1 Wednesday, 24 June 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning. The witness will be coming in.
6 [The witness takes the stand]
7 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning.
8 THE WITNESS: Good morning, sir.
9 JUDGE PARKER: The affirmation you made to tell the truth
10 continues to apply. And Mr. Djurdjic is to continue.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
12 WITNESS: JOHN KAROL DREWIENKIEWICZ [Resumed]
13 Cross-examination by Mr. Djurdjic: [Continued]
14 Q. Good morning, General.
15 A. Good morning.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please look at
17 Exhibit P836.
18 Q. Sir, we are going to see now the Byrnes-Djordjevic Agreement
19 dated the 25th of October, 1998. You will agree that this agreement
20 governs the check-points and observation points and the location where
21 police forces are going to be deployed. But let's start from the
22 beginning. Below the list of the check-points, you will agree that it
23 has been left open for this issue to be considered by the
24 29th of October, 1998; am I right?
25 A. Yes, that's correct.
1 Q. Thank you. You will also agree that under item 2, it is
2 envisaged that in the case of incidents, the police can patrol in
3 armoured vehicles and use machine-guns up to 7.9 millimetre, and in
4 self-defence and with maximum restraint?
5 A. Yes, that's correct.
6 Q. Thank you. Let's move now to item 3. We see here that from
7 certain places, the stationary forces are to withdraw; is that correct?
8 Whereas they are going to remain in Malisevo, Orahovac, Zociste, Restane,
10 A. Yes, I got that.
11 Q. Thank you. Will you agree with me that there is no mention at
12 all about the number of forces in the places where the police is allowed
13 to stay?
14 A. Agreed.
15 Q. Thank you. Now, in my mind the most important part is this last
16 part, probably you are familiar with it, but I suspect the Chamber isn't.
17 We see here that the Orahovac-Suva Reka road is mentioned and that the
18 traffic on that road will be regulated in the coming 15 days?
19 A. Yes, yes.
20 Q. Sir, can you tell me how many kilometres are there between
21 Orahovac and Suva
22 the exact figure.
23 A. Well, this is Kosovo Trivial Pursuit. I would need a map. I'm
24 sorry, I'm not going to speculate. I need a map.
25 Q. All right. I don't want you to guess. What I wanted to tell
1 you -- we are talking about the Orahovac Suva-Reka road on which the
2 police is not allowed to patrol according to this agreement; is that
3 correct? For 15 days.
4 A. Along the Suva Reka road, correct, yes.
5 Q. But they are allowed to travel from Orahovac to Malisevo via
6 Suva Reka then Dulje and then again to Malisevo; is that correct?
7 A. Yes, yes. I think the Court would benefit from a map on this.
8 Have we got a map?
9 Q. I think we do. If you will bear with me until I find the number
10 of the exhibit. We'll get back to this; I have to save time. I'll show
11 it to you later.
12 So after the expiry of this 15-day period, the police was allowed
13 to travel directly from Orahovac to Malisevo; is that correct?
14 A. Yes, completely.
15 Q. Thank you. Let me ask you from your opinion. What do you
16 think -- why was this provision is inserted banning the police to travel
17 over the 15 days from Malisevo to Orahovac, in whose interest and benefit
18 was this?
19 A. There were two aspects to this I think. One was that there were
20 a lot of displaced people in the hills hiding, and the other was that the
21 KLA were given time to extract themselves. I don't know which of those
22 two is more important, but certainly the issue of needing to allow
23 displaced people to go back to their homes without harassment was
24 certainly one of the factors.
25 Q. Thank you. Yesterday you told us that the police were barricaded
1 the whole time at the police station in Malisevo with sand bags and that
2 they only ventured out in order to do their patrols in armoured vehicles;
3 am I right?
4 A. That's correct.
5 Q. Well, then how did the police pose a threat to the population if
6 the situation is as I've just described it?
7 A. The people that -- the people in the area that we talked to
8 firmly stated that they were -- they felt very intimidated by the police,
9 the police presence, which they considered to be excessive. I don't know
10 how many patrols -- how many vehicles patrolled at a time, but that was
11 the impression we got, and that was why we approached the issue of
12 recommending that for everyone's sake in order to calm the situation,
13 that that police presence should be -- should make it itself look less
14 threatening. And one of the ways it could do that was reducing the size
15 of the presence.
16 Q. Thank you. Bearing in mind the reports from your verifiers and
17 your daily reports, KVM was constantly being escorted by this police
18 patrolling between Malisevo and Suva Reka?
19 A. No, not constantly being escorted. I think the KVM had freedom
20 of movement to go where it felt it needed to. I think sometimes the
21 police were on the road at the same time and sometimes they weren't.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please now look at
24 Exhibit D156, please. I do not need the B/C/S version on the screen.
25 Can we just provide an English version for the witness and enlarge it so
1 that he can read it better.
2 Q. Please look at item 1. First paragraph of item 1. Will you
3 agree that during the verification conducted on the 5th of January, 1999
4 it was noted that:
5 "Not all the OPs were manned. Full details of the verification
6 are contained in the individual regional centre daily reports."
7 A. Yes, correct.
8 Q. When this verification was conducted, you did not establish that
9 the agreement had been breached?
10 A. No, that's wrong. We did establish that the agreement had been
11 breached because elsewhere it has been shown that we reported that the
12 the majority of the 27 OPs were occupied. So this proves that -- that
13 not more than 26 were occupied.
14 Q. Based on the report of the 6th and after the verification, it
15 just says that not all were occupied whereas no specific number of how
16 many were indeed occupied was given; am I right?
17 A. Yes, but elsewhere you will recall that we reported that the
18 majority of the 27 were occupied. And since the key number was nine, the
19 majority is more than nine. Considerably more than nine. So I don't
20 have the exact number, I'm very sorry. If I had had that piece of paper,
21 I would have rendered it back in 2000 or 2002 or 2006. I don't have it,
22 but I'm convinced in my mind that there were a lot more than nine.
23 Thank you.
24 Q. Thank you. Tell me now, did you see a protest letter if you sent
25 one to the Yugoslav authorities regarding the occupation of a larger
1 number of the OPs than the one envisaged in the agreement?
2 A. This was reported to Vienna
3 reported this to General Loncar in one of the regular liaison meetings at
4 which MUP liaison were present. I'm sure it was also discussed
5 separately between the officer who was responsible for MUP liaison and
6 his MUP counterpart. Thank you.
7 Q. And the document that you are talking about in the course of all
8 the proceedings in which you appear has never been shown to you?
9 A. Which document are we talking about, please? I've -- I have
11 Q. Any document addressed to Loncar or anyone else --
12 A. No, it was not a document given to Loncar. It was a verbal
13 statement given to Loncar face to face by me and I recall those meetings
14 vividly. Thank you.
15 Q. So we are just talking about verbal exchanges, we are not talking
16 about documents. Okay.
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let's move on to
18 65 ter document 00636.
19 Q. General, we are going now to look at a table in which breaches
20 are specified and listed. It starts with a preamble containing the
21 description of what constitutes breaches and what were operational
22 breaches and then we see the table. If I understood correctly, sir,
23 those were the reports that you occasionally sent to the Security Council
24 and to Vienna
25 A. This was a compendium of all of the previously reported breaches,
1 but bringing them together systematically in one document. Because the
2 chairman in office was in the process of doing a periodic report to the
3 UN and wanted this as one document rather than trying to extract it from
4 all of the daily reports. That was the purpose of this document. And it
5 was put together by the -- the three people that worked in Walker
6 office putting the daily reports together.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we see the first page of the
9 table, please.
10 Q. General, here we have a legend. This white square means FRY
11 non-compliance, the black one means KLA non-compliance, and the last one
12 half black and half white diagonally is non-attributable.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. I'm not going to go through all the incidents, I'm just going to
15 highlight a few of them. Please look at a January 20th on this first
16 page. It says:
17 "In Racav the village was surrounded by a MUP force of 8 to 10
18 vehicles, three brothers, a doctor, and two teachers, were eventually
19 arrested for weapons possession."
20 And we see that there's a white rectangle here, white square,
21 which means that this indicates an FRY non-compliance.
22 A. Yes, in accordance with paragraph 6 of the UN Security Council
23 resolution and further on with whatever number 4 was. So if you go back
24 to the front of the document where the different paragraphs of the
25 UN Security Council resolution are listed, then you can find out what --
1 the reason why that was considered to be non-compliance.
2 Q. Thank you. So therefore you think that the FRY authorities
3 should not have arrested persons for illegal possession of weapons
4 pursuant to Resolution 1199?
5 A. This is a document which was issued by the head of mission, under
6 the head of mission's authority, and it was his -- this document would
7 have gone to him and they'd have gone through all of the incidents, and
8 they would have said why they felt that that was a non-compliance. It
9 was probably harassment, and it was probably the fact that they may have
10 been arrested and were never charged and did not go through due process.
11 I don't know. But that is my -- that's my suspicion in this
12 case. And since we are all speculating, that's my speculation. But I
13 certainly can't remember every individual case of the many hundreds that
14 we listed.
15 Q. Thank you. General, this is a document that you have provided to
16 the Prosecution.
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let's move on to the next page
18 now, please. No, no, no, please, the next page after this one. I can't
19 believe it.
20 Q. Please look at the entry dated 29th January. It reads:
21 "25 Kosovo Albanians and one Serb policeman were killed in the
22 village of Rogovo
23 And this was again attributed to the FRY forces?
24 A. Yes, I've got this. I think I can help you with this one.
25 Q. Yes. Arresting terrorists in possession of illegal weapons
1 and -- by refusing to surrender, and we even have a report that a
2 policeman was attacked and a rifle was snatched from him, all of these
3 incidents are attributable to the FRY; is that what you are saying?
4 A. Now, we are looking at the 29th of January, are we, please?
5 Q. Yes.
6 A. So on the 29th of January, Serb Special Forces storm an Albanian
7 farm where they suspect it is a safe house for KLA transiting. I believe
8 that they carried out -- and that was entirely legitimate. I believe
9 they carried out a good operation until the moment having gone over the
10 wall, there having been an exchange of fire, one Serb policeman having
11 been killed, a number of the Albanians having been killed but not all of
12 them. At that point the Albanians surrender. At that point it stops
13 being a legitimate police operation because at that point the police load
14 the Albanians into their minibus, lock the doors, and then riddle it with
15 bullets and kill all of them in cold blood without any judicial process
16 taking place. That is why that is non-compliance. Thank you.
17 Q. Can you please tell me the source for everything that you have
18 just told us?
19 A. The source of that is partly the impressions of my people who
20 were there before me and partly, I believe, the testimony of the one
21 survivor of this who hid under a haystack and subsequently told his story
22 to us. I don't have those documents, but I'm giving you my recollection
23 of things as I recall them ten years later. And I fully understand that
24 I'm under oath.
25 Q. Did you see the documents that you are referring to? Have they
1 been shown to you in the course of these proceedings?
2 A. The written report of the verifiers who were there before me, I
3 have seen and I have handed in in the course of the previous -- the
4 previous meetings with the ICTY staff. The testimony of the survivor was
5 not seen by me; but I understand it was taken, and it was handed to UN
6 authorities, which would have been probably in the course of
7 February 1999. Thank you.
8 Q. General, in the chronology you prepared with the most important
9 dates included, you noted for the 29th it's probably a safe house of the
10 KLA but not all of them were armed. When you were making this in 1999,
11 you did not note this, nor did you do so in May?
12 A. What did I not note?
13 Q. I've just read to you the entry, the location is probably a KLA
14 safe house but probably not all of them were armed.
15 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Kravetz.
16 THE WITNESS: I stand by that. It was probably a safe house for
17 the KLA. They were -- a few of them were in uniform, most of them were
18 not. We were told -- I was told that all were armed. I was shown 12
19 weapons. No forensic examination was carried out on those weapons to see
20 whether those weapons were linked with the deceased. They could just as
21 easily have been from the back of the MUP van and placed at the scene of
22 the crime.
23 So I wrote there the facts that I understood, that it was a KLA
24 safe house, that they were probably KLA transiting. The people that were
25 the owners of the farm may or may not have been KLA because they may well
1 have been pressured into offering their safe house. No identification of
2 who were the -- who were the people who originally lived there who may
3 have well have been put under pressure, and the people who may more not
4 have been KLA in civilian clothes. I never saw any attempt to
5 differentiate them. They were all just thrown in the same heap.
6 Thank you.
7 Q. Did you seek from the Yugoslav authorities an on-site
8 investigation report because an on-site investigation judge was there to
9 investigate and there were other forensic and ballistic reports as well?
10 A. Good, I'm glad you mentioned that. There was a so-called
11 investigation by the judge. It appeared to take about two hours. And in
12 two hours you cannot investigate a scene of crime about 100 metres by 200
13 metres, much of which is up to your ankles in mud and water, and
14 involving 25 corpses. So there was not a proper investigation carried
15 out by that judge under the terms of an investigation as I understand it.
16 In my conversation with General Loncar outside the farmhouse we
17 exchanged a number of comments and at the end of which I said, Let's have
18 a joint investigation. And he said, Yes, let's have a joint
19 investigation. I said I look forward to. It never happened. Thank you.
20 Q. That's because you did not have a scene-of-crime officer's team
21 that would come out on the site.
22 I asked you something else: Did you seek from the Yugoslav
23 authorities forensic and ballistic reports because you obviously are not
24 familiar with the way an on-site investigation is carried out in the FRY?
25 Did you ask for those reports to look at them?
1 A. I'm very very familiar with the way on-site investigations are
2 carried out in the FRY. Certainly in Kosovo. People went in, looked
3 around, took a very short time, and walked out declaring it all to be
4 legitimate. That is not a proper investigation. You do not need to be a
5 policeman in order to see a bad investigation. Bad is bad. Thank you.
6 Q. So did you seek that documentation?
7 A. What I did do, because there was an EU forensic team in Kosovo at
8 the time sifting through the remains of other incidents, and I attempted
9 to get them diverted on to this scene of crime, and that did not prove
10 possible. They were a professional team, and it is a great pity that
11 they were not allowed by the various authorities to come and investigate
12 that properly. And it would have taken about four days to do a proper
13 scene-of-crime investigation on that -- on that scene.
14 As for ballistic evidence, if it had been available, then it
15 should have been made available to us so that the FRY authorities could
16 dispel the impression that we had and that we made pretty clear that this
17 was excessive in the way that the operation which had begun as a
18 legitimate operation but the way it had degenerated into non-judicial
19 killing. Thank you.
20 Q. Did you ask who the killed policeman was? Where he was from? To
21 which unit he belonged?
22 A. He was identified by General Loncar as a member of the unit in
23 the light grey coveralls that had carried out the storming. He was in
24 the same uniform as the rest of them.
25 Q. General, from the previous two Kosovo trials and the present one,
1 you are the only person mentioning a light grey uniform. Nobody has ever
2 seen a light grey or any grey uniform on a police member anywhere. Are
3 you saying that this was some sort of special police force with only one
4 person in that kind of uniform?
5 A. If it was light grey or if it was a light grey-blue, it was a
6 light grey tending to blue uniform. There were 25 of them in that
7 uniform. It was a uniform uniform. They had a patch on their arm which
8 was not one I'd seen before. It's a pity I didn't photograph it. It's a
9 pity I didn't photograph them. But I know what I saw, and I'm still
10 under oath. Thank you.
11 Q. Do you see how long it took you to say grey blue uniforms.
12 Thank you.
13 I'd like to ask you something about the information that was
14 available to you concerning the activity of the Kosovo Liberation Army in
15 the area of Kacanik and their relationship with the civilians. Do you
16 recall what it was that was going on towards the end of February and what
17 kind of information and reports you had?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Could you share it with us?
20 A. Certainly. Towards the end of February, the area in the extreme
21 south of Kosovo, an area which up until this point had not had any
22 noticeable KLA presence in the area, started to see KLA activity. As a
23 result of this, the FRY forces carried out an operation in that area in
24 which they surrounded the area and dealt with the KLA.
25 I understand the sensitivity of the area to the FRY authorities
1 because it -- that high ground dominated the main road between Pristina
2 and Skopje
3 Q. Thank you. Did you have any reports that these were members of
4 the KLA who had arrived from Macedonia
5 not a local, he was not from that area?
6 A. Not at the time, we thought they had moved from elsewhere within
7 Kosovo but we did not get the impression that they were indigenous to the
8 Kacanik area certainly.
9 Q. Thank you. And did you have the information that they were
10 abusing civilians, forcing them to leave their villages to stay in the
11 woods in order to portray that as a humanitarian catastrophe for
12 journalists who arrived and spread it all over the world as KLA
14 A. I heard rumours to that effect, not necessarily at the time.
15 However, when we went up on to the plateau and we looked it at the areas
16 where fighting had taken place, we were -- we did note that in the
17 villages where fighting had taken place, only a small number of houses
18 had been burned. And this was reported to us by the FRY authorities,
19 that only those houses where KLA had actually been occupying were burned,
20 and the rest were left standing.
21 In the next few days, those villages completely burned, and we
22 did suspect that the KLA were burning those villages in order to attempt
23 to put the blame on to the FRY. We reported that these operations in the
24 Kacanik area were noted as being less violent than the other ones we had
25 seen previously.
1 And I remember this led the NATO Secretary-General, when he saw
2 these reports, to comment only -- only devastating one village per day
3 keeps NATO away, in other words, keeping the level of violence down at
4 that low level was ensuring that NATO would not use its Activation Order.
5 So that was a comment also on the fact that this operation was more
6 restrained by the FRY forces than others that we had seen. Thank you.
7 Q. Thank you. And if I read to you that it "... appeared as if over
8 100 KLA members crossed the border and clashed with the aforesaid
9 police," does that remind you of reports from end February and beginning
10 of March, reports by the KVM?
11 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Kravetz.
12 MS. KRAVETZ: Your Honour, I see my learned colleague is reading
13 from a document. If he could, I don't know, tell us the source of the
14 document, put it on the screen for the witness so he can properly assess
15 what's in the document and comment on it. Thank you.
16 JUDGE PARKER: Your reference, Mr. Djurdjic.
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour, but to the
18 best of my understanding, if I put a question and the witness confirms,
19 I'm not obliged to show the document. This is 680 on the 65 ter list.
20 It's an OSCE report for the period from the 26th of February to the
21 4th of March. I'm using portions of it to remind the witness. If the
22 witness says yes, I move on without wasting time, provided he confirms.
23 JUDGE PARKER: Your understanding is not complete or accurate,
24 I'm afraid, Mr. Djurdjic. If you are quoting a document to the witness,
25 you will need to identify it. If you are asking the witness whether it
1 is true that on a certain date 20 houses were burned in the village of so
2 and so and he says yes, you have not referred to a document at all. Do
3 you see the difference? When you are quoting a document at the witness,
4 you will need to identify it. Thank you.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] All right.
6 Q. In this report for the 26th of February until the 4th of March --
7 I'll read out:
8 "The most significant activity of the KLA was on the forward
9 location of Djeneral Jankovic, in this area" --
10 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel please repeat that sentence.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. "It was quiet here the week before, before the activity started."
13 "It was quiet in this area before fighting started this week."
14 JUDGE PARKER: I think we will need to have the document on the
15 screen if you are going into this detail from a particular document,
16 Mr. Djurdjic.
17 THE WITNESS: May I attempt to help?
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Yes, please.
20 A. I think this report is looking back. It's a weekly report, so it
21 was written after what had happened had happened by several days. And I
22 think that we got this information that KLA from or people, fighters from
24 not -- not moved within Kosovo to Djeneral Jankovic. I think we got that
25 information some time after the operation, several days after the
1 operation, but that's certainly -- that's where I think I got that from.
2 At the time that it was happening, we did not understand that to be the
3 case, we later, a few days later found out. Thank you.
4 JUDGE PARKER: I'm told the report is already in evidence,
5 Mr. Djurdjic. D157. And the first page is now on the screen.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 Q. General, sir, it goes on to say:
8 "By encouraging the movement of IDPs (internally displaced
9 persons) the international media was able to claim a Serb offensive was
11 A. Sorry, I'm looking for that. Right, yes. That was clearly what
12 we thought at the time. We had a lot of --
13 Q. Thank you.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we see page 2 in English.
15 Q. You see the beginning of the page where it says:
16 "... there is a significant movement of the KLA from Macedonia
17 The last paragraph.
18 A. Owing to the belief that there was a substantial KLA movement
19 from Macedonia
20 the belief, not the fact. Now, it may well have been the fact, but the
21 piece of paper we are referring to refers to a belief. That's an
22 impression. Thank you.
23 Q. Thank you. And how about the next paragraph:
24 "The KLA force in the Podujevo area managed to carry out an
25 attack in the town itself - effectively taking the fight to the Serbs..."
1 A. I think this demonstrates that even at the end of February and
2 the beginning of March, this mission that I was in was still attempting
3 to be evenhanded in its judgement of the parties to the conflict. Where
4 the KLA clearly acted in a way that was inappropriate, we reported it.
5 Should we not have done?
6 Q. Thank you.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have page 4.
8 Q. General, at that time -- in fact, does this document reflect your
9 contemporaneous knowledge? It seems the KLA entered the region with
10 120 to 160 men, the KLA told villagers in the area to move out. Almost
11 all of them left their homes by the 28th February leading to an IDP
12 report on the 28th.
13 A. Well, that's clearly the situation as we understood it a few days
14 later, because this is a -- again, I think this is part of a weekly
15 report. So this is with the benefit of hindsight, not necessarily what
16 we knew at the moment that it was happening. But I'm happy that that's
17 what we reported, and that was the information as we understood it.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we get page 5 in B/C/S,
19 please. Sorry, English version.
20 Q. General, it says here in a subheading:
21 "KLA ..." -- the subheading is assessment. "KLA: Exploiting the
22 media. In recognising the power of the media, the ethnic Albanians will
23 continue to work on international sympathy for their cause. The plight
24 of the IDP remains their strongest weapon..."
25 And towards the bottom four lines down it says:
1 "It should be remembered that ethnic Albanians watch Albanian
2 television and such a medium could well be used in conjunction with other
3 methods to increase the propaganda effort."
4 A. Yes. We were absolutely fully aware that the international media
5 were not impartial in this, and that was why we were making these points
6 to Vienna
7 international diplomats who, as well as getting our reports, were
8 watching the international media every day. And we needed to make the
9 point that the international media were in our view being manipulated,
11 Q. Thank you. Now, I'd like to come back to the organisation of the
12 KVM. Would it be fair to say that it was perhaps not identical but
13 basically identical in terms of the organisation of the headquarters,
14 regional centres, and local centres; they had a liaison officer for the
15 army, liaison for the police, liaison officer for the KLA?
16 A. Yes, to the greatest extent possible.
17 Q. Thank you. Will you tell me, at the level of the KVM
18 headquarters, who were the liaison officers for the KLA, if you still
20 A. Well, they varied with time, but the first one that I recall
21 getting into them was -- was someone called David Wilson. And then I
22 detached in the middle of the night my military assistant David Meyer
23 because we were literally phoned up out of the blue and told that if we
24 wanted to meet the KLA leadership, we should get someone to a certain
25 crossroads within an hour and a half. And this was at 10.30 at night. I
1 only had one person with me, I sent him.
2 Various other people acted as liaison with the KLA, but
3 David Meyer became my principal link to them. Thank you.
4 Q. Thank you. And at the level of regional centres and especially
5 coordination centres, how did these liaison officers for the KLA work?
6 A. In one of three ways: In some cases they stayed with them for
7 some time; in other cases they routinely visited them; and they were in
8 contact by mobile phone for the rest of the time. Thank you.
9 Q. These mobile phones were actually satellite phones; am I right?
10 A. Not necessarily. We did not, to the best of my knowledge, ever
11 provide the KLA with phones. We did use satellite phones sometimes in
12 areas where there was no mobile phone coverage, for the obvious reason.
13 Q. General, I didn't say that it was you who gave them satellite
14 phones. I meant to say or ask you did your officers have satellite
15 phones in order to communicate with you?
16 A. Yes, because you couldn't use mobile phones in many areas. There
17 was no coverage. And the radio didn't cover in all the areas because
18 there were two many hills in the way, so you had to use satellite phones.
19 Q. Thank you. General, after you left Kosova-Metohija, what was the
20 function of these KLA liaison officers in Macedonia and Albania
21 A. They stayed in touch with their counterparts in the KLA to the
22 greatest extent possible in order to remain aware of the situation on the
24 Q. And they were the source of the your information, in fact; am I
1 A. They were one of many sources of information.
2 Q. Thank you. Tell me, the FRY army liaison officers, what role did
3 they assume after you had left?
4 A. We attempted to remain in contact with them, but they turned
5 their phones off when we attempted to phone them up, as I recall.
6 Q. Yes. But these officers who were in charge of liaising with the
7 FRY, what did they do after you went to Macedonia? Were they assigned
8 some other duties? What were they doing?
9 A. Once it was clear that the liaison, their counterparts had turned
10 their phones off, I put them on to other duties, yes.
11 Q. Thank you. After crossing into Albania and Macedonia
12 have liaison officers for NATO?
13 A. Yes. Liaison is a function. You exchange liaison officers with
14 all the people with whom you deal so that there is an unfettered exchange
15 of information. That's what liaison officers do.
16 Q. And what kind of connections did you have with NATO during the
17 war? What was your relationship with NATO?
18 A. Quite a close one. We worked hands in hand with them as far as
19 the humanitarian crisis was concerned. For instance, the Brezda camp was
20 entirely built but NATO soldiers. We assisted in that -- in that project
21 as assistance to the UNHCR. There was a meeting between Walker and the
22 lady in charge of UNHCR who came down from Geneva, at which they agreed
23 that we should act in support of UNHCR while the refugee crisis was
24 ongoing. So there was a very strong link with UNHCR and there was a less
25 strong link with NATO.
1 Q. Thank you. And all this relationship was to do solely with
2 humanitarian issues?
3 A. What else are you asking me? I mean, I can remember that the
4 amount of work we put into humanitarian issues. What else are you asking
6 Q. Thank you.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now look at document D1011,
9 Q. General, this is, as you explained, a document that you used at
10 the press conference. Can you tell me, this press conference held at
12 A. Correct, yes.
13 Q. Here in paragraph 3 you say as follows:
14 "As you know, we were ordered out 12 days ago. Since then we
15 have remained in contact with the KLA..."
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And this is what you said at the press conference, that you were
18 still in contact with the KLA.
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Thank you. And in the next paragraph you said that air campaign
21 is having positive effects on the ground?
22 A. "On the positive side we have had confirmation that the air
23 campaign is having some effect on the ground."
24 What that, I think, I should interpret that as the air campaign
25 is reducing the ability of the Serbian forces to attack civilians,
1 Albanian civilians. That's what it was doing. Thank you.
2 Q. And that was the KVM mission in Macedonia at the time, for you to
3 assess how successful the NATO bombing was; right?
4 A. We were receiving reports that the NATO bombing was de-appetizing
5 the FRY forces in their attempt to -- or in their endeavours to attack
6 unarmed Albanian civilians. The way to avoid being bombed by NATO was to
7 stop attacking unarmed Albanian civilians. NATO aircraft attacking FRY
8 forces is a more legitimate activity then FRY forces attacking unarmed
9 civilians. Thank you.
10 Q. Thank you. Cluster bombs and depleted Uranium bombs constitute
11 also a proper and proportionate use of force; is that right?
12 A. Well, luckily the KVM's duties didn't involve loading the
13 ammunition on to the planes. Thank you.
14 Q. Apparently you would have done that gladly. Can you tell me,
15 what capacity did you hold this press conference in Whitehall in London
16 A. As a member of the KVM who was in London for consultation with
17 his government. Thank you.
18 Q. Did you obtain an approval from Vienna for this press conference
19 to be held in Whitehall
20 A. I don't recall I did, no.
21 Q. Thank you. I apologise to you, Witness, for stating my personal
22 opinion concerning what you mentioned about loading the planes. You just
23 provoked me into making this comment, and I apologise.
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please now look at document
25 1027, please.
1 Q. General, this is your preparatory document that you had. In this
2 second part where you say a 35-year-old OSCE official, it is not possible
3 to establish the identity of this source because it's not specified here
4 which particular official told you this.
5 A. Well, this would have been one of our locally employed civilians,
6 a Kosovar Albanian. We wouldn't have identified him by name in this. It
7 would have been inappropriate. It would have put his family at risk no
8 doubt. But this would have been a report which we received again by
9 mobile phone talking to people on the ground.
10 Q. Thank you. At the end of this document, you say that the KLA is
11 deploying the resources for offensive activities against the Serbian
12 targets --
13 THE INTERPRETER: Can the counsel please be more specific about
14 the portion that he is reading. Thank you.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. "And the protection of its own displaced population."
17 A. Yes, that's what the note said. That was the view of the people
18 who had been talking to the KLA by phone on what the position of the KLA
20 Q. Thank you. But if we put this in the context of the document
21 that we looked at referring to the period between the end of February and
22 beginning of March, that the Albanians were interested in propaganda
23 effects and providing justification for an attack on the FRY, and that
24 for that purpose they forced their population on the move in order to
25 achieve these effects, were you not giving this any consideration at all?
1 A. Yes, we obviously were taking these reports and checking them to
2 the greatest extent possible, but I don't think we should equate what we
3 were reporting at the end of February when we were in country attempting
4 to be evenhanded with the situation 12 days after we had been ordered
5 out. And during those 12 days there had been, in our views,
6 uncontrovertible evidence of a major assault by all of the available
7 sources of FRY, including units that had come in from outside on the
8 civilian population of Kosovo. That was entirely outwith every one of
9 the deals that we had gone in.
10 So the agreement really just wasn't there anymore. There was no
11 agreement. If there was an agreement, then presumably all of this
12 bombing and driving out of the Albanian civilians during late March and
13 April was done from three company positions and 27 police posts, only
14 nine of which were ever occupied. I don't think so.
15 So this is a completely different situation. This is a situation
16 in which entirely illegitimate activity is taking place by the forces of
17 FRY and that's why they are being bombed. Thank you.
18 Q. Sir, before the bombing started, there were no refugees or maybe
19 not more than 1.000 prior to the 24th of March, and all your sources are
20 Albanian sources?
21 A. How do you know there were no more than 1.000 prior to the
22 24th of March? Were you there? Did you count them? No you did not. I
23 do not accept that. Thank you.
24 Q. I'm only looking at your document. My only source of information
25 are your documents.
1 A. Right. Let me talk to you about the numbers of refugees then.
2 We found it very difficult to work out exactly how many people had been
3 displaced, and we were very very keen not to support wild figures which
4 we felt were being given by some sectors of the media. And, therefore,
5 we went out looking for them and where we could find them, we reported
7 It was our view that when a village was emptied, that the people
8 that fled the village would take refuge with relatives as soon as they
9 could because that was natural. And so if they had a relative in the
10 next village, they would go and live in the next village. Now, that
11 still made them IDPs, but it meant that we didn't count them because we
12 would try to find out where the clusters of IDPs were, and we never found
13 more than a few hundred.
14 But were people displaced from their villages? Yes, they were.
15 Because of the nature of Albanian society, they have a lot of relatives
16 in surrounding villages, and so they went and took refuge with them.
17 That's our understanding of it. Thank you.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please now look at
20 Exhibit D151.
21 Q. General, does the name Atrim Aziri ring a bell?
22 A. Yes, Afrim Aziri.
23 Q. Can you tell us how did you make his acquaintance and what kind
24 of contacts you had with him?
25 A. Early on in the mission, he drove me on a number of occasions.
1 When we got a greater number of people, I got somebody else to drive me.
2 I remained -- he remained someone that I was aware of and if I saw him I
3 would chat to him and exchange the time of day with him. He
4 occasionally, when I was going to meetings, drove the vehicle with the
5 interpreters in it. Thank you.
6 Q. Thank you. According to his statement, he continued to work for
7 the KVM after your departure for Macedonia
8 A. Yes, I think that's true. He turned up in Macedonia. He made
9 his own way there.
10 Q. Thank you. He stated that he was in contact with
12 the Serbian forces in Kosovo, their numbers, the weapons that they had,
13 and the deployment areas. Sir, were you aware of these contacts of his?
14 A. I was aware that he was one of the people we used to talk to the
15 KLA, yes. One of a number of people.
16 Q. He goes on to say that initially this information was being
17 collected for the OSCE HQ. Were you aware of that?
18 A. Well, the information he was collecting was part of the contacts
19 that -- the results of the contacts that we were having by mobile phone
20 to try to find out what was going on on the ground, yes.
21 Q. Thank you. He also says that:
22 "Richard Ciaglinski and David Meyer discussed this information
23 with me and suggested that it might probably be shared with the NATO
24 command. I agreed that this should be done."
25 Tell me, sir, at the time, was Colonel Ciaglinski at the time a
1 liaison officer for NATO in Macedonia
2 A. He was one of them, yes.
3 Q. Thanks. And Mr. David Mayer was a liaison officer for the
5 A. Yes, that's correct. And he remained in contact with the KLA
6 when we were in Macedonia
7 Q. Thank you. Were you aware that a letter from the Supreme Command
8 of the KLA was forwarded through this gentleman to General Clark?
9 A. Yes, I think I do remember that.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 A. We acted as a post box so to speak.
12 Q. Thank you. Do you recall Mr. Agim Musliu?
13 A. Not as such. Can you help me with a few clues?
14 Q. Yes, I can. He was a security advisor for the KVM headquarters
15 in Pristina during your stay in Kosovo and Metohija, and that he used to
16 accompany you to visit KLA locations and crime scene investigations?
17 A. Well, he was either -- he may have been an interpreter.
18 Q. Very well. You don't remember. Let's move on.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please now look at
20 Exhibit D004-1283.
21 Q. This document contain a lot of protest letters concerning the
22 border crossing regimes and similar affairs. What you are going to see
23 is the protest letter issued by the government of the FRY concerning an
24 incident which took on the 26th and 27th February and the
25 Djeneral Jankovic border crossing. It's been mentioned a few times in
1 these documents.
2 I wanted to ask you the following: Were you familiar with the
3 procedure that should have been followed in compliance with the
4 Vienna Convention and applied at border crossings by people and vehicles?
5 A. I was generally aware that we had diplomatic immunity and
6 therefore our vehicles were not required to be opened for inspection.
7 And I think this incident was one at which the border guards exceeded
8 their authority and detained a number of KVM vehicles and their occupants
9 at the border for up to 24 hours because they required that the back of a
10 vehicle be opened in defiance of the Vienna Convention.
11 Eventually, Ambassador Walker turned up and directed that in
12 order to finish this incident, that despite the requirement not to open
13 the backs of vehicles, he directed that the back of the vehicle should be
14 opened in order to get the quite large number of people of the KVM who
15 were all held at this border, in effect being held hostage against their
16 will by the FRY authorities, he directed that the back be opened. I
17 think that's the incident you are talking about. It was a disgrace.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please look at page 2 of
20 this document.
21 Q. General, according to the Vienna Convention there are certain
22 rules that are applicable even to persons who enjoy diplomatic immunity.
23 This protest which was handed over to the Kosovo Verification Mission, it
24 says that the containers that entered did not have any diplomatic
25 insignia, that the content was not properly declared in accordance with
1 the Vienna Convention, and that it contained such items and equipment
2 that according to the Vienna Convention have to be declared. And then
3 they say one optical sight, a pistol, a holster, equipment, medical and
4 chemical substances, and other commodities that are bound to be declared.
5 Then it goes on to say that two vehicles contained only FRY staff, local
6 staff, without any members of the mission present.
7 Therefore, due to these reasons an official protest was submitted
8 and forwarded to the mission on the 24th of February.
9 A. So what's your question, please?
10 Q. Were you aware of this procedure, border crossing procedure,
11 owing to which your vehicles were halted?
12 A. My recollection is the first vehicle to be halted was my vehicle
13 coming back from Skopje
14 me off at the airport. Other vehicles then were impounded. And if some
15 of them had local staff in without a KVM official, then clearly that's
16 reprehensible; and I'm sure that it could have been dealt with without
17 holding people there for 24 hours, and holding them in effect at gun
18 point. It's proportionality, I think, again.
19 Q. General, I'm talking about the customs border organs, I'm not
20 talking about army and the police. They are a separate service. And
21 they say that certain things were either not declared or improperly
22 declared and were disallowed even under the Vienna Convention. I'm
23 asking you if you were aware about this protest lodged with you about the
24 incident that took place on the 25th and 26th February, 1999?
25 A. Yes, of course I am aware. I ended up in this farrago, because
1 when I got back from wherever I had been going to, I found that my number
2 one car was still at the border. So I ended up in this. I think we also
3 wrote a protest. Have you got that available?
4 Q. No. I haven't seen any of your protest letters in evidence,
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I think this is a good time,
7 Your Honours, for a break.
8 JUDGE PARKER: We will have the first break and we will resume at
10 [The witness stands down]
11 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
12 --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.
13 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I'd
15 forgotten towards the end of the last session, can we please admit
16 D004-1283 into evidence.
17 JUDGE PARKER: Which one is that, Mr. Djurdjic?
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It's this last document we looked
19 at, the protest of the FRY to the KVM.
20 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. It will be received.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00228.
22 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
23 [The witness takes the stand]
24 JUDGE PARKER: Please be seated, General.
25 Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
2 Q. General, sir, could you assist me with this, the acronym
3 AARC [as interpreted], what does it mean in some of the reports I've
4 seen, the KVM reports?
5 A. The ARRC is a the Ace Rapid Reaction Corps which was the
6 headquarters which became headquarters KFOR. Because KFOR had no legal
7 standing at this time, it had to remain calling itself what it called
8 itself in peacetime, namely the headquarters of the Ace Rapid Reaction
9 Corps a NATO formation based in Rheindahlen and commanded by General Mike
11 Q. And what about S-I-T-C-E-N?
12 A. Well, sitcen would be a situation centre.
13 Q. Whose situation centre? Which organisation?
14 A. Every military organisation and most peacekeeping organisations
15 have a situation centre. That's what we call the operations room. But
16 it could be called the situation centre. It's the place to which all
17 reports come. It's the place which I described yesterday was run by my
18 good friend the retired German colonel Ilez [phoen].
19 Q. Thank you. And there's one other acronym, S-H-A-P-E?
20 A. That is the military headquarters of NATO based in Mons commanded
21 by Sakija [phoen] called Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. It's
22 also referred to as superb holidays at public expense.
23 Q. Thank you. General, did you know Clark Christopher John?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Mr. Clark was a British officer, also an engineer, and he was
1 together with you in the KVM in 1998/1999 in Kosovo-Metohija; correct?
2 A. He was a warrant officer. That means he was not a commissioned
3 officer. He was a technician who had served about 20 years in the army,
4 in the ranks. But, yes, he was with me in 1998 and 1999.
5 Q. Thank you. And is it correct that over time he established
6 contact with the KLA while working for the KVM?
7 A. It's possible. His principal duties were to advise me on any
8 bomb incidents.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 A. Probably also not allowable under the Vienna Convention, advising
11 me on bomb incidents. Shall I tell you about the day that he defused an
12 improvised explosive device with a pen knife? That was probably not in
13 accordance with the Vienna Convention either.
14 Q. Unfortunately, these things happened on the ground and he was an
15 expert. I believe he mentioned it in his evidence, but we'll come to
16 that later.
17 In the course of February and March 1999, he was in the area of
18 Kacanik and Kotlina, and he informed both you and the KVM that members of
19 the KLA had been infiltrated from Macedonia
20 come unit was a man with a pseudonym Bardhi. Do you remember him
21 reporting to you about that?
22 A. Not specifically, but I don't dispute that that may well have
24 Q. And he goes on to say that the KLA ordered the local Albanian
25 population to leave the area and forced them to cross the border and go
1 to Macedonia
2 A. That's possible in February.
3 Q. Thank you. And then he says that in the operative zone Dukadjini
4 there was an international unit made up of men from various countries who
5 are not Kosovo Albanians and that this was information widely available.
6 A. Then you don't need me to confirm or deny it.
7 Q. I think you also said yourself that in certain areas members of
8 the KLA wore uniforms while in other ares they were in civilian clothes
9 or combined civilian clothes with parts of uniform; is that correct?
10 A. Yes. The problem in this area is that so do most of the workmen
11 working on building sites. If you go anywhere in this area, you find
12 everybody is wearing bits of cast-off uniform because it's clothing that
13 they have that they don't mind getting dirty when they're working on
14 dirty jobs. So bits of uniform are readily available and worn for things
15 like gardening. It's not a very reliable indicator, I'm afraid.
16 Q. Mr. Clark says that due to the escalation in December 1998, a
17 large number of KLA operations began against Serb positions and there
18 were reactions to these attacks and that he was tasked by you to
19 double-check reports by other verifiers?
20 MS. KRAVETZ: Your Honour.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Kravetz.
22 MS. KRAVETZ: Yes, I would like to object to the form my learned
23 colleague is using to question this witness. He is putting some
24 information given by Mr. Clark. Mr. Clark is not a witness in this case.
25 The evidence of Mr. Clark is not before Your Honours, and if my learned
1 colleague wants to lead evidence of Mr. Clark, he can call him as a
2 witness, but I don't believe this is an appropriate way to question the
3 witness on these matters.
4 JUDGE PARKER: I don't think we could uphold your objection in
5 its present form. The difficulty with the way Mr. Djurdjic is
6 proceeding, though, has other fronts. If the witness is able to confirm
7 something you put to him as being the fact or something within his
8 knowledge, that's fine. But otherwise, nothing is being gained by it
9 being or not being something that Mr. Clark or somebody other has said at
10 some other time. It's not evidence before us. So perhaps you could
11 become clearer in your own mind and then in your own questions why it's
12 relevant to put to the witness that this is something Mr. Clark has said.
13 THE WITNESS: I'm happy to confirm that Mr. Clark was one of
14 several people that I used to go and check on the veracity of reports
15 because I was extremely keen that the reports that we sent up the line
16 were as good as they could be. And when we were dealing with a lot of
17 people who were verifiers who barely spoke English, it was important to
18 make sure what ground truth really looked like. So I used a small number
19 of people who worked direct to me to go and check if I felt there was
20 doubt and it was a really important incident. Thank you.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. General, were you aware that verifiers from US KDOM were biased
23 and that is why you double-checked their reports through, among other
24 people, Mr. Clark?
25 A. I was aware that not everybody was as experienced as Clark, and I
1 can certainly recall at least one occasion where a wild report from a
2 newly arrived US
3 General Clark, the supreme allied commander Europe, and this was in
4 danger of escalating the situation to a ridiculous extent before we had
5 ascertained what actually happened. And so on that occasion, I think not
6 only Clark but myself went to the scene. We checked with the verifier
7 what he thought had been said to him. We checked with the VJ sentry what
8 the sentry thought he had said. Clearly there was a misunderstanding
9 because the sentry didn't speak English and the US KDOM member didn't
10 speak Serbian.
11 As a result of that, I personally phoned General Clark and put
12 the matter to rest. That's the extent to which we would go to try to
13 prevent misunderstanding and to try to prevent the situation from
14 escalating. Thank you.
15 Q. Thank you. Is it true that in all villages with KLA presence and
16 with fighting going on there was also civilian population?
17 A. Well, most of the villages where there was KLA presence were
18 villages where the population was largely Kosovar Albanian, yes.
19 Q. Thank you. Were you informed that the operation in Racak had
20 been planned and notified to KVM officials?
21 A. Not before the event, no. Absolutely not.
22 Q. Are you aware that Mr. David Meyer was at Stimlje police station
23 before the events in Racak and that on that occasion he was told that the
24 operation would go ahead?
25 A. I wasn't aware, but then David Meyer wasn't MUP liaison. He may
1 have had a conversation in which someone indicated that something was
2 going to happen. That is not notification. Notification is when the
3 authorised person on the MUP side speaks to the authorised person on the
4 liaison side and says this is what's going to happen, ideally well in
5 advance, and ideally in writing. That absolutely did not happen. A
6 piece of loose talk in a police station between two people is not
8 Q. Thank you. But you aware that the KVM had issued instructions to
9 two patrols to be in Racak village, that these instructions were not
10 obeyed, and these patrols remained in Stimlje contrary to the
12 A. No, I wasn't. I would think at this stage there were probably in
13 excess of 100 patrols in Kosovo and I didn't personally task each one.
14 Furthermore, each patrol was allowed to use its own discretion in terms
15 of where it actually stayed at any moment. So if it was in Stimlje and
16 was told to go to Racak, I don't know why it decided not to, but Stimlje
17 is about 2 kilometres from Racak, so it's not as though they ran away to
19 on there. Thank you.
20 Q. Yes, but subsequently did you hear that these were supposed to be
21 US KDOM patrols and that great suspicions arose why exactly they were
22 unwilling to obey the instructions they had received from the KVM?
23 A. Round about this time we had not fully absorbed all of the
25 were ordered by us, I think it's probably a case that they were invited
1 by us to go to a particular place, not least because Racak was not part
2 of the area we were covering at that moment. We were covering an area
3 who straight line went about 2 kilometres west of Racak. So it's
4 possible that that was why they were there.
5 And as I say, they were operating at that stage under a different
6 chain of command, which wasn't 100 per cent under my control. Thank you.
7 Q. Thank you, General. Did you trust Mr. Clark and his reports?
8 A. Generally, yes, within the limits of his experience.
9 Q. Thank you. With your leave, General, I'd like to move now to a
10 different issue. You have attained the highest degree of education in
11 the military, both in terms of strategy and tactics. I'd like to know
12 your opinion about KLA activity in end December and January in the
13 territory of Podujevo
14 speaking, what was your conclusion why these KLA operations were
16 A. They were attempting to provoke the FRY forces into reacting to
17 them in the knowledge that any reaction was likely to be overreaction and
18 would be self-defeating for the FRY authorities. Thank you.
19 Q. Would it be fair to say that the road from Prokuplje via Podujevo
20 to Pristina is the most important land communication line that connects
21 Kosovo and Metohija with the rest of Serbia
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Thank you. You are also familiar with railroads. Would cutting
24 off the railway near Kosovska Mitrovica and another railroad through
25 Kosovska Mitrovica cut off all supplies from Serbia towards Pristina and
1 further south?
2 A. Well, it would if it was used, but that railroad was hardly used
3 south of Mitrovica. I remember we did a report on how to get the
4 railroad working again. We wouldn't have done a report on how to get the
5 railway working again, if the railway had been working. Thank you.
6 Q. Yes, but if both roads are cut off both via Vucitrn and via
7 Kosovska Mitrovica, then you cannot transport equipment and weapons even
8 up to there; correct?
9 A. Well, why would you want to transport vehicles and weapons up to
10 there? You had all the weapons and vehicles in Kosovo that were -- that
11 were allegedly there prior to October. If you had wanted to bring
12 anything in, it would have been in violation of the agreement. So it's
13 an entirely academic question, I put to you.
14 Q. Thank you. Academically speaking, I read the newspapers and I
15 saw that NATO was threatening a ground invasion. Was Serbia
16 prepare to defend itself from the invasion, or was it supposed to just
17 sit there and do nothing?
18 A. To my knowledge, in February and early March of 1999, Serbia
19 perfectly capable of preparing the area in the south of Kosovo against
20 any NATO invasion. They prepared the tunnels for demolition with
21 explosives and they prepared the bridges for demolition with explosives,
22 and as an engineer, I know what that looks like. Thank you.
23 Q. That's natural. I agree with you it's natural to prepare a
24 defence for an upcoming attack. Therefore, you believe that these
25 attacks and provocations by the KLA did not include the cut-off of these
1 main communications.
2 Do you remember that in February Mr. Walker as head of mission
3 had a meeting on the 12th of February with Mr. Leonid Ivasov.
4 A. Who precisely was Mr. Leonid Ivasov.
5 Q. He was a Russian army general and he was with the defence
6 ministry of Russia
7 between Mr. Walker and Mr. Ivasov in February 1999?
8 A. I am afraid I didn't. I'm surprised he didn't take me with him,
9 but no. And this is the first I have heard of it. A rare occurrence on
11 Q. Well, things always happen for the first time. But in principle,
12 were you aware of the objections of Russia to Mr. Walker's work?
13 A. Well, Walker
14 the -- in Pristina. And he was perfectly able to convey instructions
15 from his government because that was one of the things that the various
16 deputies did.
17 I actually recall the relationship between Walker and the Russian
18 deputy as being rather better than I had expected, and certainly his
19 relationship with his Russian deputy was not the worst relationship he
20 had with any deputy. It was a professional relationship in which there
21 were differences, but they understood that both had differences as to the
22 exact way in which the mission was to work. Thank you.
23 Q. Thank you. I perceive you as an international OSCE mission
24 although you said this was a mixed intragovernmental commission. But
25 regardless of that, that there are certain disagreements professionally,
1 I even remember a meeting where you made some decisions, but we will come
2 to that if we have time.
3 But I'm talking about Russia
4 Mr. Walker's work. Irrespective how this internal organisation worked.
5 There was an impression that not all the opinions of all verifiers were
6 being taken into account, and I'm referring here to the Russian
7 verifiers, Swedish verifiers, et cetera?
8 A. Well, it wasn't possible for the Russian verifiers to go
9 everywhere, because the KLA occasionally stopped our patrols and said,
10 Who's in there? And the Russians had to hide behind the back seat
11 because they said if there's any Russians there we're going to take them
12 out and kill them. So we made a decision based on wishing to keep the
13 Russians alive that we wouldn't deploy Russians into KLA areas for their
14 own safety. Thank you.
15 Q. Thank you. And do you know that upon having found that the
16 Russian verifiers opinions were being disregarded, that Russia forwarded
17 this directly to Vienna
18 A. I'm not aware of such a specific objection. I am aware that
19 there were different opinions on how precisely we should verify and how
20 hard we should look, yeah. There were certainly many different opinions,
21 and this was inherent in a mission that came together so quickly and did
22 not have time to establish proper procedures. Thank you.
23 Q. Thank you. I understand that, but the point here is that the
24 reports coming from Pristina to Vienna
25 dispatched by Russian verifiers, and for that reason, Russia
1 send these reports directly to Vienna
2 been in Pristina but were sort of disregarded.
3 A. Well, if you ask all 1379 people of their opinion, they will all
4 have a different opinion. Everybody came from somewhere. And it was
5 fully understood that the Russians were more -- were more favourably
6 inclined towards the Serbs. Some of the others were more favourably
7 inclined towards the KLA. That's why when the reports got to the mission
8 headquarters it was our job to put some balance on it, and that's what we
9 tried to do.
10 It was certainly the case that individual ambassadors in Vienna
11 rang the individual verifiers on the ground and said, What's it look like
12 to you? And this came to a memorable moment when I personally said to
13 the chairman in office, Look, if you don't believe us, you come down
14 here, and you stand down here, and get shot at; and I'll come up to
16 does. You have to trust the people on the ground.
17 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that there were some objections to
18 certain members of the mission being involved in certain intelligence
19 work which was also contrary to the mandate that they had?
20 A. There were concerns, and I'm being very careful because I'm not
21 saying that anyone was involved in intelligence work that was contrary to
22 the mandated that they had. Because I was in charge of the fusion cell,
23 and I knew what it was doing. There were concerns in Vienna that what
24 the fusion cell was doing looked like intelligence to the uninitiated, to
25 people that didn't understand it. I know that 99 per cent of the
1 information they were using and analysing - and that was their job,
2 analysing - was open-source information.
3 There were moments, very occasional, when we got information
4 which was classified from other sources which directly affected the
5 safety of members of the mission, and that was handled in a way that was
6 appropriate to that information, and we used the information to keep the
7 verifiers alive.
8 Now, if that was contrary to the Vienna Convention, then perhaps
9 getting about 20 of our guys killed would have been in accordance with
10 the Vienna Convention; but if we had lost verifiers, the mission would
11 have been out of Kosovo very quickly because the people in Vienna were
12 very very windy, very concerned, very frightened, about the safety of the
14 So the safety of the verifiers was something that was important,
15 and I was prepared to accept a small amount of life-saving intelligence
16 in order to keep people alive. And when we were getting that
17 intelligence, it was handled by the people that were authorised to use
18 it. Yes. Thank you.
19 Q. General, I am not talking about intelligence -- security related
20 intelligence information, I'm talking about intelligence information
21 about the FRY forces that were made available to certain countries and
22 NATO members which was contrary to the mandate and that this criticism
23 and objection forwarded to Vienna
24 remember that army barracks were photographed. Can you tell me, was that
25 also part of the KVM mandate?
1 A. There was nothing in the KVM mandate that said we couldn't use
2 cameras; and if I had been able to use a camera at Rogovo, we wouldn't
3 have all this nonsense about whether or not these guys in grey or blue
4 uniforms existed. So, yes, photographing stuff was part of our mandate.
5 Nobody told us not to.
6 Q. I asked you about the army barracks, not about the incident in
7 Rogovo where you were invited. I wonder where these photographs of the
8 barracks ended up and the pictures of the equipment that was inside the
10 A. Well, you will recall we were called the Verification Mission and
11 one of the things we had to verify was where the units were. And one of
12 the ways of doing that was to photograph what was inside the barracks so
13 that we could ascertain what was inside the barracks as well as what was
14 outside the barracks. And if you photograph the equipment that is on the
15 barracks square on day 1 and you photograph it a few days later and you
16 compare the two and you discover that on day 1 there are 40 armoured
17 vehicles there and on day 20 there are only 6 armoured vehicles there
18 then you wonder where the remainder have gone. It's quite a good way of
19 checking against time that the situation has not changed. And that's
20 what we were there for. So it was entirely appropriate. Thank you.
21 Q. And where have these photographs ended up?
22 A. I have no idea. I think my back would have broken if I had
23 hauled any more stuff out of Kosovo.
24 Q. Thank you. Were you aware that a regiment for special tasks from
25 the UK
2 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 80.
3 THE WITNESS: You really are going to get me sent to jail, this
4 is absolutely straight in the face of my Official Secrets Act. I cannot
5 discuss what our Special Forces and military intelligence units were
6 doing at the time. You have to not question me on that.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Very well. Am I allowed to ask any questions about the
10 A. Well, they were in the NATO alliance in the same operation. I'm
11 here to talk about what I saw as a member of the
12 Kosovo Verification Mission, not the rumour that went around the bars in
14 Q. Thank you. I see that you had close cooperation with NATO up to
15 20th of March, and especially after the 24th of March, and that you
16 exchanged more than information with them?
17 A. Yes, we did. Up to the 20th of March it was extremely important
18 that they knew exactly where we all were inside Kosovo because there was
19 at least a reasonable chance that instead of being allowed out of Kosovo,
20 some or all of us could have been detained and held hostage in order to
21 stave off NATO bombing. We were very aware of this.
22 If that took place, it was important that the people that were
23 going to have to come and get us out knew where we were and how many of
24 us there were in those locations. So it was part of our insurance policy
25 in case such action took place and of course such action had taken place
1 earlier in Bosnia
2 this was prudent activity on our part.
3 After the 20th of March, again we spoke at length with NATO about
4 the locations that they were likely to be going into, because it was
5 quite clear that they were going to go into Kosovo eventually, and when
6 they went into Kosovo, we were able to help them describing the sort of
7 places that would be sensible for them to set up so that they could set
8 up quickly in order to quickly get on top of the situation so that any
9 law and order vacuum was avoided to the greatest extent possible.
10 That was why we even, in, I think late February or early March,
11 sent a team of KVM people up to the Ace Rapid Reaction Corps headquarters
12 in Rheindahlen to brief them on that sort of thing.
13 So before the bombing started, we were already doing that, and we
14 were doing that in order to assist the efforts of the international
15 community in the case of a successful end to the Rambouillet
16 negotiations. Thank you.
17 Q. Thank you. General, were you aware that the KLA had RPG-7?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Thank you. And were you aware that they had guns whose range was
20 between 3 and 4 kilometres, and that they also had various calibre
22 A. Yes, most of them came from Albania when the armouries were
23 looted in 1997.
24 Q. Thank you. Did you know that they had Howitzers?
25 A. No, we never saw any.
1 Q. Thank you. General, do you know that KLA members, when this
2 Racak incident happened, had been using mortars -- had used mortars on
3 the 15th of January, 1999?
4 A. Not specifically off the top of my head, no.
5 Q. Sir, you were, if I'm not wrong, in Racak on the 16th of January
6 together with Mr. Walker?
7 A. Yes, that's correct.
8 Q. And you were also in the company of the KLA commander who was in
9 Racak at the time?
10 A. No, I didn't meet him. Walker
12 Q. Thank you. But did you see him?
13 A. No, no. Walker
14 to me, as I recall it, that he met the head man of the village. There
15 were KLA in the village at some stage that we were there, but I did not
16 meet anybody who claimed to be a commander, and I did not see anybody
17 going around who appeared by his actions to be a commander.
18 Q. Thank you. Did you hear that on the 15th of January, the KLA
19 opened fire from mortars?
20 A. Not specifically, no. I'm not sure where this is leading because
21 whatever happened was not, in my view, in any way appropriate to the
22 non-judicial killing of over 40 people. And I think that's what I'm
23 giving evidence about. About disproportionality.
24 Q. Thank you. Witness, you are offering here your opinions and
25 conclusions. However, I want only to establish whether you knew about
1 certain facts or not, and it is up to the honourable Chamber to draw
2 conclusions and decisions.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now look at
4 Exhibit D004-0101, please.
5 THE WITNESS: I'm going to need the English. My Serb is not that
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. General, you are the best non-speaking -- non-B/C/S speaking
9 witness in terms of your command of the B/C/S.
10 A. And if I keep coming back here, I'm going to become even better.
11 Q. You are welcome to come.
12 Sir, this is a record that the foreign ministry compiled in
13 Pristina about a meeting between Colonel Orsini and
14 Lieutenant-Colonel Ciaglinski with Mr. Loncar. But this is just leading
15 me to another question, because attached to this document, the issue of
16 the movement of KVM members was raised. I don't know if you were ever
17 informed by Mr. Ciaglinski that there were any discussions about the
18 movement of KVM verifiers concerning fighting between the KLA and the FRY
20 A. Well, by this stage, I mean, this is the 15th of March, this is
21 five days before we drive out. By this stage our freedom of movement was
22 very very severely constrained by the FRY forces. And so whatever the
23 discussions were, I am sure that they related to the fact that we were
24 being stopped from going where we needed to go in the execution of our
25 duties, and told that we could go no further, and therefore all we could
1 do was speculate about what was happening on the other side of the
2 roadblock. Thank you.
3 Q. General, the government of the FRY was principally responsible
4 under all agreements for your safety and security; is that right?
5 A. Yes, but we found that this was used as a convenient excuse for
6 preventing us from going to where we needed to go when it suited the
7 people on the ground.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] And now, can we please first look
10 at item 4.
11 Q. You can see here there were negotiations being held to the effect
12 to have the verifiers sign a statement that they were entering the
13 fighting areas at their own risks and that they were to be responsible
14 for the consequences of anything -- or of coming to any harm. Are you
15 aware of that?
16 A. Yes, that proposal was made by us in order to get around the use
17 of the issue of the concern for the safety of the verifiers that was
18 being -- that was being used as the excuse for not letting us through.
19 I have to say that the ability of the FRY forces to keep our
20 verifiers safe was sometimes in question. I recall MUP dragging a couple
21 of my verifiers out of their vehicle and beating them up one day up by
22 Podujevo, so there were a moments when we were a bit skeptical about this
23 sacred duty that the FRY forces had. Thank you.
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please look at the next
1 Q. General, is this the proposed form of the statement to be signed
2 by your verifiers when entering fighting zones?
3 A. This was, I think, our proposal which we were doing under
4 considerable protest because we believed the whole thing to be a ruse to
5 deny us access. We did not feel that it was any -- it was -- we felt
6 that it was our own business. The extent to which we interpreted our
7 freedom of movement under the agreement. And the agreement did not
8 appear to say anywhere that we could be prevented from going anywhere for
9 our own safety by someone who was not a member of the KVM. So this was
10 an offer in order to keep the process going and to keep dialogue alive.
11 It was not done by us because we wanted to do it, it was done to get
12 around the attempt to constrain our activities still further. Thank you.
13 Q. Thank you. We extensively discussed the security of verifiers.
14 Now, what would have been the consequences had any of the verifiers were
15 to lose their lives in light of the FRY's obligation and responsibility
16 to provide the protection for you because they had the highest
17 responsibility for that?
18 A. I agree, it would have been very serious, and that was my job.
19 To make sure that the verifiers understood that when they went forward,
20 they knew what they were doing. My problem was actually the other way
21 around. There were quite a lot of verifiers that we found standing two
22 hills back complaining that their binoculars weren't strong enough and at
23 that point I was having to take them by the hand and take them forward a
24 couple of hills and show that if they went forward a bit they didn't need
25 such strong binoculars. So our problem was to get them to go forward in
1 many cases rather than to protect them from the consequences of their
2 actions. Thank you.
3 And that sort of explains why we needed binoculars and telescopes
4 in the back of vehicles, doesn't it?
5 Q. Thank you.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I offer this document
7 into evidence.
8 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00229.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. General, sir, do you know that Mr. Gilbertson and Ed Sullivan as
12 well as Mr. Giovanni Santini attended the crime scene investigation in
13 Racak on the 18th of January, 1999?
14 A. Not specifically, but I know that Gilbertson was the deputy head
15 of that regional centre that covered that area, so that would have not
16 been a surprise to me. I probably knew it at the time but have forgotten
18 Q. Thank you. Do you know that Mr. Jan Robert Hendry and
19 Mark Pederson were present during the autopsy of the bodies found in
21 A. Well, a lot of people were present at the autopsies of the bodies
22 found in Racak because it went on for a very long time, so they may well
23 have been among the people. By the time they got to the autopsy, these
24 bodies were in a very advanced state of decay.
25 Q. Thank you. I'd like to ask you this: Did General Maisonneuve
1 inform you about his meeting with the commander of the operation zone
2 Drini and that the latter had informed him that certain KLA members who
3 were seriously injured in Racak were still in hospital, whereas others
4 had been discharged from hospital?
5 A. I know Maisonneuve met Drini from time to time, and it is
6 possible that Maisonneuve did inform me that KLA members were injured in
7 the Racak operation, which is, I think, what you're telling me.
8 Yeah, okay.
9 Q. Thank you, General. Let me ask you this, a short while ago you
10 describe today me the procedure of crime scene investigation. Now, when
11 on 16th of January, 1999, you and Mr. Walker arrived at Racak, did your
12 verifiers after you arrived secure the area?
13 A. No.
14 Q. Thank you. Did you stop those present from tampering with the
15 bodies in terms of moving them and doing various things of that nature?
16 A. I did not see the bodies moved or tampered with at any stage when
17 I was on the hill. If they were tampered with, they were tampered with
18 by people over whom we had no authority. Thank you.
19 Q. Of course you did not have any authority over the 50 journalists
20 who accompanied you to Racak and went whichever way they pleased. Did
21 you notice people, however, picking up casings or other evidence?
22 A. I can remember people picking up shell casings, yes.
23 Q. I have another question that does not require an expert. Why did
24 you allow any moving of the bodies if you were already there with the
25 verifiers and you had your own experts?
1 A. We were not in charge of that scene. There were a small number
2 of KVM people and a large number of media. It was not our job, and we
3 could not have secured the crime scene; and I'm at a loss to know what
4 you thought we could do. What was it we were supposed to do? We weren't
5 equipped with, sort of, scene-of-crime tape. And if we had attempted to
6 put scene-of-crime tape down anywhere, I'm sure that the MUP would have
7 come along and told us not to. We might have put it all the way around
8 the whole border of Kosovo, mind you.
9 Q. General, sir, were there any representative of the FRY
10 authorities at Racak at the time?
11 A. No. You will recall, however, that when I had my meeting with
12 General Loncar, I invited him to come with us, and he said he would. And
13 I said, Right, we'll see you outside the OSCE building in half an hour.
14 And half an hour later he wasn't there. We waited ten minutes, and he
15 didn't turn up. So off we went without him. Thank you.
16 Q. Right. But there were representatives of the KLA in Racak at the
18 A. Not when we arrived. We did not see any KLA when we arrived in
19 the village. We were taken by villagers up the hill, and when we came
20 back from the hill, there were KLA around on the streets. Where they had
21 come from, I do not know.
22 Q. Thank you. Did Mr. Walker perhaps inform you that the KLA
23 commander had told him that on the 15th, at 1700 hours the KLA took
24 control of Racak?
25 A. Not in so many words. Perhaps you better talk to Mr. Walker.
1 Q. Thank you. And are you aware that the investigating judge was
2 able to come into Racak only on the 18th of January to perform the
3 on-site investigation to the best of her ability, and that she had to
4 pull out because she was under attack?
5 A. Yes, I know that very well, because I offered to take her into
6 Racak myself the day before, but she declined. She didn't want to be
7 seen with such a disreputable person as me.
8 Q. Thank you. Tell me, in the UK
9 into Belfast
10 A. Probably not, no.
11 Q. Thank you. Just two more short questions. Do you know that
12 Mr. Walker attended a meeting with the General Clark, General Naumann,
13 Mr. Kusner [phoen], and some other NATO generals when the decision was
14 made to go forward with air-strikes against the FRY?
15 A. When would that have been?
16 Q. I am afraid to get this wrong, it could have been the
17 17th of March or perhaps a day earlier in Brussels.
18 A. It's possible. I am sure that in making the decision on the way
19 ahead that Walker
20 was on the ground. So it wouldn't have been impossible. I can't
21 remember precisely where he was on a day-by-day basis. He was certainly
22 back with us when we drove out on the 20th. I have a picture of him and
23 me stepping over the border together.
24 Q. Thank you. One last question. Would you agree, General, that
25 the objective of the ruling political forces in the international
1 community at the time was to install NATO forces in Kosovo by fair means
2 or foul?
3 A. No, absolutely not. We went into Kosovo as the
4 Kosovo Verification Mission genuinely determined to do our utmost to
5 prevent NATO bombing. I promise you that. Everybody I spoke to
6 understood that's what we were there for. And that was why that mission
7 was put together at huge expense and with so many people. The fact that
8 we did not manage to prevent the bombing was in no account the fault of
9 that mission or of the selfless devotion of the people that were on it.
10 The problem lied entirely with the FRY government, I'm afraid. It was
11 entirely avoidable. And it's a tragedy for the Yugoslav people, for the
12 Serb people, that that wreckless series of circumstances took place and
13 led to the tragedy that we have seen.
14 So I'm deeply sorry, but I do not believe that it was the
15 intention of the international community to precipitate that bombing. It
16 was -- the KVM was the last-chance saloon for the officials in Belgrade
17 and it's a huge pity that they didn't understand they had the ability to
18 step back from this cycle of escalation at any stage, even up to
19 Rambouillet when they could have signed the deal and we could have
20 avoided all this. So that's my view. Thank you.
21 Q. Thank you very much. I did not mean it was the intention of the
22 KVM. But this is really my last question: Have you heard that
23 Mrs. Madeleine Albright had told Mr. Hashim Thaqi to sign the Rambouillet
24 agreement, and if he did she guaranteed to him a referendum on
25 independence within three years; just give me a yes or no?
1 MS. KRAVETZ: Your Honour, I object to this question. It's
2 completely outside the scope of the knowledge of the witness, and it just
3 calls for speculation.
4 JUDGE PARKER: Are you in a position to suggest this witness has
5 any personal knowledge, Mr. Djurdjic?
6 THE WITNESS: I was not in Rambouillet, I was in Pristina at the
7 time. Obviously we received reports of what was going on at Pristina,
8 but again, talk to Madeleine Albright, talk to Hashim Thaqi. Get
9 firsthand evidence, please.
10 JUDGE PARKER: There's your answer, Mr. Djurdjic.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. A no would have
12 sufficed. Thank you very much, General.
13 Thank you, Your Honours, for allowing me this cross-examination.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Do you have any re-examination, Ms. Kravetz.
15 MS. KRAVETZ: Yes, Your Honour but I'm going to try to be as
16 brief as possible. Could we please have Exhibit P836 up on the screen
18 Re-examination by Ms. Kravetz:
19 Q. General, this morning you were asked a number of questions in
20 relation to the agreement known as the Shaun Byrnes-Djordjevic Agreement,
21 and I would just like to clarify some of your answers in this respect.
22 And if we first look at the first paragraph of the agreement,
23 which refers to all check-points will be dismantled then there is a
24 provision regarding the 27 observation points and the number that is
25 allowed, which you've given evidence on.
1 First of all, with regard to the first sentence about the
2 check-points being dismantled by the MUP, this requirement. Do you have
3 any information as to why this provision was included in the agreement?
4 And I'm referring to this situation on the ground. Why was that
5 required, the dismantling of all check-points by the MUP?
6 A. Because the check-points were used as a way of harassing the
7 local population, to the best of my knowledge.
8 Q. Now, we see that the agreement does authorise the establishment
9 of observation points and one-third of them being manned initially. Is a
10 check-point and an observation point the same thing, or they different
12 A. No, they're not the same thing. An observation point is a
13 location from which you can see what's going on on the road but it's away
14 from the road, so it's a passive fixture. A check-point is on the road,
15 everything that drives up or down the road has to stop and then the
16 occupants of the vehicle do whatever they are told by the people manning
17 the check-point.
18 Q. Now, I would like to direct your attention to paragraph 2, which
19 was where you were also questioned about this paragraph by my learned
20 colleague and it says that:
21 "In case of incidents or increased tension, the police will have
22 the right upon notifying KVM OSCE to perform patrol duties."
23 Before we move to the second part of that paragraph, was this
24 requirement of notification complied with?
25 A. In almost all cases, no.
1 Q. Now, if we move to the second part of the paragraph, it says:
2 "To perform patrol duties in armoured vehicles equipped with
3 machine-guns of 7.9 millimetres," and I'm interested in the last part
4 which says, "which will be used exclusively in self-defence and with
6 Was that part of this provision to the best of your knowledge
7 complied with when these patrol duties were carried out?
8 A. I'm hesitating because I'm trying to remember moments when I
9 specifically noticed MUP machine-gun operated vehicles firing as opposed
10 to other vehicles. And I can't instantly remember one specific incident,
11 but it is my recollection that generally when there was a fire fight
12 going on, the MUP and the VJ fired with everything they had without
13 restraint and certainly not exclusively in self-defence.
14 So I can't recall any moments when machine-guns were used
15 exclusively in self-defence and with restraint. The problem with a
16 machine-gun is that it's belt fed, it's very difficult to use it with
18 Q. Thank you.
19 MS. KRAVETZ: I would like to now move to a different document,
20 and this is P844. And I would like for page 4 to be displayed on the
22 Q. You were asked a number of questions about the verification of
23 the observation points and specifically you were shown a report by KVM
24 dated 6 January, 1999
25 the previous day on the 5th of January and that not all observation
1 points were manned. And your response to my learned colleague was that
2 on the occasion of that verification you were able to establish that
3 there had been a breach of the agreement.
4 This is page 5 line 9 of today's transcript.
5 I would like you to read out the entry marked number 58 here and
6 also if you just tell us what this document is?
7 A. This is a chronology of all of my time in Kosovo which I made
8 around about the end of April 1999, at which I tried to list everything
9 that was of significance to us, and to put a very short comment on it, it
10 was an aid-memoire, really, for myself. Written, as I say, just after I
11 had left Kosovo in order to put things in chronological order in my mind.
12 Number 58, you can read it, that all 27 OPs were inspected and
13 most were occupied by MUP. And most is 14 or more, which is more than 9.
14 I cannot for the life of me remember exactly how many, but it was
15 reported to me like that. I think I was actually, on the 5th of January,
16 I think I was coming back from three days back in England, and I think it
17 happened on the day I came back while I was en route back. And it was
18 Mike Maisonneuve who actually supervised all of this acting on my behalf
19 in my absence. Thank you.
20 Q. Thank you. And you told us today and this is on page 6, that
21 when you established that the disprovision regarding the manning of
22 observation points had been breached, you had a meeting with General
23 Loncar and there was a MUP representative present. Do you recall
24 speaking about that this morning?
25 A. After that 5th of January, yes, I mean, I'm sure I had a meeting
1 probably the next day as part of getting back into the saddle and making
2 sure that General Loncar knew I was back.
3 Q. And did you raise this specific issue that you had carried out
4 this verification of the observation points and that you had observed
5 that there was a breach?
6 A. I'm sure I did.
7 Q. And what was the reaction from General Loncar, the MUP
8 representative present? I mean, did the situation on the ground change
9 after you raised this?
10 A. No, it didn't. The retort was that this what was made necessary
11 by the evolving deteriorating security situation on the ground, and I
12 mean, that was -- that was credible. My point was that we should know
13 about any decisions to go out -- to reoccupy any of these extra positions
14 in advance so that we could then be aware of it and report on it properly
15 and be present when it was happening.
16 And simply to ignore us when there was an ongoing requirement to
17 provide weekly detailed reports of MUP and VJ activity was in breach of
18 the agreement. So it didn't matter what the justification for this was;
19 it was in breach of the agreement because it wasn't being told to us, and
20 we had no opportunity to discuss it with the people on the grown. That
21 was my point. And it was the wider point of the continuing
22 non-availability, non-provision of these detailed reports that we were
23 supposed to get.
24 Q. After you had this meeting did the situation change regarding the
25 provision of information about the MUP and VJ activity?
1 A. No.
2 Q. Do you recall who was the MUP representative who was present at
3 that meeting?
4 A. I'm pretty sure it would have been Colonel Mijatovic.
5 Q. Thank you. My last topic. Yesterday you were shown the copy of
6 the Geremek-Jovanovic Agreement, which is P835, and you were shown - this
7 is page 3 paragraph 4 - which is a paragraph that refers to the border
8 zone and the access that you had to the border zone, and specifically the
9 provision that says the Verification Mission when invited by FRY
10 authorities or upon its request will visit border control units.
11 Could you explain to us if during the time you were in Kosovo you
12 were authorised to visit border units in the border zone and how this
13 regime worked?
14 A. There were visits and inspections made to the border zone. Some
15 were specific when there was an incident such as in December when the KLA
16 foot convoy was ambushed, and we were invited to verify that which we
17 did. I personally went with General Loncar's deputy, Colonel Kotur, to
18 the border zone in February when we were trying to do the sums on what
19 would be needed in the future on the border. The two regional centres
20 that abutted the Albanian border, namely Pec and Prizren, had a more
21 detailed constant interaction and dealt directly with their counterparts
22 when they felt they needed to go into the border zone.
23 So I don't believe that we generally went into the 5 kilometre
24 border zone without letting the FRY authorities know. Thank you.
25 Q. During the time you were in Kosovo, did the border zone remain an
1 area of 5 kilometres or was it changed in any way?
2 A. It was extended to 10 kilometres by a decree in Belgrade that we
3 were not consulted with. I don't believe the OSCE in Vienna were
4 consulted about it, and so we regarded it as interesting but not binding.
5 Q. And from a military perspective does this make any difference
6 whether the border zone is 5 or 10 kilometres? I mean, what is the
7 importance of that?
8 A. Well, it would have stopped us moving up and down the main road
9 between Pec and Prizren, for instance. I mean, yes, because -- because
10 Kosovo is a small place, adding another 5 kilometres to the border zone,
11 adds a very big area to the area that we would be excluded from.
12 So it would have made our life extremely difficult. And would
13 probably have required the Jovanovic-Geremek Agreement to be
14 renegotiated. That's the sort of effect it should have had, but of
15 course it was early March and the whole thing was falling to pieces
16 around us at that stage, so it was rather academic. Thank you.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 MS. KRAVETZ: Those are my questions, Your Honours. I have no
19 further questions for this witness.
20 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Ms. Kravetz.
21 JUDGE FLUGGE: I have just a very short question relating to your
22 statement of 2000. It is P996. In paragraph 23, it's on page 4, you are
23 mentioning and describing different places of the VJ and the MUP in
24 Pristina. You mentioned two different places where the police was
25 stationed. Could you describe the difference between the two places?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] To the best of my knowledge, the
2 one that we went into was the one where the public went in to do the
3 things that the public do in connection with the police. The sort of
4 place where you and I would take our driving licences if we'd been caught
5 speeding. If judges are ever caught speeding, I'm sure you are not. So
6 that's the public place, and that was on one side of the road. And then
7 there was another building on the other side of the road where nobody was
8 allowed, and I have no idea what went on in that building.
9 JUDGE FLUGGE: And you had your contacts in the first building,
10 the open-to-public building?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's where our contacts came
12 from. They tended to meet us, rather than us meet them.
13 JUDGE FLUGGE: Thank you.
14 JUDGE PARKER: General, thank you very much. You will be pleased
15 to know that that concludes the questioning. The Chamber would like to
16 thank you for your attendance once more, for the time you've been able to
17 spend, and the assistance you've given. And we indicate, of course, that
18 you may now return to your normal activities. And the court officer will
19 show you out. Thank you, sir.
20 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
21 [The witness withdrew]
22 JUDGE PARKER: We will take the next break now with a view to the
23 remaining witness commencing at 1.00.
24 MS. KRAVETZ: Can I ask one question, Your Honour, with regard to
25 a document that was marked for identification, well two versions of it,
1 the Blue Book at the end of my examination-in-chief. I'm wondering if
2 the status of this document being seen that we have completed
3 cross-examination and my learned colleague has had the opportunity to put
4 questions to the witness on this document, if the status of that document
5 will change, and we would request that --
6 JUDGE PARKER: That is going to be considered by the Chamber
7 during this break, Ms. Kravetz.
8 MS. KRAVETZ: Thank you, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE PARKER: We adjourn now.
10 --- Recess taken at 12.25 p.m.
11 --- On resuming at 1.00 p.m.
12 JUDGE PARKER: While the witness is being brought in, the Chamber
13 will indicate that it has decided that with respect to the -- what has
14 been described as the Blue Book, that it will not change its present
15 order in respect of the total book, but it will receive in evidence those
16 parts of it which have been translated and which are separately in
17 e-court at the present time. We would point out that the description
18 "book" is in a sense misleading. It is really simply a collecting
19 together of a series of individual daily reports and it is those reports
20 that have been translated which we will receive.
21 We indicate that it is done because they are reports collected by
22 people who it was their duty to make these observations and these reports
23 and that it is something that is acted upon by the witness who has spoken
24 in respect of it and accepted by that organisation so that it is a matter
25 of some propriety.
1 We would also observe that if at any future time it is considered
2 by counsel either for the the Defence or the Prosecution that some other
3 parts of that book are material to their cases and should be included as
4 an exhibit, then we will receive a motion for the addition of those
5 additional parts. Of course that will be subject to translation of that
6 part. And we hope by that means that if Mr. Djurdjic has not had an
7 adequate time to consider the balance of the document, that it will be
8 possible for him to do so and if necessary to move for the addition of
9 any part.
10 [The witness entered court]
11 JUDGE PARKER: Good afternoon. I'm sorry, we were dealing with
12 another matter as you came in. Would you please read aloud the
13 affirmation that is shown to you.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
15 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
16 WITNESS: MERITA DEDAJ
17 [Witness answered through interpreter]
18 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much. Please sit down. Mr. Behar
19 has some questions for you.
20 MR. BEHAR: Thank you. Good afternoon, Your Honours.
21 Examination by Mr. Behar:
22 Q. Good afternoon, Ms. Dedaj. Could you please begin by stating
23 your name and your date of birth for the record?
24 A. My name is Merita Dedaj. I was born on the 8th of January, 1983
25 Q. Ma'am, I understand that you were born in Guska in the Djakovica
1 municipality and that you grew up in that town as well; is that correct?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. I also understand that on the 8th of April of 2000 you gave a
4 statement to the Office of the Prosecutor about the events that you
5 experienced in Kosovo; is that correct?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And I understand that you also made certain corrections or
8 clarifications to that statement on the 12th of July, 2002; is that
10 A. Yes, that's correct.
11 Q. Have you had the opportunity to read those statements before
12 coming to court today?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. I understand that there's one brief correction or clarification
15 that can be made to your initial statement. To just deal with it
16 quickly, your statement refers to your uncle Anton Dedaj.
17 MR. BEHAR: If I can just give me friend the reference. That
18 appears at page 4, paragraph 2, of the English; or paragraph 1 of the
20 Q. Can you just tell us, is Anton Dedaj your uncle or can you
21 explain how you are related to him?
22 A. Anton Dedaj is my first cousin, the son of my uncle.
23 Q. Thank you. With that said, are you satisfied that the
24 information that's contained in those statements is true and accurate to
25 the best of your knowledge and belief?
1 A. Yes, I am.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 MR. BEHAR: Your Honour, I would seek to tender those two
4 statements. They both appear under 65 ter 02233.
5 JUDGE PARKER: They will be received.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01030.
7 MR. BEHAR:
8 Q. Ms. Dedaj do you recall testifying at the trial of
10 A. Yes, I do.
11 Q. And have you had a chance to review or to have read back to you
12 in Albanian the transcript of your testimony in that case?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Does that transcript accurately reflect your evidence and would
15 you testify to the same facts again today?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 MR. BEHAR: Your Honours, I would seek to tender that transcript
19 at 65 ter 05058.
20 JUDGE PARKER: It too will be received.
21 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P01031, Your Honours.
22 MR. BEHAR:
23 Q. And I would, Your Honour, seek to tender one exhibit that was
24 tendered in association with Ms. Dedaj's testimony in the Milutinovic
25 case, it's Exhibit 00035. It's a map that was marked by the witness in
1 her testimony.
2 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, it will be received.
3 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P01032, Your Honours.
4 JUDGE PARKER:
5 MR. BEHAR: I can now provide a summary of Ms. Dedaj's evidence.
6 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
7 MR. BEHAR: Ms. Dedaj is from Guska village in the Gjakove
8 municipality. She describes the deployment of VJ and MUP forces in her
9 area beginning in autumn of 1998.
10 She also describes the changes that took place in her village
11 after the 24th of March 1999. She explains that after reportedly
12 executing 8 civilian men --
13 THE INTERPRETER: Kindly slow down for the sake of the
14 interpreters, thank you.
15 MR. BEHAR: -- a VJ commander named Dragan came to her house on
16 the 28th of March and told her uncles to bury those bodies, which they
18 The next day at about 2.30 p.m., VJ forces led by Dragan came to
19 Ms. Dedaj's house once again and expelled her and her family from Guska.
20 She and her family went to Korenica and stayed there for a week.
21 Ms. Dedaj lived in a field. From there she and her family joined a
22 convoy of about 1.000 people. The convoy went to Meje-Orize but was then
23 ordered back to Korenica.
24 Ms. Dedaj and her family took shelter at a house for three weeks.
25 On the 27th of April, 1999
1 everyone out. The women and children were separated from the men, sent
2 out of the house, and made to yell Serbian chants. Ms. Dedaj saw the men
3 inside being lined up by Serb forces. Among those men were her father,
4 her uncle, and her cousin, and a number of men she knew. She heard
5 multiple shots. And when she turned back, she saw the men falling down
6 to the ground. She never saw those men again.
7 Ms. Dedaj saw houses on fire and heard shooting all around. She
8 joined a large convoy of women and children. That convoy passed Meje
9 through Djakovica towards Prizren. In Bishtazhin police stopped the
10 convoy at check-point and separated out more of the men. Ms. Dedaj
11 stayed at her aunt's house in Bishtazhin along with 50 other people until
12 NATO forces arrived in Kosovo. Five years later, the bodies of her
13 father, uncle, and cousin were returned from mass graves in Batajnica.
14 That is the end of the summary.
15 Q. Ms. Dedaj, I do have some brief questions for you in the limited
16 time we have. You explained in your statement that on the
17 29th of March, 1999, Dragan returned to your house with a number of Serb
18 forces and at that time expelled your family from Guska. And you
19 explained that you and your family took tractors and cars and went from
20 there to Korenica.
21 Can you tell me, were other people from your village also
22 expelled at that time?
23 A. Yes. All the inhabitants of the village were expelled from the
24 village and they went to Korenice.
25 Q. Did you observe them being expelled and removed from the village?
1 A. I didn't hear the order, but when we went out in the road, they
2 too left their homes; and we formed a convoy, and all of us headed
3 towards Korenice.
4 Q. You described arriving in Korenica and the VJ and the police
5 ordering you to stay in the meadow, can you explain to the Court where
6 those VJ and police who gave you that order, where they came from? In
7 other words, did you encounter them there or had they been with you
9 A. The forces were those of commander Dragan who came to our house
10 and ordered us to flee. He was there with a group of the VJ and two
11 police cars that escorted us until Korenice.
12 Q. Thank you, ma'am. You mentioned as well in your previous
13 testimony and in your statement that you had stayed in Korenica for a
14 week. Can I explain to the Court how and why it was that you came to
15 leave from Korenica?
16 A. Can you repeat the question, please?
17 Q. Yes. Ma'am, I understand from your statement that you stayed in
18 Korenica for a week, and I'm wondering if you can explain why you left
19 Korenica with that convoy at the time that you left?
20 A. We stayed on the meadow for a week in Korenice, then the order
21 came for us to leave Korenice and leave towards Albania. This happened
22 one week after we were remaining on that meadow.
23 Q. And was there a time when you encountered or joined with another
24 convoy, or was this just the same group of people that moved on from
25 Korenica forward?
1 A. No, there was our convoy from Guske in that meadow we stayed for
2 a week, but people in other village, Korenice, Meje, and some other
3 villages joined the convoy.
4 Q. And just so that I'm clear, when you say in your statement that
5 I'm quoting:
6 "There were about 1.000 people in the convoy that moved from
8 That included other people who had joined from another convoy?
9 A. Yes, that's correct.
10 Q. Can you tell us what ethnicity those people were amongst those
11 1.000 people?
12 A. Yes, they were all Albanian.
13 Q. You explained that the convoy went to Meje-Orize but was ordered
14 back to Korenica, that your family then stayed in the house of
15 Prend Markaj. I know that you've already testified about how on the
16 27th of April, 1999, the Serb forces broke into your house, ordered
17 everyone out, and separated the men from the children. You described in
18 Milutinovic - and I can give my friend the reference, this is transcript
19 page 1413 - that when you were being forced out of the house there were
20 no policemen there, but you said that there were policemen as well as
21 soldiers as you were leaving, and I'm wondering if you can explain that
22 to us, if you can clarify where it was that you saw --
23 THE INTERPRETER: Kindly slow down please, thank you.
24 MR. BEHAR:
25 Q. Maybe I'll just repeat that last part. I'm just wondering if you
1 can explain to us where it was that you saw the police as you were being
2 forced out of the house or afterward?
3 A. Yes. When we left the house there were police and army forces.
4 We saw them along the way. We saw them in front of various houses in
5 Korenice, we saw them in the meadow. Everywhere there were police and
7 Q. So again just so that I'm clear, when you had said earlier that
8 when you were being forced out of the house there were no policemen there
9 but you saw them as you were leaving or after you were leaving, is that
10 correct, were they not inside the house but outside?
11 A. That's correct.
12 Q. Are you able to explain what those police were doing when you saw
13 them there?
14 A. I don't know what they were doing, but I saw them that they were
15 armed. They were shooting all the time. As I mentioned, they were
16 stationed in front of the various houses, along the streets, in the
18 Q. Thank you, ma'am. You also described somewhat later in your
19 statement being stopped at a police check-point at Bishtazhin. You
20 explained that ten young men were separated out from the convoy at that
21 time. You also explained that your cousin Gustin Markaj was released and
22 that he explained to you that he was kept in a wine cellar for a number
23 of days with other men. What I'd like to clarify with you if I could is
24 that you say in your statement - and again the reference is at page 4,
25 paragraph 2, or for my friend it's at paragraph 2 as well of the B/C/S -
1 that further researches were made. And you say after those further
2 researches at the end it was established that these men disappeared and
3 nowadays are still missing.
4 My question for you is if you can explain to the Court what those
5 further researches were? In other words, how did you learn that?
6 A. Yes, I myself wasn't involved in any searches, but this person,
7 Gustin Markaj who was there with those ten males in the wine cellar,
8 after the war was over, he asked the family members of those persons he
9 was staying with in that cellar and from him I learned that those persons
10 disappeared, went missing, and they are no longer found. That was what
11 Gustin Markaj told me.
12 Q. Thank you, ma'am.
13 MR. BEHAR: Those are my questions for you, and my learned friend
14 from the Defence I expect will have some questions for you now.
15 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much, Mr. Behar.
16 Mr. Djurdjic.
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
18 Cross-examination by Mr. Djurdjic:
19 Q. Ms. Dedaj, my name is Veljko Djurdjic, I'm a Defence team member
20 for the accused Vlastimir Djordjevic. First of all, let me extend my
21 condolences for the death of your father and other of your close
23 I didn't intend to ask you any questions, but in view of the
24 corrections that you have made, I just wanted to ask you why did you make
25 these corrections today regarding the police and the vehicles, and why
1 didn't you do that in 2000 when you gave your statement?
2 A. I already said even before that Dragan with some soldiers came to
3 us and ordered us to leave the house and the village within an hour. I
4 also mentioned that there were policemen, but nobody ever asked me
5 whether these policemen were along the way or elsewhere. But during all
6 the time, these two police cars were present.
7 Q. Thank you. I would like to direct your attention to your
8 statement which says that:
9 "On our way to Korenica we were escorted or followed by VJ
11 So if you look at page 3, paragraph 1 of your statement, you'll
12 find it there.
13 A. If you look later on, I say there that when we arrived in
14 Korenice, the army and the police forced us to stay on that meadow. So I
15 have said that there were police and army forces. One thing you should
16 be clear about, when Dragan came to my house, he was accompanied with
17 soldiers, but along the way we were escorted by these two police cars
18 until Korenice.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Ms. Dedaj, we have your
20 statement, we have your testimony today. Thank you for your answers.
21 Your Honours, I have no further questions for this witness.
22 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much, Mr. Djurdjic.
23 Any re-examination, Mr. Behar?
24 MR. BEHAR: No, Your Honours, thank you.
25 [Trial Chamber confers]
1 JUDGE PARKER: Mrs. Dedaj, I am pleased to be able to tell you
2 that that completes the questioning. It had been anticipated that it
3 might take longer. Fortunately it has been extremely quick. We would
4 like to thank you for coming again to The Hague, for the assistance that
5 you have been able to give, not only here today but also in your
6 statement and your previous evidence in the Milutinovic trial. And we'll
7 be taking all of these into account in due course. But we are happy to
8 say that you may now return, of course, with your family to your home and
9 carry on your normal activities. And you go with our thanks. The court
10 officer will assist you.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thanks to you, Your Honours. I
12 feel honoured to have been invited to come here to tell what I went
14 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
15 [The witness withdrew]
16 JUDGE PARKER: How many more witnesses do you think we can finish
17 before the break? The next witness I anticipate cannot possibly be so
18 quick. Is it feasible to spend a quarter of an hour with him, or should
19 we adjourn?
20 MR. BEHAR: I would suggest that we adjourn, Your Honours.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Happy with that, Mr. Djurdjic? Well, we do not
22 sit tomorrow or Friday at the request of the Belgrade district court
23 before which the accused will be giving evidence, so we adjourn now to
24 resume again on Monday and to continue the trial at that time.
25 We now adjourn.
1 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.25 p.m.
2 to be reconvened on Monday, the 29th day of
3 June, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.