions in that

6 village. We see shells landing.

7 And the next clip, which shows the use of mortars by the Army of

8 the Republic of Macedonia, mortar shells striking what appear to be NLA

9 positions on Mount Kala.

10 Your Honours, the forces of the Ministry of Interior constituted

11 the remainder of the forces under the command of the Macedonian

12 government. Ministry of Interior forces, numbering approximately 9.700

13 police personnel, were active in the conflict areas and often engaged in

14 joint operations with the army. Due to the rapidly deteriorating

15 security situation in 2001, reserve personnel within the Ministry of

16 Interior were mobilized, resulting in a total of 10.200, approximately,

17 engaged reserve personnel at the height of the armed conflict. All of

18 these forces were subordinate to and under the effective control of

19 Ljube Boskoski after he became the Minister of Interior in May of 2001.

20 The next video clip, which comes from Prosecution ter number 984,

21 will also be shown without sound, was taken in the city of Tetovo in the

22 spring of 2001, where there was fierce fighting between Macedonian

23 government and -- the Macedonian government forces and the NLA.

24 Can we see this clip, please? We see an armoured personnel

25 carrier of the army going through the street. We see a -- either a

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1 soldier or a police officer firing a weapon at NLA positions above the

2 city. And here we see a police officer firing his Kalashnikov at what

3 are apparently NLA positions, and here a group of police officers firing,

4 here an armoured personnel carrier moving through the city.

5 Your Honours, opposing the Macedonian security forces was the

6 National Liberation Army; in English known as the NLA, in Albanian with

7 the acronym UCHEKA. The NLA was a political military organisation that

8 traced its origins to various ethnic Albanian groups based in Kosovo and

9 Macedonia since the 1980s, as well as in Europe. The NLA grew out of the

10 Kosovo-Albanian militancy that followed the 1999 Kosovo war and NATO

11 bombing campaign, as well as the grievances of the ethnic Albanian

12 minority in Macedonia. Under the overall leadership of Ali Achmete, the

13 NLA's numbers rapidly increased in 2001 to a force that peaked at about

14 6.000 men; mainly ethnic Albanian-Macedonia citizens, plus an unarmed

15 reserve that provided support and logistics.

16 The NLA was an organised armed force. The expert report of

17 Viktor Bezruchenko, the Prosecution's military analyst, explains that it

18 was comprised of four main components: The Supreme Command was the

19 Supreme Commander and political representative, Mr. Achmete, plus support

20 staff; the general staff; deployed fighting units; and an

21 externally-associated organisation known as "Liria Kombetare," which is

22 Albanian for the phrase "national freedom," which was responsible for the

23 coordination of political and fundraising activities abroad.

24 The most prominent individuals within the NLA leadership were

25 Mr. Ali Achmete, also known as Abaz, the NLA Supreme Commander and

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1 political representative; Mr. Gzim Ostreni, also known as Plaku, who was

2 the chief of NLA's General Staff; and Fazli Veliu, who was the NLA's

3 coordinator of political activities for the Albanian Diaspora.

4 If we can take a look now at a portion of 65 ter number 969.

5 Your Honour, this sketch, which comes from a document from the military

6 intelligence sector of the Macedonian Ministry of Defence describes how

7 the military component of the NLA included the General Staff, with

8 Gzim Ostreni at the top as its chief, as well as at least six combat

9 brigades which vary in structure, strength and composition.

10 You see from the left there was the 112th Brigade; the

11 116th Brigade; the 113th Brigade; the 114th Brigade, which operated in

12 the area close to the village of Ljuboten; the 115th Brigade; and the

13 111th Brigade, all with commanders who reported up to the General Staff.

14 The NLA had an identifiable hierarchy of command involving

15 superior/subordinate relationships between the General Staff and Supreme

16 Command and the brigades. All military activities were planned and

17 coordinated by the General Staff, which exercised the NLA's command and

18 control function.

19 The Prosecution will adduce evidence to show the exercise of

20 effective control over personnel and units and the use of headquarters

21 and command posts, with the ability to plan and coordinate armed

22 operations.

23 Your Honours, command and control at the brigade level was

24 facilitated by daily contacts between the brigade commanders and the NLA

25 chief of General Staff, Gzim Ostreni. Lateral and vertical

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1 communications between brigades and the General Staff were maintained

2 through satellite telephone communications. The NLA also had a crude

3 logistic system and training areas. The NLA leaders made efforts to

4 introduce common uniforms, insignia denoting rank and units, internal

5 rules and regulations, and military police.

6 NLA weaponry included mainly automatic and semi-automatic rifles,

7 hand-held rocket-launchers, antiaircraft machine guns, portable

8 surface-to-air missiles, antitank and antipersonnel mines and

9 hand grenades.

10 If we could turn to the Prosecution's 65 ter number 662, this is

11 a page from a report from the Ministry of Interior's Security and?

12 Counter-Intelligence Division, dated the 23rd of August, 2001, and if we

13 can focus on the last -- the bottom half of that page, we see that the

14 Ministry of the Interior noted that the NLA possessed over 100.000 pieces

15 of weaponry, including 16.000 automatic rifles, 3.000 semi-automatic

16 rifles, 2.000 sniper rifles, 3.000 light-machine guns, 20.000

17 hand grenades; hand-held rocket-launchers, et cetera, et cetera. Even

18 Howitzers, 50 Howitzers at the bottom, and 100 antiaircraft cannons.

19 Although the NLA's structure lacked the complex organisation of a

20 modern conventional army, it nevertheless possessed all the basic

21 elements of an organised armed force, a command element, combat units and

22 logistical support elements. As a further indication of its strength and

23 organisation, the NLA enjoyed external relations with the media and

24 international organisations. The NLA issued communiques and political

25 statements and met with representatives of the mediating parties

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1 preceding the conclusion of the Ohrid Framework Agreement.

2 In summary, Your Honours, during all relevant times the NLA

3 sufficiently possessed the characteristics of an organised, armed group

4 capable of engaging in military operations.

5 Let me turn now to the second legal requirement regarding the

6 intensity of the armed conflict.

7 As carefully detailed in Chapter 5 of the expert report of

8 military analyst Viktor Bezruchenko, the armed violence in Macedonia

9 during the period January to September 2001 reached the requisite

10 threshold to prove the existence of an internal armed conflict. The

11 intensity of the armed violence was characterised by the duration,

12 frequency and the geographic scope of the violence; the territorial

13 control of the warring parties; and the displacement of persons and the

14 casualties that occurred. Furthermore, even early on the conflict was of

15 such intensity that it attracted the attention of the United Nations

16 Security Council and ultimately the intervention of NATO and the European

17 union.

18 I would like to show you a page or two from Prosecution 65 ter

19 number 3, which is a publication by the Macedonian Ministry of Internal

20 Affairs that is known as the white book, which contains a great deal of

21 information about the conflict in 2001. But if we focus on the next

22 page, please, and focus first on paragraph 1, we see that the Security

23 Council, as early as March 2001, strongly condemns extremist violence,

24 including terrorist activities in certain parts of the Republic of

25 Macedonia and certain municipalities in Southern Serbia, the Federal

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1 Republic of Yugoslavia, and notes that such violence has support from

2 ethnic Albanian extremists outside these areas and constitutes a threat

3 to the security and stability of the wider region.

4 Can we go back to that page, please? And if we could now focus

5 on paragraph 4, please.

6 We see later on, in the same resolution, the Security Council

7 demands that all those who are currently engaged in armed action against

8 the authorities of those states immediately cease all such actions, lay

9 down their weapons, and return to their homes.

10 Your Honour -- Your Honours, a brief timeline of the armed

11 conflict that again is summarised in detail in Chapter 5 to the

12 Bezruchenko expert report provides an indication of the level of combat

13 operations that took place between the NLA and Macedonian security forces

14 from January through September 2001.

15 For the convenience of everyone in the courtroom, the Prosecution

16 has produced hard copies of two maps that also contained in Prosecution's

17 65 ter Exhibit number 3 the so-called white book, and I would like, if I

18 could ask the assistance of the usher, perhaps to place one copy on the

19 ELMO so that my colleagues can follow along as well as the Judges.

20 The reason we are working with hard copies on the ELMO, Your

21 Honours, is because on the computer screen simply the quality of the map

22 appears of a low quality.

23 Your Honours, beginning in January of 2001, the NLA launched an

24 attack against government forces in a village called Tearce, which is to

25 the north of the city of Tetovo, close to the border between Kosovo and

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1 Macedonia. Clashes in the area of Tanusevci, a village to the north of

2 the city of Skopje along the border with Kosovo and Macedonia took place

3 in February 2001.

4 During March of 2001, NLA attacks on Macedonian security forces

5 occurred in the area of Kudra Fura, Caska, Malino and Brest on the

6 borders with Serbia.

7 Further clashes continued in the area of Tanusevci, but the most

8 intensive fighting took place in the area of Tetovo and surrounding

9 villages. And if you look at the map, on the bottom half of the page

10 that I've given to you, you'll see a number of red stars indicating

11 villages in and around the city of Tetovo that were the scene of fighting

12 beginning in March 2001.

13 The situation prompted government forces to launch an offensive

14 operation in the area of Tetovo in the second half of March, with heavy

15 fighting in the area of Kale, Lavce, Selce, Gajre, Germo, Sipkovica,

16 Vejce and Brodec to the west of Tetovo.

17 In May 2001, Your Honours, if you take a look at the map on the

18 upper part of the page, you see the city of Kumanovo to the northeast of

19 Skopje, and in the May of that year the NLA opened up another front in

20 the area of Kumanovo by taking control of the village of Vaksince, which

21 is to the northeast of the city of Kumanovo. The NLA took control of one

22 village after another, including Slupcane, Lojane and Matejce, gradually

23 pushing to the west towards Skopje. For those reasons, the Macedonian

24 security forces launched an offensive operation against the NLA in the

25 area of Vaksince and Slupcane.

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1 Your Honours, between February and June 2001, the NLA established

2 control over considerable territory in the areas adjacent to the borders

3 with Serbia, starting from the villages of Brest and Malino and in the

4 mountains around Tetovo.

5 In June of 2001, the NLA extended its northern front to just 10

6 kilometres from the city of Skopje, which you see here in the middle of

7 the map. The NLA took control of the Skopje suburb of Aricinovo, which

8 is located to the east of Skopje, and also expanded the area -- its area

9 of control around the border town of Radusha.

10 In July, 2001, the fighting continued on all fronts. The NLA

11 took control of additional villages around Tetovo. In August of 2001,

12 the NLA took control or, shall I say perhaps cut the strategic

13 Skopje-Tetovo highway running from east to west between those two cities.

14 NLA soldiers moved freely along the highway and established check-points

15 in the area. The city of Tetovo was on the verge of falling to the NLA

16 forces, and there was street fighting in parts of the city and NLA

17 check-points established within the urban area. The urgency and the

18 seriousness of that situation prompted then President Trajkovski to order

19 a military operation to regain control of the highway and to prevent the

20 seizure of Tetovo itself.

21 On the 10th of August, 2001, eight Macedonian soldiers died in a

22 mine explosion to the north of the village of Ljuboten. All of these

23 details are described in Chapter 5 of the expert report of

24 Viktor Bezruchenko, as well in other exhibits that the Prosecution will

25 provide to you during the course of the trial.

Page 338

1 In the course of the conflict, Your Honours, the NLA succeeded in

2 establishing control, as I've said before, of up to 20 per cent of the

3 territory of Macedonia, mainly in the northern and northwestern regions.

4 If we can see a page from what would be Prosecution's 65 ter number 410 -

5 I'm grateful to Ms. Walpita for her efficiency - this page comes from the

6 annual report of the Ministry of the Interior for 2001. And if we can

7 focus, please, on the first paragraph. In other words, this report was

8 published in the beginning of 2002, looking back to the events of 2001,

9 by the Ministry of The Interior. By that time, the Minister was still

10 the accused in this case, Mr. Boskoski.

11 And you see at the top of the paragraph:

12 "As a consequence of the armed activities of the Albanian

13 terrorist organisation, the so-called NLA, in the course of 2001 in the

14 northwest part of the Republic of Macedonia, 20 per cent of her territory

15 was temporarily occupied."

16 Your Honours, the territorial control achieved by the NLA was

17 sufficient to allow and support sustained and concerted military

18 operations and was characterised by a degree of stability in the areas

19 controlled, to the exclusion of government forces. Territorial control

20 of the NLA was evident in the establishment of check-points and road

21 barricades; the free deployment of NLA units from one location to

22 another; the reinforcement of NLA defence positions and the strengthening

23 of their fortifications; the establishment of so-called authority bodies

24 in so-called liberated areas.

25 And if we look again at the first paragraph on this page from

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1 Exhibit 410, the report of the Ministry of the Interior, we see 69

2 members of the security forces were murdered, as well as 16 civilians;

3 174 members of the Minister of Internal affairs and 211 members of the

4 Army of the Republic of Macedonia were wounded. Property damage of a

5 large scale was over half a billion -- was -- excuse me, was 150 million

6 Euros by arson, destruction and damage, but damage to the economy was

7 estimated at over half a billion Euros.

8 Lower down, we see that over 86.000 citizens on the territory of

9 the Republic of Macedonia were displaced from their homes and

10 settlements, and 80.000 citizens left the territory of the Republic of

11 Macedonia and temporarily stayed abroad. Over 40 religious facilities

12 were damaged.

13 Your Honours, this conflict involved frequent and intensive armed

14 clashes which occurred virtually continuously between January and

15 September 2001 over a widespread and expanding geographic area. Although

16 the NLA forces were less numerous than the government forces, the

17 evidence will show that the conflict was not one-sided. NLA attacks were

18 carried out against a variety of Macedonian military targets over a wide

19 and expanding area of Macedonia. Furthermore, NLA forces were able to

20 offer strong and often effective resistance to Macedonian forces

21 undertaking military and police operations.

22 While large numbers of well-equipped Macedonian forces were

23 deployed in the relevant areas of Macedonia during the period relevant to

24 the second amended indictment, the NLA enjoyed a significant level of

25 overall military success, tying up the Macedonian security forces with

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1 effective guerrilla-style tactics.

2 In conclusion, Your Honours, the Prosecution will adduce

3 sufficient evidence to prove that at all relevant times an armed conflict

4 existed in Macedonia for the purposes of the application of international

5 humanitarian law, and that a nexus existed between that armed conflict

6 and the crimes that occurred in and around the village of Ljuboten in

7 August of 2001.

8 With your leave, Your Honours, I will now turn the podium over to

9 my colleague, Ms. Motoike, for another section of the Prosecution's

10 opening statement.

11 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

12 MS. MOTOIKE: Good morning, Your Honours.

13 As Mr. Saxon indicated, I'm going to speak about the events in

14 Ljuboten with respect to the second amended indictment, and then I'll

15 turn to the criminal responsibility of Johan Tarculovski.

16 With respect to the events in Ljuboten, could we see a picture,

17 please, of Ljuboten village, which is on the fifth page of the court

18 binder? It's identified by ERNNOO57603. This is a panoramic photo from

19 the southeastern viewpoint of Ljuboten village.

20 Ljuboten is a small village which sits at the southwestern foot

21 of the Skopska Crna Gora mountain ridge in the northern part of

22 Macedonia. It is about 10 kilometres by air from the centre of Skopje,

23 which is the capital of Macedonia. Most of the residents in Ljuboten are

24 ethnic Albanians who are mainly farmers by profession.

25 The village is surrounded by three predominantly ethnic

Page 341

1 Macedonian villages: Ljubanci to the northwest; Rastak to the southeast;

2 and Radushane, which is to the southwest.

3 The Prosecution will present evidence that in the early morning

4 hours on Sunday, 12th August 2001, this picturesque village and its

5 residents were subjected to an intense, brutal and unlawful attack for

6 which the accused are criminally responsible. Before speaking of this

7 attack, however, a brief summary of the events that occurred just prior

8 to the 12th of August is necessary.

9 On 10 August 2001, two days before this unlawful attack, a

10 Macedonian military vehicle belonging to the 3rd Battalion of the

11 1st Guardist Brigade was destroyed by a remote-controlled explosive

12 device in an ambush. This occurred in a place called Ljubotenski Bacila,

13 which is in the Skopska Crna Gora mountain ridge area about 5 kilometres

14 north of Ljuboten. This vehicle was carrying an outgoing shift of

15 soldiers of the second company to Ljubanci. Unfortunately, eight

16 soldiers were killed in the incident; two of whom were residents of

17 Ljubanci.

18 The Prosecution will present evidence that immediately following

19 the explosion, members of the National Liberation Army or NLA opened fire

20 on the Macedonian military vehicle, causing the Macedonian Army's

21 2nd Company to respond. These two groups exchanged fire for several

22 hours that day. Afterwards, the 3rd Battalion of the Macedonian Army

23 opened small-arms fire on the village of Ljuboten. Two mortar and/or

24 cannon rounds were also launched into Ljuboten presumably in retaliation

25 for the death of the eight soldiers. The rounds killed two Ljuboten

Page 342

1 civilians; one of them a five-year-old child.

2 The evidence will show that at the time the army opened fire that

3 Friday, there were no legitimate military targets in the village, other

4 than possibly a group of three armed persons, yet no hostile or defensive

5 acts were committed by these persons or any residents of Ljuboten.

6 The Prosecution will show that later on the same day, a police

7 unit, commanded by the accused Johan Tarculovski, arrived in the

8 neighbouring village of Ljubanci and during the night hours on Friday

9 this unit conducted a reconnaissance of Ljuboten.

10 Evidence will show that on Saturday morning, the 11th of August,

11 the Macedonian army again opened small-arms fire on Ljuboten, and later

12 that evening members of Johan Tarculovski's police unit fired several

13 rockets into the village.

14 At the time of these actions, there were no legitimate military

15 targets in the village. Additionally, no hostile or defensive acts had

16 been committed towards the army or this police unit by the residents of

17 Ljuboten.

18 In the early morning hours of the next day, which was Sunday,

19 12 August 2001, the intense, unlawful ground attack on Ljuboten

20 commenced. The evidence will show that at approximately 8.00 that

21 morning, Johan Tarculovski's police unit, comprised of about 100 men,

22 entered the northwestern end of Ljubanci -- of Ljuboten from Ljubanci.

23 If we could see a photo from Prosecution's 65 ter 199, this

24 photograph, Your Honours, is also photo A on page 8 of the court binder.

25 This is an aerial photograph of the northwestern and northeastern parts

Page 343

1 of Ljuboten village.

2 Your Honours, with the leave of the Court, I have pre-marked the

3 photographs I will be utilising and displaying in my statement in an

4 effort to save time.

5 The red line in this photograph, if followed from the right of

6 the photograph to the left, indicates the path of this unit. Their point

7 of entry into Ljuboten is marked with a "1" and a red circle.

8 The evidence will show that this assault focused mainly on the

9 northern and eastern parts of the village, which in relation to this

10 photograph that's being displayed is the bottom half. As the unit

11 advanced into the village, witnesses will testify that this -- that the

12 Macedonian army, excuse me, provided fire support for this police ground

13 assault by firing mortar and cannon rounds into and around the village

14 between approximately 6.00 and 10.00 in the morning.

15 Evidence will further show that this shelling was calculated to

16 dissolve any possible resistance to the advancing police unit led by the

17 accused Tarculovski.

18 The Prosecution will present witness testimony that at

19 approximately 8.20 that morning, members of this police unit forcibly

20 entered the yard of Jusufi household. This household is in the

21 northwestern part of Ljuboten.

22 If we could see another photo, which is actually a closer shot of

23 the northwestern part of Ljuboten, from 65 ter 199. This is also photo A

24 on page 9 of the court binder.

25 In this photograph, the red line again traces the point of entry

Page 344

1 from the right of the photograph to the left. The red circle labelled

2 "1" indicates the point of entry of the unit, and the red circle labelled

3 "2" marks the location of the Jusufi household.

4 Rami Jusufi, a 33-year-old ethnic Albanian, was asleep in his bed

5 when his mother called him to the front door of their house. When he got

6 up and went to the door, he was shot by at least one of the police

7 officers in the yard. Rami Jusufi was unarmed. He fell from his wounds

8 and was dragged by his 57-year-old mother from the doorway. Two hours

9 later, in the presence of his family, Rami Jusufi died.

10 After the killing of Rami Jusufi, the evidence will show that

11 this police unit then moved to the upper eastern part of Ljuboten where

12 they arrived at the houses of Adem Ametovski and Zija Ademi at about

13 11:00 o'clock in the morning.

14 Can we see the previous photo of the northeastern and

15 northwestern portion of Ljuboten from 65 ter 199? Again, Your Honours,

16 this is photo A on page 8 of the court binder.

17 The eastern portion of the village is in the lower half of this

18 photo, while the western portion is depicted in the upper half. If one

19 follows the red line in this photograph from the left to the right, the

20 line indicates the path this unit took. Again, the red circle marked

21 with a "1" indicates the point of entry for the unit, while the red

22 circle marked with a "3" in the photograph indicates the location of the

23 Ametovski and Ademi homes.

24 At these two homes, men, women and children, all unarmed and all

25 ethnic Albanian, were seeking cover in the basements from the police

Page 345

1 ground attack and the shelling by the army. Most of the men were in the

2 basement of the Ametovski house, while the women and children were

3 sheltering in the basement of the Ademi house.

4 The police ordered the men out from these basements and detained

5 13 of them near the main gate of the Ametovski house. The detained men,

6 including one juvenile male, were forced to lie on the ground, where they

7 were punched, kicked, jumped on and hit by the police with rifle butts

8 and wooden sticks. One police officer even carved a large cross into the

9 back of another detainee. The beatings left these men with multiple

10 injuries to their heads and bodies.

11 Witnesses will testify that at some point during these beatings,

12 one of the detainees, Sulejman Bajrami, a 23-year-old ethnic Albanian,

13 stood up and began to either run or walk away. As he did so, he was shot

14 and killed by at least one police officer while his younger brother and

15 father watched.

16 Witnesses will also testify that at some point, Sulejman's

17 father, Aziz Bajrami, was shot in the hand. After the killing of

18 Sulejman Bajrami, two of the men, including a juvenile, were then forced

19 to walk under armed escort and continued beatings to the adjoining

20 village of Ljubanci. Two men from the group, apparently due to their

21 elderly age, were ordered to leave. But as they walked away, members of

22 the police unit fired at them, killing one, Muharem Ramadani, a

23 65-year-old ethnic Albanian resident.

24 I apologise, Your Honours, if I misspoke. I didn't mean to say

25 "two men" if that's what I did say, I meant to say ten of the men,

Page 346

1 including the juvenile, were then forced to walk under armed escort. The

2 evidence will show that these ten males were escorted along the west-east

3 road in Ljuboten.

4 If we could see the same aerial photo of the northeast and

5 northwest parts of Ljuboten from 65 ter 199. Again, it's photo A of

6 page 8 on the court binder.

7 As indicated previously, the red circle marked with a "3" in this

8 photograph shows the location where these males were detained. As one

9 follows the red line from this circle, from the left of the photograph to

10 the right, the line marks the route these males were forced to take out

11 of the village to Ljubanci. It is essentially the same route this police

12 unit took into the village. Ljubanci is situated just to the right of

13 the location marked with a red circle and the number "1" on the

14 photograph.

15 The males were escorted to the police check-point at a residence

16 known as Braca's house, which is situated at the edge of the Ljuboten and

17 the adjacent village of Ljubanci. Braca's house is surrounded by a

18 concrete fence which witnesses will refer to as the Chinese wall.

19 Witnesses will testify that at Braca's house, the beatings by members of

20 this police unit continued for about half an hour. The males continued

21 to be kicked on, jumped on, and some were even hit with pieces of burning

22 wood. Again, many suffered multiple injuries to their bodies as a

23 result.

24 Afterwards, the males were forcibly thrown onto a police truck

25 and taken to Mirkovci police station. A witness will testify that upon

Page 347

1 arrival at the station, some of the males were simply tossed off the

2 truck onto the concrete driveway. From that point, which was the 12th of

3 August, until the 14th of August, the males were subjected to even more

4 physical abuse by regular and reserve police officers in and outside of

5 this police station. This abuse resulted in even more injuries to those

6 already suffering.

7 The Prosecution will present evidence that one of these males

8 eventually died as a result of these beatings. Witnesses will testify

9 that Atula Qaili, a 35-year-old ethnic Albanian, was one of the remaining

10 ten males who were forced to walk from the Ametovski house to Braca's

11 house on 12th August. En route, he was continually beaten.

12 Consequently, when he arrived at Braca's house, Mr. Qaili was in a

13 seriously injured state. Nonetheless, the evidence will show that

14 members of this police unit kicked him repeatedly at the check-point and

15 threw him into the back of an open police truck with the other males.

16 Like the others, he was taken to the Mirkovci police station

17 where the beatings continued. These repeated beatings left Mr. Qaili

18 battered and unable to speak. He was then transported to Skopje City

19 Hospital where he died on 13 August 2001 as a result of his injuries.

20 The Prosecution will present expert evidence that Mr. Qaili's injuries

21 were consistent with the use of objects and/or mechanical tools on the

22 body of Mr. Qaili, and that these injuries were the result of his death.

23 Following the murders of Rami Jusufi, Sulejman Bajrami and

24 Muharem Ramadani, and while the ten males were being marched off, beaten

25 and detained at Braca's house, the police unit continued to move further

Page 348

1 east through the village to the house of Qani Jushari.

2 Could we see another photo of Ljuboten village, which is 65 ter

3 199. This is also photo D, Your Honours, on page 8 of the court binder.

4 The bottom half of this photo illustrates the southeastern part

5 of Ljuboten village. The red circle marked with a "3" indicates the

6 location of the Ametovski and Ademi homes. If one follows the red line

7 from the circle marked with a "3" to the red circle marked with a "4,"

8 this indicates the path the unit took to the Jashari house that day.

9 Witnesses will testify that at the Jashari house, five unarmed

10 men had sought refuge from the advancing police unit. When the police

11 arrived at the Jashari house, witnesses will testify that the police

12 opened fire on the home and then used petrol to set both the house and

13 the barn on fire. The five unarmed men, who were seeking refuge at this

14 house, then jumped out of the home's side window and hid a short distance

15 away in the adjacent field. But when these men were spotted, the police

16 opened fire. The men continued to flee through the open field towards

17 the mountains. The evidence will show that as these men ran up into the

18 field, the police shot and killed three of them: Xhelal Bajrami,

19 Bajram Jashari and Kadri Jashari, all ethnic Albanians. The other two

20 men, (redacted) escaped; one injured by a bullet and

21 the other unharmed.

22 The Prosecution will also present evidence that the police unit,

23 led by the accused Tarculovski, burned houses and left a trail of

24 physical destruction as they progressed in Ljuboten that fateful Sunday.

25 The unit set fire to and damaged at least 14 houses by using

Page 349

1 hand grenades and small-arms. In the northern, upper eastern and eastern

2 parts of the village, police set fire to a number of homes with petrol,

3 while they opened fire at others with small-arms.

4 Video taken on that day illustrates this path of destruction.

5 Could we see a clip, please, from 65 ter 309? This is video coverage of

6 Ljuboten from that day, where Your Honours could see homes burning,

7 obviously smoke arising from the village from a distance away.

8 [Videotape playing]

9 Thank you.

10 The Prosecution will present evidence of an independent

11 assessment conducted by an international housing reconstruction group in

12 September of 2001. This assessment will describe the type and extent of

13 the damage to these homes. The evidence will further indicate that none

14 of these houses were occupied by combatants and none were used as a point

15 of resistance in the village by its residents. Indeed, the evidence will

16 show that this destruction was completely wanton, intentional, and

17 committed without any military justification.

18 In addition to the beatings and visible destruction in the

19 village of Ljuboten, witnesses will also testify as to the cruel

20 treatment of many other Albanian men, including at least one juvenile

21 male from Ljuboten at the Buzalak check-point on 12 August 2001. On the

22 12th, villagers fled Ljuboten with their families by heading towards the

23 city of Skopje. Video from that day illustrates this.

24 Could we see a clip, please, from 65 ter 309?

25 Your Honours, this is video footage shot near Buzalak check-point

Page 350

1 on 12 August 2001, which shows the line of villagers from Ljuboten

2 heading towards Skopje.

3 Thank you.

4 Evidence will show that between the early afternoon and 6:00

5 o'clock in the evening on 12 August 2001, ethnic Albanian men who arrived

6 at Buzalak check-point were arrested at gunpoint as they fled the village

7 with their families. Witnesses will testify that these men were beaten

8 by regular and reserve police, as well as some civilians who acted at the

9 encouragement of the police. They were beaten repeatedly, sometimes with

10 objects such as rifle butts and wooden sticks.

11 Evidence will also show that one ethnic Albanian man was shot in

12 the head as he and another male ran away from the check-point in fear.

13 Video shot on that day will confirm this account.

14 Can we see the clip from 65 ter 309, please? This is more

15 footage from the area near Buzalak check-point, showing the man had

16 actually already fallen from being shot in the head, while the other man

17 ran.

18 Thank you.

19 The Prosecution will present evidence that the men detained at

20 Buzalak check-point suffered multiple injuries as a result of such

21 beatings. Permanent disabilities resulted from some of the injuries

22 received by the detainees. Due to the nature of some of their injuries,

23 a number of these detainees have also lost their ability to work and

24 support their families.

25 Witnesses will also testify to the cruel treatment of ethnic

Page 351

1 Albanian men from Ljuboten at other locations in and outside the city of

2 Skopje on the 12th of August. That afternoon detainees from Buzalak

3 check-point were taken in separate groups to Cair, Kisela Voda and Bit

4 Pazar and Karpos police stations.

5 Witnesses will further testify that at these locations, these

6 detainees were beaten by regular and reserve police officers in and

7 outside of these various police stations during their detention and upon

8 their arrival and departure. As with the other beatings, these were

9 often committed with instruments.

10 The Prosecution will also present evidence that the beatings for

11 some detainees continued even after being transported to Skopje Court 2

12 for initial court appearances. On 14 August 2001, several detainees were

13 brought for the initial court appearance at Skopje Court 2. While there,

14 some of them were beaten in the hallways and corridors of the court.

15 They were beaten by regular reserve police, prison guards, and some

16 civilians with the permission and encouragement of the police and guards.

17 Evidence will also be presented that these beatings continued

18 even after some detainees were transported for treatment to Skopje City

19 Hospital. Between 12 and 21 August 2001, badly injured ethnic Albanian

20 detainees were brought from various locations to Skopje City Hospital.

21 Some of these detainees will testify that they were beaten in front of

22 the hospital or in their rooms by regular and reserve police, and by

23 hospital personnel who mistreated the detainees while the police officers

24 stood by.

25 This evidence will show that the detention and beatings of these

Page 352

1 men were organised, systematic and pervasive. Indeed, most of the

2 detainees were beaten repetitively at successive locations as some were

3 transported from one station to another, and physically abused at each

4 station.

5 Through the presentation of this evidence, the Prosecution will

6 prove beyond a reasonable doubt the crimes of murder, wanton destruction,

7 and cruel treatment as alleged in the second amended indictment.

8 Next, I'd like to speak about the criminal liability of the

9 accused Johan Tarculovski. The evidence presented by the Prosecution

10 will prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused Tarculovski is

11 responsible under Article 7(1) of the statue for the crimes described in

12 the second amended indictment. At the time of the attack on Ljuboten,

13 the accused Tarculovski was a 26-year-old police officer employed by the

14 Ministry of Interior as a bodyguard to the president's security unit. At

15 the time, he was a member of the same political party to which the

16 accused Ljube Boskoski belonged.

17 The Prosecution will present evidence in the form of documents

18 and witness testimony that about two weeks before the attack on Ljuboten

19 in July 2001, Ljube Boskoski ordered Johan Tarculovski to select a group

20 of individuals who would be under Johan Tarculovski's leadership to

21 participate in a police security operation.

22 Johan Tarculovski personally selected individuals from the

23 regular and reservist police force to participate in this operation.

24 Some of the individuals selected by Johan Tarculovski were also members

25 of Kometa, a private security agency with which Johan Tarculovski had

Page 353

1 close ties. The evidence will show that these members of Kometa were

2 hired and activated as reservists after being selected by

3 Johan Tarculovski.

4 The Prosecution will also present evidence that the accused

5 Tarculovski organised the arming and outfitting of these selected

6 individuals with semi-automatic weapons and pistols, which was approved

7 by the accused Boskoski.

8 Evidence will be further presented that on 10 August 2001, with

9 tensions extremely high following the killing of the eight Macedonian

10 soldiers at Ljubotenski Bacila, the accused Boskoski ordered

11 Johan Tarculovski to conduct a search of Ljuboten village for

12 Xhavid Asani. The evidence will show that Ljube Boskoski believed

13 Mr. Asani to have been responsible for the killing of the eight soldiers,

14 and Ljube Boskoski believed Mr. Asani was hiding in Ljuboten.

15 Johan Tarvulovski was selected because he knew the area of Ljuboten well,

16 as he had a family home in the adjoining village of Ljubanci.

17 The Prosecution will present documentation and witness testimony

18 to show that the accused Tarculovski, acting on this order, then selected

19 around 100 men from the active and reserve police, as well as employees

20 from the security company, Kometa.

21 During the afternoon of 10 August 2001, the evidence will show

22 that Johan Tarculovski then commenced the planning and preparation for

23 the unlawful attack on the village of Ljuboten. Witnesses will testify

24 that Johan Tarculovski arrived at Cair police station with about 50 men

25 dressed in camouflage police uniforms and armed with weapons. Upon

Page 354

1 arrival, Johan Tarculovski requested that officers stationed at Cair

2 transport these 50 men to the school building in Ljubanci, home to two of

3 the soldiers killed by the explosive device the same day.

4 Witnesses will also testify on this same date that a Ministry of

5 Interior truck driven by police arrived at the Ljubanci school to deliver

6 ammunition, bombs and grenade launchers, which were then distributed to

7 between 60 and 70 persons who had come to this location.

8 Over the course of these two days, which were the 10th and 11th

9 of August, 2001, evidence will show that Johan Tarculovski attended at

10 least two meetings and had several communications with the military and

11 police officials responsible for the police and army security for the

12 area.

13 Documentary evidence and witness testimony will show that at

14 these meetings and through these communications, Johan Tarculovski

15 demanded more weapons and logistical support from the army and the

16 police. During the later meeting on the 11th of August,

17 Johan Tarculovski advised these officials that he would be leading the

18 attack against Ljuboten, which would commence on 12 August 2001 at 4.30

19 in the morning, regardless of the support from the Macedonian army.

20 In the early evening hours of that Saturday, which was the 11th

21 of August, evidence will show that the police unit commanded by the

22 accused Tarculovski used grenade launchers to set the houses in Ljuboten

23 on fire. Witnesses will testify that on the following Sunday morning,

24 12 August 2001, the accused Tarculovski did indeed lead this unlawful

25 ground attack on Ljuboten. The attack began with mortar fire into

Page 355

1 Ljuboten at the request of the accused, Tarculovski.

2 The Prosecution will present witness testimony that following the

3 mortar attack, the accused Tarculovski also contacted Mr. Boskoski to

4 request the use of a armoured vehicle from the Ministry of Interior.

5 This vehicle was to provide cover to Johan Tarculovski's police unit.

6 Evidence will show that the accused Boskoski, then ordered the

7 implementation of this request.

8 As described previously, the evidence will show that the police

9 unit, led by the accused Tarculovski, deliberately killed unarmed

10 civilians, wantonly burned and destroyed many homes without

11 justification, and cruelly treated a group of residents, seven of whom

12 were killed.

13 During the unlawful ground attack, evidence will be presented

14 that Johan Tarculovski was the leader of the unit into the village and

15 was present during the unlawful attack. Consequently, the evidence will

16 prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the actions of the accused,

17 Tarculovski, and the police unit he led in the village clearly had a

18 criminal design, as demonstrated by the manner, method and results of

19 their attack. The illegal objective of this joint criminal enterprise or

20 JCE, was to direct an unlawful attack on civilians and on civilian

21 objects in the village of Ljuboten, an attack that was not justified by

22 military necessity.

23 From the first moment when this police unit entered the village

24 on Sunday, 12th August 2001, and Rami Jusufi was murdered, the evidence

25 will show that the illegal nature of the attack was obvious. The

Page 356

1 criminal nature -- the criminal attack, excuse me, continued with the

2 further murders of two unarmed civilian residents, Sulejman Bajrami and

3 Muharem Ramadani. The final gunning down and killing on the same date of

4 three additional unarmed Ljuboten residents, Xhelal Bajrami, Kadri

5 Jashari and Bajram Jashari, will be further evidence of the criminal

6 nature of this attack.

7 Other documentary and witness evidence will be presented by the

8 Prosecution indicating the existence of this JCE and its unlawful

9 purpose. The Prosecution will show, through documentary evidence, that

10 the police within the Ministry of Interior, had a systematic and

11 comprehensive reporting system within the Ministry up to and after this

12 unlawful attack. However, the evidence will show that despite this

13 system, there was a lack of detailed reporting about the plans and

14 activities eventually undertaken in Ljuboten that fateful weekend.

15 Additionally, the Prosecution will present evidence that the

16 three weapons, supposedly seized by the police at the Jashari house

17 during this unlawful attack, were subsequently used to substantiate

18 criminal charges against the persons detained at the Ametovski house,

19 which was in another part of Ljuboten. The existence and unlawful

20 purpose of the JCE will also be demonstrated through witness testimony

21 and documentary evidence relating to the medical records for certain

22 ethnic Albanian detainees from Ljuboten.

23 The evidence the Prosecution will present, regarding the

24 destruction of houses along the path followed by the police, also

25 substantiates the criminal intent that members of the unit possessed as

Page 357

1 they moved through the village. Indicative of the criminal nature of the

2 JCE was the police unit's killing of the unarmed civilians in Ljuboten

3 and the cruel treatment of the males who were detained from the Ametovski

4 house, which ultimately led to the death of one of the detainees,

5 Atula Qaili. The Prosecution will also present evidence that this

6 unlawful ground attack on civilians by the police was planned at or after

7 the time that Ljube Boskoski ordered Johan Tarculovski and the police

8 unit to go to the Ljuboten to search for Xhavid Asani. From the

9 distinctly criminal nature of the entire operation, the plan would have

10 had to have been in place before the police entered the village or, at

11 the very least, developed extremely rapidly after the first crimes were

12 committed.

13 The witness and documentary evidence will prove that the accused

14 Tarculovski participated in this JCE as a co-perpetrator.

15 As discussed previously, the evidence will show that he was the

16 central figure responsible for the attack, as his acts determined when

17 and how the village would be attacked. He drew on resources, personnel

18 and logistics, as required them, and he was the leader of and present

19 with the police unit as it moved and committed crimes throughout the

20 village.

21 Alternatively, the same evidence will show that the crimes

22 enumerated in Counts 1, 2 and 3 of the second amended indictment were the

23 natural and foreseeable consequences of the execution of the objective of

24 the JCE and that the accused Tarculovski was aware that such crimes were

25 the possible consequences of the execution of the JCE. With that

Page 358

1 awareness, he nonetheless decided to participate in the enterprise.

2 In addition to his participation in the JCE as described

3 previously, the evidence will also show that the accused Tarculovski is

4 individually criminally responsible for ordering, planning, instigating

5 and aiding and abetting the crimes in the second amended indictment.

6 Indeed, by virtue of the authority vested in him by the accused Boskoski,

7 and by virtue of the central role that the accused Tarculovski played in

8 the planning, preparation and execution of the attack on the village,

9 Johan Tarculovski had the authority to issue orders to carry out the

10 attack. The evidence will show that the accused Tarculovski ordered the

11 crimes and the attack, or at least he acted with the awareness of the

12 substantial likelihood that the crimes would be committed in the

13 execution of his orders.

14 On the basis of this evidence, the Prosecution will show beyond a

15 reasonable doubt that the accused Tarculovski is responsible pursuant to

16 Article 7(1) of the Statute for having committed, ordered, planned,

17 instigated or otherwise aided and abetted the crimes in the second

18 amended indictment.

19 I would now like to turn the floor back over to my colleague,

20 Mr. Saxon, who will speak about Ljube Boskoski's criminal responsibility.

21 Thank you.

22 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

23 Yes, Mr. Saxon.

24 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, I note the hour, and I wonder whether --

25 JUDGE PARKER: You would like an early break?

Page 359

1 MR. SAXON: Well, my comments, Your Honour, will take, I believe,

2 approximately an hour, so this might be a good time to take the break,

3 and then I should finish before noon.

4 JUDGE PARKER: Well, we will take the first break now, which will

5 take half an hour, and we will resume at five minutes to 11.

6 --- Recess taken at 10.26 a.m.

7 --- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.

8 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Saxon.

9 MR. SAXON: Thank you, Your Honour.

10 Your Honours, I will now speak about the criminal responsibility

11 of the accused Ljube Boskoski pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Statute of

12 this Tribunal.

13 During the afternoon of 12 August 2001, while the ethnic Albanian

14 residents of Ljuboten were being beaten, abused and detained, Ljube

15 Boskoski, then the Minister of the Interior for Macedonia and the

16 superior of all police forces operating within that Ministry, arrived at

17 the place referred to as Braca's house in the second amended indictment.

18 This home and enclosed garden is on the outskirts of the village of

19 Ljuboten. From behind a wall known as the Chinese wall, Mr. Boskoski was

20 able to view the ongoing attack by his police forces in Ljuboten. I'd

21 like to show a clip from Prosecution 65 ter 309 which shows Mr. Boskoski

22 at that spot on that day.

23 [Videotape playing]

24 You see smoke coming from the village of Ljuboten. You see the

25 view from that Chinese wall; the police officer behind the wall; the

Page 360

1 inside of the garden; the arrival; you see fire-arms that were allegedly

2 seized at Ljuboten that day, and you'll hear more about these fire-arms.

3 There we see Mr. Boskoski at that so-called Chinese wall in Braca's

4 house, and he's pointing to the direction of the ongoing activities in

5 Ljuboten.

6 If we can continue, please.

7 There we see again the view that Mr. Boskoski would have had from

8 that spot. Again we see smoke rising from the village of Ljuboten.

9 Several witnesses will also describe seeing Mr. Boskoski at this spot on

10 the 12th of August after they were detained by police officers, beaten,

11 and forced to walk to Braca's house.

12 In addition to Mr. Boskoski's personal presence at Ljuboten

13 during the attack, additional Prosecution evidence will demonstrate his

14 knowledge of the events that occurred at that village on the 12th of

15 August, 2001. Witnesses will testify that on the 12th of August, Mr.

16 Boskoski met with participants in the attack, such as the accused Johan

17 Tarculovski, and in the evening he met with other participants of the

18 joint criminal enterprise, such as Zoran Juvanovski, also known as Bucik,

19 the owner of the security agency called Kometa.

20 A limited number of police and Ministry of Interior reports about

21 the events in Ljuboten were sent up the chain of command.

22 If we can look briefly at 65 ter 224, Your Honours, this is a

23 report sent to the Ministry of Interior, Internal Affairs Sector in

24 Skopje on the 11th of August, 2001, regarding the security situation in

25 the city for the period of 0800 to 2000 hours on the 11th of August. And

Page 361

1 if we go to the next page, we see at the top, from OVR-Cair, which at

2 that time was the police department that for the municipality of Cair

3 which had within its jurisdiction, Ljuboten, and you see a note that

4 between 0800 and 10:00 o'clock in the morning, from above the ridge in

5 the recreation ground in the village of Ljubanci, the Army of the

6 Republic of Macedonia used infantry weapons to fire single shots and

7 bursts of fire in the direction of the village of Ljuboten.

8 If we can look at 65 ter number 217, please. This is a note

9 signed by the supervisor of the OVR-Cair police station. It's dated the

10 12th of August 2001, and if we can highlight that paragraph, please. And

11 it's a report -- if we can actually get the title as well. Thank you.

12 A report on recorded events and measures undertaken regarding the

13 Operation Ramno. This is a code word, Your Honours, that you will see in

14 a number of documents that will be presented during the trial by the

15 Prosecution, and the word Ramno simply referred to operations taken by

16 the police that were related to the armed conflict then ongoing in 2001.

17 And we see that in this note, in a conversation with the

18 commander of the police station at Mirkovci, which fell within the

19 jurisdiction of Cair, Slavko Ivanovski had asked to undertaken security

20 measures regarding the safe return of inhabitants of the village of

21 Ljuboten.

22 If we can leave that exhibit now and move to Exhibit 232, please.

23 Again, this is a document, it's dated the 12th of August, 2001, it's

24 directed to the Internal Affairs Sector of the Minister of the Interior

25 in Skopje. It's another report on events and measures taken with respect

Page 362

1 to Ramno.

2 And if we can focus in on the text of the report, please. It's

3 from the head of the OVR-Cair. And we see, for example, that at 10:00

4 o'clock in the morning a group of individuals was seen leaving the

5 village of Ljuboten. In the next paragraph, shots were fired and bursts

6 of fire from infantry weapons in the direction of the village of

7 Ljuboten, et cetera.

8 And if we can look at one more document, which would be

9 Exhibit 232 -- oh, that perhaps would be 243. Go back, please. This

10 should be 243, yes, 65 ter number 243.

11 Your Honour, the date says "1 August 2001" at the top, but that

12 must be a typographical error, because this is another report related to

13 Operation Ramno from the supervisor of the OVR-Cair police station, and

14 if we focus on the middle paragraph, you see a list of names, and these

15 are -- this list of persons is a group of persons who were detained at

16 Ljuboten on the 12th of August, and this is what the supervisor is

17 reporting about it.

18 Moreover, the events in Ljuboten received a great deal of media

19 attention after the 12th of August, and the Prosecution during the trial

20 will show you a number of media reports that include comments by

21 Mr. Boskoski himself as they were reported in the Macedonian media, and

22 furthermore international organisations, such as Human Rights Watch and

23 the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhumane

24 Treatment, published reports about the events in Ljuboten. Human Rights

25 Watch published its formal report on the 6th of September 2001.

Page 363

1 If we can go to 65 ter number 355, please, the next exhibit.

2 Next page, next page. This is the page of the -- first page of the

3 report that was published by Human Rights Watch called "Crimes Against

4 Civilians: Abuses by Macedonian Forces in Ljuboten, August 10 to 12,

5 2001."

6 If we can go to page 2 of this report, please, the next page.

7 And if we focus, first of all, on the third paragraph in the summary, we

8 see that Human Rights Watch recorded, among other things, that Macedonian

9 police forces committed serious abuses during their three-day operation

10 in Ljuboten. Lower down, they say: "During their Sunday house-to-house

11 attack, police forces shot dead six civilians. One man was killed by

12 police as he tried to close the door to his home when the police entered

13 the yard," et cetera.

14 If we can go back to page 2, please, and focus on the fifth

15 paragraph. We see Human Rights Watch also reported about the cruel

16 treatment that occurred that day. You see they wrote: "The abuse

17 continued for the hundreds of ethnic Albanian civilians who tried to flee

18 Ljuboten."

19 Lower down: "Over 100 men were arrested and taken to police

20 stations in Skopje where they were subjected to severe beatings."

21 It says to "Atula Qaili" -- it should say: "Atula Qaili, age 35,

22 was taken away alive from the village by police officers, and his badly

23 beaten and mutilated corpse was later recovered by family members from

24 the city morgue."

25 If we can go to the next page of the report, please. In the

Page 364

1 fourth paragraph here, if we can -- no, just the fourth paragraph there.

2 In the first recommendation of the report, Human Rights Watch asks the

3 Macedonian government to investigate and prosecute the persons

4 responsible for the abuses in Ljuboten and to conduct credible, impartial

5 and transparent investigation into the allegations of government abuses

6 in Ljuboten, including the role of Minister of the Interior

7 Ljube Boskoski and the forces under his command.

8 Your Honours, prior to the publication of that report, however,

9 in late August 2001, reports circulated in the "Sunday Telegraph"

10 newspaper in London about the expected conclusions of the Human Rights

11 Watch report which was then imminent, including concerns about the role

12 and responsibility of the Ljube Boskoski for the crimes that occurred in

13 the village of Ljuboten.

14 If we can see 65 ter number 120, please. This is the text of a

15 radio broadcast from Skopje radio Macedonia on the 27th of August, 2001,

16 and if we can highlight this paragraph in the middle, please, starting

17 with the word "Boskoski," it contains a response by the accused to the

18 expected findings of Human Rights Watch.

19 According to this report, Mr. Boskoski said: "I vigorously

20 refute the accusations against the Interior Ministry, against the regular

21 and the reserve police forces, which have demonstrated unprecedented

22 courage in defending Macedonia's sovereignty and territorial integrity in

23 the past six months. I view the accusations issued by the Human Rights

24 Watch as a classic act of framing the Interior Minister, because their

25 information is based on certain witnesses' claims, according to which I

Page 365

1 sat on a balcony observing a massacre of the civilian population. I

2 fiercely refute these allegations. I am prepared to account for

3 Macedonia at all times. My purpose here is to defend the Macedonian

4 people's national interests, and I have no intention to justify my

5 concrete actions. If there exists any evidence, I am prepared to account

6 for it, although all this is out of the question."

7 Therefore, the Prosecution will present overwhelming evidence,

8 Your Honour, that Ljube Boskoski knew or had reason to know that his

9 subordinates had committed the crimes alleged in the second amended

10 indictment.

11 Of course, pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Statute, the

12 Prosecution must prove that Mr. Boskoski exercised effective control over

13 these subordinates. The defence do not dispute that at the time of the

14 unlawful attack on Ljuboten, Ljube Boskoski was the Minister of the

15 Interior of Macedonia and a member of one of the governing political

16 parties. Mr. Boskoski held this position, the highest position of

17 authority in the Ministry of Interior, from May of 2001 until November of

18 2002.

19 In his capacity as the Minister of the Interior, Ljube Boskoski

20 had the overall authority and responsibility for the functioning of the

21 regular, reserve, and special police forces within the Ministry of the

22 Interior. He exercised de jure and de facto effective control over these

23 police forces, which included Johan Tarculovski and the police unit that

24 directly participated in the crimes charged in the indictment.

25 Your Honours, Mr. Boskoski's de jure authority over police forces

Page 366

1 came from several sources. First of all, I'd like to draw your attention

2 to Prosecution 65 ter number 93, which was the Macedonian constitution

3 that was enforced in 2001. And if we focus on Article 95 for a moment,

4 we see in Article 95, paragraph 1, that the state administration consists

5 of ministers and other administrative bodies and organisations determined

6 by law.

7 If we turn now to 65 ter number 95, which is the law on the

8 organisation and work of government bodies, and we focus on Article 16,

9 we see that the Ministry of Interior, by law, deals with matters which

10 concern -- and the very first matter is the implementation of the system

11 for state and public security.

12 If we stay on this exhibit for a moment and turn to Article

13 47(1), focus in on that, please, we see that Mr. Boskoski was responsible

14 for the conduct of his employees as the Minister of the Ministry of

15 Interior, pursuant to this same law, Article 47, which says, 47(1):

16 "The work of a Ministry is managed by a Minister."

17 And if we move now to Article 49, if we could focus on Article

18 49(1), we see that this law tells us:

19 "The minister represents the Ministry, organises and secures the

20 lawful and efficient completion of work and tasks, submits regulations

21 and other acts for which he is authorised and undertakes other measures

22 from the competence of the Ministry in accordance with the law; decides

23 on the rights, duties and responsibilities of government employees and

24 other individuals employed by the Ministry who do not have government

25 employee status, unless otherwise stated by law."

Page 367

1 And finally, Your Honours, if we turn to 65 ter 88, which is the

2 law on internal affairs for Macedonia that was in force in 2001, and we

3 focus on Article 6, we see that the law says, the second part of that

4 article:

5 "An employee of the Ministry must implement orders of the

6 Minister or the person authorised by him given in connection with the

7 functions of the Ministry, except when implementation of the orders

8 present a criminal offence."

9 Ljube Boskoski's official responsibility, which included public

10 and state security, also then included violations of the laws or customs

11 of war. I'd like to show you briefly a portion of 65 ter number 83,

12 which is an English translation of the Macedonian Criminal Code as it

13 stood in 2001, and this is the table of contents. If we go to the next

14 page -- no -- we see that Chapter 34 is entitled "Crimes Against Humanity

15 and International Law." If we can turn to those chapters, please, the

16 includes Article 403 to 417. Article 403 describes the crime of

17 genocide. The title of Article 404 at the bottom of that page, "War

18 crimes against the civil Population."

19 If we can turn the page, please, we see Article 405, "War crimes

20 against wounded and ill."

21 And if we go to the next page. Article 406, "War crimes against

22 prisoners of war." Article 407, "Use of unallowed combat needs."

23 If we can move forward a page or two, to Article 417, please, and

24 if we could focus on Article 417. This particular article codifies the

25 crime of racial or other discrimination, Article 417, and notes in

Page 368

1 subparagraph 1:

2 "A person who based on the difference in race, colour of skin,

3 nationality or ethnic belonging, violates the basic human rights and

4 freedoms acknowledged by the International Community, shall be punished

5 with imprisonment of six months to five years."

6 Ljube Boskoski exercised his de jure and de facto authority at

7 many different levels of the Ministry of the Interior. For example,

8 documents that will be presented to you during the course of the trial,

9 demonstrate that Mr. Boskoski executed -- exerted his effective control

10 down to minute details of police administration.

11 If we can see Exhibit 36, please. This is a decision dated the

12 25th of May, 2001. If we can highlight the first paragraph, paragraph 1,

13 please, the whole paragraph. We see that a Mr. Ungelof is being assigned

14 to the duty of deputy commander of the special tasks unit, Tiger, at the

15 Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Macedonia.

16 If we could go back to the next page, please. No, go to the next

17 page. We see there at the end of this decision, it's stamped and

18 signed --

19 JUDGE THELIN: Mr. Saxon, we don't seem to have that on our

20 screens.

21 MR. SAXON: Do you have it now? We see this decision is signed

22 by Ljube Boskoski as Minister of the Interior.

23 If we can turn to 65 ter number 37, please. It's a decision

24 dated 20 June 2001. We can focus on paragraph 1, please, the whole

25 paragraph. We see a Mr. Ilic is being transferred from duty in the

Page 369

1 police station at Centar to duty as deputy commander in the police

2 station of Mirkovci within the Department of the Ministry of Interior for

3 the municipality of Cair.

4 If we can go back to page 1, please. Next page, next page. We

5 see this decision is -- no, this is the wrong decision. Next decision.

6 Okay. Next page. We see it is signed -- if we go back one. The

7 decision was signed by Ljube Boskoski.

8 If we can go to the next exhibit, please. Here we have a

9 document dated 26 June 2001, and if we could focus on the title and the

10 first few paragraphs, please. This is called a decision on establishing

11 police special unit of the Ministry of Interior.

12 Paragraph 1:

13 "The police special unit is being established for accomplishing

14 special tasks."

15 Paragraph 2:

16 "The special unit is being established in order to protect

17 security of the Republic of Macedonia in conditions of complicated

18 security situation."

19 And by the way, Your Honour, this is 65 ter number 48.

20 Subparagraph 4:

21 "The command of the special unit is composed of a commander of

22 brigade, commander of battalion, commanders of companies, and commanders

23 for logistical security."

24 Can we go to the next page of this decision, please? Next page.

25 And we see that this decision was signed by Ljube Boskoski as Minister of

Page 370

1 the Interior. Mr. Boskoski's exercise of effective control even reached

2 the level of instructions for procedures on providing identity cards for

3 reserve police officers. We can look at 65 ter number 87, please. And

4 if we can highlight the title, please. This is dated July 2001, "Rules

5 on the form and procedure for the issuing of a separate identification

6 document to members of the reservist rank of the Ministry of the

7 Interior.

8 If we can go back to the first page, please. Next page. You see

9 a series of rules about how these identification documents should be

10 issued, when they should be issued. Next page, please. Several pages of

11 rules. Next page, we'll go to the end. And we see, finally, underneath

12 Article 7, that these rules were signed by Ljube Boskoski as Minister of

13 the Interior.

14 Mr. Boskoski would often review the police forces that were

15 underneath his responsibility and authority. I'd like to show you two

16 short clips without any sound that will show Mr. Boskoski reviewing

17 special units of the Macedonian police forces during 2001. This is from

18 65 ter number 979.

19 [Videotape playing]

20 MR. SAXON: We see the arrival of the Minister, these men at

21 attention, and Mr. Boskoski addressing his subordinates.

22 The next clip is of a different ceremony.

23 [Videotape playing]

24 MR. SAXON: You see Mr. Boskoski addressing a large group with

25 police personnel.

Page 371

1 That's fine, thank you.

2 As a person with superior responsibility and with the knowledge

3 of the occurrence of the crimes charged in the indictment, Ljube Boskoski

4 had an obligation to investigate and establish the facts of the crimes,

5 and to impose appropriate punitive and disciplinary measures on the

6 perpetrators. Such an obligation was a continuing one, at least until

7 such time as May 2002, when the prosecutor of this Tribunal informed the

8 Macedonian authorities that she was exercising primacy over the crimes

9 arising out of and following the Ljuboten attack in August of 2001.

10 So what did Mr. Boskoski do? Your Honours, on the 13th of

11 August, 2001, Ljube Boskoski created a so-called commission for the

12 review of the circumstances and to analyse the activities undertaken by

13 the security forces of the Ministry of the Interior in order to repulse

14 the armed attack of the terrorist groups on 12 August 2001 in the village

15 of Ljuboten. The report provided by this commission is Prosecution 65

16 ter number 239, and if we can focus just on the first page, please, and

17 the paragraph called "Subject" and "Originator." You'll see the long

18 title of the report, and below that, that the commission was formed

19 pursuant to a decision dated 13 August 2001. You'll hear testimony

20 during the trial that this commission was made up of three high-ranking

21 police officers who were subordinate to Ljube Boskoski.

22 On the 4th of September, 2001, the commission issued this report,

23 and I'd like to show you the opinion that they stated at the end -- that

24 the commission members provided at the end of their report. Next page,

25 next page, go back one. And if we can just focus on the first paragraph

Page 372

1 of that pane. We see just in the first sentence, Your Honour, the

2 activities which were undertaken by the security forces of the Ministry

3 of Interior --

4 I'll start again:

5 "The activities, which were undertaken by the security forces of

6 the Ministry of Interior to repulse the armed attacks of the terrorist

7 groups on 12 August 2001 in the village of Ljuboten, are indispensable,

8 justified and lawfully undertaken."

9 This was the opinion of the so-called commission. The chairman

10 of the commission, Goran Mitevski was the head of public security for the

11 Ministry of the Interior and a direct subordinate and long-term associate

12 of Mr. Boskoski. Your Honours, this so-called commission in fact did not

13 carry out any investigation into the events at Ljuboten, as claimed in

14 the report.

15 Prosecution witnesses will describe how the three members of the

16 commission never met, never interviewed witnesses or suspects, whether

17 police, army or ethnic Albanian victims identified in connection with the

18 Ljuboten operation. They never collected any oral or documentary

19 evidence relating to the murders, cruel treatment and destruction of

20 property that occurred on or after the attack. They followed no

21 established rules of evidence and procedure and issued this single vague

22 and perfunctory opinion. The Prosecution will demonstrate, therefore,

23 that the accused Boskoski completely failed to exercise his duty to take

24 necessary and reasonable measures to ensure that his subordinates who

25 committed the crimes, alleged in the second amended indictment, were

Page 373

1 punished.

2 The evidence presented at trial will show that only ethnic

3 Albanian residents of Ljuboten were investigated and prosecuted for the

4 events that occurred there in August 2001. However, there were a number

5 of reasonable measures that Mr. Boskoski could have performed, and let me

6 briefly describe several of them to you before I finish my remarks.

7 Mr. Boskoski could have filed a criminal report. Pursuant to the

8 rule book for conducting the affairs of the Ministry of the Interior,

9 which is Prosecution Exhibit 370, as an authorised official under Article

10 103, Mr. Boskoski had a duty, upon reasonable suspicion that a crime had

11 been committed, to undertake necessary measures in order to reveal the

12 perpetrator of a crime and prevent escape, and to discover and secure any

13 evidence and gather information.

14 That same rule book at Article 167 provides a duty after that

15 information is gathered, to submit a criminal report to the public

16 prosecutor. Mr. Boskoski could have conducted an internal review within

17 the Ministry of the Interior and terminated the employees responsible for

18 the crimes. Under the Labour Relations Act, which is 65 ter 376, in

19 conjunction with the law on internal affairs, a genuine commission could

20 be established, assessed the responsibility of the employee, and prepare

21 a proposal to the Minister for a decision.

22 With respect to the use of fire-arms or means of physical force

23 and coercion that were used by Mr. Boskoski's employees in Ljuboten on

24 the 12th of August, reports should have been generated, and based on the

25 authorities that I have mentioned to you, an investigation should have

Page 374

1 been conducted either through a criminal investigation or by an internal

2 review.

3 I'd like to briefly show you 65 ter 100, please, which is a

4 decree on the use of means of coercion and fire-arms within the Ministry

5 of Interior. And if we focus on Article 5, please.

6 Article 5 says:

7 "Before using any means of coercion or fire-arms, if the

8 circumstances allow, the authorised person will identify him or herself

9 and clearly warn the other person on the use of the means."

10 If we can take a look at Article 27, please. Focus on

11 Article 27. This is a chapter entitled "Reporting on the Use of Means of

12 Coercion Or Firearms." Article 27 says:

13 "An authorised person, who has used some means of coercion or a

14 fire-arm, submits a written report to the immediately senior person in

15 charge, who determines the basis, the justification and the correctness

16 of the use of the means of coercion, i.e., the fire-arm."

17 And the Prosecution will provide you with evidence, Your Honour,

18 during the trial that these procedures were working even during the armed

19 conflict days of 2001. There is no evidence, however, that these

20 procedures were ever implemented with respect to the events in Ljuboten.

21 Can we look -- go back to Article 9, please, of that same

22 exhibit. Focus on Article 9:

23 "An authorised person who violates the legal authorisation by

24 using means of coercion or fire-arms will be prosecuted according to the

25 legal regulations."

Page 375

1 If we take a look now at 65 ter 88, which is again the law on

2 internal affairs, Article 38. If we can go to Article 38, please, and

3 focus on that. I want to go to 65 ter number 88, the next exhibit.

4 Okay. Article 38, please. Okay, up here. Again, we see that according

5 to the law on internal affairs:

6 "The reason, the justification and the regularity of the use of

7 means of enforcement or fire-arms in each concrete case is evaluated

8 directly by the responsible superior."

9 Finally, Your Honours, Mr. Boskoski had a general duty to

10 investigate as an authorised official and as a minister of the Interior,

11 he had a duty to investigate the crimes that occurred in Ljuboten.

12 Neither a genuine investigation or even a genuine request for one was

13 initiated by Mr. Boskoski or members of the Ministry of the Interior in

14 respect of the murders, cruel treatment and wanton destruction charged in

15 the indictment.

16 Despite such an obligation and Ljube Boskoski's knowledge of the

17 crimes, the Prosecution's evidence will prove that neither

18 Johan Tarculovski nor the police unit that he led in the unlawful attack

19 on Ljuboten, nor any member of the police force that was involved in the

20 murder, cruel treatment and wanton destruction of properties of the

21 ethnic Albanian residents in Ljuboten was ever punished, disciplined or

22 reprimanded in any way by Mr. Boskoski or any other member of the

23 Ministry of Interior. Mr. Tarculovski continued in his employment with

24 the Ministry of Interior throughout Mr. Boskoski's term of office.

25 Your Honours, due to his failure to take necessary and reasonable

Page 376

1 measures to punish the perpetrators of the crimes committed in the

2 village of Ljuboten, the Prosecution will ask you to find Mr. Boskoski

3 criminally responsible as a superior, pursuant to Article 7(3) of the

4 Statute of this Tribunal.

5 Your Honour, that concludes the Prosecution's opening remarks. I

6 will sit down now.

7 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Saxon.

8 Ms. Residovic, the Rules provide that a statement may be made at

9 this point by the Defence of Mr. Boskoski. Is it intended to make one at

10 this point?

11 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the Defence,

12 pursuant to Rule 84 from the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, will use

13 its right to provide the opening statement before it starts presenting

14 its own evidence.

15 I would also like to inform the Trial Chamber that our client,

16 Mr. Boskoski, will not avail himself of the -- of his right from 84 bis,

17 that with the leave of the Trial Chamber would give a statement at this

18 moment. He would not use it.

19 Thank you.

20 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

21 So I understand that it's not intended by you or your client to

22 make a statement at this time, but you will make an opening statement

23 when it comes time for Defence evidence to be led by you.

24 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Exactly, Your Honour. Thank

25 you.

Page 377

1 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much.

2 Mr. Apostolski, the same position applies. Your client may at

3 this point have an opening statement made. What is the intention?

4 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the Defence of

5 Johan Tarculovski holds the same position with regards to this issue, so

6 we will defer our right. Before we start presenting our evidence, we

7 will then make our opening statement.

8 Thank you.

9 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much, Mr. Apostolski.

10 This morning was intended as the day upon which opening

11 statements were made in this trial, which officially commences today. As

12 we have heard, the Prosecution has completed its opening, and both

13 Defences prefer to follow the more usual course of making their own

14 opening at the commencement of their respective Defence cases. So that,

15 therefore, concludes the matters for which the Chamber convened today.

16 Before we adjourn, are there any other matters that require

17 attention?

18 MR. METTRAUX: Good morning, Your Honours.

19 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Mettraux.

20 MR. METTRAUX: Good morning, Your Honours.

21 The Defence has given an indication to the Chamber that it would

22 briefly seek to respond to three Prosecution applications, and if

23 Your Honour would wish to do so at this stage, we would be happy to do

24 so.


Page 378

1 MR. METTRAUX: Thank you, Your Honour.

2 The first response by the Defence concerned the latest

3 Prosecution application for amendment to its Rule 65, their list of

4 exhibits, and the Defence would wish to indicate at this stage that it

5 will not formally object to leave being granted to amend this list of

6 exhibits.

7 The Defence would like to record, however, its concern as to the

8 constant change of the Prosecution lists of exhibits and Prosecution

9 witnesses. We have made a similar indication in the past in relation to

10 further applications, and the Defence is quite concerned that the change

11 in the prosecution case has not come to an end.

12 As regards the other application of the Prosecution, namely, to

13 withdraw 30 exhibits from its Rule 65 ter lists, the Defence has no

14 objection to leave being granted in relation to this matter as well.

15 The second matter which the Defence would like to bring to your

16 attention concerns notification by the Prosecution to the Defence to the

17 effect that it had omitted to place a particular document on its exhibit

18 lists as provided to the Defence. The Defence would simply indicate that

19 it would have no objection to this document being formally placed on the

20 Prosecution list of exhibits without the need for further application on

21 the part of the Prosecution to amend its lists in relation to this

22 document, which appears to have been forgotten from one of the lists, at

23 least, that was given to the Defence.

24 The Defence would finally like to respond to an application by

25 the Prosecution for protective measures in relation to one of its

Page 379

1 proposed witnesses. It's the Defence position in relation to that

2 application that the application is premature, indeed, insofar as the

3 witness in question has indicated her unwillingness to come and testify

4 before this Tribunal. It is the Defence position that any issue as to

5 protective measures should be dealt with, should there be any need for

6 it, at the time when the witness is called or when an application for

7 subpoena is made formally to the Trial Chamber.

8 The Defence would not wish to reiterate the submissions that have

9 been made by lead counsel, Ms. Residovic, in relation to what we consider

10 to be a very improper submission made by the Prosecution investigator.

11 However, we would simply wish to note that the system of protective

12 measures should not be abused by making general allegations of a threat

13 without any identification or without any evidence being put forth as to

14 a concrete threat or danger which create a risk for any of the witnesses.

15 Having said that, the Defence will leave it to the Trial Chamber

16 to decide whether, in those circumstances, any protective measures would

17 be appropriate for this person and would not formally object to those

18 measures being granted.

19 Thank you very much.

20 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much, Mr. Mettraux.

21 Mr. Apostolski, is there any observations that you wish to make

22 in respect of those matters?

23 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour. Thank you.

24 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

25 There would appear to be no other matters to be raised at this

Page 380

1 point. That being so, we will now adjourn, as previously indicated, to

2 commence the evidence on Monday, the 7th of May.

3 We thank counsel for their attendance today, and we will resume

4 the trial at that time.

5 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 11.54 a.m.,

6 to be reconvened on Monday, the 7th of May, 2007,

7 at 2.15 p.m.