Press Release
. Communiqué de presse
(Exclusively for the use of the media. Not an official document)
TRIAL CHAMBER |
CHAMBRE
DE 1ERE INSTANCE |
The Hague, 1 September 2004
KR/ P.I.S./888-e
JUDGEMENT IN THE CASE THE PROSECUTOR V. RADOSLAV
BRDJANIN
Please find below the summary of the Judgement delivered by
Trial Chamber II, composed of Judges Agius (Presiding), Janů
and Taya, as read out by the Presiding Judge.
I. Introduction
Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia is sitting today to deliver its Judgement in the
trial of Radoslav Brdjanin.
The Accused was charged with genocide, complicity in genocide,
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws
and customs of war and crimes against humanity, committed in 13
municipalities in the Bosnian Krajina between 1 April 1992
and 31 December 1992. The area relevant to the Indictment includes
the municipalities of Banja Luka, Bosanska Krupa, Bosanski Novi,
Bosanski Petrovac, Celinac, Donji Vakuf, Kljuc, Kotor
Varoc, Prijedor, Prnjavor, Sanski Most, Sipovo and Teslic.
The Accused stood trial for the following 12 charges:
- Genocide (Count 1) and complicity in genocide (Count 2): namely
for having participated in a campaign designed to destroy Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats, in whole or in part, as national,
ethnical, racial or religious groups, as such, in the municipalities
of the ARK;
- Persecutions, a crime against humanity (Count 3): namely for
having subjected the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat populations
to killings, torture and mistreatment, for denying them fundamental
rights, for deporting or forcibly transferring them as well as
destroying, wilfully damaging and looting property in predominantly
Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat populated areas and destroying
or wilfully damaging Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat religious
and cultural buildings;
- Extermination, a crime against humanity, (Count 4) and wilful
killing, a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, (Count
5): namely for having participated in the campaign designed to
exterminate members of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat populations
in the ARK through a significant number of killings in non-Serb
areas, camps and other detention facilities and during deportation
or forcible transfers;
- Torture, a crime against humanity (Count 6) and a grave breach
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Count 7): namely for having
inflicted severe pain or suffering on the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian
Croat population through inhuman treatment including sexual assaults,
rapes, brutal beatings and other forms of severe maltreatment
in various locations;
- Deportation, a crime against humanity (Count 8) and inhumane
acts (forcible transfer), a crime against humanity (Count 9):
namely for having deported or forcibly transferred Bosnian Muslims
and Bosnian Croats from the ARK to areas under the control of
the legitimate government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and to Croatia;
- Unlawful and wanton extensive destruction and appropriation
of property not justified by military necessity, a grave breach
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Count 10);
- Wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation
not justified by military necessity, a violation of the laws or
customs of war (Count 11);
- Destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated
to religion, a violation of the laws or customs of war (Count
12).
The Prosecution, while not alleging that the Accused physically
perpetrated any of the crimes in question, alleged that he is individually
criminally responsible pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute,
namely for having participated in a joint criminal enterprise, the
purpose of which was the permanent forcible removal of Bosnian Muslim
and Bosnian Croat inhabitants from the territory of the planned
Serbian state by the commission of the crimes alleged in Counts
1 through 12. Alternatively, the Prosecution pleaded the Accused’s
individual criminal responsibility pursuant to an extended form
of joint criminal enterprise, the purpose of which was the commission
of the crimes of deportation and forcible transfer, whereby the
commission of the other crimes charged in the Indictment was alleged
to have been a natural and foreseeable consequence of the perpetration
of the crimes of deportation and forcible transfer.
In addition, the Accused was charged pursuant to Article 7(1)
of the Statute for having planned, instigated, ordered or otherwise
aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of these
crimes, as well as pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Statute
for the crimes committed by his subordinates whilst he was holding
positions of superior authority.
Throughout the trial proceedings, which commenced on 23 January
2002 and ended on 22 April 2004, the Trial Chamber was confronted
with a large amount of evidence, testimonial and documentary. It
sat 284 trial days, during which it heard the evidence of 135 viva
voce Prosecution witnesses and 19 viva voce Defence witnesses.
Additionally, the Prosecution tendered 104 written witness statements
pursuant to Rule 92bis. The Trial Chamber called one witness
proprio motu pursuant to Rule 98. In total, 2736 and 314
exhibits were tendered in evidence by the Prosecution and by the
Defence respectively. The complete trial record amounts to over
61,000 pages.
For the purpose of this hearing, I shall briefly summarise the
Trial Chamber’s findings and the reasons for these findings. I emphasise,
however, that this is only a summary and that it does not in any
way form part of the Judgement of the Trial Chamber. The only authoritative
account of the findings of the Trial Chamber is in the written Judgement
which will be available to the Parties and the public, today, at
the end of these proceedings.
II. Facts of the Case
- The Strategic Plan and its implementation
The death of Marshal Tito and the collapse of the League of Communists
in January 1990 led to the emergence of nationalist parties throughout
the former Yugoslavia. The first multi-party elections were held
in November 1990 in Bosnia and Herzegovina ("BiH"). The
SDA (Bosnian-Muslim Party for Democratic Action), the HDZ (Croatian
Democratic Union) and the SDS (Serbian Democratic Party) collectively
won the overwhelming majority of votes.
The break up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("SFRY"),
and in particular the secession of Slovenia and Croatia, had a significant
impact on the socio-political situation in BiH. From late summer
1991, many military aged men from BiH were mobilised to join the
army to fight in Croatia. A large number of Bosnian Serbs responded,
but Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, supported by their respective
leaders, generally did not. This led to increased tension between
the ethnicities, especially in the Bosnian Krajina region bordering
Croatia.
Other sources of anxiety and fear for the people in the Bosnian
Krajina were the threatening conduct of the soldiers returning from
the battlefields in Croatia and the influx of large numbers of Serbian
refugees from Croatia, the latter causing serious housing problems.
Furthermore, the conflict in Slovenia and Croatia had a disastrous
impact on the economy of BiH. The flow of goods between the republics
was interrupted and the whole of the SFRY was affected by hyper-inflation.
In this atmosphere of tension, the three main nationalist parties,
having separate national agendas with conflicting interests, failed
to reconcile their differences and started moving in opposite directions.
Most importantly, they disagreed on the question of the constitutional
status of BiH. While the SDA and the HDZ, following the declarations
of independence of Slovenia and Croatia, promoted the secession
of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina ("SRBH")
from the SFRY, the SDS strongly advocated the preservation of Yugoslavia
as a state, in order to ensure that the Serbs would continue to
live together in a single state, and would not become a minority
in an independent Bosnian state.
During the second half of 1991, it appeared increasingly unlikely
that the SRBH would remain within the SFRY. The Trial Chamber is
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that during this period, the Bosnian
Serb leadership, including the Main Board and other senior members
of the SDS, as well as Bosnian Serb representatives of the armed
forces, devised a plan to link Serb-populated areas in BiH together,
to gain control over these areas and to create a separate Bosnian
Serb state, from which most non-Serbs would be permanently removed
("Strategic Plan"). The Bosnian Serb leadership knew that
the Strategic Plan could only be implemented by the use of force
and fear.
On 19 December 1991, the Main Board of the SDS issued a document
entitled "Instructions for the Organisation and Activity of
Organs of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Extraordinary
Circumstances" ("Variant A and B Instructions").
These instructions provided for the conduct of specified activities
in all municipalities in which Serbs lived, and essentially mapped
out the take-over of power by Bosnian Serbs in municipalities where
they constituted a majority of the population ("Variant A")
and where they were in a minority ("Variant B").
On 9 January 1992, the newly created Assembly of the Serbian
People in Bosnia and Herzegovina ("SerBiH Assembly") proclaimed
the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina ("SerBiH").
It was composed of so-called Serbian autonomous regions and districts,
which included the Autonomous Region of Krajina ("ARK").
During the 16th session of the SerBiH Assembly that
took place on 12 May 1992, at a time when the armed conflict had
already begun, Radovan Karad`ic articulated the six strategic goals
of the Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first and most
fateful of these goals was the "separation from the other two
national communities – separation of states". In essence, these
strategic goals constituted a plan to seize and control territory,
establish a Bosnian Serb state, defend defined borders and separate
the ethnic groups within BiH by forcibly and permanently removing
most of the non-Serb population from the territory of the proclaimed
Bosnian Serb state. General Lieutenant Colonel Ratko Mladic, the
Commander of the newly established Army of the Serbian Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina ("VRS") accepted that the VRS
would be instrumental in implementing these political strategic
goals and indeed transferred them into operational imperatives for
the VRS.
The Strategic Plan was implemented in successive steps, so that
the Trial Chamber was able to clearly recognise a pattern of criminal
conduct by the actors involved throughout the relevant municipalities.
Already prior to the outbreak of the armed conflict, the SDS started
waging a propaganda war which had a disastrous impact on the people
of all ethnicities, creating mutual fear and hatred and particularly
inciting the Bosnian Serb population against the other ethnicities.
Within a short period of time, citizens who had previously lived
together peacefully became enemies and many of them, in the present
case mainly Bosnian Serbs, became killers, influenced by a media
which, by that time, was already under the control of the Bosnian
Serb leadership. The use of propaganda was an integral part of the
implementation of the Strategic Plan and created a climate in which
people were prepared to tolerate the commission of crimes and to
commit crimes.
A further measure towards the implementation of the Strategic
Plan was the dismissal of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from
key positions in the army, the police and other public institutions
and enterprises. This process had already started during the war
in Croatia when the refusal of non-Serbs to respond to mobilisation
had resulted in their dismissal. It escalated during the period
relevant to the Indictment, resulting in the dismissals of almost
all Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from their positions who
were thus deprived of their livelihood.
In addition, Bosnian Serb authorities exerted undue pressure on
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in an organised manner to force
them to leave the area. Non-Serbs did not receive the same attention
and medical treatment at hospitals as Bosnian Serbs did. Their freedom
of movement was severely restricted in the form of checkpoints and
curfews, in contrast with the freedom of movement enjoyed by Bosnian
Serbs. Moreover, they were not protected against harassment and
abuse from Bosnian Serb armed individuals. Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats were oppressed and pressurised to an extent that living in
the Bosnian Krajina became unbearable for them.
In late 1991 and early 1992, all three national parties began
arming themselves. The evidence shows that the SDS received substantial
support from the army which systematically supplied light arms and
weapons to local SDS committees in Bosnian Serb claimed municipalities
of the Bosnian Krajina as well as to Serbian paramilitary groups.
Distribution of arms and weapons to Bosnian Serb civilians was carried
out by the local communes and was supervised by the SDS, with the
support of the army and the local police. The distribution was carried
out without considering to whom these weapons would be given and
for which purpose they could be used. Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats were also preparing for a war and correspondingly arming
themselves. However, their efforts to procure and distribute weapons
were nowhere near as successful as those of the Bosnian Serbs, both
in terms of the number and the quality of the obtained weapons.
While the arming operations were taking place, public announcements
were made through the media that illegally possessed weapons had
to be returned to the Territorial Defence ("TO") staffs
or to the local police by a certain deadline. Although some of these
announcements were formulated in a neutral manner, calling upon
all paramilitary groups and individuals of all ethnicities to return
illegally possessed weapons, they were in practice enforced by the
Serbian controlled police and army in a discriminatory fashion against
non-Serbs only. In practice, non-Serbs were also deprived of legally-owned
weapons. The selective disarmament of non-Serbs created an imbalance
of arms which rendered them totally vulnerable and prevented them
from setting up any effective resistance or even from defending
themselves.
By the spring of 1992, a number of Serbian paramilitary groups
had been formed in BiH or had arrived from Serbia. Some of these
paramilitary groups were trained and equipped by the army and were
closely associated with it or with the SDS. The paramilitaries created
an atmosphere of fear and terror by committing crimes against Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats including rape, murder, plunder and the
destruction of their property. They engaged in war profiteering
and looting. Serbian paramilitary groups also participated in combat
operations of the 1st Krajina Corps of the VRS throughout
the ARK, and, from mid-June 1992 onwards, they were formally
incorporated into the structure of the VRS and put under its command.
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that both the army as well as the
SDS used paramilitary groups as an operative tool that contributed
to the implementation of the Strategic Plan.
When the armed conflict broke out in BiH in April 1992, the scale
of crimes committed against the non-Serb civilian population in
the Bosnian Krajina escalated. These crimes came about through close
co-operation between the Bosnian Serb police, the army and Serbian
paramilitary groups. The clearly recognisable pattern of criminal
activity allows for only one reasonable conclusion, namely that
these crimes were committed with the aim of implementing the Strategic
Plan of the Bosnian Serb leadership to take control of the territory
claimed for the Serbian State within BiH and to permanently remove
most non-Serbs from this territory.
The Bosnian Serb forces attacked non-Serb towns, villages and
neighbourhoods throughout the 13 municipalities relevant to the
Indictment. These attacks mostly started after the expiry of a deadline
for non-Serbs to surrender their weapons. Sometimes an incident
caused by non-Serbs would be used as a pretext. Attacks commenced
with intensive shelling from heavy army weaponry. Muslim villages
and neighbourhoods were targeted, with houses and institutions dedicated
to religion shelled indiscriminately, resulting in extensive destruction
and civilian casualties. Many of the survivors fled and sought shelter
in the surrounding areas. After the shelling, armed soldiers entered
the villages, looted and torched houses, and expelled or killed
some of the villagers who remained behind. In some instances, women
were raped.
Overall, the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat population of the
attacked towns, villages and neighbourhoods were not able to set
up any effective resistance to these armed attacks. They were not
adequately organised and they did not have sufficient weapons with
which they could oppose the attackers.
During the spring and summer of 1992, Bosnian Serb forces committed
killings on a massive scale throughout the ARK. While the Judgement
provides a more complete picture, I shall now only mention three
examples:
On 31 May 1992, Bosnian Serb soldiers entered the Muslim hamlet
of Begici in Sanski Most municipality and rounded up its inhabitants.
Men were separated from women and children. Between 20 and 30 men
were taken towards the Vrhpolje bridge where they were supposed
to be put on buses. Four Bosnian Muslim men were killed by Jadranko
Palija on the way to the bridge. Upon arrival, the other men were
ordered to take off their clothes and line up. Many Bosnian Serb
soldiers in different uniforms were present. One of them said that
70 Bosnian Muslims had to be killed in retaliation for the death
of seven Bosnian Serb soldiers in the area. Then, the Bosnian Muslim
men were ordered to jump off the bridge into the Sana River one
by one. Once in the water, the soldiers opened fire upon them. Rajif
Begic survived after swimming under water for about 100 metres
downstream. From the place where he was hiding, he was able to observe
the executions at the bridge. The Trial Chamber found that a total
of at least 28 persons were killed in this incident.
On 1 June 1992, approximately one hundred residents from various
hamlets in the Kljuc Municipality were confined in the old
primary school in Velagici. Both Bosnian Serb policemen and
soldiers were present. Shortly before midnight, people were taken
out from the school and ordered to line up in front of the building.
Then, two Bosnian Serb soldiers armed with automatic rifles opened
fire on them. The soldiers continued firing until every person had
fallen down. Thereafter, they shot at those who still appeared to
be alive. One person survived the massacre. The Trial Chamber is
satisfied that at least 77 civilians were killed in this incident.
On 21 August 1992, four buses comprised only of men set off from
Trnopolje camp. At a junction near Kozarac, the buses from Trnopolje
were joined by other buses full of prisoners that came from Tukovi.
The convoy was accompanied by members of a special police unit of
the Prijedor SJB. Towards late afternoon, before reaching the line
of separation between Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim controlled
territory, shortly after Skender Vakuf and near Mount Vlacic,
two of the buses, each carrying approximately 100 persons, stopped.
On one side of the road, there was a deep gorge, on the other side,
a steep face of rock. The area is referred to as Koricanske
Stijene. The men from the buses were taken in a column to the edge
of the cliff and ordered to kneel down. The police officer in charge
said: "Here we exchange the dead for the dead and the living for
the living." Before the victims were executed, they cried and pleaded
for their lives. Then the shooting started. The dead bodies fell
into the abyss or were pushed over the edge, sometimes by other
Bosnian Muslims prior to their own execution. Grenades were thrown
into the gorge to make sure no one would survive. The entire operation
lasted not more than half an hour. The Trial Chamber is convinced
that, at a minimum, 200 men were killed on this day at Koricanske
Stijene.
In the spring of 1992, camps and other detention facilities were
established throughout the territory of the Bosnian Krajina in army
barracks and compounds, factories, schools, sport facilities, police
stations and other public buildings. These camps and detention facilities
were set up and controlled by the Bosnian Serb army, police or civilian
authorities. Non-Serb civilians were arrested en masse and
detained in these camps and detention facilities. For example, in
Prijedor Municipality, after the armed attacks on non-Serb villages
by Bosnian Serb armed forces, women and children were separated
from the men, all of whom were loaded onto buses and taken to Trnopolje,
Omarska or Keraterm. While prominent members of the SDA and the
HDZ were among the first to be arrested, the overwhelming majority
were normal citizens arrested solely because of their ethnicity.
The conditions in the camps and some detention facilities were particularly
harsh. Inmates were interrogated, tortured, beaten and subjected
to inhuman and degrading conditions of life. Women were raped and
killings occurred on a regular basis. The tragic peak of killings
inside these camps was reached with a massacre in "Room 3"
of Keraterm camp, perpetrated by Bosnian Serb army personnel, during
which at least 190 Bosnian Muslims from the Brdo area in Prijedor
Municipality were killed.
Already before the outbreak of the armed conflict in BiH, Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats living in the Bosnian Krajina were feeling
increasingly insecure and started leaving the region in convoys.
As the events in the Bosnian Krajina developed, from the spring
of 1992 onwards, active and systematic repression and expulsion
of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats was carried out by the Bosnian
Serb authorities throughout the Bosnian Krajina. Convoys of buses
and trains were organised by the Bosnian Serb authorities to drive
tens of thousands of men, women and children out of Bosnian Serb
claimed territory to either Bosnian Muslim held territory within
BiH or to Croatia. On 12 June 1992, the Agency for Population Movement
and Exchange of Material Wealth was established in Banja Luka, assisting
in the implementation of the policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’. The non-Serb
population often sought to leave, and requested the convoys, which
were then organised by the Bosnian Serb authorities. However, they
did not leave of their own free will, but were forced to do so due
to the conditions imposed on them. Moreover, in many instances the
Bosnian Serb authorities made them sign documents stating that they
renounced claims to all the property that they left behind in favour
of the SerBiH. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that this measure
was intended to dissuade the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats
leaving the territory from returning at a later stage. At the same
time, the cleansed areas in northern Bosnia that had been emptied
of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats and had not been destroyed
were re-populated by resettling Serbian refugees coming from Croatia.
The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the
crimes that were committed in the Bosnian Krajina from April 1992
until the end of December 1992, occurred as a direct result of the
over-arching Strategic Plan. The ethnic cleansing was not a by-product
of the criminal activity, it was its very aim. The conditions of
life imposed on the non-Serb population of the Bosnian Krajina and
the military operations against towns and villages which were not
military targets were undertaken with the sole purpose of driving
people away. By August 1992, the consistent application of such
a discriminatory policy was completely clear to objective observers
on the ground. The evidence shows a consistent, coherent and criminal
strategy of cleansing the Bosnian Krajina of ethnic groups other
than Bosnian Serbs implemented by the SDS and the Bosnian Serb forces.
During the implementation of this policy, effective control over
the Bosnian Serb military, police and civilian structures was exercised
variously by political leaders from the Bosnian Serb Supreme Command
and other governmental authorities of the SerBiH. It was impossible
to implement a systematic policy of this magnitude, just by spontaneous
action or by criminal actions conducted by isolated radical groups.
Moreover, the actual methods used to implement the Strategic Plan
were controlled and coordinated from a level higher than the respective
municipalities, even though some municipalities distinguished themselves
by taking certain initiatives.
- The regional level of authority
Already in early 1991, the SDS embarked on a programme of regionalisation,
the ultimate object of which was the implementation of the Strategic
Plan. On 7 April 1991, the SDS Regional Board decided to create
the Community of Municipalities of Bosnian Krajina ("ZOBK").
On 16 September 1991, the ZOBK Assembly transformed itself
into the Autonomous Region of Krajina ("ARK"). The Accused
became its First Vice-President. While it is difficult to precisely
define which municipalities belonged to the ARK at any given time,
the Trial Chamber is satisfied that all thirteen municipalities
addressed in the Indictment were members of the ARK during the period
relevant to the instant case.
Notwithstanding Articles 4 and 5 of the ARK Statute, suggesting
that it was a multi-ethnic institution, the ARK was essentially
a purely Serbian authority. The ARK was vested with powers of a
political nature that belonged to the municipalities, including
powers in the area of defence. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that
the ARK as an intermediate level of government was established by
the Serb leadership to co-ordinate the implementation of the Strategic
Plan by the municipalities in that region.
On 5 May 1992, the ARK Executive Council issued a decision on
the formation of the ARK Crisis Staff, appointing the Accused as
its President. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that, as with municipal
Crisis Staffs in their respective areas of jurisdiction, the ARK
Crisis Staff was established primarily to ensure the co-operation
between the political authorities, the army and the police at the
regional level, with a view to co-ordinating the implementation
of the Strategic Plan by the different authorities.
Among the 15 core members of the ARK Crisis Staff were the political
and military leadership of the ARK, as well as persons holding key
public positions in the ARK and individuals linked to paramilitary
organisations. In addition to these core members, the meetings of
ARK Crisis Staff were attended on a weekly basis by the Presidents
of the Crisis Staffs of other member municipalities or their representatives.
The composition of the ARK Crisis Staff not only secured its authority
and influence over the various bodies represented on it, but also
made sure that in the eyes of the public the ARK Crisis Staff was
seen to be vested with such authority and influence.
Indeed, between 5 May 1992 and 17 July 1992, at which time
the ARK Crisis Staff stopped functioning, the ARK Crisis Staff assumed
all powers and functions of the ARK Assembly and acted as an intermediate
level of government between the authorities of the SerBiH and the
municipalities. The ARK Crisis Staff was the highest civilian authority
in the ARK and exercised de facto authority over the municipalities
and the police and had great influence over the army and Serb paramilitary
groups. The extent and the limits of the power of the ARK Crisis
Staff are discussed in great detail in the Trial Chamber Judgement.
The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the
Accused not only formally represented the ARK Crisis Staff as its
President, but was in fact at the very heart of the ARK Crisis Staff
as its key figure. He was the driving force behind the major decisions
issued by the ARK Crisis Staff, which is the reason why the Trial
Chamber comes to the conclusion that the decisions of the ARK Crisis
Staff can be attributed to the Accused.
The municipalities, the police and, to some extent the army, systematically
implemented ARK Crisis Staff decisions in three key areas: a) dismissals
of non-Serb professionals; b) disarmament of paramilitary units
and individuals illegally possessing weapons, selectively enforced
against non-Serbs; and c) resettlement of the non-Serb population.
In the view of the Trial Chamber, these areas were crucial and vital
to the success of the over-all plan of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and gave
a substantial contribution to the implementation of the Strategic
Plan.
III. Legal Findings
This being a summary of the Trial Chamber Judgement, I shall not
go into all the details of the Trial Chamber’s legal assessment
but rather to highlight the following key points:
- The Trial Chamber is satisfied that all the chapeau
elements required for the application of each of the Articles
of the Statute pursuant to which the Accused has been charged
with in the Indictment have been met.
- Regarding the mens rea for extermination, the Trial
Chamber found that it is analogous to the mens rea for
murder as a crime against humanity with the difference that the
Prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
the accused had the intention to kill persons on a massive scale
or to create conditions of life that led to the death of a large
number of people. The Trial Chamber found that all the killing
incidents alleged in the Indictment were proved beyond reasonable
doubt except for: the incident in Lisjna on or about 1 June 1992,
the incident in Vrbanjci on 25 June 1992, the incident on the
way from Kukavice and surrounding areas in Kotor Varos on or about
25 June 1992 and the incident in Dujo Banovic’s house in
Kenjari on or about 27 June 1992. In sum, the Trial Chamber is
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that at least 1669 Bosnian Muslims
or Bosnian Croats were killed by Bosnian Serb forces in these
events, all of whom were non-combatants. The Trial Chamber is
further satisfied that these killings fulfil the element of massiveness
for the crime of extermination.
- The definition of torture adopted by this Trial Chamber reflects
that contained in the Convention against Torture and reads "the
intentional infliction, by act or omission, of severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, in order to obtain information
or a confession, or to punish, intimidate or coerce the victim
or a third person, or to discriminate, on any ground, against
the victim or a third person, amongst others." Having considered
the objective and the subjective severity of the mistreatment,
the Trial Chamber found that the treatment inflicted on the victims,
and examined at length in the Judgement, constituted severe pain
and suffering for a designated purpose of intimidating, discriminating
or obtaining information, thus amounting to torture. The Trial
Chamber wishes to note that some acts, such as rape, by definition
meet the severity threshold.
- By a majority vote, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the
actus reus of deportation consists of the forcible displacement
of individuals across a State border from the area in which they
are lawfully present without grounds permitted under international
law, whereas such displacement within the boundaries of a State
constitutes the actus reus of forcible transfer, punishable
as other inhumane acts as a crime against humanity. The Trial
Chamber was confronted with a great deal of evidence regarding
the deportation or forcible transfer of a large proportion of
the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat population from the ARK to
other areas both within and outside BiH. In view of the specificity
with which the charges were pleaded, the Trial Chamber was precluded
from making any finding of guilt with respect to incidents where
the transfer destination was to locations other than Travnik (under
the control of the legitimate government of BiH) or Karlovac (Croatia).
Having examined all the evidence, the Trial Chamber is satisfied
beyond reasonable doubt that a large number of deportations to
Karlovac and forcible transfers to Travnik, originating in the
ARK, took place during the period relevant to the Indictment.
- The Trial Chamber is satisfied that all the incidents of extensive
destruction and appropriation of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat
property by the Bosnian Serb forces alleged in the Indictment
were proved beyond reasonable doubt except for incidents in Ramici,
Humici, Vrhpolje, Trnova, Sasina, Komusina, Rasjeva, Kamenica
and Sipovo. However, for Article 2(d) of the Statute to apply,
the Trial Chamber needs to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt
that either the property destroyed and appropriated was located
in occupied territory or the property is subject to general protection
under the Geneva Conventions. The Trial Chamber found that in
the present case the evidence adduced was insufficient to prove
either of these two alternatives and therefore found that no violation
of Article 2(d) occurred. In contrast, the protection of Article
3(b) of the Statute, however, extends to all property in the territory
involved in a war, including that located in enemy territory.
The Trial Chamber therefore found that the destruction of property
in the relevant municipalities of the ARK were in violation of
Article 3(b) of the Statute. The Trial Chamber is also satisfied
that institutions dedicated to religion were destroyed and devastated
in the relevant municipalities of the Indictment in violation
of Article 3(d) of the Statute.
- Regarding the crime of genocide, the Trial Chamber concluded
that the protected groups, within the meaning of Article 4 of
the Statute, must be defined, in the present case, as the Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that
the targeted parts of the groups were the Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats of the ARK, and that these amounted to "substantial
parts" of the protected groups. In this case, the Prosecution
pleaded three different types of acts as genocide. As stated earlier,
the Trial Chamber found that Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat
non-combatants were killed by Bosnian Serb forces. The Trial Chamber
is also satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that serious bodily
and mental harm was intentionally inflicted upon Bosnian Muslims
and Bosnian Croats detained in camps and other detention facilities.
Further, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the conditions in
these camps and other detention facilities were deliberately inflicted
upon the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat detainees and amounted,
in some cases, to conditions calculated to bring about physical
destruction. As a result, it remained to be determined whether
these offences were committed with the specific intent for genocide,
conscious that where direct evidence of intent is absent, the
specific intent may still be inferred from the factual circumstances
and particularly conscious also that where an inference needs
to be drawn, it has to be the only reasonable inference available
on the evidence. In this case, the Trial Chamber is not satisfied
that the only reasonable inference that may be drawn from the
evidence is that the offences were committed with the specific
intent to destroy the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat groups
of the ARK. One reason for this is that the number of Bosnian
Muslim and Bosnian Croat men, women and children forcibly displaced
from the ARK in this case is extremely high, particularly when
compared to the number of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats subjected
to the acts enumerated in Article 4(2)(a), (b) and (c) of
the Statute. This fact does not support the conclusion that the
intent to destroy the groups in part, as opposed to the intent
to forcibly displace them, is the only reasonable inference that
may be drawn from the evidence. The Judgement details the Trial
Chamber’s reasons in full. On the basis of the evidence presented
in this case, the Trial Chamber has not found beyond reasonable
doubt that genocide was committed in the relevant ARK municipalities,
from April to December 1992.
- The Trial Chamber found that the crime of persecution consists
of an act or an omission which discriminates in fact and denies
or infringes upon a fundamental right laid down in international
customary or treaty law and was carried out deliberately with
the intent to discriminate on one of the listed grounds, specifically
race (the concept of "race" including ethnicity), religion
or politics. The Trial Chamber found that the campaign of persecution
against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats included killings,
torture, physical violence, rapes and sexual assaults, constant
humiliation and degradation, destruction and appropriation of
non-Serb property and institutions dedicated to religion, deportation
and forcible transfer, and the denial of fundamental rights, namely
the denial of the fundamental rights to employment, freedom of
movement, right to proper medical care and proper judicial process.
The Trial Chamber is further satisfied that the acts were discriminatory
in fact and were committed by the perpetrators with the requisite
discriminatory intent on racial, religious and political grounds.
IV. Criminal Responsibility of the Accused
I would now like to turn to the question as to whether the Accused,
Radoslav Brdjanin, is criminally responsible for any of the crimes
charged in the Indictment under any of the modes of liability
included therein. For this purpose, it is necessary to clarify
some of the core issues examined by the Trial Chamber to establish
the Accused’s criminal responsibility.
The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that,
both prior to and during the period covered in the Indictment,
Radoslav Brdjanin was a leading political figure in the ARK and
that he held key positions at the municipal, regional and republic
levels, including that of First Vice-president of the ARK Assembly,
President of the ARK Crisis Staff, and later Acting Deputy Prime
Minister for Production, Minister for Construction, Traffic and
Utilities and acting Vice-President of the Government of the Republika
Srpska.
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that between mid-1991 and the
end of 1992, the Accused possessed de jure and de facto
powers that made him one of the most significant political figures
in the ARK. The sources of his powers were twofold: In the first
place, the Accused possessed power by virtue of the political
positions that he occupied at the municipal, regional and republic
levels. In the second place, he was entrusted with political power
directly by the Bosnian Serb leadership, including Radovan Karad`ic.
The Trial Chamber is further satisfied that the Accused espoused
the Strategic Plan and knew that it could only be implemented
by the use of force and fear.
Amongst the political figures in the Bosnian Krajina, it was
the Accused who was identified by the Bosnian Serb leadership
as best representing the interests of the SerBiH. He was chosen
to play a leading role in co-ordinating the implementation of
the Strategic Plan in the ARK. For this purpose, the top leadership
of the SerBiH granted the Accused a high degree of authority and
autonomy in areas of fundamental political importance, which is
indicative of the trust the Accused enjoyed at the highest political
level. In a telephone conversation on 31 October 1991, Radovan
Karad`ic assured the Accused that he had all the power in the
Bosnian Krajina and indicated that he should take more decisions
without consulting the party leadership. Moreover, in a conversation
between Radovan Karad`ic and a certain Miroslav on 7 January
1992, the Accused was identified as a mature and politically strong
personality, who would be able to take power.
Radoslav Br|anin made a substantial contribution to the implementation
of the Strategic Plan in three distinct phases: before the establishment
of the ARK Crisis Staff, in his capacity as member of the SerBiH
Assembly and the ARK Assembly, as the President of the ARK Crisis
Staff and after the ARK Crisis Staff ceased to exist, in his capacity
as a minister in the RS Government.
Before the creation of the ARK Crisis Staff, Radovan Karadžic
was already discussing and relying upon the Accused, amongst others,
to set up civilian commands to ensure territorial defence and
civilian protection, to liaise with military officers and prepare
for the mobilisation of the Bosnian Serb military and to implement
the policy of dismissing non-Serbs from their jobs.
As President of the ARK Crisis Staff, the Accused exercised
de facto authority over the municipal authorities
and the police and had substantial influence over the army and
paramilitary groups. Through the decisions of the ARK Crisis Staff,
that can be attributed to him, the Accused contributed to the
implementation of the aims of the Bosnian Serb leadership in the
ARK.
After the ARK Crisis Staff was wound up, the Accused not only
maintained his political power in the Bosnian Krajina but also
extended his power at the republic level. He continued to meet
with high ranking military and political officials to discuss
issues concerning the implementation of the Strategic Plan.
The Trial Chamber found that the Accused made one of his most
substantial contributions to the implementation of the Strategic
Plan by way of a propaganda campaign against Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats which he conducted at the different stages of his
political career. His positions of authority gave him access to
the media which he used to make public statements creating fear
and hatred between Bosnian Serbs on the one hand and Bosnian Muslims
and Bosnian Croats on the other. Not only did the Accused call
for the dismissal of non-Serbs from their jobs but he also publicly
advocated that the non-Serb population should leave the Bosnian
Krajina. Moreover, the Accused spoke openly against mixed marriages
and publicly suggested a campaign of retaliatory ethnicity-base
murder.
The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that,
although the Accused’s public statements may have been motivated
in part by his drive towards self-advancement, they were intentional
and had a disastrous impact on people of all ethnicities. They
incited Bosnian Serbs to commit crimes and contributed to creating
a climate where people were prepared to tolerate the commission
of crimes as well as to commit crimes, and where well-meaning
Bosnian Serbs felt dissuaded from extending any kind of assistance
to non-Serbs. The non-Serb population of the Bosnian Krajina understood
the Accused’s public statements as direct threats to leave the
areas under Bosnian Serb occupation, and many of them did so in
fear for their lives. A number of witnesses gave evidence that
the Accused’s public statements constituted the main reason why
they left the area.
The Trial Chamber is additionally satisfied that the Accused
had detailed knowledge that, during the time and in the area relevant
to the Indictment, crimes were being committed in the execution
of the Strategic Plan.
In relation to each of the modes of liability presented in the
Indictment, I am going to underline the following general findings
of the Trial Chamber:
- In order to hold the Accused criminally responsible under
the institute of joint criminal enterprise, the Prosecution needs
to establish a common plan amounting to or involving an agreement
between the Accused and the physical perpetrators of the crimes
in question to commit a crime envisaged in the Statute. The physical
perpetrators of the crimes in question are members of the police,
the army and paramilitary organisations. As the Prosecution did
not plead a joint criminal enterprise between the Accused and
the police, the Trial Chamber examined whether there was a joint
criminal enterprise between the Accused and members of the army
and paramilitary organisations. In doing so, the Trial Chamber
made reference to the Strategic Plan.
As already stated, the Trial Chamber has found that the Accused
espoused the Strategic Plan. Moreover, it is satisfied that many
of the relevant physical perpetrators of the crimes in question
equally did so and acted towards its implementation. However,
the Trial Chamber is of the view that the mere espousal of the
Strategic Plan by the Accused on the one hand and many of the
relevant physical perpetrators on the other hand is not equivalent
to an arrangement between them to commit a concrete crime. Indeed,
the Accused and the relevant physical perpetrators could espouse
the Strategic Plan and form a criminal intent to commit crimes
with the aim of implementing the Strategic Plan independently
from each other and without having an understanding or entering
into any agreement between them to commit a crime. The Trial Chamber
further examined whether an understanding or agreement to that
effect between the Accused and the relevant physical perpetrators
could be inferred from the fact that they acted in unison to implement
the Strategic Plan. Given the physical and structural remoteness
between the Accused and the relevant physical perpetrators and
the fact that the relevant physical perpetrators in most of the
cases have not even been personally identified, the Trial Chamber
is not satisfied that the only reasonable conclusion that may
be drawn from the Accused’s and the relevant physical perpetrators’
concerted action aimed towards the implementation of the Strategic
Plan is that the Accused entered into an agreement with the relevant
physical perpetrators to commit a crime. Indeed, the Trial Chamber
is satisfied that the evidence allows for other reasonable inferences
to be drawn.
The Trial Chamber is of the view that joint criminal enterprise
is not an appropriate mode of liability to describe the individual
criminal responsibility of the Accused, given the extraordinarily
broad nature of this case, when the Prosecution seeks to include
within a joint criminal enterprise a person as remote from the
commission of the crimes charged in the Indictment as the Accused.
The Trial Chamber therefore dismissed joint criminal enterprise
as a mode of liability in this case.
- Planning is also dismissed as a mode of liability under Article
7(1) of the Statute as the Trial Chamber found that, taking into
consideration the individual responsibility of the Accused that
has been established and which will soon be dealt with here, there
is insufficient evidence to conclude that the Accused was involved
in the immediate preparation of the concrete crimes.
- Regarding criminal responsibility under Article 7(3), the
Trial Chamber found that although the ARK Crisis Staff had de
facto authority over the municipal authorities and the police
and influence over the army and paramilitary organisations, the
Accused, as President of the ARK Crisis Staff or in any of his
other positions between April and December 1992, did not have
effective control over members of the municipal authorities, the
police, the army or paramilitary organisations which would entail
his material ability to prevent or punish the commission of crimes
by these individuals. Thus, the Trial Chamber dismisses superior
criminal responsibility under Article 7(3) of the Statute as a
possible mode of liability.
The remaining modes of liability under Article 7(1) of the Statute
were examined successively for each of the crimes charged in the
Indictment and the Trial Chamber reached the following conclusions:
- Regarding wilful killing, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that
the ARK Crisis Staff decisions on disarmament between 9 and 18
May 1992 constituted practical assistance to the attacks of the
Bosnian Serb forces on non-Serb towns, villages and areas, and
that these decisions are attributable to the Accused. The Trial
Chamber is further satisfied that the Accused was aware that during
these armed attacks the Bosnian Serb forces would commit a number
of crimes including the crime of wilful killing of a number of
non-Serbs and that the members of the Bosnian Serb forces carrying
out the killings in question had the required intent to kill.
Through the ARK Crisis Staff decisions on disarmament, the Accused
had a substantial effect on the commission of these killings.
Therefore, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the Accused aided
and abetted in the killing committed by the Bosnian Serb forces
in the context of the armed attacks of the Bosnian Serb forces
on non-Serb towns, villages and areas after 9 May 1992. The Trial
Chamber is not satisfied that it has been sufficiently proved
that the same ARK Crisis Staff decisions, or any of the acts of
the Accused, render him criminally responsible for other killings
mentioned in the Indictment.
- The Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the evidence establishes
beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused was aware that by issuing
ARK Crisis Staff decisions on disarmament he would be assisting
in the killings on a massive scale such as to amount to the crime
of extermination. Nor has it been established beyond reasonable
doubt that the Accused knew that the members of the Bosnian Serb
forces intended to commit killings on a massive scale such as
to amount to the crime of extermination.
- Applying the same reasoning for the acts of torture charged
in the Indictment as for the acts of wilful killing, the Trial
Chamber found that the Accused aided and abetted the torture committed
by Bosnian Serb forces in the context of the armed attacks of
the Bosnian Serb forces on non-Serb towns, villages and areas
after 9 May 1992, the date when the ARK Crisis Staff issued its
first decision on disarmament. In addition, the Trial Chamber
is satisfied the Accused aided and abetted the commission of the
underlying acts of torture in camps and other detention facilities
throughout the ARK by Bosnian Serb forces. It has been established
beyond reasonable doubt that, with the exception of the Jasenica
and the Petar Kocic Elementary Schools, all the camps and detention
facilities mentioned in the evidence came into being once the
ARK Crisis Staff had been established. There is ample evidence
that the establishment of these camps and detention facilities
formed an integral part of the Strategic Plan, that the Accused
was fully aware of the nature of these camps and detention facilities
and that detainees were tortured therein. During his mandate as
President of the ARK Crisis Staff, not only did the Accused not
take a stand in public or during ARK Crisis Staff meetings against
them but he adopted a laissez-faire attitude and spoke
in public about them in a way which sent the wrong message to
those who were committing crimes inside these camps and detentions
facilities. Therefore, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that his
inactivity as well as his public attitude with respect to the
camps and detention facilities constituted moral encouragement
and support to the members of the Bosnian Serb army and police
to continue running these camps and detention facilities in the
way described to the Trial Chamber throughout the trial.
- Turning to the crimes of deportation and forcible transfer,
the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the ARK Crisis Staff decisions
of 28 and 29 May 1992, advocating the resettlement of the non-Serb
population, prompted the municipal authorities and the police
who implemented them to commit the crimes of deportation and forcible
transfer. The Trial Chamber is also of the view that the only
reasonable conclusion that may be drawn when the terms of these
decisions are considered in the light of the Accused’s unambiguous
statements, made repeatedly from early April 1992 onwards, calling
upon the non-Serb population to leave the Bosnian Krajina and
stating that only a small percentage of non-Serbs would be allowed
to stay, is that the decisions could only have been meant as a
direct incitement to deport or forcibly transfer non-Serbs from
the territory of the ARK. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that,
with the exception of the failed attempt at displacing the Bosnian
Muslim population of Gornji Agici, Donji Agici and Crna
Rijeka in Bosanski Novi on 24 May 1992, the deportations to Karlovac
and forcible transfers to Travnik originating in the ARK, and
described in detail in the Judgement, all took place after the
adoption of the ARK Crisis Staff decisions previously mentioned.
Furthermore, the Accused’s espousal of the Strategic Plan, of
which the crimes of deportation and forcible transfer formed an
integral part, and the implementation of which he coordinated
in his position as President of the ARK Crisis Staff demonstrated
that he intended to induce the commission of the crimes of deportation
and forcible transfer. On this basis, the Trial Chamber found
that the Accused instigated these forcible transfers and deportations.
In addition, the Trial Chamber is also satisfied that the Accused
aided and abetted the execution of these crimes through his inflammatory
and discriminatory public statements, the decisions on disarmament
previously mentioned and finally through the ARK Crisis Staff
decision of 12 June 1992 setting up the Agency for the Movement
of People and Exchange in Banja Luka.
- The Trial Chamber reiterates the reasoning used for the crime
of wilful killing for the crime of destruction, namely that the
ARK Crisis Staff decisions on disarmament constituted practical
assistance to the attacks of the Bosnian Serb forces on non-Serb
towns, villages and areas and that the Accused was aware that
crimes including the crime of wanton destruction of cities, towns
and villages or devastation not justified by military necessity
would be committed. The Trial Chamber is thus satisfied that the
Accused aided and abetted in the wanton destruction of cities,
towns and villages or devastation not justified by military necessity
committed by the Bosnian Serb forces on non-Serb towns, villages
and areas in Bosanski Novi, Bosanski Petrovac, Celinac, Donji
Vakuf, Kljuc, Kotor Varos, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Sipovo
and Teslic after 9 May 1992. With the same reasoning and
having examined the evidence carefully, the Trial Chamber is satisfied
that the Accused aided and abetted the destruction or wilful damage
done to institutions dedicated to religion committed by the Bosnian
Serb forces in the context of the armed attacks of the Bosnian
Serb forces on non-Serb towns, villages and areas in Bosanski
Novi, Bosanski Petrovac, Celinac, Donji Vakuf, Kljuc,
Kotor Varos, Prijedor, Prnjavor, Sanski Most, Sipovo and Teslic
after 9 May 1992.
- Finally, regarding the crime of persecution, the Trial Chamber
has previously established the responsibility of the Accused for
aiding and abetting certain crimes of wilful killing, torture,
destruction and devastation of cities, towns, villages and institutions
dedicated to religion as well as deportation and forcible transfer.
The Accused has also been found responsible for instigating certain
incidents of deportation and forcible transfer. The Trial Chamber
is further satisfied that the Accused aided and abetted persecution
with respect to physical violence, rapes, sexual assaults, constant
humiliation and degradation, as well as appropriation of property.
Furthermore, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the Accused ordered
the denial of the fundamental right to employment through a decision
of the ARK Crisis Staff of 22 June 1992, providing for the dismissal
of virtually all non-Serbs in the ARK, an act which amounted to
persecution. Moreover, the Accused aided and abetted persecution
with respect to denying the right to freedom of movement and the
right to proper judicial process. However, the Trial Chamber found
that the evidence before it is insufficient to establish the responsibility
of the Accused for the denial of the right to proper medical care.
In relation to all these underlying acts, the Trial Chamber is
satisfied that not only the physical perpetrators but also the
Accused possessed the intent to discriminate against the Bosnian
Muslim and Bosnian Croat victims.
V. Sentencing
The Trial Chamber assessed the factors relevant to an appraisal
of the gravity of the crimes of which the Accused has been found
guilty.
The Prosecution in this case, considering the gravity of the
crimes charged in the Indictment, the aggravating factors submitted
and the alleged absence of any significant mitigating factor,
claimed that the criminal responsibility of the Accused could
only be adequately punished with a sentence of life imprisonment.
The Defence put forward a preliminary objection to the absence
from the proceedings of a separate and ad hoc sentencing
hearing after conviction and submitted that because of this he
could not make adequate submissions on sentencing. The Trial Chamber
does not agree with this submission and the reasons are given
in the Judgement. The Defence did, however, make several submissions
for the purpose of sentencing which are dealt with comprehensively
in the Judgement and which I shall now mention.
The Trial Chamber found that the following were relevant aggravating
circumstances to which appropriate weight, as indicated in the
Judgement, was attached when determining the sentence: the position
of leadership of the Accused, the status and vulnerability of
the victims and the impact of the crimes on the victims, the willingness
of the Accused’s participation, the duration of the criminal conduct
to a lesser extent and the educational background of the Accused.
However, the Trial Chamber found that the following were relevant
mitigating circumstances to which the appropriate weight indicated
in the Judgement was attached when determining the sentence: contributing
to the decision to provide shelter to Bosnian Muslims from Celinac,
treating all citizens equally, voicing concern about paramilitaries,
participating in the decision to arrest members of the Mice group,
the family status and age of the Accused, his speeches against
profiteering from the armed conflict, his respectful conduct during
the course of the proceedings and with witnesses testifying against
him, and finally his remorse in individualised instances.
Finally, in accordance with the Statute and the Rules, the Trial
Chamber took into consideration the general sentencing practice
of the courts of the former Yugoslavia but acknowledged that it
is was not bound by this practice. The Trial Chamber noted that
under the SFRY Criminal Code, the range of penalties existing
in 1992 was a fine, confiscation of property, imprisonment, and
capital punishment. The maximum term of imprisonment was 15 years,
except for offences punishable with the death penalty, committed
under "particularly aggravating circumstances," or causing
"especially grave consequences," in which cases the
maximum term of imprisonment was 20 years.
The Trial Chamber pursuant to Rule 87(C) decided to impose a
single sentence in this case, as it reflects better the criminal
conduct of the Accused which shows a constant pattern of criminal
behaviour occurring within a closed temporal context.
VI. Disposition
Radoslav Brdjanin, please rise.
For the reasons I summarised above, this Trial Chamber, having
heard all the evidence presented by the Prosecution and the Defence,
finds you not guilty of:
- Count 1: Genocide
- Count 2: Complicity of genocide
- Count 4: Extermination as a crime against humanity
- Count 10: Extensive destruction and appropriation of property
not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully
and wantonly as a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
The Trial Chamber finds you guilty of:
- Count 3: Persecutions as a crime against humanity (incorporating
Count 6 (torture), Count 8 (deportation) and Count 9 (forcible
transfer as an inhumane act).
- Count 5: Wilful killing as a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions
- Count 7: Torture as a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
- Count 11: Wanton destruction of cities, towns and villages
or devastation not justified by military necessity as a violation
of the laws and customs of war
- Count 12: Destruction or wilful damage done to institutions
dedicated to religion as a violation of the laws and customs
of war.
We sentence you, Radoslav Brdjanin, to a single sentence of 32
years of imprisonment and state that you are entitled to credit
for 5 years, 1 month and 26 days, as of the date of this Judgement,
calculated from the date of your deprivation of liberty, that is
the 6 July 1999, together with such additional time as you may serve
pending the determination of any appeal.
Pursuant to Rule 103 (C) of the Rules, you shall remain in the
custody of the Tribunal pending the finalisation of arrangements
for your transfer to the State where this sentence will be served.
The court stands adjourned.
*****
The full text of the Judgement is available upon
request at the Public Information Services and is also available
on the Internet site: www.un.org/icty
of the Tribunal. |