1 Tuesday, 18 August 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.17 p.m.
5 [The witness takes the stand]
6 JUDGE PARKER: Good afternoon.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good afternoon.
8 JUDGE PARKER: I would remind you the affirmation you made to
9 tell the truth still applies.
10 Yes, Mr. Hannis.
11 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honours.
12 WITNESS: MILAN DJAKOVIC [Resumed]
13 [Witness answered through interpreter]
14 Examination by Mr. Hannis: [Continued]
15 Q. Good afternoon. General --
16 A. Good afternoon.
17 Q. -- I would like you to help us in understanding how you
18 participated in coordinating the VJ and MUP anti-terrorist actions in
19 1998. And if I could start with the -- one of the items we looked at
20 yesterday, it's Exhibit P1232. And I've got a hard copy of that if the
21 usher would hand that to you. This is that 14 August 1998 decision
22 concerning breaking up Siptar terrorist forces in the Slup and Voksa
23 villages sector. Now, this involves tasks for both VJ units and MUP
24 units; is that correct?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. How would this information get from the Pristina Corps to the
2 MUP? Can you tell the Judges how that worked. How did the MUP know what
3 they were supposed to do and where they were supposed to be in carrying
4 out this action?
5 A. Information was received at the level of the operations -- the
6 operative organ of the Pristina Corps command and the operational and
7 logistics department of the MUP staff; in other words, when a decision is
8 adopted to use forces and when this decision is adopted or actually
9 issued by the commander of the army and when he approves that decision,
10 on the basis of that decision we would then proceed to coordinate and
11 plan the activities foreseen. In other words, there would be an exchange
12 of information and data, and also we would agree on the forces that are
13 to be used in a certain operation. In other words, the MUP would
14 determine what forces they need to use and what complements and the army
15 would on their part also determine which forces to use in order to
16 provide support to the MUP along a certain axis.
17 Now, I have to explain something here. Coordination is to define
18 cooperation and joint action in every aspect. This also means that there
19 needs to be very precise coordination at all levels, not only at the
20 staff level of the MUP and the Pristina Corps but also coordination at
21 the level of combat groups and Special Police units and police
22 detachments and other units.
23 Would you like me to provide more detail? I can do that.
24 Q. Yes, once General Lazarevic had signed this decision and it was
25 approved by General Samardzic, how did it get implemented in the field at
1 that level? How did this information get from this document out to the
2 troops who were going to carry out the action? If you could explain that
3 process for us.
4 A. I can only assume how it worked in Djakovica because I was not
5 there in this particular -- on this particular occasion, but I know how
6 we worked in Pristina. As a matter of principle, once a decision is made
7 to break up forces within a certain area, once the MUP forces know where
8 they will be used and the army forces know where they will be used, then
9 we would proceed to coordinate the operation at a lower level, at the
10 level of their employment. In other words, for instance, the units would
11 be brought to a kilometre or two from the area where they are to be used,
12 where the commander of the combat group and the supporting unit would
13 meet. Now, usually they would be there together, but it's not
14 necessarily so. And if they were not in the same spot together, then
15 they would have to provide -- they would have to make sure that they had
16 some means of communication, usually a Motorola would be used, a radio, a
17 hand-held radio; and they could use these Motorolas in order to meet this
18 criterion, in other words to provide communications with the army
19 commander. But in most cases, both commanders were at the same spot and
20 they would determine when support was needed, when the army needed to
21 provide support to the MUP in a certain operation.
22 Q. Okay. Take, for example, this document. Item 2.1 says that:
23 "Battle group 15-3 is to support an attack of the 8th MUP
24 Detachment and the Djakovica PJP ... along the following axes ..."
25 And it describes a line from a certain village another village,
1 et cetera. How did the 8th MUP Detachment and the Djakovica PJP get the
2 information about where they were going to carry out the attack? Did
3 they get a copy of this document? Did they get a map? How did they
4 know, and where did that information come from?
5 A. They would receive excerpts from the Pristina Corps as a basis
6 for coordination. In other words, in order for them to be able to
7 coordinate their action with army units, they would have had to receive a
8 certain assignment. And when they are issued an assignment, the
9 assignment is defined strictly as provided for, both for the unit that is
10 participating in the action and the support unit, otherwise it would be
11 impossible to coordinate their action. In other words, once they receive
12 these excerpts, they would have to judge, assess, the situation in the
13 same way that an army commander would do it, to see who was on their left
14 flank, on the right flank, who was providing support in the rear, what
15 kind of surprise they can expect. And based on that they would formulate
16 their main action and decision. And on the basis of this, the MUP
17 commander would use his own forces. Coordination, the purpose of
18 coordination was only to make sure that no friendly fire came about to
19 be, so that they would have to coordinate their participation, their
21 Q. I understand. That makes sense to me. But where -- from where
22 did the MUP -- the 8th MUP Detachment and the Djakovica PJP get the
23 excerpt from this document? Who provided it to them? Did
24 General Lazarevic send it to the 8th MUP Detachment? Did that come from
25 your section? How did this information get from this document to the MUP
1 detachment in the field? You said an excerpt of this document, so was it
2 something that was copied or cut out and pasted? How did that work?
3 A. In 1998 most documents were prepared at the Pristina Corps
4 command as -- they were prepared as excerpts for police units. And it
5 was also possible in the event that the -- General Lazarevic was at the
6 Djakovica IKM, he could carry out those activities in the same manner
7 that General Pavkovic, for instance, would do from Pristina because there
8 was a part of command that was there with him who could actually carry
9 out these tasks. And once an operation is completely coordinated and the
10 final solution has been defined, then they would make excerpts from them
11 that would relate to what the application or the employment of the MUP
12 forces would be. And some of these items would be provided in short form
13 in order for them to know where -- what the neighbouring units are, and
14 other assignments would not be defined for the MUP units because they
15 would have to define them themselves. That had to do -- that would
16 usually relate to security, to providing medical assistance, to treatment
17 of prisoners, wounded personnel, and so on. In other words, the tasks
18 that the MUP defines for themselves, the same way that the army defines
19 it for themselves. In other words, they would be provided with a certain
20 number of assignments or some aspects of the assignments, and the other
21 aspects they would have to define themselves.
22 Q. For those, those decisions that you helped work on, how did you
23 deliver excerpts to the MUP concerning the tasks that they had to carry
24 out? Who did you send it to and how did you transmit it, the excerpts
25 for a MUP unit that was going to carry out an action in the field?
1 A. If there were multiple participants, then we would have to
2 coordinate via the staff because we could not issue the excerpts
3 directly. But if it was a lower-intensity operation, then -- if
4 General Lazarevic, for instance, was in Djakovica, he probably would not
5 send this to Pristina again, but rather with the chief of the Ministry of
6 the Interior in that territory he would probably coordinate the operation
7 with him, which is quite in keeping with our regulations. In other
8 words, it wasn't only the MUP staff that was in charge of coordination;
9 coordination was also carried out at the level of secretariats, combat
10 groups, detachments, all the way down to the lowest-level unit. So there
11 were various versions.
12 Q. In Pristina you said that if it involved multiple participants,
13 then you would coordinate via the staff. Do you mean the MUP staff at
15 A. Yes, the MUP staff.
16 Q. And was there a particular individual that you dealt with in
17 forwarding these excerpts?
18 A. As far as operations were concerned and the logistics part, for
19 the most part I was in contact with Mr. Adamovic because I was referred
20 to him by the MUP commander and Mr. Mijatovic.
21 Q. Okay. Do you recall Mr. Adamovic's first name at the MUP staff?
22 A. Dusan, I believe his first name is Dusan.
23 Q. Now, in addition to the text, the excerpt from this decision, was
24 there also a map that was delivered to the MUP?
25 A. Yes, the excerpt the same way as the excerpts from the decision.
1 Q. Okay. If I could show you now --
2 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, this is a document ID number
3 D004-3062. This was not on my original list of documents I intended to
4 show the witness, but the Defence this morning indicated to me that they
5 planned to use it. I asked if I could go first and use it, and they had
6 no objection.
7 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
8 MR. HANNIS:
9 Q. I have a hard copy, too, General, that I can hand you that may be
10 easier for you to see than what's on the screen. Do you recognise that
12 A. This is a lower-level map, whereas the map that I would take to
13 General Samardzic, it would relate to a wider area. So this would be an
14 excerpt from the decision that was approved by the army commander, but I
15 know that for these joint operations at Voksa were -- I know that it was
16 approved, but I did not see this one because it was at the Djakovica IKM,
17 whereas the one that General Samardzic approved, the one that I took to
18 General Samardzic to approve, it also included the villages of Stup, Voks
19 and some others.
20 Q. I see in the upper left-hand corner what appears to be the name
21 and the signature of General Samardzic; is that correct?
22 A. Once he approved - I've already explained this procedure - he
23 would use a highlighter to approve that decision. He would use -- and
24 this one here was -- as far as I can see, it was a simple pen, felt pen.
25 But I know that he would usually approve such decisions in the same way
1 that you see the pen that is used for General Pavkovic at the bottom. So
2 he would approve the excerpt from this portion and probably he was --
3 somebody took this to him to also approve this because he would approve
4 everything. And I'm sure that he approved the operation Voks and Stup
5 and the use of the forces there. The last time I had another map which
6 was the original map. The last time you showed me the original map that
7 I took to them for approval. Now this is something quite different.
8 Q. Okay. Well, I don't -- I don't recall what map we showed you
9 last time, but this -- this does appear to be a map related to that
10 decision signed by General Lazarevic, isn't it?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Okay. Because we see on the map what appears to be the
13 designation for the 8th MUP Detachment and for Battle Group 15-3, et
14 cetera, around the area of Slup; correct?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Okay. All right. Thank you. That's all I needed to ask you
17 about that right now --
18 A. This is Voksa --
19 Q. I'm sorry, I misspoke. Voksa.
20 A. Yes, this relates to Voksa.
21 Q. Okay. And you say this was a lower-level map, so is this what
22 the MUP unit, the 8th MUP Detachment would have in hand, a map like this,
23 to see where they were supposed to be, or would it be something even
25 A. Yes, yes.
1 Q. Okay. All right. Thank you. Now, lastly I want to talk
2 about -- well, two topics. The first is MUP subordination to the VJ or
3 lack thereof. You're aware, aren't you, General, that during the war
4 there was an issue about whether or not the MUP should be subordinated to
5 the VJ for purposes of combat? You knew about that?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And as I understand it there was a constitutional provision that
8 allowed for that to take place; were you aware of that?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Did the VJ General Staff or General Ojdanic ever issue any order
11 to try and have that take effect?
12 A. The General Staff attempted to do that. There was an order from
13 the 18th of April, I believe, that was received on the 18th of April, and
14 that decision did not come to be implemented because the explanation that
15 was given was that the organs of the Ministry [as interpreted] of the
16 Interior did not receive an identical order from the Ministry of the
17 Interior of Serbia
18 explanation provided.
19 Q. Okay. I'll ask some more questions about that. But before I
20 forget, can I tender D004-3062 of the map?
21 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01237.
23 MR. HANNIS: Thank you. Now could we see -- oh, I see
24 Mr. Djurdjic on his feet, sorry.
25 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] There is an error in the
2 transcript. The witness said that organs of the ministry had not
3 received orders from the minister, that's what it should say, not from
4 the ministry, so from the minister of the interior.
5 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
6 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
7 MR. HANNIS: If next we could see Exhibit -- or 65 ter number
8 01267. If I could show you a hard copy -- well, I see the whole page is
9 on the screen, so if we could just have a look at that.
10 Q. General, this is a document dated the 20th of April, 1999
11 General Lazarevic to his subordinate units. And he's ordering units and
12 organs of the MUP to be resubordinated to the VJ brigade command. And do
13 you see the first paragraph in this order where it says: "Pursuant to
14 the order by the Supreme Command Staff" it cites the number "of 18 April,
15 1999, and an announcement of the 3rd Army command of the 20th of April,"
16 he's issuing this order. So it appears you were right, it was the 18th
17 of April that there was an order of the Supreme Command for this
18 subordination to take place. Did you ever see General Lazarevic's order?
19 A. I'm aware -- I know of this order and I also subsequently saw an
20 order that had arrived from the General Staff of the army to
21 Pristina Corps, sent to Pristina Corps to do with resubordination. And I
22 also know of this order from General Lazarevic.
23 Q. And did you also see the order that General Pavkovic had sent out
24 passing on basically the order from the Supreme Command Staff?
25 A. Yes, yes, that is -- that was done within the army, and I was
1 already within the army at this time as an operations organ.
2 Q. Okay. And it appears in the list of addressees at the very
3 bottom of the order - we'll have to see page 2 of the English - that this
4 order from General Lazarevic also went to the Pristina MUP staff. Do you
5 see there -- do you see that listed? I think it's the last one.
6 A. Yes, I see it.
7 Q. Now, after you -- well, where were you on the 20th of April
8 physically located, or the 18th/19th of April, whenever the order first
9 came down to where you were?
10 A. On the 18th of April, General Pavkovic received this dispatch; on
11 the 19th I remember that I wrote an order that had to do -- that dealt
12 with refugees and some other matters; and on the 20th I was probably also
13 physically there. I can't recall with certainty that there was any
14 special thing that I did then, but I know that for sure that on these
15 days I was in Pristina.
16 Q. Okay.
17 MR. HANNIS: Before I move on could I tender 01267 at this time.
18 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01238.
20 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
21 Q. After this order from General Ojdanic was received, did you or
22 General Pavkovic have any contact with the MUP about how this was going
23 to be implemented?
24 A. We had a contact sometime in the afternoon. I spoke about this
25 at a trial last year. It was around 1700 or 1730 hours. We were in a
1 room, I think in the building of Kosovska Banka or somewhere else because
2 at the time we had to move around because of the air-strikes. A few
3 officers and us were sitting there. At one point a group of officers
4 from the MUP entered the room, the ones from Pristina, and they joined us
5 at the desk where we, five or six officers of us from the Pristina Corps,
6 were sitting.
7 Q. Let me take this step by step. This meeting took place at
8 this -- you think it was in the bank of Kosova. That was in Pristina?
9 A. Yes, in Pristina, and I believe it was the bank building, but I'm
10 not quite sure, but definitely in Pristina.
11 Q. And the meeting took place on the same day that you had received
12 the Supreme Command Staff order?
13 A. Yes, in the afternoon.
14 Q. Do you know who arranged the meeting?
15 A. I had no information about any impending meeting because
16 General Pavkovic, Lazarevic, and I and other officers were conducting
17 some informal conversation. We gathered together, and I think that
18 General Pavkovic then informed someone from the MUP staff or some officer
19 from the police, and that subsequently they came to this room where we
20 already were.
21 Q. And do you recall who from the VJ was in the room when this
22 meeting took place? You mentioned yourself and General Pavkovic. Who
23 else was present that you recall?
24 A. I definitely remember General Lazarevic being there and maybe
25 another two or three colonels, but at this point I'm not quite sure. I'm
1 only sure about General Lazarevic, Pavkovic, and myself.
2 Q. And who from the MUP came in and participated in the meeting?
3 A. Mr. Djordjevic, Mr. Lukic, and Mr. Obrad Stevanovic were the
4 persons from the MUP who came.
5 Q. And what happened at the meeting? Who started talking first and
6 what about?
7 A. When the gentlemen from the Ministry of the Interior arrived,
8 they sat next to each other, and General Pavkovic, since
9 General Djordjevic sat next to him, he handed him the telegram for him to
10 read it without explaining anything. Now, whether they had heard about
11 this previously or not, I don't know; all I know is he gave him the
12 telegram to read. Maybe after a minute or so, because it was a short
13 telegram, Mr. Djordjevic gave the telegram back to General Pavkovic and
14 added, What do you mean Ojdanic? Who does he think he is that he can
15 command? There will be no subordination until we receive such an
16 instruction, an order, from the minister.
17 Q. And the telegram you're referring to is the one that you had
18 received from General Ojdanic and the Supreme Command Staff? That's the
19 one that was handed --
20 A. Yes, General Pavkovic --
21 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Resubordination, not
23 MR. HANNIS: Okay.
24 Q. And after that remark from General Djordjevic, what happened next
25 in the meeting? Did you have any further discussion about the issue?
1 A. I was personally somewhat surprised because I had no knowledge
2 about the telegram to begin with, and we never expected this issue to be
3 raised. Secondly, there were no comments on the part of other organs.
4 Some informal conversation lasted for a couple of minutes, and after that
5 we split without having defined anything because basically prior to that
6 there had been no problems during the conducting of the operations. The
7 main problem was the issue of resubordination and the reason why this did
8 not happen was simply the absence of the order from the minister
9 instructing the police to do so. So that applied to the whole period of
10 1998, which meant that there could be no action without specific order
11 from the MUP commander and the persons in charge, which only makes sense,
12 and this is how it should be.
13 Q. All right. Now, in spite of that did the MUP -- did the VJ,
14 after 18, 19, 20 of April, continue to issue orders that contemplated MUP
15 being subordinated to the VJ? Do you understand that question?
16 A. I understand your question. It's clear. There were attempts at
17 all levels to define this by means of an order pursuant to
18 General Lazarevic's order. Equally, the same applied to brigade
19 commanders. This was not only the problem at the MUP staff level, but it
20 was a problem also within the PJP and other units that could have been
22 Q. Okay. Let's look next at 65 ter number 01269. I can give you a
23 hard copy of this one. This is dated the 8th of May, 1999, from
24 General Pavkovic concerning the deployment of VJ and MUP forces in combat
25 and control of the territory, an order. Have you seen this document
2 A. Yes, I have and I am the author of this document.
3 Q. I think you explained before on the last page, directly across
4 from General Pavkovic's signature and stamp, we see your initials
5 followed by a slash and someone else's initials. Is it correct that the
6 initials of the person on the left are the one who drafted the document?
7 A. Yes, the first initials MDj is the author, in this particular
8 case it was me, and this other person was the typist.
9 Q. Okay. And in this order it appears that Pavkovic is trying to
10 direct how MUP units are going to be deployed for certain purposes. And
11 I see handwritten at the top it says:
12 "Pristina MUP to General Lukic personally ..."
13 Do you know who wrote that in?
14 A. This was written by General Pavkovic.
15 Q. And do you know if it was delivered to General Lukic personally?
16 A. Yes, it was. I did, however, warned the general that they were
17 not going to carry this out, but he replied, It's up to us to forward
18 this to them. That was his only comment.
19 Q. Okay.
20 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I'd like to tender 1269.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, yes.
22 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
23 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
24 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received with the official translation
25 we have. There is another translation which is not official.
1 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01239.
3 MR. HANNIS:
4 Q. Next, General, I'd like us to look at 65 ter number 01723. I can
5 give you a hard copy of this one as well. This is dated the 24th of May,
6 1999, from General Lazarevic to General Pavkovic as the commander of the
7 3rd Army. Have you seen this document before?
8 A. I saw it while it was being drafted.
9 Q. Do you know who drafted it?
10 A. According to this, it was Vladimir Lazarevic himself and this
11 must be accurate because General Lazarevic was in the habit of quickly
12 writing reports in order not to waste time, because he thought that, just
13 like General Pavkovic, he could explain certain things much better.
14 Q. Okay. And if you'll go down under the order to the fifth bullet
15 point where it talks about the work of mixed check-points of the MUP and
16 military police. Do you find that paragraph?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And you'll see in there that he talks about there are problems
19 and salient issues since the MUP tolerates criminal activities of its
20 members against the Siptar civilian population, murder, rape, looting,
21 robbery, and so on. Were you aware of that problem -- were you
22 personally aware of that problem on the 24th of May, 1999?
23 A. Not to this extent. There were certain incidents of the kind,
24 but as for rape -- I know that there were thefts; I know that there were
25 car thefts and thefts of household appliances. There were some isolated
1 cases, but here you don't see the scale and the extent of this. If they
2 say just rape, it would be two rapes or 50 rapes. And by the way, this
3 particular issue was not within my purview and my area of interest, and I
4 was not in charge of following these developments. I may have heard
5 something during the briefing at the command, but that would be all.
6 Q. And you don't know where General Lazarevic got his information
7 from that led him to write that in his report, do you?
8 A. No, no, I don't. I can only assume that he received it either
9 from the commanders or from his assistants, and that is to say security
10 organs. So it either came from the commanding officers or he got it from
11 a security organ. I don't believe that he personally witnessed all these
12 events because he would have then formulated it in a different way, in a
13 completely different way.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 MR. HANNIS: I would like to tender 1723.
16 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, it will be received.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01240.
18 MR. HANNIS: And the next one if we could look at Exhibit P888,
19 already in evidence, I believe.
20 Q. General, I can give you a hard copy of this next one as well.
21 And this one, you'll see, is the very next day. And this one is from
22 General Pavkovic. By the initials it looks like he, himself, was the
23 author. And it's to the Supreme Command Staff concerning subordination
24 or resubordination of the MUP. Did you see this document back in 1999?
25 A. Again, while it was being drafted.
1 Q. And he, too - I think it's in item 3 on the first page - passes
2 on information about problems at the joint check-points and that the MUP
3 members condone or openly permit evident criminal activities and plunder
4 committed by their fellow MUP members as well as civilians resulting in
5 appropriation of vehicles, et cetera. And on the next page in item 4 he
6 talks about the noncompliance with resubordination, and he goes on to
8 " ... some MUP members and to a considerable extent entire
9 smaller units, which 'operate' independently on the ground are committing
10 serious crimes against the Siptar civilian population in settlements or
11 refugee shelters - murder, rape, plunder, robbery, ..."
12 Now, do you know where General Pavkovic was getting his
13 information? Was it based solely on the report he had gotten the day
14 before from General Lazarevic, or did he have some additional source?
15 A. I suppose that his main source was General Lazarevic's report,
16 because General Pavkovic did not have enough personnel from the army
17 command in order to cover these issues. These issues were mainly covered
18 by the section that was part of the Pristina Corps, that is to say
19 subordinate commands and security organs and command organs who were
20 capable, first, of feeding information to General Lazarevic; and
21 subsequently, General Pavkovic probably acquired the same information as
22 the one that was written and recorded by General Lazarevic.
23 Q. And the last thing I'd like you to look at in this document is
24 the last paragraph called: "Measures Proposed." Do you see that?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And he is urging the Supreme Command to take urgent measures
2 falling within its jurisdiction to resubordinate the units and organs of
3 the MUP in the spirit of the Constitution and existing laws in accordance
4 with the proclaimed state of war or, otherwise, annul the order on the
5 resubordination and then:
6 "... leave the command and commanding of the forces of the MUP of
7 the Republic of Serbia
8 Interior - Staff of the MUP of the Republic of Serbia
9 Metohija through the Joint Command as has so far been the case."
10 So it seems that on May 25th, 1999
11 under the impression that the MUP units have been commanded through this
12 body called the Joint Command; that's what it says. Isn't that correct?
13 MR. HANNIS: I see Mr. Djurdjic on his feet.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can you please stop. My learned
16 friend Mr. Hannis arrived at a conclusion that does not derive from what
17 he has just read. I wouldn't like to go any further in belabouring this
18 issue, but if you think that I am right, then I would kindly ask for your
19 indulgence to allow me to explain. I think that the conclusion is quite
20 the opposite to the one reached by Mr. Hannis judging by the citation.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic, this appears to be a material point.
22 I think it is a matter to be dealt with by cross-examination if you take
23 a different view. Thank you.
24 Mr. Hannis.
25 MR. HANNIS:
1 Q. General, do you need me to repeat my question?
2 A. No. I understand.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 A. My opinion is - and given that I attended the meetings of the
5 Joint Command and this part which refers to the general's proposal to
6 annul the order, which is only logical. He says either to annul the
7 order or to continue to implement coordination and separate planning and
8 actions by the MUP and the army, but under the coordination with the
9 coordination - and I always add mutual coordination - of the
10 Joint Command. If this order is annulled, then the previous practice
11 could continue separately with coordination, but each segment would be
12 responsible for their respective tasks and units. This is what
13 General Pavkovic had in mind. So that was the practice that was applied
14 before because the MUP organs had not been subordinated to the army
15 units. He proposes that this situation can continue, but in that event
16 the corps cannot assume responsibility for the actions of other
17 participants in the zone unless they are subordinated to the
18 Pristina Corps. This was the idea of General Pavkovic.
19 Q. Well, did he tell you that personally, or are you just assuming
21 A. I know that because the two of us had frequent contacts. I am
22 fully familiar with how he thinks and what his views were. He did not
23 mind the fact that the MUP was not subordinated, but he did not want to
24 take responsibility for something that he cannot give orders for, and it
25 only is reasonable.
1 Q. Okay. I agree, that's reasonable.
2 MR. HANNIS: Can we next look at 65 ter number 01281. If we
3 could look at the --
4 Q. Now, if we could look at the -- this is from the VJ web site on
5 the internet on the 14th of June, 2001. And have you seen this before?
6 Did -- was this shown to you previously?
7 A. Yes, during the briefing, and I am aware of the events that are
8 described here and I learned about them from the media.
9 MR. HANNIS: And if we could go to the bottom of the B/C/S page,
10 the big paragraph there is the one I want to focus on. And for English
11 we actually have to go over to the next page, page 2.
12 Q. You're aware that around this time in 2001 that there was some
13 public debate or discussion between General Pavkovic and the
14 then-Minister of the Interior, Dusan Mihajlovic, that centred around the
15 publicity concerning the freezer trucks with bodies that had been found
16 in the river during the war; is that right?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And the minister of the interior had made some allegations
19 suggesting that the army had been involved or perhaps involved in that;
20 is that correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. If you'll look at that paragraph 4, about halfway through the
23 paragraph, General Pavkovic is talking about how -- it's translated here
24 in the English as:
25 " ... it is true that the national defence law regulated that
1 police units in the responsibility zones were bound to subordinate to the
2 commands of the Yugoslav Army. However, this never came into
3 existence ..."
4 And you agree with that, right, the MUP never was actually
5 subordinated to the VJ in 1999?
6 A. Yes, not in the classical sense as one would understand the
7 meaning of resubordination.
8 Q. And if you'll be patient and follow along with me just a little
9 bit more. He goes on to say:
10 "The Police had their own headquarters, headed by their own
11 officers, and the cooperation with the Army was coordinated through
12 political actors in Joint Command, formed for the purpose. Therefore,
13 the information to what the police force units were doing can best be
14 provided by the police commanders and the members of the Joint Command in
15 charge of them."
16 Now, General Pavkovic seems to be suggesting that Joint Command
17 included political actors.
18 A. This is what the text reads, and this is how he put it.
19 Q. Okay.
20 A. If this text is completely accurate.
21 Q. Well, this was posted on the VJ web site. You have no reason to
22 believe that that's not correct? You never heard of General Pavkovic
23 coming out and denying he said this, did you?
24 A. I know that the meaning is accurate, but I cannot vouch say for
25 every sentence being accurate. I'm not expressing any doubts.
1 Q. Fair enough. Thank you.
2 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I'd like to tender that exhibit.
3 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
4 Mr. Djurdjic.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I object to this document being
6 admitted. This is a site that was taken off another site, and the
7 witness is providing an opinion of something that he learned from the
8 press. He doesn't even know whether this article is correct and
9 accurate. He said that the spirit is there but he cannot guarantee for
10 the accuracy of the comments, and I think that this kind of documents and
11 exhibits should be introduced through someone else, not through this
12 witness. This site was taken off another site in 2001. How this took
13 place, whether this is an official site or an unofficial site and who did
14 that, I don't know; therefore, it makes this totally unreliable. And I
15 particularly object to the witness giving his opinion about what he is
16 not quite sure and on what he has not sufficient knowledge.
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE PARKER: The Chamber will receive this document. Some of
19 the matters raised by Mr. Djurdjic may in time be relevant to weight when
20 the Chamber comes to assess the nature of the document, but on its face
21 there is a sufficient indication of reliability and the knowledge of the
22 witness at the time is sufficient in the Chamber's view to support the
23 admission of the document.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01241.
25 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
1 Q. Now, General, I just have three more items to show you and these
2 all are sort of matters of general information about the VJ in 1998 and
3 1999. The first one I wanted to show you is 65 ter number 02556. I
4 think we have this in English only I believe, but this is a document that
5 was shown to you during proofing. And my question for you: Does this
6 document accurately reflect the organisational structure within the VJ in
7 1999 -- because it shows General Ojdanic as the Chief of the General
8 Staff or the Supreme Command Staff. Does it accurately reflect all the
9 VJ units that were under General Lazarevic in the Pristina Corps in 1999?
10 I don't know if you're able to read it on the screen. Do we need to
11 enlarge it?
12 A. Yes, could you just enlarge it a bit.
13 Q. Is that any better for you?
14 A. It's better. This is an organigram that reflects the structure,
15 but I would have to make some corrections. General Pavkovic is the
16 Pristina Military District; and where it says Zlatomir Pesic as the
17 commander, he was actually resubordinated to General Lazarevic in April
18 and they were under the immediate direct command of General Lazarevic.
19 And he also resubordinated parts of the detachment to the brigade
20 commander. So he was the command of the army in 1998, and he commanded
21 directly with the military district of Pristina, but as of April 1999 he
22 actually ceded the command to General Lazarevic and the commander of the
23 Pristina Corps. That would be my intervention here.
24 Now, as for the second, the commander of the 15th Armoured
25 Brigade, that's correct; 125th, correct; 243rd Mechanised, correct;
1 549th Motorised, correct; 52th Mixed Artillery, correct; 52nd Mixed Air
2 Defence and Rocket Artillery Brigade, correct; 37th -- I think it's the
3 37th, Djikovic, yes, that's the brigade that was resubordinated from
4 Raska to General Lazarevic. In other words, it is not an establishment
5 unit; it was just resubordinated for the purposes of combat operations in
6 Kosovo. The 354th is our unit of the Pristina Corps. The 58th also the
7 establishment unit. 175th is the resubordinated brigade from the
9 211th was another Nis Corps unit which was resubordinated. The 252nd, I
10 cannot quite make out what unit this is referring to, 252nd --
11 Q. It says armoured brigade.
12 A. Oh, armoured, yes. That was also a unit that was added to or
13 joined to this. And the 72nd Brigade, I remember -- well, you actually
14 asked me during the proofing session, and then I subsequently recollected
15 that General Perisic did not approve the resubordination of the entire
16 72nd Brigade, but only the scout company and, I believe, a police unit,
17 reinforced company, or something of that level. And he kept this as a
18 reserve, although --
19 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter's note: Could the witness
20 please repeat the last portion of his answer referring to whom it was
21 resubordinated to.
22 MR. HANNIS:
23 Q. Did you hear the interpreter? There was a request that you
24 repeat the last portion of your answer referring to whom it was
25 resubordinated to.
1 A. The 72nd Special Brigade was not, in its full complement, part of
2 the Pristina Corps. General Pavkovic asked General Ojdanic to
3 resubordinate the entire 72nd Special Brigade to him. And the reply he
4 received in writing was that this was not approved, not the
5 resubordination of the entire 72nd Special Brigade because there was
6 already a scout unit as part of the corps from the 72nd Brigade and
7 another unit of the rank of a reinforced company up to the level of
8 battalion of the police complement. The 63rd Parachute Brigade only
9 participated with one unit, one combat unit -- one combat group both in
10 1998 and 1999. The 52nd Military Police Battalion, this is an
11 establishment unit of the Pristina Corps. The same is true of the
12 52nd -- I don't know if this is the medical unit. I know that it exists,
13 but I'm not sure. I can't really make out what this here stands for.
14 Q. In English it says "reconnaissance and diversionary company."
15 A. Oh, right, reconnaissance or scout company. Yes, I couldn't read
16 that, I couldn't see it. Yes, that's also a unit that is part of the
17 establishment of the Pristina Corps. Then we have the 53rd Border Guards
18 Battalion, that's a battalion that was on the border with the Republic of
20 the 75th Border Guards Battalion was on the border with the Republic of
22 Pristina Corps.
23 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, General.
24 I move to tender that, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01242.
2 MR. HANNIS:
3 Q. Next, General, 65 ter number 01548. This was another document I
4 think you were shown during proofing, and in the English translation
6 "Rule on official correspondence and office administration in the
7 Army of Yugoslavia
8 Are you familiar with this document from 1994?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And what was the purpose of this? Was this sort of your style
11 book in the army about how correspondence was to be drafted?
12 A. Yes. It is -- it provides very in -- with a lot of precision for
13 how a document is to be drafted, how it is going to be filed, what form
14 it has to follow. So this is an instruction that was implemented by the
15 organ that was in charge of these activities, and they were part of my
16 department, the department that I was at the head of as of 1998 in the
17 Pristina Corps. And the head of that department was a junior officer
18 who's in charge of implementing these tasks.
19 Q. And was this the version of the rule that was in effect in 1998
20 and 1999?
21 A. Yes. We were still following this rule because we had not been
22 provided the new rule, so this was implemented and in force both in 1998
23 and 1999.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 MR. HANNIS: I move to tender that.
1 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01243.
3 MR. HANNIS: May I have one moment, Your Honour. I have one more
4 document I think.
5 [Prosecution counsel confer]
6 MR. HANNIS:
7 Q. Lastly, General, I would like to show you 65 ter number 01739.
8 General, this is another one that you were shown during proofing, and
9 it's a list of -- it's a purported list of members of the VJ
10 General Staff or the Supreme Command Staff, I guess, during the first
11 sixth months of 1999. And can you have a look at it and confirm for us
12 whether or not to your knowledge those people were on the General Staff
13 or the Supreme Command Staff during the wartime in the positions that are
14 named there.
15 A. General Ojdanic was there. He was the Chief of the
16 General Staff. His deputy was General Marjanovic. I know this for a
17 fact. Now, I don't know Mr. Arsenovic, I haven't met him, but I know of
18 him and the name rings a bell, but what position exactly he was at, I I'm
19 not really sure. It says here that he was advisor, but I don't know him
20 personally. Obradovic, Milorad and Kovacevic, Blagoje, that's true, they
21 were assistant Chiefs of the General Staff or operations of staff
22 matters. And Panic, Miodrag and Simic, Miodrag assistant Chiefs of the
23 General Staff for the land army, I know both men.
24 MR. HANNIS: Can we go to the next page, please.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Assistant Chief of the
1 General Staff of the air force and PVO, those assistant chiefs were
2 General Grahovac, General Velickovic, and General Karanovic. I know the
3 individuals, some of them I know personally, and I know all the names.
4 The assistant Chief of the General Staff for the navy, Vlado Nonkovic, I
5 know him, this is correct. Assistant Chief of the General Staff for
6 communications, information technology, and electronic war fair, Ljubomir
7 Andjelkovic, I know the man. Assistant Chief of the General Staff for
8 recruitment, mobilisation, and system matters, Risto Matovic, I know the
9 person. Assistant Chief of the General Staff for logistics, Vidoje
10 Pantelic, I also know this man. Assistant Chief of the General Staff for
11 education training, Sinisa Borovic and Zlatoje Terzic, I know both men.
12 The chief of the Yugoslav Army inspectorate of the Yugoslav army, General
13 Samardzic, the former commander of the 3rd Army, I know him. He was
14 later appointed to the post of inspector in chief.
15 MR. HANNIS: And I don't know if there's another page.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't think so -- actually, there
18 The chief of the information and moral guidance administration,
19 General Zivanovic, I know him. And as for Aleksandar Bakocevic, I don't
20 know him. It says here that he's a reserve major general, I don't know
21 him in person. The chief of the housing administration,
22 Spasoje Djurovic, I know him. And Miodrag Panic, lieutenant-general, I
23 think that his name appears twice here, as far as I could observe. There
24 was a Panic together with General Simic. I think it's the same Panic,
25 Miodrag Panic. I think his name is duplicated.
1 MR. HANNIS:
2 Q. And I think you'll see -- yeah --
3 A. Aleksandar Dimitrijevic, the chief of the security administration
4 and Geza Farkas, his deputy. The chief of the intelligence
5 administration, General Krga, I know all these men. And the chief of the
6 first administration, Djordje Curcin, I know him. In other words, the
7 only thing that remains to be clarified is the name of Miodrag Panic.
8 Maybe he appears twice because here it says as of April 2nd, 1999, and
9 maybe earlier it appeared until or before April 2nd, 1999, in that case,
10 it's correct. In any case, I know all these generals mentioned here.
11 Some of them are no longer living, two or three, whereas most of the
12 others have retired.
13 Q. Thank you, General.
14 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I would move to tender that exhibit.
15 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
16 MR. HANNIS: And with that I have no more questions for the
18 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01244.
19 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Hannis.
20 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, General.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Is this a convenient time for a break do you
22 think, Mr. Djurdjic?
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Exactly, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE PARKER: We will have the first break a little early and
25 resume at 4.00.
1 --- Recess taken at 3.32 p.m.
2 --- On resuming at 4.04 p.m.
3 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic has some questions for you.
4 Mr. Djurdjic.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
6 Cross-examination by Mr. Djurdjic.
7 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, General. My name is
8 Veljko Djurdjic, and I'm a member of the Defence team of the accused,
9 Vlastimir Djordjevic. With me together in the team today are
10 Ms. Marie O'Leary and Mr. Aleksandar Popovic.
11 A. Good afternoon.
12 Q. Since we speak the same language and you are a very fast speaker
13 and when I get carried away I get to speak even faster, I appeal to you
14 in order to get a correct interpretation and a clean transcript, please
15 bear in mind that we should keep our speed under control which is better
16 than to go back and correct portions of the testimony.
17 Now, General, let me ask you first, after you completed the
18 military academy, what military schools did you attend and which army did
19 those academies belong to?
20 A. In 1971 I completed the infantry academy. And in 1881 [as
21 interpreted] until 1883 I attended and completed the command staff
22 academy, it's a two-year school. And in 1990 through 2000 I completed
23 the National Defence college or school. So practically I completed all
24 military schools that existed in the army of the SFRY and the Army of
1 Q. Thank you. So your specialty is infantry; correct?
2 A. Yes.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please see Exhibit,
4 or rather, document 65 ter 02088.
5 Q. General, this is an order issued by the commander of the
6 Pristina Corps dated the 29th of May, 1998. What I would like to ask you
7 is you're familiar with the format of this document, but are you also
8 familiar with the content of the document? Were you familiar with it at
9 the time when it was drafted?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Now, my question is: What was the political situation like, what
12 was the backdrop, and what was it that led to such an order being issued?
13 A. The political and security situation at this time was extremely
14 complex. The fact that the army command issued this order to the command
15 of the Pristina Corps to which it refers to place at full
16 combat-readiness the entire standing complement of the Pristina Corps up
17 until the 29th of May, 1998, and it further describes and defines other
18 issues that are of lesser significance. But what is most important here
19 is that it was necessary to raise to full combat-readiness the
21 Q. Thank you. But could you please now just tell us in lay terms
22 what combat-readiness or full combat-readiness, rather, means.
23 A. Before I answer your question, I have to say an order to raise to
24 full combat-readiness can be issued by a superior command at the level of
25 the General Staff. And the measures and procedures of -- applicable to
1 units and individuals when the -- when we have this situation of raising
2 to full combat-readiness is prescribed by them. The full
3 combat-readiness means that certain measures and actions of individuals
4 and units should be made according to certain levels of combat-readiness,
5 various levels of combat readiness. And at one point all units have to
6 be at this level of full combat-readiness; in other words, ready and
7 prepared for any situation that may occur in the territory where the unit
8 is deployed.
9 Q. Thank you. Could you now please tell us a bit about the
10 political and security situation that demanded the raising to full
11 combat-readiness of the units.
12 A. In this period, on the 29th of May, 1998, this is the time when
13 in the border area there were already combat -- combat -- there was
14 already fighting with terrorist Siptar forces which attempted in various
15 ways to bring weapons and equipment to the territory of Kosovo
16 Metohija through armed force. Also, in the rear outside the area of the
17 border area they were taking up position at major intersections,
18 crossroads, dominant elevations, organise -- they had to organise defence
19 and prepare features for the protection of personnel and to provide for
20 the Defence of settlements. And they were terrorising and attacking the
21 civilian population. And in this period of time they were especially
22 focused on targeting members of the Ministry of the Interior.
23 Q. Thank you. Now, sir, would you agree with my assessment, with my
24 statement, that the purpose and the objective of the Albanian separatists
25 was to secede, or rather, to cut off Kosovo and Metohija through armed
1 force from the Serbia
2 A. Yes.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move that we enter this into
4 evidence, Your Honours. I move that we admit this document into evidence
5 as an exhibit.
6 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00318.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 Could we now please have Defence document D004-3002.
10 Q. General, this is a decision of the commander of the 3rd Army to
11 establish a forward command post. Have you seen this document before?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Are the reasons mentioned here, were they the reason for the
14 commander's decision to establish a forward command post in Pristina?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Could you now please explain this. Could the army commander
17 issue this decision independently, or would he have done this on orders
18 of the chief of the -- Chief of Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia?
19 A. He could not do this independently. In order to establish any
20 command post, a junior -- or rather, a subordinate officer could not
21 establish such a command post without an order from his superior. And
22 let me just say this, I know as a fact that General Pavkovic informed us
23 that General Samardzic at a meeting with President Milosevic proposed
24 that his men establish an -- a forward command post in the barracks in
25 Pristina. And then I asked him, What did the president reply to that?
1 And he said -- well, he didn't say anything. He just went over that. So
2 we considered that to be approved. That was the gist of his comment.
3 And later on as I went through certain documents I confirmed this. So
4 this is an activity that could not be carried out by the -- by an army
5 commander without at least a -- an approval from the Chief of Staff of
6 the army.
7 Q. General, you have referred to this -- to meetings with the
8 president of the republic on several occasions during your testimony.
9 Would it be more precise to say at meetings of the Joint Command --
10 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Supreme Defence
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, this was a meeting with the
13 president because it was held at the president's premises. He is the
14 supreme commander, and it is within his competence to command the army in
15 war and peacetime. Whether the meeting would be held in -- at the
16 federal -- at the Executive Council or the Beli Dvor, that was
17 irrelevant, but this would be a meeting where he would convene a meeting
18 and invite officers to come and join him. So the Supreme Defence Council
19 actually approved the use of the army at the meeting that was held with
20 the president, and the president, President Milosevic, issued tasks to
21 his subordinate officers, or rather, to General Perisic in -- for the
22 army with the presence of General Samardzic, Pavkovic, and so forth, and
23 also in the presence of the minister of the interior and his subordinate
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Thank you. Since you mentioned the minister of the interior, am
2 I correct that these meetings of the Supreme Defence Council were also
3 attended by the president of the Republic of Serbia
4 Mr. Milutinovic?
5 A. Yes.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please admit this
7 document into evidence.
8 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00319.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. General, let us clarify this. In addition to this proposal being
12 made at the meeting with the chairman of the Supreme Defence Council, was
13 an approval required to be given to General Samardzic to set up the
14 forward command post?
15 A. I suppose that they had prior agreement before this meeting with
16 the president, that is to say to send a team of officers of the 3rd Army
17 to be sent to Pristina in order to provide support to the 3rd Corps [as
18 interpreted], in view of the tasks and the higher level of alert and
19 combat-readiness. Whether General Perisic gave only oral approval or if
20 he gave it in writing, I don't know. It is possible in the military to
21 accept an oral approval and it is considered to be valid, but as a matter
22 of principle it should be always followed by a written approval.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Line 3, page 36, it should read
24 Pristina Corps rather than the 3rd Corps. That is actually line 4.
25 Q. Thank you, General.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please now look at
2 Exhibit P1216.
3 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The speakers are again
4 reminded to pause between questions and answers. Thank you.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation].
6 Q. General, you're now going to see a document already shown to you
7 by Mr. Hannis, and you made some comments on it. It is an order issued
8 by the commander of the 125th Motorised Brigade, dated July 7th, 1998.
9 Let me first ask you this: As far as I was able to understand, in your
10 conversation with Mr. Pavkovic earlier in the beginning of July -- June,
11 you agreed to call certain coordinating activities as the activities of
12 the Joint Command. Did I understand that properly?
13 A. Yes, completely. I still believe that much before the arrival of
14 civilians to the territory of Kosovo
15 would come. At my proposal to the general and in order to make this
16 coordination official, we used to write it as K and M Joint Command. You
17 can see that clearly under item 2 which says that MUP unit and the army
18 shall be approved by the MUP and the army command.
19 Q. Thank you, General. Can you tell me, what were the activities
20 that at the time you qualified as the ones to be carried out by the
21 Joint Command?
22 A. Roughly speaking I remember, I believe that these activities
23 identified as something to be carried out by the Joint Command were under
24 somewhat altered name of the operation that was conducted by the Ministry
25 of the Interior in the area between Pec-Djakovica-Prizren road in order
1 to lift the blockade on this road. This operation was called Grom. It
2 was considered that this was directed by an inter-departmental staff, and
3 after that we started with this Joint Command because this
4 inter-departmental staff led by Mr. Stanisic was somehow disband because
5 they were not up to the tasks that had been planned and due to that these
6 changes took place. It all took place in June 1998. The general
7 accepted my proposal, and we started making documents with the heading
8 "Joint Command."
9 Q. Thank you. Can you please slow down so that we can get correct
10 translation and transcript. It says here that this is document number
11 1104-6 -- actually, reference is made to this document. At the time when
12 this number 6 was added, was that in compliance with the register that
13 just by random appears as number 6 under which a decision is recorded
14 where this is mentioned?
15 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters kindly ask again the speakers
16 to slow down and to pause between questions and answers.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Coordination within the MUP and the
18 army because at the time there were no civilians. Coordination was
19 implemented exclusively between the MUP staff and the Pristina Corps
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Thank you. When this situation happened, did you as the head of
23 the operations department initiated a contact for the first time with the
24 MUP in Pristina?
25 A. Yes, one can say so. I would say that it was a first time,
1 although there had been some contacts in passing when General Perisic
2 used to come down there in April and May, and we were under the
3 obligation to contact the MUP organs, but all of this was in a certain
4 manner prompted by the need to make preparations for the arrival of
5 General Perisic in Kosovo. I can say that more intensive contacts with
6 the MUP started in June.
7 Q. Who was at the head of the MUP at the time when you coordinated
8 these actions on behalf of the Pristina Corps during these activities?
9 A. Sometime in late June General Pavkovic mentioned General Lukic to
10 me as the MUP staff commander. And for the first time I met
11 General Lukic face-to-face on the 22nd of July at the meeting where all
12 the other senior officers from the MUP were present. And we may have had
13 some meetings with some other organs, but these were informal
14 conversations without going into many details and problematic issues.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now see the document under
16 65 ter number 04038.
17 Q. General, this is information provided by the Chief of
18 General Staff of the Yugoslav Army to the federal minister of foreign
19 affairs of the FRY on the 16th of July, 1998. Were you aware of this
20 document? Did you ever hear of it?
21 A. No, never.
22 Q. As for the format, is it familiar to you? Does it resemble the
23 format used by the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army?
24 A. I think that it is fully in compliance.
25 Q. Do you recognise Mr. Perisic's signature?
1 A. I can't see it.
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can you please scroll down the
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was seldom in a position to see
5 Mr. Perisic in person because he was my second superior in hierarchy. I
6 can recognise the signatures of General Samardzic and General Pavkovic,
7 but I never had an opportunity to see Mr. Perisic's signature. But since
8 there is a stamp, I have no doubts about this document.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Thank you. This information contains some attachments. One
11 refers to involvement of the Republic of Albania
12 Kosovo, list of weapons, ammunition and other military equipment, and
13 list of Yugoslav army soldiers killed and wounded in Kosovo and Metohija
14 during 1998. The information that were received by the General Staff
15 through the 3rd Army, did it contain information that the Republic of
17 provided support in providing weapons to them, and that the Ministry of
18 the Interior and other authorities of the Republic of Albania
19 involved in that?
20 A. The organs who were charged with monitoring the security
21 situation close to the border, as far as I know, had some information
22 about the involvement of the Republic of Albania
23 Kosovo, primarily following the events that took place in the Republic of
25 part of Albania
1 lot of information to that effect, and I believe that the intelligence
2 and security organs from Kosovo provided the competent authorities with
3 this kind of reports, and suppose that these services were -- by their
4 function were obliged to provide this to General Perisic. And then
5 General Perisic would forward this information to the minister of the
7 Q. It should be corrected, minister of foreign affairs.
8 A. Yes, foreign affairs.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move this document to be
10 admitted into evidence.
11 JUDGE PARKER: For the same reasons that we gave in respect of a
12 number of Prosecution documents that were subject of objection today,
13 this will be received.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00320.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. General, let us now go back to your yesterday's conversation with
17 Mr. Hannis about the plan for combatting terrorism in Kosovo and
18 Metohija. Did I understand you correctly when you said that you took
19 part in creating this plan?
20 A. Yes. I was in charge of this job on behalf the Pristina Corps,
21 and this was my functional duty. At that point, I was the person who was
22 involved this, of course under the supervision of General Pavkovic, and
23 on the basis of the -- of information received by General Lazarevic and
24 other organs.
25 Q. This proposal of a plan that you made in the Pristina Corps, was
1 it presented to the Supreme Defence Council?
2 A. Yes, it was. I suppose it was. I know that President Milosevic
3 saw it, and definitely if the Supreme Council decided to implement this
4 plan, then it only makes sense that the plan had been previously
5 presented to the Supreme Defence Council.
6 Q. Can you tell us about the elements contained in this proposal of
7 the plan.
8 A. I think that I already mentioned these elements contained in the
9 plan, but I can amend it by saying the following in view of your
10 question. I said that initially it was comprised of three stages. The
11 first stage involved the engagement of border units of the army in the
12 border area. The police had no jurisdiction there except for their
13 regular policing and checking the movement of people and vehicles. The
14 major factor there, preventing the incursion of terrorist forces and
15 their retreating to Albania
16 jurisdiction of the army. The next or the second phase involved the
17 engagement of MUP units and support provided by the army in the process
18 of breaking up terrorist forces along the main road between Pec,
19 Djakovica, and Prizren. And in the process of drawing up this plan and
20 in line with the rules governing the preparation of working map which
21 requires plans to be made and various signs to be included for various
22 structures such as the army and the MUP and the Ministry of Defence and
23 all other forces that are included in the plan, we plotted roughly on the
24 map the MUP unit --
25 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: The units of the
1 Minister of Defence.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- without any specific annotations
3 attached to these units, because at the time the ministry defined its own
4 tasks relating to the preparation of this plan. At the time we still
5 didn't know which units from the ministry were to take place, but we
6 nevertheless marked them with colour green without specifying the names
7 because we were still waiting for the plan to be incorporated from the
8 MUP staff. And the third phase also involved support to the MUP forces
9 in lifting the blockade of the roads, of the roads.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Thank you. You already said that. Let us not repeat things.
12 Please, according to your knowledge, was this plan, as you proposed it,
13 ever adopted?
14 A. Yes, it was adopted. Once we received information from the MUP
15 staff about which units are going to take part, we included this
16 information into it.
17 Q. Now, General, let us clarify one thing. What you told me so far
18 and after having reading many documents, I found out that this was called
19 a global plan for the destruction of sabotage and terrorist forces in
20 Kosovo. So that entailed that at a later stage detailed plans would be
21 drawn up according to specific activities envisaged in the global plan;
22 am I right?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And am I correct that following this stage what we saw here were
25 your decisions, your instructions and directives, referring to certain
1 actions that were envisaged in this global plan in these various stages.
2 You're free to correct me if I misspoke.
3 A. Well, following this we would look at the excerpts from the
4 global plan which only provide the basic elements for us to be able to
5 plan combat operations, both at the level of the army and the MUP, and in
6 coordination between these two structures.
7 Q. Thank you. Could we now please just correct something, on page
8 42, line 13, when you mentioned various forces, General, we see here in
9 the transcript the Ministry of Defence. Is that what you actually said,
10 or did you refer to the forces of the Ministry of the Interior?
11 A. Well, I don't know which part of my testimony you're referring
13 Q. Well, talking about this general plan and what the units entered
14 in green ink were representing, what did that refer to?
15 A. Yes, those were the MUP units.
16 Q. General, based on this global plan, then there would be various
17 decisions and orders issued for various stages of the operation. And it
18 was at this level that there would be a degree of coordination between
19 the Pristina Corps and the MUP staff in Pristina. Am I correct?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And at this stage politicians would also join this process of
22 coordination, and as far as I understood you, this happened for the first
23 time on the 22nd of July, 1999; correct?
24 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 1998.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, on the 22nd of July, 1998
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. And on this day a meeting was held, am I correct, where as you
3 mentioned you started making notes for your own use?
4 A. This was the first time that I saw these persons and I mentioned
5 already, I wrote down the names of the individuals that I knew and also
6 the ones that I didn't. Up until then I had no contact whatsoever with
7 these individuals.
8 Q. Thank you. You've already explained all this, but now let me ask
9 you this: Did you ever see any kind of decision on the establishment of
10 a Joint Command?
11 A. No.
12 Q. Or the composition of the Joint Command?
13 A. No.
14 Q. Thank you. Could you please tell me, in view of this first
15 minutes of the meeting and you mentioned there the individuals who were
16 present. Now, in addition to these individuals who were -- whose names
17 were entered in the first minutes, could you tell us what other
18 individuals came to these joint meetings, the meetings of the
19 Joint Command, in 1998?
20 A. Well, there were some 20 or so individuals who would attend these
21 meetings, 20 to 23, 22 or 23 individuals. Most of these people were from
22 state security and then from the Ministry of the Interior and from the
23 ministry -- the defence ministry. And I remember that from the
24 security -- from the state security there was the chief of state security
25 for Pristina, I believe his name was Zlakovic [phoen] or something like
1 that, but he was the chief of state security. I think Radovic was absent
2 as well as Gajic, and that he actually was standing in for them. I'm
3 pretty sure that he was there as the chief for Pristina. Then from --
4 before the army there was General Samardzic, the commander of the
5 3rd Army attended the meeting on the 27th of July. We can see in the
6 minutes that he also took part in the discussion. Then there was also
7 the assistant for intelligence, Colonel Djindjic. And then later on
8 these meetings were also attended by General Lazarevic and a couple of
9 other individuals from the ranks of the army. I think four or five other
10 individuals also began coming to these meetings. As for the Ministry of
11 the Interior, there was General Obrad Stevanovic -- no, he was not
12 present at this first meeting. Then I think on one or two occasions
13 Mijatovic attended. And I don't know if there were any other
14 individuals. So this would be approximately some 20 individuals or so in
15 addition to the names that I mentioned on this first day.
16 Q. Thank you. Let me try and jog your memory. I believe that
17 Mr. Matkovic, if I'm not wrong, was also not present at this first
19 A. No, and I did not put down the names of civilians because they
20 were -- they came from time to time, and I think Mr. Matkovic was the
21 minister for the economy at the time. He would come to these meetings
22 occasionally. And there was also an individual, Mr. Milosavljevic, who
23 was in the Executive Council, he was a minister, but he usually did not
24 attend these meetings, although I think that he probably did have some
25 contacts and carried out certain tasks in the field.
1 Q. Thank you. Now, would you agree with me that all these
2 individuals who were civilians and politicians, that they also had
3 certain state functions in addition to their party roles?
4 A. Yes, I know that they all held certain positions in the
5 government. I know that the then-president of the chamber of citizens
6 was there and he was also the director of the railway company, and then
7 there was -- there were also the vice-presidents of the army, Andjelkovic
8 and Matkovic.
9 Q. Thank you. Now, here we frequently heard that these people were
10 party functionaries, but isn't this normal that a party that wins an
11 election would form a government, right, that's normally in any country?
12 A. Well, there's nothing strange in that.
13 Q. Well, let me now get to the point. Did the army ever carry out
14 or implement any decision by -- issued by the Joint Command?
15 A. What I consider the Joint Command to be, the decisions
16 exclusively pertained to those decisions that were issued by
17 General Samardzic on behalf of the army. And I stand by this and I'm
18 absolutely certain that General Pavkovic could not carry out any
19 assignment without General Samardzic issuing an -- instructions or being
20 in on it.
21 Q. Thank you. Now, the body or the -- what is being referred to as
22 Joint Command, did it have -- did it include any types -- any elements of
23 command in terms of the army or the Ministry of the Interior?
24 A. Well, what we refer to as Joint Command actually does not meet
25 any of the criteria that actually applied to commanding, those being, for
1 instance, that the superior officer would establish it by issuing an
2 order; that he would have to determine the organisation and structure of
3 that command and its competences and responsibilities; and also that it
4 would have to be integrated in the system of command of the forces for
5 which that command is being established; and also they would have to
6 determine who would provide support and logistics for those forces. So
7 as far as I know, the corps command never received in any order from the
8 3rd Army command which defined any of the criteria that I just mentioned.
9 In addition to that it would have to be stamped, and there would have to
10 exist a stamp of this Joint Command, and there would have to be commander
11 of this Joint Command.
12 Q. Thank you. Now, let me ask you this: Would an army unit of any
13 level be able to --
14 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters -- the interpreter requests
15 that Mr. Djurdjic repeat his question and the witness repeat his answer.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. I will repeat my question and you please give your answer so that
18 we can have it in the transcript.
19 Now, would any military unit be in a position to issue an order
20 to the staff -- to a MUP staff as to the use of MUP units?
21 A. No way.
22 Q. And vice versa, could any military unit act on orders from a MUP
23 staff or any other unit of the MUP?
24 A. No, unless it was resubordinated, only in those conditions, in
25 both of these cases.
1 Q. Thank you. In 1998 were there instances of resubordination of
2 units between the army and the military?
3 A. No.
4 Q. Thank you. And now my next question: In view of the complex
5 political situation, most of these events reflected the difficult
6 situation in view of the activities Albanian separatists and terrorists.
7 Now am I correct in saying that the state leadership and the leadership
8 of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia decided to send state persons --
9 state officials to Kosovo and Metohija who would then together with the
10 military and the police contribute to the resolution of this difficult
11 situation in Kosovo and Metohija?
12 A. Well, I think that is a normal thing. I think it was a logical
13 thing to do.
14 Q. Thank you. Were these meetings where you took minutes under
15 instructions from Mr. Pavkovic, were these meetings in fact -- was the
16 purpose of these meetings to coordinate and inform the state structures,
17 all the government structures, that were working on the resolution of the
18 Kosovo problem?
19 A. That's how I understood them.
20 Q. Thank you. Speaking about these minutes, am I correct in saying
21 that you only noted down what you considered to be significant for the
22 job at hand that you had as the chief of operations of the
23 Pristina Corps?
24 A. For the most part I noted down those -- that information, but I
25 also have to add that Pristina Corps was very much interested in
1 obtaining information from state security organs. These were vital bits
2 of information for our work, and that is why I wrote down in detail the
3 information provided, both by Mr. Gajic and Mr. Radojic [as interpreted].
4 And almost only 60 per cent of the notes actually relate to that
5 information, that type of information.
6 Q. Thank you. Now, am I correct that it was General Pavkovic for
7 the most part and sometimes the security organs, in other words, the
8 chief of security when he comes from the Pristina Corps or some other
9 individual, that they would present the security information that they
10 had in the army and that they would brief both the politicians and the
11 MUP members on them?
12 A. From time to time General Stojanovic provided information to
13 General Pavkovic, and then General Pavkovic would just brief that
14 security organs of the Pristina Corps obtained certain information. And
15 this is what the exchange of information between state security and the
16 Pristina Corps actually amounted to.
17 Q. Thank you. In view of this large number of people who
18 occasionally attended and took part in these meetings, in the work of
19 these meetings, can we agree that these were individuals who had equal
20 roles and equal standing in this exchange of information and
22 A. Well, just a brief explanation. Coordination as a rule implies
23 that there is an equal or equitable -- an equitable or equal level of
24 responsibility of all members who participate in it. Thank you.
25 Q. Thank you. Now, we will talk about General Samardzic who was at
1 the time the commander of the 3rd Army. He would present the positions
2 of the 3rd Army at these meetings and give his opinions and suggestions
3 at an equal footing as all the other members -- or participants of the
4 meetings; am I correct?
5 A. Well, General Samardzic at this meeting, and I have a very vivid
6 memory of it --
7 Q. No, let me stop you there. We will come to this meeting later.
8 There is a document that I would like to show you in relation to that.
9 Just answer my question.
10 A. Yes, well my answer is affirmative.
11 Q. Thank you. I would now like to go back and ask you something
12 about the question that was put by Mr. Hannis, and my question relates to
13 the use of the army. Mr. Hannis told you that according to some members
14 of the military - and I think he mentioned General Perisic and
15 Dimitrijevic - that for the employment of the army, the use of the army,
16 it was necessary to issue a decision on the proclamation of a state of
17 emergency, and the second group in this military leadership considered
18 that such a decision was not necessary.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please see document
21 Q. General, these are the Rules of Service of the Yugoslav Army. We
22 will see it in a moment on the screens. And I would like now to see
23 Article 473, especially item 2, entitled: "The use of the units in army
24 in peacetime."
25 Would you please just read this to yourself and then we can
1 discuss it together. So Article 473.
2 A. Can I see the next page, please.
3 Q. Yes.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we see the next page both in
5 the B/C/S and the English versions.
6 Q. General, are you familiar with this provision?
7 A. Yes, I am.
8 Q. Am I right to say that this article, 473, governs the use of the
9 Yugoslav Army in peacetime when it involves combatting outlaw, terrorist,
10 sabotage, and other armed enemies?
11 A. Yes, the army can be used in peacetime for these purposes.
12 Q. In order to use the army, a decision of the Supreme Defence
13 Council is required as well as an executive decision by the president of
14 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; is that correct?
15 A. Yes, it is.
16 Q. And after that, in order to use the army shall be issued by the
17 Chief of General Staff; is that correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Was this the legal basis for the use of the Yugoslav Army in 1998
20 in Kosovo and Metohija?
21 A. In compliance with the Rules of Service, it was possible to
22 engage the army in solving these problems as well.
23 Q. This paragraph 4 is interesting which says that regardless
24 whether there is an armed rebellion or not, if an army unit is attacked,
25 it has the right to defend itself.
1 A. Yes, in this situation, no decision is required.
2 Q. Thank you. Can we please now look at Exhibit P1226.
3 General, we saw this document yesterday as well. Is it fair to
4 say that despite the plan for combatting terrorist forces and despite the
5 meeting held on the 21st of July, 1998, with the president of the
6 republic, where an order was issued to implement the plan, the commander
7 of the Pristina Corps from the commander of the 3rd Army demands to
8 provide detailed plan or a detailed explanation of their participation in
9 the implementation of the plan?
10 A. Yes, because there were certain objections and opposition to the
11 plan that was approved with the president of the republic.
12 Q. Neither the Supreme Defence Council nor the president of the
13 republic nor the body that was set up on the 22nd could order the use of
14 the Pristina Corps, but instead Pavkovic asked the 3rd Army commander to
15 regulate this exclusively.
16 A. Exclusively.
17 Q. Now, in this context let's look -- let's look at document
19 General, when you said "exclusively," that referred exclusively
20 to the army or the commander of the 3rd Army?
21 A. Yes, he was the only one who was in charge. It was possible for
22 General Perisic to issue a direct order to an army commander or the
23 commander of the Pristina Corps and the president of our country under
24 the law, but he can undertake direct command only under exceptional
25 situation and circumstances when he consider that it be necessary. But
1 this should be also known by his subordinate officer.
2 Q. This is another document dated the 22nd of July. Now we have the
3 commander of the 3rd Army addressing the commander of the Pristina Corps,
4 and he -- regardless of this plan which was approved by the president, he
5 is again asking for a proposal for a direct and indirect engagement of
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. You're familiar with this?
9 A. Yes, I am.
10 Q. Did you receive it on that day?
11 A. Yes.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move for this document to be
13 admitted into evidence.
14 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00321.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now look at Exhibit P1227.
17 Q. You have -- you saw it yesterday, and it was admitted into
18 evidence, but let's establish a link with the previous document. Based
19 on the previous document, did you at the Pristina Corps -- or rather,
20 General Pavkovic draft this document dated the 23rd of July?
21 A. Yes, I think it was General Pavkovic as a response to the
22 previous document.
23 Q. In which we -- in which he provides a detailed plan of how he
24 intends to use the units.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we look at the end of the
1 document now.
2 Q. This last paragraph we see that General Pavkovic is again
3 requesting approval from the 3rd Army commander for the use of units.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Therefore, without such an approval there could be no such order.
6 Thank you.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please now look at
8 Exhibit P886. It's page 17 in English and --
9 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel please read the numbers
10 slowly. Thank you.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. General, now we come to the meeting of the joint --
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Which number should I repeat?
14 K022-8424, that's in B/C/S and page 17 in English. That's how it was
15 yesterday in e-court. And that's Exhibit P886. Yes, we now have it on
16 our screens. Let's look at the top of the page, also in English.
17 Q. It says here that present are General Samardzic and
18 Colonel Djindjic; is that correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. You told us a while ago that General Samardzic was the 3rd Army
21 commander and Colonel Djindjic was --
22 A. Assistant for counter-intelligence and deputy security head of
23 the 3rd Army.
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now look at page 19 in
25 English and the next page in B/C/S. The English page is wrong. Can we
1 have page 18 in English, please.
2 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Hannis.
3 MR. HANNIS: I think my learned friend's having a problem partly
4 related to the problem I had the other day. We had initially had in
5 e-court the non-CLSS translation. I moved to substitute the CLSS
6 translation, and he's probably using the one I started out with.
7 JUDGE PARKER: For once, Mr. Djurdjic, you can blame Mr. Hannis
8 for all your troubles.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Oh, no, I'll never do that.
10 Yes, it is indeed page 19 in English and says General Samardzic,
11 but what I see now -- I think that the B/C/S version is all right. Let
12 me just see by comparison where I can find the name Minic. The date is
13 completely wrong in English. I need the 27th of July, and I think that
14 page 17 that I initially requested was the right one. Let's go back
15 because these are completely different numbers.
16 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I think in the current version of the
17 English in e-court the meeting of the 27th of July is page number 13,
18 which shows General Samardzic and Djindjic as being present and then
19 pages 14 and 15 are the rest of that meeting.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Hannis. Let's look
21 first at page 14 in English. Thank you.
22 Q. General, can you tell us what is this discussion about in which
23 General Samardzic is -- has taken to the floor?
24 A. I can say that General Samardzic took part in this debate and
25 exchange of information, and I noted down the following. The main goal
1 is Malisevo, and we must not back away. Just a brief comment.
2 General Samardzic knows very well that the Main Staff of the Siptar
3 terrorist forces is in Malisevo, and for that reason he states that
4 regardless of the fact that the plan does not contain an attack on
5 Malisevo and the crushing of these terrorists or the command of these
6 terrorist forces in the vicinity of Malisevo, he ordered that we must not
7 back away. The next bullet, forces should not be thrust from Dulje.
8 Dulje was on the Stimlje-Suva Reka road. And that was one of the key
9 features on this road. I put a question mark for my own purposes for the
10 time when I start planning these activities to include this because I was
11 aware that the army commander was going to ask me if I incorporated his
12 order because that was, and still is, the practice in any military.
13 Malisevo must be crushed. We do not need to hold all the villages, only
14 the key points. The term "crushed" does not involve the literal meaning.
15 It just means occupy or capture. The next point is do not pull out any
16 forces from Junik village because there are main forces there. This term
17 "pull out" means do not activate but keep the forces surrounding them.
18 Next, Troja should be toured with the MUP through Drenovac in order to
19 prevent the spillover of forces. Troja was also one of the important
20 features near the town of Orahovac
21 since General Samardzic was originally from Kosovo and he exceptionally
22 knew the terrain because he was born in Srbica municipality, the village
23 of Kraljica, he was fully familiar with this territory. And he was not
24 speaking with the aid of map, but based on his good knowledge. And for
25 that purpose he ordered Troja to be bypassed because he didn't expect any
1 losses and any attacks on our forces in that region.
2 Next point, set out again from Blace village and with strong
3 artillery preparations and the strongest possible support. This applies
4 to the area of Blace village, or rather, the road leading from Dulje
5 passage to Malisevo. The next one at 0900 hours, the combat group 243.1
6 shall begin movement preceded by artillery preparations. So he is
7 ordering the movement and artillery preparation for the combat group 243
8 in order to -- for it to join the fighting along the axis where its use
9 was planned. So this is what General Samardzic spoke about at the
10 meeting on the 27th of July.
11 Q. Thank you. And everything that he said at this meeting, you had
12 to put into practice and to ask approval for this decision from
13 General Samardzic in order for the army unit to comply?
14 A. Based on this and the tasks and plans that had already in -- been
15 in existence, prepared a decision and General Samardzic approved it.
16 Officially he approved this decision by this very order, and he also
17 provided written approval.
18 Q. Am I right to say that not in a single minutes there was any such
19 decision ordered by the command?
20 A. Never.
21 Q. Now, concerning this correspondence between the Pristina Corps
22 commander and the 3rd Army commander, it says the second stage of the
23 plan has been approved, what took place on the 22nd of July. Now tell
24 me, what was the first stage, was it a bringing in of the units?
25 A. Yes. The first stage involved the bringing in of units.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 A. That means both the MUP and the army units.
3 Q. Thank you. Now, when this is mentioned here, this -- there is
4 not a reference to this global plan but to specific implementation plans;
5 is that correct?
6 A. Yes, it is a completely different stage.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please have D176.
8 Q. But before that, for clarification purposes of the transcript,
9 let me ask you again. Am I correct that the Joint Command never issued
10 any decision and that there is no mention of such a decision in your
12 A. Yes, you're correct.
13 Q. General, what we see before us is a directive dated the 20th of
14 July, 1998. Are you familiar or were you familiar with this document at
15 the time when it was adopted in 1998?
16 A. I was not familiar with this document because this is a directive
17 from the General Staff of the army, and I, as the chief of operations and
18 training, did not receive such directives. I would get an order from the
19 commander of the 3rd Army. So this directive is at the level of the army
20 that is issued by General Perisic to General Samardzic on the basis of
21 which General Samardzic will draft his order.
22 Q. But tell us, please, does it comply with the normal format?
23 A. Yes, absolutely.
24 Q. Now, tell us, please, did you have occasion to review this
25 directive since?
1 A. Yes, I did. During the proofing session I saw this.
2 Q. All right. So this directive - could we now please pull up the
3 next page - provides for the use of the Yugoslav Army. That is under
4 Roman III
5 next page in the English version, please. So on this page we have the
6 first stage. In item 2, General -- paragraph 2, rather --
7 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter correction.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. [Previous translation continues]... it says here -- or rather,
10 could you tell us what does this provide for, this paragraph 2, through
11 quick actions, what does it refer to?
12 A. It says here: "Through quick actions coordinated with the forces
13 of the MUP of the Republic of Serbia
14 and terrorist forces in the territory of Kosovo
15 special order from the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army.
16 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's request: Could you please slow
17 down and make pauses between question and answer.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Thank you. Now, let us see, under item 2 we have tasks of the
20 3rd Army; correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. So do we have an iteration of the same thing as the task of the
23 3rd Army?
24 A. Yes, but here it is more specific, and it also specifies which
25 units will be used as reinforcements sent by the General Staff to the
1 corps in order to be able to implement the tasks as envisaged.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now could we please have D177.
4 Q. General, is this a further development of the directive from the
5 commander of the 3rd Army?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Were you familiar with this order?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. What were the responsibilities and assignments for the 3rd Corps
10 based on that directive, or rather, this order from the commander of the
11 3rd Army?
12 A. The commander of the Pristina Corps proceeded to prepare its own
13 decision in keeping with the order of the army commander.
14 Q. Thank you. Are all these decisions that we have seen now, were
15 they all already built in, in the plan that had been adopted at the
16 Supreme Defence Council, the global plan, for the suppression of
17 terrorism? So this is in fact this implementation?
18 A. In fact -- in fact, this is the putting into practice of the plan
19 that I described and explained earlier, the three stages provided for
20 there. And here we see in even greater detail the description of the
21 tasks and assignments and the forces that are allocated in order for this
22 task to be implemented.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please see D178.
25 Q. General, this is an order by General Samardzic dated 30th July
1 1998. Tell us, please, were you familiar with this document?
2 A. This is a document from the army command that we knew of only
3 indirectly because this is an order issued to General Mladenovic for the
4 implementation of this task and he was at the army command, whereas I was
5 at the Pristina Corps. However, when the command came to the barracks,
6 the Kosovski Junaci barracks, we were briefed on this and we provided the
7 report to the army command that we have provided for accommodations and
8 so on. Because we were issued an order to actually provide for
9 accommodations and the establishment of the IKM.
10 Q. General, here under item 3 General Samardzic orders that the
11 commander of the Pristina Corps as a member of the Joint Command for KiM
12 shall attend all meetings, and prior to going to meetings he shall
13 acquaint the army Chief of Staff with any possible requests and he shall
14 explain to him the proposals for the engagement of forces with
15 reinforcements. And following his approval he should go to the meeting.
16 After the meeting the commander of the Pristina Corps shall report to the
17 army Chief of Staff on the proposals adopted and those that were provided
18 subsequently which diverge from the proposal, and he shall ask him for
19 permission relating to those requests. He shall inform also the
20 Joint Command for KiM of any decisions concerning these requests.
21 General, is this another proof that the Joint Command could not
22 issue orders and that the army did not take action pursuant to orders
23 from the Joint Command?
24 A. Correct.
25 Q. And this explicitly provides that an agreement has to be made
1 before the meeting as to what was to be done, and if there are any
2 changes that it has to be sent back to the commander at the IKM and that
3 his approval should be sought for any changes?
4 A. Yes. The commander issue -- orders General Pavkovic within the
5 framework of the Joint Command. In other words, all questions or all
6 requests that are sought cannot be adopted or approved without his
7 knowledge. In other words, that is explicitly stated there, and this
8 order was in force throughout 1998, which was the time when I usually
9 went with General Pavkovic to brief him -- with General Pavkovic to
10 General Samardzic for briefings.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think this would be
13 a good time for a break.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Very well. We resume at 6.00.
15 --- Recess taken at 5.30 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 6.01 p.m.
17 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
19 Q. General, we're not slow enough. Please try to answer as if you
20 were giving a lecture, and I will be nudged by my assistant to slow down.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see D004-2997.
22 Q. General, are you familiar with this document?
23 A. Yes, I did have opportunity to see it.
24 Q. This document regulates the briefings of the Chief of Staff of
25 the 3rd Army who was at the forward command post of the 3rd Army; am I
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. This is an order that daily reports need to be sent; am I
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. This is stated in paragraph 2, and there is even mention of how
7 long this will be -- how long these reports will take.
8 A. Yes, the morning briefings.
9 Q. Was this document implemented in practice?
10 A. Fully.
11 Q. Am I correct that the command of the 3rd Army, or rather, the
12 Chief of Staff received daily briefings on the situation in the field and
13 the activities of the 3rd Corps -- of the Pristina Corps?
14 A. Several times a day.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please admit this
17 document into evidence.
18 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00322.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please see 65
21 document 01418.
22 Q. General, are you familiar with this document?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. This is another request from the commander of the Pristina Corps
25 addressed to the 3rd Army commander in relation to the sending of units
1 of the corps; am I correct?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And again we see that there is no engagement of Pristina Corps
4 units without the approval of the 3rd Army commander; correct?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please admit into
8 evidence this document.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00323.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please have 65 ter
12 document 01419.
13 Q. General, are you familiar with this document?
14 A. It seems vaguely familiar, but I did not -- I was not involved in
15 the implementation of this document.
16 Q. Well, yes, but we can't even see who drafted this document, but
17 it is authentic?
18 A. Yes, and it is in keeping with the situation as it was
20 Q. General, could you explain, please, the heading here says the
21 implementation of the third stage of the plan and then it says
22 "approval." So here again we see that there is a request for approval
23 from the commander of the 3rd Army.
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Now, in view of the differences in these plans, what did this
1 third stage envisage according to this document?
2 A. Well, it envisaged the lifting of the blockades of these three
3 main roads.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now have -- oh, excuse
6 me, let us first deal with this document, and then we'll see the next
7 one. Could we please admit this document into evidence.
8 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
9 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I have a question I want to raise
10 concerning this document.
11 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Hannis.
12 MR. HANNIS: As he noted, there are no initials of who the author
13 of this document was, and there is no transmission information which
14 makes it different from most of the other documents that we've admitted.
15 So I just raise that as a matter, I suppose it goes to weight.
16 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. It has been received, it will be
17 received, but those matters may be relevant to weight.
18 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00324.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. General --
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Or, rather, could we please have
23 D002-4026. Could we blow this up a little bit. Could we enlarge it a
24 bit more.
25 Q. General, could you please mark, if you can of course see well
1 enough --
2 A. Well, I can manage.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could I ask the usher to please
5 Q. Now, as far as I understood your testimony, there were three main
6 roads that needed to be deblocked. Could you please show us and indicate
7 what they were.
8 A. The first road was the road between Kosovska Mitrovica via
9 Rudnik, Mount Rudnik
10 Q. Thank you. Could you please put a number 1 there.
11 A. [Marks]
12 Q. Thank you. Now, could you please indicate the second road or
13 major communication.
14 A. The second road leads from Pristina via Glogovac, Klina, and then
15 here it forks into two sub-roads, one goes towards Pec and the other one
16 goes toward -- the other fork goes to Djakovica.
17 Q. Would you put a number 2 where the fork is.
18 A. [Marks]
19 Q. And the third direction?
20 A. The third road leads from Stimlje via Dulje, Suva Reka, to
22 Q. Would you mark this with a number 3.
23 A. [Marks]
24 Q. Thank you, General.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please admit this
1 into evidence.
2 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00325.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. General, do you recall whether for the implementation of this
6 third stage any operations were ordered and executed, if any, and what
7 kind of decisions were made?
8 A. I remember for the most part, which is only natural, because
9 those -- this was the most important stage in the implementation of the
10 plan. May I use the map and mark it?
11 Q. No, no, we shall have a new map for this purpose.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have again
13 Exhibit D002-4026. And can we have it enlarged again.
14 Q. Now, please.
15 A. Along this first road or axis number 1, the fiercest resistance
16 was put up in the area of Mount Rudnik
17 were exceptionally strong forces there.
18 Q. Can you please put number 1 in the middle.
19 A. Within this axis and in the area encompassed by the villages
20 which are within this circle, there are quite a few villages and they
21 have Siptar or Albanian names, so it is a little bit difficult for me to
22 decipher them, although I know some of the villages like Vocnjak and
23 other but I'm not sure about all of them. So this is number 2. Then the
24 next area is on the approaches to Pec and the villages between Klina and
25 Pec, and that's number 3, that's this axis. And the major stronghold was
1 west of Pristina near Iglarevo village, including all these villages, and
2 this whole area was totally occupied. They had strong features and they
3 included all these villages. This is a densely populated area and
4 practically this whole area was occupied. We found bunkers made of
5 reinforced concrete when we managed to open up a passage here.
6 Q. General, can you please make this number 4.
7 A. [Marks]
8 Q. Thank you.
9 A. Next, the area between Pec along these roads from Decani and the
10 area of Glodjane and Baranski Lug, it is not even necessary to make these
11 circles because there was so many armed men in Metohija that it was
12 totally incredible. Unlike the eastern line Pristina-Urosevac where
13 these numbers were significantly lower. Then next Kranovica [phoen] all
14 the way to Pec was totally occupied, this is number 5 and this is number
15 6. Next, via Malisevo and Troja, all the way to Orahovac --
16 Q. For the sake of transcript, let us say, General, 1, 2, 3 is the
17 first axis from the previous one, and 4, 5, 6, are ... ?
18 A. That's another axis, but only this sub-axis from Glogovac via
19 Malisevo and Orahovac was the one mentioned by General Samardzic
20 transversing [as interpreted] Troja. That was the main headquarters of
21 the Siptar terrorist forces in the village south-east of Malisevo. I
22 think the name of that village where their command was Dragobilje. That
23 was their main command for all their forces.
24 Next, this would be 7. The next one leads from Stimlje to Dulje.
25 That's number 8, another stronghold. Number 9 covers the area around
1 Suva Reka and includes the villages south-east of that region. That's
2 number 9. I'm not including here the areas that are west of Pec,
3 Djakovica, and Prizren because the whole road from Pec via Decani,
4 Djakovica, and Prizren was totally blocked and MUP suffered most losses
5 in this particular area, especially near Decani. I remember an incident
6 when 12 policemen were killed at once near Decani, were either wounded or
7 killed in clashes with the terrorists, and that took place in one day
9 Q. So numbers 8 and 9 indicate the third axis.
10 A. That's correct.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I tender this document into
13 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00326.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now see Exhibit D003-2618,
17 Q. General, are you familiar with this document dated the 1st of
18 August, 1998?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. This is a document sent by the 3rd Army commander to the
21 Pristina Corps command?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Can you tell us what was the decision of the --
24 THE INTERPRETER: The speakers are kindly asked to pause between
25 questions and answers. It is impossible to interpret.
1 JUDGE PARKER: You have to stop, I'm afraid, General. Your
2 answer is far too quick on the question. The interpreter could not
3 finish the question before your answer was well advanced. So if we go
4 back to the end of the question and then ask the general to answer again.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. General, this is an order issued by the 3rd Army command to the
7 commander of the 3rd -- or the Pristina Corps concerning Joint Command;
8 am I right?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Thank you. Can you comment this decision made by the 3rd Army
12 A. The 3rd Army commander forbids the use of the units of the
13 Pristina Corps with reinforcement who are engaged in Kosovo and Metohija
14 pending the approval of the plan for the execution of the third phase of
15 the operation in Kosovo and Metohija, 3rd of August, 1998, at 1300 hours,
16 in a meeting with the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
17 his previous approval of the 2nd of August, 1998, at the command of the
18 3rd Army.
19 Q. Thank you. Does this indicate that the Joint Command did not
20 have any function in terms of issuing orders or instructions --
21 MR. HANNIS: Objection.
22 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Hannis.
23 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, he's asking the witness to make a legal
24 conclusion that I think is for Your Honours at the end of the case when
25 you've heard all the evidence. I object to the form of the question.
1 There was an earlier one about that. There was an answer yes, before I
2 could even hear the translation. So I want to be on record that I'm
3 opposing these kinds of questions for this witness.
4 JUDGE PARKER: The question that you are putting is one which
5 applies reasons and infers conclusions that may or may not be justified
6 by what is said here, and you are not asking them of the knowledge of the
7 witness but simply for his commentary on the document. So your question
8 is going too far there, Mr. Djurdjic.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. I was
10 not referring to the legal aspect. I was talking about the factual
11 situation and the relationship between the army command and the
12 Pristina Corps and the body that was called the Joint Command. I know of
13 course that you are the only ones who can draw legal conclusions, but
14 anyway, I'm thankful to my learned colleague for drawing my attention to
15 this issue. I would like to tender this document into evidence, please.
16 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00327.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now see the document 65 ter
19 number 04045, please.
20 Q. General, are you familiar with this format of reporting by the
21 security organ of the Pristina Corps?
22 A. Yes, I am familiar with the format.
23 Q. Now, in paragraph 3 it says that:
24 "Women and children have fled from Junik as have a number of
25 terrorists who abandoned their weapons and went to the Republic of
3 Did you have any information or report about these claims at this
4 period of time, which is the 1st of August, 1998?
5 A. Yes, we did.
6 Q. Now, at the end of this first page in B/C/S - and that would be
7 on page 2 in the English version - it reads:
8 "Reliable sources from the Glogovac area have said that the
9 civilian population has been evacuated from the villages of Prekaz, Laus,
10 Poljance, and Poluza ..."
11 Do you know who organised and carried out the evacuation of
13 A. I would like to see the date of this document.
14 Q. It's the 1st of August, 1998. You can see it on the top of the
15 page, and this is the bottom of the page that I'm reading from.
16 A. It is difficult for me to say for this particular sector who
17 carried out the evacuation of the civilian population, but in principle
18 if there are combat operations in progress, the commander of a brigade --
19 it is his duty to evacuate the population from the area of combat
20 operations. That's one solution. But what happened in most cases was
21 that the Siptar terrorist forces would send the civilians on the move
22 immediately prior to any major attacks on the MUP and the army and would
23 send them out as refugees and thereby created a situation which resembled
24 the expulsion of the population.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I tender this document into
3 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00327 -- 328.
5 I apologise.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now look 65 ter
7 document 04051, please.
8 Q. General, do you recognise this document?
9 A. Yes, I do, but just let me read through it. Yes.
10 Q. Can you comment on it?
11 A. The army commander still forbids the use of army units with
12 reinforcements, except for the purpose of securing the state border and
13 possibly repelling attacks on the army personnel and installation, which
14 means only in exceptional cases.
15 Q. Thank you. Under item 4 there is a request for daily reports to
16 be provided by the commander of the 3rd Army.
17 A. Yes, and in addition to that he should receive a written combat
18 report from the Pristina Corps command on a daily basis.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have this document
20 admitted into evidence.
21 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00329.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please look at Defence
24 Exhibit D213.
25 Q. General, this is an order dated 7th of August, 1998. I'm
1 interested in this item 2 that's been highlighted by someone. And in
2 relation to the previous document has anything changed here within these
3 few days, or is the 3rd Army command now allowing the use of forces in
4 concert with MUP forces?
5 A. Give me a minute, please.
6 Yes, the situation changed. It took place on the 7th, and the
7 army commander hereby orders for support to be provided to the MUP forces
8 from the deployment area in which the VJ units are stationed.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now please see 65 ter
11 document number 01422.
12 Q. General, this is an order issued by the Pristina Corps on the 7th
13 of August, 1998. Are you familiar with this document?
14 A. I'd like to see the signature.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have page 2.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This document was drafted by my
17 assistant Ratko Tesevic; he worked on it. And if we can go back to page
18 1 now.
19 Yes, in compliance with this order of the commander of the army
20 he did this, but it included the ban on inflicting damage on persons and
21 property, and it involves specific measures and orders issued to
22 commanders relating to the protection of property of the Albanian
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Yes, General, but in the preamble there is an assessment that it
1 was done in a highly professional manner and with good assessment these
2 actions had been carried out; is that correct?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have this document
6 admitted into evidence.
7 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00330.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now have Defence
10 Exhibit 004-3006.
11 Q. General, this is a regular combat report of the forward command
12 post of the 3rd Army dated 9th of August, 1998.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And in it under item 3, if we can please see item 3 in both
15 languages, it is said that:
16 "Part of the Army forces are providing support to MUP forces in
17 accordance with the decision on engagement."
18 And then it goes on to say on which axis. Therefore, there is no
19 mention about any problems in functioning between the Pristina Corps and
20 the army command.
21 A. No, there isn't.
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now look at item 5, and
23 it's on the next page.
24 Q. Here we see the decision in paragraphs 2 and 3. It says continue
25 to support MUP forces which is in line with the previous approved use of
1 the units.
2 A. Yes.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have this document
4 admitted into evidence.
5 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
6 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D00331.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. General, these combat reports from the forward command post of
9 the 3rd Army, are they in any way related to the third stage of the
10 implementation of the global plan, and were they -- within this third
11 stage, did they also comprise a decision on routing the DTS forces,
12 sabotage and terrorist forces, in the area of Slup and Voks, Slup and
14 A. Yes, they are related -- they do relate to that, but we have to
15 stress that the plan as it existed could not envisage all the scenarios
16 that would develop in a period of a several months so that some actions
17 had to be repeated on a number of times in some areas, especially in
18 Glodjane and Baranski Lug because this was an area which had a lot of
19 problems and the commander had to approve a new plan every time because
20 what would happen is we would neutralise certain points, but these
21 targets would re-emerge seven or eight days later. So that as a matter
22 of course, this would be a standard report provided from the command of
23 the Pristina Corps, which would then be forwarded to the General Staff.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please have Defence
1 Exhibit 004-3062.
2 Q. General, are you familiar with this decision as it is plotted on
3 this map?
4 A. I already answered the question put by the Prosecutor -- by the
5 Prosecutor, and I said that I knew that this was approved personally by
6 the general of the army. But I did not see this particular map as
7 presented here, but rather the plan drafted by the army commander, and it
8 included a number of activities, whereas this is an excerpt from that
10 Q. But could you now please see what it says below, it says
11 Samardzic Dusan and there is a signature there. Can you see that?
12 A. Yes, I can, but I don't know where the signature of
13 General Samardzic came from on this particular map. This is not
14 something that is clear to me. I know that this plan was approved for
15 the general area of Pec, Voksa, Slup, and Decani. But why this was
16 individually signed, why -- well, perhaps the general signed off on these
17 individual plans, maps.
18 Q. All right. But the signature that we see here, can you recognise
19 it as the signature of General Samardzic in the upper left-hand corner?
20 A. As far as I know, General Samardzic is the responsible individual
21 here and also General Pavkovic's signature. But I cannot say with
22 certainty that that is so, that these are their signatures. But I can
23 only say that I know for a fact that this action was approved by
24 General Samardzic; of that I am sure.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see D004-3052 --
2 JUDGE PARKER: Before you move on, I believe the map that the
3 witness has just spoken about is already an exhibit. Could we have the
4 exhibit number for the transcript, please.
5 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, that, I believe, was given Exhibit
6 Number P1237.
7 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I apologise. My assistant noted
9 this or informed me that this has already been admitted, and that is why
10 I did not ask for its admission.
11 Q. General, we see here a regular combat report provided by the
12 forward command post of the 3rd Army, and it was compiled on the 14th of
13 August. Could we now see item 5, please. That would be on page 4 in
14 English. And in the B/C/S version that's on page 3.
15 General, in paragraph 2 under item 5 we can see that Combat
16 Group 15-3 still provides support to MUP forces.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. The command of the army, and then proceed in the same manner. So
19 we see that, again, there is no problem now -- there is no problem
20 mentioned here between the Pristina Corps and --
21 A. That's right, there is no mention of such a problem.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we admit this document into
25 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00332.
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we see document D004-2953.
3 Q. General, this is an order from the General Staff of the
4 Yugoslav Army, dated 17 August 1998
5 that it says that in the period between the 13th and 15th of August,
6 1998, a tour of inspection of part of the commands and units of the
7 3rd Army was carried out.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now move to the next
9 page, item 4.
10 Q. General, could you comment on this item 4 of the document?
11 A. I am aware of this. After this tour of inspection we were issued
12 very specific tasks by the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Army, and we
13 actually translated them into an order for the Pristina Corps. One of
14 them -- one of those orders was to prevent the spilling over of part of
15 the sabotage and terrorist forces from the KiM territory in the area of
16 Raska-Polim which means to the north-west of -- in the north-west of
17 Kosovo as well as the area of the Jablanica and Juzna Morava district
18 which is the area towards Vranja and Leskovac. And to coordinate a joint
19 action with MUP forces. And in keeping with assessments, support MUP
20 forces in destroying the DTG
21 Q. Thank you. General, after this tour of inspection there were no
22 objections made either to the 3rd Army or to the Pristina Corps?
23 A. No, the Chief of the General Staff was there in person with a
24 strong team, and from these assignments we can see that the assignments
25 were actually carried out according to plan.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I tender this document into
4 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D0333.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now pull up document
8 Q. General, I believe that a few moments ago you mentioned this
9 document, but here we see that this was a document produced by the army
10 command following the -- a report after the inspection. And I would
11 especially like to refer you to item 4 which is on the next page.
12 A. The command system is operational, functioning well, both
13 vertically from the Pristina Corps to the General Staff and the other way
14 around, from the General Staff to the Pristina Corps and the subordinate
15 units, which is affirmed by this order issued by the army commander
16 pursuant to an order from the Chief of the General Staff which we had
17 occasion to see earlier.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see page 2. Yes, I
19 see it now on the screen.
20 Q. Could you comment on items 4 and 5, paragraphs 2, 4, and 5.
21 A. Well, here we see the implementation of this item, and it says
22 that in cooperation with the command of the 2nd Army and in coordinated
23 action with MUP forces and the deployment of forces in the area, the
24 spillover of DTS should be prevented from the KiM area -- the spillover
25 from the KiM area into the Raska-Polim district and into the Jablanica
1 and Cinja [as interpreted] district should be prevented. And the
2 responsible bodies are the army command which means it -- it's own
3 command and the Pristina Corps command. And this is a continuous task
4 which is very important.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could I tender this document into
8 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00334.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see Defence
11 Exhibit 004-2987.
12 Q. General, this is -- these are minutes from the briefing of the
13 commander of the IKM, and you attended this briefing?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. You've already mentioned this, didn't you?
16 A. Yes.
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see the next page in
18 the B/C/S version, which is page 5 in English.
19 Q. We see here -- is this a reference to you, PrK NOOPiO?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. So this is your discussion; correct?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And this is in preparation for Operation Ratis; correct?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. On the next page, and that's the end of the document, and it's on
1 the last page of both versions, the 3rd Army commander approves the
2 decision of the PRK
3 reporting; correct?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Very well.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I tender this document.
7 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00335.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we have D004-3063. I may be
10 mistaken, but then again maybe not, but when we see it on the screens
11 we'll know if this is the right document. It's again a reference to
12 Ratis operation.
13 Q. Is this the same map, General, that we saw a little earlier or
15 A. I haven't seen it yet. It's not on my screen.
16 Q. It will be in a moment. It says Ratis village, and we can now
17 see the signature, it's clearer.
18 A. Yes, the signature of General Samardzic is far easier to make out
19 now. And, again, this is done in the way that he normally did it, by
20 signing it in a felt-tip pen.
21 Q. So is this the same map?
22 A. No. There were many plans for certain -- for actions, but this
23 one is produced on the basis of the plan, which is the normal way to do
25 Q. All right. Let me ask you this: Did the army commander sign off
1 on the excerpts which we don't have here before us, or did he only sign
2 off on the -- let me put it in layman's terms, a general, basic plan?
3 A. That's the thing, I know that that plan was approved. But how
4 these were approved, I'm not clear on that. Whether they were taken to
5 the commander individually, whether that's what he demanded, I don't
6 know, it could be that he would not allow a single operation without his
8 Q. I apologise, but you are in fact in charge of preparing these
9 decisions and translating them into maps; in other words, they were made
10 pursuant to your orders?
11 A. That's correct. When General Pavkovic was at the IKM, I took
12 this plan for approval to the general, the plans for Voksa and Slup, the
13 operations that were carried out in the area between Decani and Pec.
14 Now, how it came about that these decisions were signed -- because based
15 on what I see here, this is an original signature. But whether
16 General Samardzic asked General Pavkovic to provide individual excerpts
17 for his signing, I don't know, but that's what it seems to be.
18 Q. Thank you. But just tell me: Is this an original signature?
19 A. Yes, as far as I can see, it is.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I tender this document.
22 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00336.
24 JUDGE PARKER: That appears to be a convenient time,
25 Mr. Djurdjic.
1 We therefore adjourn and will continue tomorrow at 2.15.
2 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.00,
3 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 19th day of
4 August, 2009, at 2.15 p.m.