Page 8039
1 Wednesday, 19 August 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 3.03 p.m.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Good afternoon. It's unfortunate that due to
6 circumstances at the Detention Unit we've had to have a late start today.
7 We would propose to try and minimise the effect of that by sitting longer
8 for each of two periods so that hopefully we might manage an hour and 40
9 or an hour and 45 minutes for each sitting session and just have the one
10 break in the middle.
11 Ms. O'Leary.
12 MS. O'LEARY: If I may address the Chamber on one evidentiary
13 matter that's peripherally related to the testimony today. On
14 10th of June, 2009, Mr. -- General Vasiljevic was testifying and we had
15 called up a document Mr. Djurdjic had at D003-2633, and this is reflected
16 in the transcript on that date at 5863, line 12. The document that was
17 loaded in at that number was the incorrect number or the incorrect
18 document, excuse me, it was a 3rd Army combat report dated the
19 29th of April, 1999. General Vasiljevic looked at the document. He
20 attested to it being the 13th of April, 1999, which is the document it
21 should have been. We all actually looked at the document but nobody
22 caught the error that it was the wrong document on the screen. And it
23 was tendered into evidence as D190. The second document that was called
24 right after it was actually the exact same document, the proper
25 29th of April document, and then that was admitted as D191. So what we
Page 8040
1 have is a duplicate at D190 and D191.
2 We would like to use the 13th April, 1999, document -- or we'd
3 like to have it in evidence, and we're wondering if it would be possible
4 to substitute that in the e-court system at this time as the proper
5 document. Or if you prefer, we can file something on the matter.
6 JUDGE PARKER: Do you see any difficulty, Mr. Hannis?
7 MR. HANNIS: No objection from the Prosecution, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE PARKER: I think leave will be granted to substitute the
9 correct document as the exhibit.
10 MS. O'LEARY: Thank you, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE PARKER: I leave it to you to work it out with the
12 Court Officer how to achieve that.
13 MS. O'LEARY: Of course. Thank you.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Now if we could have the witness.
15 [The witness takes the stand]
16 JUDGE PARKER: Good afternoon. Once again, if I could remind you
17 the affirmation you made still applies. We apologise it was -- there has
18 been a delayed start today because of a fire which has delayed
19 arrangements, so you were kept waiting unexpectedly.
20 Now Mr. Djurdjic will continue.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
22 WITNESS: MILAN DJAKOVIC [Resumed]
23 [Witness answered through interpreter]
24 Cross-examination by Mr. Djurdjic: [Continued]
25 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, General, sir.
Page 8041
1 A. Good afternoon.
2 Q. Yesterday we were very fast so that there are some imprecise
3 things left in the transcript, so before the end of the day today or
4 before we begin today I would like to correct that and I ask you kindly
5 to continue slowly with your answers in a professorial manner, and I'm
6 also going to do my best to put my questions slowly.
7 General, yesterday on page 7892, line 18, it was said
8 "General Lukovic." Line 17, 21, it also says "General Lukovic." Am I
9 correct if I say that actually it was General Lukic?
10 A. Well, I would like to see that. I don't know what exactly this
11 is about.
12 Q. Well, it's line -- actually page 7892, line 18. It's about the
13 reports by the Joint Command and reporting before the 21st of July.
14 General Bakovic told me that this was on the basis of his agreement with
15 General Lukovic that they should send us certain information so that we
16 could use that when we make our assessments.
17 A. We're talking about General Lukic here.
18 Q. Thank you. Now we have page 7962, lines 12 to 18. The
19 General Staff tried to do that. There was an order of the 18th of April.
20 I believe that it was received on the 18th of April and the decision was
21 not implemented because the explanation that was given was that the
22 organs of the Ministry of the Interior did not receive the identical
23 order from the Ministry of the Interior as the top ministry -- as the top
24 officer in the ministry. Should it actually state that the organs of the
25 minister did not receive the identical order from the minister of
Page 8042
1 internal affairs as the highest official at the ministry?
2 A. Yes, from the minister of the interior.
3 Q. Thank you. We are not going to correct the transcript here, but
4 we can do it like this. According to your knowledge at the time,
5 Mr. Minic, what was his state position at the time?
6 A. Based on what I know, he was the president of the council of
7 citizens in the Federal Assembly. I believe that that was his post, and
8 I believe that he was at the same time the director of the railways. I
9 heard that in an informal conversation.
10 Q. Thank you. Could you please tell me the post held by
11 Mr. Sainovic.
12 A. As far as I know, he was the vice-president in the -- of the
13 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
14 Q. The --
15 A. Actually federal -- the prime minister of the federal government
16 in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
17 Q. Thank you. Mr. Andjelkovic, can you tell me what was his post?
18 A. As far as I know, he was the minister for sports and youth.
19 Q. Thank you. Is this in the Republic of Serbia
20 the Republic of Serbia
21 A. Yes, that is correct, in the Government of the
22 Republic of Serbia
23 Q. And Mr. Matkovic?
24 A. As far as I know, Mr. Matkovic was responsible for the economy.
25 I don't know if at the time he was a minister, but he was also the
Page 8043
1 director of the steel works in Smederevo.
2 Q. Thank you. Yesterday you mentioned Mr. Andro Milosavljevic. Do
3 you know what his position was, where he worked?
4 A. I think that he worked at the ministry, one of the ministries,
5 and he was in charge of resolving the outstanding matters in
6 Kosovo and Metohija, in terms of regular supplies and care for the Serbs
7 and Albanians in Kosovo. I really didn't have any contacts with him.
8 It's something that I heard more from other people.
9 Q. Thank you. Am I correct if I were to say that this function was
10 in the republican government of the Republic of Serbia
11 A. Yes, he had this post in the republican government.
12 Q. On page 8002, lines 1 and 2, in response to a question in 1998
13 was there resubordination between the army and the military. My question
14 was between the army and the police, actually. So this is something that
15 needs to be corrected.
16 [Defence counsel confer]
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] All right. That would be that.
18 I would now ask for 65 ter Exhibit 01430.
19 Q. General, sir, do you recognise this document?
20 A. I would like to look at the signature and the initials.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 2, please.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. It seems that you are the author of this document. Is that
25 correct?
Page 8044
1 A. Yes.
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Well, if we can look at the first
3 page. I'm interested in the first paragraph regarding these assertions
4 that the situation in Kosovo and Metohija and especially in Metohija
5 recently is becoming even more complex due to the Siptar terrorist
6 pressure at the civilian population in order to prevent their return to
7 inhabited areas.
8 Could we please --
9 Q. Could you please tell us a little more about these statements
10 that you made here.
11 A. In the period in early September, terrorist activities continued
12 against members of the army. And the terrorist forces continued to try,
13 by exerting pressure on the civilian population, to -- particularly those
14 of the Catholic faith in the area of Baranski Lug, which includes the
15 area of 20 to 30 villages - by burning haystacks and killing their
16 cattle, burning their houses, and forcing them to take up weapons and to
17 fight against members of the army and the Ministry of the Interior, or
18 rather, the police -- actually, that is one of the most characteristic
19 cases. There were some others in the areas around the outposts in the
20 area of the 53rd Border Battalion. This is the area of Has towards
21 Albania
22 Q. Thank you. General, sir, this occurrence of the abuse of
23 civilians and not permitting them to return to their homes even though
24 the operations were over was something that General Djordjevic pointed to
25 at a meeting on the 14th [as interpreted] of September when you remarked
Page 8045
1 that the civilians should be returned to their villages by force?
2 A. Yes, it did include those occurrences in places where this was a
3 characteristic.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would just like a correction in
5 the transcript. I didn't say the 14th of September. I said the 4th of
6 September, that it was a meeting on the 4th of September.
7 JUDGE PARKER: You may have meant the 4th.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, it's possible. I'm not
9 sure, actually, what I said. Thank you, Your Honour.
10 Could we tender this document as an exhibit.
11 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00337.
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would like
14 65 ter document 01433, please.
15 Q. General, this is a document of the 15th of September, and would
16 you believe me when I look at the last page I can see that MDj/MV drafted
17 this document?
18 A. Well, I worked on these documents that refer to the areas of
19 responsibilities of units on several occasions.
20 Q. And do you remember how these areas of responsibility pursuant to
21 this order were established?
22 A. I know the principle and the order I received from
23 General Pavkovic.
24 Q. Thank you very much.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] We would like to tender this
Page 8046
1 document for adoption.
2 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00338.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Sir, General, according to what you know, who was in charge of
6 the police units in Kosovo and Metohija in 1998 and 1999, if you know?
7 A. I could say with a great degree of certainty for 1998 that this
8 was the MUP staff in Pristina. I personally did not see any order or
9 document indicating who would be in charge, but in view of what I heard
10 from General Pavkovic he stressed that General Lukic was the commander of
11 the MUP staff in Pristina. In 1999 I went to a different duty and I no
12 longer had contacts with people from the Ministry of the Interior or any
13 civilians who attended the meetings of the Joint Command, except for
14 Mr. Andjelkovic on three occasions. And I already referred to those
15 occasions before.
16 Q. Thank you. Can you please tell me if you know if in 1998 -- in
17 1998 which police units took part in these anti-terrorist actions?
18 A. Yes. I am well aware of this because I received a review from
19 the MUP staff of the units that were being brought to the area of
20 Kosovo and Metohija, and those are the following units: Ten detachments
21 of 400 to 600 men in strength, so they're of different compositions and
22 different strengths. I know that those detachments were initially
23 deployed as follows: Two detachments from the Uzice area, I don't know
24 from which municipalities, but I know that they referred to them as the
25 Uzice Detachments. They were deployed in the Kosovska Mitrovica and
Page 8047
1 Srbica area.
2 Q. Well, I didn't really think of the deployment, but can you please
3 tell me which unit these ten detachments were from. What police units
4 this was?
5 A. These were the PJPs, Posebne Jedinice Policije.
6 Q. Thank you very much. Can you tell me which other police units
7 were in Kosovo, their names, not where they were deployed?
8 A. There was the SAJ
9 security, and also companies of MUP from the secretariats -- seven
10 secretariats in the Kosovo and Metohija area, and there were a total of
11 ten companies all together, two secretariats had contributed two
12 companies each as far as I can recall.
13 Q. Thank you. But the companies that you mentioned at the end as
14 being from Kosovo, these were Posebne Jedinice Policije, Special Police
15 units?
16 A. Yes, but they were part of the seven secretariats that covered
17 the territory of Kosovo
18 Q. Thank you. The principle of forming all the PJP units in the
19 entire territory of the Republic of Serbia
20 secretariats would contribute detachments so that one detachment was made
21 up of troops from several secretariats?
22 A. Yes, it's correct. One secretariat was not able to form these
23 units, but five or six secretariats would form one detachment.
24 Q. Thank you. Can you please tell me if you know which department
25 the Jedinica za Specijalne Operacije belonged to?
Page 8048
1 A. Yes, they belonged to the state security department.
2 Q. Thank you. Do you know who was the commander of the -- unit for
3 special operations commander was in 1998?
4 A. Yes, Legija was the commander, namely Milorad Lukovic, a.k.a.
5 Legija.
6 Q. Thank you. General, do you know -- or rather, what do you know
7 about the reinforcements of the staff when the anti-terrorist actions in
8 Kosovo and Metohija began, the joint military and police actions?
9 A. I don't know what -- how large the staff was and how it was
10 established. What I do know is that after a meeting in Belgrade held on
11 the 21st of July, 1998, at a meeting which was in the evening hours, I
12 saw Mr. Djordjevic and Mr. Obrad Stevanovic. I apologise. I'm not sure
13 whether I actually saw Obrad that very evening, but Mr. Djordjevic, yes,
14 for certain. But whether Obrad came along with him or not I'm not sure
15 of that. I did see him a few days later.
16 Q. All right. Thank you. Now, did you know at the time that
17 General Djordjevic and General Obrad Stevanovic were assistant ministers
18 for the interior, assistants to Mr. Vlajko Stojiljkovic?
19 A. I personally did not know that.
20 Q. Thank you. After October 1998 did you have occasion to see
21 General Djordjevic at -- in Kosovo and Metohija ever?
22 A. No, I did not. I had no occasion to see him because
23 General Pavkovic assigned me to other assignments that had to do with the
24 arrival of the OSCE Mission and the deployment of our units in that
25 territory.
Page 8049
1 Q. Thank you. Yesterday you told us that you saw General Djordjevic
2 on the 19th of April, 1999. Aside from that day, did you ever see him in
3 Kosovo and Metohija in the course of 1999 up until the end of the war?
4 A. I think I've already said that we received an order on the 18th
5 from Belgrade
6 only, but that was the only time that I saw General Djordjevic and
7 Obrad Stevanovic in Kosovo in 1999.
8 Q. Thank you. In the course of 1998, other than in the meetings
9 that you mentioned where you took notes, outside of these meetings did
10 you have any contacts with General Djordjevic or any type of
11 communication?
12 A. I had very infrequent contacts with him, but there was an
13 occasion when I was supposed to exchange information and coordinate my
14 work with MUP staff. And since I didn't find the person that I was
15 looking for, namely Colonel Adamovic, I went to see the duty officers at
16 the duty service. And I found General Djordjevic there. We exchanged
17 greetings. And I noticed that there were some three or four police
18 officers who were monitoring some activities of the Siptar terrorist
19 forces on the screens in front of them. I think they had some tapes,
20 videotapes, and this was following the events in Ovcarevo village and the
21 general just briefly commented. He said, These were the documents that
22 we seized in Ovcarevo village. There is a lot of -- there are a lot of
23 documents there. And this was actually confirmed later on in a meeting
24 where Mr. Sainovic, I think, said that it would be a good idea if the
25 state security organs and military security organs reviewed and studied
Page 8050
1 these documents in order to find out what the deployment of the Kosovo
2 terrorist units in Kosovo was and to use that material in the best
3 possible way. I saw this, and for some five minutes or so perhaps I
4 myself could view this on the screens.
5 Q. General, the notes or the minutes that you took in these
6 meetings, tell us, please, these notes were not minutes proper, but
7 rather they were notes that were to serve you and help you in your work.
8 Am I correct if I say then that that is the reason why you did not
9 re-type these notes and produce documents that would be then filed in the
10 protocol of the operations department of the Pristina Corps?
11 A. Yes, that's the main reason. I mean, General Pavkovic never
12 asked or ordered me to prepare any document following this meeting. I
13 took the notes for my own purposes - and I stressed this earlier - and I
14 only jotted down those details and facts that I felt might be of use to
15 my command in their assessment of the Siptar terrorist forces' strength.
16 And in fact this notebook was -- I kept it with me all the time until I
17 handed it over to the -- to my subordinate officer who then actually
18 chaired the last five meetings.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have
20 Exhibit P1229.
21 Q. General, you've already seen this document. Mr. Hannis presented
22 it to you. It is a document of September 22nd [as interpreted], 1998.
23 He referred you to the heading which says -- which reads:
24 "Implementation of the fifth stage of the plan for combatting
25 terrorism."
Page 8051
1 Now, if I look at the second page I see that it says -- the
2 initials there are BV. You were not the author of this document, were
3 you?
4 A. Well, if there is an NP initial, that's General Pavkovic.
5 Q. Yes, that's NP, and there is also his signature there.
6 Now what I would like to know is what was the fourth stage if
7 this one is the fifth stage?
8 A. The fourth stage implied the routing of Siptar terrorist forces
9 in some areas where they re-emerged; in other words, this was just the
10 second and third stage, in fact, once again renewed because unexpectedly
11 some of these terrorist forces actually re-appeared in some areas in
12 Kosovo where we had not foreseen that it was possible at all for them to
13 reach there, for instance, the Jezero mountains. And according to our
14 assessment, it was not expected that there would be an amassing of
15 terrorist forces there. The -- then there was an emergence of the
16 terrorist forces in Podujevo, next west of Pristina, and even in Gnjilane
17 and Kosovska Kamenica.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please have
20 Exhibit D004-3000.
21 Q. General, this is a document from the forward command post of the
22 3rd Army signed by General Dusan Samardzic, the commander, whereby he
23 approves the establishment of eight new combat groups. Are you familiar
24 with this document?
25 A. Yes.
Page 8052
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I tender this document into
2 evidence.
3 JUDGE PARKER: Is this document the 26th of September or
4 the 22nd? The transcript records the 22nd.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it's dated the
6 26th of September.
7 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] You can see that in the heading.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, it will be received.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00339.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now have exhibit -- or
12 rather, document 65 ter 04036.
13 Q. General, were you aware of the contents of the analysis produced
14 by the command of the 3rd Army dated October 2nd, 1998, which document we
15 see in front of us now?
16 A. Partially, and for the most part I was aware of it while it was
17 being prepared.
18 Q. Thank you. Now, am I correct in saying that there is -- there
19 are no indications whatsoever in this document that the Pristina Corps
20 actually failed to implement the decisions from the army command for the
21 period to which this report relates?
22 A. That's correct. From this analysis I can see no objections or no
23 remarks to the effect that the command of the Pristina Corps was not
24 abiding 100 per cent by the commands of the 3rd Army.
25 Q. Thank you.
Page 8053
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please see page 5 in
2 English and 4 in B/C/S.
3 Q. General, we have already seen the description of the stages and
4 what they entailed. I think this document reflects that clearly, how
5 everything transpired, but look at this second paragraph on page 4 here.
6 It says --
7 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We do not have the
8 relevant document on the screen.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Which paragraph are you quoting, Mr. Djurdjic? Is
10 it 4.1?
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] No, no. It's actually 3 and then
12 we see it says "negative experiences," and then we have -- I apologise,
13 actually this is at the bottom of page 4 in the English version as well.
14 JUDGE PARKER: [Previous translation continues]... the bottom of
15 page 4 in the English.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, can you see this last
17 paragraph, that's in the last paragraph, requests were made by the army.
18 Q. So, General -- and we are on page 4 of the B/C/S as well. That's
19 okay.
20 So, General, this paragraph here "requests were made by the
21 army," am I correct that the support was provided in depth to MUP units
22 and that it was not used for any other tasks?
23 A. Yes, this was in the third stage where the army provides support
24 to MUP in lifting the blockade of the main roads. And we both knew and
25 were certain that MUP alone was not capable nor did it have sufficient
Page 8054
1 forces to lift the blockade of these three main communication routes.
2 And I can say with certainty that the army used a lot of -- applied a lot
3 of effort and together with MUP they finally managed, after fierce
4 fighting, to break-up or destroy the bunkers - especially on the
5 communication lines Klina-Pristina-Pec - bunkers made of reinforced
6 concrete. And we could not believe that it was possible for terrorists,
7 by just using civilians, to build up all these shelters and protective
8 structures. And I myself was able to see this in Iglarevo, where a
9 portion of our units provided support to a MUP unit from the
10 15th Armoured Brigade.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please see page 7 of
13 the English version and page 6 in the B/C/S version.
14 Q. Please take a look at this paragraph, 4.3, proposed measures, and
15 then see under the third paragraph where it says "by using larger forces,
16 larger MUP forces ..."
17 A. Yes, I've read it.
18 Q. General, is this also another bit of evidence that shows that the
19 Joint Command actually had no command responsibility --
20 MR. HANNIS: [Previous translation continues]... an ultimate
21 issue in this case on a legal conclusion that he's not entitled to opine
22 on.
23 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Hannis has a valid point, Mr. Djurdjic. You
24 may be able to get something from the witness by asking other questions,
25 but you can't come in in this way asking this question.
Page 8055
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 Q. General, here under the proposed measures, this paragraph, does
3 the command of the 3rd Army propose that in future whenever units of the
4 MUP are engaged together with the army, that there should be an organ to
5 coordinate the activities with MUP forces?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Does this mean that in the earlier period there was no such body
8 created for those purposes?
9 A. No, that does not mean that because that function was actually
10 performed by the operations and training organ of the Pristina Corps and
11 some elements of the MUP staff.
12 Q. Thank you. You are now talking about coordination, but what I am
13 referring to is a body or an organ that will actually direct such future
14 joint operations.
15 A. Well, up until then there was no such body.
16 Q. Yes, but this is a proposal of measures for the future.
17 A. Coordination is a process which does not entail just the
18 preparation of documents. It is also a process that is active, both in
19 the course of and following a completed combat operation, so that now
20 there is a proposal that during and after combat operations there should
21 be a body to coordinate the work of the military and the MUP so that they
22 shouldn't fire at each other.
23 Q. Thank you. And that should be done by a new body that was to be
24 established; correct?
25 A. Yes.
Page 8056
1 Q. This is a document we see of October 2nd, 1998, so this means
2 that there was no such body in existence at this time; correct?
3 A. Yes.
4 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic, you're moving from the idea of there
5 being a person or a group of people at a forward command control post to
6 coordinate on the ground, in the operational spot coordination, to the
7 proposition which you just put at the very end that there was no such
8 body in existence to coordinate. The witness has been at pains to try to
9 point out to you that coordination involves a lot of things, one of them
10 is when there are two operational forces in the one area. I think as he
11 himself put it, it's important to ensure that two friendly forces aren't
12 firing at each other. That's one form of coordination. And this
13 reference seems to be dealing with that. There may be much higher levels
14 of coordination in other parts of the controlling command.
15 Now, you seem to be assuming that there can only be one point of
16 coordination in your questions, and I think the witness was trying to
17 point out to you that some other situation than that obtained. Now, you
18 may want to explore this more with the witness if you've grasped what I'm
19 getting at.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. General, sir, can you clarify for us, please, the question of the
22 organ that should coordinate a number of the units of the MUP and the
23 army pursuant to the measures contained in this order of the 3rd Army
24 command?
25 A. Well, we understood this in the way that the army commander was
Page 8057
1 insisting that the coordination within the MUP staff and the army be
2 improved from planning with the emphasis on the implementation of combat
3 assignments at all levels. I don't know that there was a special organ
4 allocated to carry out coordination. At the staff and the corps level
5 that was this exchange in the plan part at the level of combat groups,
6 and at the level of MUP detachments the coordination was carried out by
7 the commander of the brigade and the combat group and on the other side
8 the detachment commander -- or rather, the subordinated units.
9 Q. Thank you, General. Well, the proposal here is to appoint an
10 organ in future who would -- that would be in charge of all of that; is
11 that correct?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please tender this exhibit.
15 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00340.
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we look at Exhibit D004-3036.
18 Q. General, we're now going to look at one combat report of the
19 15th of September, 1998, from the 3rd Army command -- the
20 15th of October, 1998.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would like to look at page 2 of
22 the English version and page 2 of the B/C/S version. And can we look at
23 item marked with the number 4.
24 Q. This is the 15th of October, 1998. The situation in the
25 territory, in that paragraph it is stated in the first paragraph that:
Page 8058
1 "... 3.000 armed non-uniformed terrorists in the area of
2 Donje Ljupce-Majance-Kisela Banja-Gornje Ljupce-Popovo, Podujevo
3 municipality ..."
4 Could you please tell us a little bit more about this and how
5 this happened that such a number of terrorists appeared in that area?
6 A. Well, I do -- I am aware of this piece of information, and I know
7 that this is an area that is called the Teneslovski Teznac [phoen] and it
8 spreads from Pristina towards Podujevo. Teneslovski Teznac. And in that
9 area -- or actually, before smaller groups of terrorists were noted
10 there. And then in this period, in mid-October, large numbers of
11 terrorists assembled and there were intense attacks on the MUP and army
12 units on the roads leading to central Serbia.
13 There were an exceptional number of attacks from the Bajgora
14 slopes. This is an area between Kosovska Mitrovica and Podujevo. It is
15 impassable, sparsely populated, and for the most part the terrorists from
16 the Podujevo municipality and some from the Vucitrn municipality
17 participated.
18 Q. Thank you very much.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
20 exhibit, please.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00341.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now look at D004-3030.
24 Q. General, sir, in this document of the 17th of October, 1998
25 again Podujevo is mentioned that the KLA had returned to the lines they
Page 8059
1 had before they were scattered. They're talking about the villages of
2 Ljubince, Kisela Banja, Popovo, and other villages. This previous answer
3 of yours would refer to these territories as well and what happened on
4 the 17th; is that correct?
5 A. Yes, it's the same kind of general area.
6 Q. Thank you very much. But what did the KLA take advantage of in
7 order to return to this territory from which they had been driven away?
8 Was it due to the withdrawal of our forces or ...
9 A. Our forces did -- were not so numerous, neither were the MUP
10 units in such numbers to be able to control and hold the entire
11 territory. Mostly in that narrow area we held five or six key points for
12 purposes of regular logistics supplies of the units from Serbia or units
13 that received their supplies from the Malo Kosovo area or from the
14 Podujevo municipality.
15 The terrorists, being aware that we didn't have enough manpower
16 to cover the whole area - and I already said that this was an area that
17 was full of forests, it was not easily passable, and even the combat
18 equipment tanks could not be used in certain areas -- actually, we're
19 talking about the southern slopes of Mount Kopaonik which in that area is
20 quite impassable and you are not able to use heavy equipment there.
21 Q. Thank you. You told us that later you had some assignments that
22 had to do with the Kosovo Verification Mission. Were members of the KLA
23 using the international situation in order to occupy territories that
24 they had been pushed back from, that they were returning to now?
25 A. This was a period when -- I think on the 16th the agreement was
Page 8060
1 signed, and I think it was Mr. Sainovic specifically who was involved in
2 that. At that time, we were carrying out certain movements of troops
3 pursuant to the agreement with the OSCE. Now we're talking about the
4 15th and the 20th of October, that period. Up until the end of the year
5 we pulled our units back, and from what I know the MUP pulled their
6 forces back to the barracks except for the border units; seven combat
7 groups in the border area, that was something that was in keeping with
8 the strict OSCE agreement; and three tactical groups, three mixed
9 companies that had been deployed at three key points in the area of
10 Volujak mountain near Glina, Iglarevo, which is on the Pristina-Glina
11 road; and one mixed group on the Dulje pass.
12 Q. Thank you. Now that we're talking about the
13 Kosovo Verification Mission, we mentioned them, do you have any
14 information about the misuse of the mandate by members of the
15 Kosovo Verification Mission during their stay in the territory of
16 Kosovo and Metohija and in the territory of Yugoslavia
17 let's say, late October until the 20th of March, 1998 -- actually, until
18 March 1999?
19 A. I had some contacts with some representatives of the OSCE. Once
20 there were some allegations that our reconnaissance organs fired at their
21 vehicles; and General Pavkovic sent me, he personally sent me, to
22 investigate this matter, to meet with those representatives, and to
23 establish if there had really been any firing at them or not. Not to go
24 into any more detail I'm going to explain briefly that previously I
25 checked what the scouts, the soldiers, had told me and I established
Page 8061
1 reliably that there had been no firing but that due to the driving
2 downhill of a combat vehicle there was gas let out from the tires or the
3 exhaust which sounded like fire from a machine-gun. When I showed the
4 representatives this, he was convinced that there had been no fire that
5 was opened, and he accepted that the army did not fire at their vehicle.
6 I cannot really say anything in particular about misuse or abuse
7 of their position, but it is a fact that OSCE representatives tolerated
8 the provocations on the part of Siptar terrorist forces, attacks on
9 check-points, attacks on mixed units and companies that we had to
10 intervene several times, both General Pavkovic and other organs of the
11 command. But I have to say they accepted that but there didn't seem to
12 be any effort made in order to prevent these activities by the Siptar
13 forces, nothing was achieved.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we look at
15 Defence Exhibit 289, please -- Exhibit D179.
16 Q. General, sir, were you aware that this directive was adopted? We
17 can see that it's called Grom 3, Thunder 3, and this was in January 1999?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Am I correct if I say that this directive refers to the use of
20 the military in the event of the arrival of the multi-national NATO
21 brigade in the KiM area?
22 A. Yes.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now please look at --
24 Q. It refers only to the strategic formations - does it not? - this
25 directive, the 1st, 2nd, and the 3rd Army, the RVPO [as interpreted]
Page 8062
1 Department, and the KSJ command?
2 A. Yes.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we look at 04305 document on
4 the 65 ter list.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Before we do that, was there a document of the
6 17th of October that you intended to tender?
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Yes, I
8 would like to tender document D00433 -- 43030.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Just check that we're getting back to the correct
10 document.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] If I can assist, the first one was
12 on the 15th of October, 1998, and this one D004-3030 --
13 JUDGE PARKER: [Previous translation continues]... and then I
14 think this document you referred to but you did not tender, combat report
15 of the 17th of October? You would like it to be received? It will be.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00342.
17 JUDGE PARKER: Now you were seeking a further document when I
18 interrupted you?
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you for your help,
20 Your Honour. I asked for document on the 65 ter list 04305, if we can
21 see that.
22 Q. General, sir, we are seeing now on our screen an order of the
23 3rd Army command of the 27th of January, 1999. Can you please explain to
24 us a little bit about this order. We see that this refers to Grom 3 and
25 what connection is it then with the directive and how does it relate to
Page 8063
1 the Pristina Corps?
2 A. When the Chief of the General Staff on the 16th of January issued
3 the directive Thunder 3, and then on the basis of that directive the
4 command of the 3rd Army approached the drafting of the order for the use
5 of the 3rd Army -- that relates to the same tasks issued in the directive
6 by the Chief of the General Staff in Thunder 3, which is the prevention
7 of the forceful entry of the NATO brigade and the breaking up of the
8 Siptar terrorist forces. And that corresponds to the order of the
9 commander of the 3rd Army that was passed down to the command of the
10 Pristina Corps, where the Pristina Corps command drafted its own order
11 containing the same tasks included at the level of the General Staff and
12 at the level of the command of the 3rd Army but on the territory of the
13 Pristina Corps.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I'm tendering this document into
16 evidence.
17 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00343.
19 Q. General, sir, could you now clarify certain things. As the
20 result of this operation Thunder 3, am I correct that an order was issued
21 to rout and destroy the Siptar terrorist forces in Mala and
22 Velika Drenica, Podujevo and this was to be done by the Pristina Corps?
23 And we can also see Exhibit P889 if that may be of assistance.
24 General, is this one of the documents that was produced in the
25 aftermath of Grom 3 of that -- this order?
Page 8064
1 A. From the moment that the directive was issued by the Chief of the
2 General Staff, the commander of the 3rd arm [as interpreted], and they --
3 pursuant to the order of the commander of the Pristina Corps, which deal
4 with activities to break-up Siptar terrorist forces, there have been no
5 separate decisions issued, but rather pursuant to the already mentioned
6 directives and orders these were implemented and made operational in the
7 preparations in order to prevent the arrival of the multi-national NATO
8 brigade while at the same time breaking up and destroying Siptar
9 terrorist forces in the areas of their arrival.
10 In other words, in the area of Malo Kosovo, Drenica, and
11 Malisevo, these areas were on the outskirt of the assault and landing
12 area of the NATO forces; and the commander of the army, bearing this in
13 mind, developed a plan in order to break up and destroy Siptar terrorist
14 forces on the edges of -- along the edges of these assault areas. And I
15 was ordered by General Pavkovic to provide support to the command of the
16 Pristina Corps in preparing these documents together with the air force
17 officers from the General Staff of the army, who were assigned to the
18 Kosovo Pristina Corps command.
19 Q. Thank you. Just one more clarification, please.
20 In March -- in other words, as of March 22, 1999, up until, I
21 believe, April 16th we have seen a number of orders entitled -- rather,
22 bearing the heading of the Joint Command and that deal with the decisions
23 relating to Malisevo, Drenica, Malo Kosovo, and Zegra. How did -- or did
24 these decisions tie-in with this directive of the 3rd Army and the order?
25 A. The command of the 3rd Army and the command -- the order of the
Page 8065
1 3rd Army and the order of the Pristina Corps provided the basis for
2 routing terrorist forces in any area where they might appear. In other
3 words, neither the army commander nor the Chief of the General Staff
4 issued any particular orders, but rather in this general directive it was
5 determined that the strategic goal in the preparations in the course of
6 January and February was to break-up these forces so that in March when
7 the aggression was expected to begin the forces were ready to push back
8 the forces, the NATO forces, coming from the Republic of Macedonia and
9 the Republic of Albania
10 Q. Thank you. Now, tell us, please, if you know, I've looked at all
11 these orders up until the 16th of April and they all bear the heading
12 "Joint Command" and they have no signature and they all carry the log
13 numbers of the Pristina Corps, whereas after April 22nd, including the
14 resubordination orders, all orders and decisions have the Pristina Corps
15 heading and the log numbers of the Pristina Corps. Are these decisions
16 the result of the coordination that you mentioned, the coordination that
17 was done in 1998, so that pursuant to those orders MUP units which
18 participate in these operations should join the operation?
19 A. I suppose -- well, General Radojko Stefanovic, who actually
20 replaced me in the operations and training department, he probably
21 continued to work in the same manner that we had done earlier. In other
22 words, he would put "Joint Command" in the heading which would actually
23 be an indication that there was coordination between the army and the MUP
24 in keeping with the order issued by General Samardzic in 1998 and in
25 early 1999 from -- the order from General Pavkovic.
Page 8066
1 Q. General, regardless of the problems with resubordination, if
2 there were any - and we can discuss this a little later - but beginning
3 with the 20th of April and onwards, all decisions and orders had in their
4 heading the words "the command of the Pristina Corps"; correct?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. So this means that in this period the Pristina Corps issued
7 orders that were then forwarded to police units that participated in
8 those operations, and those units actually complied with those orders?
9 A. Well, I would appreciate it -- I'm not actually certain that
10 that's how it was, and I was not really in a position to follow the work
11 of General Stefanovic --
12 Q. All right. We'll come to that a little later.
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see document D104 --
14 I apologise.
15 Q. General, do we see here "Joint Command" in the heading? Would
16 you take a look? Can you confirm it?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Well, I see that you are jotting something. Would you please
19 write down the number 455-56, that is the log-book and the number under
20 which this order was filed; correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. This order relates to the routing and destruction of the STS,
23 Siptar terrorist forces, in the Malo Kosovo area; correct?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. It's dated 22nd of March, 1999.
Page 8067
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now take a look at the last
2 page of this order in both languages.
3 Q. General, can you see here that as the signature we see the words
4 the Joint Command for KiM. Now, please keep this in mind, this order.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please see D105, the
6 Defence Exhibit D105.
7 Q. General, can we see here again that this -- this is a document
8 produced by the Joint Command? We see that in the heading?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And we see the number, strictly confidential number 455-56/1.
11 Now, can you tell us what this slash 1 refers to?
12 A. That is -- that means that this is the same document with some
13 version 1 or redaction 1.
14 Q. All right. I see when I look at this that this is a similar
15 document like the one we've seen before; correct?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Could you tell us what is the subject of this decision?
18 A. The subject of this decision -- it says here it's an amendment to
19 the decision on supporting the MUP, Ministry of the Interior, forces in
20 breaking up and destroying the STS
21 Q. Could you describe -- could you please tell us what this
22 amendment actually relates to, what it refers to?
23 A. Well, I know in this particular case what this refers to. I know
24 that General Lazarevic actually amended his decision -- or rather,
25 point 4 of the decision because of the developments on the ground,
Page 8068
1 because of certain circumstances that had changed. And he signed both
2 that -- this amendment to the decision because the fourth item of this
3 order, when we look at the entire document, can only be decided on by the
4 unit commander, and no one but him can actually amend item 4. But since
5 these amendments were done, General Lazarevic, although the previous
6 order, 455-56, of 22nd of March, 1999, was not signed by
7 General Lazarevic but rather in the signature we had the words
8 "Joint Command," in this case he signs this order because there was an
9 amendment to the agreement to what had been agreed at the MUP staff and
10 with the MUP staff. And since these changes actually related to the
11 military, he then forwarded this decision to his subordinate units so
12 that they would know that he was the author of that amendment.
13 Q. But in the heading we still have the same number, and is this the
14 log-book of the Pristina Corps?
15 A. Yes.
16 [Defence counsel confer]
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Thank you, General.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now have document
20 D003-2555.
21 Q. General, are you familiar with this order issued by the
22 General Staff?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. This is an order dated the 25th of March ordering mobilisation;
25 correct?
Page 8069
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Did the 3rd Army comply with this order?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. I apologise, but I think that this document has already been
5 admitted into evidence as number 199. Perhaps I can get some assistance.
6 Do you have number 199, D199?
7 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, counsel is correct. That document
8 is Exhibit D199.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. This was really
10 helpful because I would have wanted to avoid admitting into evidence a
11 document that has already been admitted.
12 Could we now see document D004-3013.
13 Q. General, I'm trying to go through this fast so I've already
14 switched to the second page. I see that there's some initials here,
15 DM/MC. I believe these initials are familiar. Could you tell us what
16 the objective of this document was, why was it issued? I see under
17 item 3 it says:
18 "Continue to undertake combat operations with all army units to
19 smash and destroy Siptar terrorists."
20 A. Well, I drafted a large number of documents so I can only assume
21 what this is about. So would you allow me a few moments just to read
22 through it?
23 Q. Yes, and I'm specifically referring you to item 3.
24 A. Yes. Well, this is an order to continue with combat operations
25 with a purpose of routing and destroying Siptar terrorist forces because
Page 8070
1 this is the time when the aggression had already begun. And in addition
2 to its main task, which was to defend the borders and prevent the
3 multi-national brigade to enter the territory and to defend the
4 territorial borders, they also had this task to participate in the
5 routing and destruction of Siptar terrorist forces.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please admit this
8 document into evidence.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that is Exhibit D00344.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. General, could you please just tell us briefly -- or rather,
13 could you describe the difference between a command, an order, and a
14 decision?
15 A. Well, first of all, a command can be -- or rather, an order can
16 be a general type order which, as we've already seen, is not strictly
17 speaking a command but certainly the objectives have to be implemented.
18 Commands are also orders but of a special type. But a command would also
19 include items. It would have to describe the enemy, the second item
20 would be the neighbouring units, and the fourth item would be a decision
21 which should also include the orders to subordinate units, the fourth,
22 fifth, 16th or whatever the number of units that belong to it are. So
23 the difference between an order and a command is that in a command an
24 order begins with item 4, whereas in an order it begins with item 1.
25 Q. Thank you. Now, is there a difference whether an order is
Page 8071
1 ordered -- is issued by a brigade or a lower unit or does it matter?
2 A. Well, it always bears the same name, order, but at the level of
3 lower units it would be called a command.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now could we see
6 65 ter document 02812.
7 Q. General, this is an order of the 3rd Army command of the
8 29th of March, 1999, about regular combat reports, but in the
9 introduction we can see that it's actually an elaboration of the order
10 from the Supreme Command from the 27th of March, 1993 [as interpreted];
11 is that correct?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. I would like to ask you now to explain something. This report is
14 called a regular combat report, is that a daily report?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. What I'm interested in is from the lowest units going towards the
17 top. So the lowest unit that compiles a report, does that report have to
18 contain the noted problems in the combat actions, discipline matters, and
19 so on, which are being reported to the immediately superior command?
20 A. Yes, it does have its format and the precise questions which are
21 being reported on to the superior command.
22 Q. All right. What I'm interested in is the following. For
23 example, we're in the middle of an action and my detachment has some
24 problems. Would the report of the daily combat report of the -- being
25 delivered to the command of the brigade, would that problem have to be
Page 8072
1 referred to and the higher instance be informed about?
2 A. If these are matters that were discussed during coordination and
3 there has been some deviation in terms of these matters and these matters
4 have a significant influence on decisions of the commander of the
5 military unit, such a report should then refer to these particular
6 problems because they do affect the members of the army or the commander
7 of the independent battalion or the brigade as the lowest command units
8 that do provide a report.
9 Q. All right. Thank you. So this problem then is reported from the
10 brigade to the corps command, the corps command report to the army
11 command about it, and then the army command would refer to the
12 General Staff and inform them about it?
13 A. Yes, that is correct.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please tender this
15 document.
16 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00345.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we look at D180. It's a
19 Defence exhibit.
20 Q. General, sir. Can you please look at this exhibit and tell me if
21 you have any information or did you have any information at that time. I
22 am just going to tell you that this was the 7th of April, 1999, when the
23 document was drafted. Have you seen this document before?
24 A. No.
25 Q. Thank you. Well, let us move on.
Page 8073
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we look at
2 Defence Exhibit D172, please.
3 Q. At the time when you were in the 3rd Army, were you familiar with
4 this document, this indication or announcement of the directive?
5 A. I was in Pristina, and in a conversation with the general he did
6 point out that the directive was about to arrive because
7 General Stojmirovic who was in Nis
8 contact with and I was in Kosovo, and so he let me know that the
9 directive was on its way.
10 Q. All right. Well, we can move on.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we look at exhibit --
12 65 ter list 01448, please.
13 Q. This is a document of the army command. As far as I can see you
14 did not participate in its drafting. Judging by the format, do you
15 recognise ...
16 A. Well, I would just like you to turn the page so that I can see
17 exactly what it is.
18 Q. Can we look at the next page -- I don't see anyone other than
19 general -- I don't see any signature -- anyone's signature other than
20 General Pavkovic.
21 A. I'm not sure that perhaps it wasn't me because it's about
22 security, and if it's about some operative matter that has to do with
23 security in any way and since he knows I was a security man before, he
24 would usually give such documents to me. I would need to read a little
25 bit of the document or perhaps you can point me to a specific question.
Page 8074
1 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel please repeat his question.
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. General, sir, are you more familiar with this document now?
4 A. I don't see this item, paragraph 4.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please look at the first
6 page of the document and then you can see it. Yes, now we see it.
7 Q. You can see that during the restriction of movement period ...
8 A. I'm not quite sure that I have seen it before, but I do know
9 about these patrols that were organised and the recognition signs that we
10 set for during the night so that we could have mutual contacts and in
11 view of the complex situation in order to avoid friendly fire between the
12 MUP and the army.
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we look at paragraph 5 now.
14 This is on page 2 of the English version.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Regardless of whether there
16 were such cases or not, this was often repeated in orders to the
17 commander to constantly keep reminding them of the duty of respecting
18 international humanitarian law, to conduct themselves properly in terms
19 of enemy soldiers, the civilian population, and so on. These matters
20 were very often dealt with in these documents.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
22 document, please.
23 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00346.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please look at 65 ter list
Page 8075
1 document 04049.
2 Q. General, were you aware of this document from the forward command
3 post of the 3rd Army?
4 A. Could you please zoom in a little bit on the first page. Judging
5 by this previous part and since I think my style of writing is a little
6 bit different, I think that I did not draft this document.
7 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel repeat what he said, please.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, this is one of the superior
9 officers at the forward command post.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. What I'm interested in is if we can -- you did not draft this
12 document. I can see that the initials are DC/BV; is that correct?
13 A. Yes. This was done by a senior officer from the forward command
14 post.
15 Q. And on the next page, item 4, did you ...
16 A. This is an assignment allocating the focus of activities by the
17 army and reminds the subordinate commanders to unify activities and
18 actions in the area of all the forces where they happened to be. Joining
19 together means coordination or coordinated action with neighbouring
20 units, regardless of whether it was the MUP or other ministry organs, but
21 this does not imply ordering. So this implies one form of coordinated
22 action and joint action, but it does not imply orders.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
24 document, please, Your Honours. And I would like to first ask -- I don't
25 know now what the calculation of the time is. Should I continue, or
Page 8076
1 should we make a break at the same time?
2 JUDGE PARKER: You're perfectly on time. This is our first
3 break. That document will be received.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the document will be
5 Exhibit D00347.
6 JUDGE PARKER: We will resume at quarter past.
7 --- Recess taken at 4.45 p.m.
8 --- On resuming at 5.18 p.m.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
11 Q. General, sir, as for the speed, I think that we have established
12 a good rhythm, so we can continue without being warned by the ladies and
13 gentlemen from the interpreting booths.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would like to look at
15 65 ter list Exhibit 04054.
16 Q. General, we can see here an order for the defence of the
17 Pristina Corps command of the 6th of April, 1998. This is the command
18 for defence of the Pristina Corps. And then we can see that this has
19 been classified as a state secret, and then it says Grom, Thunder, 4.
20 The date is the 6th of April, 1998, on the document --
21 JUDGE PARKER: There seems to be a difficulty with that, is there
22 not, Mr. Djurdjic? The original appears to be 1999.
23 MR. HANNIS: Yes, Your Honour, I would stipulate that the English
24 translation should be 1999 instead of 1998. I think this came up in
25 Milutinovic and we agreed.
Page 8077
1 JUDGE PARKER: The content would suggest it's 1999.
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I apologise. I am reading the
3 original document in the Serbian so I didn't really pay attention to the
4 translation of the date, but I think that it is clear that it's just a
5 typo because the original document has the date of 1999 and this is also
6 indicated by the context.
7 Q. Is that correct, General?
8 A. Yes, yes.
9 Q. Can you please explain Grom 4, Thunder 4, what that means.
10 A. I need to explain right away that there has been a mistake here.
11 Instead of "Thunder" as it says in the directive of the General Staff,
12 there is a mistake at the army command level down to the Pristina Corps,
13 where we have Thunder 4. In the period of preparation for the previous
14 trial of Mr. Milutinovic and others, General Stojmirovic, who was the
15 Chief of Staff in the Nis
16 of the command at the 3rd Army command level, when the senior officer
17 received the command from the General Staff because the previous one was
18 Thunder 3, he thought that Grom 3 -- 4 had been skipped, so then he added
19 it. But actually the command Thunder 4 at the army and the corps level
20 is a product of the command for Thunder from General Ojdanic which does
21 not have any numerical marking. This is the essence. The only mistake
22 is that this person added the number 4 because he believed that somebody
23 in the General Staff missed the number 4.
24 Q. Thank you. I believe this is an administrative error, but what I
25 would like you to do is tell us a bit about the content actually.
Page 8078
1 A. Well, this is a command for defence against the aggression. The
2 aggression was already ongoing. The Siptar terrorist forces broke into
3 the territory of Kosovo
4 defence areas along the border from the border with Montenegro all the
5 way to the Bulgarian border in the area of responsibility of the 3rd Army
6 command, practically the entire border with Bulgaria.
7 Q. Thank you. Could you now please explain whether, as a result of
8 this command, decisions and commands that were issued on the 6th, 9th,
9 14th, 15th, and 16th April, 1999 - and I'm referring to actions
10 Zatric Selo, Jezerce Selo, Bajgora, Bare, Cicavica, Orlane, Las, Drenica,
11 Zegovac -- do you know of this?
12 A. Well, yes, I did know about this. There was no doubt anymore
13 that an all-out attack was impending on the area of responsibility of the
14 3rd Army. And in keeping with our combat rules, the army, pursuant to
15 the task that was issued to it, proceeded to rout and break up terrorist
16 forces in the areas -- in their areas in the -- in direct combat. And
17 this was as part of the preparations for defence against the overall
18 aggression.
19 Q. Thank you. So to put this in lay terms, the purpose was to
20 neutralise the terrorist Albanian forces before the aggression actually
21 begins, the land aggression, because they knew that they would then
22 strike us from the back?
23 A. Well, that is a task that could not be done in one go. It was a
24 task that was ongoing, and it would be ongoing during the combat
25 operations. The first echelon, which means the brigades in the forward
Page 8079
1 positions, the 125th, 549th, and 156th Infantry Brigade which were
2 towards Macedonia
3 others, the 15th Armoured Brigade, the 252nd Tactical Group, the
4 211th Armoured Brigade in the area of Podujevo municipality, they all had
5 the task to build up positions and organise firing systems. And part of
6 their forces were to fight the terrorists and sabotage groups because
7 those groups were attacking the artillery and the rear and taking up the
8 important positions on -- on crossroads and bridges and so on.
9 So the general task of the army was defence and then the --
10 another task that was comprised in that was the fighting against
11 terrorist and sabotage groups.
12 Q. Thank you. General, in view of the position that you occupied,
13 could you tell us whether any of these commands or orders, especially the
14 ones that were issued between the 26th -- or rather, the 24th of March,
15 when the war began, up until the end of the war, and specifically up
16 until April 15th, were any of these directed against the civilian
17 population, the Albanian civilian population?
18 A. Well, as far as I know, in 1998 and 1999 there was something in
19 the commands that was perhaps never, up until then, regulated by any
20 army, such as the deployment of units whose task was to pull out the
21 civilian population from the threat -- from the areas where fighting was
22 fierce. So they -- these units were tasked with the task of pulling out
23 and protecting -- pulling out, withdrawing the civilian population from
24 the areas where the fighting was going on.
25 Q. Thank you.
Page 8080
1 Do you know that villages that were encircled -- do you know of
2 instances where villages that were encircled were bombed and civilians
3 attacked?
4 A. I don't -- I'm not sure I understood your question. Do you mean
5 that they were bombed by us, by our side?
6 Q. Yes. Do you know that there was any such plan, that they would
7 bomb them and then soldiers would come into the villages?
8 A. No. Such plans and such operations I don't know of, which does
9 not mean that there weren't some civilian casualties, as, for instance,
10 in Lipljani, where a group of civilians were killed -- and this was even
11 taken to court but no one was convicted because there was insufficient
12 evidence that there was intent to kill these individuals. I personally
13 do not know of any cases, of a single case, that anything like this was
14 done in a planned way and that there were deliberate civilian casualties
15 by mortar fire.
16 Q. Well, you said now that you didn't know of this, that you didn't
17 know that there was any of this envisaged in any of these orders or
18 commands, but do you know of any such instances in fact that villages
19 were encircled and civilians expelled from there?
20 A. No, not at any level of command. This was never -- no such
21 orders were ever issued, nor was anything like that ever done.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please admit this into
24 evidence.
25 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
Page 8081
1 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00348.
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now have
3 Defence Exhibit D183.
4 Q. General, we see here a directive from the Supreme Command Staff
5 dated 9th April, 1999
6 and directive from January. Now, could you tell us whether there were
7 any changes relayed between these two, were there any changes in the
8 tasks for the units of the 3rd Army Corps?
9 A. Well, there is a big difference between that directive and this
10 one. The January directive provided for the engagement of forces of the
11 Pristina Corps, or rather, the 3rd Army in the routing of sabotage and
12 terrorist groups and preparations for the defence against the
13 multi-national brigade of NATO whose advance was expected. This was a
14 directive whereby the General Staff was developing a plan of opposition
15 to the NATO forces in the event that they would attack the country or
16 enter the country.
17 Now, this directive here is a direct order for taking up
18 positions, defence positions, and raising the level of combat-readiness
19 of units in order for them to be ready to fight the units that would make
20 incursions from the territory of Albania
21 whereas the other one related to a plan against the NATO advances.
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now I would like to take a look at
23 another document, D187.
24 Q. General, this is an order from the Supreme Command Staff of
25 15 April 1999
Page 8082
1 see that this was also sent to the 3rd Army. Now, was -- was there any
2 information coming in pursuant to this order as far as the 3rd Army was
3 concerned and the staff of the Supreme Command?
4 A. I don't see anything in item 1. There are no changes whatsoever.
5 This is the standard format. There are no amendments. The second item,
6 to check the veracity of information, that is something that was implied.
7 There was nothing novel in this. I don't see any major differences in
8 the third item either. In essence, all of this was something that was
9 already in force; but when the Chief of the General Staff issued his
10 directive, he stressed this problem in view of the fact that a
11 high-intensity armed conflict was anticipated. And I think that this was
12 the only reason why the Chief of the General Staff actually issued this
13 directive because pursuant to those reports he would make his decisions.
14 So that is the purpose of this. In any other sense there are no changes
15 or differences.
16 Q. Let me just put you a lay question. Is this -- does this relate
17 to written reports, combat reports that would be sent to their units that
18 would then be referred to higher commands, or are these reports that are
19 sent via the signals or communications system?
20 A. This relates to reports that would be sent through combat reports
21 and operations departments, because we see here that it is -- that stress
22 is put on the operations officer who is at the duty centre who prepares
23 these combat reports.
24 Q. All right. Now, you are in the command of the 3rd Army. Up
25 until this date and after this date as well, there have been certain
Page 8083
1 weaknesses and certain irregularities in conducting combat operations.
2 Now, would you or did you refer such information, the information that
3 you received from units, would you have to refer this to the higher -- to
4 your superiors?
5 A. Yes. This had to be done and on the basis of the corps units and
6 independent units.
7 Q. Thank you. So lower-level units would send this to the corps
8 command, and then the corps command would send it to their higher-ups;
9 correct?
10 A. Yes.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now have
12 Defence Exhibit D004-3017.
13 Q. General, would you please read this document to yourself.
14 A. This is report number 23 from the Supreme Command Staff, the
15 intelligence administration.
16 "Through an indirect source who is said to be reliable, we have
17 acquired photocopies of the topographical maps which the KLA gave to
18 American representatives in Macedonia
19 "Drawn on the maps are the precise positions and coordinates of
20 VJ and MUP units and also the areas which they are not allowed to target,
21 areas where KLA units and Siptar refugees are situated.
22 "Enclosed: Photocopies of topographical maps (5 pages)."
23 Q. Were you familiar with this report received at the intelligence
24 administration?
25 A. Well, in general principle, yes. I did not -- I hadn't read the
Page 8084
1 report, but I knew that such information was being forwarded.
2 Q. Now, I would just like to ask you this: The verification mission
3 and the locators, could you tell us what -- how efficient were the NATO
4 air-strikes and how precise were they in targeting certain targets, and
5 do you have any information as to how they were -- how the fire was
6 directed and through what means this was done?
7 A. I do not have a lot of information for the period when the
8 verification mission was there. I do have some information from the
9 period at the beginning of the NATO air-strikes, but this was something
10 that was really done by the intelligence organs so that I myself was not
11 privy to the details. But I did learn at the command about some of these
12 things. I learned, for instance, that the locators had been put in place
13 and we could ascertain this for ourselves because the targeting was very,
14 very precise. And we were, for instance, near a warehouse in Gracanica.
15 We were some 150 metres away from the warehouse, and we never thought
16 that they could miss the warehouse and hit us because they were so
17 precise. And nearby was also a Serbian settlement, Gracanica, which
18 numbered several thousand people. So there were no misses. They were
19 very precise.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we admit this into evidence,
22 please.
23 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00349.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
Page 8085
1 Could we have 65 ter list document 01614, please.
2 Q. General, sir, this is a document from the 3rd Army command, and I
3 can see in the introductory paragraph that it was prepared pursuant to a
4 warning sent from the staff of the Supreme Command. I suppose, because I
5 see the initials here MC/MK, that you did not prepare this document?
6 A. I did not prepare this document.
7 Q. But you were familiar with it?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Could we look at item 3, please.
10 A. Item 3 of this order says that because an aggression was
11 impending, the fighting against Siptar terrorist forces should be
12 conducted within the areas of responsibility; and if the terrorists are
13 in that zone of responsibility, which means that if there should be
14 artillery fire in the rear or from the flanks, in those cases unit
15 commanders from the level of brigade and independent battalion should
16 determine and allocate up to one-third of their forces for fighting these
17 terrorist forces, whereas the brunt of their forces would conduct
18 defensive operations. Because it was well-known that there would be a
19 synchronised NATO and Siptar terrorist forces attack because they were in
20 constant satellite contact. We know this for a fact. And their
21 activities were synchronised and they would attack on the front line all
22 elements of our combat disposition.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we admit this document into
25 evidence, please.
Page 8086
1 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00350.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 Q. General, am I correct that as early as 15th of April there were
5 incursions from Albania
6 A. I think those began already on the 9th of April.
7 Q. Yes, that's correct.
8 A. Well, yes, I think I actually prepared one of the reports for the
9 General Staff, and I think this actually referred to two organised
10 brigades of Siptar terrorist forces which made an excursion -- incursion
11 from Albania
12 53rd Border Guards Battalion, but these forces managed to actually close
13 the gap after several kilometres of their advances. And then in
14 systematic concentric fire they managed to push them back to the border
15 with the Republic of Albania
16 Q. Could you tell us which mountain pass this is or which mountain
17 border post? Was that Pastrik or --
18 A. Yes, this is the area near the border post Morina, the
19 mountainous area, the least passable area, and our forces were the
20 thinnest there, which is actually why they actually chose to advance
21 through that area because there was not much equipment there. Mostly
22 these men were infantry fighters and they had some equipment with them,
23 up to 72-millimetre mortars at most.
24 Q. Thank you. But later on was there another incursion in the area
25 of Kosare from the Republic of Albania
Page 8087
1 A. Well, that is the entire area that we're talking about towards
2 the border with Montenegro
3 Djakovica, and I mean -- I'm referring to that mountain area, the
4 Junik mountains actually.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 Now, tell us, please, was this also an aware where weapons were
7 smuggled and brought into the country in 1998?
8 A. Yes, this was the main route for the supply of terrorist forces
9 to Jablanica, where the main base is for these smuggled weapons was, and
10 from there they were distributed to Srbica, Bajgora, towards the
11 Milanovac -- Mount Milanovac
12 Q. Thank you.
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] We did admit this into evidence,
14 correct, this document 01614?
15 JUDGE PARKER: Not --
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Well, in that case, I tender it
17 into evidence. I was just off with my question.
18 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that's the document that was
20 assigned D00350.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I believe that this is already an
22 exhibit that it had number 350.
23 JUDGE PARKER: One way or another it is D350.
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see P44, please,
25 Exhibit P44. The English version, page 3; in B/C/S I think it's page 2.
Page 8088
1 Can we just have Article 17 in both versions, and can we just zoom in on
2 them. Thank you. Very well.
3 Q. General, sir, this is Article 17 of the Law on Defence, and I'm
4 sure that you're very familiar with it. But let us take a closer look at
5 this article. Am I correct that in case of -- in a state of war, to be
6 brief, units and organs of internal affairs can be used or may be used to
7 carry out combat assignments?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. In other words, if -- is this something that is conditional, it's
10 not automatic, there is no automatic use of organs and units of the
11 Ministry of the Internal Affairs?
12 A. Yes, they may be used to carry out combat assignments or rather
13 to engage in combat or offer armed resistance, so these are two different
14 things.
15 Q. All right. Now -- next we see it says:
16 "These units and organs carrying out their combat assignments
17 shall be subordinate to the officer of the armed forces who is commanding
18 combat operations;" correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. So someone has to make a decision in order for this Article 17 to
21 be applied; correct?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. General, sir, are you aware that on the 18th of April, 1999
24 supreme commander, the president of the FR, Slobodan Milosevic, issued an
25 order on resubordination, not the use. Are you familiar with this
Page 8089
1 document?
2 A. No, but I seem to vaguely know about it.
3 Q. All right.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we look at
5 Defence Exhibit D203.
6 Q. Sir, the order in paragraph marked 1, does it state that units
7 and organs of the Ministry of the Interior in the territory of the FR are
8 to be resubordinated to the officers of the Yugoslav Army planning,
9 organising, and commanding combat operations according to the tasks
10 received in the assigned areas of responsibility?
11 A. Yes, that is what it states.
12 Q. Yes, that is correct. And regardless of slight changes in the
13 terminology more or less that would be that Article 17 according to the
14 law, it would need to say the use of the forces, not resubordination of
15 forces, the legal term is the use of forces?
16 A. Well, the terminology is a little bit different.
17 Q. But still that's what it is. So now we know. And in paragraph 2
18 we have:
19 "The chief of the Supreme Command Staff will regulate by his
20 order all other matters arising from item 1 of this order."
21 And it is left up to General Ojdanic to regulate possible other
22 matters; is that correct?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Now I'm going to ask you this: Where did you and when did you
25 see for the first time the order of Mr. Ojdanic on the resubordination,
Page 8090
1 or rather, the implementation of this order of the supreme commander, did
2 you ever see this order before and when?
3 A. In the morning -- in the afternoon of the 18th of April, I
4 attended a meeting at which General Pavkovic had an order with him. But
5 at that time I did not read it myself and I didn't know about it. Later,
6 I found out the contents - this was after a certain period of time, let's
7 say after a few days.
8 Q. Thank you very much. So on the 18th you knew that an order had
9 been reached but you did not know exactly what the telegram said, you
10 didn't read the telegram?
11 A. Yes, that is correct, I didn't read the telegram.
12 Q. Well, it's not important whether on that day or the following day
13 in April they came to Commander Pavkovic, where you were with a number of
14 your colleagues, General Djordjevic, General Obradovic, and General Lukic
15 from the MUP came to see him?
16 A. Not Obradovic, but Obrad Stevanovic.
17 Q. Bravo, yes, thank you for the correction; is that correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And that is when General Pavkovic issued -- gave
20 General Djordjevic, who was sitting next to him, this telegram; is that
21 correct?
22 A. Yes, that is correct.
23 Q. At that time you didn't know the contents of the telegram?
24 A. That is correct, I didn't know.
25 Q. And then you said that he read this telegram, General Djordjevic,
Page 8091
1 for a minute or so and then he said what -- how come Ojdanic is
2 resubordinating the MUP; is that correct?
3 A. General Djordjevic later, after he read it, said, What do you
4 mean Ojdanic? Who is he supposed to be commanding? We didn't receive
5 any order from the minister. And he returned the telegram to the
6 general.
7 Q. Thank you. Would I be correct if I said that judging by his
8 reaction Djordjevic learned the contents of the telegram at that time,
9 the telegram that was given to him by General Pavkovic?
10 A. Yes, that is quite possible.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now I would like to look at
13 exhibit on the 65 ter list 01460.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, for the record, the document is
15 Exhibit P00887.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. General, sir, in paragraph marked with the number 1, what is
18 General Ojdanic actually ordering?
19 A. In paragraph marked 1 General Ojdanic orders that internal
20 affairs units and organs are to be subordinated to you in your areas of
21 responsibility.
22 Q. And if -- can you please tell us whether it states that this
23 applies to the time of combat, does it state that?
24 A. No, it doesn't.
25 Q. Now, let me ask you this, General: Does the Army of
Page 8092
1 Yugoslavia
2 the domain of the MUP that have nothing to do with armed battle which is,
3 for example, apprehending those who committed crimes, matters that have
4 to do with traffic, issuance of identity cards, passports, things that
5 have nothing to do with the army?
6 A. Well, the army cannot do that kind of job and is not authorised
7 to do those kinds of jobs.
8 Q. According to that Article 17 of the law and in the order of the
9 supreme commander, it is specifically stated that units and the MUP
10 organs be resubordinated in combat and not in other areas and
11 competencies for which the MUP of the Republic of Serbia
12 is that correct?
13 A. Yes, this is possible only during combat.
14 Q. But you cannot see that in this paragraph 1?
15 A. Yes, that is not specified.
16 Q. Yes, it's not specified, as compared to the order of the
17 president of the republic. And now, please, can you please look at the
18 order -- the persons that the order is being dispatched to. Who is
19 receiving this order?
20 A. It is sent to the commander, then to the 3rd Army forward command
21 post, to the Pristina Corps, to the commander of the Chief of Staff of
22 the Pristina Corps, the Nis Corps, and to the commander also. I don't
23 know to whom it refers, this note, "for information only."
24 Q. All right. Is it stated anywhere that it's being sent to the
25 minister of the interior or to any other organ of the
Page 8093
1 Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia
2 A. No, there is nothing like that, but probably someone had to order
3 the minister to draft the same kind of order or a similar order to pass
4 it to the MUP staff and to other similar structures.
5 Q. Yes, this was supposed to be done, but we see in this order that
6 this order was not provided to the MUP minister or anyone else?
7 A. Yes, but General Ojdanic is not authorised to order the minister.
8 Q. But he is authorised by the president of the republic in combat
9 to resubordinate the units and the organs, and in order for them to know
10 about this decision this decision had to be furnished to them. So
11 Ojdanic's decision does not contain all that it's supposed to contain.
12 How is the minister of internal affairs supposed to know who is the
13 person in charge, and who's at the head of the ministry supposed to know
14 that something like that has been adopted unless he is informed about it?
15 A. Well, yes, with this comment, yes.
16 Q. So we don't have it stated here that he has been informed, or we
17 have the reaction of General Djordjevic; is that correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And now if you can please tell me, did you ever find out whether
20 and when and if so who was informed of this decision by General Ojdanic
21 at the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia
22 A. Well, I don't know.
23 Q. You don't know. All right. After receiving this - you said that
24 you received this on the 18th -- well, let me just ask you this, please:
25 Can you look at the stamp of the army command -- the incoming stamp of
Page 8094
1 the army command, and then explain, if I'm seeing this properly, the
2 strictly confidential number is 872 dated the 19th of September, 1994.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Perhaps we can look at the top of
4 the page in the B/C/S. We only have one page. This page.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, it's dated the
6 18th of April, 1999.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. No, no, no, are you looking at the heading of the document?
9 A. Yes, the 19th of April.
10 Q. The 19th of April, yes. So was this received on the
11 19th of April technically and it has this number 94/2?
12 A. Yes, that is logical. The telegram was delivered personally to
13 General Pavkovic, the commander, who kept it with him and then when on
14 the 18th he announced to the generals of the MUP that -- after they read
15 it then he probably kept that with him for that evening still. And then
16 the following day he sent it to be archived. And then the office stamped
17 it because it received the document on the 19th. But at the bottom, in
18 the receipt, the incoming stamp, you can see that the telegram arrived on
19 the 18th of April, and I don't think there are any problems there.
20 Q. And just explain this to me, this 94/2, what does this slash 2
21 mean?
22 A. It's probably indicating some sort of previous order that dealt
23 with the same matter, the matter of resubordination or something like
24 that, so that can be a document, document number 2, because the person
25 who looks at number 872/94 probably will have something similar that has
Page 8095
1 to do with resubordination and a document that was registered under
2 number 94. But I don't know exactly what it is.
3 Q. General, sir, after this, the commander of the 3rd Army also
4 adopted an order or issued an order about resubordination, but the
5 document refers to the execution of combat assignments.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please look at
7 Exhibit D204.
8 Q. Are you familiar with this document? Did you work on this
9 document?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. To whom was this document or this order sent?
12 A. It was sent to the Pristina Corps and the commander of the PJP in
13 Kosovo, General Lukic, and to the Nis Corps -- it was sent to them via
14 communications.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would just like to warn the
16 Chamber, we're talking about Exhibit -- Defence Exhibit D205, and I think
17 my learned friend Mr. Hannis used that yesterday. And it was marked
18 P1238, but I think that this is the same document. This is General
19 Lazarevic. It's also a decision on resubordination.
20 Q. General Lazarevic implemented this order in detail. Would you
21 agree with me, General, sir?
22 A. Yes, he is being even more specific in defining the points.
23 Q. And in paragraph 2 of item 4 he's saying:
24 "At the time when there is no combat forces of the MUP are
25 engaged to execute other specific tasks according to plans and orders of
Page 8096
1 the MUP staff in Kosovo and Metohija."
2 Am I correct that all of this is being conducted at the level of
3 the brigades, the units that are carrying out combat activities, that the
4 units and organs are to be resubordinated at that level? Can you please
5 explain that?
6 A. The corps commander cannot have so many units as the MUP had
7 detachments, so in the -- in principle they are resubordinating those
8 detachments to the brigades during the execution of combat actions.
9 Q. So this is paragraph 5, resubordination of MUP forces to be
10 carried out in combat operations in the areas of responsibility of the
11 brigades by April 25, 1999
12 A. Yes.
13 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel please repeat his question.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Could you repeat your question, please,
15 Mr. Djurdjic.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 Q. So pursuant to paragraph marked 5, resubordination of MUP forces
18 to carry out combat operations in the areas of responsibility of brigades
19 would be carried out by the 25th of April, 1999, that is the level of
20 resubordination?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Can you explain this now, please. Would this -- these orders,
23 did the -- was the MUP staff resubordinated to anyone?
24 A. I don't know if the MUP staff was resubordinated because in
25 principle an order did not define or specify the role of the MUP staff at
Page 8097
1 the point in time when the units were being resubordinated to the
2 Pristina Corps.
3 Q. And now let me put it to you in a broader context. Is the MUP
4 ministry in Belgrade
5 to the entire FRY not only to Serbia
6 the Montenegro
7 happening with the higher levels independent of Kosovo and Metohija?
8 A. I don't know about such an order, and we need not have
9 necessarily received it there, because it relates to the role of the
10 ministry and the MUP in Belgrade
11 combat sections of the MUP units during combat actions were being
12 resubordinated to units of the Pristina Corps. And the decision on who
13 was going where and who was being resubordinated to whom was exclusively
14 in the domain of General Lazarevic in the area of responsibility of the
15 Pristina Corps.
16 Q. Thank you. Can you please tell me the reports on the
17 implementation of the assignments - we're talking about the 25th of
18 April - that had to be -- that was the dead-line to be submitted to them,
19 this referred to brigades?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. So let me ask you this: If there are any problems in
22 resubordination, up until the 25th of April the brigade commanders had to
23 inform the Pristina Corps in their reports about it?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. In that case, would the Pristina Corps have to pass that up to
Page 8098
1 the 3rd Army command, that there were problems in the resubordination?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. At the time, were you aware of any document regarding the
4 problems in resubordination? We're talking about April. Did you receive
5 such a document?
6 A. Well, we knew that there were problems because units openly let
7 know the commanders that they could not carry out the resubordination
8 because they had not received any orders from the staff of the
9 Ministry of the Interior.
10 Q. Well -- but that's what I'm asking you. All of this what you're
11 telling me about should be in the reports. Now, were these problems put
12 in reports and was that sent to the corps and did the corps inform
13 thereof the army command?
14 A. I know that General Pavkovic informed the General Staff and
15 General Pavkovic personally that -- General Ojdanic personally that the
16 units -- MUP units had not been resubordinated. And I also know that
17 General Lazarevic was informed by his inferiors about this --
18 subordinates about this. But I'm not sure whether this was stated in
19 each and every report.
20 Q. But I'm asking you about any report. Now, was there any report
21 that the army command received from the corps level that you know of?
22 A. Well, I never really dealt with this problem, so I really
23 wouldn't -- couldn't give you an answer. I don't know.
24 Q. Well, let me ask you this: We said a few moments ago this had to
25 be in the report from the Pristina Corps had it been written there?
Page 8099
1 A. Yes, but I know there were also reports sent via the
2 communications system, the same type of information that was also put in
3 written reports.
4 Q. Well, let me now ask you: Do you know whether, in a report from
5 the 3rd Army command which was sent to the Supreme Command Staff, whether
6 there was a report sent to that effect in this period of time?
7 A. Well, since I did not draft this combat report it would be
8 difficult for me without a document to say anything off the top of my
9 head. If I had a document, I could comment on it. Now, the -- I know
10 that the report for the 3rd Army was drafted in Nis, not where I was. It
11 was drafted by General Stojmirovic and the part of the unit that was in
12 Nis
13 issues that were in the report, in the combat report.
14 Q. I know that you did not do -- draft this because you were in
15 Gracanica; however, in view of the position that you were on, had such a
16 report come to Nis
17 Supreme Command Staff; correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Now I would like to ask you this, maybe you can clarify: Now if
20 I were to look at all the reports from the Pristina Corps to the 3rd Army
21 and then from the 3rd Army to the Supreme Command Staff, then I should be
22 able to establish whether there were any such notes put in there;
23 correct?
24 A. Yes.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please see P1239.
Page 8100
1 This is an exhibit that we saw yesterday.
2 Q. That is a document that you drafted on the 8th of May, 1999,
3 General. General, what was the purpose of drafting this document of the
4 8th of May, 1999?
5 A. This order I drafted pursuant to General Pavkovic's order, and
6 its purpose was to define more specifically the tasks assigned to MUP
7 units and issues dealing with their resubordination, because the general
8 on the 8th of May pursuant to a report from the commander of the
9 Pristina Corps, he was aware that MUP had not been resubordinated up to
10 that point to the Pristina Corps.
11 Q. Thank you. Can you just tell me, where can we find that in the
12 introduction to this document?
13 A. Well, this document did not state that, and that was not its
14 purpose. This document had a wholly different purpose.
15 Q. General, but if something is not in compliance, if an order is
16 not complied with, and if we look at item 2, here it says: In order to
17 completely destroy the remaining terrorist forces in your zones of
18 responsibility and so on and then -- in order to prevent the further
19 activities of STS
20 then it says "order." So what is the sense of this?
21 A. Well, this -- the purpose of this was to tell General Lukic that
22 he has to implement the order on resubordination and that it was not
23 expected that no one could expect that this can be done in 24 hours,
24 because the resubordination for combat activities also implied that there
25 would be coordination, irrespective of the fact that they would be
Page 8101
1 subordinated to the Pristina Corps anyway. So this is an exchange of
2 communication between General Pavkovic and General Lukic whereby he was
3 trying to tell General Lukic that he has to comply with this order
4 because this order was received from the Chief of the General Staff.
5 Q. Now, let me ask you this: The activities that followed as of
6 April 18th, 19th, and so on and so forth, were all these tasks actually
7 carried out?
8 A. Yes, they were carried out and there were never problems in
9 carrying out tasks through coordination. So there was no issue there.
10 We never received any sort of refusal from MUP. They never said that
11 they would not take part in routing the Siptar terrorist forces.
12 However, the problems arose because of the fact that the orders that
13 were -- the order on resubordination was not completely clearly defined
14 at the state level, not the way it should have been.
15 Q. Thank you. That's what I was aiming at. Now, looking at this
16 document and all the other documents that we will still see, we've never
17 seen any mention that there were any problems with resubordination during
18 combat activities. Did you ever see any document of this type up until
19 this date, the 24th of May, 1999?
20 A. No.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now let's take a look at the next
22 document, that's document P1214.
23 Q. General, this is a document issued by General Lazarevic on the
24 24th of May, 1999. Well, first let me ask you this: General Lazarevic
25 is making a reference here to this order on resubordination, the order of
Page 8102
1 the 18th and the order of the 3rd Army command of the 20th of April.
2 There is no mention of any kind of the document that we've seen earlier,
3 a little earlier, the one of the 18th of May, where you said that there
4 were problems with resubordination.
5 A. Well, they weren't sent to General Lukic as an order, but rather
6 as a reminder that there was certain responsibilities and -- that were
7 binding on him, but this was not a classic order on resubordination.
8 Q. General, if we look at paragraph 2 here it says that the
9 commanders and commanders, komandir, of MUP are resisting and openly
10 opposing of above mentioned obligations offering as a pretext the alleged
11 lack of a corresponding order from their commander?
12 A. Well, that's what I said.
13 Q. Yes, but this is of the 24th of May. But we also saw the order
14 of 20th of April and it was only, what, 34 days later that we see the
15 first document where Lazarevic is actually informing Pavkovic of this?
16 A. Well, it is difficult for me to comment on this as to why there
17 weren't any others, but I'm sure that General Lazarevic was aware as well
18 as the government leadership, that they were aware that the
19 resubordination had not been carried out. And General Lukic was -- had
20 also been informed of this, but this would have had to be forwarded to
21 the General Staff, just as General Lukic would have had to inform his
22 minister of this.
23 Q. Well, okay, let's not go into conjecture, but let's now take a
24 look at a document P588 [sic]. General, this is a document from the 3rd
25 Army. You did not draft this document. This is NV/NP, and as far as I
Page 8103
1 could understand this this was done by General Pavkovic personally --
2 JUDGE PARKER: [Previous translation continues]... P588 is a
3 transcript. It can't be the right number.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I apologise. I probably misspoke.
5 It's 888, three 8s.
6 Q. General, can you see this document? Now we have it before us.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Let's take a look at item 1 first. Here it is stated under A,
9 where the reasons are given for something -- so there is a -- there is
10 some kind of resubordination but not in keeping with the order. So what
11 are the problems? A, the inherited peacetime autonomy of these units and
12 the related conduct of their command personnel in practice, this is a
13 reference to command of MUP units; correct?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And under B it says:
16 "The order of the NSVK, the Chief of Staff of the
17 Supreme Command, was not accompanied by a corresponding order from the
18 minister of the interior of the Republic of Serbia
19 So do you agree that this pin-points the problem that
20 General Pavkovic exactly pin-pointed the problem and informed thereof the
21 chief of the Supreme Command Staff?
22 A. Yes, but this is an order from the minister of the interior and
23 not the ministry.
24 Q. Yes, exactly, you're correct. I made a mistake. So this is an
25 order from the minister. So now let me ask you, the problem here is
Page 8104
1 stated. Now, from this date up until the end of the war not much time
2 passed. Now, do you know whether at any point anything was done in
3 reference or with reference to this communication from General Pavkovic?
4 A. Well, I wouldn't know about this because I didn't receive any
5 information from General Pavkovic and I didn't participate or prepare
6 any -- or draft any document thereof.
7 Q. Thank you. And you didn't see any document relating to that?
8 A. As far as I know, as far as I can recall, no.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now have the next page,
10 please.
11 Q. General, the proposed measures here, let's zoom in on that,
12 measures proposed, General Pavkovic is here proposing either that
13 resubordination be carried out pursuant and in the spirit of that
14 decision that was issued by the staff, that is one proposal; correct?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And the alternative proposal is either to annul this order and to
17 agree with the MUP staff via a Joint Command and work with them in this
18 manner in the same way that it had been done earlier, that coordination
19 was carried out earlier?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Now, tell me, please, from the time when this decision was
22 adopted in April 1999, the decision by General Pavkovic, up until the end
23 of the war or at least the 25th of May, 1999, there was no coordination
24 between them; is that correct?
25 A. Well, at this time I was at the forward command post in
Page 8105
1 Gracanica, and during my testimony in the Milutinovic case I said that I
2 wasn't able to actually follow the developments in this segment. I --
3 all I knew was that the resubordination had not been carried out and that
4 after the 19th I was never issued any order or any tasks from
5 General Pavkovic to take any measures in that sense.
6 Q. Thank you. I won't read now to you the documents that relate to
7 this because you said you're not familiar with them, but let's move on.
8 There is an interesting document I'd like to show you, that's
9 Exhibit P961. P961.
10 General, is this an order issued by the Pristina Corps commander
11 of May 27th, 1999
12 A. If we look at the heading it would appear so.
13 Q. All right. Let's take a look at number 2. We see the tasks of
14 the Pristina Corps.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we just scroll down the
16 English version to see item 2 on the monitors so that the Trial Chamber
17 and my learned colleague could see it.
18 Q. So under 2 we see the Pristina Corps' task.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now please show us page -- page 4
20 of the English version and page 3 in the B/C/S.
21 Q. Under 5, General, we see here 5.1 it says:
22 "37th Motorised Brigade" and then "36th;" correct?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Then on the same page, on page 5 of the English version, we can
25 see 5.3, paragraph 5.3, in addition to the 58th Light Infantry Brigade.
Page 8106
1 We also see the 35th Detachment of the PJP; correct?
2 A. Yes.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now I would like to look at the
4 last page, please, so that we can see that it's been signed by
5 General Lazarevic.
6 Q. With this decision the -- General Lazarevic is using units of the
7 Pristina Corps and the MUP in assignments pursuant to this order, am I --
8 pursuant to this command; am I correct, General?
9 A. Yes, according to this you could say that.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can I please have P1234.
12 Q. I have a very short question. You said that this was the format
13 that you provided to the MUP staff in Pristina. Do you remember, did you
14 give this form to -- as a template?
15 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not get the name of the
16 person the template was being given to. Could the counsel please repeat
17 the name of the person in his question.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. My question for the transcript, General -- I'm going to repeat
20 the question again. Did you give this template of the
21 19th of February, 1999, to Dusan Adamovic who worked at the MUP staff in
22 Pristina?
23 A. Yes, through the emergency -- or duty service, I did pass it on
24 to Mr. Adamovic.
25 Q. Thank you.
Page 8107
1 General, we saw three documents yesterday of the federal defence
2 ministry. I think these are documents that have to do with the chief of
3 the administration, Mr. Ilic, do you remember?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Let us clarify one thing. Am I correct that the
6 Army of Yugoslavia
7 of Defence and its staff units, the defence administration in Pristina?
8 A. They did not have any jurisdiction in terms of issuing orders and
9 could not have had such a jurisdiction.
10 Q. So the -- they could not issue orders to one another; is that
11 correct?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Let me ask you this: Are you aware that or do you know if units
14 of the police had tanks?
15 A. No.
16 Q. Am I correct that only combat groups that were in coordinated
17 action with certain police units could have tanks?
18 A. Tanks, yes, police units had armoured personnel carriers.
19 Q. I'm only asking you now about tanks.
20 A. No, they did not have tanks.
21 Q. Now I would like to -- I have another question. When carrying
22 out combat actions - I'm just giving an example to make it easier - the
23 commander of the 549th Brigade, Delic, and his units and the commander of
24 the 37th Detachment let's say of the Nis PJP in practice, in order to
25 coordinate at that level, was it usual for the deputy commander of the
Page 8108
1 37th Detachment would be with Mr. Delic and Mr. Delic's deputy would be
2 with the commander of the 37th Detachment?
3 A. You are asking -- are you asking about conditions of
4 resubordination or joint coordination?
5 Q. No resubordination, just joint coordinated action. That's what
6 I'm talking about.
7 A. This does not necessarily have to be done. It's not specified
8 anywhere in the rules for the Chief of Staff of the brigade to go to the
9 command post of the PJP units. This was not even a practical thing for
10 the Chief of Staff who is the main organiser of the assignments in the
11 command would be carrying out a kind of auxiliary duty to spend time at
12 the command post of the police units. This would be a waste of forces.
13 Q. Well, I wasn't thinking of the Chief of Staff specifically in
14 that role, but a person assigned to do that by the brigade commander.
15 For example, Delic did go to -- into action, so perhaps he would allocate
16 a person who would be together with the PJP commander at the position
17 where he was and the deputy PJP commander would be with Delic. I'm not
18 talking about rules, just in the execution of combat activities in order
19 to achieve this coordinated action and the communication that you
20 referred to.
21 A. Well, I cannot speak for Delic and how that was. If you ask me
22 how I would have worked, I would establish communications with the PJP
23 police commander, a certain -- specific communication, and together with
24 him -- during combat, because he's not subordinated to me, we would keep
25 informing each other back and forth about what was going on at the line
Page 8109
1 of contact and what was going on along the depth. And in accordance with
2 that we would be reaching decisions jointly. If he were subordinated,
3 however, he would get a strict order, start moving in that direction,
4 rout the forces, reach the line, and report back to me. That is the
5 difference between the classical order and the coordinated action of
6 units.
7 Q. General, thank you for answering to my questions.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. I have
9 completed my cross-examination.
10 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much.
11 Mr. Hannis.
12 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour. If I may just have a moment
13 to get organised.
14 Re-examination by Mr. Hannis:
15 Q. General, yesterday at page 7991, line 1, the Defence counsel
16 asked you about the operation called Grom, Grom 98. And in your answer
17 you said it was considered that this was directed by an
18 inter-departmental staff. And after that we started with this
19 Joint Command because this inter-departmental staff led by Mr. Stanisic
20 somehow disbanded because they were not up to the task. My first
21 question was: The Mr. Stanisic you're referring to there in connection
22 with an inter-departmental staff was Jovica Stanisic; is that correct?
23 A. Yes, that was Jovica Stanisic. I talked about the
24 inter-departmental staff of the MUP.
25 Q. Okay. And inter-departmental staff within the MUP exclusively;
Page 8110
1 is that what you're talking about?
2 A. Yes, it was the members of the state security, members of the
3 police, and then later pursuant to the order of the commander of the army
4 in these actions, Thunder, General Simic also was engaged who testified
5 in the case against Mr. Milutinovic. I think it's him that we're talking
6 about.
7 Q. Thank you. You were also asked about the plan to combat
8 terrorism that was first approved by Mr. Milosevic, I think, on
9 July 21st, 1998
10 line 17, Mr. Djurdjic said:
11 "I found out that this was called a global plan for the
12 destruction of sabotage and terrorist forces."
13 And I know that we've seen that term "global plan" in a -- in a
14 MUP document, I think it's Exhibit P768 in evidence. Was that a term
15 that you used in the VJ? Did you refer to it as a global plan?
16 A. The word "global" is not used in the army so much, but it's the
17 same thing as a general plan. It's a plan that sets the -- establishes
18 the basis on which other plans can be made, and on the basis of that
19 orders can be issued. We did write "general" and "global." It's not a
20 mistake, one or the other.
21 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... line 9, Mr. Djurdjic asked
22 if you ever saw any kind of decision on the establishment of a joint
23 command and your answer was no.
24 I'd like to show you an exhibit now. This is
25 65 ter number 01317. And I think this was shown to you during proofing.
Page 8111
1 This is a document dated the 12th of July, 2002, it's from the
2 Federal Ministry of Justice of the -- well, the document says the
3 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in response to a request for assistance
4 from the Office of the Prosecutor, asking questions about the
5 Joint Command. And you'll see the first bullet point. The information
6 from the Serbian government is that:
7 "The Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija was formed on the
8 order by the FRY President in June 1998 without any specific document."
9 You weren't present in June 1998 when Mr. Milosevic formed the
10 Joint Command, were you?
11 A. No.
12 Q. If this is correct, that would explain why --
13 MR. HANNIS: Oh, I'm sorry, I see Mr. Djurdjic on his feet.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
15 MR. HANNIS: I'm sorry.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I apologised if I heard properly.
17 This is a document from 2002 and the federal ministry is writing
18 something in response to the Prosecution.
19 JUDGE PARKER: That's correct. Thank you.
20 Carry on, please.
21 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
22 Q. If that information is correct, General, that would explain why
23 you never saw a document creating the Joint Command; would you agree?
24 A. Yes, I didn't see it, definitely.
25 Q. Okay.
Page 8112
1 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I would tender 1317 at this time.
2 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01245.
4 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
5 Q. At page 8000, line 13, yesterday, Mr. Djurdjic asked you if the
6 army ever carried out or implemented any decision by the Joint Command,
7 and your answer was what you considered the Joint Command to be the
8 decisions pertaining to those decisions issued by General Samardzic and
9 you're absolutely certain that Pavkovic could not carry out any
10 assignment or issue instructions without Samardzic being in on it.
11 What about 1999? Did you ever attend any meetings of the
12 Joint Command after October 1998? I'm sorry, did you answer? Did you
13 attend any Joint Command meetings after October 1998?
14 A. No, never. Only one meeting which I referred to on the 18th was
15 when I was present, and it was also attended by members of the MUP and
16 the army. I wasn't even engaged in the coordination because this was
17 transferred to the jurisdiction of General Radojko Stefanovic, and I was
18 not working on that. So I simply was not in a position to know, and I
19 did not personally see any members that were registered on the
20 22nd of July, 2008, in the record other than Mr. Andjelkovic. I think I
21 have said that already three or four times.
22 Q. You said --
23 MR. HANNIS: I'm sorry, I see Mr. Djurdjic on his feet.
24 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Just a brief objection for the
Page 8113
1 purpose of the transcript. The -- Mr. Hannis made a conclusion and asked
2 him whether he attended meetings of the Joint Command in 1999, but the
3 witness did not even say if he knew that such a command existed in 1999.
4 Thank you.
5 MR. HANNIS: Well, Your Honour, I think that evidence came from
6 General Vasiljevic that there was a meeting of the Joint Command on the
7 1st of June, 1999.
8 JUDGE PARKER: We have, yes.
9 MR. HANNIS:
10 Q. General, in your answer you mention a meeting on the
11 18th of April. I think you're talking about the meeting where
12 General Pavkovic gave General Ojdanic's order about subordination to
13 General Djordjevic; correct?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Okay. And that wasn't a meeting of the Joint Command like those
16 1998 meetings where the political persons like Mr. Minic and Mr. Sainovic
17 and others were in attendance?
18 A. No. This was just a meeting in order to provide information to
19 the MUP members and to give them the order by General Ojdanic about
20 resubordination. It wasn't a meeting that had particular format, didn't
21 last more -- longer than 10 or 15 minutes all in all.
22 Q. Okay. Now, the meetings in 1998 of the Joint Command that you
23 attended and took notes, was there a person who seemed to be the
24 chairperson in terms of running the meeting, you know, starting the
25 meeting, discussing the agenda, ending the meeting, did anyone do that or
Page 8114
1 did everyone just start talking at once? How did it work in real life?
2 A. It was actually like this as it happened. As far as I know, it
3 was not known when the next meeting would take place. There would be
4 telephone contact between General Lukic and General Pavkovic, and then
5 depending on the situation they would decide when the next meeting would
6 be held.
7 Upon arriving at the place where the meeting was being held, I
8 noted down in the notebook that you saw that it was the first meeting of
9 the Joint Command after going to the command and based on the explanation
10 of General Pavkovic. All the other meetings I did also record - and you
11 can see that from the notebook - as sessions because civilians called
12 that "sednice," [phoen] a gathering, a session. It was never referred to
13 as a meeting. In essence, there is no significant difference, but it's a
14 term that is more suitable for the civilian structure than the military
15 structure. And the agenda was written by me most often on the basis of
16 the discussion, or it would happen sometimes that some of the civilians
17 would say, I would like to discuss the protection of the cities a little
18 bit today, the protection of the population, and other questions that
19 General Pavkovic and General Lukic would also put forward for discussion,
20 they would also be discussed.
21 Most often the meeting would begin with the organs of the state
22 security, would take quite a long time to present detailed information
23 that they acquired through operations and technical -- by technical means
24 about the activities of foreign intelligence services and the Siptar
25 forces. So if you consider the time based on the analysis that I did,
Page 8115
1 about 60 per cent of the time was spent on these intelligence reports. I
2 wrote more detail about that, as much as I could manage, and I did my
3 best to write that down because for objective reasons it was important to
4 me at the command. And I also passed on some information to organs of
5 the corps command depending on the nature of the intelligence, either I
6 would pass it on to security organs, intelligence organs, or other
7 organs.
8 After Mr. Gajic and Mr. Radovic, most often then the floor would
9 be given or he would begin to explain about what the police did over the
10 past few days or what they planned to do in the future. That is the
11 format of the meetings. After that it would be General Pavkovic.
12 Depending on the matters that were being discussed, the others would then
13 individually participate in the discussion and the debate.
14 I often did not write down and it wasn't of much interest to me
15 what Mr. Sainovic was saying about these international contacts because
16 this was in the domain of politics, which to me as an officer didn't mean
17 much in the resolution of the problems that I had and the corps command
18 had. That is why I noted down the points of discussion, but he spoke
19 much more, especially about the meetings with Mr. Hill, Miles, and the
20 others, because he would also go to Macedonia for meetings, he would --
21 Mr. Hill would come to Kosovo, and they were practically resolving some
22 political issues that I was aware of as problems but were not important
23 to me as a soldier.
24 Q. Can I stop you there. I think we're close to our time for ending
25 for the evening --
Page 8116
1 MR. HANNIS: And if I may I would like to continue tomorrow.
2 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, we have reached our time. We resume tomorrow
3 morning at 9.00 so that the re-examination should continue then.
4 We will adjourn now for the evening.
5 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.00 p.m.
6 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 20th day of
7 August, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.
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