1 Wednesday, 30 January 2002
2 [Open session]
3 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: Call the case, please.
5 [The accused entered court]
6 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. This is the case number
7 IT-99-36-T, the Prosecutor versus Radoslav Brdjanin and Momir Talic.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning, Mr. Brdjanin. Can you hear me in a
9 language that you can understand?
10 THE ACCUSED BRDJANIN: [Interpretation] Good morning. I can hear
11 you and understand you.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: And General Talic, I put the same question to you.
13 Can you hear me in a language that you can understand?
14 THE ACCUSED TALIC: [Interpretation] I can hear and I can
15 understand. Thank you.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: So good morning, everybody.
17 Appearances for the Prosecution.
18 MR. CAYLEY: May it please Your Honours, my name is Cayley. I
19 appear on behalf of the Prosecutor. Ms. Korner will not be with us today,
20 Your Honours.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: And for Mr. Brdjanin.
22 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I'm John Ackerman here with Tania
23 Radosavljevic, Milka Maglov, and Milos Peric. Thank you.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: For General Talic.
25 MS. FAUVEAU-IVANOVIC: [Interpretation] I'm Natasha
1 Fauveau-Ivanovic, replacing Mr. de Roux and Mr. Pitron. And I'm assisted
2 by Mr. Fabien Masson.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Ackerman, at this distance you feel safer?
4 MR. ACKERMAN: Somewhat, Your Honour. It's a little harder for
5 you to pull my leg from that far away, I think.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: So let's start. Please call in Dr. Donia.
7 [The witness entered court]
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning, Mr. Donia.
9 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Mr. President.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: You are going to be kindly requested to make the
11 same solemn declaration that you made twice already yesterday, and we can
12 proceed after that.
13 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
14 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
15 WITNESS: Robert J. Donia [Resumed]
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Please sit down. Mr. Cayley will be continuing,
17 proceeding with his examination-in-chief.
18 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
19 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Your Honour.
20 Examined by Mr. Cayley: [Continued]
21 Q. Dr. Donia, if you could remember to pause between my question and
22 your answer, because as you know, we're speaking the same language, and
23 there is interpretation between us into two other languages.
24 A. We may not be quite speaking the same language. I shall endeavour
25 to pause.
1 Q. If I can just recap briefly on what you were discussing
2 yesterday. You referred to the change of name of the ZOBK to the ARK on
3 the 16th of September of 1991.
4 And if I can now refer you to Tab 14, which is Prosecutor's
5 Exhibit 17.
6 What document is this, first of all, Dr. Donia?
7 A. This is the shorthand notes of the second session of the Assembly
8 of the Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Just because I know we
9 will return to the first session shortly, the first session of this
10 assembly was convened and constituted on the 24th of October, 1991, and so
11 this is the next, second session, on 21 November.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Cayley, could you please repeat the exhibit
14 MR. CAYLEY: It's Prosecutor's Exhibit 17, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay.
16 MR. CAYLEY: Behind tab 14.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay, okay. Thank you.
18 MR. CAYLEY:
19 Q. Now, specifically concentrating on these autonomous regions that
20 were being created at the time, if you go to page 29, and explain to the
21 Judges the significance of what is said there in these minutes, please?
22 A. This page reflects the decision of the second Assembly of the
23 Serbian People to verify the existence of five autonomous regions. These
24 regions were constituted in ways that were somewhat similar to the
25 constitution of -- the creation of the ZOBK and then, in this particular
1 document, ratified or verified by the Assembly of the Serbian People.
2 Q. Is the Autonomous Region of Krajina specifically referred to in
3 this verification by the SDS?
4 A. Yes, it is. It is the first one referenced in the second line of
5 the decision, along with its - I believe it's 20 at that point - members
6 who -- municipalities whose assemblies had declared association with the
7 Autonomous Region of Krajina, or ARK.
8 Q. Was the -- were the municipalities that are listed here the final
9 constituent members of this Autonomous Region of Krajina, or did it
11 A. It changed. It evolved over time. In fact, I believe there is an
12 entry in the Official Gazette also reflecting this decision. It also
13 lists 20 municipalities but they are not the same 20. There is a variance
14 of two of them. So this question of exactly who belonged at any given
15 time, I think, is a rather difficult one to define precisely, at least
16 from this level, from the level of the ARK itself.
17 Q. If we can now move ahead, and if I can refer you to page 55 of
18 your report, and specifically the section which you have subtitled "Arms
19 Buildup," now, you identify in your report various paramilitary groups
20 that were linked with the specific political parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina
21 and I would like you to address each one of those so that the Judges get
22 an accurate picture of the connections between these forces and the
23 various political parties in the country at the time.
24 A. Each of the three national parties, the SDA, SDS and HDZ, formed
25 or operated paramilitaries, starting in no later than the summer of 1991.
1 For the SDA, those paramilitaries really had two principal names, the
2 Patriotic League and the Green Berets. Both the HDZ and SDS also became
3 involved with paramilitaries from neighbouring states, that is Croatia and
4 Serbia and Montenegro. The Serbian paramilitaries were known by a variety
5 of names. They were organised by, among others, the leader of the Serbian
6 Renewal Movement, Vuk Draskovic, the Serbian -- Bosnian-born Serb,
7 Vojislav Seselj, and Zeljko Raznatovic. In addition, there was at least
8 one Serbian military, paramilitary, operating from the Serbian Krajina
9 region of Croatia.
10 The difference of -- that kind of came to be the important factor
11 in these paramilitaries was really the existing organisation of defence of
12 Yugoslavia, and that consisted really of two parts: Number 1, the JNA,
13 the Yugoslav National Army; and second, the Territorial Defence, known as
14 the TO. The military planning in socialist Yugoslavia never really
15 departed from the Partisan experience in World War II, and part of this
16 thinking was that at any given time, small sectors of the country should
17 be able to conduct resistance based on local forces. These were the
18 Territorial Defence forces, which had their own weapons - they were light
19 weapons - and in the late socialist period, developed a dual reporting
20 relationship to the JNA and to the republican authorities in which they
21 were located.
22 In September 1990, the JNA issued an order to bring the arms of
23 the Territorial Defence forces under control of the JNA, essentially put
24 them under lock and key in JNA armouries. This did something but not a
25 great deal to limit the arms capabilities of these TO units, which in the
1 course of 1991 came -- and in early 1992, came under the control of the
2 political leadership in whatever municipality they were located. So for
3 example, the TO units in the area under the control of the Bosnian central
4 government became either part of the -- typically became a part of the
5 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina; and in Croat-controlled areas became a part of
6 the Croatian Defence Council, HVO; and in Serb-controlled areas came under
7 the control of the SDS or later on the JNA, and ultimately the Army of the
8 Serbian Republic.
9 Q. Dr. Donia, if I can just interrupt you briefly, because you
10 referred to a document that we won't go through. But you referred to the
11 document where the JNA essentially placed under their control the arms of
12 the Territorial Defence, and I think that document is at Tab 16,
13 Prosecutor's Exhibit 19. Is that correct?
14 A. Yes. Prosecutor's 19, yes.
15 Q. Please carry on.
16 A. The final tie-breaker in this picture, really, was the JNA, which
17 in the summer of 1991 engaged certain commanders, certain units -- engaged
18 in distribution of light arms to SDS committees and Serbian paramilitary
19 groups in Bosnia. The JNA subsequently underwent a transformation over
20 many months, a transformation which really was not complete until the
21 summer of 1992 but involved the increasing, if one might call it,
22 Bosnianisation of the JNA in Bosnia.
23 First of all, the JNA was -- the JNA's presence in Bosnia was
24 strengthened by the withdrawal of JNA forces from Croatia in the late
25 month or two of 1991 and early 1992.
1 Then, more significantly, the JNA in Bosnia underwent some
2 transformation of its personnel. This process is reported by Borislav
3 Jovic, the close advisor to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and also
4 a member of the Presidency -- of the Federal Presidency of Yugoslavia, in
5 which he described a meeting on the 5th of December to transfer all
6 non-Bosnian soldiers out of Bosnia and transfer all Bosnians who were
7 stationed in JNA units elsewhere back into Bosnia. And later in December,
8 he reported that that process of stationing Bosnian troops -- troops
9 native to Bosnia in Bosnia was largely complete.
10 Q. Just a few points of clarification. And if I can refer you to
11 your report. You've essentially identified three types of armed
12 formations in Bosnia during this time period: paramilitary formations,
13 Territorial Defence, and the JNA. Is that --
14 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel approach the microphone, please.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Cayley, I have just been -- had my attention
16 drawn that I should call on you to move closer to the microphone.
17 MR. CAYLEY: I'll move the microphone closer to me, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: More like it.
19 MR. CAYLEY: Yes.
20 Okay. I think that's clear enough on the transcript.
21 Q. In terms of heavy weapons in Bosnia, armour, artillery, who had in
22 their possession these heavy weapons during this time period and
23 subsequently into 1992?
24 A. The JNA had a virtually complete monopoly on heavy weapons. And
25 by "heavy weapons," I mean heavy artillery, aircraft, tanks, and armoured
1 personnel carriers, things like this, that -- right up until, really, the
2 spring of 1992. Those were in the sole possession of the JNA with perhaps
3 a very occasional exception. But none of the efforts to arm locals
4 involved heavy weapons at that point, until that time, say, early spring
5 of 1992.
6 Q. Now, you state in your report that on the 15th of April of 1992,
7 TO units in Muslim-led municipalities were placed under a unified command
8 and became the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Now, we are calling other
9 military experts but, to your knowledge, in April of 1992, how effective
10 was that unified command structure?
11 A. I really can't answer the question for a specific area, but I
12 think in general, the effectiveness was best closest to -- in and closest
13 to Sarajevo, and became less effective and less direct in those areas that
14 were removed from Sarajevo and in which local TO units were often very
15 poorly armed and had problems communicating with the centre.
16 Q. Just referring briefly to the region of the Krajina, from your
17 knowledge, if you can answer this question, how effective was the Bosnian
18 army in that area?
19 A. Well, I don't -- I don't really think there was a Bosnian army per
20 se in the Krajina. It was really these local TO units which were poorly
21 armed and its effectiveness was very low.
22 Q. But you do state that the Bosnian army had the advantage in terms
23 of manpower; is that correct?
24 A. It appears that at this time, yes, they did, yes.
25 Q. If we can move on to page 58 of your report, and this is the
1 section that is titled, "Towards independence and division of
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina." Now we are moving back to events at the republican
3 level, and if you could tell the Court briefly about the various solutions
4 that were sought to the Yugoslav problem in 1991?
5 A. In the first half of 1991, the presidents of the six republics of
6 Yugoslavia held a rotating series of talks. One president hosted each
7 talk in his respective capital. These began in January and ended in June,
8 and featured kind of an alignment of the Slovenian and Croatian
9 leaderships promoting a loose confederation, and the Serbian and
10 Montenegrin leaderships supporting a strong federal Yugoslavia, with
11 efforts for compromise being brokered principally by Presidents
12 Izetbegovic and Tupurkovski of Bosnia and Montenegro respectively.
13 In the course of these meetings, there was another meeting at
14 Karadjordjevo at the royal hunting estate in Serbia, between Presidents
15 Tudjman of Croatia and Milosevic of Serbia. In this discussion, which
16 they held among just the two of them, although there were many other
17 members of their parties nearby, they held a conversation about a possible
18 division of Bosnia. They did not, by all accounts, agree at this time on
19 such a partition. Rather, they established a commission to investigate
20 the possibility of an agreement, and this commission held a couple of
21 sessions and adjourned without reaching an agreement.
22 This would be the first of a number of efforts between Serbs --
23 Serb and Croat leaders to reach an agreement on the partition of
25 After the last meeting of the six republican presidents -- at the
1 last meeting, there was an agreement to pursue further talks between
2 Presidents Tudjman, Milosevic and Izetbegovic. That meeting took place
3 shortly thereafter in Split and, again, by -- a number of accounts suggest
4 that partition was openly discussed at that meeting among the -- those
5 three presidents. I think after the conclusion of these talks, which
6 failed essentially to reach an agreement on the future of a federal
7 Yugoslavia, they were followed very soon by the war in Slovenia. And at
8 that point, discussions among the Yugoslav republics essentially became
9 internationalised, first through the intervention of the troika of the
10 European Community and later the semi-permanent, ultimately permanent
11 Conference on the Former Yugoslavia under UN and EC auspices.
12 Q. Dr. Donia, let's go back to Bosnia, to October of 1991, and to the
13 republican assembly in Sarajevo. 15th of October, 1991, Radovan Karadzic
14 is speaking before the assembly. What does he say?
15 A. At a session of the assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina on October 15,
16 Dr. Karadzic delivered an impassioned speech in which he raised the
17 prospect that if the Muslims pursued the option of independence for
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina, that they might cease to exist. In response to that
19 comment or that very impassioned presentation, President Izetbegovic and
20 -- President of the SDA and of Bosnia-Herzegovina, responded that the
21 manner of Karadzic's presentation and the message that he conveyed aptly
22 illustrated why Bosnia and Herzegovina might no longer be able to remain a
23 part of the Yugoslav federation.
24 On that same day, after the assembly had adjourned for the day,
25 and been adjourned by its president, SDS President or member Momcilo
1 Krajisnik, the Serbia -- or the Croatian and Muslim representatives of the
2 HDZ and SDA remained and reconvened on their authority the assembly, and
3 passed a declaration of sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was
4 exactly the step that was bitterly opposed by the SDS, and at least in
5 symbolic terms, moved Bosnia and Herzegovina one step closer to
7 On that evening, there was a session of the SDS board, and I --
8 this meeting appears to me to be a definitive discussion of strategy and
9 launch a new course for the SDS for the next several months.
10 In that --
11 Q. Dr. Donia, if I can just interrupt you, this meeting that you
12 refer to, that happened on the evening of the 15th of October of 1991, the
13 meeting of the SDS board?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And the minutes of that meeting are at Tab 17, Prosecutor's
16 Exhibit 20.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Now, if you could go through those minutes and identify for the
19 Court those sections that you believe are important in respect of events
20 that were accelerating at this time.
21 A. On page 2 of this document in the English version, Professor
22 Milorad Ekmecic is speaking. And in the very end of the first full
23 paragraph on that page he says: "The Serbs have created regions which are
24 not connected, and these regions must not be allowed to establish their
25 governments which would not be connected. In public, we must let it be
1 known that we can set up a Serbian government with its seat in Sarajevo
2 which would connect all our regions."
3 So Professor Ekmecic, who was a Professor of History in Sarajevo
4 and kind of a key senior elder member of the SDS, here expressly advocates
5 the formation of a republic-level Serbian government.
6 He is followed by Mr. Dutina, who says: "This evening we must get
7 rid of the illusion that a form of life together with the Muslims and
8 Croats can be found."
9 Going to the fourth page, just turning the page, the --
10 Mr. Radovan Neskovic says in a number of comments making recommendations,
11 number one: "Since they will not revoke their decisions, I suggest that a
12 parliamentary crisis be provoked."
13 Now, this comment is -- relates to the disagreement among party
14 leaders about whether SDS members should continue to participate in the
15 deliberative bodies and institutions of the Republic of
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina. It -- all parties operated on the assumption that if
17 a large number of delegates withdrew from a deliberative body, this in
18 some sense invalidated or weakened the authority of that body and was
19 therefore referred to here as a parliamentary crisis.
20 He adds then: "We should demand new elections, because in this
21 way we would gain time, which suits us."
22 Point four is "Go for a change of policy with the aim of creating
23 a greater Serbia." Now, this pertains to that dispute that arose at the
24 time of the creation of our declaration of unity of two Krajinas. The
25 party's policy, the SDS official policy at this time, was to support a
1 federal Yugoslavia and only to view the creation of a greater Serbia as a
2 back-up or contingent strategy. So Neskovic here is proposing that the
3 party now move to that back-up or reserve strategy and support the
4 creation of a greater Serbia. It will be seen that that viewpoint does
5 not prevail within the party at this time.
6 Going to the next speaker, Rajko Dukic, who was a very important
7 member of the SDS, President of its cadre commission. Point 2: "We
8 cannot leave the assembly or any other body." Dukic and many others
9 believed that the SDS should continue to work within the deliberative
10 bodies of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
11 It's in the comments of Mr. Miskin halfway down this page that we
12 find many of the recommendations that were in fact implemented in the
13 subsequent 1993 months.
14 Number one: "Continue regionalisation more intensively." And
15 "regionalisation," as I'll show shortly, had a rather complex meaning at
16 this time.
17 Number four: "Establish parallel government bodies immediately so
18 that they will be ready."
19 Number five: "Organise militarily, especially in the towns, and
20 give instructions to this effect in the municipal boards and local
22 And number six: "We are not well organised in the media war."
23 And then number seven, he mentions a plebiscite.
24 To the next speaker, Mr. Tutnjevic. On the following page, which
25 is the next to last page containing English language text: "We must call
1 on the JNA to secure the bridges on the Drina." This was intended to
2 secure free passage of goods and materiel from Serbia to Bosnia. "The
3 regions must be ready to impose a blockade of commodity and money channels
4 towards Sarajevo."
5 And finally: "Urgently issue a proclamation setting out the
6 political goals of the Serbian people."
7 Professor Slavko Leovac, who was another senior academic and
8 influential member of the SDS, noted in point two of his presentation that
9 "a republic in which there are three ethnic groups, two of which are
10 linked to their mother countries, cannot be neutral."
11 And finally the last sentence in the document, Biljana Plavsic, a
12 member of the Presidency, states that "the demilitarisation of the JNA is
13 out of the question because a concentration of the Army of Bosnia and
14 Herzegovina has already been announced." This comment pertains to the
15 concentration of forces in Bosnia in the wake of the conflict in
16 Slovenia -- or in Croatia and in support of the military effort there.
17 Now, the primary -- this meeting came to no formally established
18 recommendations, but the primary events that occurred in the next three
19 months were already recommended or backed by one of these speakers. Those
20 were: First of all, the formation of a Serbian assembly, which took place
21 on the 24th of October, 1991; second, the holding of a plebiscite of the
22 Serbian people; and third, the formation of a Serbian Republic of
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was completed on 9 January, 1992.
24 Q. Dr. Donia, you've already referred to the Serbian assembly meeting
25 of the 24th of October of 1991, and if we can briefly look at the minutes
1 of that constituting session, which are behind tab 18, Prosecutor's
2 Exhibit 21, and if you could first of all go to page 36 of those minutes,
3 and that page contains the address on the establishment of a Serbian
4 assembly, and if you could draw the Judges' attention to those significant
5 areas of Mr. Najdanovic's speech on the matter of the establishment of the
7 A. Yes. These words were spoken at the time that the decision to
8 constitute this assembly was under consideration, and there are two
9 indications that the speaker is Mr. Milutin Najdanovic. There is a change
10 of tapes here right in the middle of his presentation, before his name is
11 mentioned the second time. The first comment I would -- or comment of his
12 that I would note is that just before his name is mentioned the second
13 time, he states, "The Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and
14 Herzegovina will be comprised of the deputies of the SDS and of the
15 Serbian Renewal Movement in the Bosnia-Herzegovina assembly." So this new
16 body consists of deputies in the assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina of
17 Serbian nationality from two particular parties.
18 The second paragraph after the change of tape, "The Assembly of
19 the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina shall debate and decide on
20 issues pertaining to the achievement of equality by the Serbian people
21 with other peoples and nationalities living in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
22 to protection of the interests of the Serbian people should such interests
23 be put at risk by any decisions reached by the Socialist Republic of
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina assembly."
25 His next sentence pertains to this SDS decision to remain in the
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 organs, the deliberative bodies of Bosnia-Herzegovina: "The Serbian
2 deputies shall continue working in the chambers and working bodies of the
3 Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina assembly to which they were
4 elected until a final solution is found to the crisis in Bosnia and
5 Herzegovina and Yugoslavia."
6 And then one paragraph down, "The Assembly of the Serbian People
7 in Bosnia and Herzegovina shall recognise the validity of enactments by
8 the Bosnia and Herzegovina assembly, provided they are not contrary to the
9 interests of the Serbian people."
10 I think this speech really represents the spirit and intent of the
11 formation of this assembly as a Serbian-only body devoted to protecting
12 Serb interests against what -- against the -- whatever decisions might be
13 reached by the assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
14 Q. Now, Dr. Donia, you also stated earlier that this same meeting
15 decided that a plebiscite would be held of the Serbian people in Bosnia,
16 and if I can direct you to page 41 of these minutes, which refers to that
17 decision, and if you can explain to the Judges exactly what the purpose of
18 that plebiscite was and who was to participate in it?
19 A. The decision to hold a plebiscite was reached at this assembly.
20 It was to be a plebiscite of the Serbian people of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
21 Others were allowed to vote but they voted on a separate coloured ballot,
22 a yellow ballot, and their votes were tabulated separately, subsequent to
23 this referendum -- or plebiscite, on the 9th and 10th of November, 1991.
24 The assembly, in point 2 of this decision on page 41, essentially
25 states that the decision to remain within Yugoslavia will enter into a --
1 into force on the day it is confirmed at this plebiscite of the Serbian
2 people of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And the question at the plebiscite raised
3 asked each voter to choose whether they wished to remain as part of
5 Q. Now, if we can move to the results of the plebiscite, and they are
6 contained in the session of the assembly that was held on the 21st of
7 November of 1991, and unfortunately that involves moving backwards in the
8 file to tab 14, which is Prosecutor's Exhibit 17.
9 A. On page 15 of that document, which is Prosecutor's 17, in the
10 English language variant, the commission for the plebiscite reported the
11 results, and it indicates here that there were over a million votes in
12 favour of the issue on the plebiscite and 398 votes against.
13 On the following page, page 16, there is also an indication that
14 Serbs were allowed to vote in foreign countries. So the last paragraph on
15 that page reports, "The speaker is pleased to inform us that 916 people
16 voted in Sweden, all in favour; 353 voted in the U.S.; some in Great
17 Britain, Germany, Switzerland, and some 30.000 people in Soviet Russia,
18 all of whom voted in favour."
19 Q. Did the Muslim and Croat people of Bosnia-Herzegovina participate
20 in this plebiscite?
21 A. The overwhelming majority of Muslims and Croats did not
22 participate in the plebiscite, did not vote.
23 Q. So in essence, this was a vote of the Serbian people rather than
24 anybody else in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. What in essence was the result of the plebiscite, in terms of what
2 did the people, the Serbian people of Bosnia decide?
3 A. Well, the Serbian people or Serbs of Bosnia voted overwhelmingly
4 to remain in Yugoslavia. In addition, in at least two municipalities,
5 another vote was taken at the same time. In the municipality of Bosanska
6 Krupa and in Donji Vakuf, Serbs were asked another question, given another
7 box, presumably, on the ballot, to ask if they wished to remain a part of
8 Yugoslavia but also a part of a Serbian Assembly of that municipality.
9 So, for example, on page 31 of this same document, the speaker is
10 Mr. Miroslav Vjestica, representative of Bosanska Krupa, and at the very
11 top of the page, he says, "We held a referendum of the Serbian people of
12 Bosanska Krupa municipality along with the plebiscite of the Serbian
13 people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and formed our own municipality called the
14 Serbian Municipality of Bosanska Krupa, since 63 per cent of the present
15 territory of Bosanska Krupa municipality belongs to the Serbian people.
16 In this way, the Serbian people of Bosanska Krupa municipality made the
17 decision to stay a part of the Autonomous Region of Banja Luka and through
18 it a part of Yugoslavia."
19 And on the very top of page 34, we have the representative from
20 Donji Vakuf, who is not identified, say, "Mr. President, people's
21 deputies, ladies and gentlemen, as regards item one of the decision, I
22 would like to ask that we add the people of Donji Vakuf, who added another
23 box on 9 and 10 November on the plebiscite and decided to live in the ARK
24 then. We would like to ask that Donji Vakuf be added to the list on
25 behalf of the 7500 Serbs in Donji Vakuf municipality."
1 Then immediately after that, Mr. Djukic from Olovo makes a similar
2 statement, saying they also added a second box and -- Olovo never joined
3 the ARK, but it, subsequent to this, was listed as part of the SAO of
4 Romanija. Consequently, this plebiscite also served as a vehicle for
5 Serbs in non-Serb majority municipalities to, in a sense, declare they
6 were bypassing the established assembly and affiliate themselves with the
8 Q. Now, you've specifically stated that these municipalities did not
9 have a Serbian majority - Bosanska Krupa, Donji Vakuf - and if I can refer
10 you briefly to your report, page 48, where you have the ethnic census and
11 those two municipalities are contained in that second table, what was the
12 ethnic composition of those two municipalities, Krupa and Donji Vakuf, in
14 A. Excuse me, this is page 49.
15 Q. I'm sorry, page 49.
16 A. It will show that Bosanski Krupa was -- in 1991 was 24 per cent
17 Serbs and 74 per cent Muslims.
18 Donji Vakuf, its population was 39 per cent Serbs and 55 per cent
19 Muslims and 3 per cent Croats. In each there was a -- and also a small
20 percentage of Yugoslavs and others. So both were 24 and 39 per cent
21 Serbian at this time in 1991.
22 Q. And Muslims were in the majority in both of these municipalities?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. If we can now move back to Tab 21, which is Prosecutor's
25 Exhibit 24. And this is a transcript of the third session of the Assembly
1 of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. And this is page 63 of
2 your report, Dr. Donia.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Now, this session I think is significant for the decision to
5 establish Serbian municipalities.
6 And if I can direct you firstly to page 13 of this document, and
7 if you could briefly summarise for the Judges the discussion that took
8 place during this particular meeting of the SDS -- of the Serbian
9 Assembly. I'm sorry.
10 A. Much of this meeting was taken up with a discussion of the topic
11 of regionalisation, and there was an effort to define "regionalisation"
12 and determine what the next steps would be.
13 One of the early speakers in this debate, Mr. Veselinovic on page
14 13 advocates in the second paragraph of his speech: "I think that the
15 order of moves should be planned plainly speaking to break up the existing
16 municipalities where Serbs are not in a majority, for there are situations
17 of some adjacent local communities of settlements belonging to two
18 municipalities where Serbs are not a majority. This means that from two
19 or three neighbouring municipalities, we have space to form a large nice
20 Serbian municipality."
21 This is that variant of regionalisation I referred to early on in
22 which municipalities were essentially carved up, their Serbian inhabitants
23 identified, and then either join a new -- an existing municipality or form
24 a new one.
25 On the next page, page 14, the chairman, who is Momcilo Krajisnik,
1 states in the last paragraph of his presentation that "only municipalities
2 where Serb delegates are a minority should form such assemblies, as this
3 republican assembly of ours, so as to exercise certain rights. I think
4 that this is the source of the misunderstanding. Veselinovic spoke about
5 regionalisation, the rounding off of territories, like Mr. Vjestica and
6 others are doing." And Mr. Vjestica, of course, was the representative of
7 Bosanska Krupa who had reported on the formation of a Serbian municipality
8 that then affiliated itself with the ARK. But at this point, as evidenced
9 by this paragraph, Mr. Krajisnik supported the formation of these Serbian
10 assemblies only in those municipalities where Serbs were in a minority.
11 On page 22, at the top of the page -- the speaker here is
12 Mr. Rajko Dukic. He's identified on the previous page, page 21, only as
13 Rajko, but I believe that he is -- it's quite clearly Mr. Dukic, based on
14 his other views expressed on regionalisation.
15 "I therefore propose that serious work be done on the issue of
16 regionalisation, not only as a political issue but also as a strategic one
17 where we also have a specific goal. It is necessary to define not only
18 the territorial relationships but also economic, culture, and all other
20 And then if I could turn to page 28, after this discussion which
21 included varying views on exactly what ought to be included in the
22 regionalisation process, at the bottom of the page, the chairman asks for
23 an adoption of a resolution and also mentions a couple of supplements and
24 says that, "the assembly unanimously, with the two mentioned supplements,
25 adopted the proposed recommendation on the establishment of municipal
1 assemblies of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina." And the chairman
2 so noted, adding that the cover letter would specify that "this is
3 recommended where necessary and should in no case be across the board,
4 because the latter would be unnecessary."
5 Now, this suggests to me that as of the 11th of December, 1991,
6 the formation of Serbian assemblies was voluntary for all SDS local
7 boards. The reason, of course, was the extensive discussion that had gone
8 into this decision. But as of the 11th of December, both as it is
9 reflected here in this assembly session and in the version that
10 subsequently appeared in the Official Gazette, this is a decision that's
12 Q. Dr. Donia, if we can now move ahead in time to the 19th of
13 December of 1991, to an important document. This is Prosecutor's
14 Exhibit 25, and it's behind Tab 22.
15 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honours, I would like at this stage to
16 interpose a sort of general objection.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Ackerman.
18 MR. ACKERMAN: I think it is up to the Trial Chamber to decide
19 whether a document is important or not, and I object to Mr. Cayley
20 identifying documents as important and crucial and -- we're getting his
21 opinion, basically, which we shouldn't be getting.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Your objection is sustained, Mr. Ackerman.
23 MR. ACKERMAN: Thank you.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Please, Mr. Cayley, I think you take the point, and
25 I'm sure you understand. So move ahead.
1 MR. CAYLEY: I think somewhere in his report he makes reference to
2 it being a critical document, but I won't state that if Mr. Ackerman has
3 an objection.
4 Q. Dr. Donia, that particular document, the title is clear. I won't
5 rehearse it on to the transcript. But rather than me pointing out to you
6 areas in the document which are critical, could you go through it,
7 essentially identify for the Judges the sections which you believe are the
8 essence of the document and state why they are and what they actually
10 A. With this document of 19 December, eight days after the Serbian
11 Assembly meeting, the formation of separate Serbian institutions moved
12 from being voluntary to being mandatory for SDS local boards. I would add
13 that this is a somewhat complex document in my view, and it's, I think,
14 best understood by comparing the two variants, Variants A and B.
15 Variant A describes those municipalities in which Serbs
16 constituted a majority of the population. That is spelled out in point
17 three of the second -- it's the opposite side of the cover page in the
18 English translation under -- under point capital "One," there's a "3"
19 there in which it spells out these two variants.
20 In addition, the document describes actions to be taken under the
21 first stage and the second stage. So in a sense, this is a document that
22 prescribes transition from regionalisation to a preparedness for war.
23 And I'll just read a few excerpts from this. On the -- at page 3
24 of the document in the English translation, point three: "The SDS
25 municipal board will immediately form a crisis staff of the Serbian people
1 in the municipality." It then spells out those people who are to be
2 members of the crisis staff in Variant A.
3 If I can just flash to page 6, in Variant B -- on page 6, Variant
4 B, point three, the very same directive is given: "The SDS municipal
5 board will immediately form a crisis staff of the Serbian people." It's
6 less detailed in spelling out who is to -- who are to be members of the
7 crisis staff. The reason for that is that in the Variant A municipalities
8 which were already under SDS leadership, it could be safely assumed that
9 all those offices mentioned in Variant A were already filled by SDS
10 appointees or those who met SDS satisfaction.
11 Now, in Variant A, again on page 3, point four was: "To convene
12 and proclaim an assembly of Serbian people in the municipality comprised
13 of deputies from the ranks of Serbian people in the municipal assembly."
14 So this echoes exactly what the Serbian Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina had
15 done on the 24th of October, take those deputies from the municipal
16 assembly who are from the ranks of the Serbian people and proclaim a
17 separate body.
18 The very same recommendation is found on page 6 for Variant B,
19 also in point four.
20 The first stage in both variants was to create these institutions
21 but to take only very limited steps of implementation. It remained for
22 the second stage to actually take power in these municipalities, and the
23 prescription for taking power was slightly different in the Variant A and
24 Variant B cases. But if I could turn to the last page, page 8, under
25 heading 3, the last two points, 3 and 4, specify how this process is to be
1 triggered. Number 3, "The order to carry out the specified tasks,
2 measures and other activities in these instructions is given exclusively
3 by the Bosnia-Herzegovina SDS president using a secret, pre-established
4 procedure." And then point 4, "The secret procedure for transmitting and
5 accepting the order to carry out these tasks, measures and other
6 activities specified in these instructions shall be established at a
7 future time."
8 The Variant B second stage was characterised by procedures that
9 were more secret and which were to take place in those parts of the
10 municipality in which a majority of Serbs lived. So, for example, on page
11 7, point 4, in this second implementation stage, "Those municipalities
12 which did not have a Serbian majority were to organise the constant
13 protection of all vital facilities, communication lines and production
14 capabilities in inhabited areas with a majority Serbian population." And
15 over the page now, on page 8, point 5, "In inhabited areas with a majority
16 Serbian population, increase reserve stocks of food and other essential
17 household products in an organised way and in other appropriate ways."
18 I guess that means disorganised way.
19 Number 6, "At approaches to areas inhabited by a Serbian
20 population, organise secret patrols and an information system focusing on
21 all possible dangers for the Serbian population."
22 This document was very explicit about many of the steps to be
23 undertaken, and yet it gave no deadline. There were no deadlines
24 contained in the document, no time frame for these things to be done.
25 However, there is a substantial record of changes throughout
1 municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina that corresponded to the
2 instructions contained in this document for the first stage, and in many
3 municipalities, Serb assemblies were convened and proclaimed within days
4 of this document being issued. There was, however, substantial resistance
5 to it as well from some local SDS boards, and consequently, by the end of
6 March, there were still many municipalities in which this first stage had
7 not been implemented.
8 Q. Dr. Donia, if I can just draw your attention to a number of
9 sections. In particular, let's look at Variant B, where the Serbian
10 population was in a minority and specifically page 7, paragraph 2 --
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. -- of the second stage.
13 A. This states that the local boards are directed to mobilise all
14 police forces from the ranks of the Serbian people, and in cooperation
15 with command posts and headquarters of the JNA, ensure their gradual
17 Q. And the next paragraph, paragraph 3, to summarise it, is stating
18 that the JNA reserve units and TO units should be mobilised?
19 A. Right, ensure that the order is put into effect to mobilise JNA
20 reserve forces and TO units.
21 Q. Where did the real authority for that order lie in
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991 and 1992?
23 A. Well, the authority to mobilise JNA reserve units was in fact a
24 matter of great dispute, but the primary claimant was the JNA. The
25 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, at a number of points, disputed that, but
1 the mobilisation of TO units was a function of the Republic of
3 Q. If you were to sum up this document in a very brief statement,
4 what is this document as a whole?
5 A. It's a set of quite specific and detailed instructions to prepare
6 for war, to create new institutions, to make preparations for armed
7 conflict, and then to implement certain steps on the instructions of the
8 SDS central leadership.
9 Q. If we can now move to Prosecutor's Exhibit 27, which is behind tab
10 24, what is this declaration? And if you can link it to the Variant A,
11 Variant B document that we have just discussed?
12 A. I have three pieces of paper here, which are part of P27, and the
13 second sheet that I have is a two-sided English-language sheet, which is
14 -- reflects a decision, if I'm correct in this, that everyone has this --
15 this particular document is the decision of the Serbian Municipality of
16 Bihac to constitute itself, that is to organise, in a meeting held on
17 December 21, 1991.
18 There is then the first page, which is -- I don't have a
19 translation, though.
20 Q. Dr. Donia, sorry, we are awaiting a translation of the first page,
21 so if you deal simply with the decision, and you'll find the page after
22 that, the original version --
23 A. Right.
24 Q. -- of the document is in place.
25 A. The first page is in fact a decision of the Bihac assembly to join
1 the ARK, adopted on the -- I think on the 28th of December.
2 Q. Now, the second decision or, in fact, it's the first decision
3 because it's the 21st of December, 1991, the decision for which there is a
4 translation, how many days after the instructions on Variant A, Variant B
5 was this decision made by Bihac?
6 A. This is two days after the instructions from the 19th of December.
7 Q. Did Bihac fall within the classification of Variant A or
8 Variant B?
9 A. It was a Variant B municipality.
10 Q. So Serbs were in a minority in Bihac?
11 A. Yes.
12 MR. CAYLEY: Now, Mr. President, the next document that I want to
13 refer to, we don't have a translation of that document into English. I
14 don't know how you wish to deal with that.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Well, we point it out to the witness first. We'll
16 see whether he is in a position to enlighten us on it, and then we can
17 take a decision whether to proceed on it or not.
18 Please keep in mind that we have roughly five to ten minutes more
19 before we break and so adjust your preference to continue with the
20 cross-examination -- with the examination-in-chief now or we break now and
21 continue in half an hour's time. I mean, choose whatever suits you. I'm
22 leaving you the option. I don't know how long you intend to question the
23 witness on the next document, in other words.
24 MR. CAYLEY: Tantalisingly close to the end of this file, Your
25 Honour, but I don't think I'm going to finish it in five minutes, but
1 certainly I can deal with this document in five minutes. It's a short
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Then proceed. Which document are we talking
5 MR. CAYLEY: I'm sorry, we are referring to tab 25, Prosecutor's
6 Exhibit 28.
7 Q. What is this document, Dr. Donia?
8 A. This is the decision of the Assembly of the Serbian People of
9 Prijedor at its session on the 17th of January, 1992, to join the ARK.
10 MR. CAYLEY: Do you wish -- Mr. President, do you wish there to be
11 a translation of this document into English? The witness can actually
12 read it into the transcript and then the interpreters who have --
13 JUDGE AGIUS: It's a very short document, Mr. Cayley. If
14 Dr. Donia is in a position to tell us what it says, it would be easy and
15 it will lighten our burden in any case, if he's in a position to do that.
16 THE WITNESS: I can read it - it's very brief - and ask the oral
17 translation to come through, if you wish.
18 [Interpretation] "On the basis of the rules of procedure of the
19 work of the assembly of the Serbian Municipality of Prijedor, at a session
20 of the assembly held on the 17th of January, 1992, we hereby take the
21 following decision on joining the Autonomous Region of Bosanska Krajina.
22 Article 1: The Assembly of the Serbian People of Prijedor
23 municipality hereby unanimously adopt" - the word is not clear, but it is
24 probably "decision" - "on joining the Serbian territory of the Prijedor
25 municipality of Bosanska Krajina."
1 Article 2: This decision shall enter into force on the day of its
2 adoption at the meeting of the Assembly of the Serbian people of Prijedor
4 A signature by the President of the Assembly of the Serbian people
5 of Prijedor municipality. The name is not clear.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Cayley.
7 MR. CAYLEY: I think, Mr. President, if you wish, we can pause at
8 this point.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: So the Chamber will rise, and we will resume at ten
10 to 10.00 -- at ten to 11.00. Sorry, ten to 11.00.
11 --- Recess taken at 10.27 a.m.
12 --- On resuming at 10.54 a.m.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Please call the witness in, please, Donia.
14 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Your Honour.
15 Q. Dr. Donia, you had referred to the decision by Prijedor. In fact,
16 you'd read out the decision in the original version. Now, this decision
17 in fact not only declares a Serbian assembly in Prijedor but it also
18 decides to join the Autonomous Region of Krajina; is that correct?
19 A. It is a decision to join the -- the ARK, yes.
20 Q. Now, just to digress for a moment. Prijedor. From your
21 knowledge, your expertise, what was the historical significance of the
22 municipality of Prijedor?
23 A. Prijedor was a scene of considerable fighting in World War II, and
24 in fact a major battle was fought in -- near Prijedor between the
25 Partisans and the Germans with their Ustasha allies. And that became a --
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 very much part of the kind of legacy of Partisan culture in
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, in all of Yugoslavia. But in Prijedor in particular,
3 the -- probably the most imposing monument to the Partisans and victims of
4 World War II is located just outside Prijedor on -- at Mirkovica on Mount
6 Q. In terms of its strategic position in the country in
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, why is Prijedor important?
8 A. Well, it's located, first of all, in the heart of the Krajina.
9 And it has a population that was mixed. It had no group with an absolute
10 majority. Its Serbian population had been gradually declining, while its
11 percentage of Muslims was gradually increasing.
12 If I could just refer to page 49 of the report for a minute, one
13 will see that it's about as close between the Muslims and Serbs as one can
14 get. So the assembly -- municipal assembly elected in 1990 was also
15 largely split between the HDZ -- SDA and SDS. It also has a relatively
16 high percentage of Yugoslavs, reflecting that Partisan legacy and
18 Q. If you could turn to the next document, which is Tab 26,
19 Prosecutor's Exhibit 29. Briefly -- there is a English translation of
20 this document. If you could summarise what the effect of the document
22 A. This is the decision of the Serbian municipality of Kotor Varos on
23 7th February 1992 to join the ARK.
24 Q. Now, the next document which is behind Tab 27 --
25 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, there is an English translation for
1 this document, which I've just discovered. I previously thought there was
2 not a English translation. But I will wait to receive that in the
3 courtroom before I actually refer to that document because it's quite
4 important that the translation is available.
5 Q. And in the meantime, Dr. Donia, if you could go back to Tab 23,
6 which is Prosecutor's Exhibit 26. Now, this is a meeting, the twelfth
7 session of the Serbian Assembly held on the 24th of March of 1992. And if
8 you could go, please, to pages 23 and 24. And if you could explain to the
9 Court the effect of that particular decision.
10 A. The bottom of page 23 contains the decision of the Serbian
11 Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina to verify the establishment of new
12 Serbian municipalities which would be in accord with those provisions of
13 the directive of 19 December, 1991, and lists some, I think, 35 of them or
14 so. So this is, in a sense, an inventory at this point in time of those
15 SDS local boards that had complied with the directive and established a
16 Serbian -- to the degree of establishing a Serbian Assembly of their
18 There was further concern, however, expressed at this meeting that
19 the task of forming Serbian assemblies in all municipalities had not been
20 completed and not been completed properly. And on -- about one-third of
21 the way down page 24, the chairperson, who would be Mr. Krajisnik,
22 explained that, "All the presidents of autonomous districts had received
23 instructions and should have prepared and organised this." This is a
24 reference to the SAOs. "Those who have not done it should do so by
25 Friday." I will represent to you that this was a Tuesday, so...
1 "Can we verify this and finish what has not been done so far by
2 Friday when we shall adopt the law? The assembly unanimously verifies the
3 decisions by municipalities on the proclamation of newly established
4 Serbian municipalities. Municipalities which have not done so shall
5 submit by Friday their decisions verified by the competent organs."
6 The date of Friday was simply the next scheduled session of the
7 Serbian Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
8 So this document speaks to the fact that the absence of a deadline
9 in the document of 19 December had resulted in only partial compliance
10 from the SDS local boards, and in those municipalities in which it was
11 appropriate, it was to be completed now within three days.
12 MR. CAYLEY: If we can go back to tab 27, it's Prosecutor's
13 Exhibit 30, and I'll just hand out through the usher just the English
14 version of this. I believe the B/C/S is complete. If it's not, we can
15 correct that afterwards.
16 Having checked the document, Mr. President, the B/C/S version, the
17 version in Cyrillic, is complete.
18 Do Your Honours have a copy of that document? Yes, I think the
19 Defence do as well.
20 Q. Now, Dr. Donia, if you go to the second page of the translation,
21 which is the decision on the establishment of the Serbian Municipality of
22 Donji Vakuf --
23 MR. ACKERMAN: Excuse me a moment, I assume that this should now
24 get a - maybe it already has - an evidence number.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: This would be 30A, P30A.
1 MR. ACKERMAN: "A"? Thank you.
2 MR. CAYLEY:
3 Q. So referring to Prosecutor's Exhibit 30A, Donji Vakuf, who was --
4 which ethnic group was in the majority in that municipality?
5 A. This was a municipality with a majority of Muslim inhabitants.
6 Q. Now, if you go to the preamble to this decision, at the top of the
7 page, on the -- it's the page that's numbered 1 at the bottom, but it's
8 the second page of the translation, and you will see, Dr. Donia, on the
9 fifth line, that, "This decision is being made pursuant to Article 4 of
10 the instructions for the organisation and activities of the organs of the
11 Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina in extraordinary circumstances of
12 19 December, 1991."
13 Dr. Donia, is that referring to the
14 Variant A - Variant B document that we spoke about this morning?
15 A. Yes. That would be a reference to that document.
16 Q. And which variant was being implemented in this municipality?
17 A. With less than 50 per cent Serbs, this would be a Variant B
19 Q. Do you have anything else to say about this particular decision?
20 A. Well, the document is actually three related documents. The first
21 page is a request for membership in the ARK and references two
22 enclosures: number 1, the decision on establishing the Serbian
23 municipality of Donji Vakuf on 15 February; and number 2, on the same
24 session, or at the same date of 15 February, the decision of that
25 municipality to join the ARK. This follows what I believe we saw earlier
1 in Bihac, where the decision to join -- to create a Serbian municipality
2 is followed, either immediately or after some brief period of time, with a
3 decision to join the ARK. So this document speaks for the case of Donji
4 Vakuf with the use of the Serbian assembly as a growth vehicle for the
5 ARK. It recalls very similarly what was done by Mr. Vjestica in Bosanska
6 Krupa and in, I think, Olovo, earlier.
7 I would add that as I've surveyed the various reports in the
8 periodical press, this was a not universal but common for those Serbia --
9 or those municipalities in which a Serbian municipality was organised, for
10 a decision to join one of the SAOs to be taken simultaneously or shortly
12 Q. And on that note, if you go to tab 26, Prosecutor's Exhibit 29,
13 this is a decision by the municipality of Kotor Varos. Does this reflect
14 what you've just been saying to the Court?
15 A. Yes. This would reflect the decision to join the ARK by Kotor
17 Q. If we can now move on to what is page 65 of your report. We're
18 moving ahead in time now in respect of the whole of your report to January
19 1992. And this is Prosecutor's Exhibit 31, the 11th session of the
20 assembly of the ARK.
21 What was decided, Dr. Donia, at this particular meeting that's
22 significant in terms of your report?
23 A. At this meeting of the ARK Assembly, the study of Bosnian Krajina
24 as a constituent part of the new Yugoslav federation was given to each
25 person. That's reflected on page 3 of this document, under section 3, the
1 second sentence. And this study subsequently became the basis for several
2 unanimously adopted recommendations.
3 It will be recalled that the republic, the Serbian Republic of
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, was declared on 9 January 1992. So this session is
5 being held just one day before the Serbian Republic is proclaimed in
6 Sarajevo. And of the recommendations is -- of note, number three, also
7 under this section 3, on page 3 -- that "the assembly of the Serbian
8 people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as it is constituted today, fulfil its
9 function by defining and constituting Serbian regions in
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina, which will be part of the Yugoslav state and through
11 which they will be represented until the constitution of a future Yugoslav
13 So this request of the Serbian Assembly is to recognise the
14 Serbian regions as a constituent part of the future Yugoslav Assembly, in
15 a sense bypassing the actual Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and
16 submitting them directly to be a part of Yugoslavia.
17 Q. On that note, if you go to the last page, page 4, of that
18 document, where it begins, "It was decided at this session that a
19 commission ..."
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. What is the significance of that paragraph in these minutes?
22 A. In this paragraph, the ARK Assembly is deciding to dispatch a
23 commission directly to Belgrade to have talks with the Serbian president,
24 Milosevic, as opposed to mediating that to the Assembly of the Serbian
25 people or the Bosnian Serb Republic.
1 Q. Now, you've referred to two events: first of all, the declaration
2 that the Bosnian Krajina is to be a part of the Yugoslav Federation; and
3 secondly, the declaration of the Bosnian Serb Republic.
4 Now, there was a third event that was taking place simultaneously
5 at this time. And you've referred to it on page 65 of your report. And
6 that was the recommendations of the Badinter Commission. Could you
7 explain to the Court what those recommendations were and what the Badinter
8 Commission actually was.
9 A. Well, if I can return to this level of international negotiations
10 for a moment. Once the international conference on Yugoslavia was
11 established, it became evident in September 1991 that the solution to the
12 war in Croatia was going to involve some form of recognition of a Serb --
13 or of a Croatian state and some element of a territorially distinct
14 Serbian component within that state.
15 At the same time, the republics of Slovenia and Croatia had
16 declared independence back in June and agreed to defer the effectiveness
17 of those declarations until October 8th, 1991. So with the background of
18 these developments, the European Community sought to address the Yugoslav
19 question consistently and on the basis of certain guidelines. It
20 established the Badinter Commission to evaluate the applications of any
21 Yugoslav republics that wished to apply for recognition of their
22 independence. This was done in December 1991. And the Badinter
23 Commission on 17 December 1991 invited applications from any Yugoslav
24 republics wishing to apply for recognition.
25 On the 20th of December, the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina
1 voted to apply for such independence. The decision was due -- the
2 decision of the Badinter Commission was due on the 15th of January, 1992.
3 While it was a foregone conclusion -- pretty much a foregone conclusion
4 that this decision would award independence to Croatia and Slovenia, the
5 situation on Bosnia-Herzegovina was less clear. And when the decision was
6 announced on 15 January 1992, the Badinter Commission required that
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina hold a referendum on independence if it wished to be
8 recognised as an independent state by the European Community.
9 Subsequently, both the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Presidency
10 voted to hold such a referendum on February 29 and March 1, 1992.
11 In the shadow of these events, simultaneously with these events,
12 of course, the Serbian Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina made preparations in
13 late December to proclaim a separate republic, and subsequently did so on
14 9 July -- or 9 January 1992.
15 At the same time that the decision to form the republic was taken,
16 it began preparations for a constitution of that republic and made plans
17 to finalise or announce that constitution of the Serbian Republic of
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina at the end of February 1992 roughly to coincide with
19 the scheduled referendum.
20 Q. Dr. Donia, you brought us to the end of February. Let's go back
21 to Banja Luka. And if I can take you to Tab 29, Prosecutor's Exhibit 32,
22 which are minutes of the thirteenth session of the Assembly of the ARK.
23 And the matters that you've broadly referred to are being discussed in
24 these minutes. Can you draw the Judges' attentions to the relevant and
25 pertinent parts of these minutes.
1 A. The ARK Assembly was discussing the provisions of the constitution
2 of the Serbian republic to which I just referred.
3 And on page 1 of this document, P32, at the very bottom,
4 Mr. Radoslav Brdjanin makes the statement that, "It is realistic to make
5 Banja Luka the capital of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
6 Tomorrow in Sarajevo, we must all support the idea of cantons having the
7 highest degree of autonomy." Now, this tomorrow in Sarajevo refers to a
8 meeting to discuss the draft constitution of the Serbian Republic.
9 And as a part of this meeting, there were decisions adopted on --
10 this is the third page of this document, the one -- the page has at the
11 top of it Article 103(a). And at the very bottom of that page is the
12 point 1, paragraph, "The following conclusions were adopted after a
13 five-hour discussion. In order to preserve the unity of the Serbian
14 people in BH and the SDS, the constituting of the Serbian Republic in BH
15 is accepted but as a derived state structure to which the Serbian
16 republics or cantons (as 'real states with genuine internal sovereignty')
17 transfer some of their competence, or to be more precise, certain
18 coordinating functions."
19 So the ARK here is proposing that it interpose its authority and
20 assert its sovereignty against the -- or within the Bosnian Serb Republic,
21 much as the Bosnian Serb Republic had just -- was in the process of doing
22 for Bosnia-Herzegovina.
23 Then turning the page, point 2, "Only Banja Luka, as the biggest
24 city in BH in which the Serbs make up the absolute majority, can be the
25 centre of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina."
1 And finally, a threat, point 3, "If the Serbian Assembly of BH
2 fails to accept the above-mentioned conclusions at its session on 25 and
3 26 February, that is, if BH is constituted as a unitary state with
4 Sarajevo as its capital, as already intimated by the draft constitution,"
5 and then to the bottom of that paragraph, "On 28 February, the Krajina
6 should be proclaimed a sovereign republic which will establish relations
7 directly with other parts of BH."
8 So this document then states the intent of the ARK, as adopted in
9 these resolutions, to declare itself a sovereign republic if the Serbian
10 Republic does not recognise it and give it substantial autonomy in its
12 Q. Dr. Donia, if you can now go to the next binder, and indeed if we
13 could all do that now, please?
14 A. With pleasure.
15 Q. Now, you stated in your evidence that the ARK assembly had
16 referred to a meeting that was to take place the next day, and the next
17 day after the 24th of February was the 25th of February.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And I'm right in saying that that meeting was the eighth session
20 of the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
21 A. Yes, it was.
22 Q. And Prosecutor's Exhibit 33 Alpha are the minutes of that
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Just to orientate us in respect of events going on generally at
1 the international level, what had Dr. Karadzic been up to during this
3 A. In the early months of 1992, talks were convened by the Conference
4 on Yugoslavia in Lisbon - not Brussels, Lisbon - and on the 17th of
5 February, 1992, an agreement in principle was reached by the three
6 principals from Bosnia, that is Dr. Radovan Karadzic, Mr. Mate Boban, I
7 believe, and the -- Mr. Izetbegovic. This was essentially an agreement to
8 partition Bosnia into three distinct parts. And upon returning to
9 Sarajevo after the conclusion of this agreement in principle, which was to
10 be followed by further negotiations, Dr. Karadzic addressed the eighth
11 session of the assembly and was quite ecstatic, in fact, about the
12 achievement of having a separate Serbian entity recognised through these
13 negotiations, and the early pages of this document reflect that enthusiasm
14 for the negotiations as they had proceeded that far. But suddenly, on
15 page 11 of this document, towards the bottom of the page, we see that
16 Mr. Karadzic's remarks were interrupted by a telephone call from Mr. Jose
17 Cutilliero, and he left the assembly hall with apologies.
18 Q. Who was Jose Cutilliero?
19 A. Mr. Cutilliero was in charge of -- he was the coordinator, the
20 convenor, of those negotiations in Lisbon on behalf of the Conference on
21 the Yugoslavia. When he left the hall, as can be seen, Professor Nikola
22 Koljevic proceeded to do what I think is called, in the radio business,
23 filling air, and talked for several pages about the negotiations and
24 similarly shared Dr. Karadzic's enthusiasm.
25 On page 13, about one-quarter of the way down the page, we see
1 that Dr. Karadzic returns to the assembly hall and Professor Koljevic
2 continues his speech on to page 14, and in that last paragraph on page 14,
3 I think he puts the achievement in pretty good perspective, actually.
4 Where he says, in the last paragraph, "Another general impression, I
5 believe that after the establishment of the SDS and then regionalisation,
6 this is the third political event in order of importance." And he's
7 referring here to this agreement in principle reached in Lisbon. "It is a
8 step in the direction of winning back the disenfranchised rights that the
9 Serbian people were deprived of in these parts." So he gives the --
10 attributes great importance to this achievement of a separate Serbian
11 state, agreed in principle at Lisbon.
12 When Dr. Karadzic resumes, however, he reports on his conversation
13 with Cutilliero and states that Cutilliero has received a letter from
14 Izetbegovic and that letter, which was published all over the world at
15 that time, basically stated that due to events in Banja Luka and the
16 convening of an assembly in Banja Luka in which it was discussed that
17 there will be a constitution proclaimed for the Bosnian Serb Republic, he
18 found further discussions on this agreement to be pointless.
19 So in the immediate aftermath of this discussion of Cutilliero's
20 interrupting phone call, Karadzic became very -- expressed extreme
21 displeasure with the autonomous direction that was being taken by the ARK
22 assembly. If one goes to page 17, the third line - and recalling that it
23 was their intention to accept the draft constitution that day - Karadzic
24 says, "It would not be a good idea to adopt the constitution today as that
25 would be a reason for Cutilliero not to come." They were planning to
1 reconvene these discussions in Sarajevo. "Or to make any move which might
2 affect what we agree today. He told me today, 'Fine, if you can keep the
3 Serbs quiet,' and I explained that this thing in Krajina reflected their
4 distrust of Alija Izetbegovic with whom we had talked for three months at
5 a time. And just as we thought we had reached an agreement, he would come
6 up with a completely different document, which is why the Serbs do not
7 trust him."
8 But it subsequently became evident that Karadzic's irritation
9 with -- or blaming this on Izetbegovic did not just stop him from also
10 blaming those in the Krajina who were pursuing an autonomous course and
11 resisting the authority of the SDS main board.
12 On page 44, the second full paragraph: "Of course the Serbian
13 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina will have its regents with full freedom to
14 act according to the interests of the Serbian people. However, I promise
15 you, Bosnian Krajina must not become an issue. If it becomes an issue,
16 then we will lose the Knin Krajina." The Krajina across the border in
17 Croatia. "Alija is praying to God that we succeed, that we screw up. They
18 will send in UN forces, create zone A and zone B, and we are certain to
19 lose one of them, and the other will be part of an independent BH with all
20 sorts of conditions imposed."
21 And then one paragraph down: "We cannot allow that five people
22 with personal ambitions destroy our chances. We are very close to
23 achieving our strategic objections.
24 Q. Who is speaking there, Dr. Donia?
25 A. Dr. Karadzic is speaking. That's identified on page 42.
1 Now, on page 74, we see the resolution that was proposed by
2 assembly president Krajisnik at this time, which was to convene a session
3 of the ARK Assembly in Banja Luka and have it attended by essentially the
4 entire senior leadership of the SDS party in order to persuade them to
5 accept the constitution -- the draft constitution of the Serbian
7 Q. Do you have any further comments on that document?
8 A. No.
9 Q. If we could now go to Tab 30, which is Prosecutor's Exhibit 35.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: [Microphone not activated]
11 MR. CAYLEY: 34. I'm sorry.
12 Q. Now, Dr. Donia, this is a transcript of the meeting of the
13 deputy's club of the Serbian Democratic party held in Sarajevo on the 28th
14 of February, 1992; is that right?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Can you draw the Court's attention to the significant parts of
17 this document. And just -- just to clarify matters, this particular
18 meeting takes place three days after the assembly meeting that you've just
19 been referring to, doesn't it?
20 A. Yes. This is on 28 February, and it was held at -- in the
21 morning. On the second page, we see it began at 10.30 hours. And in the
22 afternoon, there was another session of the Serbian Assembly. So this
23 meeting preceded that meeting, and the afternoon meeting resulted in the
24 adoption of a constitution of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
25 But it was at this earlier meeting of the SDS deputies that the issue of
1 the ARK was again addressed and some -- many complaints were launched
2 about the, let's say, wilfulness or assertions of the ARK leadership.
3 On page 28, the speaker, Mr. Marinko Kontic -- about two-thirds of
4 the way down the page, the paragraph begins: "The problem in Banja Luka.
5 And I will tell you who the people need to be marked are: the President of
6 the Assembly, Radic, and Mr. Brdjanin, whom I have feared from day one. I
7 have had a few clashes with him, and I think there's something wrong with
8 him. There is a sickness in that man who always wants to be the boss, and
9 he's interested only in power. There is some other people there too."
10 I would note that Kontic goes on to defend Vojo Kupresanin, the
11 president of the ARK Assembly.
12 The next speaker here is -- or a couple of speakers later is
13 Dr. Karadzic, who begins speaking on 33, and on page 36 makes further
14 references to the Krajina. About three-quarters of the way down the
15 paragraph, it begins: "We can and we must renounce everyone who refuses
16 to work the way we have agreed, Brdjo and all the rest. When Brdjo
17 appears somewhere, he's like a bomb. He blows everything up. Then he
18 winks at him. And I won't allow it as a psychiatrist and as the party
20 The solution that emerged from this particular session was
21 essentially to blame the difficulties, the kind of self-will of the
22 Krajina Assembly, on five or six individuals who were kind of second-tier
23 members of the assembly, and then to adopt within the actual constitution
24 of the Serbian republic a recognition of the existence of the Serbian
25 autonomous regions but without specifying that the -- the concession was
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 that they didn't specify that the territory of the Serbian republic was
2 indivisible. They did, however, identify or define the territory of the
3 Serbian republic as made up of the territories of the Serbian autonomous
4 regions, and in a number of constitutional provisions, starting with
5 Article 100 to about 108, assigned them certain functions
7 Q. Let's go to the next day, the 29th of February of 1992, and we'll
8 go back to Banja Luka. And if I can direct you to Tab 31, Prosecutor's
9 Exhibit 35, which is an extract from the minutes of the fourteenth session
10 of the Assembly of the ARK.
11 First of all, who attended this meeting? Specifically, I'm
12 referring to people from, as it were, the republican level SDS party.
13 A. The attendees given in the third paragraph here comprised most of
14 the senior leaders of the SDS. Consequently, this is the realisation of
15 Mr. Krajisnik's proposal that all of the senior members of the SDS descend
16 on Banja Luka and attend this session. So Radovan Karadzic is present,
17 Krajisnik, Nikola Koljevic, and Velibor Ostojic, who is the Minister of
19 In number one of this extract, the second paragraph, Mr. Radoslav
20 Brdjanin, the Vice-President of the Assembly of the autonomous region, I
21 think in a wonderful understatement, recalled that the deputies in this
22 assembly, that is the ARK, "had reached an agreement at the previous
23 session on the integrity of the republic of the Serbian people in
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina but with a different viewpoint compared to the one
25 offered to the people of the Krajina from the centre in Sarajevo."
1 On the next page, we see at the top that Dr. Karadzic spoke and
2 then that the ARK Assembly voted to accept his report on the political and
3 security situation in full, that under the section labelled "Conclusion."
4 And this compromise, which brings the ARK under the umbrella of the
5 Serbian Republic, is expressed in the next two paragraphs there. "Jovan
6 Cizmovic, coordinator in the Serbian government BH, recalled that the ARK
7 can draw its autonomy from the recently adopted constitution of the
8 Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that if a republic of Krajina
9 were declared, all Serbs outside this territory would suffer from the
10 consequences of this decision." So they backed down from the idea of an
11 independent or sovereign republic.
12 And in the second paragraph there, Radovan Karadzic stressed that
13 "it would be a crime against the Krajina if it were declared a
15 On the next page, point one, the deputies in the Assembly of the
16 ARK accepted the constitution of the Republic of the Serbian people of
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina in full. This meeting essentially brought to an end
18 the clash between the ARK and the central leadership of the SDS regarding
19 its status under that constitutional document.
20 Q. Dr. Donia, if we can now go to Tab 33, which is Prosecutor's
21 Exhibit 37. And this -- and this is the instruction regarding the conduct
22 of the plebiscite of the Muslim and Croatian people in Bosnia and
23 Herzegovina. And this is an instruction from the Serbian Assembly of the
25 A. Yes. It's from the ARK Assembly, yes.
1 Q. And just to clarify matters, this is the -- referring to the
2 plebiscite or referendum that you previously spoke of that had been
3 recommended by the Badinter Commission.
4 A. Yes. And --
5 Q. What instruction was the Serbian Assembly of the ARK giving in
6 respect of this referendum?
7 A. Well, in the first point here under this instruction, the ARK
8 instructs assemblies of municipalities not to organise any activities
9 regarding the conduct of this referendum. In the second point, it calls
10 this vote for an independent and sovereign Bosnia unconstitutional and
11 illegal because it was called by an unauthorized organ in violation of the
12 decision -- or of the constitution by a decision of the rump assembly of
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina without Serbian deputies and therefore says that in all
14 municipalities in which the SDS won the elections, the official organs of
15 authorities shall have no obligations whatsoever to secure the premises on
16 which the voting is supposed to take place.
17 So this document essentially moves beyond asking for a non-vote or
18 boycott by Serbian voters to the level of the municipalities'
19 responsibility and relieves those municipalities of any obligation to
20 conduct the voting.
21 Q. Dr. Donia, did the referendum subsequently take place?
22 A. Yes. The referendum was held as scheduled on the 29th of February
23 and the 1st of March, and at that referendum, very few Serbs voted, and
24 the overwhelming majority of voters, almost all of whom were Croats and
25 Muslims, voted in favour of independence and sovereignty for
2 Q. When was Bosnia-Herzegovina recognised by the international
3 community as a sovereign state?
4 A. The European Community recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina on April 6,
5 1992. The United States followed the next day, April 7th, with that
6 recognition. And that's the date -- the date of 6 April is normally used
7 as date of recognition for Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence.
8 Q. I want to briefly go through the next series of documents, which
9 is tabs 34 through to 38. So if you could have the first document in
10 front of you, which is tab 34, Prosecutor's Exhibit 38, this is an extract
11 of the minutes of the assembly of the ARK held on the 4th of March of
13 A. Yes. In this decision -- or in this meeting, on the second page
14 of the document, we see there was an election of the executive council, or
15 the president designated the executive council, and under point 3, the
16 first of several decisions to assert authority over public functions
17 within the ARK territory. Point 3 is, "The adoption of a decision to form
18 the security services centre of the ARK, without debate." And on the next
19 page, point 6, "The adoption of a decision to form the Krajina public
20 enterprise for wholesale and retail trade in goods." And then on the
21 fourth page of the document, turning the page over, point 9, 'The election
22 and appointment of a director-general for payment transactions and
23 financial supervision of the ARK.'
24 If I may, I would just go to the next document, which is behind
25 tab 35 and is Prosecutor's Exhibit 38.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: 39.
2 MR. CAYLEY:
3 Q. 39.
4 A. 39, excuse me. The point 1 of this decision of the ARK on 11
5 April, 1992, was to transfer to the state ownership of the Serbian
6 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina the federal commodity reserves and
7 commodity reserves of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. These reserves
8 were much more substantial than in other systems that I was aware of and
9 constituted a sort of major resource in the event of emergency
11 I'm with trepidation going to move over to --
12 Q. I'll give you the exhibit numbers because there was some confusion
13 yesterday at this point, but I think I have it correct. If you could go
14 to the next document behind tab 36, which is Prosecutor's Exhibit 40?
15 A. All right. This document, dated 15 April, 1992, which is nine
16 days after the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence, is
17 directed from the president of the ARK Assembly, Vojo Kupresanin, to
18 municipal assembly presidents, and he asks that -- "Hereby asks you to
19 immediately take the following actions in your municipality: Number 1,
20 activate the TO staff or Territorial Defence staff in your municipality."
21 And then next to last, that four-line item, "Organise the effective
22 protection of people, goods, organs of authority, electricity supply
23 facilities, the PTT," which is the post office, "industrial facilities,
24 radio relay and TV nodes and transmitters, health institutions, traffic
25 and transportation facilities, and water supply." And finally, "Establish
1 full coordination with the regular and reserve police forces."
2 Q. And if you could go to the next document behind tab 37, which is
3 Prosecutor's Exhibit 41?
4 A. This is a document of 20 -- reflecting a session on 27 April,
5 1992, in which, under point 1, "The regulations of the Socialist Federal
6 Republic of Yugoslavia and of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
7 adopted prior to 7 April, 1992, which are in accordance with the
8 constitution of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and are not
9 contrary to the regulations adopted by the Assembly of the Serbian People
10 at its sessions, shall be applied in the ARK."
11 So this document establishes those -- this establishes as the
12 authority for any laws, the constitution of the Serbian Republic of
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the sessions of the -- laws of the -- passed by the
14 Assembly of the Serbian People.
15 Q. And lastly in this series of documents, the document behind tab
16 38, Prosecutor's Exhibit 42, which is a series of conclusions of the
17 Autonomous Region of Krajina from the 30th of June of 1992.
18 A. This document reflects results of a meeting on the 30th of June,
19 1992, of the executive council of the ARK, and point 1, "Government hereby
20 guarantees the rights of all people regardless of their religious or
21 ethnic affiliation who in these difficult times have expressed their
22 patriotic inclination."
23 That statement of rights of all, with the qualifier, those who
24 have expressed their patriotic inclination, is a kind of qualification of
25 those rights.
1 Q. What patriotic inclination are they referring to?
2 A. Well, one must assume that this refers to a patriotic inclination
3 in support of the Serbian people --
4 MR. ACKERMAN: I would object to what one must assume. He seems
5 to have no basis for that kind of an answer. If he has a basis, let him
6 establish it, but I would object to him just making assumptions, bold
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Objection sustained. Actually, the conclusion is
9 actually evident just the same, but the objection is sustained.
10 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, when an objection is raised, is it
11 possible for me to actually speak to it?
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
13 MR. CAYLEY: I think that Dr. Donia is perfectly entitled to make
14 logical inferences from documents, and I think, quite frankly, it's
15 absolutely clear what this document is referring to, and I think it's not
16 unreasonable that he should come to that kind of conclusion based on what
17 is actually stated in this document.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Cayley, it's an opinion, and it shouldn't be put
19 as an opinion like that. Even though he is an expert witness, he should
20 not comment on a statement which is contained in an official, or what is
21 purported to be an official, statement like this, and should leave the
22 Chamber to draw its conclusions, which, as you say, may be very obvious.
23 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
24 Q. Dr. Donia, those documents taken together, Prosecutor's Exhibit 38
25 to 42, if you were to summarise the effects of those documents, what would
1 you say to the Court?
2 A. I think the documents individually express the assertion of
3 authority by the ARK over these individual institutions and aspects of
4 public life of the ARK in the spheres of economics, economic life,
5 military and institutions of transportation and communication.
6 Q. All of these aspects of life, what kind of indices are they,
7 economy, military, transportation, communication?
8 A. Yes. They are the essential economic functions that, in this post
9 -- early post-socialist period, were essential to the functioning of the
10 state and society.
11 Q. If we can now move to the document behind tab 39, which is
12 Prosecutor's Exhibit 43, and these are the extract from the minutes of a
13 meeting of the ARK Assembly held on the 17th of July of 1992?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Now, Dr. Donia, what was significant about this meeting?
16 A. This meeting was attended by several leaders from the Serbian
17 Republic of Krajina, that is the Krajina located in Croatia, and military
18 representatives from the Bosnian Serb Army, the VRS, as well as a couple
19 of ministers from the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And as
20 such, it was kind of a joint report to the ARK on the broadly military,
21 political and security situation in both territories. And the reports
22 submitted are identified under item 1, number 1, Mr. Radoslav Brdjanin,
23 President of the War Presidency of the ARK, and Mr. Stojan Zupljanin,
24 Secretary of the Secretariat of the Interior and Chief of the Security
25 Services Centre of the ARK, submitted reports on the current political and
1 security situation in the ARK. Also, Generals Momir Talic, Zivorad
2 Ninkovic, and Minister of the Interior of the Serbian Republic of Krajina,
3 Milan Martic, informed the assembly members of the military operations of
4 the army of the VRS and the army of the Serbian Republic of
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Posavina. There are then further reports
6 indicated here from Mr. Velibor Ostojic and Mr. Bogdan Subotic,
7 respectively Ministers in -- for Information and Defence. And then
8 Mr. Goran Hadzic and Mr. Mirko Ljubicic, who was President of the
9 municipality of Doboj.
10 Q. If we could move to the next document, which is behind tab 40,
11 it's a document dated the same date as the meeting took place in Banja
12 Luka, 17th of July of 1992, Prosecutor's Exhibit 44. And this is a
13 document from the Assembly of the Autonomous Region of Krajina to the
14 Presidency of the Serbian republic and concerns the municipality of
15 Bihac. Can you explain to the Court the significance of this document?
16 A. This document was -- is dated 17 July 1992 and represents the
17 decision of the ARK to appeal to the Serbian Republic of
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina to liberate the town of Bihac so that it comprises an
19 integral part of the Serbian republic. The rationale for this is that in
20 the case that there was a majority Serbian population in Bihac
21 municipality -- reading from the second paragraph here: "43.7 per cent of
22 the population was Serbian, 35.5 Muslim, and the rest Croatian. In the
23 wake of the genocide, this percentage was virtually halved, as it has been
24 following the renewed expulsion of Serbs from a town in Bihac in this
1 Bihac, it will be recalled, established a Serbian assembly
2 immediately after the document of 19 December 1991, the instructions to
3 the Serbian people. And it obviously -- at this point the final resort
4 here of the ARK leadership -- ARK Assembly is to advocate its military
5 inclusion or military conquest to include it in the Serbian republic.
6 Q. Now, the word "liberate" is used. Who was the municipality being
7 liberated from?
8 A. Well, it was at that time under the military control of the Army
9 of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ABH.
10 Q. If we can now move to the next document, which is Tab 41,
11 Prosecutor's Exhibit 45. And this is a public announcement of the
12 Assembly of the ARK, dated the 22nd of April, 1992. What's the
13 significance of this document?
14 A. This is a -- really a public announcement that is addressed to the
15 government of the Republic of Serbia, which is, of course, a neighbouring
16 republic to Bosnia-Herzegovina.
17 And just reading the -- from the first paragraph there: "Since
18 the Serbian people in the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is
19 fighting for its biological survival and passing through the most
20 difficult moments in its history, we request that the government of the
21 Republic of Serbia return to the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
22 all able-bodied men between the age of 20 and 55 who have found refuge in
23 Serbia so that together we can defend our homes from Muslim and Croatian
24 paramilitary formations."
25 Then: "If they do not accept the appeal of the Krajinan
1 authorities, we will consider them the worst of traitors to their
2 people" - that reference here is to those who have fled to Serbia - "and
3 their right to return after the war and all their moveable and immovable
4 property will be taken away from them."
5 Q. If we could move to the next document, which is behind Tab 42,
6 Prosecutor's Exhibit 46, a decision of the Crisis Staff of the Autonomous
7 Region of Krajina. What is the significance of this document?
8 A. This decision of the crisis staff of 24 June 1992, signed by
9 Mr. Radoslav Brdjanin, is a decision to check the conscripts of -- serving
10 in military formations.
11 And the first paragraph states: "The checks shall be carried out
12 forthwith on all Croats and Muslims who have no declared place of abode or
13 residence in the ARK."
14 And two: "Checks shall been carried out forthwith on Serbian
15 conscripts who have no declared place of abode or residence in the ARK and
16 have not reported to the competent Secretariat for National Defence."
17 Q. Now, previously, we've seen that the documents have been referring
18 to an assembly of the Autonomous Region of Krajina. Now there is a
19 reference to a crisis staff. Now, can you very briefly explain what had
20 changed or what organs had developed, it's now being referred to as crisis
21 staffs, within the region.
22 A. Well, crisis staffs for the municipality level, of course, had
23 been directed from the SDS central board in its instructions of 19
24 December 1991. There was, however, no such instruction relative to the
25 SAOs, the Serbian Autonomous Regions. There was, however, an appointment
1 or designation of a crisis staff in the ARK prior to this document in kind
2 of the spirit of other crisis staffs, which were essentially
3 executive-type organs that would carry out the functions of assemblies in
4 the inability or difficulty of the assembly meeting in wartime
6 Q. And we will have another witness who will address this in more
7 detail, but broadly speaking, what powers did the crisis staff have at the
8 autonomous region level of governance?
9 A. I can't answer that question. I don't really know what the powers
11 Q. Now, moving on to the next document, which is Prosecutor's
12 Exhibit 47, behind Tab 43. This again is a document signed by --
13 purportedly signed by Radoslav Brdjanin. What is the effect of this
15 A. This document, which is a -- reflects a crisis staff of the ARK
16 decision, says that "No crisis staffs may be formed in firms."
17 Now, the address form of the document to Autoprevoz, the Director
18 and President of the Workers' Council, is such that the -- Autoprevoz was
19 the place where some crisis staff had been formed. And he says: "Since
20 you have not already done this and since you have appointed individuals
21 for whom we have firm evidence that they are not for the policies of the
22 Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it would be best if you both
23 submitted your irrevocable resignations."
24 Now, this document rejects an alternative organisation of a crisis
25 staff of the firm of Autoprevoz.
1 Q. We can now move on to the next document, which is behind Tab 44,
2 Prosecutor's Exhibit 48, which is a public announcement signed by --
3 purportedly signed by Vojo Kupresanin. What is the effect of this
5 A. This announcement, which is the -- done in the name of the
6 Presidency of the ARK, "renounces the legitimacy of Nenad Kecmanovic
7 and Mirko Pejanovic to represent the Serbian people in any capacity."
8 Kecmanovic and Pejanovic were the two members of the Presidency of
9 Bosnia and Herzegovina who had been designated to replace Biljana Plavsic
10 and Nikola Koljevic subsequent to their resignation from the Presidency of
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina on 7 April, 1992. Both of these people had run in the
12 elections of 1990 and had received -- they were down the list, in terms of
13 having received votes, for those offices on the Presidency. So this
14 effectively renounces their authority as members of the Presidency.
15 And it then goes on to say: "The Serbian people is proud of its
16 heroes to the same extent that it detests traitors and degenerates such as
17 the two mentioned."
18 Q. So in essence, these were two Serbs who continued to participate
19 in the republican government in Sarajevo; is that right?
20 A. Yes, that's correct. At this point, both of them were members of
21 the Presidency -- Serbs who were a member of the Presidency as the two
22 Serbian members on the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo.
23 Q. And they were being essentially proclaimed illegitimate people
24 because they continued to participate in the central government in
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. If you could now go to the next document, which is behind Tab 45,
3 Prosecutor's Exhibit 49, which is a series of public announcements with a
4 European Community Monitoring Mission cover sheet on the document. What
5 is the significance of this series of documents?
6 A. In May of 1992, the SDS moved to define its strategic goals and
7 also reach an agreement on the territory which it controlled.
8 On 6 May, 1992, SDS president Karadzic and HDZ president Mate
9 Boban met and reached an agreement, which was widely publicised, to divide
10 much of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina between their respective
11 state formations or parties.
12 This agreement was reached citing the ongoing efforts of the
13 European Community and the conference on Yugoslavia to reach a peaceful
14 solution to the Bosnian crisis. However, it was done without the
15 participation of Muslim representatives and without the knowledge of the
16 European -- or of the conference leader, Mr. Cutilliero. And the -- I
17 have in front of me a fax message sheet. And on the opposite side of that
18 page is a brief hand-written note dated "London, 7 May 1992," in which
19 Mr. Jose Cutilliero writes to Mr. Colm Doyle and says: "Could you in your
20 conference capacity try to elucidate with the principles the exact terms
21 and meaning of their alleged agreement and Muslim views on the matter."
22 So that makes clear that the EC mediator was not informed in
23 advance or was not a part of these discussions.
24 There were six points to this agreement. And going forward two
25 pages is a -- an English translation. I would highlight only point
1 three: "Both sides agree that in defining the borderline between the two
2 constituent units in the area of Kupres as well as of Bosanska
3 Posavina" -- and then certain municipalities are listed -- "account should
4 be taken of the compactness of areas and communications."
5 This is a reference to the importance of the corridor running
6 between the eastern and western areas of lands under Serb control at that
7 time and also to the -- the situation in the area of Kupres, where there
8 was a highway that was maintained by one side but regularly shelled on the
10 And just to note that under the provisions of this agreement, they
11 also invoke and invite the European Community to mediate their dispute on
12 the area south of Mostar.
13 The significance of this document from the point of view of the
14 two who agreed to it, or at least to the Serbian side, is reflected in --
15 by turning over yet one more page to the press release labelled "Serb and
16 Croat Leaders Sign Peace Agreement." This was a press release prepared by
17 the -- by Dr. Karadzic's public relations firm in London.
18 And the third paragraph there states: "The agreement overturns
19 the mandate of the Bosnian independence reference for self-determination
20 for a Bosnian state." This refers to the referendum of the 29th of
21 February and the 1st of March. "Instead the mandate will be reversed.
22 Bosnia will be divided, and in its place, three separate states will be
24 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, I don't know if you wish to break now.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: As you wish, Mr. Cayley. If you prefer to break
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 now, we will pause now, and --
2 MR. CAYLEY: Yes.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. So we will resume at quarter to 1.00.
4 --- Recess taken at 12.22 p.m.
5 --- On resuming at 12.48 p.m.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Call Dr. Donia in, please.
7 Yes, Mr. Cayley?
8 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Your Honour.
9 Q. Before the break, Dr. Donia, you referred us to Prosecutor's
10 Exhibit 49, which is the public announcement of the agreement on partition
11 of Bosnia-Herzegovina between the Croats and the Serbs. Is there any
12 mention in these public announcements of the Muslim people in Bosnia?
13 A. No.
14 Q. Now, moving six days later, to Banja Luka, the 12th of May, 1992,
15 this is behind tab 46, Prosecutor's Exhibit 50, and these are minutes of
16 the 16th session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina. You actually state - it's page 75 in your report -
18 it's the 14th session, but no matter, it's a typographical error. It was,
19 in fact, the 16th session of the Serbian people.
20 Now, this document, these minutes, essentially reflect prior
21 events that have taken place. If you can direct the Court to the sections
22 in these minutes which are significant for what we are discussing at the
23 moment? And I think the first reference you will find on page 13.
24 A. If I might begin with a reference to the first -- actually first
25 page, which is a -- starts with a heading of, "The Minutes," and then
1 proceeds to list the agenda in 14 items, and the very, very brief
2 conclusion of each of those 14 items. On page 4 is the statement that the
3 audiotape recording of the session is an integral part of the minutes, and
4 what follows on pages 5 through - who knows how long here - are, in fact,
5 the -- a transcript of the audiotape recording of the session. At this
6 meeting, the assembly adopted the strategic goals of the Serbian people
7 and briefly discussed each one of them, spelled them out. It also
8 completed the process of forming a Bosnian Serb Army or VRS, and appointed
9 General Ratko Mladic as its first commander. And the bulk of the
10 discussion at this session concerns issues raised in the enumeration of
11 the six strategic objectives and includes long discussions by both
12 Dr. Karadzic and General Mladic.
13 The discussion of the strategic goals for the Serbian people
14 begins on page 13. In the last full paragraph, the first goal is stated:
15 "Separation from those who are our enemies and who have used every
16 opportunity, especially in this century, to attack us, and who would
17 continue with such practices if we were to continue to stay together in
18 the same state."
19 This goal, as seen in the sentence immediately above this
20 paragraph, is stated in the more general sense as, "separation from the
21 other two national communities or separation of states."
22 Going on, on page 13, and just to identify the speaker here, this
23 is Dr. Karadzic, "The second strategic goal it seems to me is a corridor
24 between Semberija and Krajina."
25 Now, this is the -- also drew reference in the agreement of 6 May
1 in 1992 in Graz, the notion that there should be a corridor between the
2 eastern area of Serb-held lands, which -- the northern part of which is
3 Semberija and the Krajina, the western held portion. "That is something
4 for which we may be forced to sacrifice something here and there, but it
5 is of the utmost strategic importance for the Serbian people because it
6 integrates the Serbian lands, not only of Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina,
7 but it integrates Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina with Serbian Krajina" --
8 meaning Krajina in Croatia -- "and Serbian Krajina with Serbian Bosnia and
9 Herzegovina and Serbia." So there's both a purpose of reuniting the
10 Serbian lands within Bosnia and uniting the Serbian lands in Croatia and
11 the Republic of Serbia.
12 And on the next page, page 14, the first paragraph: "The third
13 strategic goal is to establish a corridor in the Drina Valley, that is,
14 elimination of the Drina as a border between our two worlds. We in our
15 strategic interest and our living space are on both sides of the Drina."
16 So this abolition of the Drina as a boundary is the third goal
17 with the idea of creating a -- or a homogenous Serbian land.
18 Q. And just to be absolutely clear, the Drina River was a boundary
19 between which two countries?
20 A. Well, the Drina -- I wonder -- we need a map. But the Drina ran
21 as a boundary in part between Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of
23 The fourth strategic goal, on page 14: "The fourth strategic goal
24 is the establishment on the Una and Neretva Rivers." That would define a
25 very expansive area, running from Herzegovina up into the Krajina.
1 The next paragraph: "The fifth strategic goal is the division of
2 the city of Sarajevo into Serbian and Muslim parts and implementation of
3 an effective state government in each of these two parts of the
4 constitutive state."
5 The sixth goal, then, is the -- "The sixth strategic goal is the
6 access of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the sea."
7 These were subsequently adopted by the Assembly as the Serbian
8 goals -- or the goals of the Serbian people.
9 Q. Dr. Donia, if I can now direct you to page 22 of these minutes and
10 the transcript of what was said by deputy Dragan Kalinic.
11 A. As I mentioned, there was substantial discussion subsequent to the
12 adoption of these goals of the position or attitude that the Serbian
13 leadership should take on some of these key issues of Serbian goals.
14 On page 22, Dr. -- Mr. Dragan Kalinic was speaking. And in the
15 second paragraph of his speech, down about four lines: "Among all the
16 issues this assembly should decide on, the most important one is this:
17 Have we chosen the option of war or the option of negotiation? I say this
18 with a reason, and I must instantly add that knowing who our enemies are,
19 how perfidious they are, how they cannot be trusted until they are
20 physically militarily destroyed and crushed, which of course implies
21 eliminating and liquidating their key people, I do not hesitate in
22 selecting the first option, the option of war, because I believe that our
23 fate, the fate of Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I do not link it in any
24 way to the fate of Serbia and Montenegro" --
25 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness slow down, please.
1 A. "Our sentimental and national bonds" --
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Donia --
3 THE WITNESS: Slow down?
4 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, please.
5 A. "Our sentimental and national bonds must be reduced in this
6 respect to a pragmatic level and established on the basis of interest that
7 the fate of Serbs in BH cannot be resolved in any other way but by war."
8 Mr. Kalinic's speech continues on page 24. It's all one
9 paragraph. About two thirds of the way down the page, there is a -- the
10 word "NO," both letters capitalised. Following that word: "However,
11 those who will be planning the Sarajevo operation, either of liberating
12 Sarajevo or of destroying the enemy forces in Sarajevo will have to plan
13 what to do with the medical facilities. And let me tell you this right
14 now, if the military hospital is to end up in the hands of the enemy, I am
15 for the destruction of the Kosovo hospital so that the enemy has nowhere
16 to go for medical help."
17 Add at this point that Mr. Kalinic was the Minister of Health of
18 the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
19 On page 29, Mr. Radoslav Brdjanin begins to speak. At the bottom
20 of the page: "Mr. President, I asked for the floor only after I realised
21 that I was the most remote, that compared to everyone else, I am a
22 kindergartner. I would first of all like to thank all those who -- all
23 those participating in the discussion. I would like to say a heart-felt
24 bravo to Mr. Kalinic. In all my appearances in this joint assembly, it
25 has never crossed my mind that although he seems quiet while I seem
1 hawkish, his opinions are the closest to mine. I believe that this is the
2 formula, that we should adhere to this formula."
3 After a further discussion on page 60, the draft decision on
4 establishing the Serbian army of Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina army is
5 considered, in the fourth full paragraph:
6 "Pursuant to amendment 2 of the constitution of the Serbian
7 Republic of BH and in conjunction with Article 70, item 2 of the
8 constitution of SRBH, Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the national
9 assembly hereby adopts the decision on establishing the Serbian Republic
10 of Bosnia-Herzegovina army:
11 "1: The Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina army is hereby
13 "2: Existing Territorial Defence units and staffs shall hereby be
14 renamed into commands and units of the army which will have its
15 organisation and establishment determined by the president of the
17 "3: Lieutenant General Ratko Mladic is hereby appointed the
18 Commander of the Main Staff of the Serbian Republic of BH army.
19 "4: The Serbian Republic of the BH army shall wear uniforms and
20 insignia of rank worn by the members of the JNA and Territorial Defence."
21 With that, the Serbian army or VRS was established, and shortly
22 thereafter, the session was adjourned.
23 MR. CAYLEY:
24 Q. Earlier, you referred to Mr. Kalinic and what he said at this
25 meeting, and I just wanted to ensure that the transcript is correct,
1 because the name is misspelled. I know the transcript is corrected
2 afterwards, but the spelling of Mr. Kalinic's name is K-a-l-i-n-i-c?
3 A. That's correct.
4 Q. Now, Dr. Donia, if we can go now to the last document that I wish
5 you to refer to, which is the document behind tab 48, you probably don't
6 have a tab in your version but it's Prosecutor's Exhibit 52, which is the
7 transcript of the 50th assembly -- the 50th session of the Assembly of
8 Republika Srpska, and in English, there is an extract of a speech made by
9 Dr. Karadzic, and I think the relevant part is at page 2. If you could
10 summarise to the Court the significance of what was being stated by
11 Dr. Karadzic in this part of his speech?
12 A. This part of Dr. Karadzic's address is a recollection of how the
13 SDS organised life at the beginning of its existence from 1990 to 1992.
14 Q. Just to interrupt you, Dr. Donia, on what date did this meeting
15 take place, can you recall?
16 A. This was -- it was April or May of 1995, so it was --
17 Q. 15 April, 1995?
18 A. Okay, 15 April, 1995. I do not have the date in front of me. I
19 see it's the fifth -- on the B/C/S, I see that it is the 15th and 16th of
20 April of 1995, in Sanski Most.
21 Q. I'm sorry, please continue.
22 A. In this discussion of the beginning years of the SDS and the
23 Bosnian Serb Republic, he says, starting at line 2, "I want to say how it
24 was. At the moment the war began, in the municipalities where we were in
25 the majority" --
1 Q. Slow down a little, because the interpreters can't follow you.
2 A. Okay. "... we had municipal power, held it firmly, controlled
3 everything. In the municipalities where we were in the minority, we set
4 up secret government, municipal boards, municipal assemblies, presidents
5 of executive boards. You will remember, the A and B variants. In the B
6 variant, where we were in the minority - 20 per cent, 15 per cent - we had
7 set up a government and a brigade, a unit, no matter what size, but there
8 was a detachment with a commander. The war began, and the JNA helped as
9 much as it could here and there, it had helped before - I hope this will
10 not be going out on HTV - General Subotic helped just before the war began
11 by sending tanks."
12 Then if I may move down to the section in which there are a number
13 of -- a whole lot of names in upper case, about two-thirds of the way
14 down. The sentence begins, "Gentlemen, we got the officers we asked for.
15 I asked for Mladic. General Ninkovic, then a colonel, and General Perisic
16 had visited me before that, and I had noticed Mladic's blunt statements in
17 the newspapers. He was already in Knin then. I took an interest in him,
18 and together with Mr. Krajisnik, I went to General Kukanjac's office and
19 listened to him issuing orders and commanding around Kupres and Knin. We
20 spent countless nights in the office of General Kukanjac at that time.
21 President Krajisnik was already president of the assembly, and I was just
22 the president of the party, I did not have any state function. We asked
23 for Mladic and said that they should set up the headquarters as they saw
24 fit, we wouldn't interfere."
25 And then just skipping down six lines: "Later, we demobilised it,
1 but the core of the army existed in every municipality. I would like to
2 hear in which municipality it did not exist. With the arrival of the
3 first active-duty officers, it could immediately be seen which active-duty
4 officers were men of the people, ideologically not poisoned, and which
5 were poisoned. Immediately, right away, those who were ideologically
6 poisoned, who at that point lacked Serbhood, particularly orthodox faith,
7 right away they knew that the Serbian government was no good, right away
8 each municipality president was a thief and a fool."
9 If I can just turn to page 4, the observations about the relations
10 with the military continue on page 4, the first full paragraph, "What is
11 the essence? The essence is what Djuric or someone said in the first
12 speech - the army should blend into the state, Kupresanin. The army
13 should blend into the state, become an organ of the state, not a repairman
14 we hire or order, someone whose requests we have to fulfil, nor a
15 structure which can place itself above everybody."
16 The next paragraph, the last sentence -- next-to-last
17 sentence: "It is clear, a commander obeys the supreme command, and all
18 his assistants and corps commanders must obey him, et cetera. There can
19 be no split in these organs, and if it is not running smoothly, if it is
20 not going well, if it is not working like a clockwork, if it is
21 running ..." et cetera. "So far, we have had a very active mutual
23 There are a number of other comments in his speech about
24 military-civilian relations within the government of the RS, which speak
25 to some disagreements which were then being publicly discussed, but those
1 are the essential comments on bringing the army into the authority of the
2 civilian government.
3 Q. Dr. Donia, we've come to the end of this binder. We've come to
4 the end of your report. You have, at the end of your report, a number of
5 conclusions, which are really based on the consideration of both binders
6 together, what these documents essentially say to us years later. Could
7 you please provide to the Judges a summary of those conclusions contained
8 in your report, the conclusions that you came to based on your
9 consideration of all of these documents and your knowledge of the region
10 and its peoples?
11 A. First, I would say that the political developments characterised
12 by the word "regionalisation" transformed the political structure of
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina well before April of 1992, and that process of
14 regionalisation involved splitting up, redefining, restructuring
15 municipalities, as well as the more evident, more obvious, process of
16 forming regional associations of municipalities, such as the ARK. And
17 therefore, the political foundation for a Serbian state was laid, in a
18 sense, from the ground up. It was a process that began at the
19 municipality level, sponsored by the highest levels of the SDS and levels
20 in between. That process led to various institutions being created, and
21 undergoing a number of name changes, from Crisis Staffs to War
22 Presidencies and Serbian Assemblies and a number of other iterations of
23 the same basic notion. I don't see a great deal of significance to these
24 different titles that are ascribed or adopted by these bodies over time,
25 for they all shared the single purpose of creating a Serbian-dominated
1 state on Serbian-specified territory.
2 I'm struck by how little -- how few references there are to
3 non-Serbs in the deliberative minutes that I've looked at, almost as
4 though they didn't exist. They are simply not entering into the narrative
5 that is exercised in these deliberative bodies. There are occasional
6 references to assuring the rights of members of other nationalities, and
7 there are occasional references in these documents to the need to bring
8 Serbs back from other territories into the areas of the Serbian state, but
9 very, very little is said about non-Serbs.
10 At the same time, perusing the population composition of the
11 Republika Srpska in 1996 up to the present day, that has become -- that
12 became, in the words of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a
13 nearly homogeneous Serbian territory. Certainly was that by 1996.
14 Despite some modest returns of some non-Serbs to the RS, it remains
15 largely homogeneous Serbian territory to this date.
16 Finally, I would note that the regionalisation process, nearly
17 from its inception had a -- as one of its objectives, the successful
18 military mobilisation of a force, always styled as a defensive force.
19 That process began in early 1991 when the JNA was a completely separate
20 organisation, under a separate command, and by May of 1992, when the JNA
21 had left behind or transferred to the VRS most of its heavy weapons and
22 the vast majority of its personnel based in Bosnia, that transformation
23 was completed and the Bosnian Serb Republic, the RS, had its military
24 force in the form of the reconstituted or renamed JNA, known as the VRS.
25 Those are the main conclusions I would outline from my review of
1 this material and evidence.
2 Q. And indeed, the full conclusions are contained on pages 76 and 77
3 of your report?
4 A. Yes.
5 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, I've now completed my
6 examination-in-chief. I have spoken with Mr. Ackerman and with Ms.
7 Fauveau, and they would like to commence their cross-examination
8 tomorrow. I know I had made certain indications yesterday that I would
9 bleed over into tomorrow. I finished more efficiently than I originally
10 thought, so I'm perfectly happy for that to take place if you are.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Actually, we are finished earlier and more
12 efficiently, as you say, because the way you conducted your
13 examination-in-chief was impeccable, and the Chamber is very appreciative
14 of that, because that way, if we continue in this way, we will be able to
15 move forward at a faster speed, and that is the wish and desire of all of
16 us here.
17 I also take it as very important to have the transcript of
18 Dr. Donia's testimony today, particularly the conclusions, ready possibly
19 first thing tomorrow morning. The conclusion, at least the part in which
20 he draws the conclusions based on the rest of his testimony, I think is
21 very important for the Chamber to have and for the Defence teams to have
22 before they commence the cross-examination tomorrow. I think that should
23 not present a big problem. More or less, it's already here. And I am
24 making this statement meaning that the -- you will have the text in
25 English, of course, which is the language of the witness.
1 Yes, Mr. Ackerman.
2 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, we are -- because of the wonderful
3 facilities provided here, we are able to make a immediate disk of today's
4 proceedings and have it available to us immediately. There will be an
5 official transcript, I suppose, in a day or so. But -- well, there's
6 never an official transcript. To my knowledge, there has never been an
7 official transcript in this Tribunal.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: No, there hasn't.
9 MR. ACKERMAN: But there will be a better transcript in a day or
10 two. But what we get from these machines is fine.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. So we will reconvene tomorrow morning at 9.00
12 in Courtroom I, not in this courtroom.
13 And would you please inform the Chamber who will be starting with
14 the cross-examination.
15 Mr. Ackerman, I understand you --
16 MR. ACKERMAN: Yes, I will be starting at 9.00 in the morning.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: And you anticipate your cross-examination to take
18 how long from tomorrow's sitting?
19 MR. ACKERMAN: I can only guess, and the best guess I can give you
20 is it will take all day.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: All day.
22 And Ms. Fauveau, would you anticipate that you will be in a
23 position to conclude -- begin and conclude your cross-examination by the
24 end of our work on Friday?
25 MS. FAUVEAU-IVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, certainly,
1 Mr. President, Your Honours.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Merci.
3 So I have put these questions again following up what -- the
4 suggestion that you had made a day or two ago so that you can actually
5 prepare for -- make the arrangements for Dr. Donia to return to the
7 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
8 Two housekeeping matters: The first one, you made an order
9 yesterday that if exhibits are not translated into English, I think,
10 within two weeks, they will not be admitted into evidence. This final
11 document that we referred to, the fiftieth session of the Assembly of
12 Republika Srpska, the version in Serbian, in Cyrillic, is over 200 pages
13 in length. We rely only on, as I say, approximately -- well, there are
14 17 pages that are translated. Within two weeks, we are not going to get
15 this translated, nor do we suggest to the Court that it should be, because
16 quite frankly, much of it we do not rely on.
17 Now, I'm sure Mr. Ackerman will turn and say, "Well, I need to
18 know what it says." But if I submit this document to the translation
19 department, I think -- I can't predict their reaction.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: I can.
21 Yes. Mr. Ackerman, I'll start with you.
22 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, this is a document from 1995, I
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, it is.
25 MR. ACKERMAN: And so it's unlikely --
1 JUDGE AGIUS: 15th or 16th of --
2 MR. ACKERMAN: It's unlikely that there is material in there that
3 is relevant to a case that covers basically the year 1992. I can have my
4 assistants here just skim through it and see if there's any other 1992
5 material there. If Mr. Cayley tried to use 1995 material, I'd be
6 objecting, so chances are I don't have any objection whatsoever to it not
7 being fully translated.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: And Ms. Fauveau.
9 MS. FAUVEAU-IVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Fortunately --
10 unfortunately, I think there may be other parts of this document that are
11 relevant to this case and that refer to the year 1992.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Well, the position as it is being taken now by
13 this Chamber for the present moment and until it has at least on a prima
14 facie basis an indication of which other parts of that document could be
15 of relevance to the -- to the case we have in front of us, restricts -- or
16 rather, it does not extend the -- that part of yesterday's order to the
17 remaining part of this last document -- we're talking of document P52B -
18 52B - since the Prosecution is basing and relying itself only on the part
19 from Mr. -- Dr. Karadzic's statement or part of the speech, so the rest we
20 will revisit if we need to later on, provided there is at least some prima
21 facie indication to this Chamber that we need to. Otherwise it will
22 remain as it is, and we should proceed with the -- with the part that has
23 been translated, the remaining part or the remaining text in B/C/S
24 remaining in its entirety as it is, without the need of having any further
25 parts from it translated into English or French. Okay?
1 MR. CAYLEY: Unless the Defence identify --
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Well, obviously, if there is. But we can't go on a
3 fishing expedition. I mean, if we have an indication, yes, you will have
4 all opportunities; we will even, if necessary, stop until we have it
5 translated. But it -- the Chamber has to be convinced that there is the
6 need for that. Otherwise, we will not entertain any -- any objections of
7 those -- anyway, it's not an objection. It's a remark which Ms. Fauveau
8 has made for the time being and the Chamber will reserve its position
9 until and only if there is a clear indication that it ought to be -- ought
10 to do so -- ought to change its ruling of yesterday.
11 So that brings us to the -- is there something else?
12 MR. CAYLEY: One last matter, Your Honour, a straightforward one.
13 We provided to Your Honours a number of binders in respect of the Banja
14 Luka municipality. If you remember, you decided that exhibits would,
15 where possible, be pre-numbered in order to speed things up. Could we,
16 please, ask for those binders back from Your Honours so that we can
17 pre-number your sets, along with any other sets that were given out.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. That will be done.
19 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Anything else?
21 MR. CAYLEY: No, that's fine. Thank you very much.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: You are informed that the decision which was
23 expected on the 92 bis has been handed down, and you should have already
24 been provided with a copy. Okay.
25 So the hearing is adjourned until tomorrow morning 9.00, to be
1 reconvened in Chamber I -- Courtroom I. Thank you.
2 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned
3 at 1.30 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday,
4 the 31st day of January, 2002, at 9.00 a.m.