Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 6615

 1                           Tuesday, 30 June 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Good morning.  I'd just remind counsel that we

 6     will sit for two sessions of an hour and a half this morning finishing at

 7     12.30.

 8                           [The witness takes the stand]

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  Good morning, Mr. Cvetic.  Please sit down.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.  Thank you.

11             JUDGE PARKER:  The affirmation you made to tell the truth still

12     applies.

13             And now Mr. Stamp has some questions for you.

14             MR. STAMP:  Thank you, Your Honour.

15                           WITNESS:  LJUBINKO CVETIC [Resumed]

16                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

17                           Examination by Mr. Stamp:  [Continued]

18        Q.   Yesterday, Mr. Cvetic, we were speaking about an operation in

19     March 1998 in the Prekaz area and you indicated that the head of one

20     sector at that time, that is RDB, was Jovica Stanisic.  Who was the head

21     of the RJB, that is, public security sector, at that time?

22        A.   The public security sector was headed at the time by

23     Vlastimir Djordjevic.

24        Q.   And was there any target of the action who was prominent in the

25     KLA at the time?  By target, I mean any personality who was a member of

Page 6616

 1     the KLA who was targeted.

 2        A.   Well, in that area of Srbica and Drenica, the Drenica group was

 3     active, I mean, the Drenica terrorist group.  It was led by Adem Jashari.

 4     There were 25 to 30 members of that group.

 5        Q.   And do you know what happened to Jashari and the members of his

 6     family as a result of that action?

 7        A.   He was killed in that operation together with members of his

 8     family, not all of them though.  If I remember well, his daughter

 9     survived.  And the senior commanding officers who commanded that

10     operation had first invited civilians to get out and invited the members

11     of the terrorist group to surrender.  Around 50 of them did, but those

12     who did not leave the base were mostly killed in that operation.

13             Let me add to what I said yesterday, in that operation in

14     addition to the special operations unit, special anti-terrorist units

15     were involved.  Those were the ones that took a direct part in the

16     operation.  Their command post was in the ammunition factory located

17     above and overlooking the Jashari Mahala.

18             In the broader area, the zone was secured by two PJP units.  The

19     37th Detachment of PJP from Nis, and the 24th Detachment of PJPs from

20     Pristina.  Within that 24th Detachment of PJP, there was also a company

21     of PJP from SUP Kosovska Mitrovica.  As the village of Donji Prekaz is

22     within the Srbica municipality, local police from OUP Srbica, the

23     Department of Internal Affairs, was also involved in securing the roads

24     and securing communications.  The security detail for the operation

25     itself was from the SUP of Kosovska Mitrovica.

Page 6617

 1        Q.   Can you recall the names of the commanders on the ground?

 2        A.   Well, the unit for special operations, the JSO, was commanded by

 3     Milorad Lukovic, also known as Legija.  The special anti-terrorist unit,

 4     SAJ, from Pristina, was commanded by Major Spalovic.  The SAJ from

 5     Belgrade was commanded by Zoran Simovic, also known as Tutinac.  I cannot

 6     recall exactly who commanded the SAJ from Novi Sad.  I believe it was

 7     Mr. Curcic [Realtime transcript read in error "Djordjevic"].  All these

 8     special anti-terrorist units, SAJs, from Belgrade, from Novi Sad and from

 9     Pristina were led by Zivko Trajkovic who was on site.  He directed their

10     work, coordinated activities, and provided instructions.

11             In addition, there was also Goran Radosavljevic, Guri, who at the

12     time was head of the section of PJPs in the city SUP.

13             JUDGE PARKER:  Could I ask you to pause a minute, please.

14             Mr. Djurdjic.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, can you hear me?

16             In line 7, the witness said Curcic, C-u-r-c-i-c, and it's

17     misspelled "Djordjevic."  He is from Novi Sad.  In the sentence that

18     begins with "I believe it was ..."  Witness, will you repeat.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said I couldn't remember exactly

20     who commanded the SAJ from Novi Sad but I believe he was called Curcic.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  Continue, please, sorry for the

22     interruption.

23             MR. STAMP:

24        Q.   Thank you.  Can you recall approximately how many members of the

25     Jashari family was killed in the course of the action?

Page 6618

 1        A.   I cannot recall exactly how many members of the Jashari family

 2     were killed in that operation; but in total, around 54 persons were

 3     killed.

 4        Q.   If we could move on, Mr. Cvetic, yesterday we were discussing the

 5     numbers and the fluctuating numbers of policemen in Kosovo and I wanted

 6     to show you a document but I couldn't find the part.

 7             MR. STAMP:  Could we go back to that document.  It's 01224.

 8        Q.   Look at page 2, third paragraph of page 2.  From the first page

 9     you can see that this is a summary of the numbers of policemen in Kosovo

10     on 16th of October, 1998, from the MUP.  It says a total 14.541 uniformed

11     members of the police force were engaged in Internal Affairs tasks in

12     Kosovo and Metohija.  10.021 are from Secretariats in

13     Kosovo and Metohija, and 4.520 are policemen from other Secretariats in

14     the republic.

15             Have you read that paragraph, Mr. Cvetic?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   Does that conform to your memory of the situation at that time?

18        A.   Yes, yes.  I said yesterday that during the anti-terrorist

19     operations that were carried out from the 25th of July until end

20     September, 14.571 policemen were involved in the territory of

21     Kosova and Metohija.  But with the arrival of the verification mission

22     and the Holbrooke-Milosevic Agreement, this number was reduced to 10.021.

23     The unit for special operations was withdrawn from Kosovo then.

24             MR. STAMP:  Could we look at page 6 in English.  This is an annex

25     to the summary.  This is page 5 in the B/C/S.

Page 6619

 1        Q.   This -- can you make it out?  Can you see or do you need it to be

 2     expanded a little bit?  It's a breakdown of the number of police

 3     personnel for each SUP.  Do the figures, particularly those for

 4     Kosovska Mitrovica SUP that you headed, are those figures in accordance

 5     with your memory of the situation at the time?

 6        A.   Yes, yes.

 7             MR. STAMP:  And if we could just revert or go back to the

 8     previous page, the page before the one we are on, page 4 in English.

 9     Sorry, page 5 in English, page 4 in B/C/S.  No, the B/C/S page was

10     correct just now.

11        Q.   This is an organogram of the Ministry of Interior in

12     Kosovo and Metohija.

13        A.   Yes.  Here you can see Secretariats in the territory of

14     Kosovo and Metohija, and internal organisational units that are parts of

15     these Secretariats.

16        Q.   I just want to ask you one question.  You see for Pristina --

17     under the SUP for Pristina you see SAJ Ajvalija can you tell us briefly

18     what that is and what its connection to SUP Pristina was?

19        A.   From here we can see that the special anti-terrorist unit is

20     physically located in installations in Ajvalija which is a place near

21     Pristina, but organisationally it belongs to SUP Pristina.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             MR. STAMP:  Your Honours, I tender the document and ask that it

24     be received in evidence.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.  Is this -- was part of this

Page 6620

 1     tendered yesterday?  Or is this an entirely new document?

 2             MR. STAMP:  I had shown the witness yesterday, but it was not

 3     tendered.

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  Very well.  The whole document will be received.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P1038.

 6             MR. STAMP:  Thank you.  If we could have a look at P769, and

 7     that's document with 65 ter number 4152.

 8        Q.   These are conclusions from a meeting of SUP chiefs and chief of

 9     police departments and commanders in PJP on the 26th of October, 1999,

10     chaired by General Stevanovic.  Do you recall attending that meeting,

11     Mr. Cvetic?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   And the conclusions represented here, particularly the conclusion

14     in paragraphs 1 and 2, were they given effect?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   And this was as, I think, indicated here in pursuant of the

17     November agreements between the KVM and the MUP, or the OSCE and the MUP?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   Could we move on to another issue.  You spoke yesterday about

20     some offensive or an offensive that was conducted between

21     July and September, an anti-terrorist offensive.  During that period of

22     time, as a matter of fact during 1998, did you see the head of the RJB,

23     General Djordjevic, in Kosovo on official business?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   Can you recall approximately how many times?

Page 6621

 1        A.   Well, Mr. Djordjevic was at the meeting of the MUP staff in

 2     Pristina on the 22nd July, 1998.  Then he took part in an operation that

 3     was organised in the area of Malisevo, that was on 28th July.  After

 4     that, on the 1st of September, he attended another meeting of the MUP

 5     staff in Pristina.  And in end September he attended yet another meeting

 6     when the anti-terrorist operations were finished.

 7             On the 5th of November, he was at the MUP meeting in Pristina

 8     when the president of the Republic of Serbia, Mr. Milan Milutinovic also

 9     came, and at that meeting the interior minister, Vlatko Stojiljkovic,

10     communicated that certain staffing changes occurred in the security

11     forces, and Radomir Markovic was appointed head of the state security

12     sector.  I remember these meetings and these events.

13        Q.   Malisevo is not exactly within your SUP territory.  Can you say

14     how you became aware that he was involved in an operation in Malisevo?

15     And just tell us what type of operation it was.

16        A.   Well, I said yesterday that in June and July certain businesses

17     and certain population centres fell into the hands of terrorist groups,

18     and Malisevo was one of them.  At the meeting of the MUP staff in

19     Pristina of the 28th July, attended by the interior minister,

20     Mr. Vlajko Stojiljkovic, and the head of that staff, Sreten Lukic; the

21     head of the public security sector, Mr. Vlastimir Djordjevic, called in

22     by radio and communicated that he was at the petrol station in Malisevo

23     and that as of that day Malisevo was free.  We learned of that at that

24     meeting on the 28th of July.

25        Q.   Did you also in the course of the operations in 1998 see -- well,

Page 6622

 1     let me ask a non-leading question.

 2             Were there any other senior MUP officials that had come to Kosovo

 3     on official business in 1998?  And when I say official business, I mean

 4     in relation to operations that would being conducted against the KLA.

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Who were the various senior persons who attended in Kosovo for

 7     that purpose?

 8        A.   Well, first and foremost, assistant minister,

 9     Mr. Obrad Stevanovic attended.

10        Q.   Did he always attend with General Djordjevic or did they attend

11     at different times?

12        A.   Sometimes with General Djordjevic, sometimes independently of

13     him, and sometimes they took turns.  General Djordjevic would spend some

14     time at the staff before being replaced by Obrad Stevanovic, and so on.

15        Q.   When you say "some time," just approximately how long would

16     General Djordjevic stay in Kosovo during that period?

17        A.   Well, I cannot tell you with any certainty but roughly their

18     stints would be 10 to 15 days.  Sometimes a few days more, sometimes a

19     few days less depending on the situation.  But I cannot be absolutely

20     exact.

21        Q.   And this was in what period?

22        A.   This was in the period in which anti-terrorist operations took

23     place which is between the 25th of July and end of September of 1998.

24        Q.   Before we get to 1999, I think perhaps it would be useful if we

25     could discuss briefly the MUP staff.  You have mentioned it quite a few

Page 6623

 1     times.  Can you recall approximately when General Lukic was appointed

 2     head of the staff?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   When was that?

 5        A.   General Lukic was appointed head of the staff, that is, either of

 6     the staff on 11th of June, 1998.  And heads of SUPs were informed about

 7     this at the meeting at the MUP staff in Pristina by

 8     General Obrad Stevanovic.  On that occasion, General Stevanovic informed

 9     us that there were certain changes in the staff, that the previous leader

10     of the staff, Aco Vasovic, was replaced and that General Sreten Lukic was

11     appointed to this position.

12             The staff of PJPs in Pristina was supposed to be strengthened.

13     In other words, the number of leaders in that staff was to be increased,

14     and for this purpose the decision was made on 11th of June in 1998 to

15     appoint some new people there, and the head of the public security sector

16     signed that decision.

17             MR. STAMP:  Could we look briefly at D100.

18        Q.   This is a decision on the formation of the staff.

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   And if you go to the next page, you see it's signed by whom?

21        A.   This document was signed by the assistant minister department

22     chief, Colonel-General Vlastimir Djordjevic.  This is a decision on the

23     formation of the staff dated 15th of April.

24        Q.   Were you familiar with that document?  Did you see that document

25     in -- sorry, before we move on, what is the date you see there?  I see

Page 6624

 1     15th of May.  Perhaps there's a translation issue.  It's the 15th of May,

 2     isn't it?

 3        A.   Yes, 15th of May, 1998, is the date when this decision on the

 4     formation of the staff was made.  Decision was made by the chief of the

 5     public security sector.  And on 11th of June, the decision was made on

 6     the appointment of the leader of the staff and members of the staff, and

 7     that decision was signed by the same person.  But we are talking about

 8     two different decisions:  decision on the formation and decision on

 9     appointments.

10        Q.   Very well.

11             MR. STAMP:  Let's look at P760.  And could we move on to the next

12     page.

13        Q.   And is this the decision you just referred to, that is, a

14     decision on the composition of the staff?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   Did you receive or were you shown these documents at about that

17     time in mid-1998?

18        A.   Yes.  Yes, yes.

19             MR. STAMP:  If we could move on to P57.  This one is dated the

20     16th of June.  Could we move to the next page.  Could we move to the last

21     page of the B/C/S.

22        Q.   This one is signed by the Minister Stojiljkovic; is that right?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   And in paragraph 6 it revokes the two previous decisions to

25     become effective.  Did you receive a copy of this one at about that time

Page 6625

 1     in mid-1998?

 2        A.   No.  As head of the Secretariat in Kosovska Mitrovica, I did not

 3     receive the decision to establish this ministerial staff at that time.

 4     And I said that this was signed by the Minister Vlajko Stojiljkovic

 5     because I can recognise his signature as head of the Secretariat.  This

 6     is the very first time that I have learned that this particular

 7     ministerial staff for the suppression of terrorism was formed.

 8             As I said yesterday, I know that back in March a Joint Command

 9     was -- a joint intersectorial staff was established for fighting

10     terrorism.  And the head of that intersectorial staff, there was

11     Jovica Stanisic, and his deputy was head of public security sector

12     Mr. Vlastimir Djordjevic.  But this particular decision, this is the

13     first time I'm seeing it.

14             MR. STAMP:  Could we go back to the previous page on both

15     documents, please.

16        Q.   You'll see after the members of the staff are listed, it says,

17     Expanded staff shall also include chiefs of the Secretariats for

18     Internal Affairs, centres and branches of the RDB in the autonomous

19     province of Kosovo and Metohija.

20             Did you consider yourself to be a member of the MUP staff,

21     Kosovo?

22        A.   I was never present at any meeting of this staff which has now

23     been presented to me.  I did not even know about this.  This is the very

24     first time that I'm seeing the decision on the formation of this staff.

25     And I was present at meetings of the MUP staff in Pristina, but when it

Page 6626

 1     comes to this staff for suppression of terrorism established by the

 2     minister of the interior, I was never present at any of its meetings.  I

 3     didn't even know about its existence.

 4        Q.   But if you look at the persons listed here, were these persons in

 5     Pristina present and active at the time?

 6        A.   Here on the monitor I can only see the second page, I cannot see

 7     the first page of the document.  Of the names listed on the second

 8     page -- okay, now I can see the first page as well.  All the persons

 9     mentioned on the first page were active and these persons also took part

10     in the MUP staff in Pristina.  They were members of the MUP staff, and

11     Sreten Lukic was leader of the MUP staff in Pristina.  And now I can see

12     that he was also the leader of the staff for the suppression of

13     terrorism.  I didn't know that at the time.

14        Q.   Let's --

15        A.   I know all the persons listed on the first page.  I know them in

16     person.

17        Q.   And let's go to the second page to see if you know or not know

18     those listed there.

19        A.   Yes.  Some of the persons mentioned on the second page I also

20     know in person.

21        Q.   Well, is there anyone there that you do not know was present and

22     working in Pristina or in Kosovo at that time?

23        A.   Yes, I heard about them, but I do not know them in person, or

24     actually at this moment I cannot remember them, for example,

25     Radovan Vucurevic and Rasko Milenkovic.  All the others I know.

Page 6627

 1        Q.   Thank you very much.  We'll get back to the MUP staff later, but

 2     if we could move on to another organ or organisation.  The operations,

 3     the anti-terrorist operations, in July to September 1998 were conducted

 4     by which forces, apart from the police?

 5        A.   The anti-terrorist operations that lasted from July until end of

 6     September, apart from the police which belongs to the public security

 7     sector, there was also a unit for special operations which belongs to the

 8     state security sector.  Also some other units, units of the Yugoslav Army

 9     took part in that operation, which provided support to the MUP units in

10     certain areas in which the operations took place.

11        Q.   Thanks.  Was there any body or entity set up to coordinate the

12     activities of the various MUP units and the VJ units that were active on

13     the ground in Kosovo?

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   Can you name and describe the functions of this entity, please.

16        A.   That body was called the Joint Command.  In the first half of

17     July, I believe, around the 10th of July, at a meeting of the MUP staff

18     in Pristina, it was stated that a Joint Command was formed.  The task of

19     this Joint Command was to coordinate the activities of the army and the

20     police.  At the meeting of the MUP staff in Pristina held on

21     22nd July, 1998, the head of the public security sector stated that a

22     command was established at the highest level and it was to be called a

23     Joint Command.

24             Head of that command was Nikola Sainovic who at the time was

25     vice-president of the federal government.  Other members of the

Page 6628

 1     Joint Command were Dusko Matkovic, who in the Joint Command was in charge

 2     of the economic development that is of starting up different companies

 3     and developing the economy in Kosovo.  Milomir Minic who was -- who

 4     belonged to the socialist party and for a period of time he was general

 5     secretary of the socialist party of Serbia, he was in charge of the

 6     political issues of working with different organisations and political

 7     activities in Kosovo.

 8             Another member of the Joint Command was president of the

 9     temporary Executive Council, Mr. Zoran Andjelkovic.  His task was to

10     coordinate and direct the work of self-management bodies and different

11     district level bodies, that is, municipalities and districts in Kosovo.

12             On behalf of the Yugoslav Army, a member of the Joint Command was

13     the commander of the Pristina Corps, General -- I'll remember his name

14     later on, I apologise.

15        Q.   General Pavkovic?

16        A.   Yes, General Pavkovic.  On behalf of the Ministry of Interior,

17     the head of the MUP staff in Pristina took part in the Joint Command,

18     General Lukic; and on behalf of the state security sector, we had a

19     leader of the state security in Kosovo, David Gajic.  David Gajic

20     coordinated and directed the work of centres of state security in Kosovo.

21     At the time, there were three of them.  And he was at the level of the

22     assistant head of state security sector.

23        Q.   You said you were told at a meeting on the 10th of July that it

24     was formed.  Who told you that?

25        A.   I can't remember exactly whether it was General Djordjevic or

Page 6629

 1     General Stevanovic, but on July the 22nd it was stated by

 2     General Djordjevic.

 3        Q.   Now, can you tell us what was the role of the Joint Command in

 4     exercising its coordinating functions in regard to the MUP staff

 5     activities and the police activities, and the VJ?

 6        A.   During the anti-terrorist operations for each single

 7     anti-terrorist operation, specific plans were drawn so that the police

 8     developed their own plans and the army developed its plans.

 9             These plans were coordinated, harmonised, at the level of the

10     Joint Command according to different parameters, time, space, and so on.

11     The Joint Command verified these plans and submitted them to the military

12     commanders, PJP commanders, and special anti-terrorist unit commanders,

13     and special operation unit commanders.  So all the tasks planned by the

14     police and by the army, they were harmonised at the level of the Joint

15     Command.  And as such, they were submitted to the commanders of the units

16     that took part in the operations.

17             MR. STAMP:  Could we have a look at 04057.

18        Q.   This is on the face of the document a Pristina Corps Command

19     order to the brigade commanders, and if you look at the second and third

20     paragraphs, it indicates that:

21             "The staff -- the MUP staff of Kosovo and Metohija has issued an

22     order to the Secretariats of the Interior to commence planning actions to

23     crush the terrorist groups that remain in their respective zones of

24     responsibility.  To coordinate action with MUP units in crushing the STS,

25     immediately establish contact with SUP chiefs concerning the following:"

Page 6630

 1     And they list territory.

 2             MR. STAMP:  If we move to page 2 of the English, and I think we

 3     can remain in the same page on the B/C/S document.

 4        Q.   We see the remaining areas where action was to be planned.  Does

 5     this represent the way in which the coordinated action of the VJ and MUP

 6     were planned?  The MUP staff and the Pristina Corps Command would issue

 7     orders for meetings to plan these actions?

 8        A.   Yes.  From this you can see that this was a regular occurrence.

 9     However, one can also draw the following conclusion:  The VJ specified in

10     great detail the units that took part in particular operations, whereas

11     the MUP forces were not specified to a high degree.

12        Q.   If you look at the planned actions for your SUP area in item 3

13     and the various sub-items, do you recall any of those actions actually

14     taking place, being planned and executed?

15        A.   Yes, I remember the Cicavica operation and the Bajgora operation

16     as well.

17        Q.   Cicavica is at 3.1 and Bajgora is 3.4?

18        A.   Yes, 3.4.

19             MR. STAMP:  Thank you.  Could this one be received in evidence,

20     Your Honour.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, it will be received.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P1039, Your Honours.

23             MR. STAMP:

24        Q.   Did you see and become familiar with, in your time in Kosovo, the

25     orders, the Joint Command orders for these military operations or

Page 6631

 1     actions?

 2        A.   For some I did, for some I didn't.  The orders that were

 3     submitted to me in which the Ministry of the Interior in Kosovska

 4     Mitrovica or the SUP in Kosovska Mitrovica had some duties concerning the

 5     execution of these orders; I was informed about them.  But I was not

 6     informed about other orders issued directly to commanders of different

 7     units.

 8             MR. STAMP:  Could we look at 65 ter 01975.  That's P969.

 9        Q.   That's a Joint Command order for Bajgora?

10        A.   Yes.

11             MR. STAMP:  Could the witness be given a copy, I just want to ask

12     him a couple of questions.  Mr. Usher, could you?

13        Q.   The previous document is dated the 9th of April, ordering the SUP

14     members and the -- that is, the police members and the brigade commanders

15     of the VJ to meet to plan these operations.

16             Firstly, is this the format of the Joint Command order that you

17     are familiar with?  You see on the front page a map of

18     Kosovska Mitrovica.  In paragraph 1, a description of the enemy;

19     paragraph 2, the task; paragraph 3, the neighbours; et cetera?

20        A.   Yes, yes.  This is the customary military terminology when

21     issuing orders to subordinate commanding officers.  Such orders may be

22     issued in the form of orders, instructions, or directives.  This is one

23     type of order.

24        Q.   And these were prepared, I take it from your answer, by the

25     Pristina Corps Command?

Page 6632

 1        A.   No.  This was harmonised at the level of the Joint Command, and

 2     you can see in the left top corner, Joint Command, strictly confidential

 3     number, et cetera.  But the draft was probably prepared by the

 4     Pristina Corps.  Let me just mention that there are only minor

 5     differences between an order and a decision.  The order is a bit broader;

 6     it encompasses information about the enemy, neighbouring units,

 7     et cetera, et cetera.  And the decision begins with what is para 4 in --

 8     in an order.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             MR. STAMP:  If we could move to page 3 in the English, and in the

11     B/C/S I don't know the page, but that is item 5.1 and 5.3.

12        Q.   These are the paragraphs or the parts of the order that gives

13     specific tasks to the -- to the units that --

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   For the tasks -- for both of the tasks it says in both 5.1 and

16     5.3:

17             "Support MUP forces in breaking up and destroying the STS along

18     the following axes."

19             Do you know what MUP units -- can you recall what MUP units were

20     involved in these offensives or tasks?

21        A.   You see, this order was taken on the 15th of April, 1999.  Let me

22     just see when combat readiness was envisaged by this order, when the

23     units have to be ready.  Readiness for communications is 25th April, so

24     it was executed from the 25th of April onwards, and it was taken on the

25     15th of April, 1999.  At that time I was not head of

Page 6633

 1     SUP Kosovska Mitrovica because I was relieved on the 16th of April.  All

 2     my duties and responsibilities at the SUP were taken over by a colleague.

 3     So I'm not aware, and I was not interested, which units were involved in

 4     this operation.

 5        Q.   Okay.

 6             MR. STAMP:  If we go back to the front page, the first page on

 7     the English version.

 8        Q.   And for you that is item 2, "Tasks of the Pristina Corps."

 9             "With it's reinforcements and the armed non-Siptar population in

10     Kosovo and Metohija, the Pristina Corps shall support MUP forces in

11     breaking up and destroying STS in its zone of responsibility."

12             Can you tell us in one sentence what you understood the armed

13     non-Siptar population to be?  This is something we return to later, so we

14     don't need to spend too much time on it now.

15        A.   I do not see this in this order, but I can tell you roughly what

16     is understood by that term.  But the term itself, I don't see it in these

17     paragraphs.

18        Q.   Do you see paragraph 2 in respect to the tasks of the

19     Pristina Corps?

20        A.   Yes, it's on page 1, but you said page 2.

21        Q.   No, no, I mean paragraph, sorry.  Could you just read so we can

22     get a spot translation of that first sentence there.

23        A.   "The Pristina Corps with reinforcements and armed non-Siptar

24     population in Kosovo and Metohija, shall support MUP forces in breaking

25     up and destroying Siptar terrorist forces in its area of responsibility."

Page 6634

 1             I wouldn't know exactly what this term was understood to mean by

 2     the person who drafted this order, but thinking logically, I should think

 3     that the Serbian population is meant.  And when I say that, I have in

 4     mind the following facts:  At that time via the Ministry of the Interior

 5     and the MUP staff in Pristina, and through Secretariats of

 6     Internal Affairs in Kosovo and Metohija, a certain amount of weapons were

 7     distributed to the Serbian population.  But those Serbs who received the

 8     weapons were included in reserve police sections, and reserve police

 9     sections had the task of defending their local communes, their villages,

10     their settlements, from various Siptar terrorist forces that were active

11     in the area, that infiltrated themselves into Serbian population centres,

12     and committed arson, looting, kidnapping of people and vehicles,

13     et cetera.

14             That's why it was decided, because of these crimes, to establish

15     reserve police departments and to distribute weapons to the Serbian

16     population.  So it is my opinion, therefore, that the non-Siptar

17     population in this text means that segment of the Serbian population.

18        Q.   Thank you very much.

19             MR. STAMP:  Could we move on to 1968.  That's 65 ter number 0968

20     which is also P971.

21        Q.   This is another Joint Command order, I think you'll see there.

22     And the map -- you can see that accompanying it, it's a map of Kosovo or

23     Kosovska Mitrovica.  On page 2 in the English --

24             MR. STAMP:  Perhaps you could hand a copy to the witness again in

25     B/C/S.  With the assistance of the usher, could we retrieve the one that

Page 6635

 1     he has and give him 1968.

 2        Q.   This is dated the 24th of April.  If you look at the tasks again,

 3     you'll see that it is --

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  Did you mean April, Mr. Stamp, or March?

 5             MR. STAMP:  March 1999.

 6        Q.   At page 2 of the English, we see the tasks expressed in similar

 7     language:

 8             "The Pristina Corps with reinforcements of the armed non-Siptar

 9     population of Kosovo and Metohija shall support MUP forces in defeating

10     and destroying the Siptar terrorist forces in the zone of its

11     responsibility?"

12             I'd like you to look at paragraph 4, and that's on page 3 in the

13     English, and just tell us, if you can remember, this operation which is

14     to support MUP forces in the area described, and if you can, if you can

15     remember the MUP forces.  This is at paragraph 4, the decision.

16        A.   While I was head of SUP in Kosovska Mitrovica, I did not receive

17     this order, and I did not see it.  This is the first time I'm seeing it.

18     And let me conclude, at first sight, there is something illogical about

19     it.  If you allow me to read:

20             The Siptar terrorist forces established the operative zone

21     Drenica with three brigades around 1500 terrorists.  And it says, 114th

22     Brigade, 250 terrorists; 112th, 200; and a third one with 400 which --

23     and another one 300 which makes 700 something.

24             Where do 1500 come from?  I can tell you about this only in

25     general terms, but not specifically because I never received this order.

Page 6636

 1     I know as the head of SUP that the 37th Brigade of the Army of Yugoslavia

 2     was active; the 7th Brigade of the Army of Yugoslavia; PJPs; the unit for

 3     special operations, JSO; and anti-terrorist units, SAJs; and the 125th

 4     Motorised Brigade from Kosovska Mitrovica.

 5             But specifically which units were involved in this operation

 6     under which order, I don't know.  But generally speaking, the units that

 7     I enumerated were active in that area.

 8        Q.   And they are --

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  If I could interrupt.  We have page 3 on the

10     screen which doesn't include any of the information being read by the

11     witness.  Is it page 2 or 4 or what?

12             MR. STAMP:  The information is --

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

14             MR. STAMP:  -- at page -- the question was in respect to page 3,

15     whether he recalled this particular action in this area at item 4; but

16     the witness in his answer referred to forces or units that are mentioned

17     at page 4, page 5, page 6.

18             JUDGE PARKER:  Can we have pages 4 and then 5 and then 6, please.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, sir.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Just a minute, please.

21             MR. STAMP:  Your Honours, if I may, I think the question may have

22     been directed to his reference to the mathematics, and that part of his

23     answer is on the first page in English.  He gave a rather long answer in

24     which he said that he saw an error in the mathematics, that's on the

25     first page.  And then he referred to the units that he knew were

Page 6637

 1     operation in Kosovska Mitrovica, that's on page 4, 5, and 6.  But if we

 2     could look briefly on the first page as well, I think you will see what

 3     he says about the addition.

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

 5             Yes, now, did you want to stay something, Mr. Cvetic?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I did.  I was saying that in

 7     the area of Drenica at that time, the following VJ, Army of Yugoslavia,

 8     forces were operational:  The 7th infantry Brigade, the 37th Motorised

 9     Infantry Brigade, and 125th Motorised Infantry Brigade.

10             As for MUP units, especially PJP units were involved, I don't

11     know.  But PJPs were present.  Which particular detachments, I don't

12     know.  Special anti-terrorist units and the unit for special operations

13     were also present.  From this we can conclude that the two VJ units I

14     mentioned, namely, the 37th Motorised Brigade and 125th Motorised

15     Brigades were involved in these operations.  That is, in the execution of

16     the tasks envisaged by this order.

17             That's what I wanted to say, thank you for your permission,

18     Your Honour.

19             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I don't have any objection.  The

21     witness has explained everything.  But the inferences of Mr. Stamp are

22     wrong.  The witness already said he was not aware of this order and he is

23     just telling us which units were present in that area, which means that

24     Mr. Stamp's inferences do not tally with what the witness has said.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  I haven't grasped Mr. Stamp's inferences yet,

Page 6638

 1     Mr. Djurdjic.  As usual, you are well ahead of me.

 2             Now, Mr. Stamp --

 3             MR. STAMP:  I was asking questions.  I didn't mean to infer

 4     anything.  But I don't want to address on the evidence, the witness has

 5     said that he saw some and he did not see some.

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  Carry on, Mr. Stamp.

 7             MR. STAMP:  Thank you, Your Honours.

 8             If we could move quickly to a couple more of these Joint Command

 9     orders.  02031.

10        Q.   Actually, this is a Pristina Corps order dated the 22nd of March,

11     drafted by the Pristina Corps.  A Joint Command order drafted by the

12     Pristina Corps.  It's again in your area.

13             MR. STAMP:  If we could just scroll down in English to the

14     bottom, please.

15        Q.   I think you had made a distinction between the orders which are

16     broader, and the decisions which are narrower.  This is a Joint Command

17     decision on the 22nd of March, 1999, in respect to an action in Cicavica.

18     Do you recall this order or this action?

19        A.   Yes.  But not concerning Cicavica.  This operation whose

20     objective was to engage the main forces on the axis that we see in the

21     order, Poljance, Trstenik, Prelovac, Likosane, which is far from

22     Cicavica; but the point was to prevent spillout and withdrawal of Siptar

23     terrorist forces in Cicavica.  And the main axis of attack was as I said,

24     Poljance, Trstenik, and Prelovac-Likosane.  The auxiliary axis of attack

25     was Gladno Selo-Likosane and Novo Cikatovo-Trstenik.

Page 6639

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             MR. STAMP:  Your Honours, I tender this and ask that it be -- it

 3     was admitted P972, I'm told.  And the last of these Joint Command orders

 4     we look at the for the time being is 04140.

 5        Q.   This one is dated the 4th of May, and it's actually a

 6     Pristina Corps Command order, and that is after you left.  But you recall

 7     an earlier order that we looked at today in which there was planning for

 8     an operation, you said you remember the operation Bajgora, would this be

 9     the order for that operation that was planned while you were there?

10        A.   Yes.

11             MR. STAMP:  Thank you.  I wonder, Your Honours, if this is a

12     convenient time.

13             JUDGE PARKER:  Is this already an exhibit?

14             MR. STAMP:  No, Your Honour.  But this -- thank you very much.

15     Could it be received in evidence.

16             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P1040, Your Honours.

18             JUDGE PARKER:  We will have then the first break now and resume

19     at 11.00.

20                           --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.

21                           --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.

22             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Stamp.

23             MR. STAMP:  Thank you, Your Honours.

24        Q.   Mr. Cvetic, I'd like us to move on to look at events from the

25     standpoint of the MUP as they developed in Kosovo during the relevant

Page 6640

 1     period.  And in that regard I'd first like to show you this document.

 2             MR. STAMP:  It's 04151.  And the exhibit number is P768 [Realtime

 3     transcript read in error "P7568"]

 4        Q.   These are minutes, rather short minutes, consisting of two pages

 5     actually, of the MUP meeting held on the 22nd of July, 1998, at the

 6     Pristina MUP conference hall.  Do you recall attending that meeting,

 7     Mr. Cvetic?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   And if you have a look at those persons present, does the list at

10     least at the beginning reflect the relative seniority of the persons

11     present at the meeting?  The order in the list, does it reflect the

12     seniority?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   At item 3, we see that Major-General Lukic proposed an agenda

15     that included defining tasks in the implementation of the global plan.

16     What did you understand or what do you understand the global plan to

17     mean, or what would he be referring to there?

18        A.   The global plan was a plan that was prepared for implementation

19     of the anti-terrorist actions that were planned for the 25th of July.

20             MR. STAMP:  And if we could move on to another document, P688,

21     that's 03121.

22             JUDGE PARKER:  Are you tendering this one?

23             MR. STAMP:  I think it's already in evidence.

24             JUDGE PARKER:  What is the number?  Thank you.  The transcript

25     showed 7568, clearly not a right number.  768, apparently.  Thank you.

Page 6641

 1             MR. STAMP:  Thank you very much, Your Honour.

 2        Q.   The next document I'd like you to look at is P688.

 3             MR. STAMP:  And the 65 ter number is 3121.  If we could move to

 4     page 3 in both copies, please.

 5        Q.   And these are the minutes of the MUP staff meeting of the

 6     20th of February -- sorry, I beg your pardon, the 20th of July, 1998.  I

 7     think you had referred to that meeting before in your evidence, and if

 8     you look at the --

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   -- participants, you'll see that you are one of the participants.

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   In the first paragraph there, in his presentation,

13     Major-General Lukic said that the second part or the second phase of the

14     global plan had been carried out in accordance with the established

15     schedule with ten detachments.  Actions were carried out in coordination

16     with the Yugoslav Army, and he stressed that the next task was to

17     liberate and capture Drenica.

18             Could you briefly explain what General Lukic was describing here?

19        A.   You see, the plan that was composed to be for the execution of

20     anti-terrorist actions, it included several phases.  The first phase was

21     to bring units to the territory, or actually, the first phase was the

22     mobilisation and bringing of the units, PJPs, to the territory of

23     Kosovo and Metohija.  On that occasion to the territory of -- in the

24     territory of Kosovo and Metohija, there were ten detachments of PJPs that

25     were stationed at various Secretariats throughout Kosovo and Metohija.

Page 6642

 1     The bringing of these forces required the next phase, and this is was

 2     accommodation and deployment of personnel, of forces, their learning

 3     about the plans, and specific tasks for each single unit.

 4             So the first phase completed, this means that mobilisation was

 5     completed, that forces were brought there, and that the units learned

 6     about the tasks of respective units; and now they were supposed to move

 7     to the second phase of this plan.  Obviously I do not have this plan in

 8     front of me right now, so I cannot be entirely certain in claiming what

 9     this second phase is supposed to be.  But most probably, this was the

10     implementation of the specific tasks as specified by the global plan,

11     give that the first two phases were completed.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             MR. STAMP:  If we could now move on to page 7 in the English,

14     page 8 in the Serbian version.

15        Q.   And I see you made a presentation there.  But what I'd like you

16     to focus on for the time being is what was said by Captain Pesic,

17     Captain Blagoje Pesic, did you know him before?  Or could you tell us who

18     Captain Pesic -- Captain Pecic was at the time?

19        A.   Yes, as you can see here, it was captain Blagoje Pesic and he

20     worked at the staff of PJPs.  His task was to plan, organise, and train

21     reserve police units.  I knew him in person.

22        Q.   And do you recall him making the presentation that we see

23     represented here about the reserve police station?  Well, first, could

24     you just tell us, we see here that he says:

25             "We formed 243 reserve police stations."

Page 6643

 1             That is what we have in the English translation.  But these RPOs,

 2     are they reserve police stations with fixed buildings or offices or are

 3     they reserve police detachments or units which was a word you used

 4     earlier?  Could you just explain what an RPO is.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic.

 6             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, I'm not sure what the

 7     transcript says, but I hear the interpretation as reserve police stations

 8     and the witness talked about reserve police departments or units, so this

 9     is a very large difference because the police station is an institutional

10     formation and reserve police department or unit is something very

11     different.  So when we are talking about departments or squads rather --

12             JUDGE PARKER:  The question, Mr. Djurdjic, is asking the witness

13     to explain more precisely what was meant, so your uncertainty may be

14     clarified by the answer.  Thank you.

15             Do you remember the question, Mr. Cvetic?

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course.  The first thing I would

17     like to say is that indeed Captain Blagoje Pesic at this meeting talked

18     about the training, or sorry, about the formation of reserve police units

19     and possible problems expected with their formations, so he informed us

20     about what was done up to that moment as regards the formation of reserve

21     police squads or units.

22             Let me explain what these reserve police squads are.  In

23     June of 1998 at a meeting of the MUP staff in Pristina --

24        Q.   Mr. Cvetic, we are going to get into these squads in more detail

25     later.  I just wanted to clarify for the time being that the RPOs are

Page 6644

 1     reserve police squads, that's what it refers to?

 2        A.   No, no.  This is personnel that was formed or established in

 3     every single village, in every single inhabited area, to protect their

 4     inhabited area.  They were formed following military conventions, so they

 5     had a commander, deputy commander, and a certain number of members.  But

 6     they were not permanently mobilised.  They did not have a separate venue

 7     or facility, and they did not function as an organisational unit.  So

 8     they only became an organisational unit at the time when they were

 9     mobilised to defend their village from the attack launched by the Siptar

10     terrorist forces.  And after the end, they all left to their respective

11     homes.

12        Q.   We have here an acronym in the English translation that we are

13     using:  RPO.  What does that mean?

14        A.   This means reserve police squads.

15        Q.   Thank you.  We'll get to those squads in more detail later on.

16     Was this the meeting you were at when General Djordjevic called to report

17     on the action in Malisevo?

18        A.   No.  I was at the meeting at the MUP staff in Pristina on

19     July the 28th when General Djordjevic called in via radio transmitter and

20     stated that he was at a petrol station in Malisevo, and that as of that

21     day, Malisevo was free.  This was what was conveyed to us, and I'm not

22     aware that he reported on anything.

23        Q.   Very well, thank you.

24             MR. STAMP:  If we could move on to document 02528.  Perhaps if we

25     could look at the second page in B/C/S.  We could remain on the first

Page 6645

 1     page in English, or we could look at the second page in English as well.

 2        Q.   This is a dispatch sent by the head of the MUP staff of the

 3     21st of October, 1998.

 4             MR. STAMP:  And if we could go back to the first page.  Item 3.

 5        Q.   Were these instructions you received from General Lukic on how to

 6     receive and deal with the KVM monitors?

 7        A.   Yes.  These were not only instructions issued by General Lukic,

 8     but this was the position of the Ministry of the Interior, or actually,

 9     the position of the state politics of the Republic of Serbia, and it was

10     merely conveyed through the ministry staff to us.  So after the arrival

11     of the mission to Kosovo and Metohija, after

12     Milosevic-Holbrooke Agreement was signed, there were some 2.000 verifiers

13     in the area of Kosova-Metohija, and we got instructions on how to treat

14     representatives of the OSCE mission, instructions on our mutual contacts,

15     exchange of information, and so on.  So, yes, this is correct.

16        Q.   I think you are saying that the MUP staff was a conduit for these

17     instructions which came from high up, from the ministry itself?

18        A.   Yes, as I said, the MUP staff served as an intermediate command

19     which linked the ministry and lower ranks.  So the information coming

20     from the ministry when sent to the Secretariats in Kosovo were sent via

21     MUP staff, usually.  Although sometimes we also received information

22     directly from the ministry; it all depended on the type of information.

23     But this particular information came from the MUP staff in Pristina to

24     heads of Secretariats.

25             MR. STAMP:  And if we scroll down a little further, I think you

Page 6646

 1     want page 2 in the B/C/S, we could have a look at item B on the front

 2     page in English, and then move on to the second page in English as well.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can see that.

 4             MR. STAMP:

 5        Q.   The obligation to report, as mentioned here by General Lukic, was

 6     this mandatory and was this complied with?

 7        A.   Yes.  This is a type of methodological instruction that was

 8     submitted to the heads of Secretariats, and it considered the way in

 9     which they should treat the representatives of the OSCE mission and what

10     is it that they should report on to the staff.

11             As a Secretariat, we were obliged to fully comply with everything

12     that is listed here, not only this, but we were also obliged to receive

13     OSCE mission, to accommodate them, to guarantee their full safety and to

14     cooperate fully with the OSCE mission.  We were obliged to exchange

15     information with them on a daily basis.  And as a head -- as the head of

16     a Secretariat in my own facility in my own office, I received OSCE

17     mission representatives and informed them about all the significant

18     events and occurrences.

19             They also asked for certain security related problems in Kosovo

20     to be resolved in accordance with the law and in accordance with what was

21     agreed within the Milosevic-Holbrooke Agreement.

22             Apart from me, the authority to be in touch with the OSCE mission

23     was also given to commanders of the police stations and also personnel

24     working at check-points, so police officers working at intersections,

25     traffic police, they could also be in conduct with OSCE mission

Page 6647

 1     representatives.  But it was clearly stipulated which level could share

 2     what type of information.

 3        Q.   Thank you very much?

 4             MR. STAMP:  Your Honours, could this one be received and given an

 5     exhibit number.

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, it will be.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P1041.

 8             MR. STAMP:  If we could move on to have a look at another

 9     document very quickly, this is P770, 65 ter number 02805.  And we could

10     move straightaway to page 3 of this document.

11        Q.   These are minutes of a meeting held on the 5th of November, 1998,

12     at the ministry staff in Pristina, and it was attended by various leading

13     figures in the republic at the time.  Do you see the attendees of this

14     meeting?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   Do you recall this meeting?  Did you attend this meeting?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   And the minutes here indicate that the president of the republic,

19     Mr. Milutinovic, made a presentation in respect to your obligations under

20     the Milosevic-Holbrooke Agreement.  Do you recall that?

21        A.   Yes.  It was given in 11 points.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             MR. STAMP:  We could move on to another document P689.  And it's

24     65 ter number 03122.  And we could go straight to page 3 in both.  These

25     are minutes of the meeting of the ministry staff, chiefs of the SUPs, and

Page 6648

 1     commanders of the detachments of the Special Police unit on the

 2     2nd of September, 1998, in Pristina.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, the 2nd of December, 1998, in

 4     Pristina.

 5             MR. STAMP:  I am sorry, thank you.

 6        Q.   And do you recall attending this meeting --

 7        A.   I can remember this meeting.

 8        Q.   If you look at the first paragraph, you'll see that

 9     Major-General Lukic made a presentation in which he said that, and I'll

10     just read it:

11             "That on the 27th of November, 1998, in Belgrade a meeting of the

12     Ministry of Interior which was chaired by Minister Vlajko Stojiljkovic

13     was attended by the chiefs of the departments of the JB, that is public

14     security, and the DB, state security, assistant ministers, head of the

15     MUP staff in Pristina, and Nikola Sainovic."

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Could you please read a bit slower for the

17     interpretation.

18             MR. STAMP:  Pardon me.

19        Q.   "The current security situation in Kosovo was examined in the

20     meeting in which the duties and further engagement of members of the

21     police in Kosovo were defined.  The essence of the meeting was to

22     continue execution of anti-terrorist actions aimed at suppressing

23     terrorism in Kosovo, and that in this regard the police will be more

24     offensive in taking measures in the newly-arisen situation."

25             Firstly, did General Lukic frequently brief the heads of the

Page 6649

 1     organisational units in Kosovo about meetings that he had with the police

 2     leadership in Belgrade?

 3        A.   Well, no.  When he had meetings he would sometimes, depending on

 4     the topic, say that he had just been at the meeting in the

 5     Ministry of Interior and he would share with us what had been said,

 6     sometimes not, depending on the topic of the meeting and whether there

 7     was any need to inform heads of Secretariats.  It was up to his

 8     judgement.  Sometimes he would inform us, sometimes he would not.  How

 9     many times he attended meetings at the ministry and what was discussed at

10     those meetings, I really don't know.

11        Q.   Very well.  Now, having regard to the first paragraph, the part I

12     just read about the persons who attended this meeting, and what was the

13     purpose of the meeting and the topics discussed, can you comment based on

14     your knowledge as to who were the top decision-makers within the police

15     force on the use and engagement of police units in Kosovo?

16        A.   Well, the decision to engage the police in suppressing terrorism

17     in Kosovo was made only at the level of the Ministry of Interior.  The

18     decision was made by the minister and his closest associates, or perhaps

19     sometimes by a person authorised by the minister.

20             When PJP units were to be sent to Kosovo, it was usually head of

21     the public security sector who gave the authorisation.  He was the one

22     who made the decision to send police to perform security tasks in Kosovo.

23     But the command over those units was exclusively in the hands of unit

24     commanders.

25             Once the decision to send and engage units in security tasks in

Page 6650

 1     Kosovo was made, specific tasks to those units were given also by the MUP

 2     staff in Pristina as the body directly on the ground that had an insight

 3     into the overall security situation.  And it was based on this assessment

 4     of the overall security situation that the MUP staff issued tasks to SAJ

 5     units and PJPs, but not to the JSO because they had no command over them.

 6             And the execution of these tasks was exclusively within the

 7     purview of the unit commander who had command in a particular area of

 8     responsibility.

 9        Q.   Very well.

10             MR. STAMP:  If we look at page 8 in the English and page 7 in the

11     B/C/S.  Are we there?  Could you scroll down to the bottom of page 7 in

12     the English copy.  It's end of the document in both.

13        Q.   We see here that Lukic -- General Lukic, or Mr. Lukic, gave

14     instructions for the commanders present to submit a plan for the

15     prevention of terrorism in their areas.  I'm just trying to get a better

16     understanding of the chain of command from the ministry in Belgrade to

17     the units on the field in Kosovo.  And what I'd like to ask, as a result

18     of this instruction, were activities planned on the ground level, that

19     is, by units operating on the ground or heads of units operating on the

20     ground in Kosovo?

21        A.   Well, you see, operations in the combat against terrorism have a

22     two-pronged role.  There are two types of operations:  offensive and

23     defensive.  In this specific case that we see on this page and that is

24     specified in the plan on fighting terrorism, this plan is basically a

25     plan of defence, a plan to defend population centres and territory, and

Page 6651

 1     to enable free passage and traffic of people, goods, and communications.

 2             This part of the plan was taken care of by

 3     Secretariats of the Interior.  However, offensive plans drafted at the

 4     level of the ministry and the army and that were harmonised at the level

 5     of the Joint Command, they were then handed down to units that were to

 6     execute them.

 7             So those are offensive plans.  And this plan is defensive for

 8     contingencies such as defending yourself from terrorist attacks.  And you

 9     can see from the paragraphs that it is a plan of defence.

10             MR. STAMP:  If we could move on to document 03116.  It's a

11     document dated two days later, the 4th of December, 1998.  3116.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Perhaps you refer to 2166, Mr. Stamp.  I can't

13     open 3116.

14             MR. STAMP:  3116, I think.

15             May I just have a moment, Your Honours.

16                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

17             MR. STAMP:  It's maybe -- I don't know if it will help if I say

18     03116.  Yes.

19        Q.   This draft plan of the Internal Affairs organs in Glogovac for --

20     to prevent terrorism, 4th of December, 1998.

21             MR. STAMP:  If you could just go to the end of the document.

22        Q.   We see that there's an area for the signature of the chief of the

23     Secretariat, Colonel Petric, Colonel Bosko Petric.  Who was

24     Colonel Bosko Petric?  Did you know him?

25        A.   Well, I know him.  Bosko Petric was the chief of SUP in Pristina

Page 6652

 1     at the time, and he was chief of SUP in Uzice before that.

 2        Q.   To the right of that you see that the plan was made by the

 3     chief of OUP, Major Petar Damjanac.  Who was he?  Do you know him?

 4        A.   OUP Glogovac was organisationally part of SUP Pristina.  This

 5     plan was drafted by the chief of the OUP Internal Affairs department in

 6     Glogovac, whom I do not know.

 7        Q.   But do you know the name Petar Damjanac, or did you know the name

 8     at that time?

 9        A.   Yes, the name is familiar, but I don't know the person.

10        Q.   And this is a plan prepared, I take it, in response or in

11     compliance with the previous document we had seen, the instructions from

12     General Lukic of the 2nd of December?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   Thank you.  So on the basis of these documents, could you just

15     tell me if my understanding of what you are saying is correct, that the

16     leadership of the police including the Minister Stojiljkovic; the chief

17     of the RDB, Mr. Markovic; the chief of the RJB, Mr. Djordjevic; and other

18     senior members like the assistant ministers would formulate the policy

19     and define the task and the engagement of the police, and that was

20     conveyed sometimes to the SUPs directly, and sometimes to the ministry

21     staff?  In this case with these documents General Lukic and ...

22             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this is a direct

24     examination.  This broad question contains a number of inferences by

25     Mr. Stamp.  I know this witness cannot be easily misled, but I believe it

Page 6653

 1     would be more appropriate to answer proper -- to ask and answer proper

 2     questions.

 3             Mr. Stamp in his question has already concluded what is done at

 4     what level and how it is executed, and now he wants the witness to

 5     confirm.  And by the way, the witness answered two questions ago exactly

 6     how decisions and plans were made.  This is a leading question.

 7             MR. STAMP:  This is a leading question, Your Honours, but this

 8     question arises from evidence already given by the witness and how the

 9     documents are to be interpreted, and I'm merely asking him if the summary

10     I give of his evidence and the documents is correct.  It is leading

11     question, but it is based on the evidence that has already been given and

12     the natural meaning of the words in the documents.

13             JUDGE PARKER:  Well, you are doing two things, Mr. Stamp.  You

14     are bringing into the answers contents of documents that have not been

15     the subject of specific oral evidence so far.  So you are not merely

16     summarising what the witness has said, you are summarising documents that

17     have been tendered and what the witness has said.  I am afraid that's a

18     step too far.

19             MR. STAMP:  Very well, Your Honours.  I will accept that and move

20     on, Your Honours, so that we can --

21             JUDGE PARKER:  The question is gone, Mr. Djurdjic.  Your

22     objection has been successful.  As ever.

23             MR. STAMP:

24        Q.   How will you explain, Mr. Cvetic, or relate plans formulated by

25     the units or the groups on the ground in Kosovo to the decision-making by

Page 6654

 1     General Djordjevic and the minister in Belgrade?

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your suggestion was not

 4     successful, Your Honour.  Mr. Stamp again concluded himself who made

 5     plans in Belgrade.  Let me just remind you that the witness said

 6     decisions were made by the minister or a person authorised by the

 7     minister.  Those decisions were handed down to Kosovo where they were

 8     executed by the commander, and specific tasks were issued by the staff.

 9     Now, Mr. Stamp should say what type of plan he means in his questions,

10     because there is a number of plans.

11             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Stamp, you have introduced into your question

12     a very big factual disputed matter.

13             MR. STAMP:  Sorry, Your Honours.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  You may want to ask how were decisions made at the

15     ministry implemented, but you come to the point of introducing specific

16     decisions of the accused and the minister without distinction.

17             MR. STAMP:  Yes, but I think the witness testified about those.

18     However, I will withdraw the question and I think, as usual, the way it

19     is formulated by Your Honours is perhaps the best way to go about it.

20        Q.   How were decisions made at the ministry level by either the

21     minister himself or the chief of the public security department

22     implemented by the forces on the ground in Kosovo?

23        A.   To be specific in answering this question, I would kindly ask you

24     to specify your question to a higher degree.  Do you mean to ask

25     decisions only taken during the anti-terrorist actions, or during the

Page 6655

 1     state of immediate threat of war, or the war?  Or you mean the overall

 2     period in Kosovo?

 3             If you mean the overall period in Kosovo, each ministry developed

 4     its own programme of work which was an annual programme.  That annual

 5     programme specified concrete tasks in every area of security work.  That

 6     programme, or rather, it's extract was delivered to each of the

 7     33 Secretariats on the territory of Serbia.  And based on that plan,

 8     based on that programme, each Secretariat would develop its own plan for

 9     the following year, specifying their objectives, how to attain them,

10     specific tasks and who was responsible for them.

11             Specifically, if you want to know about the events that triggered

12     anti-terrorist actions or the events that followed the immediate threat

13     of war situation, you would find decisions that say that the decision was

14     made exclusively by the minister or a person authorised by the minister.

15     As a rule, the authorised person was head of the public security sector.

16             Why do I say that?  Because I personally held dispatches on the

17     sending of units to Kosovo and Metohija to perform special security

18     tasks, and they were signed by the head of the public security sector

19     General Djordjevic.

20             Now, speaking of the execution of such decisions, the decision to

21     engage units is one segment in the chain of control.  Another segment is

22     command.  Command was within the exclusive purview of the executing

23     units.  But how did they command?  They commanded on the basis of plans

24     previously made at the level of MUP staff and at the level of the army.

25     These plans were harmonised at the level of the Joint Command.  And then

Page 6656

 1     in the form of orders or decisions, they were handed down to units on the

 2     ground.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic.

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It's not an objection,

 5     Your Honour.  In line 19 -- sorry, page 19, line 15 and 16.  It wasn't

 6     recorded that it was the minister of person authorised by the minister

 7     who made decisions to send.  I was mistaken about the page number, the

 8     page number is 40.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  I'm not sure what your concern is.  What I have

10     recorded indicates that decisions would stipulate if they were made

11     exclusively by the minister or by a person authorised by the minister.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, but what is missing is that

13     those were decisions to send.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Stamp, you might clarify that with the

15     witness.

16             MR. STAMP:

17        Q.   What sorts of decisions were you referring to in your answer in

18     respect to the anti-terrorist action in Kosovo?  What sort of decisions

19     by the authorities in Belgrade were you referring to?

20        A.   You see, the people that I mentioned who were at the top of the

21     pyramid of the ministry in Belgrade, the minister, heads of sectors, and

22     even certain assistant ministers, took the decisions to send units.  They

23     write this decision in the form of dispatch.  This dispatch is sent to

24     Secretariats.  And it says that on such and such a day and such and such

25     an hour they should send such and such a unit somewhere on the territory

Page 6657

 1     of the Secretariat.  It is further specified which vehicles they will

 2     use, what kind of weapons they will take, et cetera.  That's the decision

 3     sent in the form of dispatch.

 4             Now, the other decision to execute combat operations is something

 5     entirely different.  Nothing to do with the first type of decision.  That

 6     decision is taken at the level of the MUP staff in Pristina and the army.

 7     It is then harmonised at the level of the Joint Command, and it's an

 8     entirely different type of decision that specifies the tasks of combat

 9     units in specific operations in Kosovo.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Since you have mentioned these decisions, maybe we

11     could look at a couple of documents and ask you what they are about.

12             MR. STAMP:  Could we look at 4134 quickly, please.  And

13     it's P138.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Do you mean to tender --

15             MR. STAMP:  Yes, Your Honours, I'm so sorry.  Sorry.  Could this

16     one be received in evidence as well.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter number 3116 will be

18     Exhibit P1042.

19        Q.   This is a MUP dispatch of the 18th of March, 1998, to SUP chiefs

20     and PJP detachment commander, and I think you can see on your copy that

21     it is signed for the chief of the public security department

22     General Djordjevic.  It's probably self-evident from the face of the

23     document, but can you tell us briefly the purpose of this document?  What

24     is this about?

25        A.   This is the right question.  This is the decision to send units

Page 6658

 1     to carry out special tasks in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija in the

 2     form of a dispatch, and it regulates all the issues that I previously

 3     mentioned.  And here you can see that it was signed by head of the public

 4     security department, so this is the way in which the heads of

 5     Secretariats received orders, through this kind of dispatch.  And then

 6     also at the ministry level, such dispatch could be signed by a different

 7     person who was authorised by chief of the public security department.

 8     And usually it would be the person in charge of these particular types of

 9     units.  That person would sign a dispatch as authorised by the head of

10     the public security department, it would be submitted to the

11     communications centre, and communications centre would forward it.  And

12     the heads of the Secretariat were informed to prepare their -- and

13     organise their units and send them on such and such a date to such and

14     such a place.

15             The same is true when it comes to withdrawal of units from

16     Kosovo and Metohija for a period of rest.  Usually they stayed in Kosovo

17     for 40 days and after that they would be replaced or withdrawn.

18             So here you can see that this dispatch was not signed by

19     General Djordjevic but it was signed upon his authorisation which was a

20     regular practice at the ministry.

21             MR. STAMP:  Just as another example, if we look briefly at 4135.

22     That is 04135, which is P139.  If we could just look at the front page

23     and then the next page quickly.

24        Q.   That's another example of what you just described, Mr. Cvetic?

25        A.   Yes.  And all such dispatches that I could see were written

Page 6659

 1     following the same methodology.

 2             MR. STAMP:  Thank you.  To round off this area, may I -- could we

 3     go back to this document P689.  This is 03122.  Page 3 in both Serbian

 4     and English versions.

 5        Q.   And again referring to the briefing by Mr. Lukic about the

 6     meeting he attended in Belgrade on the 27th of November, 1998.  If you

 7     could read that first paragraph again and --

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   My question may be a little obvious, but I'll ask it anyway.

10     What sort or types of decisions were made at these meetings, the meeting

11     that Mr. Lukic described?

12        A.   Lukic here described the situation which was analysed by the

13     Ministry of the Interior together with heads of public security sector

14     and state security sector, and attended -- this meeting was attended also

15     by Mr. Sainovic.

16             The situation analysed by the MUP staff in Pristina is an

17     overview of the security situation in all the Secretariats.  So the

18     current topics and problems are discussed and what needs to be done in

19     order to raise the security level.

20             All heads of Secretariats and all commanders of PJP detachments

21     describe the situation in their respective territories, that is, in their

22     Secretariats; and commanders of other units, for example, special

23     anti-terrorist units, would describe the situation this their units, the

24     situation and the problems.

25        Q.   What I'm asking is this:  The meeting involving Mr. Stojiljkovic,

Page 6660

 1     Mr. Djordjevic, Mr. Markovic, Mr. Sainovic, what types of decisions were

 2     made at these meetings?

 3        A.   At these meetings, decisions were not made.  They simply analysed

 4     the situation, and then later on this was transformed into certain

 5     conclusions, and these conclusions were incorporated into certain plans

 6     for the engagement of units.  This is my understanding of the issue.  I

 7     am not sure if I was clear enough.

 8        Q.   Yes, I think it's probably that I'm not understanding or I didn't

 9     understand what you meant when you say they analyse the situation and

10     then this was transformed into certain conclusions.  Would you explain

11     that further what you mean, They analyse the situation, it was

12     transformed into conclusions which are incorporated in plans.

13        A.   You see, the political and security situation was analysed and

14     there was a very specific methodology whereby the political and security

15     situation was described on the basis of an analysis of the political

16     security situation, conclusions were drawn.  And on the basis of these

17     conclusions, specific tasks were made which were then incorporated into

18     plans for individual units.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             MR. STAMP:  If we could move on to another document, 3130.  And

21     that is P690.  This is another MUP staff meeting.  I think we could move

22     straight to page 2 of this one.

23        Q.   These are the minutes of the MUP staff meeting of the

24     3rd of November, 1998.  And --

25             MR. STAMP:  Could we have page 2 of the B/C/S as well, please.

Page 6661

 1     Or, it's page 3 of the B/C/S, I'm so sorry.

 2        Q.   Do you recall this meeting, Mr. Cvetic?  Did you attend it?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   And I see here it says:

 5             "Following the speech of the chief of the Secretariat."  I think

 6     there is a mistake there, it think it should be the chief of the staff,

 7     "the following conclusions were adopted," and number 1 was that:

 8             "The basis of your activities is a report by the president of the

 9     Republic of Serbia, Milan Milutinovic.  In respect to various discussions

10     as well as the agreement signed by Colonel-General Vlastimir Djordjevic

11     and the head of the USA Diplomatic Mission Mr. Shaun Byrnes?"

12             Do you remember those discussions and those conclusions at that

13     meeting?

14        A.   Yes, yes.  I can just state that this is okay.  After the

15     speeches of the chiefs of the Secretariats, not after the speech of

16     General Lukic.  General Lukic chaired the meeting.  He greeted everybody

17     present and gave the floor to chiefs or heads of Secretariats so that

18     they could describe the situation this their respective areas.  And

19     pursuant to these reports, certain conclusions were drawn.  This is what

20     I previously stated.  So this is one example of how these conclusions

21     were drawn on the basis of the analysis of the situation.

22             So yes, I can recall this meeting and whatever is stated here is

23     correct.

24             MR. STAMP:  Could we move on to page 3 of the English.  That's

25     page 4 of the B/C/S.  Item 10.

Page 6662

 1        Q.   If you could just comment on it, help us to understand what was

 2     being -- what this conclusion meant and if it had an effect.

 3        A.   Yes.  This conclusion is quite all right.

 4        Q.   Well, when it says at the end:

 5             "Commanders and deputy-commanders will take command of the

 6     dispatched units - "A" units of the PJP - and all units will come under

 7     the Secretariats."

 8             What does that mean, and did these PJP units come under the

 9     Secretariats thereafter?

10        A.   No, this is not what these conclusions say.  These units were

11     not -- they could not be -- and if anybody wanted to put them under

12     command of Secretariats, this could not be effected.

13             The Secretariat when it comes to PJPs had the following tasks:

14     First of all, to accommodate PJPs in the facilities, so to provide

15     accommodation, to provide food, health care, sanitation; to secure

16     necessary number of vehicles, if needed, by PJPs; also to secure weapons

17     so that whatever was used up could be replaced; and so on.  So these were

18     the functions of the Secretariats as regards the PJPs.  So simply to

19     provide logistics.

20             Within the command system, it is clearly stipulated who commands

21     which units and who can make decisions on the use of particular units,

22     and you cannot make any decision that would change that.  And this --

23     these conclusions certainly are not doing that because the commanding and

24     functioning are two very different things.

25             Let me explain.  Commanding is one part of controlling, and

Page 6663

 1     functioning of the Secretariat simply means carrying out the tasks as

 2     stipulated by the Law on the Interior.

 3        Q.   Thanks for that clarification.

 4             MR. STAMP:  If we could move on to item 8.

 5        Q.   If I could read from about the middle of that item:

 6             "Make sure that Serbs and members of the RPO" - properly

 7     translated here as reserve police squads - "do not misuse weapons, let

 8     off guns at weddings, celebrations of Slava, farewell parties, and so on.

 9     Do not carry weapons or show them in public in the presence of members of

10     the mission.  When on guard duty, use one weapon and prevent individuals

11     from bringing in the weapon they have been issued.  Tell them not to

12     state the fact that the Serbs are armed and to explain this fact, if they

13     must, using the excuse that it is only members of the guard who are

14     armed."

15             Was this one of the conclusions that was drawn at this meeting?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   Was there a particular reason to -- or not to reveal to the

18     mission, the KVM mission, the degree to which the Serb population was

19     armed?

20        A.   In my opinion, there was no justified reason for this because it

21     was done publicly, that is, through the public security sectors, through

22     the staff and Secretariats, so everybody knew about this.  Serbs were

23     issued weapons to protect their villages, to defend their villages, so to

24     protect themselves and to defend their villages from the entry of the

25     Siptar terrorist forces.  And the weapons could only be used for these

Page 6664

 1     purposes.

 2             However, there were occasions when weapons were misused by the

 3     Serbs.  They would fire off weapons at weddings, different religious

 4     facilities, and so on; so whatever is list is here is absolutely correct.

 5     Certain measures were taken against some individuals.  The weapons were

 6     taken away from some people and later on returned.

 7             When it comes to the OSCE mission, there was no reason to hide

 8     from them that Serbs were armed.  But they were armed through reserve

 9     police squads, and this was also legitimate, covered by an instruction

10     adopted at the level of the ministry which was to form reserve police

11     squads at level of inhabited areas, and to issue arms weaponry to the

12     population there.

13        Q.   And that is your opinion, I take it, so therefore you didn't

14     agree necessarily with the concealment of this -- of the degree to which

15     the Serbs were armed -- or very well, the question is withdrawn.  Could I

16     just check one --

17        A.   No.  To be more specific, there was no reason to hide anything.

18     We were supposed to provide all the information to the OSCE mission.

19     This was a verifying mission, and the goal of all of us of the political

20     structures at Kosovo as well were to carry out the decisions of the top

21     leaders of the state, and this was to present all the facts to the OSCE

22     mission so that they can determine what could be a proper solution for

23     the problems in Kosovo.  So for that reason, no hiding was necessary, and

24     why some people decided to hide some things, I really don't know.

25        Q.   Thanks.

Page 6665

 1             MR. STAMP:  Could we move on to document 0991.  This is a MUP

 2     meeting of the 21st of December.  Sorry, 01991.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  That last document is already an exhibit, is it?

 4             MR. STAMP:  The last one, 3130, it is an exhibit.  Yes,

 5     Your Honours, it is 690.

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

 7             MR. STAMP:  And, Your Honours, I wonder if it's a convenient time

 8     because I will probably spend some time on this document.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  Very well.  We will adjourn now as indicated to

10     resume tomorrow morning at 9.00.  You are watching your total time, I

11     take it, Mr. Stamp.

12             MR. STAMP:  Yes, Your Honour.  I will have to, it seems, beg the

13     leave of the Court to go somewhat beyond it, it seems, at the rate we are

14     going.  But we'll try to make it up, -- we can make it up with other

15     witnesses that we could shorten.

16             JUDGE PARKER:  We encourage you and give you great strength in

17     your task of going quicker, and Mr. Djurdjic will have the same

18     encouragement.

19             MR. STAMP:  Very well, Your Honours.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  But we recognise some things are important and

21     need to be covered.  We must now adjourn again, sir, because of a special

22     need.  We will continue tomorrow morning at 9.00.

23                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 12.30 p.m.,

24                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 1st day of

25                           July, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.