1 Wednesday, 30 January 2002

2 [Open session]

3 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

4 JUDGE AGIUS: Call the case, please.

5 [The accused entered court]

6 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. This is the case number

7 IT-99-36-T, the Prosecutor versus Radoslav Brdjanin and Momir Talic.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning, Mr. Brdjanin. Can you hear me in a

9 language that you can understand?

10 THE ACCUSED BRDJANIN: [Interpretation] Good morning. I can hear

11 you and understand you.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: And General Talic, I put the same question to you.

13 Can you hear me in a language that you can understand?

14 THE ACCUSED TALIC: [Interpretation] I can hear and I can

15 understand. Thank you.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: So good morning, everybody.

17 Appearances for the Prosecution.

18 MR. CAYLEY: May it please Your Honours, my name is Cayley. I

19 appear on behalf of the Prosecutor. Ms. Korner will not be with us today,

20 Your Honours.

21 JUDGE AGIUS: And for Mr. Brdjanin.

22 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I'm John Ackerman here with Tania

23 Radosavljevic, Milka Maglov, and Milos Peric. Thank you.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: For General Talic.

25 MS. FAUVEAU-IVANOVIC: [Interpretation] I'm Natasha

1 Fauveau-Ivanovic, replacing Mr. de Roux and Mr. Pitron. And I'm assisted

2 by Mr. Fabien Masson.

3 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Ackerman, at this distance you feel safer?

4 MR. ACKERMAN: Somewhat, Your Honour. It's a little harder for

5 you to pull my leg from that far away, I think.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: So let's start. Please call in Dr. Donia.

7 [The witness entered court]

8 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning, Mr. Donia.

9 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Mr. President.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: You are going to be kindly requested to make the

11 same solemn declaration that you made twice already yesterday, and we can

12 proceed after that.

13 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

14 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

15 WITNESS: Robert J. Donia [Resumed]

16 JUDGE AGIUS: Please sit down. Mr. Cayley will be continuing,

17 proceeding with his examination-in-chief.

18 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

19 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Your Honour.

20 Examined by Mr. Cayley: [Continued]

21 Q. Dr. Donia, if you could remember to pause between my question and

22 your answer, because as you know, we're speaking the same language, and

23 there is interpretation between us into two other languages.

24 A. We may not be quite speaking the same language. I shall endeavour

25 to pause.

1 Q. If I can just recap briefly on what you were discussing

2 yesterday. You referred to the change of name of the ZOBK to the ARK on

3 the 16th of September of 1991.

4 And if I can now refer you to Tab 14, which is Prosecutor's

5 Exhibit 17.

6 What document is this, first of all, Dr. Donia?

7 A. This is the shorthand notes of the second session of the Assembly

8 of the Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Just because I know we

9 will return to the first session shortly, the first session of this

10 assembly was convened and constituted on the 24th of October, 1991, and so

11 this is the next, second session, on 21 November.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Cayley, could you please repeat the exhibit

13 number?

14 MR. CAYLEY: It's Prosecutor's Exhibit 17, Your Honour.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay.

16 MR. CAYLEY: Behind tab 14.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay, okay. Thank you.

18 MR. CAYLEY:

19 Q. Now, specifically concentrating on these autonomous regions that

20 were being created at the time, if you go to page 29, and explain to the

21 Judges the significance of what is said there in these minutes, please?

22 A. This page reflects the decision of the second Assembly of the

23 Serbian People to verify the existence of five autonomous regions. These

24 regions were constituted in ways that were somewhat similar to the

25 constitution of -- the creation of the ZOBK and then, in this particular

1 document, ratified or verified by the Assembly of the Serbian People.

2 Q. Is the Autonomous Region of Krajina specifically referred to in

3 this verification by the SDS?

4 A. Yes, it is. It is the first one referenced in the second line of

5 the decision, along with its - I believe it's 20 at that point - members

6 who -- municipalities whose assemblies had declared association with the

7 Autonomous Region of Krajina, or ARK.

8 Q. Was the -- were the municipalities that are listed here the final

9 constituent members of this Autonomous Region of Krajina, or did it

10 change?

11 A. It changed. It evolved over time. In fact, I believe there is an

12 entry in the Official Gazette also reflecting this decision. It also

13 lists 20 municipalities but they are not the same 20. There is a variance

14 of two of them. So this question of exactly who belonged at any given

15 time, I think, is a rather difficult one to define precisely, at least

16 from this level, from the level of the ARK itself.

17 Q. If we can now move ahead, and if I can refer you to page 55 of

18 your report, and specifically the section which you have subtitled "Arms

19 Buildup," now, you identify in your report various paramilitary groups

20 that were linked with the specific political parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina

21 and I would like you to address each one of those so that the Judges get

22 an accurate picture of the connections between these forces and the

23 various political parties in the country at the time.

24 A. Each of the three national parties, the SDA, SDS and HDZ, formed

25 or operated paramilitaries, starting in no later than the summer of 1991.

1 For the SDA, those paramilitaries really had two principal names, the

2 Patriotic League and the Green Berets. Both the HDZ and SDS also became

3 involved with paramilitaries from neighbouring states, that is Croatia and

4 Serbia and Montenegro. The Serbian paramilitaries were known by a variety

5 of names. They were organised by, among others, the leader of the Serbian

6 Renewal Movement, Vuk Draskovic, the Serbian -- Bosnian-born Serb,

7 Vojislav Seselj, and Zeljko Raznatovic. In addition, there was at least

8 one Serbian military, paramilitary, operating from the Serbian Krajina

9 region of Croatia.

10 The difference of -- that kind of came to be the important factor

11 in these paramilitaries was really the existing organisation of defence of

12 Yugoslavia, and that consisted really of two parts: Number 1, the JNA,

13 the Yugoslav National Army; and second, the Territorial Defence, known as

14 the TO. The military planning in socialist Yugoslavia never really

15 departed from the Partisan experience in World War II, and part of this

16 thinking was that at any given time, small sectors of the country should

17 be able to conduct resistance based on local forces. These were the

18 Territorial Defence forces, which had their own weapons - they were light

19 weapons - and in the late socialist period, developed a dual reporting

20 relationship to the JNA and to the republican authorities in which they

21 were located.

22 In September 1990, the JNA issued an order to bring the arms of

23 the Territorial Defence forces under control of the JNA, essentially put

24 them under lock and key in JNA armouries. This did something but not a

25 great deal to limit the arms capabilities of these TO units, which in the

1 course of 1991 came -- and in early 1992, came under the control of the

2 political leadership in whatever municipality they were located. So for

3 example, the TO units in the area under the control of the Bosnian central

4 government became either part of the -- typically became a part of the

5 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina; and in Croat-controlled areas became a part of

6 the Croatian Defence Council, HVO; and in Serb-controlled areas came under

7 the control of the SDS or later on the JNA, and ultimately the Army of the

8 Serbian Republic.

9 Q. Dr. Donia, if I can just interrupt you briefly, because you

10 referred to a document that we won't go through. But you referred to the

11 document where the JNA essentially placed under their control the arms of

12 the Territorial Defence, and I think that document is at Tab 16,

13 Prosecutor's Exhibit 19. Is that correct?

14 A. Yes. Prosecutor's 19, yes.

15 Q. Please carry on.

16 A. The final tie-breaker in this picture, really, was the JNA, which

17 in the summer of 1991 engaged certain commanders, certain units -- engaged

18 in distribution of light arms to SDS committees and Serbian paramilitary

19 groups in Bosnia. The JNA subsequently underwent a transformation over

20 many months, a transformation which really was not complete until the

21 summer of 1992 but involved the increasing, if one might call it,

22 Bosnianisation of the JNA in Bosnia.

23 First of all, the JNA was -- the JNA's presence in Bosnia was

24 strengthened by the withdrawal of JNA forces from Croatia in the late

25 month or two of 1991 and early 1992.

1 Then, more significantly, the JNA in Bosnia underwent some

2 transformation of its personnel. This process is reported by Borislav

3 Jovic, the close advisor to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and also

4 a member of the Presidency -- of the Federal Presidency of Yugoslavia, in

5 which he described a meeting on the 5th of December to transfer all

6 non-Bosnian soldiers out of Bosnia and transfer all Bosnians who were

7 stationed in JNA units elsewhere back into Bosnia. And later in December,

8 he reported that that process of stationing Bosnian troops -- troops

9 native to Bosnia in Bosnia was largely complete.

10 Q. Just a few points of clarification. And if I can refer you to

11 your report. You've essentially identified three types of armed

12 formations in Bosnia during this time period: paramilitary formations,

13 Territorial Defence, and the JNA. Is that --

14 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel approach the microphone, please.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Cayley, I have just been -- had my attention

16 drawn that I should call on you to move closer to the microphone.

17 MR. CAYLEY: I'll move the microphone closer to me, Your Honour.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: More like it.

19 MR. CAYLEY: Yes.

20 Okay. I think that's clear enough on the transcript.

21 Q. In terms of heavy weapons in Bosnia, armour, artillery, who had in

22 their possession these heavy weapons during this time period and

23 subsequently into 1992?

24 A. The JNA had a virtually complete monopoly on heavy weapons. And

25 by "heavy weapons," I mean heavy artillery, aircraft, tanks, and armoured

1 personnel carriers, things like this, that -- right up until, really, the

2 spring of 1992. Those were in the sole possession of the JNA with perhaps

3 a very occasional exception. But none of the efforts to arm locals

4 involved heavy weapons at that point, until that time, say, early spring

5 of 1992.

6 Q. Now, you state in your report that on the 15th of April of 1992,

7 TO units in Muslim-led municipalities were placed under a unified command

8 and became the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Now, we are calling other

9 military experts but, to your knowledge, in April of 1992, how effective

10 was that unified command structure?

11 A. I really can't answer the question for a specific area, but I

12 think in general, the effectiveness was best closest to -- in and closest

13 to Sarajevo, and became less effective and less direct in those areas that

14 were removed from Sarajevo and in which local TO units were often very

15 poorly armed and had problems communicating with the centre.

16 Q. Just referring briefly to the region of the Krajina, from your

17 knowledge, if you can answer this question, how effective was the Bosnian

18 army in that area?

19 A. Well, I don't -- I don't really think there was a Bosnian army per

20 se in the Krajina. It was really these local TO units which were poorly

21 armed and its effectiveness was very low.

22 Q. But you do state that the Bosnian army had the advantage in terms

23 of manpower; is that correct?

24 A. It appears that at this time, yes, they did, yes.

25 Q. If we can move on to page 58 of your report, and this is the

1 section that is titled, "Towards independence and division of

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina." Now we are moving back to events at the republican

3 level, and if you could tell the Court briefly about the various solutions

4 that were sought to the Yugoslav problem in 1991?

5 A. In the first half of 1991, the presidents of the six republics of

6 Yugoslavia held a rotating series of talks. One president hosted each

7 talk in his respective capital. These began in January and ended in June,

8 and featured kind of an alignment of the Slovenian and Croatian

9 leaderships promoting a loose confederation, and the Serbian and

10 Montenegrin leaderships supporting a strong federal Yugoslavia, with

11 efforts for compromise being brokered principally by Presidents

12 Izetbegovic and Tupurkovski of Bosnia and Montenegro respectively.

13 In the course of these meetings, there was another meeting at

14 Karadjordjevo at the royal hunting estate in Serbia, between Presidents

15 Tudjman of Croatia and Milosevic of Serbia. In this discussion, which

16 they held among just the two of them, although there were many other

17 members of their parties nearby, they held a conversation about a possible

18 division of Bosnia. They did not, by all accounts, agree at this time on

19 such a partition. Rather, they established a commission to investigate

20 the possibility of an agreement, and this commission held a couple of

21 sessions and adjourned without reaching an agreement.

22 This would be the first of a number of efforts between Serbs --

23 Serb and Croat leaders to reach an agreement on the partition of

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

25 After the last meeting of the six republican presidents -- at the

1 last meeting, there was an agreement to pursue further talks between

2 Presidents Tudjman, Milosevic and Izetbegovic. That meeting took place

3 shortly thereafter in Split and, again, by -- a number of accounts suggest

4 that partition was openly discussed at that meeting among the -- those

5 three presidents. I think after the conclusion of these talks, which

6 failed essentially to reach an agreement on the future of a federal

7 Yugoslavia, they were followed very soon by the war in Slovenia. And at

8 that point, discussions among the Yugoslav republics essentially became

9 internationalised, first through the intervention of the troika of the

10 European Community and later the semi-permanent, ultimately permanent

11 Conference on the Former Yugoslavia under UN and EC auspices.

12 Q. Dr. Donia, let's go back to Bosnia, to October of 1991, and to the

13 republican assembly in Sarajevo. 15th of October, 1991, Radovan Karadzic

14 is speaking before the assembly. What does he say?

15 A. At a session of the assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina on October 15,

16 Dr. Karadzic delivered an impassioned speech in which he raised the

17 prospect that if the Muslims pursued the option of independence for

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina, that they might cease to exist. In response to that

19 comment or that very impassioned presentation, President Izetbegovic and

20 -- President of the SDA and of Bosnia-Herzegovina, responded that the

21 manner of Karadzic's presentation and the message that he conveyed aptly

22 illustrated why Bosnia and Herzegovina might no longer be able to remain a

23 part of the Yugoslav federation.

24 On that same day, after the assembly had adjourned for the day,

25 and been adjourned by its president, SDS President or member Momcilo

1 Krajisnik, the Serbia -- or the Croatian and Muslim representatives of the

2 HDZ and SDA remained and reconvened on their authority the assembly, and

3 passed a declaration of sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was

4 exactly the step that was bitterly opposed by the SDS, and at least in

5 symbolic terms, moved Bosnia and Herzegovina one step closer to

6 independence.

7 On that evening, there was a session of the SDS board, and I --

8 this meeting appears to me to be a definitive discussion of strategy and

9 launch a new course for the SDS for the next several months.

10 In that --

11 Q. Dr. Donia, if I can just interrupt you, this meeting that you

12 refer to, that happened on the evening of the 15th of October of 1991, the

13 meeting of the SDS board?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And the minutes of that meeting are at Tab 17, Prosecutor's

16 Exhibit 20.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Now, if you could go through those minutes and identify for the

19 Court those sections that you believe are important in respect of events

20 that were accelerating at this time.

21 A. On page 2 of this document in the English version, Professor

22 Milorad Ekmecic is speaking. And in the very end of the first full

23 paragraph on that page he says: "The Serbs have created regions which are

24 not connected, and these regions must not be allowed to establish their

25 governments which would not be connected. In public, we must let it be

1 known that we can set up a Serbian government with its seat in Sarajevo

2 which would connect all our regions."

3 So Professor Ekmecic, who was a Professor of History in Sarajevo

4 and kind of a key senior elder member of the SDS, here expressly advocates

5 the formation of a republic-level Serbian government.

6 He is followed by Mr. Dutina, who says: "This evening we must get

7 rid of the illusion that a form of life together with the Muslims and

8 Croats can be found."

9 Going to the fourth page, just turning the page, the --

10 Mr. Radovan Neskovic says in a number of comments making recommendations,

11 number one: "Since they will not revoke their decisions, I suggest that a

12 parliamentary crisis be provoked."

13 Now, this comment is -- relates to the disagreement among party

14 leaders about whether SDS members should continue to participate in the

15 deliberative bodies and institutions of the Republic of

16 Bosnia-Herzegovina. It -- all parties operated on the assumption that if

17 a large number of delegates withdrew from a deliberative body, this in

18 some sense invalidated or weakened the authority of that body and was

19 therefore referred to here as a parliamentary crisis.

20 He adds then: "We should demand new elections, because in this

21 way we would gain time, which suits us."

22 Point four is "Go for a change of policy with the aim of creating

23 a greater Serbia." Now, this pertains to that dispute that arose at the

24 time of the creation of our declaration of unity of two Krajinas. The

25 party's policy, the SDS official policy at this time, was to support a

1 federal Yugoslavia and only to view the creation of a greater Serbia as a

2 back-up or contingent strategy. So Neskovic here is proposing that the

3 party now move to that back-up or reserve strategy and support the

4 creation of a greater Serbia. It will be seen that that viewpoint does

5 not prevail within the party at this time.

6 Going to the next speaker, Rajko Dukic, who was a very important

7 member of the SDS, President of its cadre commission. Point 2: "We

8 cannot leave the assembly or any other body." Dukic and many others

9 believed that the SDS should continue to work within the deliberative

10 bodies of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

11 It's in the comments of Mr. Miskin halfway down this page that we

12 find many of the recommendations that were in fact implemented in the

13 subsequent 1993 months.

14 Number one: "Continue regionalisation more intensively." And

15 "regionalisation," as I'll show shortly, had a rather complex meaning at

16 this time.

17 Number four: "Establish parallel government bodies immediately so

18 that they will be ready."

19 Number five: "Organise militarily, especially in the towns, and

20 give instructions to this effect in the municipal boards and local

21 boards."

22 And number six: "We are not well organised in the media war."

23 And then number seven, he mentions a plebiscite.

24 To the next speaker, Mr. Tutnjevic. On the following page, which

25 is the next to last page containing English language text: "We must call

1 on the JNA to secure the bridges on the Drina." This was intended to

2 secure free passage of goods and materiel from Serbia to Bosnia. "The

3 regions must be ready to impose a blockade of commodity and money channels

4 towards Sarajevo."

5 And finally: "Urgently issue a proclamation setting out the

6 political goals of the Serbian people."

7 Professor Slavko Leovac, who was another senior academic and

8 influential member of the SDS, noted in point two of his presentation that

9 "a republic in which there are three ethnic groups, two of which are

10 linked to their mother countries, cannot be neutral."

11 And finally the last sentence in the document, Biljana Plavsic, a

12 member of the Presidency, states that "the demilitarisation of the JNA is

13 out of the question because a concentration of the Army of Bosnia and

14 Herzegovina has already been announced." This comment pertains to the

15 concentration of forces in Bosnia in the wake of the conflict in

16 Slovenia -- or in Croatia and in support of the military effort there.

17 Now, the primary -- this meeting came to no formally established

18 recommendations, but the primary events that occurred in the next three

19 months were already recommended or backed by one of these speakers. Those

20 were: First of all, the formation of a Serbian assembly, which took place

21 on the 24th of October, 1991; second, the holding of a plebiscite of the

22 Serbian people; and third, the formation of a Serbian Republic of

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was completed on 9 January, 1992.

24 Q. Dr. Donia, you've already referred to the Serbian assembly meeting

25 of the 24th of October of 1991, and if we can briefly look at the minutes

1 of that constituting session, which are behind tab 18, Prosecutor's

2 Exhibit 21, and if you could first of all go to page 36 of those minutes,

3 and that page contains the address on the establishment of a Serbian

4 assembly, and if you could draw the Judges' attention to those significant

5 areas of Mr. Najdanovic's speech on the matter of the establishment of the

6 assembly?

7 A. Yes. These words were spoken at the time that the decision to

8 constitute this assembly was under consideration, and there are two

9 indications that the speaker is Mr. Milutin Najdanovic. There is a change

10 of tapes here right in the middle of his presentation, before his name is

11 mentioned the second time. The first comment I would -- or comment of his

12 that I would note is that just before his name is mentioned the second

13 time, he states, "The Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and

14 Herzegovina will be comprised of the deputies of the SDS and of the

15 Serbian Renewal Movement in the Bosnia-Herzegovina assembly." So this new

16 body consists of deputies in the assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina of

17 Serbian nationality from two particular parties.

18 The second paragraph after the change of tape, "The Assembly of

19 the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina shall debate and decide on

20 issues pertaining to the achievement of equality by the Serbian people

21 with other peoples and nationalities living in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and

22 to protection of the interests of the Serbian people should such interests

23 be put at risk by any decisions reached by the Socialist Republic of

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina assembly."

25 His next sentence pertains to this SDS decision to remain in the

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1 organs, the deliberative bodies of Bosnia-Herzegovina: "The Serbian

2 deputies shall continue working in the chambers and working bodies of the

3 Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina assembly to which they were

4 elected until a final solution is found to the crisis in Bosnia and

5 Herzegovina and Yugoslavia."

6 And then one paragraph down, "The Assembly of the Serbian People

7 in Bosnia and Herzegovina shall recognise the validity of enactments by

8 the Bosnia and Herzegovina assembly, provided they are not contrary to the

9 interests of the Serbian people."

10 I think this speech really represents the spirit and intent of the

11 formation of this assembly as a Serbian-only body devoted to protecting

12 Serb interests against what -- against the -- whatever decisions might be

13 reached by the assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

14 Q. Now, Dr. Donia, you also stated earlier that this same meeting

15 decided that a plebiscite would be held of the Serbian people in Bosnia,

16 and if I can direct you to page 41 of these minutes, which refers to that

17 decision, and if you can explain to the Judges exactly what the purpose of

18 that plebiscite was and who was to participate in it?

19 A. The decision to hold a plebiscite was reached at this assembly.

20 It was to be a plebiscite of the Serbian people of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

21 Others were allowed to vote but they voted on a separate coloured ballot,

22 a yellow ballot, and their votes were tabulated separately, subsequent to

23 this referendum -- or plebiscite, on the 9th and 10th of November, 1991.

24 The assembly, in point 2 of this decision on page 41, essentially

25 states that the decision to remain within Yugoslavia will enter into a --

1 into force on the day it is confirmed at this plebiscite of the Serbian

2 people of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And the question at the plebiscite raised

3 asked each voter to choose whether they wished to remain as part of

4 Yugoslavia.

5 Q. Now, if we can move to the results of the plebiscite, and they are

6 contained in the session of the assembly that was held on the 21st of

7 November of 1991, and unfortunately that involves moving backwards in the

8 file to tab 14, which is Prosecutor's Exhibit 17.

9 A. On page 15 of that document, which is Prosecutor's 17, in the

10 English language variant, the commission for the plebiscite reported the

11 results, and it indicates here that there were over a million votes in

12 favour of the issue on the plebiscite and 398 votes against.

13 On the following page, page 16, there is also an indication that

14 Serbs were allowed to vote in foreign countries. So the last paragraph on

15 that page reports, "The speaker is pleased to inform us that 916 people

16 voted in Sweden, all in favour; 353 voted in the U.S.; some in Great

17 Britain, Germany, Switzerland, and some 30.000 people in Soviet Russia,

18 all of whom voted in favour."

19 Q. Did the Muslim and Croat people of Bosnia-Herzegovina participate

20 in this plebiscite?

21 A. The overwhelming majority of Muslims and Croats did not

22 participate in the plebiscite, did not vote.

23 Q. So in essence, this was a vote of the Serbian people rather than

24 anybody else in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. What in essence was the result of the plebiscite, in terms of what

2 did the people, the Serbian people of Bosnia decide?

3 A. Well, the Serbian people or Serbs of Bosnia voted overwhelmingly

4 to remain in Yugoslavia. In addition, in at least two municipalities,

5 another vote was taken at the same time. In the municipality of Bosanska

6 Krupa and in Donji Vakuf, Serbs were asked another question, given another

7 box, presumably, on the ballot, to ask if they wished to remain a part of

8 Yugoslavia but also a part of a Serbian Assembly of that municipality.

9 So, for example, on page 31 of this same document, the speaker is

10 Mr. Miroslav Vjestica, representative of Bosanska Krupa, and at the very

11 top of the page, he says, "We held a referendum of the Serbian people of

12 Bosanska Krupa municipality along with the plebiscite of the Serbian

13 people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and formed our own municipality called the

14 Serbian Municipality of Bosanska Krupa, since 63 per cent of the present

15 territory of Bosanska Krupa municipality belongs to the Serbian people.

16 In this way, the Serbian people of Bosanska Krupa municipality made the

17 decision to stay a part of the Autonomous Region of Banja Luka and through

18 it a part of Yugoslavia."

19 And on the very top of page 34, we have the representative from

20 Donji Vakuf, who is not identified, say, "Mr. President, people's

21 deputies, ladies and gentlemen, as regards item one of the decision, I

22 would like to ask that we add the people of Donji Vakuf, who added another

23 box on 9 and 10 November on the plebiscite and decided to live in the ARK

24 then. We would like to ask that Donji Vakuf be added to the list on

25 behalf of the 7500 Serbs in Donji Vakuf municipality."

1 Then immediately after that, Mr. Djukic from Olovo makes a similar

2 statement, saying they also added a second box and -- Olovo never joined

3 the ARK, but it, subsequent to this, was listed as part of the SAO of

4 Romanija. Consequently, this plebiscite also served as a vehicle for

5 Serbs in non-Serb majority municipalities to, in a sense, declare they

6 were bypassing the established assembly and affiliate themselves with the

7 ARK.

8 Q. Now, you've specifically stated that these municipalities did not

9 have a Serbian majority - Bosanska Krupa, Donji Vakuf - and if I can refer

10 you briefly to your report, page 48, where you have the ethnic census and

11 those two municipalities are contained in that second table, what was the

12 ethnic composition of those two municipalities, Krupa and Donji Vakuf, in

13 1991?

14 A. Excuse me, this is page 49.

15 Q. I'm sorry, page 49.

16 A. It will show that Bosanski Krupa was -- in 1991 was 24 per cent

17 Serbs and 74 per cent Muslims.

18 Donji Vakuf, its population was 39 per cent Serbs and 55 per cent

19 Muslims and 3 per cent Croats. In each there was a -- and also a small

20 percentage of Yugoslavs and others. So both were 24 and 39 per cent

21 Serbian at this time in 1991.

22 Q. And Muslims were in the majority in both of these municipalities?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. If we can now move back to Tab 21, which is Prosecutor's

25 Exhibit 24. And this is a transcript of the third session of the Assembly

1 of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. And this is page 63 of

2 your report, Dr. Donia.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Now, this session I think is significant for the decision to

5 establish Serbian municipalities.

6 And if I can direct you firstly to page 13 of this document, and

7 if you could briefly summarise for the Judges the discussion that took

8 place during this particular meeting of the SDS -- of the Serbian

9 Assembly. I'm sorry.

10 A. Much of this meeting was taken up with a discussion of the topic

11 of regionalisation, and there was an effort to define "regionalisation"

12 and determine what the next steps would be.

13 One of the early speakers in this debate, Mr. Veselinovic on page

14 13 advocates in the second paragraph of his speech: "I think that the

15 order of moves should be planned plainly speaking to break up the existing

16 municipalities where Serbs are not in a majority, for there are situations

17 of some adjacent local communities of settlements belonging to two

18 municipalities where Serbs are not a majority. This means that from two

19 or three neighbouring municipalities, we have space to form a large nice

20 Serbian municipality."

21 This is that variant of regionalisation I referred to early on in

22 which municipalities were essentially carved up, their Serbian inhabitants

23 identified, and then either join a new -- an existing municipality or form

24 a new one.

25 On the next page, page 14, the chairman, who is Momcilo Krajisnik,

1 states in the last paragraph of his presentation that "only municipalities

2 where Serb delegates are a minority should form such assemblies, as this

3 republican assembly of ours, so as to exercise certain rights. I think

4 that this is the source of the misunderstanding. Veselinovic spoke about

5 regionalisation, the rounding off of territories, like Mr. Vjestica and

6 others are doing." And Mr. Vjestica, of course, was the representative of

7 Bosanska Krupa who had reported on the formation of a Serbian municipality

8 that then affiliated itself with the ARK. But at this point, as evidenced

9 by this paragraph, Mr. Krajisnik supported the formation of these Serbian

10 assemblies only in those municipalities where Serbs were in a minority.

11 On page 22, at the top of the page -- the speaker here is

12 Mr. Rajko Dukic. He's identified on the previous page, page 21, only as

13 Rajko, but I believe that he is -- it's quite clearly Mr. Dukic, based on

14 his other views expressed on regionalisation.

15 "I therefore propose that serious work be done on the issue of

16 regionalisation, not only as a political issue but also as a strategic one

17 where we also have a specific goal. It is necessary to define not only

18 the territorial relationships but also economic, culture, and all other

19 ones."

20 And then if I could turn to page 28, after this discussion which

21 included varying views on exactly what ought to be included in the

22 regionalisation process, at the bottom of the page, the chairman asks for

23 an adoption of a resolution and also mentions a couple of supplements and

24 says that, "the assembly unanimously, with the two mentioned supplements,

25 adopted the proposed recommendation on the establishment of municipal

1 assemblies of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina." And the chairman

2 so noted, adding that the cover letter would specify that "this is

3 recommended where necessary and should in no case be across the board,

4 because the latter would be unnecessary."

5 Now, this suggests to me that as of the 11th of December, 1991,

6 the formation of Serbian assemblies was voluntary for all SDS local

7 boards. The reason, of course, was the extensive discussion that had gone

8 into this decision. But as of the 11th of December, both as it is

9 reflected here in this assembly session and in the version that

10 subsequently appeared in the Official Gazette, this is a decision that's

11 voluntary.

12 Q. Dr. Donia, if we can now move ahead in time to the 19th of

13 December of 1991, to an important document. This is Prosecutor's

14 Exhibit 25, and it's behind Tab 22.

15 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honours, I would like at this stage to

16 interpose a sort of general objection.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Ackerman.

18 MR. ACKERMAN: I think it is up to the Trial Chamber to decide

19 whether a document is important or not, and I object to Mr. Cayley

20 identifying documents as important and crucial and -- we're getting his

21 opinion, basically, which we shouldn't be getting.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Your objection is sustained, Mr. Ackerman.

23 MR. ACKERMAN: Thank you.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: Please, Mr. Cayley, I think you take the point, and

25 I'm sure you understand. So move ahead.

1 MR. CAYLEY: I think somewhere in his report he makes reference to

2 it being a critical document, but I won't state that if Mr. Ackerman has

3 an objection.

4 Q. Dr. Donia, that particular document, the title is clear. I won't

5 rehearse it on to the transcript. But rather than me pointing out to you

6 areas in the document which are critical, could you go through it,

7 essentially identify for the Judges the sections which you believe are the

8 essence of the document and state why they are and what they actually

9 mean.

10 A. With this document of 19 December, eight days after the Serbian

11 Assembly meeting, the formation of separate Serbian institutions moved

12 from being voluntary to being mandatory for SDS local boards. I would add

13 that this is a somewhat complex document in my view, and it's, I think,

14 best understood by comparing the two variants, Variants A and B.

15 Variant A describes those municipalities in which Serbs

16 constituted a majority of the population. That is spelled out in point

17 three of the second -- it's the opposite side of the cover page in the

18 English translation under -- under point capital "One," there's a "3"

19 there in which it spells out these two variants.

20 In addition, the document describes actions to be taken under the

21 first stage and the second stage. So in a sense, this is a document that

22 prescribes transition from regionalisation to a preparedness for war.

23 And I'll just read a few excerpts from this. On the -- at page 3

24 of the document in the English translation, point three: "The SDS

25 municipal board will immediately form a crisis staff of the Serbian people

1 in the municipality." It then spells out those people who are to be

2 members of the crisis staff in Variant A.

3 If I can just flash to page 6, in Variant B -- on page 6, Variant

4 B, point three, the very same directive is given: "The SDS municipal

5 board will immediately form a crisis staff of the Serbian people." It's

6 less detailed in spelling out who is to -- who are to be members of the

7 crisis staff. The reason for that is that in the Variant A municipalities

8 which were already under SDS leadership, it could be safely assumed that

9 all those offices mentioned in Variant A were already filled by SDS

10 appointees or those who met SDS satisfaction.

11 Now, in Variant A, again on page 3, point four was: "To convene

12 and proclaim an assembly of Serbian people in the municipality comprised

13 of deputies from the ranks of Serbian people in the municipal assembly."

14 So this echoes exactly what the Serbian Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina had

15 done on the 24th of October, take those deputies from the municipal

16 assembly who are from the ranks of the Serbian people and proclaim a

17 separate body.

18 The very same recommendation is found on page 6 for Variant B,

19 also in point four.

20 The first stage in both variants was to create these institutions

21 but to take only very limited steps of implementation. It remained for

22 the second stage to actually take power in these municipalities, and the

23 prescription for taking power was slightly different in the Variant A and

24 Variant B cases. But if I could turn to the last page, page 8, under

25 heading 3, the last two points, 3 and 4, specify how this process is to be

1 triggered. Number 3, "The order to carry out the specified tasks,

2 measures and other activities in these instructions is given exclusively

3 by the Bosnia-Herzegovina SDS president using a secret, pre-established

4 procedure." And then point 4, "The secret procedure for transmitting and

5 accepting the order to carry out these tasks, measures and other

6 activities specified in these instructions shall be established at a

7 future time."

8 The Variant B second stage was characterised by procedures that

9 were more secret and which were to take place in those parts of the

10 municipality in which a majority of Serbs lived. So, for example, on page

11 7, point 4, in this second implementation stage, "Those municipalities

12 which did not have a Serbian majority were to organise the constant

13 protection of all vital facilities, communication lines and production

14 capabilities in inhabited areas with a majority Serbian population." And

15 over the page now, on page 8, point 5, "In inhabited areas with a majority

16 Serbian population, increase reserve stocks of food and other essential

17 household products in an organised way and in other appropriate ways."

18 I guess that means disorganised way.

19 Number 6, "At approaches to areas inhabited by a Serbian

20 population, organise secret patrols and an information system focusing on

21 all possible dangers for the Serbian population."

22 This document was very explicit about many of the steps to be

23 undertaken, and yet it gave no deadline. There were no deadlines

24 contained in the document, no time frame for these things to be done.

25 However, there is a substantial record of changes throughout

1 municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina that corresponded to the

2 instructions contained in this document for the first stage, and in many

3 municipalities, Serb assemblies were convened and proclaimed within days

4 of this document being issued. There was, however, substantial resistance

5 to it as well from some local SDS boards, and consequently, by the end of

6 March, there were still many municipalities in which this first stage had

7 not been implemented.

8 Q. Dr. Donia, if I can just draw your attention to a number of

9 sections. In particular, let's look at Variant B, where the Serbian

10 population was in a minority and specifically page 7, paragraph 2 --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- of the second stage.

13 A. This states that the local boards are directed to mobilise all

14 police forces from the ranks of the Serbian people, and in cooperation

15 with command posts and headquarters of the JNA, ensure their gradual

16 subordination.

17 Q. And the next paragraph, paragraph 3, to summarise it, is stating

18 that the JNA reserve units and TO units should be mobilised?

19 A. Right, ensure that the order is put into effect to mobilise JNA

20 reserve forces and TO units.

21 Q. Where did the real authority for that order lie in

22 Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991 and 1992?

23 A. Well, the authority to mobilise JNA reserve units was in fact a

24 matter of great dispute, but the primary claimant was the JNA. The

25 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, at a number of points, disputed that, but

1 the mobilisation of TO units was a function of the Republic of

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

3 Q. If you were to sum up this document in a very brief statement,

4 what is this document as a whole?

5 A. It's a set of quite specific and detailed instructions to prepare

6 for war, to create new institutions, to make preparations for armed

7 conflict, and then to implement certain steps on the instructions of the

8 SDS central leadership.

9 Q. If we can now move to Prosecutor's Exhibit 27, which is behind tab

10 24, what is this declaration? And if you can link it to the Variant A,

11 Variant B document that we have just discussed?

12 A. I have three pieces of paper here, which are part of P27, and the

13 second sheet that I have is a two-sided English-language sheet, which is

14 -- reflects a decision, if I'm correct in this, that everyone has this --

15 this particular document is the decision of the Serbian Municipality of

16 Bihac to constitute itself, that is to organise, in a meeting held on

17 December 21, 1991.

18 There is then the first page, which is -- I don't have a

19 translation, though.

20 Q. Dr. Donia, sorry, we are awaiting a translation of the first page,

21 so if you deal simply with the decision, and you'll find the page after

22 that, the original version --

23 A. Right.

24 Q. -- of the document is in place.

25 A. The first page is in fact a decision of the Bihac assembly to join

1 the ARK, adopted on the -- I think on the 28th of December.

2 Q. Now, the second decision or, in fact, it's the first decision

3 because it's the 21st of December, 1991, the decision for which there is a

4 translation, how many days after the instructions on Variant A, Variant B

5 was this decision made by Bihac?

6 A. This is two days after the instructions from the 19th of December.

7 Q. Did Bihac fall within the classification of Variant A or

8 Variant B?

9 A. It was a Variant B municipality.

10 Q. So Serbs were in a minority in Bihac?

11 A. Yes.

12 MR. CAYLEY: Now, Mr. President, the next document that I want to

13 refer to, we don't have a translation of that document into English. I

14 don't know how you wish to deal with that.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: Well, we point it out to the witness first. We'll

16 see whether he is in a position to enlighten us on it, and then we can

17 take a decision whether to proceed on it or not.

18 Please keep in mind that we have roughly five to ten minutes more

19 before we break and so adjust your preference to continue with the

20 cross-examination -- with the examination-in-chief now or we break now and

21 continue in half an hour's time. I mean, choose whatever suits you. I'm

22 leaving you the option. I don't know how long you intend to question the

23 witness on the next document, in other words.

24 MR. CAYLEY: Tantalisingly close to the end of this file, Your

25 Honour, but I don't think I'm going to finish it in five minutes, but

1 certainly I can deal with this document in five minutes. It's a short

2 document.

3 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Then proceed. Which document are we talking

4 about?

5 MR. CAYLEY: I'm sorry, we are referring to tab 25, Prosecutor's

6 Exhibit 28.

7 Q. What is this document, Dr. Donia?

8 A. This is the decision of the Assembly of the Serbian People of

9 Prijedor at its session on the 17th of January, 1992, to join the ARK.

10 MR. CAYLEY: Do you wish -- Mr. President, do you wish there to be

11 a translation of this document into English? The witness can actually

12 read it into the transcript and then the interpreters who have --

13 JUDGE AGIUS: It's a very short document, Mr. Cayley. If

14 Dr. Donia is in a position to tell us what it says, it would be easy and

15 it will lighten our burden in any case, if he's in a position to do that.

16 THE WITNESS: I can read it - it's very brief - and ask the oral

17 translation to come through, if you wish.

18 [Interpretation] "On the basis of the rules of procedure of the

19 work of the assembly of the Serbian Municipality of Prijedor, at a session

20 of the assembly held on the 17th of January, 1992, we hereby take the

21 following decision on joining the Autonomous Region of Bosanska Krajina.

22 Article 1: The Assembly of the Serbian People of Prijedor

23 municipality hereby unanimously adopt" - the word is not clear, but it is

24 probably "decision" - "on joining the Serbian territory of the Prijedor

25 municipality of Bosanska Krajina."

1 Article 2: This decision shall enter into force on the day of its

2 adoption at the meeting of the Assembly of the Serbian people of Prijedor

3 municipality.

4 A signature by the President of the Assembly of the Serbian people

5 of Prijedor municipality. The name is not clear.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Cayley.

7 MR. CAYLEY: I think, Mr. President, if you wish, we can pause at

8 this point.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: So the Chamber will rise, and we will resume at ten

10 to 10.00 -- at ten to 11.00. Sorry, ten to 11.00.

11 --- Recess taken at 10.27 a.m.

12 --- On resuming at 10.54 a.m.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Please call the witness in, please, Donia.

14 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Your Honour.

15 Q. Dr. Donia, you had referred to the decision by Prijedor. In fact,

16 you'd read out the decision in the original version. Now, this decision

17 in fact not only declares a Serbian assembly in Prijedor but it also

18 decides to join the Autonomous Region of Krajina; is that correct?

19 A. It is a decision to join the -- the ARK, yes.

20 Q. Now, just to digress for a moment. Prijedor. From your

21 knowledge, your expertise, what was the historical significance of the

22 municipality of Prijedor?

23 A. Prijedor was a scene of considerable fighting in World War II, and

24 in fact a major battle was fought in -- near Prijedor between the

25 Partisans and the Germans with their Ustasha allies. And that became a --

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12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

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1 very much part of the kind of legacy of Partisan culture in

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, in all of Yugoslavia. But in Prijedor in particular,

3 the -- probably the most imposing monument to the Partisans and victims of

4 World War II is located just outside Prijedor on -- at Mirkovica on Mount

5 Kozara.

6 Q. In terms of its strategic position in the country in

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, why is Prijedor important?

8 A. Well, it's located, first of all, in the heart of the Krajina.

9 And it has a population that was mixed. It had no group with an absolute

10 majority. Its Serbian population had been gradually declining, while its

11 percentage of Muslims was gradually increasing.

12 If I could just refer to page 49 of the report for a minute, one

13 will see that it's about as close between the Muslims and Serbs as one can

14 get. So the assembly -- municipal assembly elected in 1990 was also

15 largely split between the HDZ -- SDA and SDS. It also has a relatively

16 high percentage of Yugoslavs, reflecting that Partisan legacy and

17 tradition.

18 Q. If you could turn to the next document, which is Tab 26,

19 Prosecutor's Exhibit 29. Briefly -- there is a English translation of

20 this document. If you could summarise what the effect of the document

21 is.

22 A. This is the decision of the Serbian municipality of Kotor Varos on

23 7th February 1992 to join the ARK.

24 Q. Now, the next document which is behind Tab 27 --

25 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, there is an English translation for

1 this document, which I've just discovered. I previously thought there was

2 not a English translation. But I will wait to receive that in the

3 courtroom before I actually refer to that document because it's quite

4 important that the translation is available.

5 Q. And in the meantime, Dr. Donia, if you could go back to Tab 23,

6 which is Prosecutor's Exhibit 26. Now, this is a meeting, the twelfth

7 session of the Serbian Assembly held on the 24th of March of 1992. And if

8 you could go, please, to pages 23 and 24. And if you could explain to the

9 Court the effect of that particular decision.

10 A. The bottom of page 23 contains the decision of the Serbian

11 Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina to verify the establishment of new

12 Serbian municipalities which would be in accord with those provisions of

13 the directive of 19 December, 1991, and lists some, I think, 35 of them or

14 so. So this is, in a sense, an inventory at this point in time of those

15 SDS local boards that had complied with the directive and established a

16 Serbian -- to the degree of establishing a Serbian Assembly of their

17 municipality.

18 There was further concern, however, expressed at this meeting that

19 the task of forming Serbian assemblies in all municipalities had not been

20 completed and not been completed properly. And on -- about one-third of

21 the way down page 24, the chairperson, who would be Mr. Krajisnik,

22 explained that, "All the presidents of autonomous districts had received

23 instructions and should have prepared and organised this." This is a

24 reference to the SAOs. "Those who have not done it should do so by

25 Friday." I will represent to you that this was a Tuesday, so...

1 "Can we verify this and finish what has not been done so far by

2 Friday when we shall adopt the law? The assembly unanimously verifies the

3 decisions by municipalities on the proclamation of newly established

4 Serbian municipalities. Municipalities which have not done so shall

5 submit by Friday their decisions verified by the competent organs."

6 The date of Friday was simply the next scheduled session of the

7 Serbian Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

8 So this document speaks to the fact that the absence of a deadline

9 in the document of 19 December had resulted in only partial compliance

10 from the SDS local boards, and in those municipalities in which it was

11 appropriate, it was to be completed now within three days.

12 MR. CAYLEY: If we can go back to tab 27, it's Prosecutor's

13 Exhibit 30, and I'll just hand out through the usher just the English

14 version of this. I believe the B/C/S is complete. If it's not, we can

15 correct that afterwards.

16 Having checked the document, Mr. President, the B/C/S version, the

17 version in Cyrillic, is complete.

18 Do Your Honours have a copy of that document? Yes, I think the

19 Defence do as well.

20 Q. Now, Dr. Donia, if you go to the second page of the translation,

21 which is the decision on the establishment of the Serbian Municipality of

22 Donji Vakuf --

23 MR. ACKERMAN: Excuse me a moment, I assume that this should now

24 get a - maybe it already has - an evidence number.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: This would be 30A, P30A.

1 MR. ACKERMAN: "A"? Thank you.

2 MR. CAYLEY:

3 Q. So referring to Prosecutor's Exhibit 30A, Donji Vakuf, who was --

4 which ethnic group was in the majority in that municipality?

5 A. This was a municipality with a majority of Muslim inhabitants.

6 Q. Now, if you go to the preamble to this decision, at the top of the

7 page, on the -- it's the page that's numbered 1 at the bottom, but it's

8 the second page of the translation, and you will see, Dr. Donia, on the

9 fifth line, that, "This decision is being made pursuant to Article 4 of

10 the instructions for the organisation and activities of the organs of the

11 Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina in extraordinary circumstances of

12 19 December, 1991."

13 Dr. Donia, is that referring to the

14 Variant A - Variant B document that we spoke about this morning?

15 A. Yes. That would be a reference to that document.

16 Q. And which variant was being implemented in this municipality?

17 A. With less than 50 per cent Serbs, this would be a Variant B

18 municipality.

19 Q. Do you have anything else to say about this particular decision?

20 A. Well, the document is actually three related documents. The first

21 page is a request for membership in the ARK and references two

22 enclosures: number 1, the decision on establishing the Serbian

23 municipality of Donji Vakuf on 15 February; and number 2, on the same

24 session, or at the same date of 15 February, the decision of that

25 municipality to join the ARK. This follows what I believe we saw earlier

1 in Bihac, where the decision to join -- to create a Serbian municipality

2 is followed, either immediately or after some brief period of time, with a

3 decision to join the ARK. So this document speaks for the case of Donji

4 Vakuf with the use of the Serbian assembly as a growth vehicle for the

5 ARK. It recalls very similarly what was done by Mr. Vjestica in Bosanska

6 Krupa and in, I think, Olovo, earlier.

7 I would add that as I've surveyed the various reports in the

8 periodical press, this was a not universal but common for those Serbia --

9 or those municipalities in which a Serbian municipality was organised, for

10 a decision to join one of the SAOs to be taken simultaneously or shortly

11 thereafter.

12 Q. And on that note, if you go to tab 26, Prosecutor's Exhibit 29,

13 this is a decision by the municipality of Kotor Varos. Does this reflect

14 what you've just been saying to the Court?

15 A. Yes. This would reflect the decision to join the ARK by Kotor

16 Varos.

17 Q. If we can now move on to what is page 65 of your report. We're

18 moving ahead in time now in respect of the whole of your report to January

19 1992. And this is Prosecutor's Exhibit 31, the 11th session of the

20 assembly of the ARK.

21 What was decided, Dr. Donia, at this particular meeting that's

22 significant in terms of your report?

23 A. At this meeting of the ARK Assembly, the study of Bosnian Krajina

24 as a constituent part of the new Yugoslav federation was given to each

25 person. That's reflected on page 3 of this document, under section 3, the

1 second sentence. And this study subsequently became the basis for several

2 unanimously adopted recommendations.

3 It will be recalled that the republic, the Serbian Republic of

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, was declared on 9 January 1992. So this session is

5 being held just one day before the Serbian Republic is proclaimed in

6 Sarajevo. And of the recommendations is -- of note, number three, also

7 under this section 3, on page 3 -- that "the assembly of the Serbian

8 people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as it is constituted today, fulfil its

9 function by defining and constituting Serbian regions in

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina, which will be part of the Yugoslav state and through

11 which they will be represented until the constitution of a future Yugoslav

12 Assembly."

13 So this request of the Serbian Assembly is to recognise the

14 Serbian regions as a constituent part of the future Yugoslav Assembly, in

15 a sense bypassing the actual Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and

16 submitting them directly to be a part of Yugoslavia.

17 Q. On that note, if you go to the last page, page 4, of that

18 document, where it begins, "It was decided at this session that a

19 commission ..."

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. What is the significance of that paragraph in these minutes?

22 A. In this paragraph, the ARK Assembly is deciding to dispatch a

23 commission directly to Belgrade to have talks with the Serbian president,

24 Milosevic, as opposed to mediating that to the Assembly of the Serbian

25 people or the Bosnian Serb Republic.

1 Q. Now, you've referred to two events: first of all, the declaration

2 that the Bosnian Krajina is to be a part of the Yugoslav Federation; and

3 secondly, the declaration of the Bosnian Serb Republic.

4 Now, there was a third event that was taking place simultaneously

5 at this time. And you've referred to it on page 65 of your report. And

6 that was the recommendations of the Badinter Commission. Could you

7 explain to the Court what those recommendations were and what the Badinter

8 Commission actually was.

9 A. Well, if I can return to this level of international negotiations

10 for a moment. Once the international conference on Yugoslavia was

11 established, it became evident in September 1991 that the solution to the

12 war in Croatia was going to involve some form of recognition of a Serb --

13 or of a Croatian state and some element of a territorially distinct

14 Serbian component within that state.

15 At the same time, the republics of Slovenia and Croatia had

16 declared independence back in June and agreed to defer the effectiveness

17 of those declarations until October 8th, 1991. So with the background of

18 these developments, the European Community sought to address the Yugoslav

19 question consistently and on the basis of certain guidelines. It

20 established the Badinter Commission to evaluate the applications of any

21 Yugoslav republics that wished to apply for recognition of their

22 independence. This was done in December 1991. And the Badinter

23 Commission on 17 December 1991 invited applications from any Yugoslav

24 republics wishing to apply for recognition.

25 On the 20th of December, the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina

1 voted to apply for such independence. The decision was due -- the

2 decision of the Badinter Commission was due on the 15th of January, 1992.

3 While it was a foregone conclusion -- pretty much a foregone conclusion

4 that this decision would award independence to Croatia and Slovenia, the

5 situation on Bosnia-Herzegovina was less clear. And when the decision was

6 announced on 15 January 1992, the Badinter Commission required that

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina hold a referendum on independence if it wished to be

8 recognised as an independent state by the European Community.

9 Subsequently, both the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Presidency

10 voted to hold such a referendum on February 29 and March 1, 1992.

11 In the shadow of these events, simultaneously with these events,

12 of course, the Serbian Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina made preparations in

13 late December to proclaim a separate republic, and subsequently did so on

14 9 July -- or 9 January 1992.

15 At the same time that the decision to form the republic was taken,

16 it began preparations for a constitution of that republic and made plans

17 to finalise or announce that constitution of the Serbian Republic of

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina at the end of February 1992 roughly to coincide with

19 the scheduled referendum.

20 Q. Dr. Donia, you brought us to the end of February. Let's go back

21 to Banja Luka. And if I can take you to Tab 29, Prosecutor's Exhibit 32,

22 which are minutes of the thirteenth session of the Assembly of the ARK.

23 And the matters that you've broadly referred to are being discussed in

24 these minutes. Can you draw the Judges' attentions to the relevant and

25 pertinent parts of these minutes.

1 A. The ARK Assembly was discussing the provisions of the constitution

2 of the Serbian republic to which I just referred.

3 And on page 1 of this document, P32, at the very bottom,

4 Mr. Radoslav Brdjanin makes the statement that, "It is realistic to make

5 Banja Luka the capital of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

6 Tomorrow in Sarajevo, we must all support the idea of cantons having the

7 highest degree of autonomy." Now, this tomorrow in Sarajevo refers to a

8 meeting to discuss the draft constitution of the Serbian Republic.

9 And as a part of this meeting, there were decisions adopted on --

10 this is the third page of this document, the one -- the page has at the

11 top of it Article 103(a). And at the very bottom of that page is the

12 point 1, paragraph, "The following conclusions were adopted after a

13 five-hour discussion. In order to preserve the unity of the Serbian

14 people in BH and the SDS, the constituting of the Serbian Republic in BH

15 is accepted but as a derived state structure to which the Serbian

16 republics or cantons (as 'real states with genuine internal sovereignty')

17 transfer some of their competence, or to be more precise, certain

18 coordinating functions."

19 So the ARK here is proposing that it interpose its authority and

20 assert its sovereignty against the -- or within the Bosnian Serb Republic,

21 much as the Bosnian Serb Republic had just -- was in the process of doing

22 for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

23 Then turning the page, point 2, "Only Banja Luka, as the biggest

24 city in BH in which the Serbs make up the absolute majority, can be the

25 centre of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

1 And finally, a threat, point 3, "If the Serbian Assembly of BH

2 fails to accept the above-mentioned conclusions at its session on 25 and

3 26 February, that is, if BH is constituted as a unitary state with

4 Sarajevo as its capital, as already intimated by the draft constitution,"

5 and then to the bottom of that paragraph, "On 28 February, the Krajina

6 should be proclaimed a sovereign republic which will establish relations

7 directly with other parts of BH."

8 So this document then states the intent of the ARK, as adopted in

9 these resolutions, to declare itself a sovereign republic if the Serbian

10 Republic does not recognise it and give it substantial autonomy in its

11 constitution.

12 Q. Dr. Donia, if you can now go to the next binder, and indeed if we

13 could all do that now, please?

14 A. With pleasure.

15 Q. Now, you stated in your evidence that the ARK assembly had

16 referred to a meeting that was to take place the next day, and the next

17 day after the 24th of February was the 25th of February.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And I'm right in saying that that meeting was the eighth session

20 of the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

21 A. Yes, it was.

22 Q. And Prosecutor's Exhibit 33 Alpha are the minutes of that

23 meeting?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Just to orientate us in respect of events going on generally at

1 the international level, what had Dr. Karadzic been up to during this

2 period?

3 A. In the early months of 1992, talks were convened by the Conference

4 on Yugoslavia in Lisbon - not Brussels, Lisbon - and on the 17th of

5 February, 1992, an agreement in principle was reached by the three

6 principals from Bosnia, that is Dr. Radovan Karadzic, Mr. Mate Boban, I

7 believe, and the -- Mr. Izetbegovic. This was essentially an agreement to

8 partition Bosnia into three distinct parts. And upon returning to

9 Sarajevo after the conclusion of this agreement in principle, which was to

10 be followed by further negotiations, Dr. Karadzic addressed the eighth

11 session of the assembly and was quite ecstatic, in fact, about the

12 achievement of having a separate Serbian entity recognised through these

13 negotiations, and the early pages of this document reflect that enthusiasm

14 for the negotiations as they had proceeded that far. But suddenly, on

15 page 11 of this document, towards the bottom of the page, we see that

16 Mr. Karadzic's remarks were interrupted by a telephone call from Mr. Jose

17 Cutilliero, and he left the assembly hall with apologies.

18 Q. Who was Jose Cutilliero?

19 A. Mr. Cutilliero was in charge of -- he was the coordinator, the

20 convenor, of those negotiations in Lisbon on behalf of the Conference on

21 the Yugoslavia. When he left the hall, as can be seen, Professor Nikola

22 Koljevic proceeded to do what I think is called, in the radio business,

23 filling air, and talked for several pages about the negotiations and

24 similarly shared Dr. Karadzic's enthusiasm.

25 On page 13, about one-quarter of the way down the page, we see

1 that Dr. Karadzic returns to the assembly hall and Professor Koljevic

2 continues his speech on to page 14, and in that last paragraph on page 14,

3 I think he puts the achievement in pretty good perspective, actually.

4 Where he says, in the last paragraph, "Another general impression, I

5 believe that after the establishment of the SDS and then regionalisation,

6 this is the third political event in order of importance." And he's

7 referring here to this agreement in principle reached in Lisbon. "It is a

8 step in the direction of winning back the disenfranchised rights that the

9 Serbian people were deprived of in these parts." So he gives the --

10 attributes great importance to this achievement of a separate Serbian

11 state, agreed in principle at Lisbon.

12 When Dr. Karadzic resumes, however, he reports on his conversation

13 with Cutilliero and states that Cutilliero has received a letter from

14 Izetbegovic and that letter, which was published all over the world at

15 that time, basically stated that due to events in Banja Luka and the

16 convening of an assembly in Banja Luka in which it was discussed that

17 there will be a constitution proclaimed for the Bosnian Serb Republic, he

18 found further discussions on this agreement to be pointless.

19 So in the immediate aftermath of this discussion of Cutilliero's

20 interrupting phone call, Karadzic became very -- expressed extreme

21 displeasure with the autonomous direction that was being taken by the ARK

22 assembly. If one goes to page 17, the third line - and recalling that it

23 was their intention to accept the draft constitution that day - Karadzic

24 says, "It would not be a good idea to adopt the constitution today as that

25 would be a reason for Cutilliero not to come." They were planning to

1 reconvene these discussions in Sarajevo. "Or to make any move which might

2 affect what we agree today. He told me today, 'Fine, if you can keep the

3 Serbs quiet,' and I explained that this thing in Krajina reflected their

4 distrust of Alija Izetbegovic with whom we had talked for three months at

5 a time. And just as we thought we had reached an agreement, he would come

6 up with a completely different document, which is why the Serbs do not

7 trust him."

8 But it subsequently became evident that Karadzic's irritation

9 with -- or blaming this on Izetbegovic did not just stop him from also

10 blaming those in the Krajina who were pursuing an autonomous course and

11 resisting the authority of the SDS main board.

12 On page 44, the second full paragraph: "Of course the Serbian

13 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina will have its regents with full freedom to

14 act according to the interests of the Serbian people. However, I promise

15 you, Bosnian Krajina must not become an issue. If it becomes an issue,

16 then we will lose the Knin Krajina." The Krajina across the border in

17 Croatia. "Alija is praying to God that we succeed, that we screw up. They

18 will send in UN forces, create zone A and zone B, and we are certain to

19 lose one of them, and the other will be part of an independent BH with all

20 sorts of conditions imposed."

21 And then one paragraph down: "We cannot allow that five people

22 with personal ambitions destroy our chances. We are very close to

23 achieving our strategic objections.

24 Q. Who is speaking there, Dr. Donia?

25 A. Dr. Karadzic is speaking. That's identified on page 42.

1 Now, on page 74, we see the resolution that was proposed by

2 assembly president Krajisnik at this time, which was to convene a session

3 of the ARK Assembly in Banja Luka and have it attended by essentially the

4 entire senior leadership of the SDS party in order to persuade them to

5 accept the constitution -- the draft constitution of the Serbian

6 Republic.

7 Q. Do you have any further comments on that document?

8 A. No.

9 Q. If we could now go to Tab 30, which is Prosecutor's Exhibit 35.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: [Microphone not activated]

11 MR. CAYLEY: 34. I'm sorry.

12 Q. Now, Dr. Donia, this is a transcript of the meeting of the

13 deputy's club of the Serbian Democratic party held in Sarajevo on the 28th

14 of February, 1992; is that right?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Can you draw the Court's attention to the significant parts of

17 this document. And just -- just to clarify matters, this particular

18 meeting takes place three days after the assembly meeting that you've just

19 been referring to, doesn't it?

20 A. Yes. This is on 28 February, and it was held at -- in the

21 morning. On the second page, we see it began at 10.30 hours. And in the

22 afternoon, there was another session of the Serbian Assembly. So this

23 meeting preceded that meeting, and the afternoon meeting resulted in the

24 adoption of a constitution of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

25 But it was at this earlier meeting of the SDS deputies that the issue of

1 the ARK was again addressed and some -- many complaints were launched

2 about the, let's say, wilfulness or assertions of the ARK leadership.

3 On page 28, the speaker, Mr. Marinko Kontic -- about two-thirds of

4 the way down the page, the paragraph begins: "The problem in Banja Luka.

5 And I will tell you who the people need to be marked are: the President of

6 the Assembly, Radic, and Mr. Brdjanin, whom I have feared from day one. I

7 have had a few clashes with him, and I think there's something wrong with

8 him. There is a sickness in that man who always wants to be the boss, and

9 he's interested only in power. There is some other people there too."

10 I would note that Kontic goes on to defend Vojo Kupresanin, the

11 president of the ARK Assembly.

12 The next speaker here is -- or a couple of speakers later is

13 Dr. Karadzic, who begins speaking on 33, and on page 36 makes further

14 references to the Krajina. About three-quarters of the way down the

15 paragraph, it begins: "We can and we must renounce everyone who refuses

16 to work the way we have agreed, Brdjo and all the rest. When Brdjo

17 appears somewhere, he's like a bomb. He blows everything up. Then he

18 winks at him. And I won't allow it as a psychiatrist and as the party

19 leader."

20 The solution that emerged from this particular session was

21 essentially to blame the difficulties, the kind of self-will of the

22 Krajina Assembly, on five or six individuals who were kind of second-tier

23 members of the assembly, and then to adopt within the actual constitution

24 of the Serbian republic a recognition of the existence of the Serbian

25 autonomous regions but without specifying that the -- the concession was

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7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 that they didn't specify that the territory of the Serbian republic was

2 indivisible. They did, however, identify or define the territory of the

3 Serbian republic as made up of the territories of the Serbian autonomous

4 regions, and in a number of constitutional provisions, starting with

5 Article 100 to about 108, assigned them certain functions

6 constitutionally.

7 Q. Let's go to the next day, the 29th of February of 1992, and we'll

8 go back to Banja Luka. And if I can direct you to Tab 31, Prosecutor's

9 Exhibit 35, which is an extract from the minutes of the fourteenth session

10 of the Assembly of the ARK.

11 First of all, who attended this meeting? Specifically, I'm

12 referring to people from, as it were, the republican level SDS party.

13 A. The attendees given in the third paragraph here comprised most of

14 the senior leaders of the SDS. Consequently, this is the realisation of

15 Mr. Krajisnik's proposal that all of the senior members of the SDS descend

16 on Banja Luka and attend this session. So Radovan Karadzic is present,

17 Krajisnik, Nikola Koljevic, and Velibor Ostojic, who is the Minister of

18 Information.

19 In number one of this extract, the second paragraph, Mr. Radoslav

20 Brdjanin, the Vice-President of the Assembly of the autonomous region, I

21 think in a wonderful understatement, recalled that the deputies in this

22 assembly, that is the ARK, "had reached an agreement at the previous

23 session on the integrity of the republic of the Serbian people in

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina but with a different viewpoint compared to the one

25 offered to the people of the Krajina from the centre in Sarajevo."

1 On the next page, we see at the top that Dr. Karadzic spoke and

2 then that the ARK Assembly voted to accept his report on the political and

3 security situation in full, that under the section labelled "Conclusion."

4 And this compromise, which brings the ARK under the umbrella of the

5 Serbian Republic, is expressed in the next two paragraphs there. "Jovan

6 Cizmovic, coordinator in the Serbian government BH, recalled that the ARK

7 can draw its autonomy from the recently adopted constitution of the

8 Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that if a republic of Krajina

9 were declared, all Serbs outside this territory would suffer from the

10 consequences of this decision." So they backed down from the idea of an

11 independent or sovereign republic.

12 And in the second paragraph there, Radovan Karadzic stressed that

13 "it would be a crime against the Krajina if it were declared a

14 republic."

15 On the next page, point one, the deputies in the Assembly of the

16 ARK accepted the constitution of the Republic of the Serbian people of

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina in full. This meeting essentially brought to an end

18 the clash between the ARK and the central leadership of the SDS regarding

19 its status under that constitutional document.

20 Q. Dr. Donia, if we can now go to Tab 33, which is Prosecutor's

21 Exhibit 37. And this -- and this is the instruction regarding the conduct

22 of the plebiscite of the Muslim and Croatian people in Bosnia and

23 Herzegovina. And this is an instruction from the Serbian Assembly of the

24 ARK.

25 A. Yes. It's from the ARK Assembly, yes.

1 Q. And just to clarify matters, this is the -- referring to the

2 plebiscite or referendum that you previously spoke of that had been

3 recommended by the Badinter Commission.

4 A. Yes. And --

5 Q. What instruction was the Serbian Assembly of the ARK giving in

6 respect of this referendum?

7 A. Well, in the first point here under this instruction, the ARK

8 instructs assemblies of municipalities not to organise any activities

9 regarding the conduct of this referendum. In the second point, it calls

10 this vote for an independent and sovereign Bosnia unconstitutional and

11 illegal because it was called by an unauthorized organ in violation of the

12 decision -- or of the constitution by a decision of the rump assembly of

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina without Serbian deputies and therefore says that in all

14 municipalities in which the SDS won the elections, the official organs of

15 authorities shall have no obligations whatsoever to secure the premises on

16 which the voting is supposed to take place.

17 So this document essentially moves beyond asking for a non-vote or

18 boycott by Serbian voters to the level of the municipalities'

19 responsibility and relieves those municipalities of any obligation to

20 conduct the voting.

21 Q. Dr. Donia, did the referendum subsequently take place?

22 A. Yes. The referendum was held as scheduled on the 29th of February

23 and the 1st of March, and at that referendum, very few Serbs voted, and

24 the overwhelming majority of voters, almost all of whom were Croats and

25 Muslims, voted in favour of independence and sovereignty for

1 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2 Q. When was Bosnia-Herzegovina recognised by the international

3 community as a sovereign state?

4 A. The European Community recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina on April 6,

5 1992. The United States followed the next day, April 7th, with that

6 recognition. And that's the date -- the date of 6 April is normally used

7 as date of recognition for Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence.

8 Q. I want to briefly go through the next series of documents, which

9 is tabs 34 through to 38. So if you could have the first document in

10 front of you, which is tab 34, Prosecutor's Exhibit 38, this is an extract

11 of the minutes of the assembly of the ARK held on the 4th of March of

12 1992.

13 A. Yes. In this decision -- or in this meeting, on the second page

14 of the document, we see there was an election of the executive council, or

15 the president designated the executive council, and under point 3, the

16 first of several decisions to assert authority over public functions

17 within the ARK territory. Point 3 is, "The adoption of a decision to form

18 the security services centre of the ARK, without debate." And on the next

19 page, point 6, "The adoption of a decision to form the Krajina public

20 enterprise for wholesale and retail trade in goods." And then on the

21 fourth page of the document, turning the page over, point 9, 'The election

22 and appointment of a director-general for payment transactions and

23 financial supervision of the ARK.'

24 If I may, I would just go to the next document, which is behind

25 tab 35 and is Prosecutor's Exhibit 38.

1 JUDGE AGIUS: 39.

2 MR. CAYLEY:

3 Q. 39.

4 A. 39, excuse me. The point 1 of this decision of the ARK on 11

5 April, 1992, was to transfer to the state ownership of the Serbian

6 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina the federal commodity reserves and

7 commodity reserves of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. These reserves

8 were much more substantial than in other systems that I was aware of and

9 constituted a sort of major resource in the event of emergency

10 situations.

11 I'm with trepidation going to move over to --

12 Q. I'll give you the exhibit numbers because there was some confusion

13 yesterday at this point, but I think I have it correct. If you could go

14 to the next document behind tab 36, which is Prosecutor's Exhibit 40?

15 A. All right. This document, dated 15 April, 1992, which is nine

16 days after the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence, is

17 directed from the president of the ARK Assembly, Vojo Kupresanin, to

18 municipal assembly presidents, and he asks that -- "Hereby asks you to

19 immediately take the following actions in your municipality: Number 1,

20 activate the TO staff or Territorial Defence staff in your municipality."

21 And then next to last, that four-line item, "Organise the effective

22 protection of people, goods, organs of authority, electricity supply

23 facilities, the PTT," which is the post office, "industrial facilities,

24 radio relay and TV nodes and transmitters, health institutions, traffic

25 and transportation facilities, and water supply." And finally, "Establish

1 full coordination with the regular and reserve police forces."

2 Q. And if you could go to the next document behind tab 37, which is

3 Prosecutor's Exhibit 41?

4 A. This is a document of 20 -- reflecting a session on 27 April,

5 1992, in which, under point 1, "The regulations of the Socialist Federal

6 Republic of Yugoslavia and of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina

7 adopted prior to 7 April, 1992, which are in accordance with the

8 constitution of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and are not

9 contrary to the regulations adopted by the Assembly of the Serbian People

10 at its sessions, shall be applied in the ARK."

11 So this document establishes those -- this establishes as the

12 authority for any laws, the constitution of the Serbian Republic of

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the sessions of the -- laws of the -- passed by the

14 Assembly of the Serbian People.

15 Q. And lastly in this series of documents, the document behind tab

16 38, Prosecutor's Exhibit 42, which is a series of conclusions of the

17 Autonomous Region of Krajina from the 30th of June of 1992.

18 A. This document reflects results of a meeting on the 30th of June,

19 1992, of the executive council of the ARK, and point 1, "Government hereby

20 guarantees the rights of all people regardless of their religious or

21 ethnic affiliation who in these difficult times have expressed their

22 patriotic inclination."

23 That statement of rights of all, with the qualifier, those who

24 have expressed their patriotic inclination, is a kind of qualification of

25 those rights.

1 Q. What patriotic inclination are they referring to?

2 A. Well, one must assume that this refers to a patriotic inclination

3 in support of the Serbian people --

4 MR. ACKERMAN: I would object to what one must assume. He seems

5 to have no basis for that kind of an answer. If he has a basis, let him

6 establish it, but I would object to him just making assumptions, bold

7 assumptions.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: Objection sustained. Actually, the conclusion is

9 actually evident just the same, but the objection is sustained.

10 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, when an objection is raised, is it

11 possible for me to actually speak to it?

12 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.

13 MR. CAYLEY: I think that Dr. Donia is perfectly entitled to make

14 logical inferences from documents, and I think, quite frankly, it's

15 absolutely clear what this document is referring to, and I think it's not

16 unreasonable that he should come to that kind of conclusion based on what

17 is actually stated in this document.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Cayley, it's an opinion, and it shouldn't be put

19 as an opinion like that. Even though he is an expert witness, he should

20 not comment on a statement which is contained in an official, or what is

21 purported to be an official, statement like this, and should leave the

22 Chamber to draw its conclusions, which, as you say, may be very obvious.

23 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.

24 Q. Dr. Donia, those documents taken together, Prosecutor's Exhibit 38

25 to 42, if you were to summarise the effects of those documents, what would

1 you say to the Court?

2 A. I think the documents individually express the assertion of

3 authority by the ARK over these individual institutions and aspects of

4 public life of the ARK in the spheres of economics, economic life,

5 military and institutions of transportation and communication.

6 Q. All of these aspects of life, what kind of indices are they,

7 economy, military, transportation, communication?

8 A. Yes. They are the essential economic functions that, in this post

9 -- early post-socialist period, were essential to the functioning of the

10 state and society.

11 Q. If we can now move to the document behind tab 39, which is

12 Prosecutor's Exhibit 43, and these are the extract from the minutes of a

13 meeting of the ARK Assembly held on the 17th of July of 1992?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Now, Dr. Donia, what was significant about this meeting?

16 A. This meeting was attended by several leaders from the Serbian

17 Republic of Krajina, that is the Krajina located in Croatia, and military

18 representatives from the Bosnian Serb Army, the VRS, as well as a couple

19 of ministers from the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And as

20 such, it was kind of a joint report to the ARK on the broadly military,

21 political and security situation in both territories. And the reports

22 submitted are identified under item 1, number 1, Mr. Radoslav Brdjanin,

23 President of the War Presidency of the ARK, and Mr. Stojan Zupljanin,

24 Secretary of the Secretariat of the Interior and Chief of the Security

25 Services Centre of the ARK, submitted reports on the current political and

1 security situation in the ARK. Also, Generals Momir Talic, Zivorad

2 Ninkovic, and Minister of the Interior of the Serbian Republic of Krajina,

3 Milan Martic, informed the assembly members of the military operations of

4 the army of the VRS and the army of the Serbian Republic of

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Posavina. There are then further reports

6 indicated here from Mr. Velibor Ostojic and Mr. Bogdan Subotic,

7 respectively Ministers in -- for Information and Defence. And then

8 Mr. Goran Hadzic and Mr. Mirko Ljubicic, who was President of the

9 municipality of Doboj.

10 Q. If we could move to the next document, which is behind tab 40,

11 it's a document dated the same date as the meeting took place in Banja

12 Luka, 17th of July of 1992, Prosecutor's Exhibit 44. And this is a

13 document from the Assembly of the Autonomous Region of Krajina to the

14 Presidency of the Serbian republic and concerns the municipality of

15 Bihac. Can you explain to the Court the significance of this document?

16 A. This document was -- is dated 17 July 1992 and represents the

17 decision of the ARK to appeal to the Serbian Republic of

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina to liberate the town of Bihac so that it comprises an

19 integral part of the Serbian republic. The rationale for this is that in

20 the case that there was a majority Serbian population in Bihac

21 municipality -- reading from the second paragraph here: "43.7 per cent of

22 the population was Serbian, 35.5 Muslim, and the rest Croatian. In the

23 wake of the genocide, this percentage was virtually halved, as it has been

24 following the renewed expulsion of Serbs from a town in Bihac in this

25 war."

1 Bihac, it will be recalled, established a Serbian assembly

2 immediately after the document of 19 December 1991, the instructions to

3 the Serbian people. And it obviously -- at this point the final resort

4 here of the ARK leadership -- ARK Assembly is to advocate its military

5 inclusion or military conquest to include it in the Serbian republic.

6 Q. Now, the word "liberate" is used. Who was the municipality being

7 liberated from?

8 A. Well, it was at that time under the military control of the Army

9 of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ABH.

10 Q. If we can now move to the next document, which is Tab 41,

11 Prosecutor's Exhibit 45. And this is a public announcement of the

12 Assembly of the ARK, dated the 22nd of April, 1992. What's the

13 significance of this document?

14 A. This is a -- really a public announcement that is addressed to the

15 government of the Republic of Serbia, which is, of course, a neighbouring

16 republic to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

17 And just reading the -- from the first paragraph there: "Since

18 the Serbian people in the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is

19 fighting for its biological survival and passing through the most

20 difficult moments in its history, we request that the government of the

21 Republic of Serbia return to the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina

22 all able-bodied men between the age of 20 and 55 who have found refuge in

23 Serbia so that together we can defend our homes from Muslim and Croatian

24 paramilitary formations."

25 Then: "If they do not accept the appeal of the Krajinan

1 authorities, we will consider them the worst of traitors to their

2 people" - that reference here is to those who have fled to Serbia - "and

3 their right to return after the war and all their moveable and immovable

4 property will be taken away from them."

5 Q. If we could move to the next document, which is behind Tab 42,

6 Prosecutor's Exhibit 46, a decision of the Crisis Staff of the Autonomous

7 Region of Krajina. What is the significance of this document?

8 A. This decision of the crisis staff of 24 June 1992, signed by

9 Mr. Radoslav Brdjanin, is a decision to check the conscripts of -- serving

10 in military formations.

11 And the first paragraph states: "The checks shall be carried out

12 forthwith on all Croats and Muslims who have no declared place of abode or

13 residence in the ARK."

14 And two: "Checks shall been carried out forthwith on Serbian

15 conscripts who have no declared place of abode or residence in the ARK and

16 have not reported to the competent Secretariat for National Defence."

17 Q. Now, previously, we've seen that the documents have been referring

18 to an assembly of the Autonomous Region of Krajina. Now there is a

19 reference to a crisis staff. Now, can you very briefly explain what had

20 changed or what organs had developed, it's now being referred to as crisis

21 staffs, within the region.

22 A. Well, crisis staffs for the municipality level, of course, had

23 been directed from the SDS central board in its instructions of 19

24 December 1991. There was, however, no such instruction relative to the

25 SAOs, the Serbian Autonomous Regions. There was, however, an appointment

1 or designation of a crisis staff in the ARK prior to this document in kind

2 of the spirit of other crisis staffs, which were essentially

3 executive-type organs that would carry out the functions of assemblies in

4 the inability or difficulty of the assembly meeting in wartime

5 conditions.

6 Q. And we will have another witness who will address this in more

7 detail, but broadly speaking, what powers did the crisis staff have at the

8 autonomous region level of governance?

9 A. I can't answer that question. I don't really know what the powers

10 were.

11 Q. Now, moving on to the next document, which is Prosecutor's

12 Exhibit 47, behind Tab 43. This again is a document signed by --

13 purportedly signed by Radoslav Brdjanin. What is the effect of this

14 document?

15 A. This document, which is a -- reflects a crisis staff of the ARK

16 decision, says that "No crisis staffs may be formed in firms."

17 Now, the address form of the document to Autoprevoz, the Director

18 and President of the Workers' Council, is such that the -- Autoprevoz was

19 the place where some crisis staff had been formed. And he says: "Since

20 you have not already done this and since you have appointed individuals

21 for whom we have firm evidence that they are not for the policies of the

22 Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it would be best if you both

23 submitted your irrevocable resignations."

24 Now, this document rejects an alternative organisation of a crisis

25 staff of the firm of Autoprevoz.

1 Q. We can now move on to the next document, which is behind Tab 44,

2 Prosecutor's Exhibit 48, which is a public announcement signed by --

3 purportedly signed by Vojo Kupresanin. What is the effect of this

4 announcement?

5 A. This announcement, which is the -- done in the name of the

6 Presidency of the ARK, "renounces the legitimacy of Nenad Kecmanovic

7 and Mirko Pejanovic to represent the Serbian people in any capacity."

8 Kecmanovic and Pejanovic were the two members of the Presidency of

9 Bosnia and Herzegovina who had been designated to replace Biljana Plavsic

10 and Nikola Koljevic subsequent to their resignation from the Presidency of

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina on 7 April, 1992. Both of these people had run in the

12 elections of 1990 and had received -- they were down the list, in terms of

13 having received votes, for those offices on the Presidency. So this

14 effectively renounces their authority as members of the Presidency.

15 And it then goes on to say: "The Serbian people is proud of its

16 heroes to the same extent that it detests traitors and degenerates such as

17 the two mentioned."

18 Q. So in essence, these were two Serbs who continued to participate

19 in the republican government in Sarajevo; is that right?

20 A. Yes, that's correct. At this point, both of them were members of

21 the Presidency -- Serbs who were a member of the Presidency as the two

22 Serbian members on the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo.

23 Q. And they were being essentially proclaimed illegitimate people

24 because they continued to participate in the central government in

25 Sarajevo?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. If you could now go to the next document, which is behind Tab 45,

3 Prosecutor's Exhibit 49, which is a series of public announcements with a

4 European Community Monitoring Mission cover sheet on the document. What

5 is the significance of this series of documents?

6 A. In May of 1992, the SDS moved to define its strategic goals and

7 also reach an agreement on the territory which it controlled.

8 On 6 May, 1992, SDS president Karadzic and HDZ president Mate

9 Boban met and reached an agreement, which was widely publicised, to divide

10 much of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina between their respective

11 state formations or parties.

12 This agreement was reached citing the ongoing efforts of the

13 European Community and the conference on Yugoslavia to reach a peaceful

14 solution to the Bosnian crisis. However, it was done without the

15 participation of Muslim representatives and without the knowledge of the

16 European -- or of the conference leader, Mr. Cutilliero. And the -- I

17 have in front of me a fax message sheet. And on the opposite side of that

18 page is a brief hand-written note dated "London, 7 May 1992," in which

19 Mr. Jose Cutilliero writes to Mr. Colm Doyle and says: "Could you in your

20 conference capacity try to elucidate with the principles the exact terms

21 and meaning of their alleged agreement and Muslim views on the matter."

22 So that makes clear that the EC mediator was not informed in

23 advance or was not a part of these discussions.

24 There were six points to this agreement. And going forward two

25 pages is a -- an English translation. I would highlight only point

1 three: "Both sides agree that in defining the borderline between the two

2 constituent units in the area of Kupres as well as of Bosanska

3 Posavina" -- and then certain municipalities are listed -- "account should

4 be taken of the compactness of areas and communications."

5 This is a reference to the importance of the corridor running

6 between the eastern and western areas of lands under Serb control at that

7 time and also to the -- the situation in the area of Kupres, where there

8 was a highway that was maintained by one side but regularly shelled on the

9 other.

10 And just to note that under the provisions of this agreement, they

11 also invoke and invite the European Community to mediate their dispute on

12 the area south of Mostar.

13 The significance of this document from the point of view of the

14 two who agreed to it, or at least to the Serbian side, is reflected in --

15 by turning over yet one more page to the press release labelled "Serb and

16 Croat Leaders Sign Peace Agreement." This was a press release prepared by

17 the -- by Dr. Karadzic's public relations firm in London.

18 And the third paragraph there states: "The agreement overturns

19 the mandate of the Bosnian independence reference for self-determination

20 for a Bosnian state." This refers to the referendum of the 29th of

21 February and the 1st of March. "Instead the mandate will be reversed.

22 Bosnia will be divided, and in its place, three separate states will be

23 formed."

24 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, I don't know if you wish to break now.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: As you wish, Mr. Cayley. If you prefer to break

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1 now, we will pause now, and --

2 MR. CAYLEY: Yes.

3 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. So we will resume at quarter to 1.00.

4 --- Recess taken at 12.22 p.m.

5 --- On resuming at 12.48 p.m.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: Call Dr. Donia in, please.

7 Yes, Mr. Cayley?

8 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Your Honour.

9 Q. Before the break, Dr. Donia, you referred us to Prosecutor's

10 Exhibit 49, which is the public announcement of the agreement on partition

11 of Bosnia-Herzegovina between the Croats and the Serbs. Is there any

12 mention in these public announcements of the Muslim people in Bosnia?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Now, moving six days later, to Banja Luka, the 12th of May, 1992,

15 this is behind tab 46, Prosecutor's Exhibit 50, and these are minutes of

16 the 16th session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina. You actually state - it's page 75 in your report -

18 it's the 14th session, but no matter, it's a typographical error. It was,

19 in fact, the 16th session of the Serbian people.

20 Now, this document, these minutes, essentially reflect prior

21 events that have taken place. If you can direct the Court to the sections

22 in these minutes which are significant for what we are discussing at the

23 moment? And I think the first reference you will find on page 13.

24 A. If I might begin with a reference to the first -- actually first

25 page, which is a -- starts with a heading of, "The Minutes," and then

1 proceeds to list the agenda in 14 items, and the very, very brief

2 conclusion of each of those 14 items. On page 4 is the statement that the

3 audiotape recording of the session is an integral part of the minutes, and

4 what follows on pages 5 through - who knows how long here - are, in fact,

5 the -- a transcript of the audiotape recording of the session. At this

6 meeting, the assembly adopted the strategic goals of the Serbian people

7 and briefly discussed each one of them, spelled them out. It also

8 completed the process of forming a Bosnian Serb Army or VRS, and appointed

9 General Ratko Mladic as its first commander. And the bulk of the

10 discussion at this session concerns issues raised in the enumeration of

11 the six strategic objectives and includes long discussions by both

12 Dr. Karadzic and General Mladic.

13 The discussion of the strategic goals for the Serbian people

14 begins on page 13. In the last full paragraph, the first goal is stated:

15 "Separation from those who are our enemies and who have used every

16 opportunity, especially in this century, to attack us, and who would

17 continue with such practices if we were to continue to stay together in

18 the same state."

19 This goal, as seen in the sentence immediately above this

20 paragraph, is stated in the more general sense as, "separation from the

21 other two national communities or separation of states."

22 Going on, on page 13, and just to identify the speaker here, this

23 is Dr. Karadzic, "The second strategic goal it seems to me is a corridor

24 between Semberija and Krajina."

25 Now, this is the -- also drew reference in the agreement of 6 May

1 in 1992 in Graz, the notion that there should be a corridor between the

2 eastern area of Serb-held lands, which -- the northern part of which is

3 Semberija and the Krajina, the western held portion. "That is something

4 for which we may be forced to sacrifice something here and there, but it

5 is of the utmost strategic importance for the Serbian people because it

6 integrates the Serbian lands, not only of Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina,

7 but it integrates Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina with Serbian Krajina" --

8 meaning Krajina in Croatia -- "and Serbian Krajina with Serbian Bosnia and

9 Herzegovina and Serbia." So there's both a purpose of reuniting the

10 Serbian lands within Bosnia and uniting the Serbian lands in Croatia and

11 the Republic of Serbia.

12 And on the next page, page 14, the first paragraph: "The third

13 strategic goal is to establish a corridor in the Drina Valley, that is,

14 elimination of the Drina as a border between our two worlds. We in our

15 strategic interest and our living space are on both sides of the Drina."

16 So this abolition of the Drina as a boundary is the third goal

17 with the idea of creating a -- or a homogenous Serbian land.

18 Q. And just to be absolutely clear, the Drina River was a boundary

19 between which two countries?

20 A. Well, the Drina -- I wonder -- we need a map. But the Drina ran

21 as a boundary in part between Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of

22 Serbia.

23 The fourth strategic goal, on page 14: "The fourth strategic goal

24 is the establishment on the Una and Neretva Rivers." That would define a

25 very expansive area, running from Herzegovina up into the Krajina.

1 The next paragraph: "The fifth strategic goal is the division of

2 the city of Sarajevo into Serbian and Muslim parts and implementation of

3 an effective state government in each of these two parts of the

4 constitutive state."

5 The sixth goal, then, is the -- "The sixth strategic goal is the

6 access of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the sea."

7 These were subsequently adopted by the Assembly as the Serbian

8 goals -- or the goals of the Serbian people.

9 Q. Dr. Donia, if I can now direct you to page 22 of these minutes and

10 the transcript of what was said by deputy Dragan Kalinic.

11 A. As I mentioned, there was substantial discussion subsequent to the

12 adoption of these goals of the position or attitude that the Serbian

13 leadership should take on some of these key issues of Serbian goals.

14 On page 22, Dr. -- Mr. Dragan Kalinic was speaking. And in the

15 second paragraph of his speech, down about four lines: "Among all the

16 issues this assembly should decide on, the most important one is this:

17 Have we chosen the option of war or the option of negotiation? I say this

18 with a reason, and I must instantly add that knowing who our enemies are,

19 how perfidious they are, how they cannot be trusted until they are

20 physically militarily destroyed and crushed, which of course implies

21 eliminating and liquidating their key people, I do not hesitate in

22 selecting the first option, the option of war, because I believe that our

23 fate, the fate of Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I do not link it in any

24 way to the fate of Serbia and Montenegro" --

25 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness slow down, please.

1 A. "Our sentimental and national bonds" --

2 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Donia --

3 THE WITNESS: Slow down?

4 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, please.

5 A. "Our sentimental and national bonds must be reduced in this

6 respect to a pragmatic level and established on the basis of interest that

7 the fate of Serbs in BH cannot be resolved in any other way but by war."

8 Mr. Kalinic's speech continues on page 24. It's all one

9 paragraph. About two thirds of the way down the page, there is a -- the

10 word "NO," both letters capitalised. Following that word: "However,

11 those who will be planning the Sarajevo operation, either of liberating

12 Sarajevo or of destroying the enemy forces in Sarajevo will have to plan

13 what to do with the medical facilities. And let me tell you this right

14 now, if the military hospital is to end up in the hands of the enemy, I am

15 for the destruction of the Kosovo hospital so that the enemy has nowhere

16 to go for medical help."

17 Add at this point that Mr. Kalinic was the Minister of Health of

18 the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

19 On page 29, Mr. Radoslav Brdjanin begins to speak. At the bottom

20 of the page: "Mr. President, I asked for the floor only after I realised

21 that I was the most remote, that compared to everyone else, I am a

22 kindergartner. I would first of all like to thank all those who -- all

23 those participating in the discussion. I would like to say a heart-felt

24 bravo to Mr. Kalinic. In all my appearances in this joint assembly, it

25 has never crossed my mind that although he seems quiet while I seem

1 hawkish, his opinions are the closest to mine. I believe that this is the

2 formula, that we should adhere to this formula."

3 After a further discussion on page 60, the draft decision on

4 establishing the Serbian army of Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina army is

5 considered, in the fourth full paragraph:

6 "Pursuant to amendment 2 of the constitution of the Serbian

7 Republic of BH and in conjunction with Article 70, item 2 of the

8 constitution of SRBH, Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the national

9 assembly hereby adopts the decision on establishing the Serbian Republic

10 of Bosnia-Herzegovina army:

11 "1: The Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina army is hereby

12 established.

13 "2: Existing Territorial Defence units and staffs shall hereby be

14 renamed into commands and units of the army which will have its

15 organisation and establishment determined by the president of the

16 republic.

17 "3: Lieutenant General Ratko Mladic is hereby appointed the

18 Commander of the Main Staff of the Serbian Republic of BH army.

19 "4: The Serbian Republic of the BH army shall wear uniforms and

20 insignia of rank worn by the members of the JNA and Territorial Defence."

21 With that, the Serbian army or VRS was established, and shortly

22 thereafter, the session was adjourned.

23 MR. CAYLEY:

24 Q. Earlier, you referred to Mr. Kalinic and what he said at this

25 meeting, and I just wanted to ensure that the transcript is correct,

1 because the name is misspelled. I know the transcript is corrected

2 afterwards, but the spelling of Mr. Kalinic's name is K-a-l-i-n-i-c?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. Now, Dr. Donia, if we can go now to the last document that I wish

5 you to refer to, which is the document behind tab 48, you probably don't

6 have a tab in your version but it's Prosecutor's Exhibit 52, which is the

7 transcript of the 50th assembly -- the 50th session of the Assembly of

8 Republika Srpska, and in English, there is an extract of a speech made by

9 Dr. Karadzic, and I think the relevant part is at page 2. If you could

10 summarise to the Court the significance of what was being stated by

11 Dr. Karadzic in this part of his speech?

12 A. This part of Dr. Karadzic's address is a recollection of how the

13 SDS organised life at the beginning of its existence from 1990 to 1992.

14 Q. Just to interrupt you, Dr. Donia, on what date did this meeting

15 take place, can you recall?

16 A. This was -- it was April or May of 1995, so it was --

17 Q. 15 April, 1995?

18 A. Okay, 15 April, 1995. I do not have the date in front of me. I

19 see it's the fifth -- on the B/C/S, I see that it is the 15th and 16th of

20 April of 1995, in Sanski Most.

21 Q. I'm sorry, please continue.

22 A. In this discussion of the beginning years of the SDS and the

23 Bosnian Serb Republic, he says, starting at line 2, "I want to say how it

24 was. At the moment the war began, in the municipalities where we were in

25 the majority" --

1 Q. Slow down a little, because the interpreters can't follow you.

2 A. Okay. "... we had municipal power, held it firmly, controlled

3 everything. In the municipalities where we were in the minority, we set

4 up secret government, municipal boards, municipal assemblies, presidents

5 of executive boards. You will remember, the A and B variants. In the B

6 variant, where we were in the minority - 20 per cent, 15 per cent - we had

7 set up a government and a brigade, a unit, no matter what size, but there

8 was a detachment with a commander. The war began, and the JNA helped as

9 much as it could here and there, it had helped before - I hope this will

10 not be going out on HTV - General Subotic helped just before the war began

11 by sending tanks."

12 Then if I may move down to the section in which there are a number

13 of -- a whole lot of names in upper case, about two-thirds of the way

14 down. The sentence begins, "Gentlemen, we got the officers we asked for.

15 I asked for Mladic. General Ninkovic, then a colonel, and General Perisic

16 had visited me before that, and I had noticed Mladic's blunt statements in

17 the newspapers. He was already in Knin then. I took an interest in him,

18 and together with Mr. Krajisnik, I went to General Kukanjac's office and

19 listened to him issuing orders and commanding around Kupres and Knin. We

20 spent countless nights in the office of General Kukanjac at that time.

21 President Krajisnik was already president of the assembly, and I was just

22 the president of the party, I did not have any state function. We asked

23 for Mladic and said that they should set up the headquarters as they saw

24 fit, we wouldn't interfere."

25 And then just skipping down six lines: "Later, we demobilised it,

1 but the core of the army existed in every municipality. I would like to

2 hear in which municipality it did not exist. With the arrival of the

3 first active-duty officers, it could immediately be seen which active-duty

4 officers were men of the people, ideologically not poisoned, and which

5 were poisoned. Immediately, right away, those who were ideologically

6 poisoned, who at that point lacked Serbhood, particularly orthodox faith,

7 right away they knew that the Serbian government was no good, right away

8 each municipality president was a thief and a fool."

9 If I can just turn to page 4, the observations about the relations

10 with the military continue on page 4, the first full paragraph, "What is

11 the essence? The essence is what Djuric or someone said in the first

12 speech - the army should blend into the state, Kupresanin. The army

13 should blend into the state, become an organ of the state, not a repairman

14 we hire or order, someone whose requests we have to fulfil, nor a

15 structure which can place itself above everybody."

16 The next paragraph, the last sentence -- next-to-last

17 sentence: "It is clear, a commander obeys the supreme command, and all

18 his assistants and corps commanders must obey him, et cetera. There can

19 be no split in these organs, and if it is not running smoothly, if it is

20 not going well, if it is not working like a clockwork, if it is

21 running ..." et cetera. "So far, we have had a very active mutual

22 relationship."

23 There are a number of other comments in his speech about

24 military-civilian relations within the government of the RS, which speak

25 to some disagreements which were then being publicly discussed, but those

1 are the essential comments on bringing the army into the authority of the

2 civilian government.

3 Q. Dr. Donia, we've come to the end of this binder. We've come to

4 the end of your report. You have, at the end of your report, a number of

5 conclusions, which are really based on the consideration of both binders

6 together, what these documents essentially say to us years later. Could

7 you please provide to the Judges a summary of those conclusions contained

8 in your report, the conclusions that you came to based on your

9 consideration of all of these documents and your knowledge of the region

10 and its peoples?

11 A. First, I would say that the political developments characterised

12 by the word "regionalisation" transformed the political structure of

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina well before April of 1992, and that process of

14 regionalisation involved splitting up, redefining, restructuring

15 municipalities, as well as the more evident, more obvious, process of

16 forming regional associations of municipalities, such as the ARK. And

17 therefore, the political foundation for a Serbian state was laid, in a

18 sense, from the ground up. It was a process that began at the

19 municipality level, sponsored by the highest levels of the SDS and levels

20 in between. That process led to various institutions being created, and

21 undergoing a number of name changes, from Crisis Staffs to War

22 Presidencies and Serbian Assemblies and a number of other iterations of

23 the same basic notion. I don't see a great deal of significance to these

24 different titles that are ascribed or adopted by these bodies over time,

25 for they all shared the single purpose of creating a Serbian-dominated

1 state on Serbian-specified territory.

2 I'm struck by how little -- how few references there are to

3 non-Serbs in the deliberative minutes that I've looked at, almost as

4 though they didn't exist. They are simply not entering into the narrative

5 that is exercised in these deliberative bodies. There are occasional

6 references to assuring the rights of members of other nationalities, and

7 there are occasional references in these documents to the need to bring

8 Serbs back from other territories into the areas of the Serbian state, but

9 very, very little is said about non-Serbs.

10 At the same time, perusing the population composition of the

11 Republika Srpska in 1996 up to the present day, that has become -- that

12 became, in the words of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a

13 nearly homogeneous Serbian territory. Certainly was that by 1996.

14 Despite some modest returns of some non-Serbs to the RS, it remains

15 largely homogeneous Serbian territory to this date.

16 Finally, I would note that the regionalisation process, nearly

17 from its inception had a -- as one of its objectives, the successful

18 military mobilisation of a force, always styled as a defensive force.

19 That process began in early 1991 when the JNA was a completely separate

20 organisation, under a separate command, and by May of 1992, when the JNA

21 had left behind or transferred to the VRS most of its heavy weapons and

22 the vast majority of its personnel based in Bosnia, that transformation

23 was completed and the Bosnian Serb Republic, the RS, had its military

24 force in the form of the reconstituted or renamed JNA, known as the VRS.

25 Those are the main conclusions I would outline from my review of

1 this material and evidence.

2 Q. And indeed, the full conclusions are contained on pages 76 and 77

3 of your report?

4 A. Yes.

5 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, I've now completed my

6 examination-in-chief. I have spoken with Mr. Ackerman and with Ms.

7 Fauveau, and they would like to commence their cross-examination

8 tomorrow. I know I had made certain indications yesterday that I would

9 bleed over into tomorrow. I finished more efficiently than I originally

10 thought, so I'm perfectly happy for that to take place if you are.

11 JUDGE AGIUS: Actually, we are finished earlier and more

12 efficiently, as you say, because the way you conducted your

13 examination-in-chief was impeccable, and the Chamber is very appreciative

14 of that, because that way, if we continue in this way, we will be able to

15 move forward at a faster speed, and that is the wish and desire of all of

16 us here.

17 I also take it as very important to have the transcript of

18 Dr. Donia's testimony today, particularly the conclusions, ready possibly

19 first thing tomorrow morning. The conclusion, at least the part in which

20 he draws the conclusions based on the rest of his testimony, I think is

21 very important for the Chamber to have and for the Defence teams to have

22 before they commence the cross-examination tomorrow. I think that should

23 not present a big problem. More or less, it's already here. And I am

24 making this statement meaning that the -- you will have the text in

25 English, of course, which is the language of the witness.

1 Yes, Mr. Ackerman.

2 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, we are -- because of the wonderful

3 facilities provided here, we are able to make a immediate disk of today's

4 proceedings and have it available to us immediately. There will be an

5 official transcript, I suppose, in a day or so. But -- well, there's

6 never an official transcript. To my knowledge, there has never been an

7 official transcript in this Tribunal.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: No, there hasn't.

9 MR. ACKERMAN: But there will be a better transcript in a day or

10 two. But what we get from these machines is fine.

11 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. So we will reconvene tomorrow morning at 9.00

12 in Courtroom I, not in this courtroom.

13 And would you please inform the Chamber who will be starting with

14 the cross-examination.

15 Mr. Ackerman, I understand you --

16 MR. ACKERMAN: Yes, I will be starting at 9.00 in the morning.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: And you anticipate your cross-examination to take

18 how long from tomorrow's sitting?

19 MR. ACKERMAN: I can only guess, and the best guess I can give you

20 is it will take all day.

21 JUDGE AGIUS: All day.

22 And Ms. Fauveau, would you anticipate that you will be in a

23 position to conclude -- begin and conclude your cross-examination by the

24 end of our work on Friday?

25 MS. FAUVEAU-IVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, certainly,

1 Mr. President, Your Honours.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Merci.

3 So I have put these questions again following up what -- the

4 suggestion that you had made a day or two ago so that you can actually

5 prepare for -- make the arrangements for Dr. Donia to return to the

6 States.

7 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.

8 Two housekeeping matters: The first one, you made an order

9 yesterday that if exhibits are not translated into English, I think,

10 within two weeks, they will not be admitted into evidence. This final

11 document that we referred to, the fiftieth session of the Assembly of

12 Republika Srpska, the version in Serbian, in Cyrillic, is over 200 pages

13 in length. We rely only on, as I say, approximately -- well, there are

14 17 pages that are translated. Within two weeks, we are not going to get

15 this translated, nor do we suggest to the Court that it should be, because

16 quite frankly, much of it we do not rely on.

17 Now, I'm sure Mr. Ackerman will turn and say, "Well, I need to

18 know what it says." But if I submit this document to the translation

19 department, I think -- I can't predict their reaction.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: I can.

21 Yes. Mr. Ackerman, I'll start with you.

22 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, this is a document from 1995, I

23 believe.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, it is.

25 MR. ACKERMAN: And so it's unlikely --

1 JUDGE AGIUS: 15th or 16th of --

2 MR. ACKERMAN: It's unlikely that there is material in there that

3 is relevant to a case that covers basically the year 1992. I can have my

4 assistants here just skim through it and see if there's any other 1992

5 material there. If Mr. Cayley tried to use 1995 material, I'd be

6 objecting, so chances are I don't have any objection whatsoever to it not

7 being fully translated.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: And Ms. Fauveau.

9 MS. FAUVEAU-IVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Fortunately --

10 unfortunately, I think there may be other parts of this document that are

11 relevant to this case and that refer to the year 1992.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Well, the position as it is being taken now by

13 this Chamber for the present moment and until it has at least on a prima

14 facie basis an indication of which other parts of that document could be

15 of relevance to the -- to the case we have in front of us, restricts -- or

16 rather, it does not extend the -- that part of yesterday's order to the

17 remaining part of this last document -- we're talking of document P52B -

18 52B - since the Prosecution is basing and relying itself only on the part

19 from Mr. -- Dr. Karadzic's statement or part of the speech, so the rest we

20 will revisit if we need to later on, provided there is at least some prima

21 facie indication to this Chamber that we need to. Otherwise it will

22 remain as it is, and we should proceed with the -- with the part that has

23 been translated, the remaining part or the remaining text in B/C/S

24 remaining in its entirety as it is, without the need of having any further

25 parts from it translated into English or French. Okay?

1 MR. CAYLEY: Unless the Defence identify --

2 JUDGE AGIUS: Well, obviously, if there is. But we can't go on a

3 fishing expedition. I mean, if we have an indication, yes, you will have

4 all opportunities; we will even, if necessary, stop until we have it

5 translated. But it -- the Chamber has to be convinced that there is the

6 need for that. Otherwise, we will not entertain any -- any objections of

7 those -- anyway, it's not an objection. It's a remark which Ms. Fauveau

8 has made for the time being and the Chamber will reserve its position

9 until and only if there is a clear indication that it ought to be -- ought

10 to do so -- ought to change its ruling of yesterday.

11 So that brings us to the -- is there something else?

12 MR. CAYLEY: One last matter, Your Honour, a straightforward one.

13 We provided to Your Honours a number of binders in respect of the Banja

14 Luka municipality. If you remember, you decided that exhibits would,

15 where possible, be pre-numbered in order to speed things up. Could we,

16 please, ask for those binders back from Your Honours so that we can

17 pre-number your sets, along with any other sets that were given out.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. That will be done.

19 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: Anything else?

21 MR. CAYLEY: No, that's fine. Thank you very much.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: You are informed that the decision which was

23 expected on the 92 bis has been handed down, and you should have already

24 been provided with a copy. Okay.

25 So the hearing is adjourned until tomorrow morning 9.00, to be

1 reconvened in Chamber I -- Courtroom I. Thank you.

2 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned

3 at 1.30 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday,

4 the 31st day of January, 2002, at 9.00 a.m.

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