Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 6211

 1                           Thursday, 18 June 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 5                           [The witness entered court]

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  Good morning.

 7             THE WITNESS:  Morning.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  Would you please read aloud the affirmation that

 9     is shown to you now.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

11     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

12                           WITNESS:  BATON HAXHIU

13                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  Please sit down.

15             Mr. Neuner has some questions for you.

16             Mr. Neuner.

17             MR. NEUNER:  Good morning.

18                           Examination by Mr. Neuner:

19        Q.   Witness, your name a Baton Haxhiu?

20        A.   Yes, my name is Baton Haxhiu.

21        Q.   And you were born on the 24th of February, 1966, in Pristina in

22     Kosovo?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   And you are a journalist by profession?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 6212

 1        Q.   Mr. Haxhiu, is it correct that you gave a statement in

 2     August 2001 to the investigators of the ICTY?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   And when you came here for the Milosevic trial in May 2002, you

 5     made some corrections to this statement?

 6        A.   Yes.  There were some minor mistakes.

 7        Q.   And after you did these corrections, you confirmed the

 8     corrections and the statement in front of a Registry officer and stated

 9     that both the statements are true and correct to the best of your

10     knowledge and belief?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   And before you came here today, earlier this week, we in the

13     Prosecution -- we communicated your statement and your transcript of

14     testimonies to you before you travelled to come here?

15        A.   Yes, that's correct.

16        Q.   So you had an opportunity to read all this material before you

17     came here today, is it?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   And you testified on the 23rd of May, 2002, in the Milosevic

20     trial?

21        A.   Yes, I did.

22        Q.   And you testified a second time on the 8th of November, 2006,

23     this time in the Milutinovic case?

24        A.   Yes, correct.

25        Q.   So together does the corrected statement and both transcripts of

Page 6213

 1     testimony truly and accurately reflect what you would say if you gave

 2     your testimony orally before this court today?

 3        A.   Yes, I'll say the same things today.

 4             MR. NEUNER:  Your Honours, I'm referring to the statements, this

 5     is the 92 bis package, 65 ter number 2478.  I'm also referring to the

 6     testimony in the Milosevic case, which is 02479.  As well as to the

 7     testimony in the Milutinovic case, 05053.  And I would like to tender all

 8     three items.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  Each of those will be received as three separate

10     exhibits.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  These would be Exhibits P992, P993, and P994,

12     Your Honours.

13             MR. NEUNER:  I just wanted to make a clarification, in accordance

14     with your decision on the 10th of February this year, the Prosecution has

15     redacted parts of the statement and of the testimony of Mr. Haxhiu.

16             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

17             MR. NEUNER:  And these are the parts relating to the meeting, and

18     I will ask Mr. Haxhiu a short while about it.

19             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

20             MR. NEUNER:

21        Q.   Mr. Haxhiu, I wanted to read out a summary for the Court and for

22     the people listening to us, a summary of what you have testified and to

23     what you have stated in your statement.

24             Mr. Haxhiu is a journalist and the founding member of the

25     newspaper Koha Ditore.  His evidence relates to the buildup of the

Page 6214

 1     conflict in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999.  He describes that the conflict in

 2     Kosovo was closely linked to the issue using the Albanian language in

 3     university.

 4             In 1991, the Serbian government forced a more Serbian oriented

 5     curriculum in Kosovo schools.  The parallel Albanian school system

 6     developed.  The Serbian state did not recognise the diplomas.  This led

 7     to non-violent student demonstrations.

 8             Baton Haxhiu was present and translated at meetings between

 9     Ambassador Petritsch, Jan Kickert, and Albert Rohan with KLA members in

10     the summer of 1998.

11             On the 2nd of October, 1998, the police broke into the offices of

12     Koha Ditore and beat the witness and some of his colleagues.  The witness

13     was arrested and interrogated by the police.

14             On 5 or 6 December, 1998, Stanisic stated at a meeting that

15     Sreten Lukic had convinced Milosevic to break up the demonstration by

16     force.  Stanisic stated he could not decide anything on his own and that

17     the proposal for a Kosovo republic would not be accepted.

18             Such a proposal would not be acceptable to the nationalistic

19     circle around Milosevic.  Stanisic said that he would meet Milosevic the

20     following day.

21             Baton Haxhiu was in Pristina in March 1999.  Leaving the town, he

22     saw men in green uniforms wearing masks.  The witness's father was beaten

23     up in the streets of Pristina.  Mr. Baton Haxhiu saw thousands of people

24     in Pristina being expelled the day he left.

25             He travelled through the mountains to the Macedonian border.

Page 6215

 1     There he saw more than 15 kilometres long line of refugees trying to

 2     cross into Macedonia.  Baton Haxhiu reached Tetovo on the

 3     7th of April, 1999.

 4             This witness's evidence is relevant to paragraphs 26, 72(g), 77,

 5     80 to 102 of the indictment and counts 1, 2, and 5 of this indictment.

 6             End of the summary.

 7        Q.   I'm going to put now a few questions, Mr. Haxhiu, to you,

 8     relating to two topics.  The first topic is a meeting at Mr. Bakalli's

 9     apartment.  And my first question would be when about did this meeting at

10     Mr. Bakalli's apartment take place?

11        A.   This meeting took place on the 13th or 14th of November.  I had

12     it written somewhere in a notebook, but I don't have it now.  But I

13     believe it was either the 14th -- 13th or 14th, 1997.

14        Q.   Thank you.  And how was this meeting initiated?

15        A.   When I was arrested on the 2nd of October, I was interrogated for

16     two and a half hours.  And since it was an atmosphere of conflict and a

17     war situation, I said that the best thing would be to stop the conflict

18     and have the Albanians and the Serbs meet in order to talk on how to find

19     a way out of this crisis and conflict situation.

20             I indicated to them that you have the example of

21     Bosnia and Croatia which would be the best way why we shouldn't use

22     hard-line regarding the Kosova situation.  And that was how this

23     initiative emerged.

24             Later, I received a phone call by Mr. Stijovic; I think it was

25     the 13th of November when I got that phone call, 1997.  And that was how

Page 6216

 1     the meeting was organised in the office of Mr. Bakalli.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Two questions.  First of all, you said you were

 3     arrested on the 2nd of October.  Which year?

 4        A.   1997.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Then you mentioned a gentleman, Mr. Stijovic.  Could

 6     you explain to the Court who was Mr. Stijovic and what position did he

 7     hold in November 1997 when he called you?

 8        A.   To my recollection, Stijovic used to be chairman of the youth --

 9     socialist youth league of Prishtina, a Serb citizen who was in good

10     relations with Albanians in normal circumstances.  But I didn't know that

11     Zoran Stijovic was a high-ranking official of the Serbian state and its

12     service until the moment when I received his phone call.

13        Q.   Could you explain to the Court what you mean by he "was a

14     high-ranking official of the Serbian state and its service."  Which

15     service are you referring to?

16        A.   In the meeting we were having in Bakalli's office, I realised

17     that that person was a high-ranking official in the secret service

18     because he was in the company of two main persons, officials, Mr. Hadjic

19     and Mr. Gajic.  In that meeting, I knew that Mr. Gajic was working there,

20     but I didn't know that that was his true name.

21        Q.   I take it one by one.  You said you didn't know that Mr. Gajic

22     was working there.  Where was Mr. Gajic working in November 1997?

23        A.   Mr. Gajic was chief responsible for security issues, or as we

24     call it in our daily speech, he was chief of secret service for Kosova.

25     And he was in Kosova for a long time.

Page 6217

 1        Q.   Okay.  Then you mentioned a second -- or another gentleman next

 2     to Mr. Gajic, could you give us the name of this person, could you spell

 3     it?

 4        A.   I don't know his name, but he introduced himself as Mr. Hadjic

 5     and as the assistance of Mr. Jovica Stankovic [as interpreted].  During

 6     the meeting he said that soon he would replace Mr. Gajic and that he

 7     would come in to Prishtina.  That was what he stated at that meeting.

 8        Q.   So what did you conclude for which service if any was Mr. Hadjic

 9     working?

10        A.   Because he was probably the main person, the key figure of the

11     secret service of Serbia then --

12        Q.   Thank you.

13        A.   -- or Yugoslavia.  He was the main figure after Stanisic.

14        Q.   And can you give us the full name of Mr. Stanisic, please?

15        A.   Jovica Stanisic.

16        Q.   Mr. Stanisic in November 1997, what office, if any, was he

17     holding?

18        A.   He was chief of Yugoslavian Secret Service.  I think they had

19     just changed the name at that time and I don't recall the exact

20     nomination of that service.

21        Q.   Okay.  Can you tell us that secret service and

22     Mr. Jovica Stanisic, to which minister, if any, did Mr. Stanisic report

23     to?

24        A.   I don't know.  But the way I perceived it as a journalist, he had

25     direct links with Milosevic.  At least he didn't mention or refer to any

Page 6218

 1     minister with whom he had links or connections or to whom he reported.

 2     At least that was my impression from the meeting we had in 1997, which

 3     was the only meeting actually.

 4        Q.   I wanted to ask you, the three gentlemen did come to

 5     Mr. Bakalli's apartment for this meeting.  Did they say on whose behalf

 6     they were coming?  Or whom they represented at this meeting?

 7        A.   They came there on behalf of their chief and said that even

 8     Mr. Milosevic was informed of that meeting.

 9        Q.   And who was their chief?

10        A.   I would presume that the chief would be Mr. Stanisic.

11     Jovica Stanisic.

12        Q.   I wanted to ask you what, in one sentence, was the Albanian

13     position promoted at the meeting in Mr. Bakalli's apartment?

14        A.   We knew that Serbia was a strong state and that it had a strong

15     army and that it was impossible politically to deal with it.  Therefore,

16     since Yugoslavia was being demolished, was in a process of

17     disintegration, that's why we proposed the establishment of an

18     independent republic in an eventual confederation including Serbia and

19     Montenegro.

20        Q.   Do I understand correctly that the proposal was to have an

21     independent republic of Kosovo but within the Federal Republic of

22     Yugoslavia?

23        A.   It was a confederation.  I wouldn't describe it as Yugoslav

24     confederation.  We proposed that the name be changed.  We proposed a

25     confederation comprising Montenegro and Serbia because they formed the

Page 6219

 1     rest of former Yugoslavia, or they constituted the artificial patrimony

 2     to the former Yugoslavia.

 3        Q.   Can you explain to the Judges what position Mr. Bakalli was

 4     holding at the time he was engaging in these proposals in November 1997?

 5        A.   The movement of Albanians of Kosova didn't have positions or

 6     pass.  In fact, we all -- Bakalli had a very strong political background.

 7     He was one of the key figures in the former Yugoslavia, and the man who

 8     in real terms established or built the concept of the former state that

 9     Milosevic and others inherited.  He was the man who knew better than

10     anyone the Serb mentality, better than anyone the Serbian political

11     figures, better than anyone he knew what was called the political rear of

12     Serbia because he had during that time built that concept for Kosova.  He

13     was one of the main persons in Kosova.

14        Q.   Did he told an office in November 1997?

15        A.   There were, as I said, no offices or posts in Kosova because

16     people were dismissed or laid off from their work, jobs.

17        Q.   So you tell us that a proposal was promoted at the meeting by the

18     Albanian side.  Can you explain to the Court what the Serb reaction to

19     that proposal was?

20        A.   The Serb reaction was furious.  It was down-right refusal of that

21     proposal.  Their immediate response was this proposal will lead to war.

22        Q.   Who said so, that it would lead to war?

23        A.   Both, Gajic and Hadjic.  The first to say it was Hadjic.  Gajic

24     simply nodded, confirmed it, what Hadjic said.

25        Q.   What else was responded to that proposal?

Page 6220

 1        A.   It was a lengthy meeting which lasted about three hours, but the

 2     most important part of that meeting, I would say, was the threats we

 3     received up to blackmail from our interlocutors.  At the moment it was

 4     said that, Do you know that there are 443 ethnically pure villages in

 5     Kosova?  We said, Yes, we know and then what.  They said, You know that

 6     these -- the population of these villages can be driven out of these

 7     villages within 24 hours given the strength of Serbia.  We said, Yes, we

 8     think it can be done but it would mark the end, if you like, to a concept

 9     of peace or peaceful concept.  And this would lead to a constant war.

10     And they promptly said, Have you heard of the project scorched earth?

11        Q.   I'll stop you here for a second.  Before we come to scorched

12     earth, I want to clarify.  These 443 ethnical pure villages in Kosovo

13     referred to by these three gentlemen, which ethnicity was living in these

14     443 villages, Albanians or Serbs or others, could you clarify?  How did

15     you understand it?

16        A.   To tell you the truth, it was the first time for me to hear that

17     there are 443 villages in Kosova inhabited by Albanians.  They didn't

18     refer to them as villages, they referred to them as settlements.  So that

19     was when I learned the number of villages, and that they had a very clear

20     idea of what Kosova was like, how it functioned, and how many Albanians

21     lived there.

22        Q.   So they envisaged Albanian villages in Kosovo, and then you

23     mentioned scorched earth.  Could you explain what was said by the

24     gentlemen in relation to scorched earth at the meeting?

25        A.   As I said earlier, they referred to them as settlements.  They

Page 6221

 1     knew what they meant by that word.  And it was also the first time for me

 2     to hear the concept of scorched earth.  I was young then, and I hadn't

 3     any idea of such conflicts of such genocidal dimension.  The very -- the

 4     mere fact of using these words scorched land or earth was shocking to me.

 5     But for Bakalli, this was not new, he had already heard of it.

 6             And by this concept, this scorched land or earth, as they put it,

 7     it was a military police project which was in place ready to be activated

 8     at any moment, and for me this seemed the greatest threat.  It was

 9     frightening.

10        Q.   Do you remember who from these three gentlemen was mentioning the

11     scorched earth concept?

12        A.   Hadjic, but the others seemed to be familiar with that.  So the

13     conversation about the scorched earth went on for a couple of minutes.

14     The two others didn't react, they were well aware of what it meant.

15        Q.   And they were well aware but did they oppose at some point in

16     time the concept of scorched earth?  What was your impression?

17        A.   No, no.  They were discussing about it as if it was the most

18     normal thing.  As a military option that might be activated or put in

19     place in case the Albanians failed to obey the instructions of Serbia.

20     They were clear about that.

21        Q.   What was the reaction by the Albanian side to the mentioning of

22     scorched earth concept?

23        A.   There was nothing to be said other than, You are not the only

24     ones living on this planet.  And that the international community would

25     certainly react to it because we are at the dawn of the 21st century, and

Page 6222

 1     you cannot come up with such concepts.  Even if you were the only one

 2     living in this world, the implementation of such a project would be hard

 3     let alone that we are living in a world where there is an international

 4     law, where there are so many media outlets, and where it won't be easy

 5     for you to act.  And they said, We will see.

 6        Q.   Did this response lead to more moderate response from the Serbian

 7     side?

 8        A.   No.  Immediately after this they said to us, This is our mandate,

 9     we cannot elaborate any more on this.  We will go back to Belgrade and

10     present the Belgrade officials with our impressions.

11             They said that it would be possible for us to meet Milosevic.  We

12     refused that.  And then they said that there is a likelihood for another

13     meeting between us to be held.  And that's how this meeting was concluded

14     that night.

15        Q.   Was there, following this meeting in the apartment of

16     Mr. Bakalli, another meeting, a follow-up meeting?

17        A.   With these gentlemen you mean?

18        Q.   With these gentlemen or with any Serbian representative who

19     wanted to speak to Mr. Bakalli or you?

20        A.   The following meeting was held sometime in December.  I don't

21     know the exact date.  It was a meeting with Mr. Jovica Stankovic.

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Correction:  Stanisic.

23        Q.   And you say the meeting was in December, which year, please?

24        A.   1997.

25        Q.   At this meeting with Mr. Stanisic, was the concept of scorched

Page 6223

 1     earth mentioned?

 2        A.   No.  Stanisic had come there with a political stance.  He was

 3     presenting surprising offers to us, surprising in a sense that we knew

 4     that we were not going to accept them.  He had a stronger mandate than

 5     the people from the previous group.

 6        Q.   Okay.  Can you tell us briefly what the surprise was, or the

 7     surprising offer?

 8        A.   He offered Bakalli the post of Yugoslavia's vice-president.  To

 9     my knowledge, Yugoslavia was not functioning at the time, so this post

10     didn't make any sense.  But Bakalli replied by saying that he has

11     finished with his mandate in former Yugoslavia and that his efforts were

12     towards finding solution to the problem of Kosova the way he had put the

13     proposals forward to the Serb party.

14        Q.   In terms of threats for violence, as one may interpret the

15     mentioning of scorched earth at the previous meeting, at the follow-up

16     meeting, was there any threat about violence mentioned?

17        A.   Stanisic used another language, a language of sophisticated

18     threats.  It wasn't a brutal language that the others used.  He said that

19     there were many nationalists and radicals around Milosevic that would

20     never accept our proposal, and he said, My friends - this is what he

21     used, the word - we are going towards a war.

22             My impression was that this person had gained experience from the

23     previous wars in Bosnia and Croatia, and he wanted to win the battle; but

24     it seemed that his mandate was also limited.  He offered us to meet

25     Milosevic, which we refused.  Then he said to us that he was going to

Page 6224

 1     meet Mr. Milosevic the following morning to present him with our

 2     proposals, but he told us that he was sure Milosevic was not going to

 3     accept our proposals.  To what I know, after this meeting and after

 4     several months, Mr. Stanisic was removed from the post he held.

 5             I'm not quite sure how long after this meeting he was removed,

 6     maybe a month or so.  There was a public resignation on his part, and I'm

 7     trying to para-phrase it:  All my responsibilities are dedicated to my

 8     boss and the president, Mr. Milosevic.  I haven't done anything that has

 9     been, to my knowledge, ordered by him.

10             This is, as far as I remember, the statement he gave when he

11     resigned.  This is a long time ago, but this is approximately what the

12     wording was in that statement.

13        Q.   Thank you, I want to have a very brief answer to my following

14     question.  From the Serbian side, did you ever hear again the words

15     scorched earth uttered in the following weeks and months?

16        A.   Officially or publicly, never; but at meetings with colleagues,

17     journalist, of course they were aware of this.  The story of scorched

18     earth or land became public later on in the end of 1998 or beginning of

19     1999; I don't know the exact time.

20        Q.   Am I right in putting to you that from an official representative

21     of the Serb regime, you didn't hear scorched earth being uttered after

22     the first meeting in Mr. Bakalli's apartment and the following months?

23        A.   No, I didn't hear.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             MR. NEUNER:  Your Honours, I want to move to my second topic.  I

Page 6225

 1     want to leave it aside.  I want to move to Pristina now, the events in

 2     March and early April 1999.

 3             Mr. Bakalli [sic] -- Mr. Haxhiu, excuse me, you lived in Pristina

 4     all your life, did you?

 5        A.   Yes, I did.

 6        Q.   And in early March 1999, where did you live?

 7        A.   I was living in Kodra e Diellit neighbourhood.

 8             MR. NEUNER:  Could we have 65 ter number 13 being displayed to

 9     this witness, please.  Or actually, I have a hard copy.  Maybe it's

10     easier, because I want to introduce a document, to show him the hard copy

11     on the ELMO, please.

12             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  Page 14, line 1

13     should read "that has not been, to his knowledge, or ordered by him."

14             MR. NEUNER:  First of all, I wanted -- we don't have an image

15     yet.  Okay.  Sorry, it's on e-court.  The best would be actually if we

16     use the ELMO image because I want to later on introduce through e-court

17     another document.  Can we zoom out a little bit because -- if I can ask

18     the usher to zoom out a little bit, yeah.  And turn the map a little bit

19     around, right now it lies -- not upside down.  Could we just turn the

20     map, rotate the map a little bit.  Yes.  Thank you.  Yes, perfect.  And

21     zoom out a little bit so that the Judges can see everything.

22        Q.   First I would like to ask you.  If it is displayed here - and

23     Mr. Haxhiu, please look at the ELMO next to you, to your right-hand side.

24     Could I ask you to encircle, if you find it, the place or the apartment

25     of Mr. Bakalli was, or the meeting in November 1997.

Page 6226

 1        A.   It should be somewhere here.

 2        Q.   Yes, you've encircled a building.  Can you mark a number 1 below

 3     it or somewhere.  Yes.  I can't read this number 1, can you make the

 4     number 1 below the circle maybe, or somewhere where there is a white --

 5        A.   Below the circle, all right.

 6        Q.   Then I wanted to ask you, where were you living in March 1999?

 7     You mentioned in Kodra e Diellit?

 8        A.   This part here should be Kodra e Diellit.  This part here is the

 9     whole Kodra e Diellit neighbourhood, and I should be here somewhere, that

10     is my apartment.

11        Q.   You marked a number 2 next to the circle, which you've drawn.

12     Can you tell us the security situation in March 1999?  How did it develop

13     in Pristina?

14        A.   From October 1998 up until the 23rd of March, 1999, the situation

15     was tense with concentration of police forces, Arkan forces, and

16     paramilitary forces in uniforms.  They were present in the whole

17     territory of Kosova, especially in Prishtina.  I'm talking about the

18     time-frame when Mr. Holbrooke and Mr. Milosevic were trying to reach an

19     agreement to end the crisis in Kosova.  I'm talking about the period of

20     the October or so agreement.

21        Q.   Okay.  Taking you to Pristina, and I'm only asking you now about

22     Pristina.  Can you tell us, once the NATO air-strikes had started on the

23     24th of March, 1999, how did the security situation in Pristina develop?

24        A.   When the Rambouillet talks failed on the 21st, we have the first

25     real killing in the town.  Arianit Kelmendi was killed and another person

Page 6227

 1     was wounded.  Forces started to shoot at facilities.  These were not

 2     police forces; these were other people who had been armed in the meantime

 3     and who were walking and driving around freely in the town.

 4        Q.   Can I stop you here for a second, because I want to clarify a few

 5     things of what you said.  You say on the 21st Kelmendi was killed.  Which

 6     month and year are you referring to?

 7        A.   That is 21st of March, 1999.  Life in Prishtina at this time

 8     would end at 5 p.m.  People were trying to avoid being on the streets

 9     after 5.00.  Everybody would stay at home with the exception of Serbs, of

10     course.

11             Personally, as I had to work in the newspaper, I had to finish

12     all my work earlier in late afternoon instead of doing it as usually in

13     the evening.  People who were working in the printing house, they would

14     remain there the whole night because they were scared to go out in the

15     dark because darkness was a synonym of killings, of fear.

16        Q.   Can I ask you again about Mr. Kelmendi.  You said he was killed

17     on the 21st of March, 1999.  What role, if any, did Mr. Kelmendi have, at

18     that time?

19        A.   We are talking about Arianit Kelmendi who was killed on the 21st

20     of March, he was a waiter, a civilian, who was killed in front of the

21     cafe where he was working.  This happened on the 21st, three days prior

22     to the bombing.

23        Q.   Okay.  And do you know anything about the perpetrators?

24        A.   The power to instate fear and to draft such actions came from the

25     Serbs --

Page 6228

 1        Q.   Okay.  But --

 2        A.   -- from the Serbian state.

 3        Q.   -- in fact, you don't know who perpetrated this crime?

 4        A.   No.

 5        Q.   Okay.  After the 24th of March, 1999, you mention here on your

 6     map that you were generally living at the house you encircled as number 2

 7     on the map.  Did you stay to live at that house after the beginning of

 8     the air-strikes?

 9        A.   No, I didn't.  A friend of mine, a British diplomat, suggested to

10     me that it would be better that I didn't spend the night in my own house.

11     On the first night of the bombing, I slept in a house somewhere in the

12     centre of the town.  We were told that the centre of the town was always

13     safer during the bombing because it was very difficult to bomb it.  So we

14     were advised to avoid the peripheral areas, because it was more dangerous

15     for us to stay there.

16        Q.   So you then stayed in the centre of the town.  Did you stay there

17     until you left Pristina, or could you explain?

18        A.   No.  I honestly didn't expect that it would be that terrifying

19     immediately after the first night of the bombing.  We could see through

20     the window terrible things out there.  I spent that night there, and the

21     following morning at 9.00, I had organised a meeting with a journalist of

22     Koha e Ditore; but when I arrived there, the guard of Koha Ditore was

23     killed, all the computers were stolen, everything was emptied, and there

24     I saw uniformed policemen.

25             I asked him, Who was killed here?  And they replied, Unidentified

Page 6229

 1     forces killed a person who was guarding this company.  And that same

 2     night, the printing shop of our newspaper was burnt.

 3        Q.   Can I ask you for --

 4        A.   I just wanted to say that the bombing would lead to peaceful

 5     negotiations shortly after.  We didn't expect at all that this would

 6     happen.

 7        Q.   I want to go back to what happened to your newspaper and its

 8     staff.  Could you give us the name of the guard who was killed?

 9        A.   No, I can't.

10        Q.   No problem.

11        A.   We refer to him with another name, uncle something, but I don't

12     remember his name right now.

13        Q.   Do you know his ethnicity?

14        A.   He was an Albanian, 57 or 58 years old.  He had been working with

15     Koha Ditore as a guard from the time it was formed.

16        Q.   Then you mentioned here:

17             "I asked, Who was killed here?  And they replied, Unidentified

18     forces killed a person who was guarding this company."

19             Can you tell me, who replied to you?

20        A.   There were policemen right at the entrance.  They smelled of

21     rakija of alcohol.  I guess they had finished up the alcohol we had in

22     our office for special occasions.  I could see traces of blood.  I guess

23     they had dragged the body of the guard; and I could see the traces of

24     blood.

25        Q.   Okay.  First of all, looking at this map again, could you

Page 6230

 1     encircle the building where Koha Ditore was and where this killing

 2     occurred, please.

 3             MR. NEUNER:  Can we a better marker for the witness?  Yes,

 4     please.

 5        A.   [Marks]

 6        Q.   And you marked a number 3 next to this.  Thank you.  To help us,

 7     on what day did the crime of killing the guard and the destruction or

 8     looting of the premises of Koha Ditore occur?

 9        A.   That would be between the 24th and 25th of March, sometime after

10     midnight.

11        Q.   Okay.  Then you mentioned that you were moving around a little

12     bit.  First you were in a house in the centre and then you moved further.

13     Could you, by marking the location in the centre with number 4, say where

14     you were first, after the war started?

15        A.   This stall building here should be the one.  I will mark it

16     with 4.

17        Q.   And when did you leave that location to live somewhere else in

18     Pristina?

19        A.   On the 27th.  I spent two days there and returned to

20     Kodra e Diellit on the 27th, I think, though I cannot be accurate.  I

21     returned to Kodra e Diellit here somewhere in this part at about 250

22     metres away from my home.  I was staying with a friend of mine, a writer.

23        Q.   You marked this location with a number 5.

24             When did you leave, finally, that location to go and leave the

25     town?  I understand from your testimony.

Page 6231

 1        A.   This should be between the 29th, and I didn't leave but we were

 2     staying in a basement.  During the day we would stay in the apartment,

 3     and during nights we would stay in basements because darkness was

 4     dangerous.

 5             On the 29th, I saw for the first time armed forces masked with

 6     green overalls.  This was the first time I saw numbers forces dressed in

 7     green overalls.  They were in the company of local policemen who were

 8     familiar with the terrain and knew exactly who was what and which part of

 9     the town was where.  So these forces were in the company of a smaller

10     group of local policemen.  The policemen were not wearing masks.

11        Q.   And can you describe the uniforms worn by these policemen?

12        A.   It was kind of a unique uniform.  An overall, not on buttons, but

13     with a zipper from here to here.  Then there was the green mask; you

14     could only see the eyes.  And they moved in two lines.  And at the end of

15     each line there were uniformed policemen.  And they would usually stay 10

16     metres or so behind the people they were expelling.

17        Q.   Okay.  The overall was worn by policemen or was worn by the

18     paramilitaries?  I'm a little bit unclear, I just want to clarify.

19        A.   No, the policemen were wearing police uniforms, but they were few

20     in numbers.  Whereas these other forces were wearing automatic -- another

21     form of automatic rifle.  They were stouter.  They were not of the

22     appearance of the usual police.  They had round potted bellies.  Not the

23     usual police, you know, figures.

24        Q.   They had green overall -- they had green uniforms or whatever,

25     yeah?

Page 6232

 1        A.   Yes, yes, one solid colour green.

 2        Q.   Okay.  But I was asking you for the dress worn by the policemen

 3     who were a few metres behind.  Can you describe why you believe these

 4     persons were policemen?

 5        A.   These persons were wearing blue uniforms, but in that case they

 6     were wearing shirts, blue shirts, and a jacket.  The usual police

 7     uniforms you could see in police patrols in the city.  They were

 8     escorting these other forces that I mentioned wearing green uniform, but

 9     they weren't giving any orders.

10        Q.   Okay.  What I'm interested in is looking at the clothes for a

11     second again.  Are we talking about plain or camouflage police uniforms?

12     Are we talking -- about which colour are we talking?

13        A.   We are talking of the usual police uniform that is one colour,

14     solid colour.  Not camouflage.  But I think they were very few in

15     numbers, maybe five.

16        Q.   Which is the colour of the uniform they had, the plain uniform?

17        A.   Dark blue.

18        Q.   Okay.  I want to show you now one document and then conclude.

19     I'm still leaving the map on the screen because I will use it in a moment

20     again.

21             MR. NEUNER:  Can we have, please, 65 ter number 407 on our

22     screens, and I need the second page right away, please.

23        Q.   For your information, these are excerpts which have been taken

24     out of the so-called Blue Book from the Kosovo Verification Mission of

25     the OSCE and they all relate to Pristina.

Page 6233

 1             MR. NEUNER:  I may have given the wrong 65 ter number.  It is

 2     041 -- sorry, 0407.01.  This is the wrong item here on our screens.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Mr. Djordjevic.

 4             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  [Interpretation] The Defence will object to this

 5     whole discussion about this evidence.  First of all, we don't have the

 6     source of the information presented in that book.  Rather, there are some

 7     numbers such as C08, C25, and so on and so forth.  But I think one might

 8     even debate the format of this Blue Book; therefore, we will be lodging

 9     an objection in terms of this being admitted into evidence at this point,

10     unless, of course, the OTP can reveal the source of their information to

11     us which in turn might effect our own position.  Thank you.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

13             Mr. Neuner.

14             MR. NEUNER:  Yes, I am aware about this point, and all I can say

15     is that a witness who is coming next week, I don't know his exact name, I

16     think Drewienkiewicz.

17             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  DZ.

18             MR. NEUNER:  General DZ, yes.  He is in a perfect position to

19     explain how the information was assembled and put together.  All I wanted

20     to do now is to show this witness some of the information gathered in the

21     time-period in which this witness was in Pristina.  And since he was also

22     moving around, I thought that he may be in a position to confirm or

23     dismiss some of the information or make a general comments and add some

24     of his own observations to it.

25             I'm not -- I'm not intending to have this witness giving any

Page 6234

 1     background about how this document was produced and so on.  This would be

 2     General Drewienkiewicz who is coming next week who could explain that in

 3     more detail, Your Honours.

 4                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djordjevic.

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for the counsel, please.

 7             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  [Interpretation] I apologize.  Just very

 8     briefly, Your Honours.  I do believe that my learned friend Mr. Neuner

 9     could ask his questions in relation to any information he wishes to

10     retrieve from the witness.  Subjects that have not been raised in the

11     statement or in the witness's testimony before this Tribunal, if he can

12     obtain that from the witness then he doesn't even have to do what he has

13     been trying to do.  Nevertheless, I gave you my reasons, and I think they

14     are valid reasons when it comes to documents such adds these when sources

15     are specifically stated.

16             Secondly, we are not sure about General Drewienkiewicz - I think

17     that's his real name - and he should be one of the next witnesses to

18     appear here in this court, that he will be able to confirm many things

19     before this Tribunal in terms of the source of the information in

20     relation to the documents that my learned friend has every intention of

21     sharing to the witness.

22             Thank you.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Neuner, what you propose is not altogether

24     clear to us, but presents some difficulties.  It's one thing to have the

25     witness describe what he saw and perhaps then have it confirmed that

Page 6235

 1     that's the same sort of thing that you find in this book.  It's another

 2     thing for this witness to be shown the book and say whether he can say

 3     something like that occurred or not because that's clearly prompting the

 4     witness to speak of things rather than he working on his recollection.

 5             MR. NEUNER:  Okay.

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  The book itself could not be admitted in evidence

 7     until such time as somebody can speak about it making and reliability.

 8     You anticipate that could be a witness next week.

 9             MR. NEUNER:  Yes, there will be.  Simply --

10             JUDGE PARKER:  It's not clear to us why you need to use the book

11     at this point.

12             MR. NEUNER:  I wanted to use the book because this witness was in

13     Pristina himself and has moved around in this time-period after the war

14     broke out and has made certain observations.  And he has already stated

15     to Your Honours that he saw, for example, that his own officers in

16     Kodra Ditore had been looted.  And in this Blue Book, there's such

17     entries which refer to looting against the Albanian population or of

18     businesses of the Albanian population.  And I just wanted to show that to

19     the witness to elicit whether he could confirm that or could dismiss it.

20             I thought I'm first giving him an opportunity to state what he

21     has observed, and after I laid this foundation that then the appropriate

22     time has come to show him a few of these more abstract entries.

23             One other entry also relates to the expulsion of the population

24     from an area where this witness has lived and where he has indicated on

25     the map that he was twice there in the relevant time-period from where he

Page 6236

 1     finally left Pristina to go to Tetovo, so there is a direct connection

 2     between the entries which I have selected and what the witness has

 3     personally experienced.  Maybe as a -- because he --

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Neuner, I think you are missing the point.

 5     Why is it that the witness is not able to simply describe what he saw,

 6     what he observed?

 7             MR. NEUNER:  Your Honours, I'm prepared not to show the book and

 8     not to show the excerpts.  An alternative could have been I'm showing him

 9     the excerpts and wait for the entire book to be tendered next week, so we

10     have some comments now on the record.  I don't need to mark it even for

11     identification, the excerpt, I could, but I don't have to.  I can also

12     just go on, elicit a few more questions about what the witness

13     experienced, and then leave it there.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  I think that might --

15             MR. NEUNER:  It's an agreeable course.

16             JUDGE PARKER:  -- be the best course --

17             MR. NEUNER:  No problem.

18             JUDGE PARKER:  -- and we'll hear from the witness what he

19     observed, what he understood, rather than him merely commenting on

20     somebody else's book.

21             MR. NEUNER:  I'm, Your Honours, saying I will proceed as

22     suggested.  Thank you.

23        Q.   Mr. Haxhiu, I wanted to ask you a little bit about when did you

24     have to move from one place to another after the 24th of March, 1999, did

25     you move during the day, or did you move at other times?

Page 6237

 1             JUDGE PARKER:  This should be removed from the screen.

 2             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  Yes, that was my objection.

 3             MR. NEUNER:

 4        Q.   Can you now answer the question, please.

 5        A.   At 9.30, after I found out about the murder of the guard of

 6     Koha Ditore seeing that the situation was risky, that the war was

 7     different from what we had thought about it, we left the centre.  And as

 8     we were instructed, we -- not to stay in one place, we kept moving from

 9     one apartment to the other in Dardanija neighbourhood.  On the 24th, we

10     stayed until the 26th when again I left for Kodra e Diellit to my

11     friend's house Taki Dervishi.  So I stayed in Kodra e Diellit in another

12     part from where my house was.

13        Q.   Who was the reason that you adopted this, if I may call it,

14     "policy" of not staying at one place but rather moving around constantly,

15     staying at different places over night?

16        A.   Between the 24th and 25th, my lawyer was killed, his name was

17     Bajram Kelmendi, together with his sons, one under 18, and the other a

18     grownup.  Lawyer Bajram Kelmendi was my attorney in respect to an article

19     in the newspaper on the -- a trial was held on the 21st, even though it

20     was a Sunday, but that was how it was done then.  The fact that he was

21     killed and also the fact that our foreign diplomat friends advised us not

22     to remain in one place made us move from one place to another.

23        Q.   Okay.  Can I first of all clarify, the 21st, you said, when the

24     trial was.  Are we talking about which month and year, please?

25        A.   Three days before the bombing.  It was in that extraordinary

Page 6238

 1     trial which was held on Sunday, I was sentenced to a fine of

 2     300.000 dinars which was quite a huge amount of money then.  I don't know

 3     what it would be like now.

 4        Q.   For what crime or offence, if I may ask?

 5        A.   For publishing an article in the newspaper, a communique or a

 6     normal communique.  We had been publishing them regularly until then,

 7     which we received from the KLA.  A communique was an official one, it was

 8     published also by the Serb media outlets.  I think that was not the real

 9     reason, because we had been doing that for months.  But that was a

10     pretext in order to strike at us.

11             And the trial was held at 4.00 in the afternoon of a Sunday.  It

12     was hard for them to find an interpreter, to find a Serb judge, to find

13     the investigating judge, so they had it ready, the trial was ready to

14     start at 4.00.  And we had to remain in the court building all day,

15     together with Bajram Kelmendi and the managing director, Luan Dubroshi.

16        Q.   So Mr. Kelmendi was defending you on that occasion?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   Can you tell us in front of which court he was defending you?

19        A.   In the communal court of Prishtina, municipal court.

20        Q.   And you say three days after that trial he was killed.  Can you,

21     by looking at the map next to you, indicate where the location of his

22     killing was?

23        A.   I know where he was -- a place where he was taken from, but I

24     don't know exactly the place where he was killed.

25        Q.   Then if you could encircle the place where he was taken from, and

Page 6239

 1     mark a 6 next to this, please.

 2        A.   [Marks]

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Did you learn about the perpetrators who did this?

 4        A.   After many years now, it is a known fact who the perpetrators

 5     were.  They were police and the secret service people who took him and

 6     killed him in the middle of the road.  Now, in this place, there is a gas

 7     station, and there is also a monument erected to them at the exit of

 8     Prishtina.

 9        Q.   And why do you say it's a known fact that the police and secret

10     service people did it?

11        A.   Because this was certified also by the counsel for the protection

12     of human rights and freedom, also the organisation led by Natasha Kandic

13     in Belgrade, and his spouse who carried on a kind of investigation of the

14     people who committed that crime.

15        Q.   Was there an official confirmation?

16        A.   Of course there will never be any official confirmation, but

17     researchers showed who the perpetrators were both for Mr. Agani and

18     Kelmendi.  Mr. Kelmendi was also --

19             THE INTERPRETER:  Correction.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- Mr. Agani was also the drafter

21     of the file for genocide against Mr. Milosevic and the Serbian state,

22     which, I think, has been submitted also to the Tribunal here in

23     The Hague.

24        Q.   Can you tell us, when was Mr. Agani killed?

25        A.   Mr. Agani was killed in May, at the end of April or beginning of

Page 6240

 1     May 1999.  He was made to get off the train towards Macedonia, was taken

 2     to a police station, and was killed -- was shot with two bullets.

 3        Q.   But you yourself didn't see this, you have heard this?

 4        A.   No.  At the time I was in Macedonia, and I went there about a

 5     month before he was killed.

 6        Q.   Okay.

 7        A.   But it is a common fact that in the case of Agani it was

 8     acknowledged that his murder was something done by people who did not

 9     belong to an institution.

10        Q.   You say "it was acknowledged."  Who acknowledged anything?

11        A.   It was acknowledged in a way, let's say, to his family, to the

12     officials; and I believe that soon there will be a trial regarding that

13     murder.  But for the moment, there isn't any official statement on the

14     murder.  The name is not public knowledge, but people more or less --

15     there is a guess, not a guess but it's a fact who is known who murder is,

16     but it's not acknowledged publicly.

17        Q.   Was there an indictment issued already?

18        A.   There is an ongoing process underway because it is known who the

19     murderer was now after so many years have passed.

20        Q.   So are you sure there was an indictment or not?

21        A.   No, there isn't until this moment, but it exists.

22        Q.   I want to take you a little bit to the reasons why you finally

23     left Pristina at the end of March 1999.  Could you tell me, what was the

24     main reason that you left your hiding place, if I may call it, at the end

25     of March and proceeded with the car, as you have testified, to leave

Page 6241

 1     Pristina?

 2        A.   In Kodra e Diellit neighbourhood, there are about 120.000

 3     inhabitants and there are three parts in this neighbourhood.  At least at

 4     that time there were three sections or parts in the neighbourhood because

 5     now it's become greater.  At the end of this neighbourhood where there

 6     are white coloured buildings, the first deportation started.  And when

 7     people were coming from the other parts, they came to the

 8     Kodra e Diellit -- to the centre of Kodra e Diellit or the middle part of

 9     it.  There is a parking-lot, a large parking-lot there, and people were

10     walking, and behind them were uniformed people, the ones I mentioned

11     earlier, those wearing green uniforms.

12             When they came to our buildings, they gave the order that within

13     five minutes all the people, the inhabitants, should leave their

14     apartments.  And we went down and joined that large group of people.  And

15     they also ordered a policeman and one of those persons wearing green

16     uniforms to see if there was any inhabitants left.

17             After that, they also ordered that the people who owned cars

18     should get their cars and leave in the direction of Macedonia.  Those who

19     didn't, should go in the direction of the train station in Fushe Kosova.

20     And they allowed us to go in two different directions:  to Macedonia and

21     to Albania.

22             On the road in every check-point there was an armoured car manned

23     by soldiers who didn't allow us to go in another direction but only in

24     the indicated direction until the main road leading towards Macedonia.

25     Along the main road in every check-point there were also policemen and

Page 6242

 1     armoured cars and the road was checked up to the border with Macedonia,

 2     it was under their control.

 3        Q.   A few final questions before we break.  Did you see the persons

 4     who were ordering the building where you were at the time in Pristina,

 5     did you see these persons ordering that people had to leave?  Did you

 6     hear them ordering?

 7        A.   The policemen didn't speak, they simply were escorting us.  This

 8     was one, a pot bellied one, who ordered in a loud voice -- gave this

 9     order in a loud voice that all people should leave their houses.  And he

10     was wearing a mask and he was wearing a uniform.  I saw them with my own

11     eyes because they were not far from where I was.  You could see that

12     their accent was not the usual Serb accent from Kosova.

13        Q.   The person you were just describing who has ordered, was he a

14     policemen or was he rather a member of this green uniform group with

15     masks?

16        A.   He was one of these green uniform group.

17        Q.   Then you mentioned that everybody had to assemble at a

18     parking-lot.  Would you find the parking-lot here on your map which you

19     have drawn?

20        A.   No.  They didn't give the order for us to gather to this

21     parking-lot, but the people simply got there, assembled there, because it

22     was a clean area, open area.  Then they gave the order for us to leave

23     either in cars or to walk.  This must be the parking-lot that I

24     mentioned.

25        Q.   Thank you.  You've marked a number 7 next to the bigger circle.

Page 6243

 1     And then you were proceeding -- okay, first of all, how many people did

 2     you see at this parking-lot marked with number 7?

 3        A.   Many.  There were many people.  Maybe about 20.000.  I couldn't

 4     give you an accurate figure.  But while we were staying in that

 5     parking-lot, we saw people walking in a street higher up leaving the

 6     city.  They had also been ordered to leave, and we could see them walking

 7     above us.  But the convoy of cars was kilometres long.  Many kilometres

 8     long.

 9        Q.   Who gave the persons gathering at the parking-lot the order to

10     move?

11        A.   The same person.  He simply said, Leave now.  That was all he

12     said.

13        Q.   And along the way in Pristina, what was your impression -- who

14     controlled the traffic that day at the end of March 1999 when you were

15     leaving Pristina?

16        A.   Inside the city there were police armoured vehicles.  Outside the

17     city there were military armoured vehicles and other vehicles.

18        Q.   Did you come across, leaving Pristina that day, any police

19     check-points?

20        A.   All the cars were -- most of them were stopped by the policemen

21     who were stationed all over the road at everyone check-point.  There were

22     police and soldiers.  They were, for example, telling the cars that you

23     could drive only 20, 30, kilometres per hour.  And they stopped the cars

24     and asked them about the money they had on them.  And if they had

25     300 marks.  In my case, I gave about 200 marks to them because I was with

Page 6244

 1     my -- with another family I got on the way, we were five of us in our

 2     car.

 3             MR. NEUNER:  Your Honours, I note the time, I would seek to

 4     tender that annotated map, 65 ter number 13.  And then the Prosecution

 5     would have no further questions at this point.

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  The map will be received.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P995, Your Honours.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  We must now have our first break.  We will resume

 9     at 5 minutes past 11.00 to continue your evidence.  A court officer will

10     assist you on the break.

11                           [The witness stands down]

12                           --- Recess taken at 10.34 a.m.

13                           --- On resuming at 11.07 a.m.

14                           [The witness takes the stand]

15             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djordjevic has some questions for you now.

16             THE WITNESS:  Okay.

17                           Cross-examination by Mr. Djordjevic:

18        Q.   Mr. Haxhiu, good morning.

19        A.   Good morning.

20        Q.   My name is Dragoljub Djordjevic.  I appear on behalf of the

21     accused in this case.  I will have some questions of you, as you were

22     told by the presiding Judge, in order to try and clarify some important

23     issues having to do with the events you testified to today as well as in

24     some related cases.  I will see to it that my examination develops in

25     such a way so as to have it completed today in order for you not to have

Page 6245

 1     to stay until tomorrow.

 2             What is your formal educational background, Mr. Haxhiu?  Which

 3     schools did you complete?

 4        A.   Faculty of law.

 5        Q.   In your statement from 2001 you said that you had a law degree

 6     and that at the state university that was your core subject in 1991;

 7     however, your diploma was issued by a parallel university in 1992.  Am I

 8     correct in saying that?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   Thank you.  I wanted to caution you about the breaks since we

11     speak different languages.

12        A.   Do you want me to speak Serbian?

13        Q.   No, you can go on in Albanian.  I just wanted to warn you about

14     the pauses that I make.  Mr. Haxhiu, let's clear up another thing which

15     was unclear from your statement.  I believe it was paragraph 7 of your

16     statement, both pages 2 and 3, wherein you say that the first diplomas of

17     the parallel university were being issued in 1996 and 1997 for the first

18     time to their students.  You said that you received your law degree or

19     law diploma in 1992 at the parallel university.  Can you explain what it

20     was all about since the first diplomas apparently were being issued as

21     early as 1996?

22        A.   When I started my studies -- I started my studies in the public

23     university, the state-owned university.  And the regular lectures, I

24     completed them in 1989.  There were some exams to go through of the

25     fourth year.  After that, the so-called process of the breaking up of the

Page 6246

 1     Kosova education system started, and we were evicted, as it were, from

 2     the state system and we started the parallel university, and the parallel

 3     system.

 4             So there were a number of exams, outstanding exams, which were to

 5     be completed and were completed in the private parallel university.  So

 6     the first degrees were issued in 1992.  The first generation of students

 7     in the parallel system started in 1992.  It was then called the parallel

 8     educational system in Kosova.  That's the situation.

 9        Q.   You will agree with me, therefore, that the parallel university

10     from which your degree comes, in a way honoured all of your exams

11     previously taken at the state university, you only had to make up for the

12     exams you never took, that is to say, the final year?

13        A.   Yes, that's correct.  Because all the professorship and the

14     administration, the Albanian stuff, moved to the administration of the

15     parallel university.

16        Q.   Mr. Haxhiu, one other question on that topic.  Since you studied

17     at this state university, were you in a position to have your lectures in

18     the Albanian language as well as to take exams in that same language?

19     Were you entitled to that?

20        A.   Yes, of course.  I was a regular student, and I took my exams in

21     Albanian.

22        Q.   Thank you.  From the numerous statements you gave, be it to the

23     Tribunal or its investigators, I gathered that you understand and speak

24     the English language very well.  My question for you is, where did you

25     learn the English language so well?

Page 6247

 1        A.   At school where we were taught English, but we also -- we also

 2     had the books and tapes which I bought, part in Belgrade and part in

 3     Zagreb.  That was an English teaching method.  There were no Albanian

 4     textbooks for this purpose.  There were different ways of learning

 5     English, but mainly we bought those books either in Belgrade or in

 6     Zagreb.

 7        Q.   Based on everything I could see in your statements, I also

 8     concluded that while you were a journalist and activist fighting for the

 9     rights of the Albanian population in Kosovo, you frequently had contacts

10     with diplomatic representatives.  They were primarily focused on

11     establishing liaison with the KLA.  First of all, in the course of such

12     contacts, were you known under a certain nickname or a code-name?

13        A.   I don't know what you are talking about.

14        Q.   I mean a nickname.

15        A.   No.

16        Q.   I will explain why I asked you that.  There is a mention of a

17     journalist in international journalistic circles, his name was Lum or

18     Liu Haxhiu.  I wanted know whether that person might not be you?

19        A.   No, no.  Lum Haxhiu was a fighter of the KLA and has no

20     connection to myself or my family.  And he lived and still lives in the

21     Ferizaj area.  He has never been a journalist.  He came from Switzerland,

22     and he became a KLA fighter.  I don't know what his name is.  I can't

23     remember his name at the moment, but as far as I know, if I'm not

24     mistaken, he is an MP in the Kosova parliament.

25        Q.   Since it is not the same person as you, then it no longer

Page 6248

 1     matters.

 2             My next question on the general topics is this:  Did you

 3     participate together with Mr. Haradinaj in the founding of the Albanian

 4     movement in Macedonia called "Ana"?

 5        A.   Never, never in my life have I taken part in the foundation of

 6     any organisation.  My only profession has been and is journalism.  I've

 7     never been part of any political party or organisation and have never

 8     taken part in the formation of any organisation, not a single one.

 9        Q.   I'm glad to have cleared that up, therefore I will no longer put

10     questions to you in that regard.

11             Mr. Haxhiu, you are a journalist, but you are also a fellow

12     lawyer.  I'm not going to ask you about law since obviously your life

13     developed in a different direction, but I wanted to ask you something

14     about your 2001 statement.  Do you recall having given that statement to

15     a certain gentleman by the name of Fred Abrahams, the other person was

16     Jonathan Sutch they told you they were investigators of

17     The Hague Tribunal.  I refer to your 2001 statement.

18        A.   Yes, I gave the statement in my house for only one reason because

19     I trusted Fred Abrahams because I knew him before and I've known him for

20     a long time.

21        Q.   He was there as an investigator of this Tribunal, although you

22     are telling us that you had known him from before.  Can you explain to us

23     the background of your relationship, of your acquaintance with

24     Mr. Abrahams?

25        A.   In fact, as an investigator, it was Mr. Sutch who presented

Page 6249

 1     himself as an investigator.  I knew Fred Abrahams for years from his

 2     activity in the Balkans.  He was a representative of Human Rights Watch

 3     starting from 1994/1995 when I first knew him during his visit to

 4     Prishtina.  Whenever he came to Prishtina, he was a guest of the Koha

 5     company.

 6        Q.   You say that you provided that statement in your house; is that

 7     correct?  In 2001?

 8        A.   Yes.  We established contact in my office, but then we -- I gave

 9     my statement in the calm of my own house.

10        Q.   As far as I recall, the interview was, A, tape recorded, and, B,

11     conducted in English; am I correct?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   In the days following the day of your statement, the witness was

14     brought -- the statement was brought back to you for you to review it and

15     sign it.  Who brought it to you?

16        A.   The statement was recorded, then it was transcribed; and I read

17     the transcript, and I confirmed that it was my statement.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Briefly we'll have to go back to 1991 since you

19     referred to that year on a number of occasions in your statements.  You

20     also mentioned the fact that the Serb authorities abolished all Albanian

21     language instruction.  This is a general assertion that one comes across

22     in several of your statements, eventually leading in different

23     directions.

24             My question is this:  1991 was the year following the new Serbian

25     constitution which was passed in 1990.  The constitution mentions the use

Page 6250

 1     of minority languages, but that year and in the years preceding that, a

 2     law was passed on the official use of language.  There were also laws on

 3     the elementary, secondary, and higher degree education, which also

 4     partially referred to the rights of the minorities living in the

 5     territory of the FRY and Serbia, as well as the autonomous province of

 6     Kosovo and Metohija, as it is called, in the 1990 constitution.

 7             Having in mind all of those legal documents, would you agree with

 8     me that the use of minority languages is allowed in education, if you can

 9     answer that question of mine?

10             If so, perhaps I can put an additional question right away, since

11     I can see that you are following quite well what I'm saying, and it

12     directly relates to the first question.  It has to do with the curricula

13     in use in the educational system.

14             Was the curriculum the basic point of contention between the

15     Serbs and Albanians in your view?

16        A.   One sentence I'd like to answer, the whole problem started with

17     the constitutional changes in 1989.  The main problem in Kosova bears the

18     date of 23rd of March, 1989, when the constitution was changed.

19             To return to your question, what you are presenting and the

20     reality in Kosova, there is a discrepancy between the two.  A population

21     which had the Albanian language as the official one, the official

22     language of teaching, becomes a language of a province.  It was being

23     dictated to the population as a second or third language, unimportant.

24             On the basis of this principle, in 1991, the reality was

25     different.  The schools were divided into schools for the Serbs and

Page 6251

 1     schools for the Albanians; and this created a reality of division which

 2     was painful, which was brutal, because -- because the elementary school

 3     pupils were divided by a wall.  There was no communication between them.

 4     The fact that it happened showed that the reality on paper and the

 5     reality on the ground were two completely different things.  And you who

 6     have been away from Kosova in Belgrade, you did not -- you do not know

 7     the reality on the ground in Kosova.

 8             That is why we cannot talk about papers, the reality on paper.

 9     And the constitutional changes then.  We can speak about a reality which

10     was completely different from what was approved of in the constitution.

11     But the key to all -- everything that followed is the changes in the

12     constitution.  It wasn't a semantical problem, but it was an issue of the

13     brutally intervention -- brutal intervention in the life of the Kosovars.

14             If I may say, the feeling among the population of Kosova after

15     these changes, it was -- it was the feeling created among the population

16     of the brutality of the police and the military, and that was also

17     deduced from how they had behaved in Croatia and Bosnia.  There was no

18     need for brutality because the divisions that were created were a bit

19     strange and unacceptable for a state, for a country, which wants to

20     develop as one.

21             The arrogance of the Serbian state was expressed on the kids, on

22     schools, on the institutions.  And the bottom line is that the difference

23     between the reality on paper and the reality on the ground was huge.  And

24     if I could tell you that if anyone deserves credit for the independence

25     of Kosova, it's not the Albanians who deserve it, it's the arrogance and

Page 6252

 1     the brutality of the Serbs.  The independence was a product of the

 2     toughness and brutality of the Serbian regime.  It was a product of the

 3     state which did not consider the Albanians as its own citizens.

 4             And the person who was sitting behind you, Mr. Djordjevic, should

 5     know better this situation because the independence of Kosova is also

 6     partly due to his behaviour because they considered the Albanians not as

 7     their own citizens, the authorities in Serbia, I mean.

 8        Q.   I believe I have to surprise you by saying that I agree with a

 9     great deal of what you said, the only thing I would hold against you is

10     mentioning my client, since as a lawyer, you know of the principle of

11     presumption of innocence.  Hence, Mr. Djordjevic is here to see whether

12     he is guilty or not.  Therefore, I will not develop that topic further.

13        A.   Because I do not know Mr. Djordjevic or I never heard of him

14     before, but simply because he was part of the state structures.

15        Q.   There will be questions to that effect as well, but let's go back

16     to the point concerning which I agree with you.  The 1989 constitutional

17     changes was the thing which in the minds of most intellectuals in Kosovo

18     was what changed the situation on the grounds.  Basically the situation

19     was changed de facto and de jure.  It wasn't different to what was in the

20     constitution.  It did do away with a certain degree of autonomy in Kosovo

21     which had existed in the previous constitution often referred to the 1974

22     constitution, the communist one.

23             We would agree that the Albanian population was not happy even

24     with that constitution, but under that constitution, it enjoyed greater

25     rights than under the 1989 constitution, which when implemented, provoked

Page 6253

 1     the reaction.  That's why I said we agree on that.

 2             My next question has to do with the school curriculum which is

 3     something that you failed to mention.  I don't remember any longer

 4     whether it was 1990 or 1991 but --

 5             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  1991 or 1992.

 6             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   -- when there was some discussion of the textbooks purchased in

 8     Albania proper in the bilingual schools.  The Serb authorities had

 9     nothing to do with the way natural sciences or math was dealt with in

10     those textbooks, these are objective sciences much as physics or biology.

11     But when it comes to history and geography, one could come across certain

12     maps showing greater Albania.  Do you recall that?  Do you recall the

13     textbooks and the discussion which ensued indicating the existence of

14     such maps that was carried by certain electronic media?

15        A.   It is difficult for me to interpret -- translate in my head in

16     the different languages, let's speed things up.  First of all, you know

17     the declaration of the Albanian parties in 1990 and the principle of

18     Kosovo republic within a federation or confederation.  As for the

19     textbooks, perhaps there may have been certain incidences or occurrences.

20     But to take textbooks from Albania at that time would have been a crazy

21     thing.  It was no -- it was not necessary.

22             In the 1990s, we had staff, we had people who could produce sound

23     textbooks.  The problem is not the curriculum, but the problem was in the

24     population.  What was it that the Republic of Serbia and Milosevic were

25     trying to do?  The fact is that they did not see the Albanians as their

Page 6254

 1     citizens.  That was the core of the problem.  The school curriculum and

 2     curricula in general were not at that core of that problem.  The problem

 3     was that the state abolished certain freedoms in 1989 and 1990 and that

 4     was done by virtue of taxes.

 5             As Derida [phoen] would say, you never know when one ends up

 6     because you start with something and it keeps rolling.  That was the main

 7     problem in the eyes of the citizens of Kosovo.

 8             You said that some people wanted more.  Of course in Serbia there

 9     were people like that.  In Croatia as well.  There are always people who

10     want more.  But there was the political party agenda or platform which

11     was in existence in 1990, and that platform was against confederation, or

12     in the state destroyed the idea of a civic state.  That is the nucleus of

13     the problem that that political system had.

14             I'm positive that that group -- that group is something that

15     caused everything that followed resulting in the eventual independence of

16     Kosova.  That was basically the gist of the problem.  It's not the

17     education or the curricula, it's the civil rights that were at hand.

18        Q.   I'm ready to accept that.  What I believe is important to say at

19     this point is that the Albanian political programs and, to use your own

20     wording when you say some people wanted something or more, i.e., they

21     wanted a republic of Kosovo or an independent Kosovo, that request has

22     been with us as of 1980s?

23        A.   So what?

24        Q.   So nothing.  I'm just saying it's been with us since the 1980s.

25        A.   Does one have to wage a war over that?

Page 6255

 1        Q.   You will agree with me that that request was in place as of the

 2     1980s.  My question concerning that is:  Did any representatives or the

 3     Albanian population in general - in the course of their demonstrations in

 4     the 1980s or say, 1997, in the course of the student demonstrations or

 5     civil demonstrations, any demonstrations for that matter in Kosovo - did

 6     they ever want to go below the bench-mark they set?  And you mentioned on

 7     that afternoon when you sat down with the representatives of the security

 8     service, the request being a republic of Kosovo or an independent Kosovo.

 9        A.   Believe me, that was back in 1989 and 1990, none of the Albanian

10     parties - and I mean those who knew what powers the Republic of Serbia or

11     the army of the Republic of Yugoslavia had - did not go for the maximum.

12     It was clear what it would mean to have independent Kosova.  Independent

13     Kosova would mean splitting Kosova down the middle losing everything that

14     you had previously created.  Therefore, we knew what had the maximum

15     claims might be.  Nevertheless, there were people in Belgrade who thought

16     differently and this is what happened.

17        Q.   My next question, your principle statement in 2001 -- that's the

18     one I'm talking about when your friend Abrahams, your acquaintance, came

19     to see you as well as Mr. Jonathan Sutch.  Did he express any misgivings

20     concerning the policy pursued by the DSK party headed from the Serbian

21     viewpoints at the time by Mr. Ibrahim Rugova, he was the party president,

22     wasn't he.  As far as I know, you said that his political goals were to

23     achieve everything by peaceful means without a war, almost Gandhi-like.

24             And that was his method of achieving the political goals of the

25     Albanian people.  I don't agree with that, but I'd still like to know

Page 6256

 1     what exactly you wanted to say.

 2        A.   Let's put it this way, after Dayton, Serbia displayed such a

 3     degree of arrogance towards Kosovo and the Albanians in Kosova that they

 4     failed to mention Kosova as a problem at all, they ignored the whole

 5     situation as much as they could.  And that is why Rugova was entirely

 6     powerless following Dayton.

 7             In Serbia, they weren't willing to have a peaceful process to try

 8     and achieve peace.  They all believed they were fully in control over the

 9     Albanians, they were controlling all the businesses and everything.  One

10     thing they forgot was people needed jobs, people needed employment.

11             In 1997, when the first generation of university students

12     graduated in the parallel system, Serbia refused to recognise their

13     diplomas, so what were those people supposed to do?  Go abroad or wage

14     war; there was no other choice.  Life was far too dynamic for those young

15     people to be able to afford to stand there and then listen to someone

16     from Belgrade.

17             The police, the Serbian services in Kosovo, were entirely

18     corrupted.  Those who were sitting there in some virtual way held sway

19     over Kosovo, but the reality on the ground was brutal.  That is why the

20     president, Ibrahim Rugova, after Dayton was politically dead.  It was

21     only a matter of time when something would start happening.

22             Why had nothing happened up to Dayton?  Everything had been fully

23     under control.  The expectations were that Serbia would come to its wits,

24     after Bosnia and after Croatia in a political sense and that an opening

25     would be found for peace.  Stanisic himself said it.  I don't have the

Page 6257

 1     power, someone else has the power to restore peace.  Milosevic is the

 2     man, with his wife and another person whose name I can't remember.

 3     Hence, in 1997 we knew where the red line was.  There was no way anyone

 4     could try and artificially affect the situation in Kosovo any more.

 5             In 1996 there was the intermediation effort, meaning San Egidio,

 6     they wanted to sign an agreement for people to go back to their

 7     buildings, the schools.  But they didn't.  They opened a single institute

 8     yet all of the other buildings remained closed.

 9             What you say -- what there was on paper and the actual brutal

10     reality the brutality on the ground were two different things.  And

11     that's why the war came about.  And that's why what happened after 1997

12     eventually materialised.

13        Q.   Speaking of persons who had a role to play, you mentioned

14     Milosevic, you mentioned the late president of Kosovo, Rugova.  I would

15     like to make a reference here to probably the richest Albanian

16     Mr. Bakalli do you not believe that he too was a man who indirectly,

17     through the Russians, joined forces with the Serbs against Albanian

18     interests?  Can you please briefly explain.

19        A.   Pacolli came from Moscow via Milosevic to make an offer, and he

20     offered something that was not feasible.  He was offering the same thing

21     that Serbia had actually abolished back in 1989.  This wasn't a realistic

22     thing.  Bakalli himself met Milosevic in February 1998 in his own home,

23     as a matter of fact, in Belgrade.

24        Q.   Let us go back to Bakalli; that is what I'm trying to get you to

25     tell me about.  What he was offering was a return to the level of

Page 6258

 1     autonomy prior to 1998 and 1999, wasn't it?

 2        A.   No.  Listen, as far as the political project was concerned, it

 3     was about details.  He was offering something that was unacceptable.  In

 4     1998 it was too late.  There were people there.  The KLA were already in

 5     the woods.  There were over 25.000 persons who were armed.  It was too

 6     late for an effort like that.

 7        Q.   Indeed.  Nevertheless, it wasn't the KLA that were in charge of

 8     everything.  The KLA and its political leaders, not the military leaders,

 9     were not involved in that.

10        A.   It was impossible, no one really accepted them as leaders.  The

11     first contacts came as late as May 1998.  It was too late.  It was too

12     late for any agreements.  We were tabling an offer for a peace project.

13     We -- they even wanted today second some of our even people, six of them

14     as a matter of fact, we offered intermediaries.  We had it all out on the

15     table and they threw it all away.

16        Q.   I'm not going into that.  I know what Serbia's position was at

17     the time, and you are entirely right.  The mediators were unacceptable in

18     view of Serbia's policy at the time.  Those were diplomats who Serbia saw

19     as being in the service of the Kosovar and Albanian interest alone.  So

20     that was the reason for their refusal.

21        A.   It wasn't about Albanian interest, it was about violations of

22     human rights.  What does that have to do with Albanian interests?

23        Q.   Call it what you like, I know they weren't acceptable candidates.

24     I'm trying not to waste any time, and I'm trying to avoid you having to

25     stay here tomorrow.

Page 6259

 1        A.   Fair enough.

 2        Q.   My next question.  Mr. Bujar Bukoshi, he was frequently in touch

 3     with you and you often went to see him in Germany, Switzerland, something

 4     like that?

 5        A.   Yes, a total of three meetings.

 6        Q.   Who is Bujar Bukosi and why Bujar Bukosi?

 7        A.   What do you mean "why"?

 8        Q.   With you.

 9        A.   Oh why, with me.  Oh yes.  At the time, he was Kosovar's

10     prime minister in exile.  As far as an illegal points of concern, you

11     should ask him.

12             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  One speaker at a time,

13     please.  Thank you.

14             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  [Interpretation]

15        Q.   You say you were arrested today, but you say --

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  One speaker at a time,

17     please, thank you.

18             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djordjevic and Mr. Haxhiu, we are translating

19     into a number of languages and you are speaking together in direct

20     conversation and not allowing time for the process to catch up to you.

21     Therefore, we are not getting down on the transcript all that should be.

22     If you could each try to pause before you come in --

23             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  I have a suggestion, Your Honour.

24             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

25             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  You should take your ear phone and listen in

Page 6260

 1     English and when it stop, we can continue.

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  That might work, yes, but I think both of you need

 3     to be aware of the problem.

 4             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 5        Q.   [Interpretation] Can we continue in B/C/S then?  Bujar Bukoshi.

 6     You invited him after, as you said, several interviews; you were called

 7     for interviews, they would hold you for two hours, then you would go

 8     away.  You said [indiscernible] today, I don't think there was any ill

 9     intent on your part, maybe it was just the way it felt for you at the

10     time.  Why did you call Bujar Bukoshi and not, for example, Kosovar's

11     president Mr. Rugova or both?

12        A.   If you read my statement properly, I sent the letter to

13     Mr. Rugova but not to Mr. Bukoshi because it was dangerous, risky, to

14     send letters; therefore, I contacted him personally in Switzerland.  In

15     the letter, I explained in detail the problem to Mr. Rugova.  But I felt

16     more confident, I mean, I had great ties with Mr. Bukoshi and Mr. Agani

17     because of past relations.

18        Q.   Why were you the choice of the Serb security forces?  Why not

19     president Rugova or Mr. Bukoshi for that matter?  Why did they choose

20     you?  What did you mean to them at the time?  What was the reason that

21     the leadership of the security service or the security agency, BIA - that

22     was what they were called at the time - contacted you as opposed to any

23     officials, if obviously they were after negotiations?  What was it that

24     they knew about you that made you a good choice in their eyes, a good

25     source of information, and why did they ask to meet you?

Page 6261

 1        A.   They didn't choose me; but when I was arrested, it was me who

 2     said the time has come for us to engage in a dialogue, and that the way

 3     you have chosen would lead us to war.  They said, Who can build this

 4     dialogue?  And I mentioned some names.  And they said, Can we have a

 5     meeting so that we start this thing?  I said, Yes, but we are rather

 6     late, I said.  I'm an open-minded person, I don't have -- I don't suffer

 7     from the idea of Balkan conspiracy.  Therefore it was a very

 8     straightforward dialogue.

 9             When I was arrested, I said, Today you maltreated me, but I think

10     this course will lead to war and that it is high time we engage in

11     dialogue to discuss concrete political issues.  Because even as it is, we

12     are rather late.  It was not they who chose me, but it was me who came up

13     with this idea curing my arrest.

14             And they asked me, Can you do this?  And I proposed Bakalli and

15     Mr. Agani; it is as simple as that.  And so two meetings took place, and

16     that was it.  I didn't contact them again, neither did they contact me

17     again.

18             The situation was a dramatic one, a settlement had to be found,

19     when the Serbs saw that they erred with the students, when they

20     maltreated them, the situation developed in a dramatic way.  So they were

21     after a rapid solution.  They saw that they no longer controlled the

22     situation so there is no conspiracy at stake at all.

23        Q.   That's not what I had in mind.  What I meant was any political

24     status that you may have enjoyed at the time, any relations that you may

25     have and obtained with certain persons.  Perhaps something that I haven't

Page 6262

 1     brought up so far.  That's what I was asking about.  But now you've

 2     explained that.

 3             My next question.  The first meeting that came about, you said

 4     Mr. Gajic was there, Mr. Hadjic too, you were there, Mr. Bakalli.  Are

 5     you certain, personally, about the identities of those persons that their

 6     names were Hadjic, Gajic, that they held the positions that they said

 7     they held?  Were you certain about their identities under those people

 8     were legal and authorised representatives of that service or agency?  Did

 9     you perhaps ask any additional questions later on in order to find out

10     who it was that you had been talking to?

11        A.   I thought that they were who they were because Zoran Stijovic was

12     also present at the meeting.  And I saw Mr. Gajic in a photo later or

13     newspapers when he gave interviews on the situation of Kosova.  But I

14     never saw Mr. Hadjic again after that.  Therefore, I cannot say whether

15     that was his true identity.  But that was how he introduced himself, and

16     I took note of his name in my notebook.  Because I wanted to be accurate

17     in what was going on.  I didn't want any misinterpretation.  I took down

18     everything single word they said.  They didn't take any notes.

19             I may suppose as Mr. Bakalli said later, maybe they had

20     microphones and maybe they recorded everything, but I personally wrote

21     down every single word that was said at that meeting.

22        Q.   Up until the moment you were interviewed and then you said "its

23     high time we engage in a dialogue," in negotiations, and some time

24     elapsed before the meeting occurred, quite some time in fact.  At that

25     point in time, did you get in touch with anyone or try to get anyone

Page 6263

 1     organised, apart from Bakalli, in order to agree what the platform, what

 2     the position would be should it ever come to a meeting like that?  Or was

 3     it more of an improvised thing going on that night?

 4        A.   The proposal I made during my arrest, I never thought it would be

 5     taken seriously, to be frank with you.  And I didn't think they would

 6     summon us, but they called us after a long time when the -- probably when

 7     the situation grew very exacerbated and they wanted to find a way out of

 8     it.  We didn't have any contacts, I didn't receive any calls from them,

 9     nothing.

10        Q.   We'll be going back to that at a later stage.  Which dates do you

11     see as the date the KLA came into existence?

12        A.   Do you want it in the context of historical development or the

13     patriotic context?  Because we had to do with different realities.  A

14     wishful reality and the factual reality.

15        Q.   I want to know about the KLA.

16        A.   In real terms, the KLA came into existence after the events of

17     the 1st of October.  And the brutal approach used against the students.

18     1st of October, 1997.  Everything that happened before consisted of

19     individual efforts, but the armed resistance which was related to the KLA

20     because due to absence of any other solutions came after the

21     intervention, brutal intervention, by the police of the 1st of October.

22     But it became more massive after the killing of the Jashari family in

23     March 1992 --

24             THE INTERPRETER:  1998.  Correction.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- when everybody wanted to take up

Page 6264

 1     arms because they could take it no longer.

 2        Q.   Nevertheless, if we look at these statements, we find you saying

 3     this:  You were aware of the entire negative aspect of the story

 4     involving the establishment of KLA and their actives in the area.  And

 5     you even went as far as to say that you deliberately misinterpreted some

 6     bits at some meetings in Malisevo, perhaps they talked about the idea of

 7     a greater Albania and you left that out because you knew that that would

 8     cause a lot of negative commotion among the international players.

 9             I understand your position, you're a Kosovar Albanian and a

10     patriot.  Nevertheless, what I would like you to share with us is this.

11     I'm not talking about your perspective, I'm talking about you in your

12     capacity as a journalist.  What was this negative context in which the

13     KLA was involved among the international players present there at the

14     beginning?  Could you please comments on that.

15        A.   They were entirely unknown, nobody knew who they were.  At the

16     beginning, we really thought they were ex-military from the

17     Yugoslav Army.  But when we realised that they were young people, young

18     boys who had just graduated from the parallel universities, we realised

19     that the situation was out of control, that it was a matter of venting

20     out their pent-up hatred against what the Serbs had done to them in the

21     last years.  And all these young people, when I saw them, personally saw

22     them, I was really taken aback at what I saw.  That's why when I

23     interpreted, I tried to be rational and not be effected by the

24     irrationality of the time.

25             Imagine if I interpreted to the international representatives the

Page 6265

 1     concept of the greater Albania.  How to explain it to someone from the

 2     KLA.  At that time, I wrote an article, a very strong article, against

 3     such an idea which I considered dangerous.  For us, it was a matter of

 4     survival, and not of grand political projects that for the moment were

 5     more than an illusion.

 6             I'm telling you that there were people who "helped" us, assisted

 7     us, with their arrogance; and what is described, if I might say,

 8     dishonest policy which originated in Belgrade.  The best way to put it

 9     would be:  Look, people, they know not what they do.

10             And I think that they didn't know what they were doing.

11        Q.   You were a journalist with the Bota e Re; right?

12        A.   In 1988 I started my internship in Bota e Re newspaper, a student

13     newspaper.  That is where I started to learn journalism.

14        Q.   What about 1997 and 1998, working as editor in Koha e Ditore?

15        A.   In 1997 we founded the Koha Ditore newspaper.  At that time it

16     was called Koha Javore, weekly time.

17        Q.   I assume that in your capacity at editor you're monitoring all

18     the electronic and the printed media in Kosovo at the time including

19     Bota e Re.

20        A.   At the time, Bota e Re didn't exist as a newspaper.  It was

21     closed down in 1990 by Rrahman Morina and the former regime.  Also the

22     front cover page which showed three overturned chairs when we asked the

23     resignation of these three persons.  Kole Shiroka, Rrahman Morina --

24             THE INTERPRETER:  And the third, I didn't get the name.  The

25     interpreter did not understand the name of the third person you

Page 6266

 1     mentioned.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Ali Shukrije.

 3             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Sir, Adrian Krasniqi, does that name ring a bell?

 5        A.   I knew his name because I published it in my newspaper, it is

 6     said that he organised an action somewhere in the vicinity of Decan, but

 7     I never met him in person, and I don't know who he is.  I only know that

 8     as the people say now, he was one of the first members of the armed

 9     group.  If I recall right, his action was organised in 1993 or 1994.

10     I couldn't be accurate.

11        Q.   Are you aware of the fact that his photograph was published in a

12     magazine wearing a military uniform with KLA insignia?  It couldn't

13     possibly have been in 1993, there was no KLA around in 1993.  The

14     magazine published his photograph carrying a hand-held rocket launcher,

15     automatic weapons.  And the caption underneath that photo read

16     "Adrian in action" do you remember that?  Yes or no, please.

17        A.   Do you want to talk about wishful Balkan wishes or facts?  In

18     fact, there are individuals who in reality --

19        Q.   Facts here.

20        A.   I don't think he was a member of the KLA.  There were many

21     individuals in exile who had similar wishes, and they bought uniforms for

22     100 francs, but there was no military formation as such.  In Germany and

23     Switzerland for example, they managed to -- they managed to form a

24     wishful military formation, but there was no active military formation.

25             The military elements were imbued in members -- former members of

Page 6267

 1     the police or the army, but they were imprisoned, and in the period after

 2     1992 that was.

 3        Q.   Are you aware of the fact that this man Adrian Krasniqi was

 4     killed in 1997?  Are you aware of the fact that the electronic media in

 5     the Albanian language, in the printed media, he was made out to be a

 6     victim of the Serbian policy and a young student who was killed amid

 7     student rallies?  Were you aware of that?

 8        A.   I said that his picture was published in a newspaper

 9     Zeri i Kosoves in Switzerland.  And it wasn't published in the newspapers

10     in Kosovo.  But as regards the action that he undertook, that was

11     published in our newspaper, but we published the official version.  That

12     according to the police he had attacked a police station.  So let's not

13     talk about imaginary military formations.

14             I'd like to say that the real KLA is a product of after the

15     1st of October.  As it to what people wrote on paper in Switzerland or

16     Germany, that's another issue.  Completely different matter.  If we start

17     exploring that avenue, then we may think that -- we may come to a

18     conclusion that the KLA was formed even before 1989.  But the real facts

19     are a different thing.  The KLA is a product of the Serb repression and

20     of these people, it's a product of the post-Dayton peaceful policies of

21     Ibrahim Rugova.

22        Q.   As a journalist, did you know that KLA members carried out

23     kidnappings of Albanian civilians and civilians of other ethnic groups?

24     Do you know of the existence of any detention camps?  And did you know

25     that throughout the period they kept attacking Serbian police and

Page 6268

 1     military forces in the guerilla type actions?  They blocked roads, set up

 2     check-points?

 3        A.   Yes, they did that after 1998.  After the Jashari family was

 4     attacked, people came out into the streets.  They set up check-points,

 5     and it was a state of war.  That's accurate.  And we are speaking about

 6     the period after the first attack on the Jasharis, in January.  And that

 7     was especially so when people came out onto the roads in the Drenica

 8     region.  That's KLA members that is.  And I'm saying it again that this

 9     was the consequence of the Serb brutality.

10        Q.   The 18th of June, 1998, the road between Pristina and Pec, you

11     say that in the summer of 1998 you used that road to get to Malisevo, and

12     that in Drenica and Orahovac, you saw the destruction caused by the Serb

13     forces.  Did you know that on that date, on that road, a civilian and

14     police convoy was attacked in Iglarevo?  Are you familiar with that?

15        A.   On the 16th, no.  There were incidents after the 1998, after

16     May 1998.  I do not recall any names, but there was fighting.  There was

17     fighting, yes.  And sporadic attacks.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that the KLA blocked the road between

19     Pristina and Pec at Lapusnik when going from the direction of Pristina

20     and at Dolac when one goes from Pec?  They set up barricades of stones,

21     tree trunks, car tires, and mined them.  You apparently used some of

22     those roads wherein travelling with the diplomat, as you said yourself.

23        A.   Yes, after the road was blocked, then the famous sentence came

24     into being that the peace and war in Kosovo is named Lapusnik.  If you

25     remember, Mr. Holbrooke said that.  Then you may know that the notorious

Page 6269

 1     offensive of the Serb forces took place after which -- following which

 2     there were so many killings.  There I saw terrifying things.  I went

 3     around those mountains with David Slinn, a diplomat, and I could not

 4     believe where brutality could go at what stage, at what level it could

 5     go.  I never thought what I saw.

 6             Whole villages, following the June offensive, were burned to the

 7     ground.  There was not a single house which was not unburned.  In the

 8     Rahovec region, in Malishevo region, in the Komorane/Prishtina region,

 9     all houses were burned to the ground, and I saw it with my own eyes.  On

10     the way to -- that was to go on the way to persuading the KLA to set up a

11     team to negotiate a way out of this conflict.  And we went to a village

12     in the Malishevo region and we when to Drenica to talk to the other part

13     of the KLA, Veton Surroi went there and Chris Hill went there.  It was a

14     catastrophe.

15        Q.   We know that, and that is not in dispute.  We found that in your

16     statement.  Am I right in saying that in June 1998 the traffic between

17     Pristina and Prizren was made impossible, it was interrupted by the KLA

18     and one had to go the round about way to get to Pristina from Prizren, in

19     June 1998?

20        A.   That's correct.

21        Q.   I received no interpretation.

22        A.   That's correct.

23        Q.   Very well.  I just wanted to have that for the transcript.

24             Am I right in saying that the village of Kijevo was blocked for a

25     month?

Page 6270

 1        A.   Yes, that's where the battle of Lapusnik took place.  They are

 2     very close.  And from there, the road was blocked.

 3        Q.   While there were blocks on the road between Pec and Pristina, one

 4     could move between the two places only via Roxhaje and Kulla; am I

 5     correct?  And I have in mind that Serbs could not use it.

 6        A.   You could go by Brezovica, you could go via Prizren-Gjakove road,

 7     and also via Istoq.  There were ways outs.  Buy, in fact, the Serbs of

 8     Peje did not need to go to Prishtina because the situation was very

 9     grave.  The Serbs did not move along the main road at the time.  Serbs of

10     Kijevo either went to Peje or they followed the Prizren-Gjakove road to

11     go to Prishtina.

12        Q.   Lapusnik, did you know that there was a KLA prison in Lapusnik?

13        A.   No, I've never visited a KLA prison there.  I never thought that

14     there could be prisons.  I learned that when the accusations started

15     against the KLA.

16        Q.   Did you know that many corpses of non-Albanians as well as

17     Albanians were discovered in Lapusnik?  Do you have any knowledge of

18     that?

19        A.   I remember a press conference of the then-Prosecutor who was a

20     Serb.  She was so untrustful.  I've never trusted her.  I'm saying that

21     if there was a shred of truth, she was the person who made the whole

22     thing unbelievable.  She had no credibility.  She was the worst

23     personality of the time.

24        Q.   Do you mean Ms. Danica Maksimovic [phoen]?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 6271

 1        Q.   Am I right in saying that in July 1998, the KLA attacked and

 2     occupied Orahovac, Velika Hoca, Zociste [phoen], and Retimlje?

 3        A.   I was there personally with journalists of the BBC.  No, it's not

 4     correct.  I visited that place and there were 250 metres distance between

 5     the check-points.  KLA and Serb forces.  This was a day before the

 6     offensive when we visited the place.  I visited Rahovec a day before the

 7     offensive.  And there was no indication as to who was attacking.

 8             In my book I described in general the fighting in Rahovec, and

 9     I -- the strategy was that through Rahovec they could attack Malishevo

10     and go towards Drenica, and the attack was planned because it was carried

11     out within 24 hours.  Because the tanks, a day before the interpretation

12     that the KLA attacked Rahovec, the tanks left Prishtina and surrounded

13     all the area in Malishevo from the other side.

14             And the action was planned.  For us who lived in Prishtina and

15     who had access to information, and Mr. Agani I remember called me to his

16     office, and he was informed by a captain of the army a day before the

17     attacks started, and he had been told that the attack would start to

18     destroy Rahovec.  But this happened after the meeting between Bakalli,

19     Surroi, Agani, in the Milosevic office, and then it finished in the white

20     house.

21             It wasn't that the KLA was attacked, but every single house was

22     attacked and burned.  It was civilian families who were killed.  And

23     there was a counter-effect of the whole thing that they had planned.

24             And it's not true that -- there was fighting in Rahovec, but the

25     attack was well planned.

Page 6272

 1        Q.   Briefly then, your answer is no?

 2        A.   Yes, and I'm positive about that.

 3        Q.   You are positive in the "no," or are you positive about the

 4     things that you were saying?

 5        A.   Positive that the planning of such a large-scale military action

 6     was an earlier one.  And I think that the signal was sounded by the

 7     international community in order to weaken the role of the KLA.  And in

 8     real terms it was Mr. Holbrooke who did that.  You may not recall the

 9     meeting of the 26th of May in the office of Milosevic of the group of

10     Kosova in 1998 and then Mr. Clinton state secretary in Washington.

11        Q.   Malisevo, did you know that there was a KLA prison in Malisevo?

12        A.   If you lived in the circumstances I lived, you don't have

13     believed that, because in fact Kosova itself was a large prison.  There

14     were 2 million people who were imprisoned in that prison.

15        Q.   For Albanians?  What prison in Kosovo?  I'm asking about

16     Malisevo.

17        A.   The whole of Kosova was a prison.

18        Q.   Very well.  But do you know where a small prison in Malisevo were

19     Serbs from Orahovac were kept?  It was small and run by the KLA.

20        A.   No, there are many reasons why I don't know.  It was a minor

21     event in the context of a horrible situation.  That's what I'm saying.

22        Q.   Did you know that the KLA in 1998 kidnapped a full busload of

23     workers and miners from the mines of Belacevac, and they were all

24     subsequently killed, they also worked at the --

25        A.   The KLA people.

Page 6273

 1        Q.   -- of Obilic?

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  The witnesses are

 3     overlapping yet again.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They entered this thermo-electron

 5     plant, but as you are putting to me, they kidnapped a busload of workers

 6     and miners, this is not true.  They entered there, I don't know if there

 7     were any casualties, because it was daily phenomenon to hear of killings

 8     and murders, so it didn't make news, so to say.  It was -- it happened in

 9     1998, this, it was something that happens in every war.  People are

10     killed.

11             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Yes, that's what I was asking you.  Concerning the methods of

13     waging the war by the KLA, first of all, was it a guerilla type of

14     warfare?  And second of all, that KLA members took to the forests often

15     with civilians changing their military uniforms for civilian clothes as

16     Mr. Zyrapi described in one of his testimonies?

17        A.   I wasn't present in any such situation when they may have changed

18     their uniforms.  But that they waged a guerilla warfare, that's true.

19     They were not a military -- regular military formation, but the Serb army

20     was so strong that it was hardly likely for any KLA groups to face up to

21     them.

22             But the worse of all this was that the Serb military and army and

23     police didn't fight with the KLA, but with the civilians, and their

24     brutality was directed against the civilians.  That's why the war -- they

25     lost the war.  They won the war against the KLA, but they lost their

Page 6274

 1     battle of the war against the human being.  The problem is that they

 2     didn't reckon with the people of the population of the 21st century.  We

 3     have two different philosophical notions.  They won the war against the

 4     KLA, but they lost it to the people of Kosova.  That's why they are here

 5     at The Hague Tribunal.  That's why we have the independence of Kosova

 6     now.

 7        Q.   It is almost time for our break, just before that, I have one

 8     more question.  Let's go back to the afternoon when you were in the house

 9     together with the representatives of the Serb security forces and

10     Mr. Bakalli.  You and Bakalli were the only Albanians who talked to them

11     on that occasion.  What legitimacy did you hold, you and Mr. Bakalli have

12     in order to appear as the representatives of the Albanian population?

13     Did you have any, as a matter of fact?

14        A.   The time context or frame is something else.  I want to explain

15     to you that every public person in Kosova had a kind of role to play.  I

16     was the editor in chief of a newspaper, Mr. Bakalli was a public figure.

17     Each of us tried to fight -- to find a peaceful way to the situation.

18             I think that Mr. Rugova, Mr. Agani, and other gentlemen had their

19     own channels of communication; but none of us had the courage to talk

20     with the Serbs face to face.  They did this either through mediations

21     which sometimes create confusion and unclarity because they want to -- by

22     all means to have positive results for themselves or for the others.  But

23     my experience is that direct contact is the best way to start

24     negotiations for peace, but I think Serbia was not ready.  We proposed

25     six persons to them to start these negotiations, but we never received

Page 6275

 1     any feedback from them as to why these negotiations never became a

 2     reality.  We proposed Mr. Ibrahim Rugova, Bakalli, Fehmi Agani,

 3     Veton Surroi, Bujar Bukoshi, and a second one whose name I don't

 4     remember; they asked who -- which of the Serbs can be of the negotiation

 5     table?  We said to them, It's not us that will decide which of you will

 6     be there.  They didn't agree that Bob Norman and Nick Hill be the

 7     intermediators in these talks.  They considered Bob Norman as a US

 8     diplomat being an anti-Serb one.  I don't know for what reason.

 9             It was not a question of legitimacy, it was a question of taking

10     an initiative when one hopes to find a peaceful solution, he tries.  Now,

11     this question may have a meaning, but not your question.  But not -- your

12     question.  But not at that time.

13        Q.   Just before the break, you and Mr. Bakalli put forth the maximum

14     of the requests of the Albanian community in Kosovo, had those people

15     there told you, Yes we would accept that and let's start with the

16     negotiations as of tomorrow and we will create a confederation, would you

17     have been able to accept such a proposal?  I agree that these people

18     representing the Serb side were Serb representatives, mediators of sorts,

19     but what if they had the authority, the power, to approve your request

20     and say, As of tomorrow we start the negotiation process.  What would you

21     have said?

22        A.   We knew what the situation was like on the ground.  We knew what

23     the real possibilities were for us.  We knew the stand of the

24     international community.  There was no one among the internationals that

25     ever mentioned the independence of Kosova.  We knew that the process

Page 6276

 1     couldn't be complete without the participation of the international

 2     community.  The fact that we made a proposal and proposed some names who

 3     would be involved in these negotiations, six names actually, that was

 4     where our work ended.

 5             That was our initiative.  You may not understand what this -- how

 6     seriously we were taken by the Serbs, how scornfully we were looked upon

 7     by them.  They felt very powerful vis-a-vis a small and unarmed

 8     population.  The main problem in this generation of politicians was total

 9     disrespect for the human being.  They never regarded the human being as a

10     real being.  That was, in my opinion, the problem with this generation of

11     politicians.

12        Q.   Thank you.  We will continue after the break hoping that we would

13     be able to conclude your testimony today.

14             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  [Interpretation] Your Honours, it is time for

15     our break.

16             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.  We will have our second break now.  The

17     Chamber would point out that we've been silent, allowing each of you full

18     rein.  Now, we hope that that will bear the fruit of a conclusion today.

19     We adjourn now and resume at 5 minutes past 1.00.

20                           [The witness stands down]

21                           --- Recess taken at 12.36 p.m.

22                           --- On resuming at 1.05 p.m.

23                           [The witness takes the stand]

24             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Mr. Djordjevic.

25             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  The

Page 6277

 1     witness and I have just entered a very comprehensive debate.  Please

 2     interrupt me if you think I'm going too far, getting carried away.

 3        Q.   I will try to wrap up this set of questions about the attempted

 4     negotiations, about Brezovica, let's move on to that.

 5             It was only you and Mr. Bakalli that went to Brezovica.  Why

 6     didn't none of the other prominent Kosovar Albanian leaders join you

 7     given the fact that the meeting was attended by Jovica Stanisic as well?

 8     There had been request by the Serb side perhaps or something else, could

 9     you enlighten us on that, sir?

10        A.   In fact, that request was presented to Mr. Bakalli.  They said

11     they wanted to continue what we started but with Mr. Stanisic; and when

12     Mr. Stanisic arrived that day, he offered us a meeting with

13     Mr. Milosevic, but we refused that.  It appeared -- it would appear that

14     he did not have a mandate to negotiate.  He had a limited mandate.

15     Although, I believe that I saw him for the first time when he was sent to

16     Bosnia during an assembly in Bosnia, and I heard his name in 1995 during

17     a Serb conference.

18             He had gone to mediate there, and it had stuck on my mind, the

19     name, and I considered him as an important person.  But later on, I

20     didn't hear any more about him.  I didn't know much about him.  But

21     during his political interpretation, it was correct, he had a rationale

22     behind what he was saying; but he was limited in what he wanted to

23     achieve, and the outcome was rather bad, very grave, I would say.

24        Q.   Another brief question, very brief.  The focus of the talk was

25     between Mr. Bakalli and Mr. Stanisic; right?

Page 6278

 1        A.   During the first half of the meeting, he wanted to have a

 2     tête-à-tête with Mr. Bakalli.  It appeared that he wanted to reassure

 3     himself in that meeting, he didn't find that during that part of the

 4     meeting, so he then came together with Mr. Bakalli to a joint meeting.

 5             I heard from Mr. Bakalli what they discussed during the first

 6     half of meeting, and obviously he had told him the same thing that we had

 7     proposed during the first meeting in his flat.

 8        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... that in your statement later

 9     on, we know that.  We know that.

10             Can you please just clarify another sentence that I came across

11     in your statement.  When you were driving back to Pristina, Bakalli and

12     you, you were shaking with fear.  That is precisely what you said.  What

13     sort of fear?  Had any threats been made?  What was all that about?

14        A.   In fact, in Bakalli's flat, Mr. Hadjic pointed his finger at me

15     and said, If anyone knows about this meeting - and he was pointing his

16     finger at me - you won't be the same person that you are.  This was not

17     reminded to me again, but the atmosphere of the place where the meeting

18     took place was not nice.

19             So he used the metaphor of going to war rather badly.  And that

20     influenced the atmosphere of the meeting.

21        Q.   Clear enough.  Clear enough.  My next question, it's about the

22     fact that you were sentenced and there was a fine to pay, you never paid

23     the fine, but I want to ask you about something else.  You said the trial

24     took place in 22nd March, 1992.  You know, we lawyers try to work

25     according to rules.  On the calendar it was a Monday, but let's not make

Page 6279

 1     any mistakes about that, it may have been a Sunday.  Was that perhaps the

 2     21st of March, 1999, when you were standing before a judge?  And not the

 3     22nd as the statement reflects.  That's what my question is about.  So it

 4     was a Sunday, that much is certain; right?  Because your statement says

 5     it was the 22nd of March.

 6        A.   It was the 21st, the 21st as I said a while ago.

 7        Q.   That's fine, that's fine then.  All right.  Let's move on to my

 8     next question.  Your statement says 200.000 German marks.  That was his

 9     punishment and yours was 25.000 German marks.  Could we agree that you

10     were wrong?  You said about 300.000 German marks.  It was a lot.  I'm

11     telling you it was more, it was 420.000 for the magazine and for you

12     personally it was 110.000.  Can we agree on that?  And for the magazine

13     it would have amounted to 26.000 dollars and 7.200 dollars for you.

14             Those were the figures reported in the foreign press about the

15     dollars, and this was all pursuant to Article 67 of the Law on

16     Information, the famous law apparently designed or devised by

17     Minister Vujacic who was then a member of the Serb radical party.

18             Can we first of all agree on these basic facts just in order to

19     have some degree objectivity here?  420.000 for the magazine and --

20        A.   If you remember, at the time there was a huge inflation with

21     regard to the dinar, and the amount, the amount that was assigned one

22     day, the value fell by 50 per cent the following day.  But the law you

23     were referring to was not implemented towards me, but also it was

24     implemented in the case of Blic.

25        Q.   That was my next question as a matter of fact.  It wasn't just

Page 6280

 1     about Blic, there was the Kikinda paper, Pancevac, many from Novi Sad,

 2     many newspapers in electronic media that were blamed on the same law?

 3        A.   This was a series of sentences during that month.

 4        Q.   There's another detail in relation to this.  That's right, and

 5     we 're about to wrap up.  It wasn't just against Albanian media, but also

 6     Serb media.  The daily telegraph from Serbia was also fined.

 7             All right.  I'm moving on to my next topic.  Can we agree that

 8     you were made to answer under the provisions of the misdemeanours law

 9     because that's what it.  It was a misdemeanours court; it wasn't a

10     textbook court of law?

11        A.   The law was a catastrophe.  According to the law, they found an

12     excuse.  The law was voted in the most brutal way in Serbia.  It was a

13     fast-track procedure, and the law was passed within a week and the --

14        Q.   I know.  Thank you, thank you.  Thank you for that.  Let us just

15     try to agree on this:  The charge you were facing causing interethnic

16     hatred, under that law, they took into account the magazine that

17     published your piece entitled, I think, "Kosovo Awaiting a Dispatch from

18     NATO," something along these lines.  But other thing that was typical, I

19     want to know if you remember that, you had to put up a defence within 24

20     hours of the misdemeanours, proceedings request?  I don't know if you

21     remember that.  It literally had to be done within 24 hours, you had to

22     mount a defence within 24 hours?  If you don't remember, that's fine.

23        A.   No, no, I do remember.

24        Q.   It's fine.

25        A.   Friday we published the article on the second page of the

Page 6281

 1     newspaper.  On Saturday the fast-track procedure was sent to us that I

 2     had to report to court and that was -- I had to report to court urgently

 3     on Sunday.

 4        Q.   It was a Sunday; right?  That's right.  And it was the duty

 5     misdemeanours judge who was there, this was perfectly normal institution

 6     at the time - I have to tell you, in case you don't remember, because I

 7     see that you were slightly surprised by the fact - that the trial -- the

 8     hearing took place on the Sunday.  But this was a duty judge.

 9             That's right.  Thank you very much.  I'm not asking you any

10     further questions about this.  We need to leave some time for my learned

11     friend Mr. Neuner to ask additional questions on his part should he have

12     any prompted by my own cross-examination?

13             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have Exhibit

14     D003-3235 pulled up on our screens.

15        Q.   What is this about?  This is an additional statement or an

16     addendum to a statement made in the November 2006 by Mr. Haxhiu to the

17     Tribunal.

18             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please go to page 2.  The

19     next one, please.  Thank you.  Could we please have the Albanian too, if

20     available.  If not, I understand the witness speaks very good English.

21     No Albanian.  All right.  I will just press on in that case.

22        Q.   Can you please look at what you said there, this is in the

23     supplement, the 24th of March period to the 2nd of April.  Let's try to

24     translate that.  From the 24th of March to 2nd of April 1999 you were in

25     the basement so you did not see what was going on in Pristina.

Page 6282

 1             When you left Pristina on the 2nd of April, 1999, he saw older

 2     fat men in green uniforms wearing masks and so on and so forth.  This is

 3     not the point because you keep talking about that in your earlier

 4     statements and the evidence you gave, you realised at one point there was

 5     most probably paramilitaries.

 6             But there's something else I'd like to ask you about where you

 7     said about the 24th of March to 2nd of April they really had no knowledge

 8     of what was going on in Pristina.  Today you spoke a great deal about

 9     precisely this period, including the murder of one of your guards on the

10     premises of your publishing house.  And then you talked about the fact

11     that you went from your house to that writer's house.  And why is it

12     phrased this way in the statement, since today you told us something else

13     altogether?  Can you tell us about that?  What does this mean?

14        A.   What is it you're unclear about?  Which part?

15        Q.   One thing that I'm unclear about:  You were telling us today that

16     you were walking around Pristina, you even went to the newspaper

17     headquarters.  At the time, your guard was killed, body-guard was killed.

18     It says here that in the period between 24th of March and the

19     2nd of April, you were hiding in the became therefore you were not able

20     to see what was going on in Pristina until you left the basement on the

21     2nd of April, and we know that you left for Macedonia.  I'm asking you

22     this:  Do you see that the discrepancy there?  That's all I'm asking.

23        A.   There's into discrepancy.  Look at the dates.  On the 24th when

24     the bombing started, let me clarify.  I thought that when bombing was

25     start there will be freedom of movement, so I had left to meet my

Page 6283

 1     journalists at the Koha Ditore offices.  And at 9.30 on the 25th, I had

 2     planned to get out and go to the offices of the newspaper.

 3             On the 25th, I went from where I stayed the night to the

 4     Dardanija neighbourhood.  Then I stayed two other days and the following

 5     day I went to Kodra e Diellit.  I never said that I went out in town

 6     because it was not possible.

 7             On the 25th in the evening, 9.30 p.m., at about 9.00 p.m., some

 8     young men broke into shops and businesses, and we could see from the

 9     windows of where we were staying because all the lights were off, and we

10     could see -- we could see what was going on in the street.  And I said

11     that we could see that the businesses were being broken into and looted

12     and so on.  But I never said for a moment that I went out in town to take

13     a walk.

14             If you consider it a walk or an outing from when I left from one

15     flat to another, then that's what it is.  But a walk has a different

16     meaning, or going out to town has got another meaning, and what the

17     situation was another.

18        Q.   I do apologise, I misworded my previous statement.  What I had in

19     mind was you moving about town because the paragraph suggests that you

20     spent all this time in a single room in this flat.  Therefore, you did

21     not know at the time what was going on in Pristina.  And that is the

22     difference that I'm trying to highlight.  You spoke a lot about

23     Julian Braithwaite [indiscernible].  Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch, he

24     was the Ambassador at the time, we don't have that much time, and I would

25     not like to ask any further questions about this because it was dealt

Page 6284

 1     with in the addendum, I would like to appeal to the Chamber.

 2             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Briefly I would like to ask the

 3     Chamber just in order to make sure I don't take up the next 15 or 20

 4     minutes, to have this addendum admitted into evidence because of the

 5     substance of the addendum and what the witness said about it.  D003-3235.

 6     He speaks about Abe Satotsi [as interpreted] Julian Braithwaite --

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Could counsel please repeat the names that he

 8     just mentioned.  Thank you.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  Could you repeat those names, please,

10     Mr. Djordjevic.

11             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  The microphone is not on.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  I repeat, could you please repeat the names that

13     you just mentioned.

14             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  [Interpretation] Indeed, Your Honour.  The

15     university [indiscernible] is mentioned here in this addendum; the

16     Pale university; Julian Braithwaite; David Slinn; Jonathan Weiss;

17     Jan Kickert, a witness who appeared here; Albert Rohan; and Ambassador

18     Wolfgang Petritsch.

19             I could cut the time short and not ask the questions that will

20     clarify this.  I won't be asking those questions, but I would like to

21     have this addendum exhibited instead, the date is the 7th of November,

22     1996.  It was 2006.  It was given by this witness, and may that please be

23     exhibited.

24             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D227, Your Honours.

Page 6285

 1             MR. NEUNER:  I just wanted to say to ease the burden for my

 2     learned colleague.  At this point in time, the Prosecution has probably

 3     one question only, so you are please going on as much as you wish to.

 4             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  [Interpretation] Thank you, thank you, my

 5     learned friend.  As the addendum has just been admitted, we are probably

 6     gaining at least 20 minutes.  I will have another brief question to ask

 7     most probably.

 8        Q.   Witness, do you have any information indicating how many Serbs

 9     left Kosovo after the Kumanovo Agreement, Serbs and other non-Albanians?

10             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could all the other

11     microphones be switched off, please, thank you.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot be firm about the number,

13     but I know that there was such movement, especially in Central Kosova and

14     Northern Kosova, so please don't ask me about the exact figure because I

15     don't have it.  I know that there was a movement immediately following

16     the Kumanovo Agreement, especially after the 14th or the 15th.  There was

17     movement on tractors from Northern Kosova in the direction of Serbia;

18     however, part of them, the Serbs, even before that during the Milosevic

19     regime had already bought some houses in Serbia.

20             So for some it was surprising that they were leaving, but for

21     some it was clear that they were fleeing because of corruption, fear of

22     prosecution, and so on, and because of guilt.

23        Q.   My last question for you today:  You still work as a journalist I

24     assume, don't you?  Do you have any information on the number of Serbs

25     and other non-Albanians who returned to Kosovo after this?

Page 6286

 1        A.   Not many.  Kosova is not a pleasant place to live in, even for

 2     Albanians themselves, let alone the Serbs.  It is a very poor country

 3     facing serious problems for all of its inhabitants.  In my opinion, the

 4     Balkans is still a primitive concept of living.  People do not have many

 5     options and opportunities in the Balkans.

 6             What would my suggestion to the Serbs be in real terms.  My

 7     answer would be, Kosova has no meaning without the Serbs.  However, it is

 8     very difficult to live in a poor country with little prospective,

 9     especially for the young people.  In my opinion, people who have lived in

10     Kosova with Serbs know of the charm of cohabitation, but this charm is

11     lost due to this economic, political, and so on problems.  So Serbia

12     would be the prospective for the young people.

13        Q.   Mr. Haxhiu, thank you for your evidence.  I wish I could say that

14     many of the things that you talked about today were possible and that

15     there might be better times ahead; nevertheless, if we want to start

16     seeking answers to a lot of other questions, that would merely prolong

17     our debate which would then take days.

18             We have heard from you today everything that has any relevance to

19     this case.

20             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Therefore, I complete my

21     cross-examination of this witness, Your Honours.  I have no further

22     questions.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you Mr. Djordjevic.

24             Mr. Neuner.

25                           Re-examination by Mr. Neuner:

Page 6287

 1        Q.   Just briefly, Mr. Haxhiu, you were asked by my learned colleague

 2     just a moment ago about your period while you were hiding in houses or

 3     various houses or basements in Pristina.  Could you just explain again,

 4     what was the reason for you going a little bit undercover, if I may call

 5     it?

 6        A.   The first reason would be that we were exposed as workers in the

 7     newspaper.  Second reason would be the fact that my lawyer was killed.

 8     And the third reason was the war itself.  Another reason would be the

 9     advice that we received from our international friends.  I was amongst

10     those who was at risk.  I always led a public, open life.  Whatever my

11     views were, I published them in my newspaper.  And on the 22nd, I

12     published on the front page of a newspaper "NATO Air:  Just Do It."

13             So a friend of mine advised me, said, Listen, this is not a good

14     message that you are sending to the people of the Milosevic regime, so I

15     would suggest that you better go into hiding and look after your life.

16             So these would be the reasons, minus the main one, that of the

17     war situation.

18        Q.   Okay.  I tried to understand this answer.  You say you were

19     exposed as workers of the newspaper.  Exposed to whom?

20        A.   Koha Ditore always had a clear-cut stance against the Milosevic

21     regime and the brutal acts of the authorities for years.  Therefore, this

22     course of criticism, in a sense that we never went out of the boundaries

23     of the lawful, instead we discussed in our newspaper cases of violation

24     of human rights, police brutality against civilians, and so on; and we

25     promoted the idea of respecting human rights, Albanians, and whatever --

Page 6288

 1     whoever lived in Kosova.  So in this way, we were exposed to the views of

 2     the authorities.

 3             I was the one who designed the policy in the editorial office,

 4     and that's why in a way, I take the blame on myself for this.  Those who

 5     made public their views against the Milosevic regime existed even in

 6     Belgrade.  An editor in chief there was also killed.

 7             So fear comes first, braveness comes second.  So that's why I was

 8     forced to move from one house to another in order to convince myself

 9     psychologically that they may not find me.  Because in a way, we were all

10     killed.  They could kill us whenever they wanted, but this fear, fleeing

11     from one apartment to another, in a way created a sense of security in

12     the people.

13             So as I said, fear was the one that was dominating at the time.

14     Not only with me, but with everybody in Kosova at the time.  There were a

15     few political figures, public figures in Kosova, that openly expressed

16     their views against the Milosevic regime.  I'm not speaking about the

17     Serbian people, about the Serbian civilians, but about the regime, the

18     Milosevic regime.

19        Q.   Is it correct that at some point in time, your -- the fact that

20     you are still living was disputed?

21        A.   I later learned, now maybe this is not the place to say, but I

22     realised later that I was amongst names of those in a list of people who

23     were wanted dead.  My name was also on this list.  I don't want to deal

24     with this part because I don't think it's relevant for the Trial Chamber

25     and for this specific case.

Page 6289

 1        Q.   Then I maybe misunderstood you.  I thought you had told me this

 2     morning, before we met briefly before you went to court, that at some

 3     point in time at the beginning of the war after the 24th of March, 1999,

 4     somebody had made an announcement that you were dead?

 5        A.   Yes.  On the 29th of March at 3.30 I was announced dead by

 6     Jamie Shea and Welby [phoen] at a NATO press conference held in Brussels.

 7             The statement said the following:  Yesterday four intellectuals,

 8     Kosovan intellectuals were killed, Fehmi Agani, Baton Haxhiu, and two

 9     others.  This happened after the funeral of Bajram Kelmendi, a well-known

10     lawyer and humanist from Kosovo.  So the so-called death, my death

11     situation, went on until the 2nd of April when I crossed into Macedonia.

12             If you asked me what death means, I can tell you that I know that

13     there is spiritual death and physical death.  I personally was

14     spiritually dead.  A civilian like me and like others was spiritually

15     dead.  The way we lived in those difficult conditions, we had this

16     feeling of being dead, not alive.  We didn't have the opportunity to

17     inform families that we were still alive or that we were well.  People

18     would go to my parents, to my family for condolences, to express their

19     condolences for my death.

20             So this is what war brings, things that should better be

21     forgotten.  So at this time I realise that there are two types of death,

22     spiritual and physical death.  In our case, we were alive, figuratively

23     speaking, but that's when I realised that spirit is part of every human

24     body that keeps you alive.

25        Q.   The declaration from NATO was issued in which year, please?  You

Page 6290

 1     said 29th of March.

 2        A.   1999.

 3        Q.   Obviously the declaration was wrong in relation to the death of

 4     your person, but what about the other man you mentioned, Fehmi Agani and

 5     two others?

 6        A.   It wasn't true for Mr. Agani at the time too.  Mr. Agani was

 7     killed a month later.  Whereas, I left Kosova in hiding, I left in

 8     disguise.  I left the basement.  I moved in disguise, not as

 9     Baton Haxhiu.  I tried to go into houses under this disguise and ask for

10     shelter, but nobody would take me in.

11             When I would knock at someone's door and tell people I'm

12     Baton Haxhiu, they would just say to me, How dare you, you should be

13     ashamed of yourself, he is dead.  It was a very difficult period.  These

14     two days were very difficult for me.  Nobody believed me.  They didn't

15     believe I was alive.  They believed more in the NATO statement than they

16     believed me, whom they saw.

17        Q.   As a journalist, you are familiar with investigative practices.

18     Did you ever approach NATO to ask them what the source of their

19     misinformation was?

20        A.   Precisely.  That list that NATO got from its sources, the list of

21     people that had to be executed, this list was in the possession of

22     Mr. Sainovic.  That's what we learned later.  The list of so-called

23     enemies.  Many of the people whose names appeared on that list were

24     killed, even Mr. Surroi, Alush Gashi, myself, and some others were

25     announced dead, although we were still alive.

Page 6291

 1        Q.   Have you seen this list yourself?

 2        A.   I cannot give you an answer for that.  I don't have one.

 3        Q.   I know, but is have you seen it, a copy of it?

 4        A.   I already told you, I don't have an answer to this question.

 5        Q.   My last question is, on what basis do you claim that this list

 6     was in the possession of Mr. Sainovic?

 7        A.   Ten years have passed since the war in Kosova.  I investigated my

 8     personal circumstances under which I was announced dead.  I asked family

 9     members, friends about the circumstances of Mr. Welby and Mr. Shea

10     declaring me dead.  I asked Mr. Shea in person about this.  I asked other

11     UK diplomats about this.  That's why I'm telling you I'm familiar with

12     what that list was about.

13        Q.   I understand.  But my question is who told you that Mr. Sainovic

14     had possession of that list, at the time?

15        A.   I told you, I don't have an answer to that, and I'm not going to

16     answer it.

17             MR. NEUNER:  The Prosecution has no further questions,

18     Your Honour.

19             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Haxhiu, you'll be pleased to know that that

20     concludes the questions for you.  We have managed it in the time.  We

21     would like to thank you for your attendance here, for the assistance that

22     you've given, and for the interest in the discussion between yourself and

23     counsel.  You are, of course, now free to go back to your normal

24     activities.  We must now adjourn for the day.  We thank you again.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 6292

 1                           [The witness withdrew]

 2                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.

 3                           to be reconvened on Friday, the 19th day of June,

 4                           2009, at 9.00 a.m.