1 Thursday, 13 March 2008
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.
6 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning.
7 Good morning to you, sir. The affirmation you made still
9 I would mention that Judge Van den Wyngaert is unable to sit
10 today. As we're not sitting tomorrow, I think we can be confident that
11 she will have recovered by the time we sit again next week.
12 Mr. Saxon.
13 MR. SAXON: Thank you, Your Honours.
14 Two brief procedural matters, if I may. Yesterday, Your Honours,
15 at pages 10813 to 10815 of the transcript, the witness and I discussed
16 what was 65 ter 700 of the Prosecution, and my learned colleagues have
17 kindly explained to me, as Ms. Residovic did yesterday as well, that that
18 is actually Exhibit 1D00177. So I just wanted to make sure that the
19 record is clear about that.
20 The second matter, Your Honour, is a request. I've had a
21 discussion with my colleague from the Defence, and both Mr. Tarculovski,
22 of course, and myself have been working hard to make sure that the
23 witness -- excuse me, I made a mistake. I'm not sure where I got that
24 mistake from.
25 JUDGE PARKER: I think there is a little disease running around
1 the courtroom; it strikes unexpectedly.
2 MR. SAXON: And I should have said that I had a conversation with
3 Mr. Apostolski, and both he and I have been working hard to streamline
4 the rest of our questions so that this witness can finish today.
5 The request is simply this. Rather than taking the usual half an
6 hour breaks, we wonder if it would be possible if the two breaks could be
7 shortened to 20 minutes, and that way I will take two sessions to finish
8 my cross-examination with the witness, but that should give my colleague
9 Mr. Apostolski an extra 20 minutes for his redirect examination.
10 JUDGE PARKER: In some earlier trials, we maintained a 20-minute
11 schedule. But under great pressure from people who found that inadequate
12 for all their purposes, we have changed to half-hour. I'm sure that
13 there will be a willingness of the people who support us, to cooperate
14 just today in managing two 20 minute breaks, rather than half-hour
16 MR. SAXON: Thank you very much, Your Honours.
17 WITNESS: BLAGOJA MARKOVSKI [Resumed]
18 [Witness answered through interpreter]
19 Cross-examination by Mr. Saxon: [Continued]
20 Q. Good morning, Dr. Markovski.
21 A. [In English] Good morning.
22 Q. On Monday, at page 10633 of the transcript, my colleague asked
23 you: "Did the terrorist group of the NLA have any military structure?"
24 And you responded to that, and at the end of your response, you said the
25 following: "But the so-called brigades worked according to their own
1 independent plans and intentions, and, obviously, this does not speak of
2 an organised structure, let alone an army."
3 Do you recall that testimony?
4 A. [Interpretation] Yes. I remember and I confirm this statement
6 Q. Okay. Now, the man known as Xhavid Asani, he was a member of the
7 NLA's 114th Brigade. Do you recall that?
8 A. I know the person that we are discussing; but whether he was
9 precisely in this brigade, I was not able to find a document about this.
10 Q. All right.
11 MR. SAXON: For the record, Your Honour, I would refer you to
12 testimony that is at page 5589 of the transcript.
13 Q. If we can take a look at your report again, Doctor.
14 MR. SAXON: If we could turn, please, to paragraph 371.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Is it paragraph?
16 MR. SAXON:
17 Q. Paragraph 371.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Paragraph 371 is part of the section of your report 7.4.1, which
20 is titled: Preparations for the operation. And if you take a look at
21 paragraph 371, it starts with a paragraph talking about the organisation
22 and execution of the action by the security forces. Then below that
23 paragraph, we see a series of subparagraphs with some little arrows.
24 Do you see those?
25 A. Yes, of course.
1 Q. If you could turn to the very last little arrow.
2 MR. SAXON: For those following along in English, in my version
3 at least, it is on page 118. I could be off by a page.
4 Q. The very last little arrow begins with the phrase: "According to
5 information ..."
6 Do you see that?
7 A. If we are discussing the weekend settlement Basinec, because the
8 Macedonian version does not start with this particular word.
9 Q. Well, in English version the last little arrow says: "According
10 to information from the diary of events of the 3rd Guardist Battalion."
11 It's a few arrows down the page from the subparagraph that talks
12 about Basinec. Do you see it now?
13 A. Yes. This was the last page before paragraph 372. Yes, very
15 Q. Okay. This little subparagraph says the following: "According
16 to information from the diary of events of the 3rd Guardist Battalion,
17 received at 1520 hours on 11 August 2001, Gzim Ostreni ordered Xhavid
18 Asani to carry out an attack on Rastak and Ljubanci."
19 Do you see that?
20 A. Yes, this is what it reads.
21 Q. And as authority for that, you rely on footnote 245, which is the
22 military diary of the 3rd Guards Battalion, which is actually Exhibit
24 Now, could you turn to paragraph 379, please.
25 Paragraph 379, at the start, it talks about documents from the
1 Ministry of Defence "show that its intelligence service possessed valid
2 information on a possible attack by the armed Albanian extremists on the
3 positions of the security forces around Rastak and Ljubanci." Then you
4 give a description of some of this information.
5 Then in the last sentence of the paragraph, you say this: "Added
6 to all of this is also the information that Gzim Ostreni ordered Xhavid
7 Asani to carry out an attack on Rastak and Ljubanci?"
8 Do you see that?
9 A. Yes, this is so. That is correct.
10 Q. Then, in footnote 255, as authority for this information, you
11 cite actually to a different document. It's another report from the
12 Ministry of Defence, this time from the sector for security and
13 counter-intelligence, called: Summary of intelligence information. It's
14 dated the 12th of August, 2001, which has 65 ter number 969.7.
15 So, Dr. Markovski, even your report indicates that Gzim Ostreni
16 issued orders to his subordinates in the field. Isn't that right?
17 A. This is right, but, here, it does not say that the Chief of Staff
18 of the NLA issued the order to the commander of, let's say, the 114th
19 Brigade. So the Chief of Staff, Gzim Ostreni, issued an order to the
20 commander of the 114th Brigade - WHAT was his name - the person, as you
21 mentioned him.
22 So we are not discussing here military order in the senses of
23 chain of command. It just says that a person such-and-such gave an order
24 to another person. Why is it not possible in a terrorist organisation
25 for one person to tell another person what to do so. So we have not
1 discussing here a situation of subordinate and superior, nor we are
2 discussing an organised planned manner of commanding or taking action.
3 Q. Well, but in your testimony, at page 10633 of the transcript, you
4 said: "But the so-called brigades worked according to their own
5 independent plans and intentions."
6 But we see here that, even in your own report, you indicate that
7 that wasn't necessarily true, was it? We see Gzim Ostreni giving orders
8 to members of the brigades, or to a member of a brigade?
9 A. One has to be fully correct. I'm not saying that the brigades
10 operated independently according to their own plans; but, basically, I
11 corroborate or I cite the position of Mr. Gzim Ostreni provided in his
12 own statement. And if one reads well my statement, this position of mine
13 in the report points out to the fact that this was stated by Mr. Gzim
15 Q. Okay. Let's turn to a slightly different topic, if we can. Can
16 you turn back, please, to paragraph 239 of your report.
17 Dr. Markovski, we looked at this paragraph briefly yesterday, and
18 we -- we looked at the four conditions that you describe at the end of
19 the paragraph, with which -- which should be in place for a unit of a
20 movement of organised resistance to be an armed force.
21 The last condition that you put here is that: "That they adhere
22 to the rules of warfare during combat actions?"
23 Do you see that?
24 A. Yes, yes. I can see it.
25 Q. And, now, one of the international organisations that addresses
1 this kind of issue is the ICRC, the International Committee of the Red
2 Cross. Is that right?
3 A. Yes. There were -- it's a structure presence in the Republic of
4 Macedonia during the crisis.
5 Q. Okay. Thank you.
6 MR. SAXON: I'd like to show the witness a video-clip, please,
7 and this will be 65 ter 1118.9. It has ERN number VOOO-7472, clip 9.
8 Your Honours, you can find the transcript of this clip at tab 65
9 in binder 3.
10 Q. And, Dr. Markovski, this is video material produced --
11 MR. SAXON: If Dr. Markovski needs the third binder, could that
12 be given to him, please. But you should be able to hear it.
13 Q. Hopefully you will be able to hear this, Doctor.
14 And, Doctor, this is video material produced by Macedonia Radio
15 and Television on the 23rd of May, 2001. It's a press conference with
16 members of the ICRC.
17 MR. SAXON: Can we see that video, please.
18 [Videotape played]
19 MR. SAXON:
20 Q. So we see from this report that there was some contact at that
21 time, May, between members of the ICRC and members of the NLA.
22 Dr. Markovski, in 2001, the ICRC was present in Macedonia at
23 least from May until the signing of the Ohrid Agreement. Isn't that
25 A. I don't know precisely until when, but starting May, yes. And,
1 probably, they were present even afterwards, after the signing of the
2 Ohrid Framework Agreement. I don't remember precisely; however, they
3 were around during the crisis.
4 Q. Okay.
5 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, I would seek to tender this video-clip
6 and the transcript, please.
7 JUDGE PARKER: They will be received.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be exhibit number
9 P000607. Thank you, Your Honours.
10 MR. SAXON:
11 Q. Moving to a slightly different topic. At page 10619 of the
12 transcript, you told the Chamber that the NLA used force of arms to
13 achieve political goals, and you also made the comment that the majority
14 of NLA actions were "terrorism."
15 I want to ask you about the attack on the army convoy at Karpalak
16 on the 8th of August, 2001, when ten soldiers, unfortunately, died.
17 Was that an act of terrorism?
18 A. Yes, it was. This was a terrorist act, yes.
19 Q. And why is that?
20 A. Because, first of all, a state of war was not declared in the
21 Republic of Macedonia; that is to say, there were no combat activities
22 planned organised combat activities. And according to the methodology in
23 which this attack was carried out on the convoy, on the members of the
24 armed forces, they were not in a combat position or position to carry out
25 combat activities. They were just being transported from one city to
2 So there was no combat situation; and in this particular case,
3 these terrorists used the opportunity provided by the configuration of
4 the terrain. This is a gorge we are discussing. And from the top of the
5 cliffs from both sides of the gorge, they carried out this terrorist
7 So let me repeat. We are not discussing about a combat
8 situation, combat activities. We are just discussing a transport. And
9 in a situation when there is no state of war, any attack on the bodies or
10 institutions of the state is considered as a terrorist attack.
11 Q. Let's go back to our hypothetical country X, if we can, Doctor,
12 and to the hypothetical classic war or classic armed conflict.
13 In a classic war or classic armed conflict, an ambush is not a
14 violation of the rules of war, is it?
15 A. In a classic war, yes.
16 Q. Okay. And just to make sure that the record is clear, my
17 question was: "An ambush is not a violation of the rules of war, is it?"
18 Then you said: "In a classic war, yes."
19 So you were agreeing with me. Is that correct?
20 A. Yes, I was. I did agree with you, because there is one of the
21 methods of the classic type of war, the methods of combat activities.
22 Q. All right.
23 MR. SAXON: Can we show the witness, please, if we could bring it
24 up on the screen, what is Exhibit P000467 again, which is the map of the
25 Republic of Macedonia.
1 And if we could zoom in a bit on the upper part of the map, the
2 area from -- yes, that would be good. Thank you very much.
3 Q. Dr. Markovski, I'm wondering, perhaps with the usher's assistance
4 if you take up the magic pen again, and I'd like to talk to you a limited
5 about where the NLA was operating by the 12th of August, 2001.
6 First of all, by that time, by early/mid-August, there was
7 fighting between the NLA and members of the security forces in and around
8 Tetovo. Is that right?
9 A. Not combat activities. There were armed incidents and
10 provocations by the armed extremist groups.
11 Q. Okay.
12 A. Fighting is a serious word.
13 Q. All right. Well, but there was a presence of the NLA in Tetovo.
14 Is that fair?
15 A. Presence in Tetovo, you mean? No. In the city of Tetovo, no.
16 Q. How about around Tetovo, in the environs of Tetovo?
17 A. In the villages around Tetovo, there was fighting in some of
19 Q. Okay. Could you do us a favour? Could you draw a line
20 indicating the villages and the areas where there was a NLA presence and
21 fighting at that time in the Tetovo region.
22 A. I'm afraid that I might make a mistake; but if you point out a
23 village, then maybe I can respond whether there was something in that
24 particular village or not.
25 Q. Okay.
1 A. For instance, I can mention that there was something going on in
2 Sipkovica. But I believe that would be a more efficient method if you
3 point out a village, and then I can confirm it or not.
4 Q. Well, let start with the villages that we can see there.
5 Sipkovica, there was fighting in that area, right?
6 A. There were not combat activities in Sipkovica. There was an
7 armed group there, and they were acting from there or attacking Tetovo
8 and the surrounding areas. So there was just an armed group in Sipkovica
9 acting or firing in these directions.
10 Q. Well, then, let's do this. You say that they were acting from
11 Sipkovica, attacking Tetovo and the surrounding areas. Would you please
12 draw a line, or lines, indicating the areas that were under attack.
13 A. Again, remind me or point out, and then I will tell you yes or
15 Q. Well, you see --
16 A. What period are we discussing or what type of activity.
17 Q. I told you before we're talking about August 2001 up until the
18 12th of August.
19 Now you're here as an expert on the political/military situation
20 at that time. So I'd like you, please, to help us understand. If you
21 could please indicate on this map the areas where - let's just start with
22 the Tetovo area - where the NLA or members of this armed group were
24 A. Now you're asking something from me, something that I cannot
25 really afford doing. I can only draw according to my recollections. If
1 it is somewhere to be found in my report, then remind me, and I can
2 explain it further.
3 So if you point out a particular location, I can agree or not,
4 but --
5 Q. In Tetovo --
6 A. -- yes. I understood that we are discussing the area around
7 Tetovo, but, please, can you be more specific? What day, what kind of
8 situation, and what was the side where they were acting from, I can do
9 that; but just to write by heart, I cannot really afford that.
10 Q. Can you draw a line along the western and north-western side of
11 Tetovo. Can you do that for us?
12 A. Of course, this is something that I can do. And north-west, you
14 Q. All right. And there were armed groups also in - I don't think
15 I'm pronouncing this word correctly - Tearce, the village a bit to the
17 A. Yes. There was an armed group in Tearce as well; not all the
18 time, but from time to time.
19 Q. All right. And could you draw, then, a line from Tearce down to
21 A. [Marks]
22 Q. Now there's a road - and, actually, let me stick with the
23 northern-most regions for a moment - to the north of Tearce, going
24 towards Vratnica, there was also the armed groups, wasn't there, or an
25 armed group that had a presence up there?
1 A. Yes. There was there Vratnica, especially during the month in
2 August -- actually, just during the month of August.
3 Q. All right. Can you draw, then, a line up towards Vratnica,
5 A. Although I don't understand the point of this, I will do that.
6 Q. Okay. Now, there's a road that goes from Tetovo to Gostivar,
7 right? We can see that on the map?
8 A. Yes, there is.
9 Q. Now, there was a presence of armed groups in the villages
10 along -- in some of the villages along there road in August 2001, wasn't
12 A. In the villages, if we are talking about to the north of the
13 axillary road, then yes. There was, for instance, in the village of
14 Golema Recica.
15 Q. Okay. Could you draw, then, a line from Golema Recica towards
17 A. [Marks]
18 Q. And there was also a presence of armed groups in the area of
19 Bogovinje, wasn't there, by August 2001?
20 A. Yes. From time to time, there were in Bogovinje as well.
21 Q. Could you draw a line from Bogovinje up to Golema Recica, please.
22 A. [Marks]
23 Q. Now, correct me if I'm wrong, there was also the presence of
24 armed groups in the villages of Vrapciste and Negotino, right?
25 A. Yes, they were in Vrapciste and in Negotino, as well, in the
1 sense that you are asking.
2 Q. Can you draw, then, a line connecting Vrapciste with Negotino,
3 and Negotino with Bogovinje?
4 A. [Marks]
5 Q. To your knowledge, in Gostivar, itself, was there a presence of
6 armed groups?
7 A. No, no. In Gostivar, there was no presence.
8 Q. How about in the -- in the area to the west of Gostivar? Around
9 Vrutok, going towards Debar, there were some presence of armed groups
10 there, weren't there?
11 A. I don't think there was presentation there. There were no
12 fighting there, apart from one of the places. I hope you will remind me
13 of the name, or was it Tanusevci. It was there only that there was a
14 single exchange of fire during the crisis in 2001.
15 Q. All right. Do you recall what month that was?
16 A. I know that it was after the incident when an anti-tank mine was
17 stepped on by the OSCE representatives. They were killed then and it was
18 immediately after that, but I don't remember the date exactly.
19 Q. Okay. That's fine. That's fine. Now, if we can move, please,
20 from Tetovo now more towards the east. We see the road going from Tetovo
21 through Grupcin and to Skopje. The other day we talked about the
22 presence of armed groups on different sides of that road, to the north
23 and to the south. There was a presence of armed groups, for example, by
24 August around Semsevo, wasn't there?
25 A. Yes. They were there, around Semsevo, in August, yes.
1 Q. Could you draw a line from Semsevo down to that road, please.
2 A. [Marks]
3 Q. And a bit further to the north, in Jegunovce, there was also the
4 presence of an armed group, wasn't there?
5 A. I'm not sure, but I suppose so, because it belongs to the region.
6 Yes, yes. So my answer is yes.
7 Q. Okay. Could you draw a red line connecting Jegunovce with
9 A. [Marks]
10 Q. Now, focussing to the south of that road between Tetovo and
11 Skopje, in the area of the Suva Gora mountains, you told us the other day
12 there was an armed group to the south of that road. Can you indicate,
13 approximately, where they were. Was it around Celopek? Was it around
15 A. I will mark it here somewhere roughly. Perhaps it should have
16 been a bit further to the north, but it was somewhere here.
17 Q. Okay.
18 MR. SAXON: And just for the record, the witness has drawn a red
19 dot a bit to the east of the town of Celopek.
20 Q. And if could you, please, could you draw a line from that red dot
21 up towards the road now.
22 A. [Marks]
23 Q. We see the town of Grupcin in the middle of that road between
24 Skopje and Tetovo. By August 2001, the -- there were some armed groups
25 who were carrying out some activities around Grupcin. Isn't that
2 A. Actually, those were the same groups that were located in the
3 northern part, and they were hiding behind or amongst the population in
4 Dvorista and in the southern part in Grupcin. With regards to Grupcin,
5 they couldn't have been there, because the security structures of the
6 army of the Republic of Macedonia and of the police were here. So they
7 could only move from Bojane to Grupcin, or from Dvorista to Grupcin.
8 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's Correction: In line 15:18,
9 "Bojane" instead of "Grupcin."
10 MR. SAXON: Okay.
11 Q. We don't see Bojane. Can you indicate on the map approximately
12 where Bojane is?
13 A. Yes. This is the dot that I made here.
14 Q. Next to Celopek?
15 A. To the east of it.
16 Q. Okay.
17 A. Perhaps it should have been a bit further to the north.
18 Q. Okay. And just to keep this clear, could you draw the number 1
19 next to that red dot, indicating Bojane?
20 A. [Marks]
21 Q. Thank you very much. Now, if we move a bit further east towards
22 Skopje, according to your testimony and I believe your report, by the
23 12th of August, there was a -- there was presence of an armed group again
24 in Aracinovo. Is that right?
25 A. Yes. There was presence in Aracinovo.
1 Q. Can you just draw a circle around Aracinovo, around where it says
3 A. [Marks]
4 Q. Okay. And according to your report and your testimony, there was
5 also armed groups in the village of Ljuboten. Correct?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Okay. Could you draw a circle around Ljuboten?
8 A. [Marks]
9 Q. And there was a presence of armed groups in Nikustak and Lipkovo.
10 Isn't that right?
11 A. Yes, you're absolutely right.
12 Q. Could you draw circles around those villages.
13 A. [Marks]
14 Q. There was a presence of armed groups in the Vaksince area, right?
15 A. Not in August, no, not in August.
16 Q. All right. And in respect to the Kumanovo area, the armed groups
17 got at least as close as Lopate and Romanovce, right?
18 A. They haven't reached Lopate. They couldn't be there. They
19 couldn't have been there.
20 Q. And Romanovce?
21 A. Neither in Romanovce.
22 Q. By August of 2001, there was a presence of armed groups in Debar,
23 wasn't there?
24 A. No. I have no documents with regards to Debar. I have no
25 information that they have been there and that they have acted there.
1 Q. Okay. Before I forget, can we freeze this image and can this be
2 given an exhibit number, Your Honours, please.
3 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P00608. Thank
5 you, Your Honours.
6 MR. SAXON:
7 Q. And I believe it was also your evidence that some members of the
8 so-called NLA had actually infiltrated Skopje by early August 2001. That
9 was the man known as Commander Teli who died on the 5th of August. Is
10 that right?
11 A. Yes. The group of seven or eight members of the person you
12 mentioned and his closest associates has infiltrated Skopje.
13 Q. Okay. If we can leave this map for a moment, if can you just
14 sort of recall where we see the presence of these armed groups now by the
15 12th of August.
16 MR. SAXON: Now can we turn now, please, to whether is
17 Exhibit P487, please.
18 Your Honours, this is at tab 88 in binder 3. You've seen it
19 before. It is the map and plan that was produced by Mr. Gzim Ostreni.
20 I don't know whether there's a problem with e-court. We see --
21 here it comes. Thank you. Can we perhaps focus in on the upper half of
22 this map, please. Thank you very much.
23 Q. This is the map that you discussed a bit during your direct
24 examination, Dr. Markovski; the plan, the map. And during your direct
25 examination on Monday, at page 10646 of the transcript, when discussing
1 this plan, you said that if a commander came to you to take an exam with
2 this kind of plan, you would send him back to first grade to study both
3 tactics and organisation of military structures.
4 Do you remember that testimony?
5 A. It is absolutely so.
6 Q. And you said that everything written on the original plan is
7 unrealistic and impossible to implement; and then on page 10647 of the
8 transcript --
9 A. I apologise. Excuse me. I didn't say that everything in the
10 plan was unrealistic. What I said was that unrealistic was the narrative
11 text accompanying the map, in terms of the purposes, the goals that were
12 set, and in terms of achieving those goals.
13 So we were discussing the narrative part.
14 Q. And you said, at page 10647 of the transcript, from the military
15 view, this is amateur stuff.
16 Do you recall saying that?
17 A. And I confirm it again now.
18 Q. Okay. But think back to the positions of the armed groups, or of
19 the NLA, that you drew on a map just a few minutes ago, where they were
20 by August 12, 2001. When we see the positions of the NLA or of these
21 armed groups by 12 August 2001, the plan looks to be pretty successful,
23 A. I don't understand what you're asking me, specifically. If I
24 understood you well, I agree with the notion that to the north of the
25 axillary road, from Tetovo to the border crossing point Jezince, in the
1 villages populated by ethnic Albanians, the ones that we have mentioned,
2 in those, there were armed extremists, Albanian groups. So from this
3 aspect, I can accept the drawing here.
4 However, one could not accept that, as far as I understood,
5 everything that is marked in yellow here was allegedly under the control
6 of the so-called NLA. First of all, the border-line with the
7 then-Yugoslavia, and later Serbia and Montenegro in the area towards
8 Kosovo, was secured by the Macedonian army. It was both before the
9 crisis and during the crisis in this territory.
10 Because of the inability to efficiently secure the border, we
11 discussed already that the president and other structures in the Republic
12 of Macedonia have requested that KFOR makes special efforts with regards
13 to securing the border from their side. But pursuant to the
14 international standards, the border -- or between the border and the
15 interior of the country, there are two zones. They are called the border
16 belt and the border region.
17 To make it more clear to you, this is actually an identification
18 of the internationally recognised grey and green zone, or the green zone
19 is the in depth territory 100 metres from the border-line.
20 Q. Dr. Markovski --
21 A. Allow me, please. I am explaining the map. I wish to explain
22 where the armed groups were and where they controlled the territory,
23 because this is the specific question you asked me.
24 Will you allow me to continue?
25 Q. Actually, that's not the specific question that I asked you.
1 The question I asked you was that: When you look at where the
2 armed groups were by the 12th of August, 2001, when you look at this plan
3 for where the armed groups were supposed to be during the summer of 2001,
4 then the plan actually looks fairly -- the results of the plan actually
5 look to be fairly successful, because we see the plan of the NLA presence
6 around Tetovo, that's the green arrows; we see the NLA moving towards
7 Skopje; we see the armed groups moving to the north of the road between
8 Tetovo and Skopje and coming as well towards that road from the south.
9 So wouldn't it be fair to say that a large portion of this plan
10 was actually realised by the 12th of August, 2001?
11 A. It is not like that, Mr. Saxon. This story that you are
12 developing now has nothing to do with this map, and I don't know we are
13 looking at this map. If you wish to corroborate your story with this
14 map, then allow me to finish my explanation and tell you that these armed
15 groups that were in the villages we mentioned and discussed, that is a
17 But this map gives a false image when we looking at it. And the
18 notion that they moved freely and whenever they wanted there is
19 absolutely incorrect.
20 Q. At page 10634 of the transcript on Monday, in response to a
21 question of my colleague, you said: "I never came across a document
22 which would speak of any planned organised action by these so-called
23 organised brigades."
24 A. And I confirm it now.
25 Q. Okay. Can we turn back to your report, please.
1 MR. SAXON: We can remove this map from the screen.
2 Q. If you could turn to paragraph 336 of your report.
3 Paragraph 336, it's part of the -- of section 7.2 which is
4 titled: Origin of the events in and around Ljuboten. I would like to
5 review with you paragraphs 336 and 337, if we can.
6 First of all, in paragraph 335, you explain that: "The
7 occurrences in the village of Ljuboten need to be analysed in the context
8 of the overall events of that period in the crisis regions."
9 And then this paragraph 336, you explain where Ljuboten is
10 located, about ten kilometres to the north-east of Skopje; that there are
11 mountains running to the north and north-east of the village; that pack
12 animals can be used or people can go by foot along these mountains;
13 sometimes motor vehicles can be used in certain terrain.
14 Then you describe the different paths that go through these areas
15 around Matejce, monastery, and the villages of Matejce and Nikustak, and
16 the other path beginning at Blace continuing to Skopje and Aracinovo.
17 And then this paragraph 237 [sic], you say the following: "These
18 routes were used extensively at the start of the crisis in the Republic
19 of Macedonia for the relocation of armed groups of Albanian extremists,
20 and for the transport of weapons and other equipment by various criminals
21 and armed Albanian extremists. At the start of June, these routes were
22 used by some 250 armed Albanian extremists to reach the village of
24 "Their aim," it may be purpose in the original Macedonian, "was
25 to drive out the non-ethnic Albanian population from the villages in the
1 vicinity of Ljuboten and Aracinovo, through terrorist sabotage activities
2 in the wider region of Skopje, and on buildings of vital significant to
3 the daily lives of the population and through intimidation, thus
4 generating ethnic cleansing, while also endeavouring to obtain
5 concessions from the government of the Republic of Macedonia, in order
6 'to resolve the Albanian issue.'"
7 Have you been following me, with me?
8 A. Yes. And this is a really good conclusion that I've made.
9 Q. Okay. Well, assuming that the information in these paragraphs is
10 correct, doesn't the activity that you describe require a certain level
11 of planning and organisation?
12 A. No.
13 Q. So it just happened sort of spontaneously. Is that how it all
15 A. I don't think that it happened spontaneously, but the purpose was
16 something completely different. We do not have here -- I really can't
17 understand what is your view to this? Do you think that a brigade, or
18 let's go down to a level of a battalion, that a battalion would freely
19 and in a planned fashion work and transport the illegal weapons from
20 Kosovo into the Republic of Macedonia, or in whatever other direction,
21 regardless of the difficulties that the terrain in the geographic sense
22 in this area presents.
23 So this could not have be the organised groups doing it. This is
24 done by individuals, two, three, four people, using animals for
25 transport. They can't even use vehicles for transport, and they used the
1 configuration of the terrain. They used the night-time and they use the
2 fog that is also present within a certain period here, because these arms
3 were brought here as early as March.
4 This does not say that we have a planned and organised activity.
5 What we have is certain activities of the armed Albanian extremist groups
6 that do this in this way.
7 Q. Just so that the record is clear, you say: We have individuals
8 or small groups of people using the configuration of the terrain, the
9 fog, using animals to transport things like weapons, to different
10 villages in the areas to the north of Skopje. And that activity had to
11 be done in that way, because it would have been dangerous to do it any
12 other way, right?
13 A. At any time, they did it before the crisis, and then they needed
14 to cover, to hide from the police controls from the police teams that was
15 controlling the area. That was regular activity of the police in the
17 Q. So to do all of this activity in difficult terrain, in difficult
18 weather conditions, using animals, doing it in secret, you think this was
19 something that required a fair amount of planning and organisation?
20 A. But this is not the level of organisation of an armed force, and
21 it is not a level of planned activity of an armed structure, such as
22 brigades, that you keep indicating allegedly existed. But I'm telling
23 you that there is no document that any brigade existed, that any General
24 Staff existed. Really, I wish to say publicly, if you prove to me or if
25 give me a document about the existence of any brigade, I will completely
1 step back from this report.
2 Q. Actually, what I think that you're explaining to us is that the
3 members of the so-called NLA were actually operating in circumstances
4 that were more difficult than what a classic army would normally face,
6 They had to use pack animals, they had to operate in bad weather
7 at night. Isn't that right?
8 A. Yes, I agree with you on this.
9 Q. And that takes a lot of planning and organisation and care,
10 doesn't it, to do that?
11 A. Look here, I'm from a village originally, so when I need to load
12 the donkey with some cargo, I don't need any special organisation for
14 MR. SAXON: If we can move on to paragraph 338, please.
15 Q. The last sentence of paragraph 338 says that: "While the
16 1st Guardist Brigade took up these positions, police officers from Cair
17 police station set up check-points on the roads between Ljubanci and
18 Ljuboten and next to the church in Ljuboten in the direction of the
19 village of Rastak."
20 Do you see that?
21 A. Yes, I see it.
22 Q. Why was it important at this time, in mid-June, for the police to
23 set up those check-points?
24 A. It was important because immediately before that, there were
25 direct -- there was direct evidence about smuggling of weapons, transport
1 and warehousing of the weapons in this particular region.
2 For this reason, in order to prevent or terminate the link
3 between Ljuboten with Nikustak, that is to say, with Matejce, and in
4 order to prevent for the village of Ljuboten to be used as logistic
5 support, in any sense, for these armed groups that were to be found
6 there, probably, according to the estimates of the Ministry of Interior,
7 the conclusion was made that it is necessary to establish these
9 Q. Okay. And in that kind of a security situation, it is also
10 important to keep those check-points manned and keep them reinforced.
11 Isn't that right?
12 A. A check-point on its own means people. This is not a facility.
13 A check-point means people.
14 Q. So the answer to my question would be yes, then, right?
15 A. Yes, it would.
16 Q. Okay. Can you take a look, please, at paragraphs 342 to 343.
17 Paragraph 342 begins with the extraction of the armed Albanian
18 extremists from Aracinovo on the 26th of June, 2001. You say that the
19 majority of them ended up in Nikustak, but then you say: "A smaller
20 number of the armed extremists returned to Ljuboten on foot, through the
21 village of Rastak."
22 You say: "These were the armed extremist groups with Xhavid
23 Asani and Nazmi Sulejmani. Their return to Ljuboten aimed to maintain
24 the tension in the area of Skopska Crna Gora by preparing and undertaking
25 activities to continue the armed provocations, incidents, and terrorist
1 actions against the members and buildings of the Ministry of Interior and
2 the army of the Republic of Macedonia."
3 And then in paragraph 343, you say this: "The village of
4 Ljuboten became a logistics base for the area of Skopje for the armed
5 extremists groups in the Kumanovo-Lipkovo region. Weapons, military
6 equipment, and sanitary material from Skopje were transported to Ljuboten
7 and then onto the Kumanovo-Lipkovo region over the mountains in the
8 Skopje Crna Gora with domestic pack animals."
9 Again, assuming that the information in these paragraphs is
10 correct, doesn't this activity, the establishment of a logistics base for
11 the area of Skopje in the village of Ljuboten, doesn't that require a
12 certain level of planning and organisation?
13 A. I really refrain all the time to make a comparison, but now I
14 would like to apologise to the Macedonian public, and I have to say that
15 Al Qaeda does the same things that you are discussing now. But nobody,
16 nor you or I, did not represent them as an armed force, but we talked
17 about them as terrorists. Your thesis that this is a planned activity
18 conducted by an organised military structure, indeed, does not hold
20 Q. To finish up on this topic, and, of course, since 2001, the
21 government and military of the United States of America has been at war
22 with Al Qaeda, hasn't it?
23 A. As far as I know - now I have to apologise to the American
24 public, because I'm going to mention a tragic event, 11th of September,
25 2001, and probably we all remember it well - the President Bush declared
1 a war to the organised terrorist and declared war to global terrorism.
2 I'm not quite sure that the United States are really in war with
3 global terrorism; however, they are part of an anti-terrorist coalition,
4 and together with me own country as well we are trying to resolve a
5 registrar serious probably in Iraq.
6 Q. Moving to a different topic, can we turn please to paragraph 369.
7 This is at the start of section 7.4, called: The operation by the
8 security forces on 12 August 2001. Then 369 comes under the subheading:
9 Preparations for the operation.
10 In this paragraph, you say, according to your analysis of the
11 documents, "the operation of the security forces of 12 August 2001 was
12 prepared on the idea and verbal order of the president of the Republic of
13 Macedonia, Boris Trajkovski."
14 Then you say: "He was under intense pressure for an extended
15 period, both from the Macedonian public and certain political circles,
16 and it is possible that he decided on this course of action in order to
17 prevent the further escalation of the crisis in the Skopje region, while
18 also taking into account the seriousness of potential terrorist acts and
19 the pressure of the armed Albanian extremists on the non-ethnic Albanian
20 population to leave the villages around Skopje?"
21 First of all, you use the phrase "it is possible" in this
22 sentence. Correct?
23 A. If you are referring about the seriousness of possible terrorist
24 attacks, the answer is yes, because this is an assumption, a possible
25 threat as a danger is possible. They haven't happened but they are
1 possible. If we would like to act preventively, then we have to make
2 serious assessment. And, in doing so, we have to point out possible
3 threats in any of the segments of security or any part of the territory
4 of the Republic of Macedonia; and, accordingly, in the preventative
5 sense, we have to prepare and prevent this kind of incidents.
6 Q. Dr. Markovski, I'm going to stop you. Perhaps my question wasn't
8 In the second sentence of this paragraph, referring to President
9 Trajkovski, you say: "He was under intense pressure for an extended
10 period, both from the Macedonian public and certain political circles,
11 and it is possible that he decided on this course of action," et cetera,
12 et cetera.
13 You use the term "it is possible" because this sentence is
14 conjecture on your part; isn't it?
15 A. The probably here is the translation again. I apologise. Maybe
16 that is why my previous anticipate was regarding the possibilities
17 because this sentence speaks about the possibility. In the original
18 text, I'm talking about a fully realistic assessment and not possible.
19 So this is an error in the translation. I'm not talking about a
20 possibility but a realistic assessment.
21 Q. Okay. Dr. Markovski, just to speed this up, could you simply
22 read in your language the second sentence of paragraph 369, please.
23 A. Yes, certainly.
24 "During a longer period, the president of the Republic of
25 Macedonia was under an intense pressure, both by the Macedonian public
1 and also certain political circles, and the assessment is completely
2 realistic that he decided to do so in order to prevent further escalation
3 of the crisis in the Skopje region, at the same time having in mind the
4 seriousness of possible terrorist acts and the pressure by the armed
5 Albanian extremists on the non-Albanian population to move out from the
6 villages in the area surrounding Skopje."
7 Q. Okay. Let's look at the phrase, though, "and the assessment is
8 completely realistic." That is still your conjecture, isn't it? You
9 don't know that to be a fact, do you, why the president did what he did?
10 A. Yes, yes. I draw this conclusion. I don't know precisely what
11 the president was thinking, what he undertook, and what he was going to
13 Q. All right. And looking at the last part of that sentence --
14 well, no, let's look at the sentence on the whole. It is a long
16 But you think, or you suggest, that the president decided on this
17 course of action "to prevent further escalation of the crisis in the
18 Skopje region." Then you also say that he had in mind or might have had
19 in mind "the seriousness of possible terrorist act and the pressure by
20 the armed Albanian extremists on the non-Albanian population."
21 So I'm just trying to understand, if the president wanted to
22 prevent the further escalation of the crisis in the Skopje region, why,
23 then, would he order an operation, a military operation, on an ethnic
24 Albanian village close to Skopje? Why would he do that?
25 A. First of all, he did not order an action against the population
1 of the Albanian ethnicity in the Skopje region. He had in mind all the
2 information that he received, and during the previous few days, the
3 information about the movement of armed groups, for instance, the
4 penetration in Aracinovo of such an armed group, then the movement in and
5 around the village of Ljuboten.
6 And, of course, by accepting the recommendations of his
7 professional associates in the defence area who were capable of pointing
8 out that the purpose of this movement in and around the village of
9 Ljuboten, actually it is the creation of a compact territory from the
10 Kumanovo region towards to the mountain of Zeden, because the only
11 problem related to any further movement of the armed groups is precisely
12 this area, because also they're not linked, and the possibility to
13 penetrate from the territory in Kosovo.
14 So the president, on the basis of all the aforementioned, he
15 could have drawn this kind of conclusion. His purpose was not attack on
16 Ljuboten, but preventing any further movement in order to establish some
17 kind of contact territory, and in order to prevent any infiltration of
18 these groups in the city of Skopje.
19 Q. Okay. At the end of paragraph 369 -- well, first of all, in the
20 remainder of paragraph 369, you talk about how the preparations for the
21 action were conducted in secret and only in the circle of those that
22 would be its direct perpetrators: The 3rd Battalion of the 1st Guardist
23 Brigade and the Cair internal affairs department.
24 You say: "This was, nevertheless, logical. It must be taken
25 into account that the chief of the General Staff was changed on
1 10 August 2001. A new one had not been appointed, and the preparations
2 demanded a certain degree of planning."
3 MR. SAXON: Can we show the witness what is 65 ter 971. That's
4 the document that Dr. Markovski cites to in footnote 228.
5 This is not in your binder, Your Honour, but we'll look at it on
6 the screen.
7 Q. This is a statement, Doctor, provided by General Metodija
8 Stamboliski to the Office of the Prosecutor, I believe in late -- I
9 believe it was December 2003.
10 General Stamboliski says the following about 12 August 2001:
11 "At around 0830 hours in the capacity of deputy chief of the army
12 of the Republic of Macedonia General Staff, and at the same time as the
13 acting chief of the army of Republic of Macedonia General Staff (pursuant
14 to the decree dated 10 August 2001 and issued by the president of the
15 Republic of Macedonia, General Pande Petrovski was relieved of his duties
16 and no replacement was appointed and, therefore, he continued to be
17 present in the cabinet of the chief of General Staff), I set off from my
18 office to see General Pande Petrovski, on which occasion we both heard
19 that there had been firing and detonations coming from the direction of
20 Skopska Crna Gora at that time?"
21 Then later on, General Stamboliski says he went to find General
22 Sokol Mitrevski.
23 MR. SAXON: My colleague is on his feet.
24 JUDGE PARKER: He's just got to his feet. I was waiting for you
25 to finish. Yes. We will turn to, now that we have interrupted the flow,
1 to Mr. Apostolski.
2 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] I apologise.
3 Your Honours, I apologise for interrupting my learned colleague.
4 However, I would like to object this line of questioning. Because for
5 these important issues for this case, my learned colleague should invite
6 and summon the person who gave this statement as a witness to testify
7 before this Court and not cite his statement.
8 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Apostolski.
9 Please carry on, Mr. Saxon.
10 MR. SAXON:
11 Q. And, later on, we see at 1100 hours on the same day the presence
12 of the minister, Dr. Vlado Buckovski; the former chief of General Staff,
13 General Pande Petrovski; and the defence minister's assistant for
14 security and counter-intelligence, Colonel Kopacev, gave some
16 So, were you following with me, Dr. Markovski?
17 A. Yes, yes, I was.
18 Q. So we see that, on that weekend, General Stamboliski was both
19 deputy chief of -- of the General Staff and the acting chief. We see
20 that General Pande Petrovski remained present in the cabinet of the
21 General Staff and continued to participate in meetings with the minister.
22 On Tuesday, at pages 10741 to 10742 of the transcript, you
23 explained that, during the crisis time, the General Staff had a
24 functioning section called G3, which was the service for planning of
1 Now, going back to that last sentence of yours in paragraph 369:
2 "It must be taken into account that the chief of the General Staff was
3 changed on 10 August 2001. A new one had not been appointed and the
4 preparations demanded a certain degree of planning."
5 Are you still saying that, during that weekend, the General Staff
6 of the army lacked sufficient competent personnel and expertise to plan
7 an operation?
8 A. No. This does not refer to that, but it refers to the attitude
9 of the president and Supreme Commander towards this activity; that is to
10 say, there is an error in the statement by Stamboliski. With the decree,
11 the president changed Pande Petrovski on the 10th of August, and we can
12 see that he still remained in office. So there is this particular
13 situation when the Supreme Commander, relieved of his duty, the Chief of
14 Staff and the new one has not been appointed yet.
15 The president and the Supreme Commander also communicate
16 exclusively with the Chief of Staff according to the constitution and the
17 Law on Defence and the Law on Service in the Army. At that time, it was
18 just a handbook for service in the army. He decided to trust the
19 preparation of this action in this particular manner as it is being
20 described here.
21 So it speaks about the relationship or of the president, the
22 Supreme Commander, with the chief who is missing, or the deputy, who is
23 not a chief yet; and this is how and why he has decided on acting on in
25 Q. Dr. Petrovski --
1 A. Markovski.
2 Q. Dr. Markovski. Thank you. I apologise.
3 We have an acting chief of the General Staff, and we had the
4 chief who had been dismissed but remained at his post. So why couldn't
5 the president simply use the General Staff in all of their planning
7 A. The Chief of Staff did not remain at his functional position, but
8 he remained in the cabinet. When he was dismissed, he has no further
9 function or responsibility or obligation that would belong to a Chief of
11 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters correction: Line 39:9, it should
12 read that he was replaced on the "9th of August," and not the "10th of
14 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, I see the time. Should we take the
15 first break now?
16 JUDGE PARKER: Yes. We will resume at five to.
17 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
18 --- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.
19 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Saxon.
20 MR. SAXON: Thank you, Your Honours.
21 Q. Dr. Markovski, if you could turn, please, to paragraph 334 of
22 your report, please.
23 In the start of paragraph 334, when you're talking about the
24 events in Ljuboten, you say: "All of this points to the fact that an
25 armed group of Albanian extremists was in the village of Ljuboten, that
1 there were legitimate aims or purpose, and that there were armed
2 provocations and incidents."
3 Then, again, at the last few lines, you say: "The Macedonian
4 security forces could and needed to undertake legitimate measures to
5 eliminate the danger and threat to security."
6 Have you been following with me?
7 A. Yes, I'm following.
8 Q. Could you turn, please, to paragraph 350; and, again, in that
9 paragraph, you are still talking about the action in Ljuboten, and you
10 say: "All this points to the fact that there were legitimate aims and
11 armed provocations and incidents in the village of Ljuboten."
12 Then, again, in the last sentence, you say: "The Macedonian
13 security forces could and needed to undertake legitimate measures to
14 eliminate the danger and threat to security."
15 Again, if you turn to paragraph 387, it's actually the last
16 paragraph of your report and that paragraph begins: "Proof of the
17 legitimacy of the action by the security forces," et cetera.
18 My question for you is this: If the Ljuboten action was
19 legitimate, why would plans for the operations be kept secret from the
20 authorities who were supposed to plan military actions; that is, the
21 General Staff of the army of the Republic of Macedonia?
22 A. In my report, I'm indicating that this is -- this was an idea of
23 the president of the Republic of Macedonia and the Supreme Commander of
24 the armed forces.
25 For a long time, we discussed these notions here now, these days;
1 and if memory serves, because the strain ask a bit too much for my small
2 mind after these four days, I believe that, in the constitution,
3 Article 89, paragraph 2 reads that the president is the Supreme Commander
4 of the armed forces of the Republic of Macedonia; and from this aspect,
5 the president is not restricted by anything in the area of security and
7 So he could have done this. He is not even restricted by any
8 law, any other regulation, to take over the command of this activity or
9 another similar activity; although, there is a saying: The war is too
10 serious a matter to be left to the Generals, and I would add to be left
11 to the civilians to plan a war and think about it.
12 So he is not restricted in any way. That was his assessment, his
13 conclusion, and this is what he did.
14 Q. Dr. Markovski, if the Ljuboten action was legitimate and it
15 involved the participation of police officers in a dangerous situation,
16 why would the plans for the action be kept secret from the minister of
17 internal affairs?
18 A. Obviously, you misunderstood what I said. The president has the
19 right, the president wanted to do that, the president can tell the
20 minister of minister of the interior, "Stand aside and I am the were the
21 and the Supreme Commander of the armed forces."
22 There was one situation, and I have indicated in the report when
23 the when the transformation of the bodies in Trebos were at stake. When
24 the president told the minister of the interior, "Minister, I am the
25 president of this state, and this is it," this is actually the right
1 expression for the power that the constitution gives to the president of
2 the Republic of Macedonia.
3 Q. But in the case of the action at Ljuboten, you don't have any
4 specific information that the president told the minister of the interior
5 to stand aside, do you?
6 A. No, I don't have.
7 MR. SAXON: If we can turn back to paragraph 370, please.
8 Q. In the middle of paragraph 370, you say that a larger group of
9 police officers entered the village of Ljubanci on the order of President
11 Then in footnote 229, you cite to a document that we looked at
12 yesterday. It's Exhibit P303, the report from the 1st Guardist Brigade
13 about the action and situation in the 3rd Guardist Battalion in the
14 village of Ljuboten, dated 12 August 2001. Yesterday, at page 10824 of
15 the transcript, we looked at this document, and we saw that this
16 particular document does not demonstrate that the president gave a direct
17 order to Major Despodov.
18 I'd like to move on to another topic. Are you aware,
19 Dr. Markovski, that there was fighting between the so-called NLA and the
20 security forces of the Republic of Macedonia around Tetovo in early
21 August 2001?
22 A. I, again, would not use the word "fighting" in the military
23 sense, because the word "fighting" or "combat" is very serious.
24 Q. Can we use the term "armed violence"?
25 A. Yes. That, yes, absolutely.
1 Q. I'd like to show you another video-clip, Dr. Markovski.
2 MR. SAXON: This will be 65 ter 1117.15. It has ERN number
3 VOOO-7471, and it is clip 15. Again, this is a video material produced
4 by Macedonian Radio and Television. It was produced on the 9th of
5 August in 2001, and addresses the situation in Tetovo and the surrounding
6 region. I may stop the clip at a very different intervals.
7 If we could start it, please.
8 [Videotape played]
9 MR. SAXON: Here we're seeing the village of Tetovo or the city
10 of Tetovo.
11 [Videotape played]
12 MR. SAXON: Can we stop there, please.
13 Q. First of all, Dr. Markovski, we see an armoured personnel carrier
14 going along the road here near Tetovo, right?
15 A. This is the highway, Skopje to Tetovo, probably.
16 Q. And we see an armoured personnel carrier. Correct?
17 A. Yes, APC.
18 MR. SAXON: This is at 1.24 seconds of the video-clip.
19 Q. We see, on the top of the armoured personnel carrier, we see an
20 individual with a machine-gun mounted there. Is that right?
21 A. It is true. But I would like to ask you to repeat, once again,
22 what was the date that this video was made.
23 Q. 9th August 2001.
24 A. Since the images of Tetovo do not correspond, this would be
25 probably due to the editing. The images of Tetovo correspond to 24th of
2 Q. Well, all can I tell you is that this was produced on
3 9th August 2001 by Macedonian Television.
4 MR. SAXON: Can we go back to this armoured personnel carrier,
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is not that I'm doubting that
7 this is a feature aired on that day, but I want to say that those
8 video-clip were made on the 24th of March, because I'm quite familiar
9 with those, I'm not disputing that the APC has been videoed on the 9th of
11 Q. And you're not the disputing that we see a machine-gun mounted on
12 the top of that APC, are you?
13 A. I don't know if it is mounted. I see a human silhouette, and I
14 see a machine-gun.
15 Q. Okay. By the way, this particular kind of armoured personnel
16 carrier, is that what was called a Hermelin?
17 A. You probably now it, since you're asking it, and I will confirm
18 this, in order to avoid having my authority under dispute.
19 Q. Okay. If we can just move forward a second, so that we can see
20 this vehicle more close-up, please.
21 [Videotape played]
22 MR. SAXON: Stop.
23 Q. On the side of this vehicle, beneath the man with the
24 machine-gun, we see the word "police." Is that correct?
25 A. Yes, that is correct.
1 Q. Okay.
2 MR. SAXON: Can we continue with this video-clip, please.
3 [Videotape played]
4 MR. SAXON: Can we stop the clip here, please. This is at
5 1 minute 52.7.
6 Q. This is the aftermath of the attack on the convoy of the army of
7 the Republic of Macedonia at Karpalak. Are you familiar with this
8 village -- with this footage.
9 A. Yes, I'm familiar with this. This is the bus that was destroyed.
10 Q. So this footage was taken after the events at Karpalak, which
11 occurred on the 8th of August.
12 MR. SAXON: Can we continue to go forward, please.
13 [Videotape played]
14 MR. SAXON: We're not getting any sound.
15 Can we stop there, please. This is at 2 minutes and 26 seconds.
16 Q. Here, we've just been informed by the journalist that: "In
17 Tetovo, the streets are empty. Only passers by and those Tetovo
18 residents who went out to buy food and the bare necessities can be
20 Again, going back to this concept of a classic war or classic
21 armed conflict in country X, we agreed before that in a classic armed
22 conflict or a classic war, the daily life of civilians is often
23 disrupted. Isn't that right?
24 A. Yes, and in crisis situations as well.
25 Q. Okay.
1 MR. SAXON: Can we continue, please.
2 [Videotape played]
3 MR. SAXON: And just so we understand what the gentleman said at
4 the end, he said: "You can't defend Macedonia in Stip or in Strumnica."
5 Those towns are much further to the south than Tetovo. Isn't that
7 A. In the eastern part of Macedonia and very far away from Tetovo.
8 Q. Okay.
9 MR. SAXON: Your Honours, I would seek to tender this video-clip,
11 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
12 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit number P00609. Thank you,
13 Your Honours.
14 MR. SAXON: And, again, because I think I always forget, if the
15 transcript could also be part of that exhibit, I would be grateful.
16 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
17 MR. SAXON:
18 Q. I'd like to talk to you for a moment about the event that
19 occurred at Karpalak on the 8th of August, 2001, Dr. Markovski. The ten
20 soldiers who died there, they were from Prilep, weren't they.
21 A. Yes. They were from Prilep.
22 Q. And after this incidence at Karpalak, there was violence in
23 Prilep directed against property belonging to ethnic Albanians. Isn't
24 that right?
25 A. Not only against that, yes, that happened, violence was also
1 directed against the barracks in Prilep, military barracks.
2 MR. SAXON: I would like to show another video-clip. I'm
3 wondering if the quality of the sound could be improved somehow.
4 This will be 65 ter 1120.2, and this is from Macedonian Radio and
5 Television. It is -- was produced on the 8th of August, 2001, and it
6 depicts some screens from Prilep. It was ERN number VOOO-7474, clip
7 number 2.
8 If we could start the video, please.
9 I'm sorry, my colleague is on his feet.
10 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Apostolski.
11 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] I apologise for interrupting my
12 learned friend but, I would like to ask you what is the relevance of this
13 to the case, of this video-clip?
14 MR. SAXON: Well, part of the case is related to charges under
15 Article 7(1) of the Statute of the Tribunal. The Prosecution has
16 specifically pleaded a joint criminal enterprise in this case, and it is
17 the Prosecution's submission that the scenes we will see in this video
18 from Prilep on the 8th of August will be relevant to the first and third
19 theories of liability under joint criminal enterprise, particularly to
20 the mens rea element.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Anything further, Mr. Apostolski?
22 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] I don't see what Prilep has to
23 do with all of this; Prilep, which is 140 kilometres away from Skopje.
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. Carry on, please, Mr. Saxon.
1 MR. SAXON: If we could start this video-clip, please.
2 [Videotape played]
3 MR. SAXON: That's not the right one. Hold on, there we are.
4 [Videotape played]
5 MR. SAXON: If we can stop there, please. This is the mosque in
6 Prilep. This is at 28 seconds. We see that it is burning.
7 Can we continue, please.
8 [Videotape played]
9 MR. SAXON: We see people standing in front of the mosque as it's
10 burning at 1.15 and 1.16.
11 [Videotape played]
12 MR. SAXON: Okay. If we can stop there, please.
13 Q. Dr. Markovski, did scenes like this that we just saw on this
14 video broadcast on the news increase tensions in Macedonia at that time?
15 A. This is a reaction, a protest, expressing the protest because of
16 the killing of the relatives, friends, fellow citizens. I don't know.
17 This was a mass scale psychological situation. I don't see anything
18 particular here that would make Prilep special, in the sense that this is
19 something provided by divine intervention or something.
20 This is a provoked reaction, a bit too harsh, and I do not
21 justify it. But I believe that the video-clip is a by the partial. It
22 depicts only facilities related to the ethnic Albanian population.
23 Before I saw the clip, I told you that such protest was also expressed
24 and demonstrated against the army, but actually in Prilep as well.
25 Q. But broadcasting these kinds of images would likely increase
1 tensions amongst the population in Macedonia at that time, wouldn't it?
2 A. Any TV situation follows its own programme and own plans. I
3 don't see any legal obligation to prohibit the TV station from
4 broadcasting this.
5 MR. SAXON: Your Honours, I would seek to tender this video-clip,
6 please, and the transcript.
7 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P00610. Thank
9 you, Your Honours.
10 MR. SAXON:
11 Q. Back in August of 2001, the minister of Defence was Dr. Vlado
12 Buckovski. Is that right?
13 A. During one period, when the so-called broad coalition of the
14 government of the Republic of Macedonia was in power.
15 Q. My question returns to August. Can we just focus on August for
16 now. In August 2001, Buckovski was the minister of defence, right?
17 A. Oh, I apologise then. Yes, you did say so. Please, this was
18 just a lapse of concentration on my part because of the huge effort.
19 Yes, yes. I apologise, once again.
20 Q. And during the events of the crisis in 2001, at least while he
21 was the minister of defence, Dr. Buckovski was informed about the events
22 that occurred, right, the security situation, the actions of the armed
24 A. I could guess with certainty, so it is more than a guess. Yes,
25 the answer is.
1 Q. And Dr. Buckovski as well, in his role as -- in his position as
2 minister of defence, he did his best to reduce fear and tension among the
3 population. Isn't that right?
4 A. You are making me, again, to make assessments of my superiors.
5 So, so be it.
6 Q. I'm sorry. Can you give me a yes or a no to my question.
7 A. Well, yes, I said "yes."
8 Q. Okay. Now, you've told us previously, several times during your
9 testimony, that, during 2001, the Republic of Macedonia was not in a
10 state of war and it was not in a state of armed conflict. Do you recall
12 A. And I will confirm it again. The Republic of Macedonia, during
13 2001, was not in a state of war.
14 Q. All right.
15 MR. SAXON: Your Honours, I'd like to show the witness another
16 video-clip, please. This is 65 ter 1118.18.
17 If we could please improve the quality of the sound.
18 JUDGE PARKER: It is said to be the input signal.
19 MR. SAXON: I don't know what that means, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE PARKER: From your equipment.
21 MR. SAXON: Well, our equipment is the registry's equipment, so I
22 don't know what we can exactly do about that.
23 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
24 JUDGE PARKER: Two sources, the equipment or the video itself.
25 MR. SAXON: Okay. I have listened to the videos and I know that
1 the sound is good, but I'll carry on. I'll carry on, Your Honours.
2 65 ter 1118.18 is a video-clip produced by MRTV, again, on the
3 9th of August, 2001. It has ERN number VOOO-7472; it's clip 18.
4 We'll see here a statement of Vlado Buckovski about the events at
6 If we could start it, please.
7 [Videotape played]
8 MR. SAXON: If we could stop there.
9 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
10 MR. SAXON: We are now at 1 minute ran 5 of this video-clip.
11 Q. And what minister of defence Buckovski has just said is: "Let
12 this great tragedy be the beginning of the end of the war, and not the
13 beginning of a bloody civil war."
14 So my question, Doctor, is if -- if this was not a war in
15 Macedonia in August of 2001, why would Vlado Buckovski describe the
16 situation as a war?
17 A. Probably because he doesn't know precisely what a war situation
18 means, or a state of war situation.
19 Q. All right. But he was the minister of defence at that time,
21 A. Yes. This is like a provocation, the answer I provided. This is
22 a verbal statement by the minister that you want to show as a
23 qualification. Also, one might say that, back in 2001, I said that it
24 was a war in one of my statements, but this is just a verbal statement
25 that does not represent the constitutional and realistic situation in the
1 Republic of Macedonia at that time.
2 This verbal statement of his cannot be a corroboration that there
3 was state of war in Macedonia. From all the documents that we reviewed
4 and the factual situation that we reviewed in the Republic of Macedonia,
5 in 2001, we did have a crisis, but not war.
6 Q. And just to recall, earlier in your testimony, you explained --
7 MR. SAXON: I'm sorry. My colleague is on his feet, Your Honour.
8 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
9 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Apostolski.
10 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] I apologise for interrupting my
11 learned friend. But regarding the admittance of the evidence P00610 in
12 relation to Prilep, I would like to say, in page 10019, the Prosecutor
13 says, upon suggestion that the Prosecutor claims that so-called national
14 joint enterprise exists, it is not just incorrect but it is also
15 inflammatory. This is all I wanted to say.
16 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
17 While we are distracted, the technical operators assure me that
18 the change in sound that occurred during the playing of that was on the
19 recording itself.
20 MR. SAXON: Very well, Your Honour.
21 Carry on, please, Mr. Saxon.
22 MR. SAXON: Okay. And just for the record, Your Honour, at no
23 time has the Prosecution accused that the nation of Macedonia being part
24 of a joint criminal enterprise, and nor did I do so today, on page 42.
25 Q. Now, just so that the record is clear, going back to your last
1 response, Dr. Markovski, you did tell us earlier in your testimony that,
2 when you spoke to the media as the official spokesperson of the army, you
3 were giving the official position of the army and the Ministry of
4 Defence. Isn't that right?
5 A. The official positions of the defence; that is to say, to the
7 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, I would seek to tender this video-clip,
8 please, and its transcript.
9 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
10 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P00611. Thank you, Your
12 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Residovic.
13 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we would like for
14 our learned friend to explain whether it is admitted and received as in
15 evidence just the portion we viewed or the entire video-clip.
16 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, if necessary, we can finish watching the
17 rest of the clip. I believe it is only perhaps a short -- a short period
18 of time. It was my intention to submit -- to submit the entire
20 JUDGE PARKER: The Chamber's understanding is that the whole clip
21 has been tendered and is an exhibit, Ms. Residovic.
22 Please continue, Mr. Saxon.
23 MR. SAXON:
24 Q. Moving on to another topic, Dr. Markovski, after the crisis
25 ended, or after the Ohrid Agreement was signed on the 13th of August,
1 2001, there was a first process of disarmament, which occurred during
2 August and September 2001, and that was called Operation Essential
3 Harvest. Is that right?
4 A. In the Macedonian language, it is called Essential Harvest.
5 Q. And during that activity or operation, Essential Harvest, I
6 believe, according to your own report, 3.875 weapons were collected from
7 the so-called NLA, which exceeded the figure of 3.000 weapons which was
8 the amount agreed upon during negotiations between NATO and the NLA. Is
9 that right?
10 A. This data was received from the NATO structures, and they were
11 the implementing party of this activity.
12 Q. Okay. Then there was also a second disarmament process, if I'm
13 correct, which occurred between the 1st of November and the 15th of
14 December, 2003. Isn't that right?
15 A. There is correct, and I already envisaged what you're going to
16 ask me.
17 Q. All right. Well, first of all, this second disarmament process
18 was organised by the government of the Republic of Macedonia, which
19 encouraged the voluntary surrender of illegal weapons by members of the
20 population. Isn't that right?
21 A. That is correct. I was the commander of this operation.
22 Q. And more than 7.000 weapons of various kinds were collected
23 during this second disarmament process in 2003. Is that right?
24 A. 7.571.
25 Q. Thank you for your precision.
1 Turning to another topic, at page 10632 of the transcript, you
2 told my learned colleague that the activities of the NLA were not
3 supported in the official statements of the ethnic Albanian political
4 parties. Do you recall that testimony?
5 A. Yes. This is corroborated by several examples in my report.
6 Q. Okay. Dr. Markovski, are you familiar with the so-called Prizren
7 Agreement that was signed by Arben Xhaferi, president of the DPA party;
8 Imer Imeri, president of the PDP party; and Ali Ahmeti, as the political
9 representative of the NLA on the 22nd of May, 2001? Are you familiar
10 with that document?
11 A. Yes, and I have read it.
12 Q. And, that document, it is actually titled: "The declaration of
13 the Albanian leaders in Macedonia regarding the reforming and peace
14 process in the Republic of Macedonia."
15 And, in that document, three leaders, the two leaders of the
16 political parties and Mr. Ali Ahmeti, agreed on a common action. Doesn't
17 that illustrate, Dr. Markovski, some official support for the NLA from
18 the leaders of the ethnic Albanian political parties?
19 A. Obviously, you are well-informed that this Prizren Agreement, its
20 purpose was to provide greater rights for the Albanians in the Republic
21 of Macedonia; that is to say, to regulate the rights of the Albanians in
22 the Republic of Macedonia. This is a problem that started in 1990, with
23 Geert Arhens, as a facilitator for the former Yugoslavia. It was
24 terminated later on.
25 I'm very glad that these two political entities, DPA and PDP,
1 overcame their prejudice and they accepted, together with the
2 representative - probably I will remember his name - Peter Feith, in his
3 presence, to negotiate and discuss these issues in Prizren.
4 The Ohrid Framework Agreement does not extend the rights of the
5 Albanians. The Ohrid Framework Agreement re-regulates the Macedonian
6 society; and on the basis of the agreement achieved by the four most
7 relevant political parties in the Republic of Macedonia, these rights do
8 not apply just to the Albanians but all the other ethnic communities in
9 the Republic of Macedonia.
10 Q. All right. But my question was actually a little bit different.
11 My question was simply this: Didn't the so-called Prizren Agreement,
12 signed by Ali Ahmeti and leaders of two -- the two main ethnic Albanian
13 political parties, doesn't the Prizren Agreement illustrate some official
14 support for the NLA from the leaders of the leading ethnic Albanian
16 A. In no sense, it does not support the armed violence.
17 Q. But it would support other aspects of the -- let me put my
18 question hopefully a little bit more clearly.
19 It would lend some support to the political goals of the NLA,
20 wouldn't it?
21 A. These political goals of the NLA are not political goals of the
22 NLA. Like I told you back in 1992, Macedonia started with this process.
23 It was terminated in 1995. And with the Ohrid Framework Agreement as a
24 political agreement, all these issues received their confirmation.
25 So it is not like you said, and we are not discussing any support
1 by the DPA and PDP of any kind of conditions that were given in order to
2 provide for expanded rights of any of the ethnic communities in
3 Macedonia, especially not to provide this through armed violence.
4 Q. All right. Now, Dr. Markovski, I'm required by the rules to put
5 some propositions to you; and if you can, I'd like to you answer yes or
6 no. If you need to expand, obviously, you can do that.
7 I'd like to put to you, Dr. Markovski, that the situation in the
8 Republic of Macedonia in 2001 amounted to an internal armed conflict
9 between the NLA and the security forces of the Republic of Macedonia.
10 Isn't that right?
11 A. It is very difficult precisely and clear, in the focus of a black
12 and white, to be able to define such a situation. In my opinion, and
13 according to the research I conducted, and it has been verified on a
14 scientific level by the academy for sciences in Bulgaria as well, my
15 position has been admitted as a scientific contribution, regarding the
16 definition on crisis in the Republic of Macedonia, both according to the
17 factual situation and the relevant legal determinations.
18 There was a crisis and it was terminated before its escalation,
19 before it grew into an internal armed conflict, of course, with full
20 support coming from the international factor.
21 Q. And it's true, isn't it, Dr. Markovski, that the NLA was an
22 organised armed force, with a military structure and a functioning chain
23 of command?
24 A. Absolutely no.
25 Q. It's true, isn't it, Dr. Markovski, that the members of the NLA
1 wore uniforms and observed the laws and customs of war?
2 A. There are two aspects in your questions. Sometimes they wore
3 uniforms; sometimes they didn't. They wore them in certain situations;
4 and, quite often, they would change their clothes, becoming ordinary
6 The second aspect of your question, I apologise, I forgot what it
7 was. Can you please remind me of the second part of the question. It
8 seems that I am already tired.
9 Q. It's my fault. I should have asked you a simpler question.
10 It's true, isn't it, that the NLA --
11 A. That's fine.
12 Q. It's true, isn't it, that the NLA observed the laws and customs
13 of war?
14 A. No, absolutely they did not observe. I don't want to remind you
15 again about the displacement, the putting fires, the terrorist
16 activities, abuse of civilian population, forcing the civilian Albanian
17 population to provide support, et cetera. These are not the rules of
19 Q. Dr. Markovski, it's true, isn't it, that between February and
20 August 2001, the NLA and the security forces of the Republic of Macedonia
21 engaged in offensive and defensive military actions on numerous
23 A. This is not so. The armed Albanian extremist structures, there
24 were situations where they would be engaged in armed provocations and
25 incidents, and the security structures of the Republic of Macedonia did
1 not engage in fighting, with the exception of the five to six incidents
2 that we mentioned as organised actions ordered by the president.
3 In all other situations, they were present in order to
4 demonstrate force; that is to say, to prevent any person or group that is
5 trying to act contrary to the legal provisions in the Republic of
7 Q. Isn't it true, Dr. Markovski, that between February and
8 August 2001, the NLA took control of large amounts of the territory of
9 the Republic of Macedonia?
10 A. Absolutely did not have control. It was present in certain
11 populated areas, and it was hiding behind the citizens. They did not
12 establish their local control, because, in the crisis regions, the mayors
13 or the leaders of the municipality, they operated with all their
14 authority, both in Lipkovo, in Tetovo, or any other of the crisis
16 There is not a single example where the head of the local
17 self-government was not able to perform his or her duties.
18 Q. Isn't it true, Dr. Markovski, that, in 2001, the NLA military
19 activities were carried out to further the political objectives of the
21 A. Not the political objectives of the NLA; political goals of their
22 leaders, I would say. And this is more than obvious even today.
23 Unfortunately, the people who bled remain without any rights. The few of
24 those that we saw in the squares yesterday, now they sit in comfortable
25 cabinets with rather good salaries.
1 Q. It's true, isn't it, Dr. Markovski, that the Ohrid Framework
2 Agreement, signed on the 13th of August, 2001, to a large degree,
3 formalised the political objectives of the NLA.
4 A. The political objectives of the NLA were to seize territory in
5 order to be able to have control over these territories.
6 Q. So is your answer to my question a yes or a no?
7 A. No, no.
8 Q. Okay. It's true isn't it, Dr. Markovski, that between the
9 10th and 12th of August, 2001, Major Mitre Despodov never received a
10 direct order from the president, Boris Trajkovski. Isn't that true?
11 A. It is true that Major Mitre Despodov received an order from the
12 president. Yesterday, I offered another piece of evidence, and this is
13 the report of the commander of the 1st Guardist Brigade dated 10th of
15 MR. SAXON: And, Your Honours, for the record, I believe the
16 witness is referring to Exhibit P00304.
17 Q. It's true, Dr. Markovski, that the actions of the police forces
18 in and around Ljuboten, on 12 August, were not legitimate and amounted to
19 violations of the laws and customs of war. Isn't that right?
20 A. The question is very complex in order to provide a simple answer.
21 They were legitimate; and, in Ljuboten, there were legitimate targets on
22 which one should have had and did act. Ljuboten was a serious threat for
23 the security of the capital city in Macedonia because of the possibility
24 to create additional tensions in this region with a possibility for a
25 link up along the line of Kumanovo, Skopje, and Radusa; and, on the other
1 hand, a great danger, if one does not react on time, for certain
2 terrorist groups to be infiltrated in the capital city of the Republic of
3 Macedonia, Skopje.
4 Q. Dr. Markovski, isn't it true that are you biased in your
5 perspective towards the events in Republic of Macedonia in 2001 and,
6 therefore, you cannot accept that the NLA was an organised armed force?
7 A. Absolutely, I am not biased, and I don't have any prejudice. At
8 present, I also deal with issues related to security. I am member of the
9 Balkan Forum for Security, an NGO for defence issues, and we also have
10 members of the Albanian ethnic origin and also one member of the DUI
11 political party.
12 Q. And because of that same bias, Dr. Markovski, you cannot accept
13 that the situation in Macedonia during 2001 was an internal armed
14 conflict, can you?
15 A. No, no, I wouldn't agree.
16 Q. Thank you, Dr. Markovski, for your patience.
17 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, I have no further questions.
18 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much, Mr. Saxon.
19 Mr. Apostolski.
20 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
21 Re-examination by Mr. Apostolski:
22 Q. [Interpretation] Dr. Markovski, I will have several more
23 questions to ask regarding the cross-examination by my learned colleague
24 from the OTP?
25 A while ago, you mentioned that you feel tired. Can we continue
1 or maybe I can suggest a break and maybe continue afterwards and then
2 work in a single session.
3 A. If there such a probability, I would be more than grateful.
4 JUDGE PARKER: That could only occur if you lost some of your
5 time at the end, Mr. Apostolski, because we can't afford two breaks
6 between now and 1.45.
7 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I thought it would
8 be convenient to take a break now, 20 to 25 minutes; and, afterwards, we
9 will have enough time until 1345 to work in a single session, at least
10 according to go my calculations.
11 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, but that would require the witness to go
12 through a full session.
13 That, you would prefer?
14 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE PARKER: And you will be more ready.
16 Very well. We will adjourn, Mr. Apostolski.
17 --- Recess taken at 11.56 a.m.
18 --- On resuming at 12.25 p.m.
19 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Apostolski.
20 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Your
22 Q. Dr. Markovski, do you remember that yesterday my colleague, the
23 Prosecutor, asked you several questions related to certain provisions of
24 the old and the new Law on Defence? Do you recall this?
25 A. Yes, I recall it.
1 Q. The attorney to Mr. Boskoski, my colleague Edina Residovic, asked
2 you similar questions two days ago. Do you recall that as well?
3 A. Yes. I know that we discussed this issue as well.
4 Q. On page 10658 of the transcript, answering the questions of my
5 colleague, Ms. Residovic, you stated that the president of the state was
6 the Supreme Commander of the armed forces. Do you remember that?
7 A. Yes. I remember, and I confirm it. This is pursuant to
8 Article 79 of the constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, paragraph 2.
9 Q. Also, on page 10675 of the transcript, you stated that also, when
10 performing the office of the Supreme Commander, the president of the
11 Republic has no restrictions. Do you remember that?
12 A. Yes. I remember this, and I mentioned it today as well.
13 Q. You also stated that the president was the Supreme Commander of
14 the armed forces in both times of war and peace. Do you remember that?
15 A. Yes, this is how the constitution provides it.
16 Q. When a state of war is not declared, would any regulation prevent
17 the president from issuing an order to both the army and the police
18 performing the authentic competencies vested in him by the constitution?
19 A. The constitution does not limit the president's competencies of
20 being the Supreme Commander to either the situation of war or peace. He
21 is a Supreme Commander at all times, and there are no restrictions in
22 this sense.
23 Q. My learned friend, the Prosecutor, asked you several questions
24 relating to the General Staff of the army. Do you remember this?
25 A. Yes, I remember it.
1 Q. It was the position of my learned colleague that the new law only
2 formalised this situation actually existing, that a General Staff
3 actually existed with all its functions?
4 A. Yes. I remember it, and I did harass the esteemed Mr. Saxon a
5 bit because I was not clear about this formulation. Probably, is it is
6 customary for you, the lawyers, but we military officers use it very
7 rarely. Now I became clear what it was about.
8 Q. Do you know what organisation and formation of the army is?
9 A. Of course, I know it.
10 Q. Could you tell me what it prescribes?
11 A. The ministries, as bodies of the state administration, have the
12 systemization. What is a systemization for the ministries for the
13 Serbian [as interpreted] army is the organisation and the formation. It
14 prescribes the specific and the complete organisation and structure of
15 the army, starting from the General Staff, until the last unit, at the
16 lowest level, and prescribes also the obligations and the duties for all
17 those levels.
18 Q. Could you tell me who is issuing the order on organisation and
20 A. It is not an order. It is called -- the title is: Organisation
21 and formation of the army. It is it not an order. The title of the
22 document is: Organisation and formation. This is a document passed by
23 the president, by the Supreme Commander of the armed forces.
24 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] For the transcript, in line 17,
25 on page 58, "Serbian army" is mentioned and it should be "Macedonian
2 Q. Do you agree with this?
3 A. I had no intention of mentioning the Serbian army. Maybe I said
4 it, but it obviously applies to the army of the Republic of Macedonia.
5 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Could we please look again at
6 the Exhibit P606, item 1. That is the Law on Defence on 1992, and let's
7 focus on Article 15 of the law.
8 Could we see the next page.
9 Q. Article 15, competences of the president, in execution of the
10 defence of the Republic. Item 4 says: "Prescribes organisation and
11 formation of the army."
12 Is that so?
13 A. Yes, it is so?
14 Q. And has he prescribed this? I'm referring here to the president.
15 A. An army could not exist if there is no prescribed organisation
16 and formation of the army. So the first organisation and formation of
17 the army is prescribed within the army of the Republic of Macedonia was
18 established, in 1992; and further on, any transformation or restructuring
19 of the army would presuppose a new organisation and formation.
20 The army of the Republic of Macedonia underwent more than five
21 transformation restructuring; so when each of those occurred, a new
22 systemization and organisation was prescribed.
23 Q. Does it also regulate the composition and the competencies of the
24 General Staff?
25 A. Yes. When I said what organisation and formation presupposes, I
1 confirmed this, and I confirm it again.
2 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: In line 61,
3 "organisation and formation," rather than "systemization and
5 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Do you recall and do you know --
7 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the counsel, please. Microphone
8 for the counsel please.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Could you put on your microphone, please,
10 counsel. Thank you.
11 JUDGE PARKER: Microphone.
12 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] I apologise. I inadvertently
13 switched the microphone off or something.
14 Q. Do you know who was the first chief of the General Staff of the
15 Republic of Macedonia?
16 A. Of course, I know. At that time, General Major Mitre Arsovski
17 was appointed, and later he was promoted.
18 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be
19 shown - the expert, I apologise - 1D1324. This is a 65 ter document.
20 Q. In the upper left corner, we read president of the Republic of
21 Macedonia, the date is the 16th of March, 1992, and confidential
22 number 53. We have here decree number 1 of the president of the Republic
23 of Macedonia, dated 16th March 1992.
24 In the upper right-hand corner, we have the seal of the ministry
25 for national defence; and below it, it reads: "Pursuant to Article 15,
1 paragraph 1, item 16 of the Law on Defence of the Republic of Macedonia,
2 Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia number 8/92, appointed to
3 peacetime and wartime formation are, number 1, General Major Arsovski
4 Milan Mitre, born on November 1st, 1936, in the Ministry of Defence for
5 Republic of Macedonia for chief of the General Staff of the army of the
6 Republic of Macedonia."
7 Do you see this in front of you?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And it is signed by the president, Kiro Gligorov. Do you see
11 A. Yes. I wish to make a brief comment.
12 The army of the Republic of Macedonia actually started
13 functioning from March 1992; and as far as I can see, this is the first
14 decree. This is one of the types of documents that the president and the
15 Supreme Commander of the armed forces of the Republic of Macedonia can
16 issue or sign. What we have here is his first decree, the decree of the
17 then-president, Kiro Gligorov, appointing as chief of General Staff of
18 the Republic of Macedonia, General Major, Mr. Arsovski Milan Mitre.
19 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I seek to tender
20 this document in evidence.
21 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit number
23 2D00104. Thank you, Your Honours.
24 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Could you please tell me what is the difference between the new
1 and the old Law on Defence with regards to the competences of the General
3 A. I feel that we discussed this several times already, and I stated
4 that the main aim of the new law was to follow the need of transformation
5 of the system, defence system. In that sense, specifically, answering
6 this question you asked me, until this time, we had a situation where
7 many of the by-laws were signed by the president of the Republic of
8 Macedonia alone.
9 Many by-laws, secondary legislation items were created, while the
10 new law has dealt with many of the issues. I'm not saying that it dealt
11 with all of the issues, but it dealt, itself, the law dealt with the many
12 of the issues that were previously regulated by by-laws.
13 Q. Was there, at any moment, a gap or vacuum in the legal position
14 of the General Staff or of other bodies of army?
15 A. No, no. Then the army couldn't function, which was not the case
16 with the army of the Republic of Macedonia.
17 Q. Does it agree with your knowledge and any study of documents, has
18 the prime minister ever issued an order to the police with regards to a
19 combat action in 2001?
20 A. I never found any documents speaking to what you just said. I
21 have never seen anything of the sort. But also from my practical
22 experience, because I was a witness to many events, I know with certainty
23 and I can confirm that in no situation has the prime minister issued any
24 order to the police in this sense.
25 Q. Very well. I thank you for the answers, and I will move on to
1 another topic.
2 JUDGE PARKER: Before you do, Mr. Apostolski, I don't believe we
3 have in evidence the organisation and structure of the army as it existed
4 in 2001, before the new Law on Defence came into existence, is that
5 correct, do you know?
6 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Your Honours, that was the point
7 of my questioning, that we don't have them at the moment but they existed
8 and do exist.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
10 Mr. Saxon.
11 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, for what it's worth, I believe this may
12 be partly addressed in what is Exhibit P00321, which is known as the
13 Macedonian briefing pack. But I see my colleague Ms. Residovic is
14 shaking her head, so I may be wrong about that.
15 JUDGE PARKER: The point I make - thank you, Mr. Saxon - I think
16 I really should address to you, Mr. Apostolski, and that is, if this
17 document is relied upon, we will need to have it in the form that it
18 existed at the time directly relevant to this indictment.
19 Can we ask you to provide that?
20 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] We will make our best efforts,
21 Your Honours, to provide the Chamber with the document.
22 JUDGE PARKER: I'm sure your best efforts will be more than
23 successful. Thank you, Mr. Apostolski.
24 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
25 Could the witness please be shown -- Dr. Markovski please be
1 shown the Exhibit 1D99.
2 Q. Until the document is displayed, do you remember that the
3 Prosecutor has shown you this document and that you discussed it?
4 A. Yes, I remember.
5 Q. You discussed, on page 10750 of the transcript, and the
6 Prosecutor asserted that, nowhere in the text, he sees that those were
7 preventative measures for the defence of the city of Skopje, and that
8 this order has been issued since there was a clear and present danger.
9 Could you please look at the upper paragraph, in the Macedonian
10 version, starting with the words: "On the basis of Article 76,
11 paragraph 2."
12 A. 79?
13 Q. Yes, 79, paragraph 2. Could you please read it until the end of
14 it. Tell me, it mentions here some measures, "timely measures."
15 A. What we have here is the establishment of the command for the
16 defence of the city of Skopje. This is a decision to establish this
17 command, and it reads: "Pursuant to Article 79, paragraph 2 of the
18 constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, and Article 18, items 4 and 5
19 of the Law on Defence of the Republic of Macedonia, and in order to
20 undertake timely measures for the defence of the city Skopje, I hereby
21 bring the following ..."
22 Q. Very well. Thank you. Could you please explain to me what
23 "timely measures" would mean?
24 A. Timely measures would mean that, on the basis of some assessments
25 and reviews, prevention measures need to be passed, in terms of
1 preventing something under desirable from happening or in order to deter
2 something undesirable. So this relates to prevention.
3 Q. Very well. Thank you.
4 Do you remember the question related to the infiltration of the
5 so-called NLA in Skopje - that is on page 10748 and 10749 of the
6 transcript - and the entry of the so-called NLA into Aracinovo?
7 The Prosecutor suggested that that was an imminent danger to
8 Skopje and it has occupied Aracinovo and Vaksince. Do you recall this?
9 A. Yes, I recall.
10 Q. Could you please tell me, first, whether the so-called NLA has
11 occupied any settlement? I'm now referring to a village or a city. Has
12 it done this through any combat action?
13 A. I haven't found such document; but knowing the situation, there
14 was nothing of the sort there.
15 I wish to clarify something. Probably, we have mentioned this
16 term "seizing or occupying" very often. But in the science, I don't what
17 it is like in the law, and I make a disclaimer because I'm insufficiently
18 proficient in the law, but to seize or occupy something means to
19 establish power, government. That would mean that institutions of the
20 government in that location would be unable to function. This is the
21 aspect from which I wanted to explain this term, "seizing or occupying."
22 Q. And I will ask you now about Aracinovo, specifically. In which
23 way has the so-called NLA seized Aracinovo?
24 A. Aracinovo, we will go back to the notion of seizing or occupying,
25 but they actually entered Aracinovo through infiltration.
1 Q. What does infiltration mean?
2 A. This means furtively, probably or not probably, but surely,
3 because, otherwise, they would have been observed, and they have also
4 brought weapons in. When these groups infiltrated, there was a group of
5 250 to 260 arm the extremists.
6 Q. And around Aracinovo, were any security forces there?
7 A. Yes. At the entry to Aracinovo from Skopje and at the exit
8 towards Nikustak, there were check-points of the security forces.
9 Q. Does it mean that they entered the village of Aracinovo without
11 A. Yes. This means without fight, illegally.
12 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters kindly ask the witness and
13 counsel to slow down a bit.
14 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Do you know whether the so-called NLA established its power in
17 A. We have a period of some ten days, and we had a situation when
18 the citizens, the inhabitants of Aracinovo, started leaving the village,
19 fearing from the infiltrated armed extremist groups; but in Aracinovo,
20 these groups have not established power or government.
21 Q. Does it mean, have I understood you well, that there were
22 security forces around Aracinovo, but still those groups managed to
23 infiltrate the village of Aracinovo?
24 A. Yes, this is what I said. Actually, this is what I meant. I
25 don't know whether I said it.
1 Q. Did they manage to establish their mayor in Aracinovo?
2 A. No, no. The same mayor remained, before that, during that, and
3 after that.
4 Q. Today, you marked certain locations that were under the control
5 of the NLA.
6 A. I wish to correct you as well. They were not under the NLA
7 control. They were villages where there were armed extremists present.
8 Q. In those villages that you marked - for the transcript, I
9 indicate this is Exhibit P00608 - were there fighting between the
10 Macedonian security forces?
11 A. I apologise, but please repeat the question.
12 Q. Today, you marked on the map.
13 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be
14 shown Exhibit P00608.
15 Q. You marked several locations that were indicated to you. Could
16 you tell me, how were throws locations, and I would say in parenthesis,
17 "seized" by the armed groups?
18 A. In the same way, without fighting. There is no seizing, with or
19 without parenthesis; there was only presence of armed extremists in these
21 Q. Was their power established in these locations, settlements?
22 A. No. The mayors of these settlements remained in office and
23 operated carrying out all the competences.
24 Q. In relation to this exhibit, I have one further question. The
25 Prosecutor has asked you to connect them, connect these settlements with
2 A. I was wondering why. I did not understand the purpose of this.
3 Q. Was there, in your opinion, because you have been a witness to
4 those events in 2001, for instance, the item 1, near Celopek, is linked
5 with Jegunovce, would there be movements free movements of so-called NLA
6 between those two locations, from one extreme of the line to the other?
7 A. I believe I told this to the Prosecutor as well. They could only
8 move illegally here disguised as civilians or in some other way. I don't
9 know. But there were no free movements between these two points. There
10 was no free movement in terms that they would have been able to move
11 freely and openly carrying weapons.
12 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters kindly ask the counsel and the
13 witness to slow down for us and for the transcript.
14 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation]
15 Q. You mentioned "illegally." What would this mean?
16 A. Illegally would mean furtively, in a clandestine fashion,
18 Q. For the transcript, were they moving from one point to the other
19 wearing uniforms? Were they able to do so?
20 A. They could do this during one point in time, today or tomorrow,
21 but not during the entire period in question.
22 Q. Very well. Thank you. You spoke about the operations, for
23 instance, in Vaksince. Let me ask you how much time it took for armed
24 forces to reclaim the control of Vaksince?
25 A. I believe that the action of the security forces lasted a day and
1 a half or possibly a maximum of two days.
2 Q. Do you know how many casualty were there on the side the security
4 A. Not a single casualty.
5 Q. In the largest operation of the security forces around Tetovo in
6 March 2001, were there any casualties on the side of the security forces?
7 A. If you're referring to the period 23rd and 24th of March when
8 this took place, no, not a single casualty.
9 Q. How many days did the operation last?
10 A. Again, around two and a half days. Actually, it started on one
11 day and then it was continued, so it lasted around two and a half days.
12 Q. Very well. I will move to another topic now, Mr. Markovski.
13 Do you remember, yesterday, page 10822, my learned colleague from
14 the OTP was asking you where from you draw your conclusion, in
15 paragraph 208 in your report, that the president directly by phone issued
16 an order to Major Despodov in order to perform certain tasks in relation
17 to Ljuboten? You were shown the footnote in the report by Ljupco
18 Kostandinov. Do you recall this?
19 A. Yes, I recall it.
20 Q. When preparing your expert report, did you have access to the
21 statements given by other witnesses in this case and statements given by
22 witnesses to the investigators from the OTP?
23 A. Yes. I used several documents; and why I chose precisely this
24 one as a corroboration of my position, I really cannot say. But
25 yesterday, and today again, I referred to one more document that
1 specifically discusses this issue. Probably, I thought these documents,
2 at least not all of them, were that important in order to be presented.
3 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be
4 shown Exhibit P304, please; page 2, if it can be opened, please.
5 I apologise. Can we have page number 1 back, please. Let's wait
6 for the English version as well.
7 Q. Did you review this document also, because there is a document
8 you referred to earlier?
9 A. Yes, this is the document. This is the report about the
10 situation in the area of the 3rd Guardist Brigade prepared by the
11 brigade, and they report to their superior, General Sokol Mitrevski.
12 Q. In the second paragraph, one can read: "The action, which was to
13 remain secret and upon order by the president, was supposed to begin on
14 the 11th of August, 2001, at 0430 hours ..."
15 Does this correspond with your conclusion given in paragraph 208?
16 A. Yes. This is what it reads, and that is why I referred to the
17 corroboration of my positions that I present in my report.
18 Q. Also, I'm going to read a portion of the testimony by Major
19 Despodov given before the Trial Chamber.
20 On the page 2580, lines 5, 6, and 7, Major Mitre Despodov says
21 the following: "I received instructions from the president that I have
22 to undertake measures and activities that are under my competency."
23 Is there testimony in accordance with your report?
24 A. Yes. It is with my report and also in accordance with the
25 documents that I have cited in corroboration to the claims in my report.
1 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Could Dr. Markovski please be
2 shown 65 ter 2D296, page 2D02-1950, and if we can focus on paragraph 38,
4 This is the statement given by Colonel Blazo Kopacev, given to
5 the investigators from the ICTY, and I'm going to read it out loud
6 because it is an English version. I'm going to read it in Macedonian.
7 Q. In paragraph 38, somewhere in the middle, it says: "I emphasise
8 that the only source of my knowledge about the alleged order by the
9 president to the Major Despodov, for the action which he allegedly
10 received by phone from the president directly, is Major Despodov
12 Does this statement, by Colonel Kopacev, is in accordance with
13 your report, to be more precise, paragraph 208?
14 A. Yes, absolutely.
15 Q. Going further, do you remember today the Prosecutor has shown to
16 you a video-clip with a statement given by Vlado Buckovski - this is
17 Exhibit P611 - with respect to the incident in Karpalak?
18 A. Yes, I recall.
19 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be
20 shown what is 65 ter 1D856. This is page 4, paragraph 21. This is the
21 statement given by Mr. Vlado Buckovski, provided to the ICTY
22 investigators in relation to the event in Karpalak.
23 Q. And it reads the following: [In English] "Humiliation after
24 Karpalak attack. Even president's advisors advised him to signing of the
25 Ohrid Agreement should coincide in time with some sort of military
1 victory. Ljubotenski Bacila was a convenient occasion to demonstrate
3 [Interpretation] Does this statement also points to the fact that
4 the president was also advised for some action in Ljubotenski Bacila?
5 A. He was both advised. And if you can -- if you followed my
6 responses to the Prosecutor today, when we were commenting on one of my
7 position, I already mentioned that he was under pressure, not just
8 advised, but also under pressure for the need for doing something like
10 Q. Thank you very much for your answers, Dr. Markovski. Now let me
11 move to another topic.
12 Is it true that, during a war or an armed conflict, the rules of
13 military law are being applied.
14 A. Absolutely, yes. This is why they exist.
15 Q. And if these are applied to the participants of the armed
16 conflict, they are allowed to perform certain activities or to perform
17 activities in certain specific manner?
18 A. I apologise. Please repeat the question.
19 Q. Previously, we were talking that, during a war or an armed
20 conflict, the rules of laws of war are being applied, and these -- those
21 are applied to the participants, they are you allowed to conduct concern
22 activities or perform them in a certain manner?
23 A. I don't understand. Who is supposed to allow them or not?
24 Q. In this specific case, if there was an armed conflict, it would
25 be allowed for the members of the parties to the armed conflict to kill
1 the members of the enemy forces?
2 A. No, no. This is far from the interpretation of any rules.
3 Q. Do you remember you have been asked by the Prosecution about the
4 structure and the functioning of the NLA.
5 A. Yes, I remember that.
6 Q. And do you remember that you pointed out that, according to your
7 opinion, the NLA was not organised in the same manner as an army or party
8 to the armed conflict?
9 A. Yes, and this is what I would claim right now, too.
10 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be
11 shown 1D256, Exhibit 1D256, page number 14; ERN 1D00-6449.
12 Can we please scroll down, under the title: Conclusions.
13 Q. Now I'm going to read it out loud. The document originates from
14 and this is the report from the international crisis group, dated 5th of
15 April, 2001. This is the portion that you can see in front of you in the
17 And the first part, under the conclusion, it reads as follows:
18 "The series of incidents in Tanusevci spiralled out of control, setting
19 in motion a series of unplanned actions by loosely coordinated guerilla
20 cells. The shooting from the hills above Tetovo does not appear to have
21 been part of a larger strategic plan, but rather an improvised show of
22 strength to test government resolve and radicalise ethnic Albanian
24 Does the content of this document would agree and coincide with
25 your professional and personal opinion?
1 A. First of all, this is well-known document to me. I don't know
2 why you don't have it in the Macedonian version. I do have it in my
3 records because I work on analytical analysis, and this paragraph
4 coincides with my position presented here, and on the other hand, I have
5 a great admiration and respect for this institution.
6 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be
7 shown Exhibit 1D260, the page would be 1D00-7798.
8 This is an article from Jane's Defence Weekly, Sunday,
9 29 August 2001, and the text IS titled: How many weapons in Macedonia,
10 in the lower part of this document. Somewhere, in the middle of the
11 text, IS the paragraph starting with the wording: "NATO."
12 Can we scroll to the lower part of the page, please, the
13 paragraph starting with: "NATO must deal with the fact that the NLA does
14 not have a fully integrated chain of command, nor centralised logistics.
15 Even NLA leaders are unlikely to have reliable figures for weapons."
16 Q. Dr. Markovski, does the contents of this document, if accepted,
17 would coincide with your professional and expert opinion?
18 A. Yes. I also write in the report that according to the
19 international factor; that is, the people who somehow are not directly
20 linked are not under the influence of the events in the Republic of
21 Macedonia, and this is why I would believe that they have a more
22 realistic view on the events that were going on in 2001. According to
23 their data, the armed groups, the total number would be around 2800.
24 However, in order to maintain a realistic view in my report, I
25 also dealt with the number of 5.000, together with the people who
1 provided logistic support, provided by some of the members of the armed
2 extremist group back in 2001, and this was corroborated by their
4 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be
5 shown Exhibit 5485 [as interpreted], page 1D009148.
6 The exhibit is P485.
7 Let me move to another document. It seems it was a mistake in my
9 Could the witness please be shown 65 ter 1D1044, the page
11 Q. This document comes from the Department Of Defence of the US
12 government, and this is about June 2001. Item number 2 reads as follows:
13 "The infrastructure of the NLA is designed and best suited for
14 independent guerilla tactics, a lose organisational structure, low
15 interdependency on other NLA groups and commanders. Individual
16 commanders have authority to establish new fighting groups and to evolve
17 fighter structure to meet the military requirement.
18 "NLA brigades have similar structure to UCK structure. NLA
19 fighters are divided into independent operational zones. Local commander
20 have decision-making authority. Individual commanders have autonomy in
21 planning of attacks within their operational zones."
22 Dr. Markovski, does the content of this document, if accepted,
23 would coincide with your professional and expert opinion?
24 A. Absolutely, yes.
25 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I seek to tender
1 this document into evidence.
2 MR. SAXON: Objection, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Saxon.
4 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, again, this is a -- a document from the
5 US government that has a disclaimer at the top of it, saying: "Warning.
6 This is an information report, not finally evaluated intelligence."
7 We don't know who produced the document or the source of the
8 information, and the Chamber has held, I think on at least two occasions
9 now, that without -- with this kind of disclaimer and without more
10 accurate information regarding the source, such a document should not be
12 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the expert
13 confirmed the content of this document; and, number two, this is a
14 credible document from the Department Of Defence of the US government.
15 This Trial Chamber already admitted some other evidence coming
16 from relevant organisation without knowing the precise source. However,
17 it was admitted into evidence; for instance, the NATO package material.
18 JUDGE PARKER: Documents of this particular type the Chamber has
19 not admitted, and that will be our position on this one, Mr. Apostolski.
20 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
21 I would like to move to another question now.
22 Q. Do you recall, yesterday, you were shown a video-clip in relation
23 to Radusa, and the activity of helicopters was depicted and a flying
24 aeroplane. You confirmed that these are aircrafts that belong to the
25 army of the Republic of Macedonia.
1 Do you recall this?
2 A. Yes, I recall.
3 Q. You were very precise saying that the aeroplane did not engage?
4 A. Yes, and I confirm this assertion again.
5 Q. Can you please, then, tell me what was the plane doing at that
6 time at that particular location?
7 A. As a confirmation, we are discussing two planes, not just one,
8 during this period above Radusa, and I confirmed this by saying that the
9 basic rule in engaging both planes and helicopters is that, when they are
10 assigned to a mission, they undergo certain preparations. Usually, these
11 missions can be combat missions or reconnaissance missions.
12 In this case, the case of the two planes -- or, I apologise, they
13 can be both reconnaissance and combat missions.
14 And if these two planes had a combat mission or operation, they
15 would have been armed with rockets. Additionally, the basic rule would
16 be that an aeroplane or helicopter which goes into a combat operation
17 cannot return with the same rockets. In this case, since there was no
18 activities, the planes did not engage, there could have been no combat
19 above Radusa, but exclusively a reconnaissance one.
20 So, if there was combat mission, they would have used their
21 rockets. As a corroboration of this, I will tell you something else that
22 came to my mind. During the NATO campaign on our northern neighbour,
23 when the aviation was to the capable of locating its targets, they would
24 always shoot and use their rockets in areas where they would not cause
25 any damage or a threat.
1 Q. Thank you very much for this additional clarification in this
3 Let me move to another topic now.
4 Do you recall, Dr. Markovski, that you were asked by the
5 Prosecutor about planning of operations?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Allow me to ask you the following: Would terrorists plan their
8 own activities?
9 A. Not at the level that it would be done in a planned manner,
10 within an organised military structure; but, probably, they had their own
11 ideas and they were planning. But their planning and the planned design
12 of operations that would be performed by a military structure cannot be
14 Q. Would criminals plan their activities?
15 A. The same would apply. I guess they planned their own work, but
16 this cannot be compared as planning by a military organisation.
17 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Could Dr. Markovski --
18 Q. Dr. Markovski, you were also asked about the road Skopje-Tetovo,
19 that it was closed. Can you please tell us, according to your knowledge,
20 when was this road closed?
21 A. Yes, I remember it well. The road was closed as an intervention
22 by the Ministry of Interior, that is to say, the police, because
23 immediately after the incident, there was a crime scene inspection team,
24 which was also joined by the chief public prosecutor of the Republic of
25 Macedonia, Mr. Dzikov. That is why during the on-site investigation or
1 investigation for two or three hours, I don't recall, the road was closed
2 by just a single lane.
3 Q. During any other period in 2001, do you remember if the road was
4 closed at all?
5 A. No, no. It wasn't closed in any other event during the crisis,
6 for the reasons that we are discussing now, that is.
7 Q. I would like to ask you also if there is a serious traffic
8 accident, in order to conduct a crime scene investigation, would you
9 close the road?
10 A. Yes. I had a personal experience, and people have to wait.
11 Q. Until when?
12 A. Until the on-site investigation is completed.
13 Q. Regarding Karpalak, one more question: Can you please tell us
14 what was the transport vehicle used in order to transport the soldiers
15 that were under attack?
16 A. Before I give the answer, I have to apologise. Because when we
17 were discussing this with the Prosecutor, I mentioned a bus and actually
18 I should have said a truck. I do apologise for this lack of precision.
19 So they were being transported both with a bus, but also trucks have been
21 Q. Let me go back to Radusa. Was there a written order for the
22 action in Radusa, ordered by the president?
23 A. No, no, there wasn't. The president did not issue an order
24 because, basically, we are discussing defensive activities by the police.
25 The police was challenged, and that is why it undertook defensive
1 measures and activities.
2 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Could the expert please be shown
3 P00604, page 2. Could we see the second page, please.
4 Q. Do you remember that my learned colleague from the Prosecution
5 showed you this document?
6 A. Yes, I do remember.
7 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Could we please see the second
8 page of the English version as well. The second page in the English
9 version, please.
10 I'm going to read it in Macedonian. It says here that:
11 "According to the information of UBK, Dzemal Huseini, one of the UBK
12 commanders ..."
13 Do you see that in front of you?
14 A. Yes, I do.
15 Q. Now, I would like to ask you: Do you know who this person is,
16 from your personal information, of course?
17 A. No, I don't.
18 Q. Very well. Thank you. Does the name Jamie Shane ring any bells
19 to you?
20 A. Yes, yes. I have heard that name.
21 Q. How do you know that name?
22 A. From the recent action of the Ministry of Interior Affairs
23 forces. It was an action of two months ago, and this person organised a
24 group of armed extremists in the area of the village of Brodec and
25 actually found shelter in the village of Brodec, in Tetovo area.
1 MR. SAXON: Your Honour.
2 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Saxon.
3 MR. SAXON: The Prosecution does not understand how events that
4 occurred in the Republic of Macedonia two months ago are relevant to the
5 matters at the heart of this case.
6 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Apostolski.
7 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this was my last
8 question, because it is our position that the 2001 was not a year of
9 isolated terrorist events, but it is something that is happening in the
10 Republic of Macedonia even now and happened even before.
11 JUDGE PARKER: I think we must say to you, Mr. Apostolski, that
12 is not your last question. Your last question was the previous one.
13 This one won't be pursued.
14 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] I'm grateful, Your Honours. I
15 have no further questions for this witness -- for the expert, I
17 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you for that, Mr. Apostolski.
18 You will be pleased to know, sir, that that completes the
19 questioning for you. We are grateful that you have come to The Hague and
20 for the time that you have been able to give in this matter. You are
21 now, of course, able to return to your normal activities.
22 Is there any matter that needs to be raised at this point?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could I please address this
24 Chamber, Your Honours?
25 JUDGE PARKER: Very briefly, sir.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the end, I would like to express
2 my respect to the Honorable Chamber, and I would like to express my
3 respect to Mr. Saxon and Mr. Bezruchenko and to the people on the left
4 side of me, and I would like to say my thanks to all the services of this
6 Thank you very much.
7 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, sir.
8 If there is no special matter we now adjourn until next Tuesday,
9 when we expect to hear the last evidence, and that I believe is Tuesday
10 afternoon at 2.15.
11 Thank you.
12 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.35 p.m.,
13 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 18th day of March,
14 2008, at 2.15 p.m.