1 Wednesday, 10 June 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.
5 [The witness takes the stand]
6 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
8 JUDGE PARKER: The affirmation you made to tell the truth still
9 applies, and Mr. Djurdjic is questioning you. Yes.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.
11 WITNESS: ALEKSANDAR VASILJEVIC [Resumed]
12 [Witness answered through interpreter]
13 Cross-examination by Mr. Djurdjic: [Continued]
14 Q. Good morning, General.
15 A. Good morning.
16 Q. Let us take it slowly today so as to have everything recorded
17 with as few corrections as possible. First I'd like to show you a
18 document that we discussed yesterday. You already provided some answers
19 to it, but I want to stay with it for some time.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please receive
21 document D003-2656.
22 Q. General, this document is the rules of service of the VJ for
23 1996. Could you please read out paragraph -- or Article 473. It starts
24 on this page and spills over onto the next.
25 A. "Army units may be used to combat outlaw, sabotage, terrorists,
1 and other enemy groups."
2 Q. Let us go to the next page in the B/C/S. Eventually we'll have
3 to change the page in the English.
4 A. "Or to prevent or eliminate a state of emergency by the state of
5 the president of Yugoslavia
6 Chief of General Staff shall issue the order for the use of the army
7 pertaining to this article. In case of an attack by an outlaw,
8 terrorist, sabotage, or other armed enemy group at a unit or institution,
9 the commanding or duty officer of the attacked unit, institution, or army
10 facility shall immediately undertake the relevant defence and repelling
11 measures and shall inform his superior thereof."
12 Q. Thank you. You will agree with me that this encompasses two
13 situations: One, when there is an attack; and the other, when the
14 Chief of General Staff makes decisions even if there is no attack.
15 A. This concerns terrorist groups rather than an armed rebellion
16 which was -- which prevailed in Kosovo in 1998. You will remember 1972
17 when a sabotage Ustasha group was introduced from Australia. That was
18 the synonym that was frequently used for the sabotage terrorist groups
19 from that point onwards.
20 As regards Kosovo, we did not have a single terrorist group. We
21 had what was basically an army there, the KLA. This was not an
22 individual small group concerning which the Chief of the General Staff or
23 the Yugoslav president could make decisions so as to avoid a state of
25 But in 1998 as far as I know, there was a state of emergency.
1 Everything was blocked, traffic, the territory, they established their
2 own check-points, they mined roads. It didn't concern a single facility,
3 say, in Drenica, but the entire territory of Kosovo
4 why there was so much discussion about introducing a state of emergency.
5 Q. Thank you, General. You have embarked upon interpreting some
6 legal regulations, but I would like to stay with the rules of service
7 only for the time being.
8 In the second part of this article, I believe the third
9 paragraph, the issue is that of a unit reacting if exposed to an attack
10 without any -- anyone's orders; am I correct in saying that?
11 A. You are completely correct.
12 Q. Thank you. Let us go back to paragraph 1 of this article. I
13 don't want to enter any legal debates with you or political debates, but
14 when it says that the general or the Chief of the General Staff can use
15 the armed forces pursuant to the decisions of the Supreme Defence Council
16 and the president of Yugoslavia
17 In this article, there is no mention of a state of emergency; am I
19 A. You are. However, it also says:
20 "In order to prevent that a state of emergency comes about."
21 Q. I don't think I find that in there. I can't see it. Yes, yes,
22 "in order to prevent," you are right. Therefore it is possible under
23 those conditions.
24 And then we have paragraph 474 on the use of army -- no, no, that
25 is irrelevant. Let's move on.
1 General, you described your view of the KLA. I would like to
2 know something more about the ways they were financed. Was that
3 something that you were interested in in 1997, 1998, and 1999. When you
4 took over duties, did you study that?
5 A. No, I was not familiar with the way they were financed in the
6 course of those few years, and there was no discussion about that when I
7 came towards the end of April. Although I know what it used to be like
8 preceding that period; therefore, I conclude that it was similar.
9 First of all, they received donations collected by the Albanian
10 lobby which was well off in financial terms abroad. There were various
11 means of going about that. It even concerned stealing or robbery, and
12 somewhere around 1985 or 1986, most of the money came from abroad.
13 Q. Thank you. In the years immediately prior to the war and
14 immediately after, were you familiar with any drug smuggling as being one
15 of the basic sources of finance?
16 A. Yes, one can make that conclusion. Drug trafficking is present
17 even as we speak in Kosovo.
18 Q. Thank you. When you took over your duties regarding the KLA,
19 were you acquainted with the importance of foreign aid in terms of
20 equipping and training the KLA?
21 A. No. That was not a topic.
22 Q. Thank you. Do you know how many VJ former officers, as well as
23 JNA former officers, were among the ranks of the KLA while you were on
24 your duty?
25 A. We did not view that as a separate issue. What I knew was that
1 they had some people from the JNA who joined the KLA. Basically, all of
2 NCOs and COs who were the subjects of our investigations later on became
3 KLA commanders. Basically all of them, and I have in mind around 15 of
5 Q. Thank you. Are you familiar with the period immediately prior to
6 NATO bombardment and the stay of the Verification Commission, the OSCE,
7 as well as KDOM, as well as the ways in which they overstepped the
8 boundaries of their mandate by engaging in counter-intelligence
10 A. As I have mentioned already, I seem to remember that some members
11 of that mission were in contact with KLA leaders, but nothing more
12 specific than that. When I arrived at the service, I know I was briefed
13 on that, and I remember that was from the period before I was reinstated.
14 I also mentioned the photograph of Mr. Holbrooke with some KLA people.
15 Q. Thank you. General, I'd like to know what you know about the
16 methods of operation of the KLA in terms of counter-intelligence. What
17 was characteristic of that? I'm not so much interested in the military
18 aspects, but the very nucleus of the problem in terms of abusing or
19 misusing civilians. Did you have any information regarding that?
20 A. The method of operation was that all reluctant Albanian
21 population in Kosovo that did not line up, that did not rally around the
22 KLA or any of its units, or who did not sign up to the KLA goals, or for
23 whom there was even a shadow of a doubt that they were in one way or
24 another loyal to the Serbian regime or were in contact with the security
25 service, irrespective of the fact that they were ethnic Albanians, most
1 of them were liquidated. They were treated extremely roughly. I know
2 that some of our collaborators were eventually killed. That was quite
3 common, and in such situations they simply put the ethnic affiliation
5 Another characteristic was that these terrorist armed groups
6 mingled usually with local population. There were several such cases
7 that we were briefed by various security organs, in the course of which
8 we learned that fire was opened from say refugee columns on the police
9 and the army. And then it was very difficult how to respond to that
10 without suffering casualties, and at the same time not hurting in a sense
12 I'm a bit familiar with the Albanian mentality since I have
13 studied the problem for a long time. I learned that families, and entire
14 parts of villages from which KLA terrorists hailed, moved together with
15 them using them as a source of protection in the sense that they were
16 protecting civilians. And at the same time, the civilians were there to
17 make sure that no fire was opened at the KLA members. And they moved
18 together as a single group.
19 Q. Thank you. Does this mean that on many occasions, the KLA
20 operated wearing civilian clothes?
21 A. I can't say that. I don't know. I didn't pay attention to it.
22 You know, a tradition in Albanians is that there must be a single rifle
23 at least in every household hidden somewhere. So I cannot exclude the
24 possibility that the civilians who were not officially or formally in KLA
25 uniform and a KLA unit, that they opened fire as well.
1 It was a general malaise. I don't know whether they changed
2 clothes into uniforms, into civilian clothes, I don't know. I can tell
3 you only about the methodology they used and their love of weapons.
4 Almost all male Albanians irrespective of their age always kept a gun or
5 a rifle.
6 Q. Thank you. A blood-feud has not been eradicated among the
7 Albanian population, do you agree?
8 A. That's correct. It's still alive.
9 Q. Thank you. What I'd like to know, Mr. General, is whether you
10 have any knowledge about KLA members evacuating certain villages for
11 their purposes in 1998, 1999, and during the war?
12 A. I know about that as a general information, but I couldn't be
13 specific which village suffered such a fate. But I know of this
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I'd like to familiarise you with
16 an exhibit P452. Rather, D452. No, it's P452.
17 Q. General, what we are about to see is a decision of the
18 Chief of General Staff of the KLA Colonel Bislim Zyrapi, dated
19 1st April, 1999
20 us, was this one of the methods for the KLA to infiltrate the civilians
21 while withdrawing from FRY forces?
22 A. Yes, I've read it. I'm quite surprised that a person that I used
23 to know, Bislim Zyrapi, became Chief of General Staff. Well, like
24 commander, like army; he used to be an NCO in Sarajevo, and we used to
25 deal with him in 1986. In the original text there are four 9s in the
1 date, and the same has been reflected in the translation.
2 What he drafted as Chief of General Staff is not of the same
3 level of quality a JNA sergeant would draft. Well, this is not
4 contentious that they moved the population in areas of combat operation,
5 maybe for protection, but maybe for political interests. I cannot enter
6 into speculation. But the fact stands that the population was moved
7 around. From their perspective, maybe for protection. Women and
8 children used to be in the woods and the western media took pictures of
9 them representing them as displaced persons; but in professional terms we
10 can deem that as evacuation, moving the population from one place to
12 Q. Thank you. General, I would like to go through some documents
13 with you, but rather, let's finish with my yesterday's remark concerning
14 the 25th of May document.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] That would be, I think, P --
16 65 ter number 1459. 1459. That was 1459 in Milutinovic et al. We can
17 see it.
18 Q. General, let's take it from the top, from page 1. So the date is
19 the 25th of May, 1999. You said that the long number reflects the
20 3rd Armies. Do you have the number of copies that this document was
21 drafted in?
22 A. There may be several copies, but no mark is borne by this
23 document. Minimum number of copies to be drafted is two; one to the
24 addressee, and the other for the archives of the drafter. You will see
25 in other documents that this number of copies, if not indicated, doesn't
1 mean anything.
2 Q. Absolutely, I agree with you. But this is a case where we have
3 delivery order in terms of who should be -- who should receive that
4 document. But let me ask you another thing, this was drafted by
5 Mr. Pavkovic, bears his signature and the date, but you do not know
6 whether he drafted that document on that date; am I right?
7 A. One cannot say whether this was drafted on the date, but we can
8 say whether it was entered into the log or the ledger on that date. The
9 document might have been drafted a week prior to the date, but what is
10 important is when it is registered in the ledger. On the 25th of May
11 there is an addendum which is not usual. 94-1-2. What 94-1 is is worthy
12 of investigation.
13 Q. This is stated in the stamp of this document, but whether it was
14 registered or not can be determined only by gaining insight into the
16 A. That's correct. Or if it was received by the General Staff and
17 is addressed to the Chief of General Staff personally, then it should
18 bear the stamp, the reception stamp; and this is why I said I could not
19 testify whether this document reached the General Staff because there is
20 no reception stamp of the General Staff.
21 Q. That's correct, General. Let me ask you another thing. Is it
22 true that all General Staff documents were placed into the military
23 archive registered, recorded, and bearing military archive's stamps, so
24 all General Staff documents are in the archives of the VJ?
25 A. I cannot tell you about the exceptions. There were documents
1 whose authenticity I have no reason to doubt, but which do not bear the
2 archive stamp. It doesn't mean that all the documents must be in the
3 archive, but the practice is whenever a document is archived or when
4 documents are taken out of an archive, whoever is giving them away, they
5 don't care whether -- who is going to do the triage.
6 Q. But if this document was received in the archive, then it should
7 bear the archive's stamp. At least that was the practice in 1999.
8 JUDGE PARKER: Your eagerness and enthusiasm is being reflected
9 in the speed of your questioning. You are getting faster and faster, the
10 interpreters are getting further behind.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I apologise to the interpreters.
12 I'll be mindful of their needs.
13 Q. So we've come to the importance of this document. Is this
14 document of such a nature that it would be preserved by the General Staff
15 had they received it?
16 A. This is an individual issue. You may ask me whether I would keep
17 it if I were Chief of General Staff, I would have. But I cannot enter
18 into personal criteria. I know what you are interested in. Yesterday I
19 explained quite clearly, the signature is that of the
20 General Nebojsa Pavkovic.
21 The part that bears the date 25th of May, this is drafted eight
22 days after the briefing with the Chief of General Staff where he explains
23 for the first time manifestations that are focused in an official
24 document for the first time concerning problems with the relations with
25 the MUP and conducts of some MUP elements. I told you that subsequently
1 wrote what he should have written as early as April, and he is now
2 seeking from the Chief of General Staff to resolve matters that is he
3 could have resolved at the Joint Commission level in Pristina.
4 I cannot tell you whether this document has been fortified by him
5 and post-dated, and it was not drafted on the 25th of April, 1999
6 25th of April, 2001. You cannot ask me to explain that. What I've
7 testified about are the facts which led to this conclusion.
8 Q. You are a fact witness, I'm going to use you as such and then we
9 can later on determine whether some things are forgeries or not. You've
10 disappointed me in another thing, I thought that the military followed
11 rules and that there is a rule on archiving the documents, but I have
12 that document so let's proceed.
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let's take a look at the next
14 page, please.
15 Q. I don't want to know about the contents; I'm interested in the
16 very end of the document. I think that the contents are not credible.
17 General, do you see who this document was delivered to? Is there
18 a list of addressees?
19 A. I don't know what the delivery order is. It is clear that it was
20 delivered to the Chief of General Staff personally, that's at the
21 beginning below the letterhead. Each document bears this.
22 Q. Let me interrupt you, General. One thing is who the document is
23 addressed to, but the delivery order is an indication who should receive
24 a certain document. And I've seen this in the military when you deliver
25 documents through telex or teleprinter then there is a note "addressees,"
1 so this in my terms is the delivery order. We have the addressee on the
2 first page, but we do not have any indication on how many copies are to
3 be delivered to whom. It's usually customary to say one copy to
4 security, one copy to department of this or that. This would be the
5 delivery order. This is what I mean by delivery order.
6 A. You are not right in this case. This document was delivered
7 personally. And as head of the administration, or in other capacities, I
8 also delivered -- I also received, personally delivered documents, which
9 means they should be delivered personally to that addressee and to nobody
11 And as I said yesterday, such a document is drafted in two
12 copies. One copy stays with the author, and the other copy to the
13 addressee. So there is no note to be delivered to this, that, and the
14 other person.
15 I've encountered many orders, particularly pertaining to the
16 Joint Command without an indication of the addressees. Those documents
17 had to be delivered to all units that were issued tasks in such an order,
18 and they could be twenty. But it's certain that such a document was
19 drafted in twenty copies and that each command had to receive copies; but
20 documents drafted to be delivered to somebody in person, it doesn't bear
21 at the end of document a note to be delivered to whom because it is
22 stated in -- on the first page.
23 Believe me, this is not the problem. The problem is, and as I
24 testified in previous trial, is that it doesn't bear the reception stamp
25 of the General Staff.
1 Q. That as well may be, but as a soldier or a policeman, you had to
2 verify to investigate a document, you see it was drafted but you have no
3 indication of where it ended up in?
4 A. Well, these are general security measures; I was
6 Q. Okay. If this is true as General Pavkovic wrote in this
7 document, and it was said that he had direct contact with Milosevic,
8 hadn't he reported on these to Milosevic personally? Now he is writing
9 to Ojdanic after all those meetings.
10 A. Well, I would have to go through the --
11 Q. No. What I'm interested in is the Pavkovic-Milosevic direct
12 contact links.
13 A. The gist of what he described in terms of problems was referred
14 to on the 16th of May to the Chief of General Staff and to
15 President Milosevic on the 17th of May. But afterwards in this document
16 he drafts a report where he covers his back and he is trying to find
17 justification for some of the problems citing as reasons that MUP didn't
18 want to cooperate and that they were not resubordinated. And now he is
19 shifting the blame to the Chief of the General Staff and demands from the
20 Chief of the General Staff to resolve those matters together with
21 President Milosevic. This is one level.
22 So he drafted this document to justify his omissions in
23 April 1999.
24 Q. Thank you, General. I'd like to say another thing. If he had
25 direct links and contacts with Milosevic, he could have briefed Milosevic
1 orally about these problems. He did not have to brief anybody else if
2 Milosevic was deciding on everything; am I right?
3 A. I don't think he communicated with Mr. Milosevic in that way.
4 Q. Thank you, General.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May we now have the following
6 document under 65 ter; it is 4017.
7 Q. And these now, General, are the minutes from the collegium of the
8 Chief of the General Staff, the senior staff meeting. So may we have
9 your comments to this first document, please. There are several that I'd
10 like us to look at, but this is the first collegium.
11 Would you explain to us something about this collegium of the
12 General Staff, when General Ojdanic was there; and do you recognise this
13 general form, the way it's set out, et cetera?
14 A. I have read this document carefully, or rather, the minutes from
15 this particular collegium, both from the aspects of learning something
16 that I didn't know when I had retired, because this is strictly
17 confidential. Everything discussed at this highest level is strictly
18 confidential, so I was curious to see what it said, to read the document.
19 And what I can tell you first of all is that minutes of this kind were
20 kept during the JNA, when I was in the JNA myself and when I took part in
21 the work of the collegium.
22 Then we can see that it is a tape recording, that it was the
23 transcription of a tape recording which means that the same practice was
24 applied that had existed in the JNA, that is to say that important
25 collegium meetings were recorded, that was compulsory, and that they were
1 supposed later on.
2 So from the aspects of how this was done, what it looks like, and
3 how the discussion of the participants was done, I think that it is
4 authentic and correct.
5 Now, part of the collegium of the General Staff after the theft
6 of the documents - and I'm sure you know about this - it was processed
7 by -- well, Vlajkovic was involved because he disclosed a military secret
8 and he received part of the minutes from the collegium unlawfully. And
9 this was -- he was prosecuted later on. He published it in a book, and
10 then he cave one example to General Perisic, and he in turn sent it on to
11 the US
12 Q. Thank you. Now, what about Milos Ladicorbic, captain of this
13 ship, what was his specialty?
14 A. Well, when he was in the security section of the navy -- well, he
15 was in the security section of the navy and then moved to the
16 intelligence department.
17 Q. He says here -- do you know about this actually? That's what I'm
18 asking you. I know you were already a pensioner, but you might have had
19 some contact with him. Anyway, the situation with the respect to the
20 NATO forces?
21 MR. STAMP: Sorry, I'm not objecting, I think maybe something was
22 lost in the translation. It seems as if Milos was mentioned earlier and,
23 well, that was lost in the translation because I think counsel's
24 reference to Milos
25 there was a mention of the Milos
1 and we missed it. So it's just difficult to follow. I'm sorry to
3 JUDGE PARKER: The cause of the problem, Mr. Djurdjic, is that
4 you can't wait for the witness's answer to finish to come in with your
5 next question and the interpreters are still some way behind. So they
6 miss things. Perhaps you better clarify this a little.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, bravo, colleague Stamp;
8 you're quite right. You're right, Your Honours, I will do that. Let me
9 ask the question again.
10 Q. What I asked you was this: Can you tell us, this man, captain of
11 the -- Milos Ladicorbic, what was his specialty, what did he deal with?
12 A. I said that previously he was in the security organs, that I knew
13 him personally, and afterwards he moved to the military intelligence
15 Q. Thank you. Now, General, at this time, at the end of 1998 and
16 beginning of 1999, did you have any information about the ground forces,
17 the land forces of NATO packed in Macedonia and Albania
18 happening there?
19 A. Well, I did know as much as any citizen knew from the media. I
20 knew that there were those forces over there and that they were grouping
21 and concentrating forces and that there were NATO bases over there,
22 although they weren't constituted in that way and perhaps referred to in
23 that way, but those forces did exist over there.
24 Q. Thank you. Now tell me,
25 Lieutenant-General Aleksandar Dimitrijevic, were you on good terms with
1 him? Did you have any knowledge about him? And we can move on if not.
2 A. Yes, I'm waiting for you to complete your question. Yes, I was
3 on good terms with him.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now, can we look at page 6 of the
6 B/C/S, and that would be page 7 of the English, para 5.
7 Q. And that should be the address made by Mr. Dimitrijevic when he
8 took the floor. Did you discuss anything with respect to para 2 on the
9 Serbian page about verifications that the KLM could know what the --
10 THE INTERPRETER: KVM. Interpreters correction.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Were you included in any of that?
13 A. I'm sorry, I was waiting for the document to come up on my
14 screen. Yes, I've read it now. Well, it's like this: We didn't discuss
15 this topic. We discussed other subjects. However, as I knew
16 General Dimitrijevic and as I knew the circumstances and the situation, I
17 don't think there's anything to be challenged here with respect to what
18 he said. And that he had good information, valid information, because he
19 had good information sources and he knew what was going on in the field.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now, may we have page number 8 in
22 the B/C/S.
23 Q. And would you take a look at para 2 which begins on the following
24 page. In English it is page 8, para 3, from the top.
25 A. Once again let me repeat, I didn't discuss any of this with
1 anyone. However, I do know from the entire story and the general mood
2 that prevailed that everything that is stated here was reflected the
3 actual situation and the -- that the mission was objective. So they had
4 detailed information, detailed information about facilities with all the
5 coordinates, that is to say, the OSCE. Not only down there in Kosovo,
6 but the intelligence organs had very precise information and detail.
7 So they knew where the zero-point of an explosion was. They knew
8 this in Belgrade
9 information, all the coordinates; they had them in front of them on the
10 table, so they knew all the military facilities, the civilian facilities,
11 their importance, and all the rest of it. So they were extremely well
12 informed about the targets that needed to be destroyed.
13 Q. Thank you. Now, let's move on to the time when you were
14 re-activated, so tell me what you know about that from your service once
15 you were re-activated?
16 A. Well, may I make a joke. Everything had already been destroyed
17 by that time, if I can say so, the General Staff buildings in Belgrade
18 and the bridges, and all the rest of it. So there were several cases
19 which were uncovered and documented and the perpetrators were arrested, I
20 don't want to mention their names now because some of them have some
21 official functions now.
22 But when I arrived, it was the stage at which all the information
23 had been collected about the effects of their actions. So all the
24 facilities were filmed and recorded. And where they weren't satisfied
25 with the results they had achieved, they would repeat their actions. And
1 this true of the General Staff building; there was one hit to begin with,
2 and then afterwards, we uncovered several days later that is, a man who
3 had filmed it all from the Beogradjanka high-rise building. So he filmed
4 the results of that first impact and then there was the second hit and
5 the second impact. So it was a stage in which in fact they were
6 finishing off, if I can use the term, finishing off what they failed to
7 achieve previously. And as you know, I arrived on the 27th of April.
8 Q. Thank you. I didn't just mean about the bombing. What happened
9 on the ground, what did NATO do there? The representatives of the
10 various states and your intelligence information about them and
11 experience with them?
12 A. Well, ever since I worked in the intelligence organs,
13 intelligence service for 30 years, we always knew what kind of
14 individuals were in charge of collecting all intelligence on a given
15 territory and setting the targets, indicating the targets. And every
16 time they would engage in reconnaissance work, intelligence
17 reconnaissance of course once again, repeated action, they would activate
18 the situation, or rather, that means they would update the changes that
19 had taken place on the ground. And that's where we engaged in specific
20 warfare where we would serve up erroneous information and things like
21 that. But it was a continuous activity which is ongoing to the present
22 day, that is, the task of the intelligence services to gather information
23 about potential targets which might come in use at some time.
24 Q. Thank you, General, I wasn't thinking of the bombing, I was
25 thinking of the situation on the ground in Kosovo. Did they enter into
1 the FRY, or where were they? I'm asking you as of the 27th of April,
2 that is to say, after you arrive.
3 A. I don't know that there were any foreigners of that nature, they
4 engaged in reconnaissance work from the air and used the information they
5 collected. They had drones flying and so on.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers kindly refrain from
8 overlapping. Thank you.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] First of all, Your Honours, before
10 I forget, I'd like to tender this document.
11 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
12 MR. STAMP: And there's also the regulation that was used
13 earlier, rules of service, I don't know whether --
14 JUDGE PARKER: Is that part of an exhibit we've already received
15 or not, do you know?
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Just a moment. Thank you,
17 Mr. Stamp. First of all, the rules of service --
18 JUDGE PARKER: While that's happening, we'll receive the minutes
19 of the collegium, which haven't been tendered.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this document bearing
21 65 ter number 4017 will become Exhibit D166.
22 JUDGE PARKER: Now, the rules of the VJ?
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] That was D003-2656, of the
24 Army of Yugoslavia
25 JUDGE PARKER: That means it's not an exhibit in our trial yet.
1 We will receive that.
2 THE REGISTRAR: That will become Exhibit D167, Your Honours.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 Q. General, were you re-activated when the three members of the
5 US Army were captured in -- was it on the territory of
6 Kosovo and Metohija? I believe so.
7 A. I know of that case, it was somewhere down from Macedonia, but it
8 happened before my arrival.
9 Q. Thank you. And were there any developments while you were in
11 A. No, I don't know about that.
12 Q. Thank you. And now, do you happen to remember that other
13 incident linked to a humanitarian worker who was from Price or
14 whatever -- Prite, Prite [phoen]?
15 A. Yes, that he was engaged in intelligence gathering. The two or
16 three cases he was one of them, and I think there was some links to the
17 Australian Embassy, unless I'm very much mistaken.
18 Q. Thank you. Now, I wanted to ask you, In your
19 counter-intelligence work, did you have any information about whether
20 there were members of NATO, any NATO people in the staffs and units of
21 the KLA? Did you have any information to that effect?
22 A. I don't remember.
23 Q. Thank you. Do you recall whether there were any Mujahadeen or
24 other foreigners in KLA units?
25 A. Yes, there's a book I have read recently by an American lecturer
1 at their naval academy John Simber [phoen], I think, and he discusses
2 that in detail. I also something about that from the time of my service.
3 Q. Can you tell us a thing or two about that?
4 A. If we are discussing this book which has recently been translated
5 into Serbian --
6 Q. Well, let's just stay with the information that the services had.
7 Let's keep away from books.
8 A. The book confirms some information. In the period between the
9 27th of April and until the end of the war, we didn't have much time to
10 deal with al-Qaeda. But I do know that al-Qaeda had its presence in
11 Kosovo throughout that time and that it arrived there from Bosnia. They
12 simply moved some al-Qaeda activists. But I can't give you any precise
13 names though. In any case, there were several cases detected confirming
14 al-Qaeda presence within the KLA.
15 Q. I am a interested in whether you received such security related
16 information from your junior security organs?
17 A. When I toured my security organs, no one briefed me on that
18 specifically, probably because it was no longer an issue.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please see
21 Defence Exhibit D003-3134.
22 Q. General, this is also from a collegium of the General Staff. Is
23 this the right format?
24 A. The format is correct. At least the cover page.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I seek to tender
2 this document.
3 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
4 THE REGISTRAR: The document will become Exhibit D168,
5 Your Honours.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could with have
7 D003-2662 next.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Based on what I can see, I can only
9 repeat the previous comment.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I seek to tender this
12 JUDGE PARKER: We have not yet seen this document.
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] 003-2662. It should be the
14 minutes of the 17th of December.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The 4th session.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes.
17 JUDGE PARKER: We are confused by the numbering here. The
18 English number is quite different from the original. Is it the correct
19 English translation?
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I can see that the
21 17th of December is also mentioned in the English, and it is certainly
22 there in the Serbian. It is 1998, the ministers collegium,
23 Biljana Popovic was the typist. I'm not sure what is the number you are
24 referring to. Copy is number 1 in both versions.
25 JUDGE PARKER: D003-2691.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I see that.
2 JUDGE PARKER: [Previous translation continues] ...looking at.
3 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] So my number is incorrect?
5 JUDGE PARKER: No, we are told that it is the correct document,
6 the English translation has a quite different number and that was giving
7 us concern. So this will be received.
8 THE REGISTRAR: It will become Exhibit D169, Your Honours.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we have
10 D003-3134 next. It should be dated the 14th of December. Did we already
11 have that? Oh, well, then all three ...
12 The first one was 10 December, then 14 December, and the
13 17th of December. If this one was already admitted, D003-3134, then I
14 would ask for the assistance of the court clerk.
15 THE REGISTRAR: [Previous translation continues]
16 [Overlapping speakers] ...
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Your Honours,
18 concerning these collegium meetings, this would be it. I will raise an
19 issue later concerning the second session.
20 Next could we please have D003-3085.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There's nothing to comment on.
22 Everything is in there. This came from the intelligence administration.
23 It would be particularly interesting if they had captured any of these
24 persons, but as far as I know they never did.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Well, it was your task to capture them?
2 A. No, they were writing about this and always on the basis of the
3 information we had, and they don't specify which available information it
4 was. Usually one would have a coded source name and an assessment of
5 accuracy, as well as the reliability of the source. Each such document
6 is filled out by an operative, but this is merely an information from the
7 field. I can neither deny or confirm it.
8 Q. I'm interested in the format, is this familiar to you?
9 A. I'm quite familiar with the way operatives reported.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would now seek to tender this
12 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
13 THE REGISTRAR: The document will become Exhibit D170,
14 Your Honours.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we please have
17 Q. Witness, again, I'm only interested in the format.
18 A. Yes, the format is the same, and it was signed for Branko Krga,
19 he was not person signing it, although that is not important. They were
20 specific in one thing, they had this particular number of 1, 2, 3, 4; but
21 it was not part of the ledger such as would be customary for the security
22 administration. They merely had reports number this and that. They
23 would start with the first report that year and then end with the end of
24 the year and this would be their typical way of reporting.
25 Q. Thank you. I do see a ledger number on the top.
1 A. That's a different thing. That is the intelligence department
2 which received that information.
3 Q. Thank you. Explain me this please, these numbers are the numbers
4 of reports forwarded to the Chief of Staff, this report number 37 for
6 A. Yes, that's the report number drafted by the intelligence
7 administration based on the influx of information from the field. We
8 would put in the contents and then say what the report refers to. It
9 would describe the problem in short terms, and then it is registered in
10 the intelligence department of the General Staff under this number, 06,
11 and so on.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.
14 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
15 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D171, Your Honours.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have D003-3089 next.
17 Q. Again, only the format, Witness.
18 A. Yes, it's the same. I'm also trying to compare the number of the
19 report and connect that to the date, and indeed the previous number
20 preceded this one in terms of date. There is also the stamp of the
21 archive there.
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.
23 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D172, Your Honours.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Next I'd like to have D003-3091,
2 Q. General, we come to the 3rd of April. Is this still the same
4 A. I'm still waiting for it. Yes.
5 Q. Thank you. Can you tell me what it says underneath the stamp or
6 below it?
7 A. Distribution, commands of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Army and to the
8 operational strategic formations. I don't want to comment on the work of
9 the military security service the --
10 THE INTERPRETER: Intelligence service. Interpreter's
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- they used different methods. In
13 any case, they were forwarding information and with we were supposed to
14 verify it.
15 THE INTERPRETER: The speakers are overlapping.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Your Honours, I seek
17 to tender this document.
18 JUDGE PARKER: The report of the 13th of April, 1999, will be
20 THE REGISTRAR: The report will become Exhibit D173,
21 Your Honours.
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Next let's have
23 D003-3093, please.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is a full report as opposed to
25 the short telegraph reports that can be sent a few times a day that we
1 just saw. This report collates the information collected from different
2 sources. I only had time for a very brief cursory look.
3 In any case, this is a report on the use of depleted uranium
4 projectiles. I do see, however, that the report refers to several
5 sources, something concerning Germany, and then the international
6 activity centre, and certain locations where we had operatives abroad.
7 They forwarded this information to the intelligence administration which
8 in turn drafted this report.
9 Based on such a report, the General Staff can -- unless sending
10 it directly to the commanders of strategic formations -- can issue an
11 order from the General Staff or the Supreme Command staff towards
12 subordinate commands, letting them know about such occurrences.
13 I see there the stamp of the military archives, and I believe
14 this is a fully, accurate, and true report. Authentic.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Let me ask you this, as of the moment you were re-activated on
17 the 27th of April and until the end of the war, did you have any
18 information or knowledge on the use of such means at Pastrik and Kosare?
19 A. Yes. Since I was in the ABHO branch, the nuclear and chemical
20 warfare branch, I see that there is a mention of it there requiring that
21 a scouting patrol be sent out in the field, and we even after the war
22 found traces confirming that such ammunition was used and some
23 Italian KFOR members suffered certain symptoms as well.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document,
1 the report of the 14th of April, 1999.
2 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
3 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D174, Your Honours.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Please, can we see D003-3096.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could we switch to the last page,
6 I'm interested.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Please, shall we turn to the
8 second page in the B/C/S, please.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. General, this is dated 4th of May, 1999, at that time you were
12 active duty. Let's go back to page 1, please. Paragraph 2 is what I'm
13 interested in, and the whole of paragraph 3.
14 A. The 4th of May, isn't it, I was in Montenegro on that day. Well,
15 this is the type of report that intelligence administration sends summing
16 up the developments in a preceding period, organising them into
17 paragraphs, as you can see them. These are sent to commanders of
18 operative strategic groups, commanders of 1st, 2nd, 3rd Army, navy,
19 air force, et cetera.
20 This is used to assess the situation and it to supplement some
21 orders in terms of what may happen. I see that they make mention that
22 information received through agents, through operational means as they
23 put it, and the intelligence department had their agents. We in the
24 security administration before and during that period, and after, we
25 would read or not read such reports. We had a problem where we received
1 a large quantity of information from the ground. We would leaf through
2 such reports, but it would not specifically concern us in terms of that
3 we should act upon it.
4 This as you can see is delivered to operative strategic group
5 commanders. You see that there were calculation -- or speculations about
6 the aggressors' attack, the axis of attacks, et cetera. Everything had
7 been done in the military to resist that land invasion. Particularly in
8 the area of Kosovo, you know, the defence lines were firm and they never
9 invaded Kosovo. But this report highlights possible routes of axis from
11 it reliable.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let's tender this document,
13 please. It was report number 73 from the 4th of May, 1999.
14 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
15 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D175, Your Honours.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. I don't want to play general because we are going to see a
18 strategic document later on. But let me ask you, you know that the KLA
19 performed on the 9th of April a land invasion from Albania between Morina
20 and Kosare, it lasted for almost 2 months?
21 A. No, this is no doubt an operation by the KLA, they received
22 support and help and assistance in that area. Let me remind you that on
23 the 1st of June when I attended a meeting of the Joint Command in
24 Pristina when General Pavkovic briefed us that forces are grouped in
1 frontline, which is a high concentration of troops, and being supported
2 by air force, this was nothing new.
3 Such groups equipped and armed were infiltrated from Albania
4 throughout the time. But there were several stages planed for the
5 execution of that operation. This is now a stage where, since they
6 hadn't succeeded in destroying military facilities and military targets,
7 then the intelligence notifies us that they are going to progress to
8 another stage and that would be attacks against military target --
9 THE INTERPRETER: Civilian targets. Interpreter's correction.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- civilian facilities, bridges,
11 trains. There was a train hit in the south of Serbia once.
12 I believe it reflected their anger and wrath since they had not
13 achieved their military targets, reckoning that the morale of the
14 military and the civilians would be destroyed, and what I -- what they
15 said was borne true later on in April and May.
16 Q. At the beginning of June or the end of May, a second axis of
17 invasion through Pastrik was used?
18 A. Well, attacks were constant and continuous. I never grouped them
19 along axis. Most probably you can find information about that in those
20 military documents. Since this is my testimony, give me some liberty.
21 I've read these documents, they are many documents which can be used by
22 the Prosecution and the Defence, and it's just a matter of who is going
23 to use them best.
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I believe this is the
25 right time for a technical break, Your Honours.
1 JUDGE PARKER: We will have the first break and resume at 11.00.
2 [The witness stands down]
3 --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.
4 --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, before the witness
7 comes, I would like to move about an issue to the benefit of the
8 expediency of the trial. It seems that both the Prosecution and the
9 Defence have problems in terms of adducing military documents. And I
10 thought, since I do have the intention of using them -- those documents,
11 but since they are of the same format and they are numerous, it would be
12 ridiculous for me for use 20 or 30 minutes of the collegium meetings and
13 orders - there's a large number of them used by the Prosecutor - it would
14 it be ridiculous for each of them to tender during court time. And why
15 don't we admit them in batches if they are not contentious so that we
16 don't have to go through each and every one of them with the witness.
17 That would be my respectful submission.
18 JUDGE PARKER: It sounds a sensible idea. It is exactly the sort
19 of thing that ought to be decided by agreement between the counsel and
20 would save a lot of time, and we would encourage counsel to reach
21 agreement about those documents. We will facilitate any such agreement.
22 Thank you Mr. Djurdjic. Now, are you ready to continue?
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
24 [The witness takes the stand]
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Witness, let's digress a bit to conclude an issue.
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see D104.
3 Q. Witness, you've seen this document, and you've seen the document
4 following it. You know the document 105 is a supplement to this order,
5 so you are familiar with it.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see the last page
7 of this order signed by the Joint Command. And in the same document --
8 of the Pristina Corps, in the supplement to this decision, that
9 supplement bears the signature of the commander of the Pristina Corps,
10 Major-General Vladimir
11 Q. Am I right saying based on the basis of those two documents it is
12 evident that decision-makings and maps, that everything was produced at
13 the level of the Pristina Corps. With the difference being that
14 sometimes it was signed by the joint commander and sometimes when, in
15 haste, it would bear the signature of the commander of the
16 Pristina Corps?
17 A. Well, I wouldn't comment on that. All the document that is I've
18 seen and that bear the phrase "Joint Command," they do not bear the
19 signature of the commander of that command or any other commanders, but
20 just -- there is an indication of the Joint Command standing behind that.
21 And the ledger for such documents was kept at the
22 Pristina Corps Command, and those documents bear the same indication as
23 combat documents and orders of the Pristina Corps commander, that
24 indication being 455, dash, and then the number of the document in the
25 sequence of their production. But when in haste, they would just put
1 "Joint Command" in place of the signature.
2 As I've already explained, what was labelled Joint Command were
3 people occupying the most responsible positions and the highest
4 positions. They would hold a briefing on the most important developments
5 of the day, and then agree on an order or a decision for the next day.
6 In case where things were verified by the commander of the
7 3rd Army, MUP generals, and Deputy Prime Minister Sainovic, when nothing
8 is contended, then such documents would further be elaborated by the
9 Pristina Corps. But since the preliminary decision was taken on a
10 session of the Joint Command, then the signature would bear the phrase
11 the Joint Command.
12 Q. Let's move on. Have you noticed if there is any difference --
13 But firstly let's deal with this: Ledger was kept in a chronological
14 order, the ledger of the Pristina Corps, do you agree with this?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Thank you. Furthermore, have you noticed any difference up to
17 the moment of the decision on resubordination, how many decisions had
18 been signed by Joint Command, and what -- and the period after that
20 A. I haven't analysed that particularly.
21 Q. Excellent. You know grammar well, and when you read the
22 decisions and orders of the Joint Command, doesn't it seem to you that
23 one of the same organ is issuing orders to another subordinate organ to
24 cooperate and support another organ particularly for 1998?
25 A. That's strange. A document and an order of the Joint Command is
1 produced in essence by the commander of the Pristina Corps, thereby
2 issuing himself orders taken by that Joint Command. It's most probably
3 complicated to understand what was going on.
4 As I've explained, on the basis of what I saw at that meeting on
5 that day, what was discussed and deliberated on that meeting, they would
6 go to have lunch or dinner, and the person staying behind to formulate
7 that into an order or a decision is the Pristina Corps commander and his
8 staff, and most probably somebody from MUP had to do the same for their
10 I can tell you almost each document may bear the indications of
11 either the Pristina Corps or the Joint Command; all of them are strictly
12 formulated from paragraph 1 to paragraph 13 or 14, drafted obviously by
13 military professionals and not civilians because there were civilians and
14 other personnel in the staff.
15 Q. I'm not doubting or questioning the professional manner in which
16 those were drafted, but I'd like to ask you as a general and a security
17 officer, and I know that you know other regulations. In normal times, in
18 peacetimes, without an order on resubordination, without any state of
19 emergency, is it possible for a military unit to issue decisions and
20 orders to gendarmerie or MUP units to follow that order?
21 A. Yes, they can. If that unit had been empowered and if that other
22 unit had been resubordinated to it. So it can.
23 Q. No, but there's no resubordination, no order on that situation
24 and the state is normal. In such circumstances, can a military unit
25 issue an order to use a gendarmerie unit or a MUP unit, or conversely, if
1 it's possible in peacetime without any state of emergency or state of
2 war, a MUP unit command a military unit to do something?
3 A. No, they are of the same rank.
4 Q. Can they perform the same functions?
5 A. No, this is what they insisted on the 9th of July meeting that
6 everybody should mind their own business.
7 THE INTERPRETER: May counsel slow down a bit because they are
8 overlapping, please. Could counsel kindly slow down. Thank you.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Now, if both the army and the police are expected to act, then,
11 in the typo, the heading, it always says Joint Command without a
13 A. I'm not sure I understand you. I don't follow you. What is it
14 that you are asking me?
15 Q. This is what I want to ask you. There's no extraordinary state,
16 there's no decision on resubordination. It is obvious that these orders
17 in 1998 right up until the decision on resubordination in 1999 are
18 brought so that the police and army can work together. Now, since
19 there's no such decision, then both the army and the police could
20 act - could they not? - because they have the army units and police units
21 under them and they are contained in this order, and it says
22 Joint Command because under the law they can't issue orders to each other
23 and deploy them.
24 JUDGE PARKER: This is no question.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I'm coming to my question?
1 Q. "Am I right in saying... " -- that is what my question was going
2 to be. Am I right in assuming that?
3 A. I don't think you are right, no. And here is why: You are going
4 to find documents of the Joint Command and after the war officially began
5 and a state of war officially proclaimed, you'll once again have, well,
6 not only in 1998, but also in 1999 there are orders of the Joint Command.
7 And I noticed that there are the code signs and signals with respect to
8 radio communication and so on, so you are not right in my opinion. You
9 can't interpret it that way. That is my opinion on the basis of all the
10 documents that I've looked through that just because of a fact that an
11 emergency state had not been proclaimed whereas objectively on the ground
12 two are parallel armed forces were being -- were going into action, the
13 army and the MUP, that something should have existed as a Joint Command
14 to issue orders to both these entities.
15 So what is called Joint Command, this Joint Command still didn't
16 have its staff, and that's where it differs to, for example, 1972 when
17 the group was infiltrated in Radosa, a sort of Joint Command was
18 established made up of the MUP, and the army, and the Territorial
19 Defence, and police, and politicians, and state officials, and so on and
20 so forth. But somebody has to stand at the head, controlling the overall
22 And here, I would say that this was more -- well I saw it more as
23 a staff which is there to coordinate something. They had very little to
24 do in the military sense by way of issuing orders and compiling
25 documents; but the most responsible persons would sit down together,
1 decide what they were going to do in the coming period, or what was to be
2 done in the coming period, and then General Lazerovic who attended the
3 meeting was given the assignment of putting that into practice. And now
4 he's writing, and it says the Joint Command, and he is in this
5 paradoxical situation in which he himself, in para 5, issues an
6 assignment to himself, an assignment to the Pristina Corps. Or rather in
7 para 4, he makes a decision as commander of the Pristina Corps, which in
8 fact should be a decision made by the Joint Command and taken by the
9 Joint Command.
10 So what I'm saying is this: And I stand by what I say, 1998 was
11 not only a year in which documents appear with Joint Command on them. We
12 had them in 1999 and even at the time when resubordination took place
13 under the law and so on and so forth. But in Kosovo in 1998 as
14 well - and you quoted yourself that article, I think it was 173 from the
15 rules of service of the Army of Yugoslavia - once the army is being
16 deployed and always when the army is being deployed in a particular zone
17 or area, everything taking place and acting in that zone objectively is
18 under the de facto command of the army. So you can't have two commanders
19 in one zone.
20 And the rules of service of the Army of Yugoslavia stipulate that
21 the military commander is in fact the commander in a situation of that
22 kind. So even when there is no state of emergency, although these are
23 two parallel organs, there is synchronization where in fact one of them
24 has to command -- is in command of all of them.
25 Q. Thank you. Now, the first point that I'd like you to tell me is
1 that after the 18th of April, the major part of the orders come from the
2 Pristina Corps, and they are far less titled Joint Command. But let's
3 leave that alone for the time being, it's not a question for you. Let's
4 move on to another area. To something else. But let me say that I'm
5 quite sure that not a single military unit can act pursuant to an order
6 from the SUP
7 A. Well, no it can't; that's right.
8 Q. Thank you. I'd now like to move on to another area, General.
9 Since you became re-activated and informed of the situation and
10 acquainted it, did you ever hear about a plan for ethnic cleansing of
12 A. No.
13 Q. Thank you. Now, on the assumption that such a plan existed at a
14 state level, would at that time the Supreme Command staff had have to
15 have been informed of a plan of that kind had it existed?
16 A. Well, it's like this: It's all speculation now and assumption.
17 Firstly, let me say that I don't think the best term is "plan for ethnic
18 cleansing." I don't think that's a proper phrase. It would be a more
19 correct to say a decision to implement ethnic cleansing.
20 Now, faced with that kind of situation, you wouldn't have to
21 write any document and then devise a plan and say in the first ten days,
22 Let's deal with these three villages, for example.
23 What we are talking about here is whether a decision was ever
24 made and whether this process evolved on the ground according to
25 somebody's decision up there or whether it was spontaneous and whether
1 that was reacted to or not. So those are all the theories and
3 But let's stay with your question. First of all, had that come
4 to the General Staff, I'm sure that the Chief of the General Staff,
5 because I knew him personally as a human being, he would have reacted to
6 it, and he would ask to have been received by the supreme commander to
7 clear this up and say that the army is not there to do things like that.
8 So no such plan existed. No such order existed in the General Staff, at
9 least I don't know about it. But when I was in the field for those seven
10 day, when I was in Kosovo, then I had -- they were -- people reported to
11 me and briefed me about certain activities that were taking place down
12 there, people being expelled from their homes, but that transports were
13 being organised or people loaded up or the times of departure and so on
14 set. I really don't know about any of that.
15 Q. Thank you. Now, we've come to the area of your practical work.
16 Down the security chain of command, did you have intelligence and
17 information telling you that organised or any other kind of expulsion of
18 the Albanian population was being conducted by the FRY?
19 A. Well, I have no knowledge about that, that this was done by the
20 authorities and the knowledge of the authorities of the
21 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. However, I've always -- I've already
22 given you examples of people being expelled. And one such example was in
23 Kosovska Mitrovica. That's one case. But I know of another case too
24 where a column of some kind, a column of refugees moving from Kosovo
25 towards Montenegro
1 population, and I can't say whether there might have been any terrorists
2 or armed persons in that column, anyway, they were being expelled up to
3 Rozaj to Montenegro
4 trial; it wasn't exhibited because it wasn't in the indictment, the area
5 of Montenegro
6 Now, the other case I know of was that the MUP asked why the
7 organs of the army were turning back columns from the border, and there
8 were reactions to that. So that's another case in point. So these --
9 this one group was moving out, and I'm not saying whether the MUP was at
10 their rear; there were people who fled from Kosovo -- most of the people
11 were fleeing from Kosovo just as they fled from Belgrade during the
12 bombing for instance. However, the question is why the army was stopping
13 them at the border and sending them back, and I can only conclude that it
14 was welcome that they were leaving.
15 Now, the next part, why at the border, were these people who were
16 going out -- complete -- entire families, I'm not saying whether there
17 were terrorists among them who had changed their clothing, anyway, all
18 these people were leaving, they were going out, taking all their personal
19 documents, their IDs, and everything that later on could prove that they
20 were who they were if they wanted to return.
21 So those are three parameters that I as a human being would like
22 to present to you regardless of how anybody is going to interpret it. So
23 I draw the conclusion from that that there were phenomena of that kind.
24 But as to any decision that that should be done, I do not know of any
25 such decision especially not with the army.
1 Q. And do you know that there was a decision made that this should
2 be tolerated?
3 A. No, there was no discussion or decision at all. Nothing at all.
4 There wasn't any meeting that I attended when this question of the
5 people's departure was raised and discussed or the fleeing of Albanians
6 to -- from Kosovo to Montenegro
7 on the agenda to say whether we're going to stop this or not. No, it was
8 just what happened on the ground down there, and there was no reaction in
9 any organised form.
10 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel please slow down and refrain from
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Did you inform anybody about that?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Where and when and whom?
16 A. On the 8th of May when -- or rather, 8th of June when I returned
17 from touring Kosovo, we wrote a piece of information about all the crimes
18 and all everything that was going on, this was handed over to the chief
19 of the administration Geza Farkas, and then he handed that document over
20 to the Chief of the General Staff, and he handed it over in turn to
21 Slobodan Milosevic.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic, you'll have to pause. You come
24 straight in at the end of a long answer and it gives the interpreters no
25 chance to catch up.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I -- well, I seem to be doing all
2 sorts of things here.
3 Q. Did you complete your answer? You gave the document to
4 Geza Farkas, and he handed it over to the chief the General Staff, and
5 then it went up to Slobodan Milosevic; was that the end of your answer?
6 Had you completed your answer?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. You have nothing further to add?
9 A. Well, after that, I left. I went to Nis to organise security
10 measures for pulling the army out of Kosovo.
11 Q. All right. Fine. I just wanted to make sure that I hadn't cut
12 you off in your answer.
13 I just wanted to ask you now that you mentioned you're going down
14 there and receiving information, the information that you received, you
15 received it from the security office on the ground. Now, do you know
16 later on whether that information was checked out and verified, the
17 information that was given to you?
18 A. As the chief of security attending those meetings, of the
19 3rd Army that is, Colonel Antic from Nis, when we returned to Belgrade
20 had a meeting in Nis
21 at everything that we had observed down there, and all the notes I made
22 in my working diary, that he should turn this into an official document,
23 file an official document on the basis of that. And as far as I know,
24 that's what he did.
25 Now, with respect to verifying the information and data. Perhaps
1 the most characteristic piece of information is the one in
2 Kosovska Mitrovica. I didn't issue the task of that being checked out
3 because ultimately it wasn't a problem that was linked to the army. It
4 was the problem that we came across as it stood as a byproduct, if I can
5 use that phrase, of the work of an intelligence officer in Prizren. So I
6 didn't order that information of that kind be checked out. Thank you.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D003-2985.
8 Q. Just one more thing before I move on to this document.
9 General, when one loses an ID or a passport, what do you do?
10 A. I report that to the organs of the MUP to be issued with a new
12 Q. Thank you. Am I correct that registers are kept in terms of all
13 citizens of the Republic of Serbia
14 A. I suppose so.
15 Q. Thank you. Do you know whether all registers, birth registers,
16 death registers, and registers of citizenship were preserved and still
17 exist in the Republic of Serbia
18 A. I know that they were moved. I have some family members born in
19 Gnjilane and they are now being issued with new passports. They need to
20 get their original documentation in Vranje because that's where their
21 registration was moved to.
22 Q. Did you know that most of the Albanians, after the 26th of June,
23 came to Serbia
24 documents were introduced?
25 A. I don't know about that.
1 Q. Thank you. By virtue of losing a document, can one lose one's
3 A. Well, it shouldn't be so.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] We are still waiting for
7 Q. General, we will move to directives. If I understood properly,
8 these are strategic documents; we see one such document dated the
9 28th of July 1998. It is a General Staff of the Yugoslav Army directive.
10 Can you please comment briefly on this directive.
11 A. Based on what I can see on the screen, which is the first page,
12 which is in full accordance with standard templates with standard
13 procedure, to tell you anything more, I would have to read the whole
15 Q. Have you not had opportunity to see this document during your
17 A. No.
18 Q. Let's look at the Roman numeral I, we see information about the
19 enemy there.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] And then if we go to the next
21 page, please.
22 A. Could we please zoom in?
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we go to page 5, please.
24 Q. As you can see, the last page contains some information about an
25 attachment on the strength of combat groups. Am I right that the
1 directive was signed by the Chief of the General Staff,
2 Colonel-General Momcilo Perisic?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. At the end of the directive, we see in how many copies it was
5 printed, and who it was distributed to; is that correct?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. I don't want to go into any deeper discussions about this
8 directive, but let me ask you this: Did you know at the time that
9 according to the military information, KLA held over 30 per cent of the
11 A. Yes, I knew that.
12 Q. Did you know that at that time or at the period preceding that
13 the road Pristina-Pec was blocked, as well as the road Pristina-Prizren?
14 A. I don't know the specific roads, but I do know, since there was
15 some journalists in Kosovo who were taken prisoner by certain KLA members
16 at check-points, that there were roadblocks along different routes. And
17 if one would get off a highway after two 2 or 3 hundred metres, one would
18 encounter a barricade directing you in one particular direction.
19 Q. Thank you. Do you recall that people went from Pristina to Pec
20 via Rozaj and Kula?
21 A. I'm not familiar with such details.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document,
25 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
1 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D176, Your Honours.
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we next have D003-2591 next.
3 Q. While waiting for it, can you tell me whether you remember the
4 date of the previous directive?
5 A. The one we just saw? I think it was the 20th of July, 1998
6 Q. Thank you.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, a correction for the
8 transcript. It should be --
9 Q. Well, witness, which day in July was it?
10 A. I think the 28th.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 A. The 29th?
13 Q. No, no, the previous one, the 28th. This is a new document.
14 First of all, this is an order to break-up DTS forces and armed rebellion
15 forces in Kosova and Metohija sent by the 3rd Army commander on the 29th
16 of July, 1998?
17 A. Yes. When a directive is issued as a strategic document, then
18 operational strategic groups, that is to say, subordinate units of the
19 army, further develop their own orders based on that directive. This is
20 standard procedure.
21 Q. Let us go to chapter 4 in --
22 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: The fourth
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. -- in both versions. Does this confirm what you told us
2 A. Yes, it does. I did mention the other element or a stage.
3 Reference is made of members of the former provincial Kosovo MUP who
4 joined the KLA thus creating a parallel set of institutions or government
5 in 1990 and 1991. They separated their part of the MUP, forming their
6 own organs. The same happened with education. I spoke more about other
7 organs and institutions yesterday rather than the MUP. In any case, this
8 is correct.
9 Q. Thank you. What is mentioned here are former JNA members, then
10 we have former members of the provincial SUP, and then political
11 convicts, and people from earlier battle-fields in Bosnia and Croatia
12 A. Yes, this is what I referred to. I stated the names of some
13 officers who were released from prisons by a general pardon that took
14 place, then I also mentioned the names of those officers who were
15 prosecuted in Zlatar, in the Zlatar Operation, and released subsequently.
16 As well as people who fought previously in Bosnia and Croatia
17 Q. Thank you. In the last part of the sentence, we find among the
18 terrorists, there is a number of mercenaries, first and foremost from the
19 Islamic countries. Can you comment that?
20 A. Yes, I but I only have general knowledge of that such as the one
21 I shared with you concerning the persons who came from Bosnia or Croatia
22 or those who used to be members of the JNA. I know them by their names.
23 However, this piece of information is something that I only have general
24 information about, and I have no reason to doubt it.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we go to page 2,
2 paragraph 1, of the English.
3 Q. And you, Witness, should look at the last paragraph in the
4 Serbian version of this page concerning weapons.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I'll do my best. I apologise.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So will I.
7 I had no information about types of weapons, but while reading
8 orders and reports we went through in the documents you showed me, these
9 calibres are frequently referred to, and I mean hand-held rocket
10 launchers, mortars. I came across many of those in the documents I
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. The information you have concerning their weapons, does this
14 confirm what they had in 1999, or did they have any modern -- more modern
16 A. It was within the remit of the intelligence administration. It
17 was not of any particular interest to me and the people I worked for. In
18 any case, they could have only received more modern weapons by that time.
19 This takes me back to General Lazarevic's intervention when he said that
20 some equipment was parachuted in the night.
21 Q. Thank you, since we are short with time, tell us immediately then
22 what it is that is your direct knowledge, otherwise we'll just move on.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let's have page 2 in the B/C/S.
24 Q. Look at paragraph 2, General, in the B/C/S. It is the third
25 paragraph in the English.
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Do you know anything about these forced mobilisations; do you
3 have any information concerning that in the time you were re-activated?
4 A. Nothing beyond what I've already told you.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let us go to the last page of this
7 document. It is page 12 in the B/C/S. In the English, page 14. No,
8 page 13. Sorry, this is the last page. I need the penultimate page.
9 This is the addendum on the composition and strength of groups.
10 Q. General, am I right in saying that the 3rd Army commander at the
11 time was Lieutenant-General Dusan Samardzic and that he issued this
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Thank you. There were five copies of this document distributed
15 to the addressees mentioned here?
16 A. Yes, these were his immediate subordinate units.
17 Q. Therefore it was the command of the Pristina Corps, the Nis
18 Corps, command of the 203rd --
19 A. Mixed artillery brigade.
20 Q. What about number 4?
21 A. Command of the logistics base, 202nd base.
22 Q. What about number 5?
23 A. The military district of Pristina.
24 Q. Thank you. Yesterday we didn't touch upon the topic of
25 organisation of the Federal Defence Ministry in the territory of the FRY.
1 How did they function territorially speaking? Were they completely
2 independent, in an independent formation answerable only to the
3 Secretariat for National Defence, or did they have any links to the army?
4 I mean specifically the civil protection and civil defence.
5 A. They were fully under the minister of defence.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document
8 into evidence, please.
9 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
10 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D177, Your Honours.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see D003-2645.
12 Q. General, is this another 3rd Army commander's order with the
13 purpose of operationalising the directive that we saw?
14 A. It says here pursuant to the order of the
15 Chief of the General Staff number, date, so and so dated the
16 24th of July. And in the directive we had the 27th of July. But this is
17 not contentious. There must have been an order pursuant to which this
18 order, brief order follows -- sent through a dispatch means.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document
21 into evidence, please.
22 JUDGE PARKER: It too will be received.
23 THE REGISTRAR: The document will become Exhibit D178,
24 Your Honours.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we please see
1 exhibit -- or document -- 65 ter document 04053.
2 THE INTERPRETER: 04035. Interpreter's correction.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. But while we are waiting for the document to appear, General,
5 please, can the military wait for the country to be attacked to start
6 preparing for its defence, or would it, on the basis of the information
7 available, prepare itself to be ready when the aggression starts?
8 A. Whatever the military does in peacetime is prepare for the
9 possibility of an overall aggression against the country.
10 Q. Thank you. See we have the 16th of January 1999 directive of the
11 General Staff of the VJ. Did you have occasion earlier to see this
13 A. No. I've noticed it.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] If we can see, please --
16 Mr. Stamp, are you trying to tell me something, or? Okay then, let's
17 move on.
18 Q. Would you agree that this directive was adopted at a time when
19 there was a threat of activating a NATO order on the aggression against
21 A. I do not have the date of this directive, but I see that it
22 contains elements of a war plane because now it has a code-name GROM-3 or
23 Thunder-3. Grom, thunder.
24 Q. I do believe that you can see now, Witness, the date of the
25 directive. Can you see it? I can.
1 A. I presume that's the 15th of January.
2 Q. 16th of January?
3 A. Well, January 1999 anyway.
4 Q. Thank you. Judging from your experience, I would like to use
5 that experience to take a look at an item in this directive.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] On page 3 of the B/C/S version,
7 please. At the end of Roman numeral II. This is page 2, please turn to
8 B/C/S page 3.
9 Q. Please take a look at the paragraph above the Roman numeral II,
10 the routes.
11 A. You see, this is a classical directive as been prepared within
12 war plans. On the basis of all the relevant information, an assessment
13 is made of the state of affairs on the goals and possible axis of
14 operations and the grouping and concentration of the forces. See here
15 the axis of expected activities and then pursuant to this a unit will be
16 issued with orders to prepare themselves and be ready.
17 Q. Thank you. What I'd like to ask you, the expected NATO axis of
18 aggression, Kacanik Gorge, and the Vrbnik axis, do you know anything
19 about that? Do you know anything about this being mentioned in any
21 A. Well, in military geography, as taught in military schools, there
22 are estimated axes and routes for certain operational units for strategic
23 activities. These are known. There are no -- there is no third option.
24 They may launch parachuters, but lands forces cannot pass anywhere else.
25 Q. From the moment when you were re-activated, although this was not
1 your area of expertise, did KLA step up their activities along the axis
2 which were expected routes of land aggression, the Kacanik Gorge and
3 Morina and Vrnmica and Capusa [phoen] along the border?
4 A. Cafa Pruse and Cafa Sani [phoen], yes. Well, the army was
5 grouped along their axis, and the focus of the military's activities
6 pursuant to this directive, and of course they moved along the axis where
7 the army forces were concentrated. It would not be worth while to act
8 and operate on hill tops where there was nobody else. They worked along
9 the axis as advanced troops of a possible invasion or aggression.
10 Q. Thank you very much.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this into
12 evidence, please.
13 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
14 THE REGISTRAR: The document will become Exhibit D179,
15 Your Honours.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see document
17 D003-3127. D003-3127. Can we turn to page 2, please, of this document.
18 Please let's zoom in on the stamp and show it to the witness, please.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've seen this stamp.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Is this announcement recorded at the staff of the
22 Supreme Command, the office of the Chief of General Staff,
23 General Staff of the Yugoslav Army?
24 A. No, this was registered and recorded in the office of the
25 Chief of the General Staff; and this is the announcement drafted in the
1 Serbian language.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Do we have the English version as
4 well? I would like to tender it into evidence, please.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Is it the evidence to your knowledge, General,
6 that this announcement was ever made?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know that. I see it for
8 the first time here. I notice that the date until which the KLA should
9 abandon their arms has been introduced. This looks as a draft of a text
10 which later on would be finalized. And the other thing is that it's
11 drafted in Serbian, whereas most of the population there were Albanians
12 in Kosovo and this appeal had to be addressed to them.
13 This seems as a conceptual draft, but I'm not sure and I'm not
14 aware whether this was sent down to the ground. I don't know what were
15 the channels of this announcement, maybe through the radio or over the
16 television, but also as leaflets. But at the time leaflets could not be
17 dropped because our air force could not -- air force aircraft could not
18 fly over there.
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D180, Your Honours.
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Although it's not in the proper
23 order, but given your answer can we see document D003-2553.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 Q. This is another order by the Supreme Command staff and concerns
2 military territorial detachments; is that right?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. What I'm interested in is paragraph 5 or item 5, and please offer
5 your comment on it.
6 A. I don't know what to comment, it's very clearly stated in the
7 text. I can read it out loud. What is being done is that units should
8 be strengthened by persons living in Kosovo of Albanian ethnicity. This
9 is dated 31st of March. I'm not sure what the question of yours is.
10 Q. Well, the question is the Supreme Command staff counted on
11 Albanian population to strengthen the ranks?
12 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic, I think I see Mr. Stamp's problem.
13 It is our problem. The document on the screen doesn't contain what you
14 are describing.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I'm discussing
16 paragraph 5 or item 5, but it seems we have the wrong document in
17 English, and this is why you don't have that. I'm very sorry, I did not
18 take heed. The B/C/S version is the correct one, but the English version
19 is not. And you can see the English document bears the date of the
20 2nd April, 1999
21 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
22 JUDGE PARKER: At the moment we can have no ready solution
23 because this is the translation that is attached in e-court. We would
24 have to hunt through to try and find the correct translation attached to
25 some other document. So maybe the witness could read item 5. It can
1 then be -- appear in translated version in the transcript, and you can
2 ask your question.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. General, please read out paragraph 5 into the microphone.
5 A. "The military territorial detachment will be brought up to
6 strength by the command of the military district of Pristina by the
7 non-allocated conscripts of Albanian, of Siptar, and other ethnic
8 background who live in the territory of Kosovo
9 Q. Thank you. General, my question is: Am I right in saying that
10 the Supreme Command staff reckoned with the able-bodied reservists of
11 Albanian and other ethnic affiliation in the war activities that started
12 on the 23rd of March, 1999?
13 A. I don't know about this order. This is the first time I see it.
14 But what I'd like to say is that during my tour of security organs in
15 Kosovo, I received briefs from security organs who were Albanians
16 themselves who in the peacetime had been appointed -- selected and
17 appointed as security officers and who had graduated from the
18 Pancevo school. So not all of them had been excluded.
19 However, something is strange here. The command of the military
20 district in Pristina, as any other military district command, has a
21 certain number of military territorial detachments. I have to ask this
22 question: Why in March when the war had started would they issue an
23 order for them to be included into the ranks? It would have been logical
24 that they be included in to military territorial detachments in 1998, way
25 before that.
1 May I remind you that I know about the order whereby the command
2 of the 3rd Army ordered for weapons to be distributed only to the Serbs
3 within the ranks, so I cannot deny that there had been some obstruction
4 dating from 1991, 1992, in terms of including Albanians into the ranks of
5 conscripts and the others. Because objectively there were security
6 concerns with their presence in military units because they had started
7 terrorist attacks, thefts of military equipment, and arms; so I believe
8 that military territorial detachments were 99 per cent Serb.
9 I do not know about this order. I have no grounds to doubt its
10 credibility and authenticity. It bears all the stamps, but it has had no
11 effect. I know of detachments comprised of Albanians, Turks, and Romas,
12 I wouldn't know about any of that. It would not be politically correct
13 to establish such a military unit. All our units were always ethnically
14 heterogenous. And I don't see any reasons why such an ethnically
15 exclusive detachment would be formed.
16 Q. I apologise, but I'm not interpreting para 5 as detachments being
17 mono-ethnic, but that they be brought up to strength with the ones who
18 existed but who weren't organised in any units, not the formation of new
20 A. It's like this: It says to form a military territorial
21 detachment in the war, and three territorial companies. So this means
22 the formation of a new detachment which has a territorial companies and
23 detachments and they have territorial platoons. And this is a new
24 territorial detachment. Before that, the territorial detachments were
25 already in existence in the Nis Corps, the Pristina Corps, and in every
1 other military district as well; and it was composed of the military
2 territorial detachments, not a territorial company.
3 But military territorial company and military territorial
4 platoons. So I have the impression that this was written in haste to put
5 right something that had not been previously done.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document
8 into evidence, or rather should it just be MFI'd before we have the
9 English translation or is it sufficient to tender the document as it
10 stands with the interpretation received?
11 JUDGE PARKER: It will be marked for identification with a view
12 to the correct translation being included at some time.
13 You found the correct number, I see, Mr. Djurdjic.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, indeed, Your Honour.
15 Everything is possible when we have Ms. O'Leary here. I see it up on my
16 screen here, and I'm sure it will come up on e-court very soon. Then I'd
17 like to tender it into evidence.
18 JUDGE PARKER: Have you given the correct number to the court
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it's still not in
21 e-court, but we do have the translation. Well, we can leave it MFI'd
22 until it comes up in e-court.
23 JUDGE PARKER: It will be marked for identification.
24 THE REGISTRAR: The document will become Exhibit D181 marked for
25 identification, Your Honours.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Now, document under
2 65 ter 01480 next, please.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I've read it.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Is this something you are aware of? It is preparatory order for
6 a directive; right?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And the date is the 9th of April, 1999; right?
9 A. Yes. Let me just comment. When this is addressed personally to
10 the Chief of Staff, then you don't have delivered to such-and-such or
11 so-and-so that we were talking about earlier.
12 Q. Very well. But I don't see what this Roman I is up there.
13 What's the Roman I? Can we see top of the document, please.
14 A. That is the abbreviation for the first administration, if I'm
15 right. First directory to administration. Yes, that was the first one
16 in the JNA. Perhaps I'm right, perhaps not, I don't really know.
17 Occupations administration.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I'd like to tender
19 this document now.
20 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D182, Your Honours.
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Now, the next document
23 under 65 ter is 1481, please.
24 Q. Am I right in saying, General, that this is a directive of the
25 Supreme Command staff of the 9th of April that was announced previously.
1 And this is copy number 1, as we can see.
2 A. Yes. It's interesting to note here, as far as I'm concerned,
3 well, was this archived or not? I don't see a stamp from the military
4 archive. And that's true of the previous documents as well. As the
5 Supreme Command staff.
6 Q. Yes. DT number 22-1?
7 A. Well, yes, that's state secret.
8 Q. Now, what is this 1 -- copy 1?
9 A. This is the first copy of this document, and I suppose at the end
10 we'll see who it was sent to, delivered to, at the end of this directive;
11 and it was supposed to go to all operative and strategic groups, which
12 means that there's copy number 1, 2, 3, and so on.
13 Q. So is the first document where we see in the heading the copy
14 number. I'm asking you about the left-hand side, DT number 22-1.
15 A. Ah, I see, that says state secret. That's quite a different
16 protocol. It's not a protocol of the Supreme Command staff. It's a
17 separate protocol for documents relating to a war plan and state secrets.
18 Q. I see. Thank you for that explanation.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May we have page 2 of this
20 document displayed, please, because I'm interested in looking at
21 para 2.2.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. So, General, we are dealing with a time of war; am I right in
25 saying that what is expected is that from the territory of Macedonia
1 aggressive forces have about 20.000 men, and from Albania 10.000 men; is
2 that what this is?
3 A. Well, those are estimations. Now, how -- what the situation was
4 like in practice as far as I know, there were more of them in Macedonia
5 more troops than there were in Albania
6 Q. Now, if we look at Albania
7 information tell you about that?
8 A. That was under the intelligence administration, but unless I'm
9 wrong, there were 15.000 men before that. So it oscillated, it varied.
10 But this is a sort of schematic that we use in compiling these documents
11 for orientation purposes. Whether these are the exact figures, we only
12 see later on during the action itself, so this is an estimation of those
14 Q. Thank you.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May we have page 12 called up,
16 please, of this document. It's page 12 of the English as well, please.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can see that.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. We have a stamp there of the Supreme Command staff and the
20 signature of the Chief of Staff?
21 A. Yes. Yes, there is a stamp and there's General Ojdanic's
22 signature there; and as I said, we see where the copies were sent to.
23 Copy number 1, copy number 2, so everything is in order.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I tender this document into
1 evidence now, please.
2 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
3 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D183, Your Honours.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] The next document under
5 65 ter is 01483.
6 Q. General, we are now going to see a supplement to the previous
7 directive on the 12th of April, 1999. Am I right, is that what it is?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I'd like to tender
11 this document as well.
12 JUDGE PARKER: It too will be received.
13 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D184, Your Honours.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'm moving on to
15 another area now, and as we are coming up to the break, I would like to
16 suggest that we take our break now and then begin with a new topic after
17 the break.
18 JUDGE PARKER: We will adjourn now to resume at 5 minutes
19 to 1.00.
20 [The witness stands down]
21 --- Recess taken at 12.25 p.m.
22 --- On resuming at 12.57 p.m.
23 [The witness takes the stand]
24 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
1 Q. General, we managed to go through all these documents that I call
2 combat documents, as a layperson. You went through a number of
3 directives and orders from the Pristina Corps, the 3rd Army, and the
4 various brigades. Did you see in any of those documents that it contains
5 something that would be against Albanian civilian population or any other
6 civilian population for that matter?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Thank you. During your active service, did you hear or have
9 information about the army participating in any actives directed against
10 civilian population?
11 A. No. Perhaps I can clarify further. In a great many documents in
12 the item stipulating security measures and moral in the army, which would
13 be standard items within an order, there were strict orders to
14 subordinate units that entering premises is prohibited, that they should
15 bear in mind that they only engage terrorists and protect civilians.
16 Some documents also contain provisions on how and where people should be
17 assembled in order to protect them.
18 The treatment of any captured Siptar terrorist members is also
19 prescribed as well as points of assembly of such prisoners and the way
20 they should be handed over to the MUP. I think one order, military order
21 of the Pristina Corps command, we also find that reference is made to a
22 refugee population from an Albanian village in which there probably had
23 been terrorist acts and they fled to the woods. In that order, the
24 military unit is ordered to assist those civilians to return to their
1 I think I saw 2 or 3 MUP dispatches for Kosovo. But as regards
2 the military orders, some of them were linked to certain MUP dispatches
3 on how and where to return that civilian population. In all of those
4 documents, emphasis was placed on civilians being excluded from any war
5 activities, combat activities.
6 Q. As a very senior official, did you ever receive an order to the
7 effect that you should either tolerate or implement -- that you should
8 either tolerate or not institute procedure against people who
9 participated in, say, arson and destruction of religious objects?
10 A. No. No one has a right to issue such an order.
11 Q. Am I also right to say that you never issued such an order to any
12 of your subordinates?
13 A. I never did. First of all, I could not issue orders. And I know
14 for certain that no trained officer would do that. First of all, there
15 would be violating the law, and their subordinates were not expected to
16 implement such an order. And they would have to notify their superiors
17 about the existence of such an order. Otherwise they would be committing
18 a criminal offence.
19 Q. Thank you. The military police was also within your domain and
20 they have great powers in terms of prosecuting -- investigating military
21 personnel who committed crimes. I wanted to ask you something in
22 relation to that. Irrespective of the chain of command in terms of
23 orders, have you ever heard of procedures not being instituted against
24 perpetrators of crimes, and that such acts were being tolerated in any
1 A. As I've already said, I know of only one case during the seven
2 days of my stay in Kosovo when a crime was committed. It was the crime
3 of murder, and certain corpses were disposed of in Gornja Klina. It was
4 the only case that was not prosecuted. When the military police were
5 supposed to carry on -- carry out on-site investigation, by that time the
6 terrorists had taken up the area of Gornja Klina; and therefore, there
7 was no investigation undertaken.
8 But the lieutenant-colonel in whose unit the three volunteers
9 charged with that crime had them arrested and they were eventually
10 brought before the Nis
11 Q. Thank you for that answer.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let us move on to a document.
13 This one I believe already has its P number. Well, let's see P679.
14 Q. General, I wanted to show you a few documents that have to do
15 with volunteers and their treatment. Therefore, I'd look to discuss
16 them. As briefly as possible, can you tell us something about this
18 A. I saw this document during its preparation, and I also know how
19 it was implemented. In all wars that took place in the
20 former Yugoslavia
21 procedure of how volunteers could be introduced into units, which
22 conditions need to be met, and how they should be treated once deployed.
23 I said that there were two assembly points for volunteers, one
24 was in Grocka and I believe since this is an introductory order -- sorry,
25 not Grocka, Bubanj Potak. And the other one was near Nis; I can't recall
1 the exact centre name. In any case, given that NATO aviation targeted
2 Bubanj Potak, the centre was moved to Grocka. This document envisaged a
3 certain procedure in terms of receiving and checking the background of
4 any volunteers as well as their health status and cooperation with the
5 MUP concerning any background information on those volunteers.
6 Q. Thank you. Let me ask you this. Let's cite and example. If I
7 were a military reservist, I have been assigned to a certain unit but
8 never received a call to report there, could I go to Nis and introduce
9 myself as a volunteer, would I be accepted?
10 A. You could go there, but you wouldn't be taken in.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let us see P680 next, please.
13 Q. I think you saw this document as well.
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. General, am I right in saying that the staff of the supreme corps
16 command reacted immediately upon being notified of a problem?
17 A. Yes. There was one single problem with certain volunteers. The
18 order envisaged that they cannot stay as a group representing a separate
19 unit. What should have taken place instead was that they be deployed
20 among various units pertaining -- depending on their military
21 specialties. They were supposed to fit in as reserve soldiers of the VJ.
22 However, in some cases such as the 37th Brigade in Glogovac, some
23 50 or 60 of them arrived, and the commander, instead of putting them into
24 various units, he left them as a separate unit, appointing a Stevan Jekic
25 for commander. This was not supposed to happen, but in practice it did,
1 and most problems came from such groups.
2 Q. Thank you. But here we see that the Supreme Command staff acted
3 as early as the 20th of April?
4 A. Yes, that was prior to my arrival, but that practice continued
5 later on since we kept pointing out the problems.
6 Q. And senior bodies always insisted on preventing such occurrences
7 in subordinate commands. However, we all know what life may be like.
8 A. Yes.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have
10 65 ter document 4016. I may have gone wrong in terms of chronology in my
12 Q. General, the date is the 14th of April, whereas the one before
13 that was the 7th of April. This was the next step taken by the Supreme
14 Command staff in terms of chronology?
15 A. The previous document was the most complete one since it set out
16 the criteria. This is a document of the staff, but some reception
17 centres did not function at all, say the one in Montenegro, since there
18 was general obstruction on the part of Montenegro in the war effort.
19 This is only to confirm that having learned from previous experience with
20 volunteers not being deployed properly, that the Supreme Command staff
21 tried to act appropriately in any following situations.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document
24 into evidence.
25 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
1 THE REGISTRAR: The document will become Exhibit D185,
2 Your Honours.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we have D003-3032.
4 Q. This document is not directly related to the previous one, but
5 I'm interested in the issue of mobilisation, hence I find item 1
6 interesting. Could you please comment on it?
7 A. Could we please zoom in. Yes.
8 Q. Could you please read out item 1 of this document since I believe
9 it is very important.
10 A. You want me to read it out?
11 Q. No, just comment on it.
12 A. I laughed a bit, and I'll explain why. There's nothing strange
13 in having psychologists in war units per establishment and even in some
14 peacetime units. What is suggested here is that at the level of brigade
15 command and higher up, such psychologists had to be employed because of
16 the various trauma encountered in such war situations. The part that I
17 laughed at was this, it says "platoons for psychological and propaganda
18 activities," citing several strategic formations.
19 Perhaps I can go back to what I was asked once, something about
20 opera. "Opera" was shorthand for a particular body which had to do with
21 psychological and propaganda warfare. In any case, this may not be
22 directly related to this.
23 Q. I believe it would be far more interesting to learn something
24 about the opera case, but I would still like to stay with these
1 In any case, joking aside, this was a prevention measure so as to
2 avoid any excesses due to the war trauma suffered.
3 A. This was not only a measure of prevention. Such platoons were
4 also charged with counterpropaganda, they were there to oppose the enemy
5 propaganda having their own experts from various professions.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we see, please, document
8 003-2550 but before we work on it, I move to admit this previous document
9 into evidence.
10 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
11 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D186, Your Honours.
12 MR. ZIVANOVIC:
13 Q. General, this, I think, is a general document on reporting.
14 Could you be concise in commenting on it, I believe that you touched upon
15 it yesterday or the day before.
16 MR. STAMP: Were we notified of this, Your Honour, or if you
17 could help me to find it, please.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] My learned friend, yes for both.
19 But the wrong document was shown on the screen. Maybe I misspoke.
20 D003-2550 is the one that I'm seeking.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The first document was clear. It
22 warns of the need of regular reporting and verification of the
23 information being reported.
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I'm not sure. If
25 this document has not been tendered, I now move to tender it.
1 [Trial Chamber confers]
2 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
3 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D187, Your Honours.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we see now,
5 please, D003-2648.
6 Q. Witness, this is supposed to be a combat report by the
7 Pristina Corps dated the 3rd of April, 1999. It is recognisable as such
8 to you by its format?
9 A. Yes. This is supposed to be a daily report sent to the operation
10 centre; and if you noticed in the last item of the order, this was
11 item 11, it's always stated regular daily reports should be submitted by
12 this hour every day, and irregular reports or interview reports were
13 never ...
14 Q. Thank you. In peacetime, these would be daily reports and in
15 wartime these would be combat reports; is that correct?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Can you confirm?
18 A. Yes, I've said yes.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move to tender this document
20 into evidence, please.
21 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
22 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D188, Your Honours.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Another document of a similar
24 format, D003-2585.
25 Q. General, is this the same format of such report, this time dated
1 the 4th of April, 1999, sent by the Pristina Corps to the commander of
2 the 3rd Army?
3 A. Yes, this went through teleprinter as well. They have the same
4 format. First item about the enemy, the second is neighbouring units,
5 the tasks of similar units, and this is a format prescribed for all
7 Q. Thank you.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now I move to tender this document
9 into evidence, please.
10 JUDGE PARKER: It too will be received.
11 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D189, Your Honours.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now, D003-2633 to be shown,
14 Q. And before we see it on the screen, General, this is going to be
15 a report one step higher from the commander of the 3rd Army to the
16 General Staff it is a combat report dated the 13th of April, 1999. Am I
17 right in saying so?
18 A. Yes. Those reports coming from army commands, different from
19 corps level or brigade level, are far more fleshed out in terms of data
20 and information, which is only normal because they are compiled on the
21 basis of subordinate units, daily reports.
22 Q. Thank you. Am I right in saying that army command reports in
23 this case, 3rd Army's report, consolidate all the important developments
24 in the area of responsibility of the 3rd Army based on the subordinate
25 units reports delivered to the command of the 3rd Army during the day?
1 A. There may be slight differences. You said with respect to all
2 the information submitted to -- during the day. It is not a mechanical
3 copy paste. Information must be triaged and consolidated, but in essence
4 all important developments and events have to be reported on for the
5 whole of the territory and for all units.
6 Q. Now. Let me ask you, if something is not contained in a report
7 of the commander of the 3rd Army concerning operational events or matters
8 down there, does that mean that the Supreme Command staff will not be
9 notified of such things?
10 A. Yes, it does mean, but the Supreme Command staff has also other
11 mechanisms which they used. And that would be to send professionals to
12 the ground and match the reported facts with --
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this into
15 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Yes, but this
16 previous witness's answer was that the Supreme Command staff had other
17 instruments meaning that they would send their own professionals on the
18 ground to match what was being reported with the state of affairs on the
19 ground as they find them.
20 JUDGE PARKER: This will be received.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D190, Your Honours.
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I keep returning to the
23 25th of May have document by General Pavkovic.
24 Q. There is an intervention that the transcript does not reflect.
25 Witness's answer to my question, Am I right in saying in respect of my
1 previous question?
2 A. Yes, you are.
3 Q. The content of the complaints of General Pavkovic dated the
4 25th of May, should they have been contained in the preceding periods,
5 daily reports, that were submitted to the Supreme Command staff?
6 A. I'm going to be brief. They should have been, but I will most
7 probably be in a situation to try to explain that.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we see document D003-3102
10 [Realtime transcript read in error "D003-3012"].
11 Q. General, this is another daily report dated 29th of April, 1999,
12 sent by the commander of the 3rd Army. Is this the prescribed format of
13 daily reporting?
14 A. Yes.
15 MR. STAMP: Are we notified of this, Your Honour? A few
16 documents have been coming through which we just can't find in our
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, it is
19 not [as interpreted] D003-3102. It is reflected erroneous in the
20 transcript. While the general is taking a look at it, Mr. Stamp, we
21 received it in our notification.
22 Q. General, is this the same format but with a different date?
23 A. I don't have anything on the screen.
24 Q. Neither do I.
25 A. Yes, this is the same format.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move to tender this document
3 into evidence, please.
4 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D191, Your Honours.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now I would like to see D003-3004,
7 if the usher can assist us, please.
8 Q. General, is the format of this document authentic? Have you had
9 an opportunity to see it in practice?
10 A. No. I haven't had an opportunity, but this is a land army sector
11 issuing an instruction regulating in greater detail certain matters.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we move to page 4 of this
14 document, and there is a ledger number. That page. Can we see the stamp
15 bearing the ledger number.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, let me first explain that the
17 POV number differs from the others. In the others there was a strictly
18 confidential -- there is a ledger for strictly confidential and
19 confidential documents, and that is a protocol of the land forces sector.
20 I see that the military post is 1122.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. I would start with page 4, but you see, General, we see the
23 Chief of the General Staff Dragoljub Ojdanic signing this instruction?
24 A. That's in order. He would verify and approve such an
25 instruction. And you see a corner of the Military Post 1122-1 which
1 would be the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia. This is their
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I move to enter this
4 document into evidence, please.
5 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
6 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D192, Your Honours.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we see now
8 65 ter document 1475.
9 Q. Hence we know what is written here, could we please hear your
10 comments on items 4 and 6 briefly.
11 A. This regulated the procedure on capturing POWs in combat and how
12 they are to be treated. In item 4, they are -- this deals with commander
13 saboteurs, paratroopers, Special Forces operating within Yugoslavia
14 it spells out that they should become prisoners of war when they are
15 surrender, if they are wearing uniforms. This is in compliance with laws
16 in force.
17 And item 6 regulates the need to provide wounded and ill
18 prisoners with adequate assistance. Now this has been highlighted and
19 spelled out.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, I move to tender this
21 document into evidence, please.
22 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
23 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D193, Your Honours.
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] The next document under
25 65 ter is 1486, please.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, now, it's interesting to see
2 what he is warning them about.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. It is about this two week period and the Supreme Command staff to
5 the subordinate units?
6 A. Well, I don't see anything lower down on the document where it
7 says "I hereby caution ..."
8 May we have the bottom of the document in B/C/S or the next page
9 and in English, please.
10 He is actually reminding them of the order he issued earlier on
11 and says warning and says that it's urgent.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document
14 into evidence now, please.
15 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
16 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D194.
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 JUDGE PARKER: I'm told that it is a single-page document. There
19 was a reference in the transcript to a second page, but I think it's a
20 lower part of the first page.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, that's right. The end of the
22 first page; the bottom of the first page. Quite right. For the time
23 being, let it remain that way, Your Honour.
24 I should now like -- just a moment, please. Let's move on and
25 we'll come back to that. Now, under 65 ter document 1944 next, please.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can confirm from what it
2 says here with respect to international law of war, when I was
3 re-activated, I received all these booklets regulating these matters.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] And I'd like to tender this
6 document into evidence as well, please.
7 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
8 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D195, Your Honours.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] The next document under
10 65 ter is 1902.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. The document is in order.
12 The same questions are highlighted and an assignment is given to the
13 security organs and command organs that they shall collect information
14 about these incidents and inform others about them.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could this be tendered
16 into evidence as well, please.
17 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
18 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D196, Your Honours.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] The next document is D003-2742, a
20 Defence document.
21 Q. General, this date here, the 10th of May, and this is the
22 administration for morale?
23 A. No. It is for recruitment, mobilisation, and system related
24 affairs, but we have the legal department within that as well.
25 Q. And in point 1 is insistence made upon the application of
1 international war law once again?
2 A. Yes, indeed and commanders and komandirs are asked to take all
3 necessary measures to prevent violation of those principles.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I'd like to tender
5 that document.
6 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
7 THE REGISTRAR: It will become Exhibit D197, Your Honours.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] The next document is a Defence
9 document D003-3001.
10 Q. General, here we have an order from the Pristina Corps command
11 dated the 16th of April, 1999, referring to security for the civilian
12 population; am I right?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Could you please give us the basic characteristics contained in
15 this order?
16 A. Well, I have to read it first because I haven't seen it. Yes,
17 this order is very precise. It defines everything in very precise terms,
18 what should be done, the tasks. It's a task to the army and the MUP
19 organs to work jointly and to inform the civilian population on time
20 about the efforts, or rather, attacks that are to follow, whether they be
21 NATO attacks or Siptar forces, and to give assistance for evacuation to
22 the most suitable areas.
23 And everything follows those general lines. And I've always
24 mentioned that in one of the combat reports I notice that the population
25 had taken shelter and then after the action was over, the officers tried
1 to return them. Whereas there was a dispatch from MUP that the local
2 population be returned to the villages. I can't remember the number of
3 document, but it's linked to this order. And we can see on the basis of
4 that that people did act upon the order. Now whether anybody did, I
5 can't say.
6 Q. Thank you. I think I have time for one more question; it is
7 this: Did you ever hear that army force or police forces surrounded a
8 village where there were no members of the KLA present in order to shell
9 it or launch action against it?
10 A. No, and judging by the documents that I've read, there were
11 always, among the casualties, terrorists casualties.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, General. Your Honours,
13 I think our time is up for today, and of course, I'd like to tender the
14 previous document into evidence before we close. Thank you.
15 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
16 THE REGISTRAR: The document will become Exhibit D198,
17 Your Honours.
18 JUDGE PARKER: Now, Mr. Djurdjic, what is your state of progress?
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I'm nearing the end. I'm not at
20 the very end, but I'm sure that Mr. Stamp and I will get through this
21 witness tomorrow. There's no doubt about that, Your Honours. So rest
22 assured. I have a few more documents to get through, but I think we've
23 been through a large number of documents. I'll have another 10 to 15
24 minutes of documents, and then I'd like to sum up my cross.
25 JUDGE PARKER: Well, I hope we do better than merely concluding
1 the evidence of this witness tomorrow, but I hope you'll both bear in
2 mind the witness has been sitting here pummeled with documents for some
3 very considerable length of time now; it must be very demanding and
5 We will adjourn now to resume tomorrow at -- Mr. Djurdjic.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I do apologise for
7 interrupting, but the MFI
8 the transcript -- 3200. That's the correct number for the record. And
9 that's the English translation. The correct English translation of the
11 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. We adjourn now to resume tomorrow at
12 9.00 in the morning.
13 [The witness stands down]
14 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.
15 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 11th day of June,
16 2009, at 9.00 a.m.