1 Thursday, 20 August 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.29 a.m.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning. Our apologies for the late start
6 this morning.
7 [The witness takes the stand]
8 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning. Our apologies for the late start.
9 I remind you the affirmation you made still applies.
10 Now, Mr. Hannis.
11 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.
12 WITNESS: MILAN DJAKOVIC [Resumed]
13 [Witness answered through interpreter]
14 Re-examination by Mr. Hannis: [Continued]
15 Q. Good morning, General.
16 A. Good morning.
17 Q. I want to begin this morning by asking you a few more questions
18 about the notes and the Joint Command meetings or sessions that you
19 attended in 1998. You have told us, I think, on Tuesday at page 8012
20 that when -- and yesterday at page 12 in particular, you said that when
21 you were taking notes you "only jotted down those details and facts that
22 I felt might be of use to my command in their assessment of the Siptar
23 terrorist forces' strength."
24 But that -- but you also wrote down additional things that were
25 said by those attending the meeting, didn't you? We have several
1 examples of the civilians talking about things that seem to deal with
2 more than simply the strength of terrorist forces. Do you recall or
3 should we look at some examples?
4 A. Yes, I do recall. There were additional matters that you are
5 mentioning now that related to the protection of the civilians to
6 supplies, assistance, to citizens of both Albanian and Serbian ethnicity,
7 in terms of food stuffs and the daily problems that they had; but as a
8 matter of course, this was something that Mr. Andjelkovic dealt with.
9 As for the others, they took the floor as they felt that they
10 should perhaps add something or participate in the discussion and so on.
11 So yes, there were other matters and not only those that had to do with
12 the Siptar terrorist forces' strength and security.
13 Q. Okay. And in your discussion with Mr. Djurdjic about that matter
14 in general on Tuesday, at page 8012 and following, you agreed with him
15 generally when he asked you if it was fair to say that there wasn't a
16 single minute where any decision had been ordered by the Joint Command
17 when there was no decision issued by them or mentioned in your notes.
18 And I want to ask you about the meeting of July 27th. And this
19 is in Exhibit 886, and it's at page 15 of both the English and the B/C/S,
20 the portion I want to ask you about. Mr. Djurdjic talked to you about
21 this meeting, this was a meeting that was attended by General Samardzic
22 and there were discussions about what the plan was going to be. And on
23 page 15 the last speaker at the meeting is listed in your notes as
24 Mr. Minic and he says:
25 "Continue the plan at 0700 hours as agreed."
1 Do you remember him saying that?
2 A. I remember that Mr. Minic said that because the army commander
3 was present and he advised -- he informed everyone that the plan was
4 being implemented and then Mr. Minic in closing practically just
5 reiterated what the army commander had already decided because the
6 decision on the use of the forces was something that was made by the army
7 commander, not by civilians. And Mr. Minic basically just reiterated his
8 words that this plan from their perspective as it were, I don't know
9 whether he was referring to the MUP or something else, but in any case,
10 the commander, the army commander, had decided that the plan was to be
11 implemented as of 0700 hours.
12 Q. Okay. Let me ask you about a couple of -- couple of others.
13 MR. HANNIS: If we can look at page 84 in the English, page 86 of
14 the B/C/S.
15 Q. This next one, General, is a meeting of the
16 10th of September, 1998.
17 MR. HANNIS: I think we'll have to rotate the B/C/S page.
18 Q. And near the bottom of that page you'll see Mr. Minic speaking
19 and in my English translation among the things he says are:
20 "Go into Dubovik and Radovic villages and see what the situation
21 is like. Go into Prapacan village," says VJ, "and have the police occupy
22 it." Skipping a bullet point, "Go into all villages and pressure them
23 into handing over weapons. Secure the roads and control the territory.
24 The army will adopt a plan on the arrangement of the territory on Monday.
25 The MUP should do the same."
1 Do you remember him saying all those things?
2 A. Well, that was the gist of what he said for the most part.
3 Whether I actually managed to write down every word that he actually said
4 verbatim, I don't know, but for the most part it's as you have read out.
5 What is he referring to there regarding the gathering of weapons, the
6 collection of weapons, this was something that was on-going, and it was
7 at the initiative of the command that this was undertaken but also at the
8 initiative of the Albanian citizens who at this time were not willing --
9 or actually even as of September we had the situation where the citizens
10 themselves were coming over, coming in to hand over their weapons, or
11 they were handing in weapons, small quantities of weapons, but then
12 holding back and keeping more sophisticated weapons with them. So we
13 knew that this was really aimed at misleading the MUP into believing that
14 they had already handed over their weapons. But there were also
15 instances where entire quantities of weapons were handed over by village.
16 For instance we even mortars handed over and --
17 Q. General, let me stop there. I was just asking if you remember
18 Mr. Minic saying all these things which on their face sound like they are
19 in the nature of decisions or directions or instructions or orders, at
20 least in the generic sense of those words? Do you remember him saying
21 those things? You wrote them down.
22 A. Yes, I did write that down and that is the sense of what he said.
23 Q. Okay. And when you answered Mr. Djurdjic on Tuesday about this,
24 I think you're thinking -- well, let me ask you this: Are you thinking
25 of the words "decision" and "order" in the technical military sense of
1 something formal that you draft up and it has specific language in it and
2 it's signed? Is that what you're thinking of when you say nobody in the
3 Joint Command ever ordered the VJ to do anything out of these
4 Joint Command meetings? Do you understand my question?
5 A. Yes, I understand it. And I can confirm that that's how it was
6 in terms of decisions. As for initiatives, I'm not denying that certain
7 individuals took some initiative. However, that was not binding on the
8 corps commander or the commander of the MUP staff in the sense that they
9 would have had to implement that, but they could bear it in mind as a
10 bit, a piece of information that they would be aware of when they were
11 making their decision. So that is the sense of what is there.
12 Q. Did those kind of things expressed by Mr. Minic - and in the
13 minutes there are other similar statements by Mr. Sainovic and
14 Mr. Makovic at various meetings. I understand you're saying those were
15 not binding on the corps, but in your experience did those kind of things
16 carry weight with the corps? The fact that Mr. Minic or Mr. Sainovic or
17 Mr. Makovic had said, Let's go there, let's do that; did that carry
18 weight with the army?
19 A. If a civilian, for instance, insisted on an issue, it was
20 General Pavkovic's duty to relay that to General Pavkovic to inform him
21 of the problem at a meeting, and then the commander would decide whether
22 he would accept the proposal or initiative that was put forth by one of
23 the gentlemen who were there or not. There were instances where the
24 commander of the army would accept them fully. There were other
25 instances where he would deny them or turn them down completely. And
1 there were cases where he would take them into account for a certain
2 part, especially when -- so the commander was really the one who had the
3 final say especially when the use of the army was at stake.
4 Q. Okay. How about with regards to the use of the MUP or do you
5 know? Was the effect the same or did the MUP give more weight to what
6 Mr. Minic and Mr. Sainovic and Mr. Makovic might say in the nature of a
7 direction or instruction or an order? Do you know?
8 A. I don't know about that, but I know that if there was a MUP unit
9 of involved, the army commander, in view of the fact that the army
10 provided support to the MUP, we had to advise him and inform him of the
11 problem that had to do with the MUP unit, and then the commander would,
12 in keeping with his decision, determine which forces to use as far as
13 support was concerned. But as a matter of principle, he did not deny
14 providing support except he never allowed the army to be used without the
15 MUP units being used as well.
16 Q. All right. Thank you. I think two more -- two or three more I'd
17 like to show you.
18 MR. HANNIS: Page 120 in the English and 123 in the B/C/S.
19 Q. This is a meeting of 5 October 1998. And I guess -- when did you
20 stop taking the minutes -- or taking the notes and you were replaced by
21 your subordinate Tesevic?
22 A. It was approximately around the 20th, so I took notes at some
23 65 meetings, and the last five the notes were taken by Colonel Tesevic.
24 I think this was around the 20th of October.
25 Q. So on the 5th of October, this is another one that you would have
1 been taking the notes. Mr. Sainovic is noted as saying:
2 "Our operations should be commensurate with the number" and "we
3 should go to minor or small-scale actions."
4 And then next he says:
5 "The leaders should be liquidated now that we have enough
6 information. Go with everything in order to deal with individuals."
7 Do you recall what he was talking about in that meeting?
8 A. I recall it. There were discussions about some individuals who
9 were member of the command personnel who were found to be some of the
10 leaders of the terrorist uprising in Kosovo, especially among them a
11 sultan from Ovcarevo and Ramus Haradinaj in the area of Baranski Lug and
12 in the Junik mountains. They were not mentioned by name then, but this
13 relate -- referred to those leaders of the extremist ideology, and the
14 gentlemen from state security were talking at this meeting about being in
15 pursuit of these individuals and that they were trying to capture them
16 and if not, then that they should liquidate them in combat. And I assume
17 that Mr. Sainovic, based on the information that General Pavkovic
18 provided regarding the handing over of weapons in certain villages and
19 the reports of the MUP, he was probably stressing this particular problem
20 which had already earlier been pointed to by state security organs, and
21 he probably felt that the key issue was to separate the terrorists as
22 soon as possible from the civilian population. And if that -- if they
23 were to be successful in that, that then there wouldn't be much
24 opposition among the civilian population in returning to their homes and
25 staying there. So I'm just basically para-phrasing what he said then,
1 but I do recall the meetings where this was under discussion.
2 MR. HANNIS: If we can go to the next page, 121 of the English,
3 124 of the B/C/S.
4 Q. In that same meeting near the bottom of the page you'll see
5 Mr. Sainovic talking again; three bullet points, the third one says:
6 "DB operatives - liquidate individuals."
7 DB is the state security; correct?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And in your last answer you suggested that this talk about
10 liquidating individuals was in combat. It doesn't say "in combat."
11 Wasn't this just a matter of finding these leaders and killing them? In
12 combat or any other way?
13 I see Mr. Djurdjic on his feet.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] The first part of Mr. Hannis's
16 question also contains certain conclusions that are not actually valid,
17 but in the latter part of his question he actually corrected himself, so
18 I don't really have an objection.
19 MR. HANNIS:
20 Q. Do you need me to repeat the question?
21 A. It's not necessary; the question is clear. Yes, I did mention
22 combat operation, but this does not preclude the use of units in combat
23 operations. For instance, we had the case where sultan was attacked.
24 His commanding of Carevo was assaulted. And some combat elements
25 captured of Carevo and not state security organs. State security organs
1 and being a member of the military security organ, I know this, their
2 responsibility was to discover the leaders of terrorist activities in
3 their operative work. And when those individuals actually offer
4 resistance during their attempt to arrest them, then they could use their
5 weapons. And of course in that sense Mr. Sainovic is here commenting the
6 comments put forth by Mr. Radovic and Mr. Gajic because they frequently
7 reported that they were in pursuit of certain terrorists. But there was
8 never an instance where they reported that there was any fighting or that
9 they had caught someone.
10 And I recall a meeting where Mr. Radovic said that a Siptar had
11 been liquidated and this man was someone for whom the Albanians had
12 discovered that he had ties with the state security service and
13 apparently he provided them certain information. However, they
14 themselves learned that some information that he provided in relation to
15 the mass grave in Klecka where remains, human remains, were found; and on
16 the basis of what I learned then, these were human remains of Serbian
18 Q. Let me stop you there.
19 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, what I'd like to do, if it's not
20 opposed by counsel and if it's agreeable to Your Honours, is rather than
21 go through several other points that I'd like to bring to your attention
22 I would simply name the pages where I think there are examples of the
23 civilian members of the Joint Command talking about things that on the
24 face appear to be in the nature of directions, orders, instructions. For
25 your future reference when you are considering the issue I would just
1 list the pages where they occurred on and move on or --
2 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I agree with my learned colleague
4 and I trust that his quotations will be accurate, but let's not overdo
6 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic is having an each-way position.
7 Mr. Hannis, proceed as you proposed.
8 MR. HANNIS: Thank you. For the record, Your Honours, I would
9 suggest that examples of this can be found at page 130 of the English,
10 13 October meeting, Mr. Sainovic speaking. At page 128 of the English,
11 11 October, again Mr. Sainovic speaking twice on that first page. On
12 page 125 of the English, 8th of October meeting, Mr. Sainovic. The 7th
13 of October meeting on 124 of the English, Mr. Sainovic. We talked about
14 that one. Page 112 of the English, 26 September, 1998 meeting,
15 Mr. Sainovic. Page 113, 29th of September, Mr. Minic speaking.
16 22 September 1998
17 one in August that I'd like to bring to your attention. The
18 1st of August, at page 27 of the English, Mr. Matkovic is speaking.
19 Q. Now, General, I'd like to talk to you a little bit further about
20 the nature of the interaction between the Joint Command and the VJ. And
21 I'd like you to have a look at P1229. I think you talked about this
23 MR. HANNIS: And I have a hard copy if the Usher could hand it to
24 you. It's a two-page document, so that may help.
25 Q. This is a 29 September 1998 document authored by and sent from
1 General Pavkovic to the 3rd Army command personally to the commander.
2 The title is "Implementation of Stage 5 of the Plan." You've looked at
3 this one before, yes?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. If we can go to item number 4 --
6 MR. HANNIS: And that's on page 2 of the English, Your Honours.
7 Q. You find that? My English translation reads as follows:
8 "During the briefing on the course of implementing stage five of
9 the plan which was given at the meeting of the ZK." And in this context
10 I take it ZK means "Zajednicka Komanda," Joint Command?
11 A. [No interpretation]
12 Q. "... at the meeting of the Joint Command for Kosova-Metohija on
13 10 September 1998
14 not carried out two of its duties under the plan. Namely, number 1, it
15 had not formed rapid intervention helicopter units as the FRY president
16 had ordered at the meeting on 31 August 1998; and 2, two BGs, battle
17 groups, had not been moved down to Kosovo and Metohija."
18 Did you see this document in 1998? Did you know General Pavkovic
19 had written it to General Samardzic?
20 A. Yes, I did.
21 Q. And do you remember this matter being discussed at a
22 Joint Command meeting on the 10th of September?
23 A. I do.
24 Q. Okay. My question is in this paragraph where General Pavkovic
1 "The other command organs at the Joint Command meeting pointed
2 out that the VJ hadn't carried out its duties."
3 I understand that the MUP would be another command or organ, but
4 this says other command organs in the plural. Who besides the VJ and the
5 MUP would be a command organ that's participating in the Joint Command
7 A. In my testimonies both last year and this year I repeatedly said
8 that there were only two organs where I was. They were the MUP staff and
9 the Pristina Corps staff command, and they were responsible for
10 coordinating the work based on the decision of the army commander. I
11 never denied that there were also representatives of the Government of
12 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia there as well as representatives of
14 individuals who had frequently attended these meetings of, as it says
15 there, the Joint Command.
16 Whom General Pavkovic actually was referring to here, I wouldn't
17 know. But I know that he considered other organs to be mainly the MUP
18 command or the MUP staff because they were the ones who were supposed to
19 take part in the creation of these intervention units. But I also
20 believed that he probably meant the other civilian representatives from
21 the federal and republic governments because General Pavkovic sometimes
22 referred to them as the Joint Command.
23 I can only reiterate my claim now that they did not take any
24 decisions, the decisions were taken in Belgrade; and they probably
25 informed President Milosevic either through phone calls or in person how
1 the activities were evolving, developing. And then based on that, he
2 would make a decision on the use of forces and issue orders to the
3 Chief of the General Staff and the MUP staff.
4 I am certain that these civilians who came down there to Kosovo
5 were very fair in their treatment of the commands. They never insisted
6 on anything being implemented. But as you were saying or pointing out,
7 they had some sway by providing -- by offering their initiatives and
8 opinions, they had some sway with the commanders to take them into
9 account in their decisions.
10 Q. Thank you. And what you just described as that sway related in
11 part to their relationships with Mr. Milosevic; would you agree with that
12 statement? That's what gave them weight?
13 A. [No interpretation]
14 THE INTERPRETER: There was a technical error. The wrong channel
15 was on. Could the witness please repeat.
16 JUDGE PARKER: We missed that answer. Would you be able to tell
17 us again what you were saying, General.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will try to repeat. I know that
19 the gentlemen from the authorities of the federal republic and the
20 Republic of Serbia
21 President Milosevic, and I know they occasionally travelled to Belgrade
22 and I suppose they met with him also. But what they discussed, I do not
24 MR. HANNIS:
25 Q. Thank you. And one more thing on this document down near the
1 bottom of the page, immediately above the words "we propose."
2 General Pavkovic says:
3 "Moreover, we are giving the members of the ZK, Joint Command for
4 Kosovo and Metohija, the opportunity to report to the president of the
5 FRY that the VJ has not carried out its duties under the plan."
6 Do you know why General Pavkovic inserted that in this document
7 to General Samardzic?
8 A. General Pavkovic is letting the army commander know that he too
9 had attended the meeting with the president when the problem was
10 discussed. And he reminds him that the problem with the creation of
11 helicopter units and bringing in two combat groups into Kosovo had
12 practically been approved by President Milosevic's plan, but that
13 assignment had not been carried out. And he warns that members of the
14 Joint Command are reminding everyone, and he is informing the army
15 commander in writing of this problem.
16 Now, what is Joint Command here? We know that in Belgrade
17 everybody is there with President Milosevic. There is some sort of
18 intersectorial command or staff - I don't know what they call it in their
19 minutes. And all those members working in Kosovo were at the same time
20 participating in Belgrade
21 sent on a mission to Kosovo to provide the president with some factual
22 information that could contribute to making political decisions because
23 what is discussed here is the political situation, not combat with Siptar
25 If it had been ordered to neutralise all the forces in Kosovo, I
1 think the army would have achieved that within seven to eight days.
2 Q. Okay. Thank you. I want to refer to you another document that
3 is sort of related to this continuing issue between General Pavkovic and
4 General Samardzic.
5 MR. HANNIS: This is Exhibit D212. I think it's just one page,
6 so if you'll have a look at it on your screen.
7 Q. This is dated the 5th of October, 1998. And I see what appear to
8 be your initials on the lower left. Is this the one that you drafted?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And we have Pavkovic writing to General Samardzic, item 2, he
12 "The plan to smash the DTS sabotage forces on the territory of
13 Kosovo and Metohija authorised by the president stipulated that when the
14 DTS had been smashed by the MUP and VJ forces rapid intervention forces
15 shall be formed to be at full readiness, with the engagement of
16 MI-8 helicopters to intervene at threatened sectors and features, as
17 ordered by the President.
18 "On my return from the reporting session with the ZK,"
19 Joint Command, I assume, "on 19 and 20 September, 1998, I informed you
20 personally by telephone of the decision to form rapid-intervention
22 When he speaks there of the decision to form these forces, he is
23 talking about a decision of the Joint Command, isn't he?
24 A. He is talking about Mr. Milosevic's decision at state level. So
25 it's not the Joint Command. The Joint Command, or rather, one of its
1 member, perhaps even General Pavkovic, proposed that rapid-intervention
2 forces be formed and that proposal was submitted to the president. And
3 based on that briefing, that reporting, that was done by General Pavkovic
4 on behalf of the army and someone else on behalf of the MUP, he, the
5 president, decided that forces should be created dedicated to rapid
6 intervention, so as to be ready in case of emergency to act quickly so as
7 not to have -- to engage larger army forces. These rapid-intervention
8 forces with some helicopters, perhaps, would be sent immediately to a
9 particular sector to deal with the situation.
10 Q. Okay. The next sentence says:
11 "As part of the conclusions from the Joint Command for Kosovo and
12 Metohija meeting, I sent you the decision to form rapid-intervention
14 What decision is he talking about, and what conclusions from the
15 Joint Command is he talking about, if you know?
16 A. I don't know exactly what he is talking about here because he
17 mainly dictated to me. I did type it out, he did make some corrections,
18 but most of this document I wrote myself.
19 Q. Okay. Let's take a look then at the Joint Command meeting for
20 the 20th of September.
21 MR. HANNIS: This is P886. At page 105 -- or 105 of the English,
22 109 of the B/C/S.
23 Q. You see, that's for the meeting on the 20th of September, but I
24 need to take you to the last entry from that meeting which is actually on
25 page 110 of the B/C/S and 106 of the English. The speaker is
1 Mr. Sainovic, and in my English translation he is noted as saying:
2 "Prepare and train the units for quick interventions. Form
3 groups and then /?/ ask the air force to send helicopters, prepare the
4 task and plan."
5 And then on Thursday it's scratched out, it says Friday.
6 "The commanders of the helicopter units commanders to come at
7 1000 hours and an army operations officer."
8 That appears to be the only noted reference to helicopters and
9 intervention units in that meeting, and it's Mr. Sainovic at the
10 conclusion of the meeting making those comments?
11 So is that what's referred to in General Pavkovic's communication
12 to General Samardzic that we just looked at?
13 A. Yes, I understand. From what I understand, I don't rule out the
14 possibility that Mr. Sainovic had contacted President Milosevic to
15 discuss the issue. I don't rule out that possibility because here he
16 puts forward certain details that he may have personally learned from the
17 president about the creation of these units. I don't believe
18 Mr. Sainovic was deciding on his own.
19 His practice was to travel to Belgrade to meet with the president
20 personally, and I don't rule out the possibility that the president had
21 given him very specific tasks to tell General Samardzic such and such a
22 thing and then that he, in keeping with his own powers, make the decision
23 on the use of forces. Mr. Sainovic did not have the right, nor did he
24 ever try to order Samardzic or Pavkovic anything. But he must have seen
25 President Milosevic to share with him his opinions about the creation of
1 that unit in Kosovo.
2 Q. Okay. Thank you. I think I'm done with Joint Command notes for
3 now. I wanted to ask you about a document that you were shown yesterday.
4 This is Exhibit D324. If you can have a look at the on screen. It's a
5 document dated 1st of August, 1998, from General Pavkovic to the
6 3rd Army. And it's a request for approval to launch the third stage of
7 the plan.
8 My question deals with the document itself. We have what appears
9 to be the signature of General Pavkovic and a stamp, but there's no --
10 nothing else on it in terms of what we often see in other VJ documents.
11 There are no initials of the author or -- and the typist, and there's no
12 delivery information. There's no archival stamps that we sometimes see
13 when the documents have been retrieved from the VJ archives. Is that
14 unusual? Can you comment on that?
15 A. There's nothing particularly unusual because as far as these
16 activities around Ovcarevo are concerned, I've already described that.
17 This was followed by activities around Liko vac, Ovcarevo, and combat
18 actions. This is a command of the Pristina Corps sending to the forward
19 command post of the 3rd Army; General Pavkovic was sending it to the
20 forward command post of the 3rd Army. Whether it was handed in to
21 someone in person, I don't know why they did not register it. But we see
22 the designations, the -- and the signature of General Pavkovic; we see
23 that he signed it himself, how he had it transmitted. He could have
24 handed it to someone. Now, whether the 3rd Army registered it in a
25 log-book, it was up to them. Because you have seen that document that
1 concerns General Djordjevic, it was shown him on the 18th of April.
2 General Pavkovic handed it on to the competent office for registration
3 only two days later, so it must have been a simple omission and the same
4 thing is possible here.
5 Q. Okay. Thank you. You were asked, I think, yesterday at page 8
6 about Mr. -- by Mr. Djurdjic about who was in charge of the MUP units or
7 the MUP units in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999, and you gave an answer about
8 1998 regarding Mr. -- General Lukic and the MUP staff. Do you know why
9 General Djordjevic and General Stevanovic were attending Joint Command
10 meetings in 1998?
11 A. Well, I can hardly answer the direct question. I can only give
12 you my impressions about their engagement there in Kosovo.
13 Q. If you can't answer, that's fine. Let me ask that next question:
14 Do you know who in the MUP was responsible for sending PJP units from
15 outside Kosovo to Kosovo in 1998 and in 1999? Do you know who that
16 person would have been?
17 A. From what I heard from General Pavkovic, it was within the
18 exclusive jurisdiction of the Minister of the Interior,
19 Mr. Vlajko Stojiljkovic.
20 Q. And was that for 1998 and 1999 both?
21 A. Well, I suppose so because in 1998 at all meetings with the
22 president, Mr. Vlajko attended as the most senior officer in the
23 Ministry of Interior, and without his decision, units of the ministry
24 could hardly be sent to Kosovo in any scenario.
25 Q. You were asked about how often you saw General Djordjevic in
1 Kosovo after October 1998. I think your answer was you just saw him that
2 one time at the meeting on or about the 18th or 19th of April. How about
3 General Lukic? Did you see him in Kosovo in 1999, and if so, how often?
4 A. I did not go to meetings and it's true that I saw Mr. Djordjevic
5 and Lukic and Obrad Stevanovic on the 18th of April. I knew Lukic was
6 there; I heard that from other people because I was no longer involved in
7 any coordination in 1999. I don't know about Obrad. And about
8 Mr. Djordjevic, I don't know either. And I did not see either him or
9 Mr. Obrad Stevanovic, and I do not know whether they came there or not.
10 During proofing, I was asked about the 1st of June, but what I
11 know, I know from double hearsay.
12 Q. Okay. Fair enough. Thank you.
13 MR. HANNIS: Next I want to look at Exhibit 340. This was shown
14 to you yesterday by Mr. Djurdjic. And I have a hard copy for you because
15 it's several pages.
16 If the Usher could help me with that. Thank you. D340.
17 Q. This is at 2nd October, 1998, analysis of task executed on the
18 territory of Kosovo
19 looking at this before?
20 A. Yes.
21 MR. HANNIS: If we could go to, first of all, page 4 in the
22 English. And it's page 3 for you, General. Item number 3.
23 Q. It talks about experiences gained. And my first question relates
24 to the positive experiences. You see the last item under positive
25 experiences, my English translation reads as follows:
1 "The distribution of weapons to citizens loyal to the
2 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," and then in parentheses it says, "of
3 Serbian and Montenegrin ethnicity has made it possible for large-scale
4 resistance against the terrorist to be organised."
5 So was it only Serbian and Montenegrin citizens in Kosovo that
6 were being provided weapons in 1998?
7 A. In 1998 all the citizens except Albanians received as part of the
8 general mobilisation or partial mobilisation weapons that they were
9 entitled to by establishment. I said that two days ago. And in the
10 Ministry of Defence, units of the civilian protection and civilian
11 defence were also given weapons including members of other ethnicities to
12 protects their own lives and property and local communes in villages and
14 There were several attempts to create some mixed Serb/Albanian
15 units in Kosovo Polje. One of these attempts was made by Mr. Pesic who
16 was commander of the military district. However, the response from the
17 Albanian community was not great, and he did not succeed in creating any
18 mixed units. The Albanian community refused outright to receive weapons
19 and to put up any resistance to the terrorists in Kosovo.
20 If you ask me what the reason was, I think that many of them
21 supported separatism but many others also feared reprisals, revenge,
22 including torture by other ethnic Albanians if they joined the army and
23 the police in any kind of effort whatsoever.
24 Q. Let me jump ahead to a related document right now.
25 MR. HANNIS: Exhibit P889.
1 Q. This is on the issue of armed non-Siptars in Kosovo.
2 MR. HANNIS: And if we could go to page 4 of the English.
3 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I think I never asked the General
5 anything on this subject. Mr. Hannis could have dealt with it in direct
6 examination if he had wanted to.
7 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, it arises from his use of that document
8 which has negative aspects of -- positive and negative aspects of what
9 the 3rd Army and Pristina Corps had done in 1998.
10 JUDGE PARKER: So it flows, in your submission, from the use of
11 the document --
12 MR. HANNIS: Yes, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE PARKER: -- in cross-examination?
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 JUDGE PARKER: Continue, Mr. Hannis.
16 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
17 Q. And, General, this is General Lazarevic's 16th February document
18 that you've seen before. And in item 2 - in the English at page 4 and in
19 your B/C/S I think we need page 3 - there's reference to the
20 Pristina Corps task and it talks about engaging the non-Siptar
21 population. Do you see that?
22 A. I haven't found that. Oh I see it. It's fine.
23 Q. Do you know who that refers to? That -- so that would not be
24 members of the MUP or members of the VJ?
25 A. This refers to something I've already explained. Serbs,
1 Montenegrins, Muslims, the Roma, and other people who were vulnerable and
2 undefended in Serbian villages, where they suffered from frequent Siptar
3 terrorists attacks, and where the army and the MUP were unable to assign
4 forces to protect villages. Therefore, as part of the general measures,
5 such population was equipped and armed to protect their own lives and
6 property. And these were people aged 65 to 80, the elderly, and
7 children. Those who were not mobilised, who were not subject to
8 mobilisation and who were certainly not capable of combat.
9 Q. And in relation to that, if you'll go a little farther down, in
10 response to your answer about using the forces to protect villages, do
11 you see where it says -- talks about using those forces to protect
12 non-Siptar villages? Or places with non-Siptar populations?
13 A. If you mean this part of the text which says:
14 "... and also for the protection of villages with non-Siptar
15 population ."
16 Q. Yes.
17 A. Well, that's precisely what I'm trying to tell you. The army and
18 the MUP were unable to detach any stronger forces to protect the
19 population because they had their main task to carry out. For the army
20 to protect the population, it would have had to dedicate at least a
21 platoons or company-size units, and we were unable to afford that because
22 we were busy protecting roads.
23 And in order to protect that population somehow, within the
24 effort at the level of the Ministry of Defence, they were given certain
25 weapons in addition to some weapons they already had from earlier on.
1 Q. Okay. But what about protecting Siptar villages with loyal
3 A. Places where loyal Siptars lived were perfectly accessible to the
4 army and the MUP, and the units could be deployed there just as easily as
5 in Serbian villages. And we did not have any problems there such as
6 attacks on units until 1999. There were no attacks of the population
7 against our units. You have reports that I wrote signed by
8 General Pavkovic sent to armoured brigades instructing units how to treat
9 the population. Those commanders spoke to the seniors in villages and
10 they reached some sort of understanding. But when these elders were
11 replaced by younger men, these understandings were no longer valid.
12 Q. Okay.
13 A. And I personally ran across columns of Albanians who were leaving
14 their own villages for that reason.
15 Q. Okay. Let me take you back to D340. And it's on page 3 of the
16 B/C/S version. And page 3 of the English. The report includes
17 information about the number of terrorists that were killed or liquidated
18 in my translation here. It says a total of 1299. And I guess this is in
19 the period up to the 1st or 2nd of October.
20 You saw the -- you saw the document of the minutes of the meeting
21 that took place on the 29th of October, 1998, in Belgrade where
22 General Pavkovic had reported on the work of the Joint Command. And in
23 that report I will tell you that he reported that between the
24 25th of July and the 29th of October, that 3500 [Realtime transcript read
25 in error "33500"] were killed, another 560 were liquidated, referring to
1 terrorists, and another 666 were liquidated in the border area. That's a
2 total of about 4700. Is it possible that 3400 terrorists were killed
3 between the 1st and 29th of October during joint VJ and MUP actions?
4 A. Well, what I can say with certainty is that this -- these are not
5 accurate details and accurate data regarding the deaths on the other
6 side. And the reason is that in 1998 we almost never found Albanians who
7 had been killed in combat. So we concluded that they most probably
8 collected these bodies and took them out to their territory so that the
9 commanders when preparing our reports and also our reports which we
10 prepared for General Pavkovic for his briefing to the commander of the
11 army and the Chief of General Staff and the president, we used figures
12 that were just assessments of what their losses would have been. And
13 that is possible in the army based on some indicators that you have
14 during combat operations.
15 So we didn't really know how many casualties they had. Me
16 myself, I did not even see five dead Albanians. Perhaps I did see one
17 person once in a barracks in Djakovica and maybe by the roadside as I
18 travelled on the road. So I didn't see any other bodies. In other
19 words, we just made assessments and the most accurate data on their
20 casualties was the data we had from the border area because they left
21 their bodies behind on these occasions and then these bodies were taken
22 to Djakovica and handed over to the municipality.
23 Q. Let me stop you there. I think you answered my question.
24 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, because of our delayed start -- I am
25 sorry, I see Mr. Djurdjic --
1 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] On page 24, line 5, there is the
3 figure of 33500. If you can just take a look at that.
4 JUDGE PARKER: 3,350.
5 MR. HANNIS: I may have misspoke.
6 JUDGE PARKER: An extra zero has been added.
7 MR. HANNIS: I actually meant to say 3500, I think is what's in
8 the document at that point. 3500 plus 560 plus 666.
9 If I may, Your Honours, because of our late start, I don't know
10 what time we'll be stopping.
11 JUDGE PARKER: I'm holding on in the expectation that you may
12 finish shortly.
13 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I think I can finish in the next 15 or
14 20 minutes.
15 JUDGE PARKER: That would be perfectly acceptable.
16 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
17 Q. Related to this document, you agreed to a question from
18 Mr. Djurdjic about the -- whether or not there were any indications in
19 this Exhibit D340 of any problems with the Pristina Corps not abiding by
20 the commands of the 3rd Army, et cetera. But as of October 1998, were
21 you aware that there indeed had been some complaints at the higher levels
22 in the VJ about the use of the Pristina Corps units? And I'm talking
23 specifically about at the General Staff level with General Perisic. Were
24 you aware of that?
25 A. Well, I learned that from General Pavkovic. In other words, on
1 the basis of a few letters and exchange of instances where information
2 was exchanged between General Pavkovic and Samardzic, I noticed that
3 General Samardzic, although he attended the meetings with
4 President Milosevic and the Chief of General Staff and the chief of the
5 security administration, once he went back to Pristina he tried to
6 suppress, sort of, initiatives that were -- and that was not acceptable
7 in the army because without something coming from the commander in the --
8 it could not be really implemented.
9 So he tried to -- General Pavkovic tried to resolve this in his
10 contacts with General Samardzic. But from what I heard on one occasion,
11 General Perisic and Dimitrijevic in late September and early October
12 began to stress this issue of Joint Command and all of a sudden that
13 surfaced as an issue, emerged as an issue. Whereas throughout this
14 period of July through August in 1998, they knew that civilians were in
15 Kosovo, there were Mr. Matkovic, Mr. Andjelkovic, and others; and on one
16 occasion I even heard from a man that General Perisic proposed - and I
17 cannot claim that this is accurate - but I heard this a few months
18 earlier, that he himself, he personally proposed that Mr. Andjelkovic be
20 I personally did not attend these meetings, but I do not exclude
21 that possibility. I can only assume why this proposal was put forth, but
22 I can claim that General Dimitrijevic and General Perisic knew of this
23 and all of a sudden this issue emerged as a problem and was emphasised.
24 Q. Were you aware that it was a problem as early as July of 1998
25 with General Perisic?
1 A. I don't know that there was any issue with General Perisic in
2 July, but I know that there was some pressure put on General Samardzic
3 because I cannot see why General Samardzic would actually try to
4 undermine a decision by the president which was made at the meeting where
5 he was present. But in a way, he was actually seeking to accomplish
6 something that had not been agreed at this meeting with
7 President Milosevic in Belgrade
8 was a certain pressure put on General Samardzic to proceed in this way,
9 in the way that General Perisic felt that it should be done.
10 Q. In October, November, December, 1998, did you have any
11 involvement or engagement in dealing with the KVM personnel from the OSCE
12 in trying to carry out the terms of the October Agreements?
13 A. Yes, I did.
14 Q. Were you aware of an incident that happened in December 1998, in
15 and around Podujevo, which the OSCE, KVM, were pointing to as being a
16 violation of the agreement where a VJ unit was engaged? Do you know the
17 one I'm talking about?
18 A. I'm not certain that I know what you mean.
19 Q. The VJ argued that it was just a training exercise and that they
20 were attacked and then they returned fire. Does that ring a bell?
21 A. I think this must have been in the area of Batalovo Lake
22 that's the incident you are referring to. Because we had training
23 grounds there in the area of Batalovo Lake
24 the 15th Armoured Brigade actually had their training. And we had
25 rotation of troops every three months because we had to provide training
1 to the troops in an organised manner; we couldn't do it in barracks. But
2 for the most part there were training grounds close to the garrison.
3 They would have two or three training grounds. And each of those would
4 have one shooting range.
5 Q. Thank you. I take it you're not aware that there were
6 discussions at the General Staff level concerning that in which
7 General Dimitrijevic suggested that this was not a genuine training
8 exercise but a provocation of the -- by the VJ of the KLA, and there were
9 discussions involving the Joint Command and Mr. Sainovic's role in using
10 VJ units? Did you know about that?
11 A. I did. But I would like to clear something up, and I feel this
12 is very important. Since the arrival of the OSCE Mission up until the
13 end of the year, and I'm referring to 1998, there were 500 instances of
14 attacks on representatives of the Ministry of the Interior and civilians.
15 And as of May 1st -- as of January 1st and up until the beginning of the
16 aggression, there were 652 instances.
17 Now, the claim that the army was the one who actually engaged in
18 provocations, that's untrue, because the army had no intention of
19 provoking the Albanian terrorist forces unless they were conducting an
21 Q. I'm sorry to interrupt. I'm running out of time. And the point
22 I was inquiring about was whether you were aware that there had been
23 discussions at the General Staff level of concerns about Mr. Sainovic's
24 role, a civilian, in using or having an influence on how VJ units were
1 I just -- two or three more areas to cover with you, General, and
2 then I will be done. This is regarding the subordination order from
3 General Ojdanic. And I had a question.
4 MR. HANNIS: If he we could look first at P887.
5 Q. You see that one? It has a 3rd Army command number at the top,
6 872-94/2. It's dated the 19th of April. But the text of it seemed to be
7 basically just General Ojdanic's order from the Supreme Command staff.
8 Was this just simply forwarded on to the 3rd Army forward command post
9 and the Pristina Corps? There seems to be no other information other
10 than just General Ojdanic's order.
11 A. Well, I think this is perfectly clear, this is an order by
12 General Ojdanic issued to the commander of the 3rd Army and then he is
13 drafting his own order and forwarding it to General Lazarevic, so they
14 should approximately be the same. He is not allowed to change it. If a
15 commander of the General Staff issued an order, then he would re-issue a
16 similar order to the commander of the 3rd Army, and then he can actually
17 expand it and make it more precise for the units in the ground.
18 Q. The question I'm -- the point I'm trying to get at has to do with
19 the numbering. I see this is 872-94/2 which, as I understand the system,
20 would indicate this is like the second document related to that specific
21 topic. And it's dated the 19th of April. If you could look next at
22 D204, and this is a document dated the 20th of April. It appears that
23 you were the author by the initials. And we see General Pavkovic's
24 signature and stamp. And it bears the number 872-94/1.
25 So I am confused. This seems to have the lower number indicating
1 it was done earlier, and yet it's sent apparently a day later. Can you
2 explain that?
3 A. I have to refer back to the number of the document. So it's
4 872-94. Could I just see the number of the first -- the original
6 Q. Let me give you a hard copy of both of them so you can look at
7 them side by side. Thank you.
8 A. Well, I answered this question yesterday. So we have a situation
9 General Pavkovic held on to this telegram. He kept it for himself. And
10 that is why it appears as if this first order was signed and then only
11 subsequently filed. In other words, the person who was on duty at the
12 command post first filed this, and then once he had done that probably
13 General Pavkovic came up to him and asked him to also file this document
14 that he was working on.
15 So what happened is, he was probably unable to make -- enter this
16 correction because then he would have to scratch everything out and also
17 he would have to stamp those scratches. So we can see based on this that
18 there is an order, then there is a response from the army commander, and
19 an order that he had drafted in connection with the order received from
20 the General Staff. Yes, there was an error in the order in which these
21 documents were filed.
22 Q. Okay. From looking at those two documents, are you able to
23 determine when you at the 3rd Army received General Ojdanic's order? Is
24 there any information on there that would indicate when it came in, what
25 date, what time?
1 A. Do you mean the resubordination order?
2 Q. Yes.
3 A. Well, I've already said that this order arrived before 1730 hours
4 on the 18th of April. It is certain that it arrived before that
5 dead-line. How much earlier we can establish on this basis of this
6 document that was received, the incoming stamp which says 1640 hours.
7 I've just noticed that now, that it was received at this time. So what
8 we have here is the General Pavkovic, after an hour later practically, he
9 called the MUP organs and told them that an order had been received on
10 their resubordination.
11 And yesterday I explained why this was done -- why he did this on
12 the 19th, because he probably kept this document for himself and then it
13 was subsequently filed. So we can see on the basis of this stamp - and
14 there cannot be any error here - where we see this incoming stamp which
15 says it was received at 1640 hours.
16 Q. And let me be clear, if I understand your prior testimony, was
17 the meeting that you and Pavkovic and Lazarevic then had with Djordjevic,
18 Lukic, and Obrad Stevanovic the same day or the following day?
19 A. As far as I can recall, it was on the same day. I did not
20 receive that document, but I think it was -- it must have been on that
21 same day because I don't think that General Pavkovic - and I know him
22 well - I don't think that he would have waited until the next day to
23 provide this information.
24 But I can see now on this incoming stamp that the time noted
25 there is 1640 which actually confirms what I said, the meeting was about
1 5.30, 1730, which was, in other words, about an hour after the document
2 was received. Because the incoming stamp, the code system that is used,
3 it would note even the minute when the -- when a telegram arrives. Had
4 it been 1642 minutes, it would have said so in the document there.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I don't have any other question for
7 the witness. Thank you.
8 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Hannis.
9 Questioned by the Court:
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: General, I would like to ask you something about
11 certain irregularities you mentioned yesterday. It's on page 44 of the
12 transcript of yesterday. In the 3rd Army command, you discussed certain
13 irregularities in conducting combat operations, and you were asked if
14 these informations you received from units, would you have to refer this
15 to the higher, to your superiors. And you answered, Yes, this had to be
16 done on the basis of the corps units and independent units.
17 That sounds that these have been the rules and the regulations.
18 Do you remember if at any stage these such reports were received by
19 your -- by you or by your colleagues about irregularities in the field?
20 A. When I testified both on this occasion and last year, I talked
21 about our having received a report from the commanders of the 125th and
22 549th Brigades, that there were certain problems in implementing these
23 decisions because the competent organs of the civilian police units had
24 not received an order from the MUP staff which had been coordinated at
25 the Joint Command, this cooperation. So as long as the police units did
1 not receive approval from General Lukic that they could conduct combat
2 operations together with the army regardless of the army commanders'
3 decision, those operations were not conducted. And in my view, that was
4 the greatest error that was made because that cooperation had not taken
5 effect and it did not work in practice.
6 Although, I can state that it wasn't really that the police units
7 refused to participate. Rather, they were just waiting for an order from
8 the MUP staff to arrive, and once that happened, there were no problems
9 of that kind anymore.
10 As for irregularities in the field, I can only deduce that from
11 some information that we received from time to time, but not in the sense
12 that this was a major problem. What I assume is that the brigade
13 commanders and the lower level commanders were probably better acquainted
14 with the problems in the fields. I could only analyse the situation
15 within units based on their reports, and based on those I would propose
16 to General Pavkovic what measures to take and send to lower commands.
17 Now, there were some reports, there was -- I found a report, for
18 instance, about two Albanian civilians having been killed in Kosovo Polje
19 by three members of the 37th Motorised Brigade who had come to Kosovo
20 Polje from Srbica and killed those people. And the command was informed
21 of this incident, measures were taken, the general ordered
22 Colonel Stojanovic to apprehend these men, arrest them. They -- an
23 investigation was conducted, but I don't know what the outcome was. In
24 other words, an investigation was conducted into their actions.
25 The same is true regarding the incident with the killings in
1 Lipljani, and of course I'm just talking about the incidents that --
2 where there was army involvement, because I couldn't speak about any
3 reports with the MUP.
4 Now, had they been subordinated to us, then we would have
5 received reports from them in the same way that we received reports from
6 the 125th, 549th, and 15 Brigades. Simply put, we did not have any MUP
7 combat reports on their participation because their reports were sent to
8 the MUP staff. That's all that that means. And the MUP staff was the
9 one who then decided how to use MUP units whereas the army role at this
10 time was exclusively to provide support to MUP units. And I've already
11 explained this, I believe.
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Did you receive reports of this kind from units
13 subordinated to you?
14 A. There were reports, regular combat reports, but no. When I
15 learned of some events and incidents that have come to light today, I can
16 see the link; and you have been shown one document here where
17 General Pavkovic, in regular intervals in seven to ten days after a
18 certain stage of combat operations, ordered that a detailed report be
19 submitted on the activities of the army and the MUP on the ground
20 focusing on the execution of combat activities and possible
21 irregularities, if any, or any other deviations from the orders.
22 In those summary reports - because that's what we call them,
23 summary reports - there was no specific knowledge provided by brigade
24 commanders and commanders of independent brigades. And there was a
25 curious case, if you allow me to tell you, in Zegra village when in 1999
1 Colonel Stojanovic informed General Pavkovic that in Zegra one ethnic
2 Albanian family had been liquidated by members of the reserve force of
3 the 175th Infantry Brigade based in Gnjilane. Instantly,
4 General Pavkovic ordered me, Djakovic, we're going to Gnjilane now. I
5 have to replace that brigade commander.
6 I knew the man, this Colonel Petrovic, from earlier on. He was a
7 very decent officer who certainly wouldn't have allowed anything like
8 that to happen if he had any control, but he did not have control because
9 that unit had just been mobilised. And included about 4.000 reservists.
10 And I can understand the man. He was not able to achieve complete
11 control at all levels within just a few days. So General Pavkovic
12 immediately replaced the brigade commander and a few other senior
13 officers, and a prosecution was started for this crime. I believe these
14 reservists were convicted and sentenced to several years' imprisonment
15 for the killing of civilians in Zegra village. That's the information I
16 had and the command had as well.
17 Now, in all other matters, I know that the corps command and the
18 army command did take measures. We reacted to every report. There must
19 have been deviations from orders, but commanders were not always apprised
20 of everything and were not always able to take steps.
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much, General.
22 JUDGE PARKER: General, that concludes the questions for you.
23 I'm pleased to be able to tell you that you may now continue with your
24 ordinary activities and you are no longer required here for further
25 questions. We thank you for your attendance and the assistance that
1 you've given us, and a Court Officer will assist you when we rise.
2 We now adjourn, and we'll resume at 20 minutes to 12.00.
3 [The witness withdrew]
4 --- Recess taken at 11.06 a.m.
5 --- On resuming at 11.44 a.m.
6 JUDGE PARKER: You stand for a reason, Mr. Djurdjic?
7 Is there a procedural matter, Ms. Kravetz?
8 MS. KRAVETZ: Yes, Your Honour. I have two matters. The first
9 one is an oral application to add some exhibits to our exhibit list.
10 These are 65 ter 05346 and two zeroes 5350. They are five US KDOM
11 reports. Four of them are dated December 1998 and relate to events in
12 the area of Podujevo. The fifth one is dated January 1999 and it relates
13 to events in the village of Racak that month. These reports are
14 contemporaneous reports prepared by the US KDOM and relate directly to
15 the evidence that this witness will be providing regarding these two
16 events, so we seek to add them as we -- it is our position that these
17 documents will assist the Chamber in understanding the witness's evidence
18 on these matters.
19 These exhibits have already been disclosed to the Defence both in
20 English and B/C/S. They -- we became aware of their availability as
21 public documents on Monday when the witness came for proofing. In
22 discussions with him, he informed us that all US KDOM reports from that
23 period are now available publicly in the US Department of State website.
24 Previously these documents had been classified documents and were
25 US Rule 70 documents.
1 I should point out these quite specific reports, these five
2 reports, had not been provided to us in the past. So they are new
3 documents for us as well. And we have alerted the Defence to the fact
4 that all this documentation is available on the website in the event that
5 there may be also Rule 68 material in these reports that may be of
6 interest to them.
7 That is my application, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
9 Mr. Djurdjic.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. The
11 Defence is aware of everything that Ms. Kravetz presented, and we have no
12 objection to these five documents that she proposed.
13 We have another problem. It's a huge batch of documents and the
14 Defence has not had enough time to go through all of them, especially
15 since many of them are in English. We have to have them translated.
16 And, if necessary, I should like to have your permission to tender some
17 documents ourselves if the Prosecution does not have any objection. And
18 since we have very little time, we would appreciate it if we could start
19 our cross-examination tomorrow.
20 JUDGE PARKER: You haven't indicated the nature of these
21 additional documents. I'm still leaping with you in your mind. First
22 you say, We've got a big problem because we've been given a large number
23 of documents therefore we want to add more documents. Now, I'm a little
24 breathless keeping up with your mental process there.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this Monday we were
1 given notification that confidentiality has been lifted from
2 State Department documents regarding KDOM reports, the US KDOM reports
3 from 1998 and 1999. Ms. Kravetz selected five documents she wants to use
4 relevant to the topics covered by this witness, and we have no objection
5 to these. I believe I'm clear now.
6 But since there is a large number of documents that have been
7 made public now, we did not have enough time to go through all of those,
8 and some of them we would certainly like to use. And we have had no time
9 to put them on the list yet. That's all I meant. And, of course, it is
10 Ms. Kravetz's agreement that we are seeking. This was not actually an
11 application to the Chamber.
12 JUDGE PARKER: We'll take things in stages. Firstly, your motion
13 to add the five documents to the list is granted. We will watch the time
14 today with a point is reached or not whether it will be necessary to
15 decide whether cross-examination should be delayed. And that too then
16 will assist us with the further question of your own documents. But we
17 appreciate your difficulty.
18 Are we ready now for the witness, Ms. Kravetz?
19 MS. KRAVETZ: I do have another matter, Your Honour. As
20 Your Honours are aware, there will be a government representative in the
21 courtroom today during the testimony of this witness. We just wanted to
22 inquire with the Court regarding contact, if we are allowed to have
23 contact with this US
24 This was not made clear in the Chamber's decision, and I understand from
25 discussion with this representative, her name is Ms. Karen Johnson that
1 she way want to inform us of matters, if in any issues arises, that may
2 be sensitive, she may want to draw our attention to that so we can alert
3 the Court. So we would just want to receive some guide-lines as to how
4 to proceed in such a situation.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Do you have any objection to the proposal that the
7 matter arises, Mr. Djurdjic?
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I understood that a
9 representative of the US
10 that could pose a risk to confidentiality. And it's the American
11 government that insisted on his [sic] presence here. What is important
12 to me is that in view of the fact that confidentiality has been lifted
13 from these facts and documents and these statements had been originally
14 taken under Rule 70, I'm not sure whether the restrictions still stand on
15 these topics. I thought it was up to the Trial Chamber to make the
16 ultimate decisions whether a question falls within these topics and
17 whether an answer is required regardless of what the US representative
18 may insist on, correct me if I'm wrong.
19 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic, the topics identified in the Annex A
20 to our decision still apply. The decision which has made available to
21 the public certain written records, which have now been provided to you
22 apparently, is not one which alters the decision we have made about
23 subjects that can be considered. The sole issue at the moment is whether
24 the representative who is here of the provider may speak to the
25 Prosecution if there is a concern that something the Prosecution wishes
1 to do or is doing is leading into some area of difficulty. Ms. Kravetz
2 is being careful to ensure that she doesn't upset you or us.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Well, I understand that's why the
4 representative of the government is here, and even if he [sic] is opposed
5 to something, the Chamber will decide whether that falls within a certain
6 topic or not, and the same will apply to me.
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE PARKER: In the Chamber's view, Ms. Kravetz, it would be
9 preferable if the representative of the government were able to speak
10 with the witness; and the witness as a consequence if there's objection
11 to providing information or answering a question, may then make that
12 objection and that it would be preferable in the course of evidence if
13 there was not any communication between the representative of the
14 government and prosecuting counsel.
15 MS. KRAVETZ: That's fine with us, Your Honour. I would just
16 request that once the representative comes in the courtroom, she be
17 informed that this is the procedure to be followed during this testimony.
18 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. And it's Ms. Johnson.
19 MS. KRAVETZ: Karen Johnson, yes.
20 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
21 MS. KRAVETZ: So, Your Honours, the next witness is
22 Mr. Shaun Byrnes.
23 [The witness takes the stand]
24 JUDGE PARKER: Good afternoon, Mr. Byrnes. Would you please read
25 aloud the affirmation which is shown to you now.
1 Would you please read aloud the affirmation which is shown to you
2 now, Mr. Byrnes.
3 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
4 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. Please sit down.
6 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE PARKER: Now, I understand that with you pursuant to our
8 earlier order is Ms. Johnson as a representative of the government.
9 Could I indicate, Ms. Johnson, to assist you, that your role is one which
10 may probably best be conducted initially by you having conversation with
11 the witness if some issue arises which concerns you. If there is
12 objection to a question or something that is proposed, the witness should
13 make that objection and you, of course, could consult with him before
14 that occurs. Whether or not it will be necessary for any further
15 submission about the matter, will depend on the circumstances. So if you
16 would confine yourself to consultations with the witness and not, for
17 example, with prosecuting counsel, I hope that will prove satisfactory.
18 MS JOHNSON: Thank you, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE PARKER: Now, Mr. Byrnes, I believe Ms. Kravetz has some
20 questions for you.
21 MS. KRAVETZ: Thank you, Your Honour.
22 WITNESS: SHAUN BYRNES
23 Examination by Ms. Kravetz:
24 Q. Good morning, sir, could you please begin by stating your full
25 name for the record.
1 A. My full name is Shaun Michael Byrnes.
2 Q. I understand, Mr. Byrnes, that you are a retired officer from the
3 United States foreign service?
4 A. That's right, yes.
5 Q. In 1998, Mr. Byrnes, did you become involved in the work of a
6 mission known as the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission, also known as
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And, sir, in April of 2007, did you provide testimony before this
10 Tribunal in a case of Milutinovic et al. in relation to your work with
11 the US KDOM mission?
12 A. Yes, I provided testimony in the case of Milutinovic et al.
13 Q. Before coming to court today, did you have the opportunity to go
14 over the transcript of your previous testimony?
15 A. Yes, I did.
16 Q. And having reviewed your testimony, if today you were asked the
17 same questions that you were asked during the course of your testimony in
18 that case, would you provide the same answers?
19 A. Yes, I would.
20 MS. KRAVETZ: Your Honours, I seek to tender this transcript. I
21 understand that it's been assigned a provisional exhibit number of P1214.
22 We would like it to be tendered under this exhibit number as a public
23 exhibit. I wish to point out that there are some sections of this
24 transcript which used to be under private -- or were initially private
25 session due to a later order of the Milutinovic Chamber in relation to
1 this transcript; the confidentiality with respect to those portions on
2 the transcript was lifted. So we are tendering the whole of the
3 transcript as a public exhibit.
4 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. The transcript will be received as an
6 Your electric personality is creating some problems, Mr. Byrnes.
7 THE WITNESS: My personality, Your Honours, has never before been
8 described as electric, but I think proper measures have been taken, sir.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
10 MS. KRAVETZ: Your Honours, as this witness is a Rule 92 ter
11 witness, I will proceed to read the in-court summary of his evidence.
12 The witness was the head of the United States Kosovo Diplomatic
13 Observer Mission
14 on the role of this mission in Kosovo. He also provides evidence on the
15 structure and chain of command of the VJ and MUP in Kosovo in 1998
16 and 1999.
17 During his tenure in Kosovo, Mr. Byrnes had meetings with the
18 heads of sections of the VJ and the MUP and provides evidence on these
19 meetings. He also speaks about the engagement of VJ and MUP units in
20 operations in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999.
21 The witness recounts instances when he raised complaints with
22 MUP general Lukic and other officials regarding the conduct of the MUP
23 units during these operations.
24 In October 1998, the witness led the negotiations with the MUP to
25 agree on specific actions to be taken by FRY and Serbian forces to comply
1 with UN Security Council Resolution 1199. He describes his negotiations
2 and indicates that General Djordjevic chaired for the Serbian side.
3 The witness also provides evidence on the Podujevo incident in
4 December 1998 and on the Racak incident in January 1999.
5 That is the end of the in-court summary.
6 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
7 MS. KRAVETZ:
8 Q. Mr. Byrnes, you had told us at the start of your testimony that
9 you were involved in the work of the mission known as KDOM. Could you
10 tell us -- could you please first start by explaining to the Chamber how
11 it is that you became involved in the work of that mission?
12 A. I was asked by Washington
13 willing to leave my current position as political minister councillor at
14 our embassy in Rome
15 recently agreed on. Washington
16 background in Yugoslav and Balkan affairs. I had proper rank, and I was
17 close. And so I agreed to do so.
18 Q. And when did you begin your work with this mission?
19 A. I believe I landed in Belgrade
20 day or two of orientation at our embassy there and which involved also
21 meeting with a number of Serbian officials, I arrived in Pristina,
22 Kosovo, on, I believe, the 12th of August and took command our
23 Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission
24 Q. What was your mandate and what did your role entail of the
1 A. Our mandate was to provide accurate and objective information
2 about what was occurring on the ground in Kosovo. This information was
3 to be provided to Washington
4 embassy in Belgrade
5 Q. You told us that you arrived in Kosovo on 12th of August in
6 Pristina specifically. Just very briefly, can you describe what was the
7 situation on the ground in Kosovo at the time when you arrived there?
8 A. We were looking at an increasingly violent insurgency on the
9 ground in Kosovo.
10 Q. Can you elaborate. Exactly what was happening at the time? Why
11 did Washington
12 A. If I may, let me -- let me add a little bit of context. Our
13 mission grew out of an agreement made in mid-June in Moscow by
14 Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic and then-president of the
15 Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin. The agreement was intended by the
16 Russians, I think, to try to head off another western intervention a la
17 1995 in Bosnia
18 between Albanian separatists and Serb security forces which was leading
19 to the deaths of people on both sides, it was leading to increasing
20 numbers of displaced persons, mostly Albanians but not always Albanians,
21 and it was leading to growing western press attention which rest again a
22 western intervention.
23 The agreement provided for foreign observation, the hope was that
24 this would lead to a diminishing of the violence and therefore provide
25 time to seek a political solution. The violence, nevertheless, continued
1 to grow. And my recollection -- I don't have the dates unfortunately,
2 our special envoy for the Balkans, Richard Holbrooke, travelled to
4 try to find a way of bringing this to a stop.
5 They agreed at that point that the international community should
6 be permitted to establish formal diplomatic observation missions.
7 Holbrooke certainly knew that western embassies, the interested
8 embassies, particularly the United States, Great Britain, France,
10 ground in Kosovo on a sustained basis. In other words, they lacked the
11 resources to make a difference. And they agreed therefore, to the
12 establishment of three diplomatic observer mission: One would be
13 American which I headed, a second would be a mission of the
14 European Union, and the third was a Russian mission. That's what brought
15 me there.
16 Overall, our instructions were, again, to provide accurate,
17 objective information on what was occurring. I think the hope was that
18 by doing so pressure would be brought on both parties to restrain
19 themselves. I think the ultimate objective was to buy time, to put the
20 conflict, if you will, on hold and buy time so that a negotiated mutually
21 acceptable political resolution could be found.
22 I hope that answers your question.
23 Q. Yes, thank you for that. Now, you have referred to the existence
24 of three diplomatic observer missions. Was there any difference between
25 these missions, the other two missions, and US KDOM; or did all three
1 missions carry out the same type of mandate that you've described?
2 A. We all tried to carry out the same mission. The American mission
3 had an advantage in that it was larger, it had more resources. The
4 Russian mission never -- never was very large. I think at maximum it
5 contained about five or six officers, and they lacked off-the-road
6 vehicles. You needed off-the-road vehicles to work in areas where
7 conflict was occurring. But we worked very closely. We -- the
8 American -- the US KDOM worked very very closely with the EU counterpart
9 and the Russian KDOM.
10 I would add that the EU KDOM actually preceded the establishment
11 of the KDOMs. The European Commission had established a monitoring
12 mission in Kosovo in, I believe, April. And they had some 10 or 12 or 15
13 officers and vehicles on the spot. That -- it was headed by an
14 Englishman. That EU monitoring mission or EC monitoring mission was
15 simply renamed the EU KDOM and then they added additional resources to is
17 Q. By 12 August when you arrived in Pristina, was the US KDOM
18 already functioning and operating, or did you get there to set it up, to
19 carry out this task of setting it up?
20 A. Yes, the European Union KDOM mission, I think that was your
21 question, was already operating.
22 Q. I was asking about the US
23 A. I'm sorry, I misunderstood. Yes, the US KDOM -- the core of our
24 mission had been established a couple of weeks earlier. We had a very
25 small group of people, we had three or four off-the-road vehicles, and
1 yes we were operating.
2 Q. You have told us that your mandate was to provide accurate and
3 objective information, how did you go about obtaining such information
4 and carrying out this mandate?
5 A. We -- we ran daily patrols with our off-the-road vehicles into
6 those parts of Kosovo where either there was ongoing conflict or we had
7 reason to believe that there might be conflict. Are -- we had -- at that
8 point we had three or four teams. Our teams consisted of two American
9 officers and a local national interpreter. Local nationals were either
10 Serb or Albanian. But in either instance, they had to be fluent in both
11 languages. And that was not -- that was not a difficult condition for us
12 to fulfill.
13 So what we would do was we would usually launch our missions 8.00
14 in the morning, they would go to areas that we believed needed to be
15 watched, where we might make a difference by getting in between the
16 conflicting forces, and they would stay in those areas until nightfall.
17 We were under instructions to be back at base by nightfall. Washington
18 and Brussels
19 We would stay in those areas, talk to people, collect information
20 about what was going on, collect information about the humanitarian
21 situation, about displaced people, that sort of thing. And then we would
22 come back in, we would meet -- I would meet with the patrol leaders who
23 would submit brief written reports, and then I or one of my other
24 colleagues would put a report together which we faxed on a daily basis,
25 usually late in the evening, to our embassy in Belgrade which then send
1 it to Washington
2 Let me add that in this connection we worked very closely with
3 the EU. Particularly in the beginning when both sides had limited
4 resources and there seemed to be quite a bit of tension and even conflict
5 occurring in Kosovo. I would meet every evening with my counterpart, an
6 Englishman named Nicholas Turnbull; we would share our reporting from
7 that day's activities, and we would discuss our expectations of what was
8 likely to happen on the next day. And then we would divide up, because
9 neither of us had enough people or enough vehicles to be everywhere. So
10 we would, on a priority basis, decide where we would send our people, so
11 we would avoid overlap.
12 Q. How would you obtain information of areas where there was ongoing
13 conflict or that you thought should be particularly monitored?
14 A. Generally from our observation during the day, police movements,
15 army movements, the International Red Cross had a mission there. UNHCR
16 had a mission there. They were running teams into the field on -- for
17 humanitarian purposes. We worked -- we stayed in touch with them. They
18 would often tell us about build-ups of troops or villages being burned or
19 that sort of thing.
20 And we would often receive information from Albanian sources.
21 People would call from villages wherever and say -- and tell us that
22 there was a build-up of Serbian security forces in their area, and they
23 were worried about what might happen the next day. So these were the
24 basic sources of our information.
25 Q. And did you personally also participate in this sort of daily
1 patrols as your mission was carrying on?
2 A. I did, but not every day. My rule of thumb was to go out twice a
3 week. I felt it was important to do so so that I had a -- at least
4 somewhat of a feel for what was going on in the field. And it was also a
5 way, of course, of evaluating how my people were working, what were they
6 doing, were they doing what they should have been, were they collecting,
7 were they talking to the right kind of people. That sort of thing.
8 Primarily it was so that I had a feel -- I was dealing with our
9 ambassador in Belgrade
10 didn't want to have -- I didn't want to deal with them on the basis of
11 second-hand information from my people. I wanted to have some personal
13 Q. And when you were not on the field participating in these
14 patrols, where were you based?
15 A. We were based in a suburb of Pristina called Kosovo Polje perhaps
16 6 kilometres south-west of Pristina.
17 Q. You spoke very briefly earlier about daily reports that you would
18 compile and send to Washington
19 you tell us what sort of information would normally be included in these
20 daily reports that your mission compiled?
21 A. The daily reports began with a general summary of the situation
22 in the province of Kosovo
23 conflict situations, where we'd observe conflict, and briefly what had
24 ensued. Then there was also a section, there was a humanitarian section
25 which dealt with displaced persons. That information came both from our
1 teams in the field who would come back and say, for example, Village of X
2 had been attacked or subject to pressure from Serbian security forces,
3 the population had left, the population was 1800 people, nobody is there
4 now. That sort of thing.
5 We also included information we received from the ICRC and UNHCR
6 which, again, had teams in the field monitoring humanitarian situation.
8 Q. So would any important events that occurred during a specific day
9 which -- regarding which you would obtain information, would these be
10 always included in the daily reports that you would send to Washington
11 and Brussels
12 A. Yes. If we were aware of them.
13 Q. Now, during your work with the mission, did you have any contacts
14 with local Serb authorities?
15 A. Yes, I did. I had considerable contact with them.
16 Q. Did you have any contact with officials from the MUP?
17 A. Yes, I did.
18 Q. Who specifically were you in contact with?
19 A. My primary point of contact as chief of US KDOM was
20 General Sreten Lukic who was the -- was in charge of the Serbian police
21 forces in Kosovo. I -- because General Lukic was periodically absent in
23 don't recall what his first name was. And then on a fairly regular
24 basis, I would see the chief of the Kosovo Polje police department, his
25 headquarters was down the street from where our, if you will,
1 headquarters was established. He was good friends with the two Serbian
2 brothers who owned the building we were in. It was a motel which had
3 been converted into a sort of dormitory. And he was often down there for
4 dinner. I got to know him, we talked. We had actually -- we had a very
5 cooperative relationship with him.
6 Those were the Serbian police officials that I would see
7 regularly in Pristina. Of course, I -- when I made trips into the field,
8 I often had contact with Serbian police officers there and I had some
9 contact with the Serbian police officials when I was in Belgrade.
10 Q. You mentioned that your primary point of contact was
11 General Lukic. How frequently would you have meetings with
12 General Lukic?
13 A. Very frequently. Often -- often daily. On some occasions when
14 there was something serious going on, I would see him more than once a
16 He -- let me add. He often would call me and ask me to come and
17 see him. Most of the time I would -- it was at my request.
18 Q. And what was the nature of these meetings with General Lukic,
19 what sort of topics would you discuss?
20 A. Well, the primary nature of the meetings was to discuss the
21 security situation in the province and MUP compliance with the -- later
22 on with the -- what we called the October Agreements. I would also use
23 these meetings to raise objections or bring to his attention what we
24 considered were unaccept -- from our standpoint unacceptable behaviour on
25 the part of the Serbian police. And what I have in mind here is when
1 villages were attacked, the inhabitants driven out and the villages
2 burned after -- they were usually burned after the homes had been looted.
3 That sort of thing.
4 Q. Now, you referred to meetings prior to the October Agreements and
5 after the October Agreements were signed. These specific issues that you
6 have just mentioned to attacks on villages and inhabitants being driven
7 out, were these the subject of your meetings during which of the two
8 periods or throughout the period there both before and after the October
9 Agreements were signed?
10 A. The discussion of police behaviour was -- for the most part
11 occurred prior to the October Agreements. The reason for that is that
12 the October Agreements led to the establishment of OSCE's
13 Kosovo Verification Mission which once it was stood up assumed the
14 responsibilities that had originally been those of the KDOMs. And
15 therefore the responsibility for dealing with compliance issues passed
16 from Nick Turnbull, Sergey Lavrov, and myself, to William Walker and his
17 staff at OSCE KVM.
18 Q. Thank you. I don't want to get into this topic in too much
19 detail as it has already been addressed in your previous testimony. But
20 just going back to your previous answer when you mentioned that you would
21 raise complaints regarding behaviour that you considered unacceptable of
22 the -- on the part of the Serbian police. When you would raise these
23 complaints with General Lukic, what was generally his reaction to the
24 issues that you were bringing to his attention?
25 A. General Lukic generally rebuffed the complaints and my
1 recollection was often attributed the actions his security forces had
2 taken as the consequence of engagement with the KLA.
3 Q. And when you were out in the field during this period, and I'm
4 speaking specifically about the period prior to the October Agreements,
5 what sort of MUP units did you observe in the field, if any?
6 A. We saw -- we saw police units that were manning check-points on
7 the roads, and they -- from our contact with these police they were --
8 they seemed -- my impression was they were regular Serbian police
9 officers, for the most part seconded to Kosovo for 30 days, 30 days
10 assignment, then they would return to their home city Kraljevo or Beograd
11 or Novi Sad
12 We also saw what we call the PJP which is Special Police, and
13 they were dressed -- they were dressed differently and they appeared to
14 be in an organised unit such as a military unit. In my previous
15 testimony, I described them as light infantry, and that was our clear
16 impression. These were not individual policemen put together to man a
17 check-point or a roadblock. They were a coherent unit, had light
18 infantry weapons including armoured cars, light anti-aircraft guns, heavy
19 machine-guns, that sort of thing. They seemed to be in short a, at
20 least, quasi-military formation.
21 Q. And were the tasks that you saw these PJP units performing in the
22 field, was that at all different or -- from that of just regular police
24 A. Yes. My impression was that regular police officers served in
25 effect in control functions, check-points, they provided security on the
1 streets of Pristina and other large cities.
2 The PJP units were used in, let's just say, anti-insurgency
3 operations. They were used in combat operations.
4 Q. During your daily patrols or your routine patrols, did you have
5 the opportunity of seeing PJP units in action?
6 A. On one occasion which I related in my previous testimony, I saw a
7 PJ unit which had just completed an operation in a village between the
8 small town of Kijevo which was west of Pristina. And it was -- this
9 village was located midway I think midway on a road running from Kijevo
10 to the town of Malisevo
11 Q. And when you say they had just completed an operation, what
12 exactly were you able to observe taking place?
13 A. What I clearly still recall seeing in my mind's eye was arriving
14 with a team at the edge of the village which was in flames. There was
15 no -- there were no hostilities that we were aware of underway. We heard
16 no sounds of gun-fire. There were a number of blue MUP buses parked at
17 the edge of the village along with blue MUP trucks and several armoured
18 personnel -- basically armoured scout cars. And what I remember is the
19 MUP troops, if you will, with their weapons, coming out of the village
20 and getting on to the buses and preparing to leave.
21 Q. And in what condition was the village after these units had left?
22 A. The village was in flames.
23 Q. Were you able to observe whether there was any civilian
24 population in the village or the surrounding areas at the time?
25 A. We -- other than the Serbian police, we saw nobody else.
1 Q. Did you bring this specific incident that you were able to
2 observe to the attention of General Lukic?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And what was his explanation of what was taking place there, or
5 did he provide any explanation?
6 A. To be honest, this was neither the first nor the last time I
7 brought such incidents to his attention. This was a more personal
8 intervention on my part because I had seen it with my own eyes, but to be
9 frank, I do not remember precisely what he said in response.
10 Q. And just a last question on this topic. When you would bring
11 issues like this to the attention of Mr. Lukic, would you later observe
12 any change in the actions of MUP units in the field, or would they just
13 continue carrying out the same type of operations? Did you perceive your
14 complaints as having any effect on what was going on on the ground?
15 A. My recollection, frankly, is no. And may I add a little comment
17 Q. Yes, of course.
18 A. And that is, I quickly learned after arrival that with the MUP,
19 not with the Yugoslav army, but with the MUP, our missions were playing
20 basic cat and mouse games. Let me illustrate it with one quick anecdote.
21 We initially ran missions Monday through Friday, and we would
22 stand down on Saturday and Sunday to service our vehicles and just to
23 give our stressed staff a break. We learned -- we learned very quickly
24 that Yugoslav security -- or the Serbian security forces would often go
25 to a low level of activity particularly towards the end of the week but
1 then on Saturday and Sunday when we were not in the field they would go
2 back into high gear and we would get reports from various sources that
3 things were happening. Villages were being attacked or whatever.
4 So Nick Turnbull and I decided we would run missions seven days a
5 week and so we - as would make sense - we set up a schedule so we could
6 still service our vehicles. And that seemed to change things a little
7 bit, but it was very interesting and very challenging.
8 Q. Thank you for that. I want to move forward in time a bit to
9 October 1998. You have mentioned the October Agreements. Did you have
10 any involvement in negotiations that took place in October 1998 in
13 A. You are referring, madam, to the 24, 25, October talks in
15 Q. I am specifically.
16 A. I was present -- I was present at those primarily in an expert
17 capacity. The negotiations in effect involved two Working Groups. One
18 which was headed by General Clark, and dealt with the regime under which
19 the Serbian Yugoslav army, we called it the VJ, Vojska Yugoslavia, the
20 regime under which the VJ would work once this agreement came into
22 The second Working Group dealt with the regime under which the
23 Serbian police would work once the agreement came into effect. And on
24 our side -- the -- our head of delegation was General Naumann a German
25 was head at that time of the NATO Military Committee and who had
1 accompanied General Clark to Belgrade
2 effect as his advisor.
3 Q. How is it that you became involved in these negotiations in
5 A. I was asked by General Clark and by Ambassador Holbrooke to
6 participate because they wanted somebody on their team who had good
7 knowledge of the situation on the ground in Kosovo.
8 Q. And what was the purpose of these negotiations?
9 A. The fundamental purpose of the negotiations was to stop the
10 fighting and save lives. Secondary purpose was to allow for what we
11 estimated to be about 200-, 250.000 displaced persons to return to their
12 homes before the harsh winter set in. There was very great concern in
13 New York
14 capitals and in Washington
15 the fighting continued.
16 Q. Now, who from the Serbian police was -- participated in these
17 negotiations in this second Working Group that you yourself was involved
19 A. I did not know all of the participants, but the officers that
20 participated that I did know and recognised were General Djordjevic,
21 General Lukic, General Stevanovic, and Colonel Mijatovic who was General
22 Lukic's deputy was also present.
23 Q. Now, you have already spoken about General Lukic and
24 General Mijatovic. At the time, what did you understand to be
25 General Djordjevic's position within the MUP?
1 A. General Djordjevic was the deputy minister of interior
2 responsible for the -- for Serbia
3 deputy minister responsible for the police.
4 Q. And what about General Stevanovic?
5 A. General Stevanovic?
6 Q. Stevanovic.
7 A. Stevanovic was a deputy to General Djordjevic. My understanding
8 when I arrived in Kosovo in August of 1998 was that he was the senior
9 police official directly responsible for Kosovo. In other words -- and
10 General Lukic was his deputy on the ground in Pristina. But at some
11 point in the autumn, Lukic became formally responsible, he was the
12 Serbian police commander in Pristina, in Kosovo. And General Stevanovic
13 remained in Belgrade
14 perfectly honest, never completely understood what his responsibilities
15 were at that point.
16 Q. And what did you understand to be the relationship between
17 General Djordjevic and General Lukic? What was --
18 A. Well, General Lukic was clearly General Djordjevic's subordinate
19 and he reported to him.
20 Q. During the conduct of these negotiations, what was the role of
21 General Lukic? Did he have any specific role in the negotiations?
22 A. General Lukic participated in the negotiations, but I do not
23 recall him participating actively --
24 Q. I'm sorry, I don't know if there was a problem with the
25 transcript, maybe, but I said -- I was asking about the role of
1 General Djordjevic?
2 A. Okay.
3 Q. Maybe I misspoke.
4 A. General Djordjevic headed the Serbian team that dealt with the
5 question of the regime the police would operate under in Kosovo once the
6 October Agreement was put into effect. He was in charge of the -- of
7 that working -- Serbian side of that Working Group.
8 Q. And for how long did these negotiations last?
9 A. They ran for a day and most of the next -- most of the ensuing
11 Q. And what was the -- what were the main points that you were
12 negotiating about? What was the substance of the negotiations you were
13 having with the MUP during this day and a half?
14 A. Basically we were negotiating definition of terms.
15 Q. Specifically what are you referring to?
16 A. What constituted a check-point, what constituted a -- even what
17 constituted a road because if you look at the document, at least what I
18 recall from that is - and I think this is in the document - the Serbian
19 police were to be restricted to patrolling certain types of road, but
20 they weren't -- the operational aspects. How do you implement the
21 agreement. What are the rights, if you will, of the Serbian police under
22 the terms of the agreement.
23 We were trying to define them as precisely as we could so as to
24 avoid problems of ambiguity which could lead to conflict and disagreement
25 in the field.
1 Q. Now, you've told us that General Djordjevic headed the Serbian
2 MUP team. Were these points that you are referring to now issues that
3 you were negotiating directly with him, or were you negotiating with one
4 of the other members who were present there?
5 A. No, General Djordjevic was the lead negotiator. What I recall is
6 General Lukic would very occasionally be involved or say something, but
7 General Djordjevic was clearly in charge.
8 MS. KRAVETZ: I would like to have at this stage Exhibit P836 up
9 on the screen.
10 Q. This document will appear on the screen before you, Mr. Byrnes.
11 Do you have the document there?
12 A. Yes, I do.
13 Q. Do you recognise this document?
14 A. Yes, I do.
15 Q. Can you explain to us what it is?
16 A. This is the document that was agreed at the end of these
17 negotiations. This was the product, if you will, of the negotiations.
18 It's an understanding between KDOM and the Ministry of Interior regarding
19 the regime under which the Serbian security -- Serbian police in Kosovo
20 would operate following the -- under the terms of the October Agreement.
21 Q. Now, we see that the document is signed by
22 Colonel-General Djordjevic and also by you. Why is it that you are the
23 person who signed for KDOM?
24 A. General Clark and General Naumann wanted me to sign it because I
25 was on the ground. General Naumann had negotiated this primarily, but he
1 was not on the ground, he was in Brussels
2 wanted me to take responsibility for, in effect, ensuring that this
3 document and this agreement was lived up to. And General Naumann simply
4 could not do that in Brussels
5 Q. So this is why you were the person appointed to sign the
6 agreement with General Djordjevic?
7 A. That's right.
8 Q. I would like to --
9 MS. KRAVETZ: Well, before I continue, Your Honours, I'm not sure
10 when we are taking the next break or if there will be a next break since
11 I know we are sitting on a different schedule today.
12 JUDGE PARKER: We are looking at the times, but I think we
13 probably best use our time by going through in one session to about 1.30,
14 which will be the limit of our tape, and then calling it the day.
15 MS. KRAVETZ: That's fine, Your Honour.
16 Q. Mr. Byrnes, I would like to direct your attention to paragraph 1
17 of the document that's there. We see it refers to the dismantlement of
18 all check-points and it speaks about the establishment of 27 observation
19 points on certain lines of communication.
20 At the time, why was it considered necessary to dismantle all MUP
22 A. To permit displaced persons to return home.
23 Q. And what did you understand to be -- when there's the reference
24 here to 27 observation points, what did you understand what allowed of
25 the MUP, what did you understand these observation points to mean?
1 A. Observation points were not to be check-points. If I may, let me
2 say, check-points were, in effect, I would call them roadblocks. They
3 were physical structures of a temporary nature placed on a road so that a
4 vehicle or an individual travelling that road would have to stop. An
5 observation point was to be precisely that. It was to be a physical
6 structure of some sort. It could be a hole in the ground, if you will,
7 but had to be off the road. The road had to be unobstructed and open to
8 free passage of vehicles and individuals.
9 Q. And during the course of these negotiations, did you have the
10 impression that General Djordjevic was aware or had sufficient
11 information about the areas in Kosovo where MUP units were deployed?
12 A. Yes, I did.
13 Q. And what gave you that impression?
14 A. General Djordjevic demonstrated a very clear knowledge of the
15 facts on the ground in Kosovo. He was clearly a professional. He took
16 his job as deputy -- as head of the police, deputy minister of interior
17 seriously, and he knew down to detail what was going on and where his
18 people were and what they were doing.
19 Q. And was there anything specific that was discussed during these
20 negotiations that gave you that impression, that he had such detail about
21 where his people were and what they were doing?
22 A. Yes. Discussions about locations of observation points, how
23 close to the roads they would be, potential flash-points that he was
24 concerned about. This -- General Djordjevic had -- very frankly, had a
25 professional's command of the facts. He was on top of his brief, and he
1 was a very tough negotiator.
2 Q. And why is that?
3 A. He was on top of his brief. The sort of thing that General Clark
4 and General Naumann was pushing for would, from an objective standpoint,
5 would clearly impede the ability of General Djordjevic's policemen to go
6 after the KLA. This put -- these restrictions were real constraints on
7 the ability of the Serbian police to actively engage the KLA.
8 From his standpoint, he was dealing with an insurgency and I -- I
9 can -- I understand now and I understood then why he would want to defend
10 to the maximum extent or preserve to the maximum extent his flexibility
11 to deal with situations as they might arise. He was a very -- he was
12 very tough in negotiating these issues.
13 Q. While these negotiations were ongoing, were you provided any
14 information by General Djordjevic or by other members of the MUP
15 delegation as to the number of MUP personnel in Kosovo at the time? And
16 we're talking end of October.
17 A. To be very honest, I simply do not remember. During the course
18 of the negotiations, I just don't have a memory of that.
19 Q. Was this discussed at all, the numbers of MUP personnel that
20 would be allowed in Kosovo after the conclusion of this agreement? Was
21 this a matter of discussion?
22 A. It certainly was, and that's reflected in one of the other
23 documents that was agreed, or -- if I can add, there was discussion and
24 agreement on a number of Serbian police that could remain in the province
25 and the number of VJ units and their equipment that could remain in the
2 Q. And during the course of these negotiations at any time did
3 General Djordjevic have to consult with anyone before reaching an
4 agreement with you or the other international negotiators on issues to be
5 included in this agreement?
6 A. I personally never saw him consult outside the room in which we
7 were working. But he did leave the room on a number of occasions. I can
8 only presume that it was for that purpose.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 MS. KRAVETZ: Could we now have Exhibit P837 up on the screen.
11 Q. Do you recognise this document, sir?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And can you tell us briefly what this is.
14 MS. KRAVETZ: Maybe the witness could also be shown the second
15 page of the document in English.
16 THE WITNESS: Basically this was a document reflecting the
17 results of the negotiations held on 24 and 25 October.
18 MS. KRAVETZ: Now, if we could scroll down on the second page to
19 Roman numeral II, paragraph 1, we see that it says:
20 "With these goals in mind the state authorities of the FRY have
21 announced the following measures."
22 And number one says:
23 "Special units deployed to Kosovo after February 1999 [sic] will
24 be withdrawn from Kosovo."
25 Do you recall why the date of February 1999 [sic] was chosen as a
1 date to include in this agreement?
2 A. It was chosen because there was a big build-up of Serbian
3 security forces, the police, and the army after -- in March of 1998.
4 Q. And in your understanding, were special units allowed to
5 remain -- were there any special units that were allowed to remain in
6 Kosovo after the conclusion of this agreement?
7 A. My understanding -- my memory is that the Special Police units
8 were to be withdrawn from Kosovo. But as I look at this document at
9 page 2.1 under Roman numeral II I see the statement:
10 "Combined police/special police strength in Kosovo will be
11 reduced to February 1998 duty level."
12 And that suggests to me that there was a provision allowing the
13 Special Police -- some Special Police to remain in the province provided
14 it was not more than -- their numbers were not more than they were in
15 February 1998.
16 Q. At the time, did you have that information of what the numbers
17 were prior to February 1998? Was this information that was provided to
18 you by the MUP?
19 A. The MUP provided us with information. However, we had no idea
20 whether that was accurate information. We had no clear idea, in my
21 recollection, as to what MUP strength was in February 1998. We simply
22 didn't have a yard-stick.
23 MS. KRAVETZ: Could we go to the next page, top paragraph of the
24 next page in the English, paragraph 2. And in the B/C/S I think we need
25 to remain in the same page.
1 Q. Directing your attention to paragraph 2 it refers to additional
2 heavy weapons or equipment brought into Kosovo or transferred from the VJ
3 to police or Special Police units, and it says that this will be
4 withdrawn from Kosovo, returned to the VJ. Why was it necessary to
5 include such a provision in this agreement, if you recall?
6 A. To enable the police to return to traditional police functions.
7 Q. And was this a specific issue that you were aware of that heavy
8 weapons were being transferred from the VJ to police or Special Police
9 units for their operations? Was this an issue of concern at this time?
10 A. It was indeed because the Special Police units that we observed
11 in the field often had equipment with them, heavy weapons that we did not
12 normally assume a police unit would have. And I'm talking about mortars,
13 I'm talking about armoured -- not only armoured scout cars but armoured
14 personnel carriers and light anti-aircraft weapons mounted on trucks or
15 armoured vehicles. Those are not -- that's not equipment that most
16 observers, I believe, would consider as part and parcel of a police
18 And, of course, our concern was that this equipment was being
19 used against the population. We were anxious to see people return from
20 the fields and the woods and the mountains to their villages and concern
21 was that if they saw police units with this kind of weaponry, they would
22 be much more hesitant about going back to their homes.
23 Q. Was this an issue that was discussed during your negotiations
24 with General Djordjevic or was it discussed in a wider frame?
25 A. It was discussed.
1 Q. And what was the MUP position at the time regarding the use of
2 heavy weaponry and the transfer of heavy weaponry from the VJ to the
3 police, if you recall?
4 A. Well, as the document shows, they agreed to it.
5 Q. They agreed to the withdrawal?
6 A. They signed this document.
7 Q. Okay. Thank you. I would like to direct your attention to
8 paragraph 5. I know you were not involved in the negotiations with the
9 VJ, but we see that here with regard to the VJ there's a reference to all
10 VJ elements remaining in Kosovo or returned to garrison except three
11 company-sized teams. And there are certain lines of communication that
12 are indicated there. Do you have any information as to why these
13 specific lines of communication included in this agreement and why these
14 company-sized teams were allowed to be deployed along these communication
16 A. Yes. In brief, the VJ was permitted to establish these
17 outstations, these deployments, in order to protect key roads through
18 which they were reinforced, supplied, and basically which they travelled.
19 These were roads that from a local perspective had strategic importance.
20 They argued that the KLA, which was armed, threatened them and if these
21 roads were cut off, their units would be isolated. That is the reason
22 they were allowed to establish these deployments.
23 Q. Thank you for that.
24 Now, moving away from the document, after these agreements were
25 concluded, did you return to Kosovo?
1 A. Yes, I did.
2 Q. And what was your role then after the conclusions of these
3 agreements? Did it remain the same as in the earlier months or did it
4 change in any way?
5 A. It changed only in the sense that Nick Turnbull and I,
6 Nick Turnbull of the EU KDOM were designated stand-ins for the new
7 OSCE KVM mission which had been agreed but had to be established. So our
8 responsibilities were to monitor the implementation of the
9 October Agreement until such time as OSCE KVM was in a position to do so.
10 Q. And when you say "monitor the implementation" of the agreements,
11 was your role to deal specifically with the MUP or did you have to deal
12 both with the VJ and the MUP in the monitoring of the compliance of this
14 A. It wasn't just monitoring complaints, it was monitoring the draw
15 down of VJ units and withdrawal of the Special Police, for example, from
16 the province. It was to monitor the full implementation of the
17 agreement. And, yes, we did have to deal with the VJ.
18 Q. Did you have any meetings with General Djordjevic after the
19 conclusion of the agreement that we saw earlier in relation to the
20 compliance of this agreement?
21 A. Frankly, I don't remember precisely. I know -- what I remember
22 is I -- I was a participant in a fairly large meeting in Pristina in
23 which he participated and Ambassador William Walker, who was head of the
24 OSCE KVM mission, and again it was get acquainted, let's go over what our
25 responsibilities are, what our obligations are to one another. I
1 remember that meeting. On our side, Bill Walker was the point man. It
2 must have occurred after the agreement, but unfortunately I can't give
3 you a date. And it was in Pristina.
4 Q. And do you recall who participated at this meeting? You said it
5 was a fairly large meeting in Pristina.
6 A. I remember from our side it was myself, Nicholas Turnbull from
7 the EU KDOM, it was General -- William Walker, his aid
8 Colonel Michael Phillips, the British head of -- the British deputy
9 director, deputy head of KVM OSCE who was deputy head for operations
10 General Drewienkiewicz, those are -- on our side those are faces I
11 remember. On their side: Nikola Sainovic, Veljko Dalovic, who was the
12 prefect for -- basically the head of the Pristina municipality, and
13 General Djordjevic. I honestly can't remember if General Lukic was
14 there, it would make sense that he was, but I don't have a clear
16 Q. You have referred to Nikola Sainovic, what at the time did you
17 understand to be Mr. Sainovic's position?
18 A. Mr. Sainovic was first deputy prime minister and had as part of
19 his duties he had -- he had responsibility for Kosovo. Within the
20 government, he was the point man on Kosovo.
21 Q. Did you have any subsequent contacts with him or was this the
22 only occasion when you met with Mr. Sainovic?
23 A. I had a fair amount of contact with Mr. Sainovic over the months.
24 Q. And generally what was the nature of this meetings you had or
25 contacts you had with Mr. Sainovic?
1 A. It was generally the consequence of problems we had in the field,
2 you might say crises, there were periodic crises. Each time we -- each
3 time we had a crises, for example, the capture of eight VJ soldiers by
4 the KLA, there was a risk that this would provoke serious violence, and
5 that, of course, put at risk the October Agreement and our efforts to
6 calm things down so a political solution could eventually be found.
7 Sainovic was interested from his standpoint trying to find a
8 resolution to crises. And over time, as our relationship developed, he
9 expressed an interest in -- and even meeting privately with KLA leaders
10 in an effort to explore the possibilities of some sort of broader
11 agreement, truce, unfortunately we never were able to get that far.
12 Q. And did you understand Mr. Sainovic at the time to have any sort
13 of authority over the units that were deployed in the field, and I'm
14 speaking about VJ and MUP units. Did understand him to have any
15 authority over these units?
16 A. Only in the sense that Mr. Sainovic represented the political
17 side of the government. I never had the sense that he could personally
18 order the police or the military to do -- to take specific action. But
19 again, let me stress, that's an impression, I was not on the inside, I
20 didn't attend their meetings, I didn't have documents. And my impression
21 is clearly influenced by my own experience as -- I served as a navy
22 officer years ago and then as a foreign service officer, so I'm clearly
23 influenced by the way our system works.
24 Q. And did you perceive him to have any influence on events in the
25 grounds --
1 A. Yeah.
2 Q. -- when you would raise a complaint with him, could he influence
3 what was happening on the ground?
4 A. Absolutely.
5 Q. And how was that?
6 A. The clearest anecdote I can give you is going back to the case of
7 the eight VJ soldiers who were captured. We worked directly with
8 Sainovic to find -- to cut a deal, to find a way to get these people
9 free. The KLA was simply not going to let them go because Bill Walker or
10 Shaun Byrnes or anybody else from the international community went to
11 them and said please let them go. They weren't going do that. So it was
12 with Sainovic that we dealt with an order to put together something, and
13 that something involved basically a prisoner exchange. And he was the
14 guy, he was the fellow that made it happen. He clearly -- clearly he had
15 influence. I don't think General Lukic could have done that. I mean,
16 that was fundamentally a political decision.
17 Q. Thank you. I would like to now move on to a different topic.
18 MS. KRAVETZ: And have Exhibit 05346 up on the screen. If only
19 the English could be displayed for the witness.
20 Q. Do you have the document before you, Mr. Byrnes?
21 A. Yes, I do.
22 Q. Do you recognise this document?
23 A. Yes, I do.
24 Q. Can you tell us what it is.
25 A. This is a copy of the -- one of our daily reports.
1 Q. We see that this is dated December 19th, 1998. I understand from
2 your answer that at the time you were still producing daily reports up
3 until -- at this period you were still producing daily reports?
4 A. Yes, we were.
5 Q. Now, directing your attention to the first paragraph, it refers
6 to fragile cease-fire that came under further pressure as the VJ deployed
7 an armoured battle group to the Podujevo region, and in paragraph 2 of
8 this document --
9 JUDGE PARKER: Excuse me, Ms. Kravetz.
10 Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we received some
12 kind of version of this translation, and for the accused to be able to
13 follow I would like the B/C/S version to be put up. I myself cannot
14 follow very well, although I have it on paper.
15 MS. KRAVETZ: I had only requested for the the English to be
16 displayed for the witness, but of course for the Court -- we can't do
17 that. Okay. That's fine. If we could zoom in then a bit more on the
18 document, second paragraph in the English just so the witness is able to
20 THE WITNESS: That's fine.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I am sorry, if the witness cannot
22 see, well, now that the screen is split, then it's all right with us, you
23 can keep the English version on the screen alone and I'll give the
24 accused the translation on paper.
25 JUDGE PARKER: It's being brought up as much as we can, and I
1 think he should be able to follow it in the Serbian. Thank you.
2 MS. KRAVETZ: And I had asked for the second paragraph of the
3 first page to be displayed, not the second page.
4 Q. Sir, directing your attention to paragraph 2 of this document, we
5 see that it says:
6 "The VJ told KDOM that the armoured battle group which moved into
7 the area of Podujevo early today was a 'training exercise' VJ officials
8 had failed to notify KDOM of the movement, in violation of the Kosovo
9 verification agreement."
10 Do you recall the incident to which this report is referring to
11 in the area of Podujevo?
12 A. Yes, I do.
13 Q. And based on your recollection, what took place there at this
14 time? We are speaking of the period of 19th of December.
15 A. The army moved a company-sized battle group from the Marshal Tito
16 barracks in Pristina to an area east of Podujevo. The convoy included
17 Serbian police and Serbian police vehicles.
18 Q. And how did you become aware of this event, that this was
20 A. We observed it.
21 Q. Okay. Where were your observers at the time? Where were they
22 based when they observed this deployment?
23 A. I don't remember precise locations, but what I can tell you is
24 that OSCE KVM maintained observation posts in proximity to the entrance
25 and egress points of the Yugoslav army's bases or garrisons. So they
1 monitored, as they were required to and permitted to under the agreement,
2 they monitored the movement in and out of garrison of VJ movements -- VJ
4 Later on after this battle group had moved into position in the
5 Podujevo area, I placed one of our vehicles right at the gate of the
6 encampment that they established. So we kept very close eye on them.
7 Q. And did anyone within the KDOM or KVM at the time contact VJ
8 officers to find out what was happening, why this deployment was
10 A. Yes, they did. Let me stress here that KVM -- OSCE KVM was up
11 and operating by this time and they had taken over responsibility for
12 dealing with the Serbian authorities in Kosovo on implementation issues.
13 So they dealt specifically, officially, and formally with the Serbian
15 My recollection is that Bill Walker sent General Drewienkiewicz
16 to deal with his counterpart on this specific incident and Drewienkiewicz
17 stayed in touch with this fellow. It may have been General Loncar, I
18 can't recall directly. But Drewienkiewicz was in direct contact with his
19 Serbian counterpart throughout the period in which this incident
21 Q. And we see from the document that the VJ -- the information
22 received from -- by KDOM from the VJ was said that this was a training
23 exercise. And it's put in quotes in the document, is there a reason for
25 A. Because that's a direct quote; that's what they told us when we
1 asked them about it.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 MS. KRAVETZ: Your Honours, I seek to tender this document at
4 this stage. It's 05346.
5 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01246.
7 MS. KRAVETZ: If we could now have 05347 up on the screen. If we
8 could zoom in on paragraphs 1 and 2 on the first page.
9 Q. Sir, we see that this is another daily report. It's dated
10 December 20th, 1998
11 in paragraph 1 there's a reference to KDOM and KVM monitoring the
12 activities of the VJ armoured battle group undertaking a training
13 exercise near Podujevo; and in paragraph 2, there's a reference to the
14 continued deployment and an indication of the type of vehicles and
15 personnel deployed, and the last sentence says "the group's exercise
16 include sending heavily armed patrols along the Podujevo-Pristina road."
17 Now, at the time, this is the day after you had been told that
18 this was a training exercise, when these deployments were observed by
19 your observers, were you still under the impression that the VJ was
20 deploying these units to the area to conduct training or did you have any
21 information as to what was happening?
22 A. Our very distinct impression at the time was that this was not an
23 exercise and that it was being done to protect the most strategic road
24 linking Kosovo with Serbia
25 to cross the border into Serbia
1 the headquarters of the -- I believe it was the Yugoslav 3rd Army.
2 That's where -- and I would add that parallel to the road ran a
3 rail line, the only major rail line running into Kosovo. On those two
4 communications links depended the Serbian security forces supplies and of
5 course other things. These roads and this railroad were important for
6 the movement of civilians and commerce and trade. So it was very
7 important to Belgrade
8 The road had come under increasing pressure from the KLA in the
9 area. I don't know if that's reflected in this report, I don't recall,
10 but the KLA commander in the Lap region was very aggressive, was not
11 particularly interested in fulfilling the terms of the October Agreement
12 to which of course the KLA was not party. Our job and then Bill Walker's
13 job in large part had been to sell this agreement to the KLA, to get them
14 to play by the agreement's rules. This fellow had begun to move his
15 troops closer to the road and there had been incidents along the road in
16 the period leading up to this.
17 In short, this was the response of the Yugoslav -- of the Serbian
18 security forces. This was a critical strategic link and they had -- they
19 had to defend it. They had to keep it open.
20 Q. Now, we saw earlier when we were looking at one of the agreements
21 signed in October that company-sized teams were authorised along certain
22 lines of communication. Was the Pristina-Nis road --
23 Podujevo-Pristina-Nis road included? I mean, were units allowed to be
24 deployed along that axis?
25 A. No, it was not. I've looked at the documents to prepare for
1 this, and it was not included. And I have to say ten years later or 11
2 years later, I have to wonder about that omission.
3 I don't have any information on that because that -- those
4 deployments and the regime which governed the behaviour, if you will, of
5 the Serbian army was negotiated by the other Working Group led by
6 General Clark. I wasn't party to it. And we were up all night
7 negotiating these documents after which Slobodan Milosevic treated us to
8 a brunch and then everybody got on airplanes and left. I'm sorry for
9 being long-winded, but I just don't know. I -- from a strategic
10 standpoint, I don't understand why the Serbian army wasn't allowed to
11 have a battle group up there to protect a strategic -- clearly the most
12 important strategic line of communication. I don't know.
13 Q. Thank you for that.
14 MS. KRAVETZ: I see, Your Honours, that it's already 1.30.
15 Before we break, I would like to tender this document, 05347.
16 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01247.
18 MS. KRAVETZ: This is a convenient time to interrupt,
19 Your Honour.
20 JUDGE PARKER: We have run out of the time we can run on our
21 tapes, Mr. Byrnes, and we must adjourn although it's a quarter of an hour
22 before our normal time as we've had a disrupted programme today. We
23 resume this trial tomorrow at 9.00, and we would ask that you be back for
24 that. The Court Officer will assist you with any further details that
25 you need in the interim. And no doubt Ms. Johnson with you.
1 So we adjourn now and resume tomorrow morning at 9.00.
2 [The witness stands down]
3 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.31 p.m.
4 to be reconvened on Friday, the 21st day
5 of August, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.