1 Wednesday, 2 September 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
5 [The witness entered court]
6 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning. Please sit down.
7 I'd remind you that the affirmation you made to tell the truth
8 still applies.
9 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
10 JUDGE PARKER: And Mr. Djurdjic is continuing.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
12 WITNESS: MICHAEL PHILLIPS [Resumed]
13 Cross-examination by Mr. Djurdjic: [Continued]
14 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, sir, Colonel.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yesterday we were working with
16 Exhibit P835, so could we please have it on the screens.
17 Could we have item 5 of the English version, or rather, Roman I,
18 subparagraph 5, that's on the first page.
19 Q. Colonel, please take a look at subparagraph 5 of this agreement.
20 Tell us, were you aware of this provision when you arrived at your post?
21 A. I was, yes.
22 Q. You will agree with me then that until the KVM was established,
23 KDOM was supposed to act in place of the verification mission, and then
24 the verification mission would take it over once it was up and running;
1 A. What I knew about KDOM and its activities was that I was informed
2 that we would at some point absorb the KDOM into KVM, and that was as to
3 the extent of my knowledge with regard to what KDOM's purpose was. I
4 didn't what they did in the field. I didn't know who all their team was,
5 how many they were.
6 Q. That wasn't really what my question was aiming at. All I was
7 asking was that this transition period, so before the KVM was
8 established, the KDOM was supposed to act in their place according to
9 this agreement, and as we know this agreement was signed on the
10 16th of October, 1998.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now have
12 Roman numeral II, that's the next page of the English version.
13 Q. Please take a look at subparagraph 1 of Roman II, Colonel.
14 A. Okay.
15 Q. Colonel, this subparagraph 1 stipulates that your basic task is
16 to actually verify whether there's compliance with Resolution 1199, but
17 this last sentence, "these reports will also be provided to the
18 authorities of the FRY," could you tell me please how did you go about
19 this relating to this particular aspect?
20 A. I do not recall how those reports found their way to the
21 Government of the FRY, I just don't recall how that happened.
22 Q. Thank you. Did you have occasion to see a single report that was
23 sent by KVM to the FRY in the period while you were in Kosovo in the
24 course of 1998 and 1999, and have you had occasion to see it in -- during
25 any of the proceedings where you testified here before this Court?
1 A. I just don't recall. I don't remember.
2 Q. Would you agree with me that KVM then did not comply with its
3 obligation arising from this subparagraph 1 of item 2 and did not provide
4 reports to the authorities of the FRY?
5 A. I can't answer that or agree with you on that because I don't
6 know if the mission provided those reports, either some, all, or sporadic
7 reports to the government. I just don't know.
8 Q. Do you remember whether you reported to OSCE and the
9 Security Council, in other words, the Permanent Council of the OSCE and
10 the Security Council?
11 A. I am aware of that, we did report noncompliance issues to the
12 Permanent Council, yes.
13 Q. Who did?
14 A. Ambassador Walker typically would do that when he would address
15 the Permanent Council periodically verbally, and then there were also
16 reports that were sent down, I believe they went to Mr. Krasnai in the
17 Permanent Council of the OSCE in Vienna
18 Q. Thank you.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please scroll up the
20 English version to see item 3 of this agreement.
21 Q. Would you agree with me, Colonel, that this item, Roman III,
22 provides for the special mandates for the KVM, and under 1 we see that
23 there should be verifications whether cease-fire is being complied with.
24 That is its main function.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we scroll down the English
1 version so we can see the subparagraph 1 of Roman III. From what I can
2 see on the screens right now, the Colonel cannot really see the entire
4 Yes, so this is where it starts and now, please, let's have the
5 next page.
6 Q. Would you agree with me that this is a special mandate, a
7 verification whether there's compliance with cease-fire agreements?
8 A. Yes, sir.
9 Q. Please now take a look at subparagraph 2. Am I correct, Colonel,
10 that the FRY had the obligation to inform on the movement of its forces
11 in the course of the previous week to inform these KVM headquarters?
12 A. That was our understanding. That was the intent, yes.
13 Q. In other words, this relates to the preceding week, and it is
14 supposed to inform on the movements and where they were. Did you receive
15 these reports on the preceding week movements?
16 A. Not always, no, sir.
17 Q. Did you seek information from the Vienna Secretariat? Did they
18 receive reports from the FRY authorities relating to the compliance with
19 the agreement which were sent to the Vienna Secretariat?
20 A. I can't speak or have knowledge of what the Secretariat in Vienna
21 received or didn't receive. I don't have any insight on that.
22 Q. Are you aware that the KVM headquarters received daily reports
23 from the MUP -- from the Pristina MUP staff on all events from the
24 previous day?
25 A. I'm aware that KVM headquarters received some reports. Those
1 reports were not always accurate. For example, can I -- may I elaborate
2 a bit on that, Your Honour?
3 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
4 THE WITNESS: We would get information that there would be a MUP
5 movement at 9.00, and in fact the movement took place at 6.30. So the
6 timing and the coordination was not always accurate, and we had a
7 terrible time linking our KVM up with the MUP. And the MUP would always
8 give us a reason why they had to depart earlier or later, but it
9 prohibited us from either accompanying them or following them and
10 sometimes we would arrive in the village even after the fact and they'd
11 already departed. So the reporting that you refer to here was not always
12 accurate, and I could also tell you that it was not a regular occurrence,
13 it didn't happen as a matter of routine.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Well, first of all, Colonel, you're talking about daily reports
16 or daily reporting that is not really stipulated by this agreement in
17 subparagraph 2. What we've seen in this subparagraph 2 is that the
18 reports were supposed to be weekly for the preceding week, but here it
19 says that the director of the verification mission and the staff may be
20 invited to accompany or escort the police within Kosovo. So the
21 headquarters director or head was supposed to ask for this under
22 subparagraph 2 of this agreement.
23 A. Okay.
24 Q. But what you've just said a few moments ago, perhaps you received
25 with some delay on the same day that there would be police movements; in
1 other words, much earlier than the week -- dead-line of a week that is
2 provided for by this subparagraph 2. Would you agree with me?
3 A. Okay, I can agree that there was a delay on receiving the
4 movements of the MUP or even the VJ, but I would tell you that often what
5 we did receive wasn't accurate.
6 Q. And how did you verify the accuracy of the information provided?
7 Did you verify this by receiving information from some Albanian from the
8 field and then you compared it to the report or did you do it in some
9 other way?
10 A. No, when we did get the reports from our MUP liaison officer who
11 was working with the MUP, often the KVM mission would go to a village
12 that we were -- had understanding that the MUP was going to visit, and
13 either they didn't arrive or they went to a different village. On
14 occasion, the reports would be accurate and the coordination would be
15 good and the KVM would meet up with the MUP as established, but it was
16 not something that we could rely on in all cases.
17 Q. Thank you, Colonel. Would you take a look at subparagraph 3 now,
19 Would you agree with me that MUP on the basis of subparagraph 3
20 was entitled to set up check-points, traffic check-points, and
21 check-points in order to prevent crime?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Thank you. Only if those check-points were set up for some other
24 purpose did they have the responsibility to inform the KVM, or rather,
25 the KVM was entitled to ask for an explanation; is that what this
1 subparagraph provides for?
2 A. I did not write this document. I can assume that that was the
3 intent of that particular paragraph.
4 Q. Thank you. Would you now take a look at subparagraph 4.
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Colonel, sir, am I correct in saying that the verification
7 mission did not have the right to control the activities of the border
8 control units of the FRY in the swath of land 5 kilometres from the
9 border at the time when this agreement was reached under this
10 subparagraph 4?
11 A. I would agree that the KVM did not have the authority to control
12 that border area.
13 Q. Thank you, Colonel. But at the request of the verification
14 mission and approval from the border unit, the KVM could also visit those
15 areas; correct?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Thank you. Would you agree with me that there were
18 misunderstandings where verifiers wanted to go and verify or actually
19 inspect border units without submitting previous requests to that effect?
20 A. There were many misunderstandings and complications at the border
21 area for transit of our vehicles, but I'm not sure and I don't recall
22 those misunderstandings, why they resulted, or whether or not the KVM
23 mission that was responsible for that particular job had sent requests to
24 the FRY for access at the border areas. I just don't recall.
25 Q. Colonel, sir, perhaps I wasn't clear enough. This
1 paragraph - and all I'm asking about now is the inspections of the border
2 units of Yugoslavia
3 inspections without having previously submitted a request for these
4 inspections, and frequently it was the case that these verifiers would
5 just show up there without having submitted the prior request and then
6 they were denied this request and this is what actually led to
8 A. I have no reason to dispute that.
9 Q. Thank you. Please take a look at subparagraph 5 now. Again this
10 has to do with escorts.
11 Am I correct in saying that the verification mission could submit
12 a request to accompany police units in Kosovo as they performed their
13 normal policing roles or at the invitation of the MUP that they could do
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 Have you ever seen -- did you ever see a request from the
18 verification mission, not necessarily from the headquarters but perhaps
19 also from a coordination centre, so did you ever see a request for
20 accompanying police units as they performed their duties?
21 A. I never saw a request, but they typically wouldn't come through
22 my office anyway whether they were formal or informal. We would hear
23 about requests at our staff meeting, that they were submitted, but never
24 saw them.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please see the next
2 page of the English version, under Roman IV, subparagraph 2.
3 Q. Colonel, sir, would you agree with me that this agreement
4 provides for 2.000 unarmed verifiers?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Tell us, please, what is the basis then -- what is the basis
7 for -- for the procurement of weapons for securing the mission, because
8 as a mission, as a verifying mission, you were not actually allowed to be
9 armed. Would you agree with me that such a request was actually a
10 request to alter the terms of this agreement?
11 A. I think that you're misrepresenting what the original request was
12 of the OSCE for weapons. We requested weapons for body-guards for
13 Ambassador Walker, not for the entire mission, so we were talking only
14 about two or three men that would be armed to provide the security for
15 Ambassador Walker. We were not talking about nor we ever requested that
16 the entire mission be armed.
17 Q. Colonel, sir, I thought you actually read through the entire
18 subparagraph 2. It says:
19 "2.000 unarmed verifiers ..." including the staff
20 "... headquarters and support staff ..."
21 And if the body-guards of Ambassador Walker's are support staff,
22 even they would not be entitled to carrying arms under this subparagraph?
23 A. I don't disagree with that. I will tell you that
24 Ambassador Walker personally asked for personal security based on
25 incidents that we had confronted once we arrived in Kosovo.
1 Q. I absolutely agree, but I'd like to ask you this: I see that you
2 cooperated or worked together mostly with Mr. Sainovic, Mr. Loncar, and
3 other representatives of the cooperation mission. Do you know whether
4 any steps were taken with the presiding officer of the OSCE or its
5 Secretariat to propose to the FRY government to change or amend the
6 agreement of the 16th of October, so as to enable certain members of the
7 KVM to carry arms?
8 A. I don't have any knowledge of what the Secretariat did with that
9 information. We requested to them what the need was for the body-guards
10 to be armed for Ambassador Walker. Whether they went through formal
11 channels with the FRY government I don't know. I know that we levied
12 that request to Mr. Sainovic, and he took that request forward to see if
13 he could assist us in meeting that request.
14 Q. Colonel, would you agree that this agreement in its unchanged
15 form remained valid all the way until the 20th of March, 1999, when you
16 left Kosovo?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Thank you. Another thing, since I see that this was the topic of
19 much discussion and waste of time, and that is the issue of helicopters.
20 Does this agreement foresee at all that the verification mission have any
22 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I would just like to put an objection
23 on the record that the commentary about a "waste of time" is
24 inappropriate in the question.
25 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Hannis, but it washes over us. Don't be
2 Carry on, please, Mr. Djurdjic.
3 THE WITNESS: Could you repeat the question again, sir.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Yes, without the "waste of time" part. Do you agree that the
6 agreement did not foresee for the verification mission to have its own
7 helicopters for medical purposes?
8 A. I would agree.
9 Q. Thank you. I won't waste any time any further. But while we're
10 still on the topic, although we will go through another two documents for
11 which DZ said they were the Bible of the verification mission, but let's
12 skip ahead for the time being. Do you agree with me that you were
13 completely in the dark as to how to perform the operation of verification
14 based on all the documents we have seen?
15 A. No, I wouldn't agree with that comment.
16 Q. What would be your position in terms of applying the documents we
17 just saw? What was your understanding of them?
18 A. Those documents are truly a foundation for what the KVM mission
19 would be based on. Once the mission stood up, the requirements for the
20 safety of our people was a top priority for Ambassador Walker. And the
21 reason that we requested the helicopter, a medical helicopter, from the
22 Swiss was purely for evacuating potential KVM members that were wounded.
23 So I look at this as a foundational document that we would on occasion
24 ask assistance with.
25 Q. Thank you, Colonel. It seems we were speaking at cross-purposes.
1 I may have jumped the gun a bit, but let's go to P387 next and perhaps
2 then I'll rephrase this question and put another one that I had in mind.
3 Colonel, we have a document of the 25th of October, 1998. In the
4 preamble we see the position of the FRY government which was attached to
5 the communique and the military representatives were informed. The basis
6 of this document is actually the communique itself, the press release,
7 hence I'd like to move forward to the next page. Let's have a look at
8 Roman numeral II, sub-items 1, 2, 3, and 4.
9 Colonel, you must have been acquainted with these provisions
10 during your verification mission in Kosovo and Metohija; is that correct?
11 Sorry, I don't mean the data contained therein as such, but the
12 provisions in general.
13 A. I would agree with that, that our mission had this information.
14 Q. I'm not discussing the information strictly speaking, but simply
15 whether you had any general knowledge of this statement and its items.
16 Were you familiar with it in the course of verification?
17 A. I don't recall precisely, but I don't have any reason to dispute
18 it. I mean, it wouldn't make -- it would be logical to me that we would
19 be aware of this document.
20 Q. This is one of the basic documents for the verification, by
21 virtue of which the FRY government undertook certain obligations to
22 reduce the levels of police units in Kosovo to the level as it was in
23 February 1998; also they obliged that they would not use any calibres
24 larger than 12.7 millimetres; and that the army will withdraw all
25 equipment that was introduced into Kosovo after February. Were you
1 familiar with that?
2 A. I can't say that I was familiar with it personally. I didn't --
3 I don't recall this document. I'm sure it was an underpinning and a
4 foundational document for how the mission stood up, but I'm -- I can't
5 give you any specifics about what I knew or didn't know about what I'm
6 reading here.
7 Q. What I read out to you was supposed to be the task of the
8 verification mission, to check whether it was complied with. Let me ask
9 you this: Everything you have been telling us is what you heard from
10 other people because you really did not have a clue what the true task of
11 the verification mission was. Is that correct?
12 A. No, I would disagree with not having a clue of what the mission
14 Q. I apologise, I may have been a bit rough, but given the role you
15 had as the Chief of Staff you simply noted down what others heard and
16 said without going into the essence of the matters involved and the -- to
17 the heart of the issue of verification?
18 A. My role, as I previously testified, as the Chief of Staff was
19 initially to set the mission up, and we did that for about six weeks,
20 until we got into the operational aspects of the mission in December.
21 These documents of verification that you have shown me were in the hands
22 of our operational head of mission director, General DZ, and he was
23 responsible for ensuring that the verification was taking place within
24 the boundaries of the documents that were provided.
25 For me to have detailed knowledge of it, I certainly may have in
1 the early part of the mission, but I don't recall all the documents and
2 the scope of the documents that you provided me and how they were applied
3 in the mission. We were aware of the boundaries, we were aware of the
4 mandates, we were aware of the Holbrooke-Milosevic Agreement, we were
5 aware of the 2.000 verifiers, which I would tell you we never did get
6 into Kosovo for a number of reasons. And we were aware that we also had
7 agreements that we could conduct some no-notice inspections, whether that
8 be in barracks, which I think primarily where that was aimed. I can't
9 speak to the border piece of your earlier questions.
10 Q. Witness, these documents, as I told you already, were qualified
11 by DZ as being the Bible of the KVM. Given your function - and I accept
12 what you said - but were you involved in the verification mission only as
13 the Chief of Staff of General Walker, who noted down what others said; or
14 did you take active participation, being familiar with the contents of
15 the documents and providing assessments on non -- of non-compliance and
16 whether something was or was not part of the agreement? Can you try and
17 answer that because that will determine what my follow-up questions will
19 A. Neither myself nor Ambassador Walker acted in the field as true
20 verifiers; that was left to the operations teams and the RC commanders
21 that managed those regions. Our purpose in going into the field was to
22 visit the RC commanders, look at their situations, visit with the people
23 in the villages, observe the activities of the VJ and MUP activities.
24 The verifications were done by the ops teams and they reported back to
25 the RCs and back to the OSCE headquarters.
1 Q. Colonel, it seems you misunderstand me. I accept everything you
2 have said so far, but I want to ask you this: A decision as to whether
3 there was a non-compliance or not and a decision to report such
4 non-compliance to certain bodies of this OSCE, that decision was made by
5 Mr. Walker and his associates and all of them had to be acquainted with
6 the provisions of the agreement we have been discussing. I'm asking you
7 this: Did you merely take notes during the meetings, noting down what
8 others heard about the events, or did you actively participate in the
9 decision-making process of whether there was or was not a non-compliance
10 issue? That is why I want to know this because that will determine
11 whether I will continue going through these documents with you or not .
12 A. I took the note --
13 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours -- I'm sorry.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Hannis.
15 MR. HANNIS: -- I would object. I think this has been asked and
17 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
18 Carry on, please, Mr. Djurdjic.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Colonel, could you please answer.
21 A. I --
22 Q. Did you only keep records of what others said, noting down their
23 opinions, or did you participate in the making of decisions as to whether
24 something amounted to an instance of non-compliance or not?
25 A. I did not participate in making decisions on issues of
1 non-compliance or not.
2 Q. Thank you, Colonel. Yesterday on several occasions you said that
3 the Army of Yugoslavia or the MUP violated or were in breach of the
4 agreement. Were you simply conveying what you heard from others during
5 the meetings with Mr. Walker or was that actually your position?
6 A. Those were the positions of Ambassador Walker and General DZ.
7 Q. Thank you. Let me ask you this: Did you know under what
8 conditions these agreements, the February agreements, came to being?
9 A. I'm not sure I understand your question. What do you mean
11 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I have a question. I'm not sure which
12 February agreements we're talking about. Can we refer the witness to a
13 specific document?
14 JUDGE PARKER: You could help me as well, Mr. Djurdjic. What
15 February agreements?
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It should have been October
17 Agreements rather than February agreements. So what were the conditions
18 in which these October Agreements came into being in 1998.
19 Q. Let's simplify things. Colonel, we have the agreement on
20 verification, then this agreement, and the Milosevic-Byrnes Agreement of
21 the 25th October. Do you know what the situation was in the background
22 of these agreements in terms of the political situation which resulted in
23 all of them being signed?
24 A. I didn't participate in the writing of any of those documents, so
25 I don't know what the backgrounds were before I came on board with the
2 Q. Were you familiar with the fact that NATO issued an
3 Activation Order to bomb the FRY in October 1998?
4 A. I can't recall whether I was aware of that or not.
5 Q. During your mandate there, did you know that the decision to bomb
6 was stayed, but that there was always a possibility that in case of
7 non-compliance NATO would re-activate that Activation Order to actually
8 bomb the FRY?
9 A. It's really beyond the scope of my knowledge of what NATO would
10 do or wouldn't do. We were there to form a mission. The decisions NATO
11 made were clearly out of my hands. I don't know what was happening in
12 the North Atlantic Council with regard to that decision.
13 Q. What I'm telling you about did not take place within NATO. It
14 was a fact which existed throughout your mission. All reports and
15 controls of yours --
16 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I --
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] -- were to the effect to the -- to
18 determine whether the agreement was complied with or not --
19 MR. HANNIS: I would --
20 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. -- excuse me, Mr. Hannis.
21 Mr. Djurdjic, you are there in a position of giving evidence,
22 which we've discussed before. You are not putting to the witness whether
23 something was the situation; you are asserting it was and making that, as
24 I understand it, the basis for asking the witness something further.
25 Now, if you want to establish a foundation from the witness, you will
1 need to get him to tell you what that position was and then proceed from
2 there. And he may tell you he didn't know enough about those things to
3 be able to help you, judging from what he said so far.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
5 Q. Colonel, why was KDOM supposed to perform its mission to carry
6 out verification until the KVM was set up? Are you familiar with that?
7 A. I have no knowledge of what the political reasons were for why
8 KDOM was to establish its key mission, but my feeling and opinion is is
9 that KDOM was to remain in place until the KVM was operational and
10 functioning on its own, at which time we would absorb the KDOM capability
11 into the KVM mission.
12 Q. Thank you. Although you were not acquainted with the October
13 Agreements in detail, but once you became a member of the KVM did you
14 know that there were dead-lines before which the FRY was supposed to meet
15 the obligations undertaken under the October Agreements?
16 A. You know, I don't -- I just don't recall from memory what, if
17 any, dead-lines were required of us. I knew we had reporting dead-lines.
18 I knew we had -- our ops people were going through verification
19 compliance -- non-compliance documents in detail, learning those. But I
20 do not -- I don't have a memory for what you're asking there.
21 Q. I don't know whether you're misunderstanding me or not. I'm not
22 talking about your verification mission. I showed you the agreement.
23 Before the KVM was set up and before it became operational, verification
24 issues were supposed to be carried out by the KDOM. Are you familiar
25 with that?
1 A. I'm not familiar what documents KDOM was operating under, no. I
2 don't know what KDOM's mission was when I got there, and only learned of
3 what it was doing shortly after arrival. What precisely is your question
4 of me?
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we have P835 on the screen,
7 Q. Colonel, sir, on page 1, Roman numeral I, sub-item 5, could you
8 please read out loud.
9 A. "KDOM will act in" --
10 MR. HANNIS: I'm sorry, Your Honour. We've already looked at
11 this paragraph. I don't know why we need him to read it.
12 JUDGE PARKER: Is there something new you need to put from this
13 paragraph, Mr. Djurdjic?
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] That seems to be the question I'm
15 putting that the colonel cannot understand. I wanted to jog his memory.
16 I asked him three times and did not receive an answer. The gist of my
17 question is as follows: Was he familiar with this once he assumed his
18 duties, the thing envisaged by sub-para 5, that is to say that KDOM will
19 act in place of the KVM until it is set up. That is the question and I
20 do not seem to be able to receive an answer to that.
21 JUDGE PARKER: I'm sorry, I thought you had the answer more than
22 once and it is crystal clear, that he did not know anything of the
23 details of the functioning and purpose of KDOM until arrival. Shortly
24 after the arrival he learned of the essence of KDOM and that he learnt
25 that it and understood that it would be absorbed into KVM when KVM was
1 fully operational.
2 Is that a summary of what you've said so far?
3 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
4 JUDGE PARKER: That's his position. You're wanting to ask, I
5 suspect, Mr. Djurdjic: What was the purpose being fulfilled by KDOM
6 which KVM took over, was it the same purpose? I think you're trying to
7 get to why all this verification was occurring, and the problem is this
8 witness may not be the right one. You or your colleague have asked
9 earlier witnesses who may have known more about that, but if I correctly
10 guess what it is that you're aiming toward, that may help you to frame a
11 question or two.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Witness, am I right in saying that KDOM, until KVM became
14 operational, carried out verification?
15 A. I have never read the KDOM execution orders on what it was that
16 they were doing. I never travelled with them on any of their visits. I
17 don't know what KDOM actually did. I don't know if they were to assume
18 the same roles that KVM was about to assume. I don't know if they were
19 just observers. I don't know if they were called verifiers. I don't
20 have an answer for you of what the KDOM mission was.
21 Q. Very well. Thank you. When did the KVM become operational?
22 A. I would have to tell you that KVM became operational the day that
23 Ambassador Walker set foot on the ground, which would have been roughly
24 4 November; however, having said that, we spent four to six weeks just
25 standing up the mission. And we got into the field for the first time in
1 about December of 1998.
2 Q. Thank you. Does this mean that until December 1998 you did not
3 know what was going on in the field?
4 A. No.
5 Q. Are you aware that KDOM up until -- actually handed over its
6 files up until the take-over by the KVM; and if so, do you know where
7 those files are?
8 A. Yeah, I'm unaware of documents that KDOM gave to our KVM mission.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see exhibit -- or
11 rather document D004-4367. Specifically could we see page 23 of the
12 English version.
13 Q. Well, this is your handwriting, I believe, your handwritten
15 A. Yes, sir.
16 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, if we're going to talk about his notes
17 we need to go into private session.
18 JUDGE PARKER: Are you going into their content?
20 [Private session]
21 THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session, Your Honours.
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I'm confused. I have a typed
23 version. Could we see a typewritten version. This should be an entry
24 for the 25th of November.
25 Your Honours, I apologise, are we now in private session? Can I
1 move on? Thank you.
2 Q. So I have in mind the 25th of November, 1998, that entry.
3 A. I'm sorry, what was your date there, sir?
4 Q. November 25, 1998
5 A. Which Executive Board are you referring to, the Permanent Council
6 or ...?
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we see page 22 of the
9 Ms. O'Leary tells me that this document should be D004-4455,
10 page 22 of the English version.
11 Q. Colonel, let's try to do it this way because this is a very brief
12 entry that I would like you to comment on. This is an entry of
13 November 25th, 1998
14 Executive Board.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] This is not the right document
17 "Italian issues: They're trying to change the nomination.
18 "Call Krasnai - to be in Vienna by Friday.
19 "Where are the Russian representatives?"
20 Is this page 22? Finally we're there.
21 Q. Could you please comment on this final paragraph:
22 "They want Russian in the fusion cell ..."
23 A. From what I can recall, Mr. K rasnai was kind of the point of
24 contact for us in regard to the Permanent Council on what their concerns
25 and desires were, and one of the issues here was the Russian member state
1 wanted to be sure we had a Russian in the fusion cell. The position of
2 the Permanent Council and later Ambassador Walker was because of the
3 nature of the information that would be in the fusion cell, it might be
4 best that it only be NATO members only in the fusion cell. And that was
5 primarily driven by the reason of having imagery to do the verification.
6 The imagery was sensitive and so there was some reluctance to have a
7 Russian in that cell. I believe that was later resolved and, in fact, we
8 did have Russians in the fusion centre.
9 Q. And when was this approximately? Do you recall who it was?
10 A. When was what? The discussion on this? 25 November is the best
11 recollection of date I have based on what's on my notes.
12 Q. Well, I just tagged on to your reply, you said that the Russians
13 later on were in the fusion centre. So my question really was related to
14 that. When did this happen? When were the Russians included in the
15 cell? And do you know the names of the persons who were -- the Russians
16 who were in the fusion cell?
17 A. Unfortunately, I cannot remember the names of the Russians in the
18 fusion cell. I don't know precisely when they entered the fusion centre.
19 I would -- it would just be a guess if I told you and I would say
20 probably late December time-frame, maybe January. I do not know
21 precisely, though.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, during the break I
24 will make sure that the numbers of the documents that I call for are
25 organised, in order, so in the meantime I would like to move on to a
1 different topic and then I will return to this later on. I just want to
2 save time, or would you prefer me -- would you prefer us to take the
3 break now so that I can do this?
4 JUDGE PARKER: I think if you moved on, Mr. Djurdjic.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] All right. Could we then go back
6 to open session, please.
7 JUDGE PARKER: Open.
8 [Open session]
9 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we see D162, Exhibit D162.
11 Q. Colonel, looking at the date here, it would seem to me that you
12 were in the US
14 A. I don't remember precisely, but I did take leave at some point.
15 So no reason to dispute it, I was there.
16 Q. Well, you were for sure, although I see that you don't remember
17 now, but let me try to refresh your memory. I believe you went on leave
18 for New Year's and I believe you returned on the 10th of January, 1999
19 A. Okay.
20 Q. Well, I see that you can't recall that, but it doesn't really
21 matter. Just -- I want to ask you this: Are you aware or were you aware
22 of these press releases while you were away from Pristina or maybe did
23 you learn about them later on?
24 A. I don't remember. I mean, it -- you know, what I looked at when
25 I was leave, where I went when I was on leave, I didn't have a
1 BlackBerry, so I wasn't getting any reporting. So I would tell you that
2 while I was on the leave I was unaware of press reporting that was coming
3 out of the OSCE, so I would have more than likely learned about them when
4 I came back.
5 Q. Well, are you aware of this incident that is reported here in
6 this report?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Do you know that at the same time, maybe even on the same day,
9 there was another patrol that was attacked, a MUP patrol that was
10 attacked in Slivovo, near Stimlje, and that a MUP member was killed?
11 A. I am aware that prior to the 15th of January there were a few
12 incidents where MUP police officers were killed or ambushed by KLA, yes.
13 Q. Thank you. Was Mr. Walker away from Pristina at this time, at
14 the time of this incident, and was he maybe in the US?
15 A. I believe he and I were in the US at the same time, yes.
16 Q. And it seems to me that you spent more time working than having
17 leisure time at this time, do you recall, while you were in Washington
18 A. We made several visits, State Department, Congress,
19 Department of Defence, yes.
20 Q. Could you tell me, why did you spend so much time in
21 Washington, DC
22 of the Kosovo Verification Mission
23 A. Are you assuming that I was holding these meetings independently
24 of Ambassador Walker?
25 Q. No, no. What I said was you were actually accompanying
1 Mr. Walker when he went to attend these meetings, so you were with him at
2 the meetings. And what I'm asking is: Why did Mr. Walker as head of the
3 verification mission, why was he attending all these meetings in the
4 US, in Washington, DC
5 A. Okay, I understand your question now. Whenever Ambassador Walker
6 went back to Washington
7 one, that he was coming home. And in doing so they put together a
8 schedule for him that they wanted him to execute while he was in
10 people wanted to know what was happening in Kosovo. So he would brief
11 what he knew at the time and answer their questions.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please see Exhibit D161.
14 Q. Do you remember this press release?
15 A. I remember the incident, but I don't remember the press release.
16 Q. Yes, and in relation to that incident do you remember that
17 Colonel Ciaglinski was in Decani when this incident occurred, when fire
18 was opened on a KVM patrol on the 15th of January, 1999?
19 A. Okay.
20 Q. Do you remember that KVM headquarters, while you were still in
21 the US
22 on a KVM patrol?
23 A. It would have been a logical event for them to do so. We -- it
24 doesn't surprise me that we issued that.
25 Q. Colonel, do you remember that at this time General DZ was
1 actually standing-in for Ambassador Walker and that Mr. Keller was the
2 chief of the staff of the KVM?
3 A. I don't know that Ambassador Keller ever assumed the
4 Chief of Staff role, but I know that General DZ was assume
5 Ambassador Walker's role in his absence, yes.
6 Q. Colonel, I did not say that he was the Chief of Staff,
7 Mr. Keller, but rather that he stood -- was standing in for Mr. Walker
8 while you were in the United States.
9 MR. HANNIS: Well, Your Honour, I object. I read his question in
10 the transcript. That is what he said. Maybe there was a translation
11 issue, but --
12 JUDGE PARKER: It seems to be a translation issue, Mr. Hannis.
13 The issue seems to be whether you are aware, Colonel, of the
14 activity of Ambassador Keller standing in for Ambassador Walker during
15 Ambassador Walker's absence, if I correctly understand where we've got
17 THE WITNESS: So the -- you're asking me did Ambassador Keller
18 ever assume Ambassador Walker's role or did General DZ ever assume that
19 role? I'm a little confused on what your question for me is.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Well, let me try and simplify the question. While you were away
22 from Pristina over the new year holidays, did Mr. Keller stand in for
23 Mr. Walker as the head of the Pristina headquarters?
24 A. I'm not a hundred per cent certain, but he did on occasion have
25 Mr. Keller perform that role, as did General DZ also would stand in for
1 Ambassador Walker. I'm not sure at that time which one it was. We
2 typically stayed in touch, when we were away, with General DZ.
3 Q. Thank you, Colonel. New, do you remember that Mr. Walker was
4 upset because of the press release of -- by the
5 Kosovo Verification Mission of January 8th, condemning the KLA -- or
6 rather, the press release of the 15th of January, condemning the KLA for
7 the attack on the MUP, on the police, and that there was a phone call
8 where they talked about this being a bit premature. Do you recall that?
9 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, we need some clarification because the
10 press release we were looking at about the 15th appears to be about KLA
11 attacking or wounding KVM officers. And this question talks about a
12 press release regarding attacks on the MUP.
13 JUDGE PARKER: Your question seems to have confused two
14 incidents, one on the 8th and one on the 15th of January, Mr. Djurdjic.
15 Which is it that you're asking about, the first press release?
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I think I've actually
17 confused these two, and I've ended up with the incident of the 21st, but
18 then I also referred to the press release of the 8th of January. And
19 what I was asking is whether the witness remembered that Mr. Walker was
20 angry because of this condemnation, this denouncement in the press
21 release, and that it was premature because it would actually make the
22 work of the KVM more difficult.
23 JUDGE PARKER: This is a question directed to the press release
24 of the 8th of January concerning the wounding of or killing of three MUP
25 officers and the wounding of two more and civilians.
1 THE WITNESS: I'm -- I do not recall the press report in detail,
2 what that was about. But Ambassador Walker, I know, was upset in regards
3 to the KVM verifiers being shot at. He was upset with each event where
4 there was a MUP policeman injured by the KLA, and I remember him saying
5 on several occasions when he would condemn the KLA for the action that
6 this was not helpful for them, to continue this kind of action.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. All right. I think we will return to this later.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I believe this is the
10 right time for a break.
11 JUDGE PARKER: Very well. Now, how are you going for time,
12 Mr. Djurdjic?
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Well, as I said before, I will
14 comply with that. So whatever time I have left I will try and make my
15 questions a bit briefer and I'm sure that we will complete with this
16 witness questioning today.
17 JUDGE PARKER: That I take it is a revised expectation. Last
18 night we were rather given the expectation that you might finish during
19 this first session, so now you see it taking much longer. Is that right?
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Well, we were far more efficient
21 yesterday, and I did not expect that we will take so much time today.
22 JUDGE PARKER: Is it that you will finish during the next
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I will do my best.
25 JUDGE PARKER: We must have our first break now. We will resume
1 at 11.00.
2 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
3 --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.
4 --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Please be seated.
6 Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Could we
8 move into closed session, please.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Private.
10 [Private session]
11 THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session, Your Honours.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D004-4455,
13 page 41. This is not the document. The 29th of November -- yes, this
15 Q. Colonel, could you please comment this entry of yours of the
16 28th -- sorry, the 29th of November. What was the cause of it?
17 JUDGE PARKER: We have on the screen two different documents.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the English document
19 is the right one. This is what I was looking for. The one in Serbian is
20 not correct, but it is not all that important. We actually want to hear
21 it from the witness. In Serbian it is D004-4504. However, it is
23 Q. Could you comment, Colonel, this entry of yours of the
24 29th of November.
25 A. I'm just waiting for the document. There we go.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Please leave the English version
2 now. It is fine.
3 THE WITNESS: This was a note to myself. It was a result of
4 photographs that I had taken on the 27th of November for two Serbian
5 journalists that we had gone out and that were hostages held by the KLA
6 and we had won their release. I took photos of the event. It was really
7 one of the first times that we had gone out into a KLA zone. It was
8 relayed to me that there was an assessment made that I was working for
9 the CIA
10 humorous and just made a note of it really for historical purposes.
11 As I mentioned, it's your introduction, I was not a combat air
12 force pilot, but I spent all my years as an intelligence officer in the
13 air force and -- which is why I found what they said to be understanding
14 but it wasn't exactly true.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would ask for D004-4623, please.
17 Page 2, please, in the English version. D004-4623. It should be the
18 4th of December. In the English page 26. Let's see if the first page is
19 correct. This is fine. Could we next go to page 2, please, that is to
20 say page 27. It mentions the Russian ambassador.
21 Q. Do you see that? I'm interested in the top entry, and then we'll
22 go back to page 26, Colonel.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let's go to page 26, please, in
24 the English.
25 Q. There, Russian ambassador.
1 A. Can you bring it up so I can read it. It's too small a print.
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] The bottom of the page, please.
3 Q. Colonel, "Russian Ambassador continues ..."
4 I'm interested in that part.
5 A. I believe this references Russians in the fusion centre.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we go back to page 27, please,
7 so that you can see the rest of this entry -- but first could we please
8 go to the bottom of page 26 to see whether there was anything else there.
9 Yes, it is the bottom of the page. Okay.
10 Page 27 then.
11 Q. Colonel, what does this mean:
12 "Our lives could be miserable with Russians on the ground"?
13 A. This was frank conversation between Ambassador Walker and
14 discussions with NATO regarding the Russian contingent that was going to
15 join us. As I recall, there were several demands from the Russians about
16 positions that they wanted. Their issues were time-consuming for the
17 mission. And I recall we had issues with alcohol with the Russians, and
18 I think that those were the kinds of things that we were worried about by
19 having a Russian contingent alongside of us.
20 Secondly, there was a concern with the imagery that we had that
21 would be part of the fusion centre and how we would have to work that
22 with a Russian representative in the fusion centre.
23 Q. Thank you, Colonel. This is a conversation with the
24 Secretary-General Mr. Solano on the 4th of December, 1998? Perhaps we
25 should go back to page 26 to see the heading.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Please zoom in for the colonel.
2 Q. Am I right, Colonel?
3 A. Yes, this was the discussion we had with Mr. Solano in his
5 Q. Thank you. At the end of the entry where the Russian ambassador
6 is mentioned it says:
7 "Other confidential information with NATO classification will be
8 forwarded through other channels."
9 That is on page 27 again. The last sub-item at the top of the
10 page, the second one that is.
11 A. I can't speak to that in this environment here.
12 Q. This has to do with the work of the verification mission,
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I don't know how to
15 treat this.
16 JUDGE PARKER: Well, I don't know what it is you're asking. What
17 are you wanting?
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Two things. First, it seems there
19 is some classification of information sent by the KVM only to NATO and
20 through other channels which had nothing to do with the KVM. Which other
21 channels are these and what information did KVM possess that was for NATO
22 only? That was on the 4th of December, 1998. I'm not interested in
23 NATO. I'm interested in the KVM.
24 JUDGE PARKER: Are you able to throw any light on information
25 gathered by KVM?
1 THE WITNESS: The best I could say on the channels was that there
2 was -- this had to do with imagery, so we had a way -- before we went to
3 do a verification on a particular site, we had other evidence that we
4 could look at. The imagery comes from sensitive sources, and that was to
5 be channelled in a different way to the KVM verifiers to look at those
7 MR. HANNIS: And, Your Honour, if I may remind counsel that your
8 order allows Mr. Phillips to decline to answer any questions on the
9 ground of confidentiality where he feels that's necessary.
10 JUDGE PARKER: We have, I think, steered around that, Mr. Hannis,
11 but we will see.
12 Mr. Djurdjic, you've had that answer. Is there any other issue
13 you wish to pursue about this?
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'm not interested in
15 NATO whatsoever. I'm interested in KVM activities. I want the Chamber
16 to get a full picture of what the actual objectivity of the KVM was. I'm
17 not interested in NATO. What am I interested in? Who made such
18 decisions. Who decided which information was NATO-only and was the
19 Secretariat in Vienna
20 officer of the OSCE, and whether all OSCE member states were familiarised
21 with that.
22 JUDGE PARKER: The answer given by the witness suggests this is
23 not information coming from KVM to OSCE, but information provided to KVM
24 to assist them in their function of verification.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, in the document it
2 "Other sensitive information that is NATO-only."
3 That is to say KVM, not NATO information. Who decided that some
4 KVM information can be NATO-only? It says "NATO-only."
5 JUDGE PARKER: I understand this quite differently from you.
6 Information that has come from NATO that is NATO-only, which they saw as
7 having a security implication if shared with some others, would come a
8 different channel and not through the main KVM.
9 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour, that's exactly correct.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Then perhaps the translation I
11 have is wrong:
12 [In English] "... that is NATO-only ..."
13 JUDGE PARKER: Information that is of NATO-only is what I'm
14 reading, not to be shared beyond NATO.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Very well.
16 JUDGE PARKER: You understand what "imagery" is, do you,
17 Mr. Djurdjic?
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I do, but our conclusions seem to
19 differ. In any case, let's move on.
20 Q. Colonel, what other channels were those?
21 A. I can't speak to those channels because they belong to NATO. It
22 was information that NATO would find a way to get to us. We were not
23 producing NATO-classified or restricted material from KVM.
24 Q. I'm not interested in the technical aspect. It means that there
25 were some special channels between NATO and the KVM, separate from all
1 others; is that so?
2 A. I can't speak for NATO, sir.
3 Q. I'm not asking you to. I'm asking you to speak about the KVM.
4 What special channel did you use? Not in the technical sense. Let's
5 skip that.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can I have document D004-4623,
7 page 36 in English. Page 36, I'm interested in the part that says
8 "KVCC" -- yes, "KVCC" - the coordination centre of the verification
10 "This facility will have all information."
11 Q. Do you see that?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Was this within the staff, this facility?
14 A. No, sir.
15 Q. Where was the coordination centre of the KVM?
16 A. This was -- this was in Macedonia
17 The Shoe Factory. Brigadier-General Montgomery was the initial general
18 officer in charge of that facility and it was a NATO facility.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 THE WITNESS: Excuse me, Your Honour.
21 [The witness and US Government counsel confer]
22 THE WITNESS: Sir.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I'd like to address the Court. If
24 you think I shouldn't or that I'm overstepping the boundaries of what was
25 approved, do let me know and I will move on. If there are any problems,
1 perhaps the Presiding Judge should just caution me and then I will filter
2 my questions.
3 JUDGE PARKER: Do understand, Mr. Djurdjic, we know less than you
4 do. We've heard what the witness has said in court. We've heard your
5 questions. We do not know what you are getting at, what you're after,
6 whether that will create a problem or not. So you are ahead of us.
7 At the moment we do not appear to have a problem, but my concern
8 is that you are increasingly straying away from what should be
9 interesting us in this case, what really matters. So if you really see a
10 need to pursue something, we'll hear your questions and if necessary
11 intervene. But it's one thing to see a topic that's interesting because
12 you don't quite know all the answers; it's another thing to see whether
13 that's really going to be important in the hearing of our trial here. I
14 don't see the latter at the moment.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Colonel, sir, within the verification mission and generally
17 within the OSCE, were special links with NATO approved that would exclude
18 other OSCE member states, such as Russia
19 A. What I can say here is we did ask assistance from NATO to provide
20 us a secure link that was honoured. And they gave us a secure telephone,
21 which I had mentioned earlier, and a secure booth to put that telephone
22 in that was accessible only by Ambassador Walker, myself, and General DZ.
23 Q. Thank you. And my question was: Within the OSCE, did you have
24 approval for that? Did you have permission for that from Russia and
25 other states, OSCE states, so that did they approve such links where
1 communications between individuals with NATO were possible?
2 A. The Permanent Council was aware of it, did approve of the link
3 being established, but that doesn't mean that all the member states
4 agreed with it. I think Russia
5 Q. Thank you. You mention that you had access to this, Mr. Walker,
6 and General DZ; correct?
7 A. Yes, that's what I remember.
8 Q. Am I correct in saying that the United States and Great Britain
9 were members of NATO?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Thank you. Thank you, Colonel.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please have
13 D004-4623. In the English version that's page 46.
14 Q. Sir, Colonel, can you see right there under the heading where it
16 "Brief - Nick Turnbull ..."
17 Could you read this to yourself up to "forensic brief."
18 Could you tell me, what was the occasion on December 9 for
19 Mr. Nick Turnbull to brief you on Malisevo and provide this information?
20 A. I believe it was our request to get an understanding of what had
21 happened in Malisevo. It had been a village that had been destroyed and
22 burned and the Albanian inhabitants had left and fled to the mountains,
23 and it was an issue that Ambassador Walker wanted to get a better
24 understanding on what Malisevo was, what it looked like, just a general
25 overview brief.
1 Q. Thank you. But there was a lot of activity by the KVM and
2 Mr. Holbrooke specifically regarding Malisevo in terms of the MUP
3 decreasing their activities, although Malisevo was the centre of this
4 movement. Would you agree with me that a lot of effort was put into
5 reaching some sort of agreement regarding Malisevo?
6 A. There was a tremendous amount of work on Malisevo in terms of
7 bringing back the Albanian population to Malisevo and decreasing the MUP
8 presence in the village.
9 Q. Doesn't that seem illogical to you, namely, that Malisevo which
10 was the centre of KLA, that one should call for the decreasing of the FRY
11 forces there?
12 A. The intent of Malisevo was to make an example of success, which
13 is why Ambassador Holbrooke focused on it so much and asked us to focus
14 on it so much. We had to show in our view, both to the FRY and to the
15 Permanent Member Council, that Malisevo could be KVM's first success
16 story by moving out the MUP, bringing back the Albanians, and then allow
17 us to sort out the KLA. It was on occasion mentioned to us that Malisevo
18 was the KLA capital. Whether it was true or not, I don't have any
19 foundation to make that assessment. That was certainly what was said and
20 what we had heard, but our hope was was to turn it into a success story,
21 both for KVM and for the peace process that we were trying to establish.
22 And our concern was was why there was so many MUP guarding a
23 village that was vacated and burned, and we found no value in that other
24 than being an intimidating factor for the peaceful population to return.
25 I would just like to add, if I may, sir, Mr. Holbrooke had asked
1 me to build a briefing that mapped out a demilitarised zone in Malisevo,
2 and that included both the KLA and the MUP, that we had established a
3 zone, that there were to be absolutely no weapons in that zone. So we
4 had an obligation to make sure that the Albanians who returned were, in
5 fact, peaceful Albanians and not KLA and an obligation to get cooperation
6 from the MUP to decrease their presence and their weapons in the
7 Malisevo. That DMZ concept was taken to Belgrade and briefed to
8 Mr. Milosevic. Ambassador Holbrooke did brief that.
9 Q. Well, just two matters here. If the village was in such a
10 condition as you state, then there was nowhere for the people to return;
11 and secondly, how could one make an agreement with those who kept
12 engaging in armed conflict and where Malisevo was there centre -- their
13 training centre?
14 A. I don't know that it was a training centre. I didn't say that.
15 But we definitely needed Albanians to come back to rebuild, and without a
16 population there would be no rebuilding or construction underway there.
17 The city needed to be rebuilt because that was the original home of
18 thousands that had fled.
19 The second reason was as you're talking obviously here
20 December of 1998, which was the winter-time. It was cold and we were
21 certainly worried about the exposure of the Albanian population that fled
22 to the mountains, children, women, that would suffer from such exposure
23 in the mountains. So we needed to get them back. A lot of the village
24 was destroyed. There were some inhabitable structures there, but a lot
25 of work did need to go in to rebuilding it.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now have Exhibit --
2 Prosecution Exhibit P1312, page 30 in English and page 36 in B/C/S.
3 Q. Colonel, what I would like to talk about is this entry for
4 January 9, 1999
5 onwards. Could you take a look at that.
6 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 7.34, the entry
7 at 7.34.
8 THE WITNESS: Okay.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Does this help you refresh your memory, these notes here? Do you
11 remember what it was that you noted then what it related to?
12 A. I believe this is related to the Panda Bar in Pec where there
13 were Serbs that were killed.
14 Q. Okay. Let me try and help you. You see that this relates to a
15 press statement of January 8th, 1999. At the time you were in the
16 United States and this relates to an attack on the police station in
17 Dulje, and I tried to refresh your memory regarding this event on the
18 basis of that OSCE statement. And now here we can actually see that
19 you've made some notes about this and also what was to be done and
20 there's also mention of Mr. Clark who says:
21 This is an unfortunate press statement made -- could play right
22 into the hands of Belgrade
23 This statement is about Suva Reka and you even mention the
24 location there. And then underneath you can see the text that follows.
25 I don't to read it out loud. And at this time Mr. DZ and Keller were in
2 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, is there a question? And if so, it
3 certainly seems to be compound.
4 JUDGE PARKER: We've had a summary with some liberties of what is
6 Now, Mr. Djurdjic, what is it that you would like the witness to
7 assist you with about this? Are you asking him does he now remember?
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Well, I wish to refresh his memory
9 because here we see that these are notes of a conversation between
10 Mr. Walker and Mr. Clark in Pristina about this statement because
11 Mr. Walker was unhappy with the content of this statement.
12 JUDGE PARKER: [Previous translation continues]... no need to go
13 over it again.
14 THE WITNESS: I might be able to help here. There is a word here
15 that I know is a sensitive issue, but I would have to look at the
16 original press release. If I recall this now the line here that says:
17 "I read the 8 January press statement calling the KLA
18 terrorists ..."
19 That was a major issue for KVM because it was a mandate of
20 Ambassador Walker, Your Honour, not to refer to the KLA as terrorists.
22 as terrorists, but we were not making a judgement on who or what they
23 were. And I think that was the exception of the press release that
24 Ambassador Keller, French deputy, released, and that's what upset
25 Ambassador Walker, and that created problems for NATO because now we're
1 talking a terrorist faction. And it's in the KVM press line which means
2 that we have identified them as terrorists, and that was never our
3 position. I think that is the key piece of this line of questioning that
4 I'm being asked here.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Thank you.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see page 31, or
8 rather, 32 in English and page 39 in B/C/S.
9 Q. The excerpt that you will see is an entry for January 10th, 1999,
10 and it's your statement.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see page 32. It's
12 the same document, P1312.
13 MR. HANNIS: That is page 32 of 1312, Your Honour. If counsel
14 could tell me what he's looking for I might be able to assist.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. Hannis, in the B/C/S version I
16 see Walker
17 B/C/S but I don't see that -- the corresponding text in English. Well,
18 let's try page 31.
19 MR. HANNIS: That English is at the bottom of e-court page 31 in
21 JUDGE PARKER: Do you have a specific question, Mr. Djurdjic?
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes.
23 Q. Colonel, you see here you stated that Mr. Walker was worried
24 because the KLA is to blame, because this undercuts NATO authority.
25 JUDGE PARKER: What is the question?
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. The question is: Why is Mr. Walker worried if the -- if the KLA
3 actually breached the agreement and how does this undercut NATO?
4 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour --
5 JUDGE PARKER: The note speaks of "the press is playing this as
6 KLA is to blame ..." rather than it being the fact, it's the way it is
7 being presented in the media, which seems to be the point of this note.
8 Mr. Hannis.
9 MR. HANNIS: I have an objection because I think the question is
10 vague and assumes something that has been established yet about who is
11 worried between the two speakers that are mentioned.
12 JUDGE PARKER: Fair comment.
13 Yes, Mr. Djurdjic, you are assuming one of the two people is the
14 worried person. It may be the other one. But if we get past that, you
15 can then be concerned about what I was saying.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Well, I'm asking for clarification
17 from the Colonel, so perhaps -- well, we see what is written down here,
18 but maybe he can tell us what it was that he wrote down and why.
19 THE WITNESS: Let me try to give you a comment here. I don't
20 remember this piece exactly, but I do know one of the worries at this
21 time was the escalation of events on both sides, the KLA and the MUP,
22 that would create an excuse for larger MUP and VJ presence which would
23 continue to escalate the problems that we were trying to de-escalate.
24 The KLA was not helpful in any of this. And whether -- I think the
25 comment there about the KLA to blame because it undercuts NATO, we wanted
1 a peaceful process, obviously. And with the KLA acting we were worried
2 that, as I mentioned, the VJ would step up and then there would possibly
3 be NATO action which was something that worried both sides.
4 So that's about the best I can do to explain that. I don't
5 remember it completely.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Thank you. And this portion where it says:
8 "French are playing this to their own advantage ..."
9 What is that supposed to mean?
10 A. Well, the French were very pro-Serbian, and we were trying to
11 keep a very unbiassed reporting and an unbiassed capacity in our mission.
12 And Ambassador Walker
13 opportunity for increased deployments. The bottom line there was
14 Ambassador Walker didn't feel this was very unbiassed reporting.
15 Q. Thank you. And this is something that he discussed with
16 Mr. Clark, but did he discuss this perhaps later on with Mr. Keller and
17 other deputies or other assistants?
18 A. He discussed this -- I believe our press lead at the time was a
19 French woman, her first name was Beatrice. He did discuss this with
20 Ambassador Keller, and I do remember it being a very heated discussion.
21 It was not a pleasant period, and I recall Ambassador Walker saying that
22 he should have seen that press release and approved it before it had gone
23 out even though he was in the United States.
24 Q. Thank you, Colonel.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see page 34 in
1 English, at the very bottom of the page, please.
2 Q. Colonel, the P there, what does that stand for? Is that -- does
3 that stand for Mr. Pickering I assume?
4 A. Yes, sir, that was Mr. Pickering's comment.
5 Q. Well, what is confusing here, we also see H, W, P, and R, whereas
6 it says that there were three participants there, Pickering, Walker, and
8 A. Yeah, H is Ambassador Holbrooke and the R is Larry Rossin from
9 the State Department. I probably didn't record all of the names that
10 were involved in the call.
11 Q. Thank you. What I'm interested in is this last statement here by
12 Mr. P, in other words, Pickering:
13 "Push hard to get them back in compliance ..."
14 How did you understand this?
15 A. I need to read the context that that was made in because all I
16 have is just a snap-shot. I don't know what this is in relation to
17 myself without referring to my notes.
18 Q. Well, you can read it. This is an entry for the 9th -- for the
19 10th, so read the whole page.
20 A. I'd like to go back to the pages prior to that. If you want me
21 to comment on this, I'd like to see the prior two pages to see if I can
22 put this in context.
23 Q. The question -- this was on the day -- one day after Racak. We
24 can see the English page that precedes.
25 Does this help to refresh your memory?
1 A. Yeah, I'm waiting for the prior page, though, to come up as I
2 asked for. If you want me to comment on this, I'd like to have the
3 opportunity to try and refresh my own memory by looking at what was
5 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I don't know if I can assist. I have
6 a hard copy of what's the prior page from our excerpts dated the
7 16th of January of conversation with General Clark. I could hand that to
8 the witness or we could go back in e-court.
9 THE WITNESS: Actually I just got it here, sir.
10 MR. HANNIS: Which is page 33 in e-court.
11 THE WITNESS: Okay. If I can go to the original page, sir.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Page 34, please.
13 THE WITNESS: And your question of me was reference to:
14 "Push hard to get them back in compliance - we must initiate
16 And you want me to tell you what I think that means?
17 JUDGE PARKER: That as I understand it is what's asked of you.
18 THE WITNESS: When Racak went down this was obviously a major
19 event and a major turning point for the KVM mission because it was up
20 until this point probably the worst event that we had faced as a mission.
21 Ambassador Walker was informing Ambassador Holbrooke and Pickering on
22 what ought to happen next, and Ambassador Pickering was very concerned
23 about de-escalating the event at Racak and getting Serbian armoured
24 vehicles and personnel and MUP out of the area, to calm it down, and back
25 into their barracks. That's what I recall that statement meaning.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Thank you. I was asking you about your contribution.
3 "We must initiate Activation Order."
4 That was my question.
5 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, that came translated as he's asking
6 about this witness's contribution. There's nothing to indicate that this
7 witness made a contribution. P has been identified as Pickering
9 JUDGE PARKER: Have you got a further question, Mr. Djurdjic?
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] No, but it's all in the notebook.
11 There are perhaps one or two contributions by the witness; everything
12 else was said by other people. It seems then we cannot ask him about it
13 at all. I'm asking him about what it means, what it means to launch the
14 Activation Order. In English it says "initiate ACTORD."
15 I'm asking him whether -- or rather, what was his interpretation
16 of Mr. Pickering's words. This is what he wrote down, the witness, and
17 I'm asking him for an explanation.
18 JUDGE PARKER: Can I say, Mr. Djurdjic, that we have your
19 explanation now of what you're asking, which is quite different from what
20 the transcript says you're asking and that's happened several times and
21 it's becoming most confusing.
22 Colonel, the last four words on that page against the speaker P:
23 "We must initiate ACTORD."
24 Can you give us any understanding of the meaning of that?
25 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. We knew when Racak occurred that our
1 mission was in jeopardy. The Activation Order was a NATO Extraction
2 Force that was in place to get us out safely. Ambassador Pickering was
3 worried about obviously all the Americans has -- were the Permanent
4 Council and their member states. It was agreed upon that NATO would be
5 the Extraction Force for all of the member states, and when he refers to
6 the Activation Order that's what that was about: Put them in Macedonia
7 to receive us or to assist us in exiting Kosovo.
8 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
9 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
10 JUDGE PARKER: Now, Mr. Djurdjic, we have gone over an hour into
11 this further session. It's been very slow progress and very little
12 substance. Can you please concentrate your attention sharply on any
13 further questions that you have for their relevance and importance.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Witness, where were you on the 15th of January, 1999, if you
17 A. In Pristina.
18 Q. Were you perhaps in Montenegro
19 A. We visited him. I'd have to look at my notes to see exactly, but
20 my point of being in Pristina, I was not in the United States is what I
21 referenced that to. We were back in the theatre, in the mission area.
22 Q. Thank you. When was it that you heard of Racak for the first
24 A. I believe it's in my notes, but I would have to tell you that it
25 would have been on the 15th, shortly after it occurred.
1 Q. Do you know when the event took place?
2 A. We visited, I believe, the site on the 16th, at 7.00 in the
3 morning, and I believe Racak occurred between the hours of 0700 and 1530
4 on the 15th.
5 Q. Thank you. Do you know that Mr. Walker came into his office on
6 the 16th at 9.00 and that Mr. DZ said that around noon they set off for
8 A. I was there at Racak in the morning, and there was frost on the
9 ground so it was early morning. Ambassador Walker was with me. We
10 visited in the morning. It was very, very cold that day. You know, I
11 can't speak to what Mr. DZ had said. My recollection is is we visited
12 the site in the morning.
13 Q. Thank you. Was DZ with you at that time?
14 A. I'm not sure if he was or not. I don't recall, and if he was, he
15 didn't go up into the ravine with us where the bodies were. But I don't
16 recall if he went with us or not.
17 Q. Thank you. Was General Maisonneuve with you?
18 A. I believe he was at Racak, yes, the morning of the 16th.
19 Q. Were you notified that the police had informed the KVM that there
20 was to be an operation in Racak?
21 A. I don't remember if we were notified or not, sir.
22 Q. Thank you. Did you know that two KVM vehicles were supposed to
23 go to Racak village concerning that announcement?
24 A. I don't have any knowledge of that, sir.
25 Q. Thank you. When on the 16th of January you arrived in the
1 village, were there any KLA in the village?
2 A. I believe we were met by the KLA. In fact, one of them
3 identified himself as the commander and we met with him, yes, sir.
4 Q. Does it mean that the village was under KLA control when you were
6 A. It was our understanding that the village was a logistics depot
7 for KLA for food and blankets and that sort of thing, yes.
8 Q. Thank you. Did you know that in and around the village there
9 had -- there were 40 KLA members as of November 1998?
10 A. I don't know what the numbers were. It was our understanding
11 that the KLA did not use the village as a stronghold, but as a supply
12 depot. They were -- they were out in the field and would come back. The
13 women and children remained in the village, but they would come back to
14 Racak for supplies.
15 Q. What were the bunkers and trenches around Racak for?
16 A. Probably to protect the village I would imagine.
17 Q. Thank you. You spoke about some elderly people yesterday. You
18 concluded they were civilians. Did you know that Sadik Mujota, aged 61,
19 and Mehmet Mustafa, aged 62, were members of the KLA, having lost their
20 lives in Racak on the 15th?
21 A. I don't know those two individuals you mentioned personally no,
22 or their ages. I don't know of them.
23 Q. Did you know that in the village of Malo Poljica [as interpreted]
24 that those killed in Racak were buried there as KLA members?
25 A. I don't know whether they were or not. I don't have any
1 information on what you're telling me on that.
2 Q. Thank you. Where did you get information to the effect that
3 three females were killed -- that there were three woman in the 45
5 A. It was a KVM assessment from the team that had gone in there and
6 counted the dead. There was also a 12-year-old boy that had been shot.
7 I believe that those were the final reports from KVM.
8 Q. Yes, but why did you not wait for a few days for an investigation
9 to determine what the facts were and then issue a press release?
10 Instead, you issued a press release the very same day.
11 A. I didn't issue the press release; Ambassador Walker did. And
12 what he did I had no control over. We did ask for an immediate
13 investigation and we did ask the Serbs for the names of those that
14 participated in shelling the houses of the -- that contained women and
15 children as well as young Serbian men and elder men. I think we
16 requested an investigative team from Finland, and I believe we asked for
17 Judge Arbour to come immediately, and of course that was met with many
18 obstacles from the Serbian side.
19 Q. Thank you. Did you know that only on the 18th of January there
20 was an on-site investigation in Racak?
21 A. Investigation by whom? The Serb side or ... ?
22 Q. Yes.
23 A. So three days after the event an investigation took place; is
24 that what you're asking me?
25 Q. Did you know that only after three days an investigating
1 magistrate was able to go into Racak to carry out on on-site
3 A. I knew there was investigations taking place, but I also heard
4 that they were incomplete and not satisfactory the way KVM understood
5 investigations should proceed. I know Ambassador Walker wasn't happy
6 with the manner that the investigations were taking place.
7 Q. Thank you. Did you know that between the 15th in the afternoon
8 and until the 18th KLA had control in Racak?
9 A. I'd have to be -- I'd have to read the reports. I'm not sure
10 what the status of Racak was.
11 Q. Thank you. During the meeting with the commander, do you
12 remember him saying to you that at 5.00 p.m. on the 15th Racak again fell
13 under control of the KLA?
14 A. I don't remember. I don't dispute it. Again, I'd have to refer
15 to my notes, to trust my notes at that time.
16 Q. Thank you. Do you recall the commander acquainting you and
17 Mr. Walker during that meeting that on the 15th of January he used
18 mortars to attack Serb positions, Serb forces?
19 A. I don't remember precisely, but I'll take your word for that.
20 Q. Thank you. A journalist who was in Racak on the 16th with
21 Mr. Walker and other KVM members was Mr. Franz Josef Hutsch. According
22 to his words, when you arrived in Racak there were about a dozen KLA
23 there. Do you recall them being there once you arrived?
24 A. I do recall seeing some KLA. Some were wearing a uniform.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I apologise. I
2 forgot to go back into open session and we have been in closed session
3 for a while now.
4 JUDGE PARKER: Open.
5 [Open session]
6 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
7 JUDGE PARKER: Can the notes be taken from the screen, please.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Do you agree that at the time when you visited Racak and its
10 environs, the location was not secured for an on-site investigation?
11 A. Secured by -- by KVM or secured by the MUP? Secured at all?
12 I'm ...
13 Q. There was no MUP in Racak, that is -- that would mean that it
14 would either have to be done by the verifiers or other members of the KVM
15 who were in Racak. Did they secure the scene of crime in your knowledge
16 when you were there?
17 A. I guess if you're asking me were there MUP around, no; was KVM
18 there, yes. We had a number of verifiers that were taking reports of
19 what events had occurred. Whether the site was secured or not as a crime
20 scene, that wasn't in KVM's charter to do that.
21 Q. Thank you. Did you notice the bodies of those killed being moved
22 and that the spent shells, cartridges, were being taken away as
24 A. I'm aware of a couple of families that retrieved their loved ones
25 from where they were killed and moved back into their -- into their homes
1 for the bodies that were up in the ravine, they were -- we were told they
2 were never touched or never moved, that was, they were shot and killed
3 where they lay.
4 Q. Thank you. Did you know that on the 18th of January, 1999, there
5 was an investigative magistrate of the district court in Pristina
6 accompanied by Gil Gilbertson and a Mr. Sullivan who was an OSCE
7 representative -- actually, both of them were?
8 MR. HANNIS: Accompanied where exactly?
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. To accompany the scene of crime team headed by the investigative
11 judge of the district court in Pristina, her name is Danica Marinkovic.
12 A. I do remember Ms. Marinkovic very, very well, and I am aware that
13 the OSCE brought her to the scene.
14 Q. Did you know that the autopsies were also attended by OSCE
15 representatives, Mr. --
16 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Djurdjic please repeat the two names
17 of the OSCE representatives.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. It seems I have to repeat the question. Colonel, did you know
20 that the autopsies were also attended by OSCE representatives
21 Ian Robert Hendrie from England
22 A. I don't remember if we attended those autopsies or not. There's
23 no reason to dispute your claim there.
24 Q. Thank you. Did you know that members of the KLA kidnapped
25 certain representatives of the Democratic League of Kosovo and they
1 actually killed some of them?
2 JUDGE PARKER: Is this on the same day or at some other time?
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. I am leaving the topic of Racak, Colonel. This is an unrelated
5 question to that topic.
6 MR. HANNIS: Can we have some indication of when, what year, what
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, in the fall of 1998.
9 THE WITNESS: I was aware that the KLA had committed acts of
10 kidnapping and other violence. I'm not specifically aware of this
11 particular event. They were certainly no saints.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Thank you. You don't recall any activities by Mr. Walker and
14 other members of the verification mission aimed at having those kidnapped
15 by the KLA who were from Mr. Rugova's party released?
16 A. I don't recall the incident. I know we worked -- we worked a VJ
17 release and we worked a KLA release, but I don't recall exactly who the
18 kidnapped were. I know we had Serbian journalists and we had Serbian VJ
19 that had been released. I don't recall the specifics of everyone that
20 was kidnapped.
21 Q. Thank you. Colonel, sir, did you know that the KLA, after the
22 signing of the October Agreements and the withdrawal of the VJ forces,
23 took up positions which it had held before the summer operation?
24 A. Yes. Yes. I'm aware of that.
25 Q. Do you agree that the road between Pristina and Podujevo and then
1 to Prokuplje used as the main vein to supply Kosovo and Metohija for both
2 the civilians and the Army of Yugoslavia?
3 A. Yes, I am aware that the Prokuplje road was a key line of
4 communication and line of transfer.
5 Q. Thank you, Colonel.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I think ...
7 JUDGE PARKER: Is that the end of your questions?
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I'll finish the sentence. I'll
9 tell you that after the break I wanted to ask Mr. Hannis if he could send
10 me a bit more time and then after that conversation I'll be able to
11 answer your question right after the break.
12 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Hannis, are you in a position to know how long
13 your re-examination might be?
14 MR. HANNIS: I think about 30 minutes, between 20 and 30 minutes,
15 Your Honour.
16 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
17 If we break now, that's the time that is available for you,
18 Mr. Djurdjic. I suggest we continue for another five minutes for you to
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 Q. Colonel, sir, the Yugoslav forces in the Podujevo area react to
22 this by securing the area for further supplies and was this simply a
23 reaction on -- to the KLA actions in that period and in that area?
24 A. We were briefed that they were concerned about losing control of
25 that particular strategic point to KLA control. And that briefing that
1 we received was a verbal briefing in Podujevo from a VJ soldier I recall.
2 Q. Thank you. Did you know that the KLA, in addition to side-arms,
3 also had anti-tank weapons?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Do you know that they also had guns that had a range of up to
6 3 to 4
7 A. I was aware that they had weapons that went beyond 7.62
8 millimetres, yes. Precisely the kinds of weapons -- we're going through
9 all this. I knew they had some mortar packs available to them, 7.62; I
10 was aware of -- I never saw them but was aware that there was some
11 anti-tank weapons available to them.
12 Q. Thank you. Since you were able to move around Kosovo, could you
13 tell us, based on your experience, your military experience, what kind of
14 fortifications did the Albanian houses in villages have? What types of
15 walls and gates were there around them?
16 A. In my experience, I didn't see anything out of the ordinary. I
17 stayed in some of those homes. I'm not precisely sure what you're asking
18 here. I mean, for me, it was a regular apartment and a regular home that
19 had a -- typically had a gate to enter.
20 Q. What about the compounds themselves, were they surrounded by high
22 A. When you refer to "compounds," what are you referring to? Are
23 you referring to the normal living and housing areas in Pristina or are
24 you talking about in the Drenica valley? What do you mean by
1 Q. Well, what I said was the village homes, Albanian village homes;
2 in other words, in villages, not in towns and cities. The walls that
3 surrounded these houses, village houses, did you see how high they were
4 and did you see them, the walls?
5 A. When we visited KLA strongholds such as a facility we called the
6 Ice House out of Drenica valley, what I observed in those areas was a
7 fair number of KLA, armed. I don't recall the heights of the walls in
8 general around any of their facility. That's not to say they weren't
9 there, I just didn't -- I just don't remember them. I remember that it
10 didn't seem -- wherever we went, it didn't seem like it was a fortified
11 bunker or position of KLA soldiers. It just seemed like a normal living
12 arrangement, a normal house, from what I can remember.
13 Q. Witness, on the topic of meetings with Milosevic, would you agree
14 with me that you attended more of those meetings than Mr. Walker?
15 A. I attended one meeting without him. I believe that was in
16 December. I attended one in November.
17 Q. Would you take my word for it that Mr. Walker only mentions one
18 meeting toward the end of October while you were -- when you were not
19 there yet and another meeting with Mr. Milosevic on November 16th; and
20 second, the chronology, the time-line that Mr. Drewienkiewicz drew up,
21 there was only one meeting with Mr. Milosevic where Mr. Walker attended,
22 jotted down, and that's the same meeting of November 16th. So there is
23 no mention anywhere of any meeting in December, and I couldn't find any
24 such mention in your notes either, and I read them through very
1 A. Right. I attended a meeting with Ambassador Holbrooke and
2 Ambassador Miles that did not include Ambassador Walker. I thought that
3 meeting was on December 15th. I attended a meeting with
4 Ambassador Walker to see Mr. Milosevic in November, and I'm not sure if
5 that was between the 23rd, 4th, or 5th, or on the 16th, but I was with
6 Ambassador Walker on one of those visits.
7 Q. Very well, Colonel. On the 15th of December you attended a
8 meeting with Milosevic, that was the meeting with Mr. Holbrooke. That
9 was on December 15th, 1998. And let me just say one more thing and this
10 is even in your notes. The letter of Mr. Walker's of November 23rd was
11 not actually taken and submitted at this meeting, but it was sent only
12 later on, on the 25th. And let me also remind you that you had a couple
13 of meetings with Mr. Sainovic where you discussed this meeting?
14 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I'm sorry, objection. That doesn't
15 sound like a question; that sounds like testimony from Mr. Djurdjic.
16 JUDGE PARKER: Same old problem, Mr. Djurdjic. If you want the
17 witness to agree that the letter was not handed over at the meeting, you
18 need to put that to him and he'll say yes or no. You can't put it to him
19 as a fact.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] No. What I'm trying to do is just
21 refresh his memory regarding some of these circumstances, but I can also
22 ask him whether I'm correct or not. I think in the final analysis it
23 comes down to the same thing. So I was just trying to jog his memory
24 because the witness said that this letter was actually handed in to
25 Milosevic at this meeting on the 23rd, but in fact it was on the 24th or
1 the 25th. And I even have your notes here, but I can't find the exact
2 spot to show that this letter was actually handed in on the 25th well,
3 never mind. Just tell us, Witness, do you remember this or not?
4 A. I remember the letter. My memory serves me that it very well may
5 have been that we gave that letter up through embassy channels and it
6 went through officially and Ambassador Walker carried his own copy of the
7 letter. My recollection is is that he gave him that letter and discussed
8 that letter. It's possible that I could be wrong, but I know that we
9 talked about that letter in there and I remember Ambassador Walker saying
10 it was going to be the purpose of his visit.
11 Q. Thank you, Colonel, for answering my questions.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours for
13 allowing me additional time for my cross-examination.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Djurdjic.
15 We need to have a break now with those tapes, Mr. Hannis, but
16 what we will do is resume at ten minutes past and hope you'll be able to
17 finish in the 20 minutes, which was the lower end of your estimate.
18 MR. HANNIS: I'll do my very best, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Hannis.
20 We resume at ten minutes past.
21 --- Recess taken at 12.42 p.m.
22 [The witness stands down]
23 --- On resuming at 1.11 p.m.
24 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I will be very brief,
1 Your Honours, and this has to do with the exhibits, or rather, the
2 documents that we propose to be admitted into evidence, D004-4172 and
3 D004-4175, they should be admitted into evidence without a stamp, and all
4 the other documents that were on the list should be admitted under seal.
5 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
6 JUDGE PARKER: Well, if that's the agreement of counsel they will
7 be admitted and exhibit numbers will be assigned and you'll be informed
8 by memo.
9 [The witness takes the stand]
10 JUDGE PARKER: Please sit.
11 Mr. Hannis.
12 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour. My first questions are
13 regarding the notebook, so if we could go into private.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Private.
15 [Private session]
16 THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session, Your Honours.
17 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
18 Re-examination by Mr. Hannis:
19 Q. Colonel, I'd like to look at your notebook which is P1312 and I'd
20 first like to look at page 30 of the English. It's page 36 in the B/C/S.
21 Colonel, this will be up on the screen in a minute, but it's
22 referring to your notes dated the 9th of January. And I want to ask
23 about some points under the heading at 0734 hours. Now, I note that this
24 January 9th is one day after we saw that press release this Exhibit D162
25 about some MUP that were killed and injured between Suva Reka and
1 Stimlje. Do you remember Mr. Djurdjic showing you that one?
2 A. Yes, sir.
3 Q. And the second entry here says:
4 "KVM going back to negotiate the release of at least two VJ
6 You told us earlier in your testimony about this group of eight
7 or nine VJ soldiers that had wandered off and been captured. Is that --
8 do you know when they were released approximately?
9 A. They were released before the 15th of January.
10 Q. Okay. And the next entry says:
11 "I read the 8 Jan 99
12 for the taking of eight VJ as POWs."
13 That's a different press release than the one we saw in D162,
14 which was about the killing of MUP. And I don't think you saw that press
15 statement while we were in here in the past couple of days, did you? I
16 haven't seen it?
17 A. I haven't seen it, no, sir.
18 Q. The next entry says:
19 "Unfortunate statement from KVM and it could play right into the
20 hands of Belgrade
21 Is that referring to the press statement calling the KLA
22 terrorists for capture of the eight VJ? Or for the killing of MUP or --
23 A. That refers to the KLA terrorists, and again the key word there
24 was "terrorists."
25 Q. Okay.
1 A. That was what was unfortunate. We didn't want that in our press
2 releases because we had made a judgement what they were.
3 Q. Okay. And the next entry says:
4 "Call Wes Clark and pass to NATO - mention this is an unfortunate
5 press statement and made by our French deputy."
6 I think you told us that was Ambassador Keller?
7 A. Keller, yes, sir.
8 Q. Did he make one statement or two statements where he referred to
9 KLA as terrorists, if you --
10 A. Ambassador Keller?
11 Q. Yes.
12 A. He always referred to the KLA as terrorists.
13 Q. Okay --
14 A. Whenever it was --
15 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers kindly pause between
16 questions and answers for the interpreters. Thank you.
17 THE WITNESS: To follow-up, Ambassador Keller always referred to
18 the KLA as terrorists. He was cautioned by Ambassador Walker that
19 whether it be in written statements, press statements, or verbal
20 statements, that was not our position to take, and he and
21 Ambassador Keller had words on that issue several times.
22 MR. HANNIS:
23 Q. The next line says:
24 "This is a bad precedent for future negotiations."
25 Was that refer -- did that have any reference to negotiations
1 about releasing the VJ hostages or was it in a broader -- broader
3 A. I would have to tell you, sir, that that would be in a broader
4 context. If KVM was calling the KLA "terrorists," it wasn't likely we
5 were going to get any progress or negotiation progress with them. So it
6 was in a broader context.
7 Q. But were negotiations about the VJ eight or nine going on at this
9 A. Yes, sir.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 MR. HANNIS: I'd like to go to the next page in English, page 31,
12 and that's page 38 in the B/C/S.
13 Q. You'll see this is from a meeting on the 10th of January at 0740.
14 I had a question about this because it's unclear to me about when you
15 were on leave in the US
16 Sainovic. Do you recall, were you back in Kosovo?
17 A. If I took these notes, I was definitely back. So I'm not sure of
18 the hour that we arrived, but I would have been back by the 10th, having
19 taken these notes.
20 Q. Okay. And the notes from the day before, on the 9th, were those
21 notes you made pursuant to phone calls that were going back and forth
22 from where you were in Kosovo?
23 A. It could have been, yes, it could have been.
24 Q. Okay. At the bottom of the page in English on this one --
25 MR. HANNIS: And I think we have to go to page 39 in the B/C/S.
1 Q. -- this entry about "Walker
2 It says:
3 "Very worried the press is playing this as the KLA is to blame
4 because it undercuts his NATO authority."
5 Who were you referred to as being worried there? Was it Walker
6 or Clark or somebody else?
7 A. This would have been Wes Clark being worried.
8 Q. I say it says "his authority." I assume Walker
9 in NATO or over NATO?
10 A. No, sir, not.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 MR. HANNIS: Next if we could go to page 34 in the English,
13 that's page 41 in the B/C/S.
14 Q. This is 16 January at 1634 hours. This is right after Racak. I
15 see the second line says:
16 "This event and the Decani incident are not related."
17 Now, I think that relates to the press release we saw in
18 Exhibit D161, which was also something that took place, I think, on the
19 15th of January, where KVM personnel were shot at?
20 A. Yes, sir.
21 Q. And do you know what the information was to show that that was
22 not related to Racak?
23 A. I don't -- I don't recall what caused me to link the -- you know,
24 the two events. I believe it was the RC commander, isolated event.
25 Q. Okay. I can see why that connection might be drawn that --
1 didn't you tell us before that some components of the KLA thought that
2 KVM was responsible in part for what happened at Racak? Or am I
4 A. No, I'm trying to remember. I remember the discussion. I
5 remember being, you know, being blamed by the KLA for in part what
6 happened. I'm having trouble trying to remember why, but I do remember
7 that discussion, that we were being blamed for what had happened and that
8 we weren't there in large numbers and we weren't protecting that village,
9 we didn't have a presence; and had we been there, that might not have
11 Q. And I think you said Racak was sort of the low point in the
12 mission's history up to that point?
13 A. Right.
14 Q. And it was particularly painful because it was on the heels of
15 your high point in getting those VJ --
16 A. -- released.
17 Q. -- soldiers released?
18 A. Yes, sir.
19 Q. Which is the next entry about:
20 "Three to four days ago KLA released eight ... and this is the
22 If you could go down to the first entry for letter H which I
23 think you told us stands for Holbrooke --
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. -- in this context. It says:
1 "Press for immediate release of KLA POWs."
2 Do you know what that refers to?
3 A. Yes. The VJ had captured eight KLA, and we were trying to win
4 their release unharmed. We struck a deal with Serb authorities, but the
5 Serb authorities did not want the release appear to be connected to the
6 VJ release, although it was, but it was a quid pro quo, but the Serbs
7 wanted to maintain an image of strength and wanted the two completely
8 separated to appear that they weren't linked.
9 Q. I understand. So this was the delayed release to avoid the
10 appearance that Serbia
11 A. Yes, sir.
12 Q. And now, in light of what had happened in Racak, Holbrooke is
13 suggesting: Release -- make Serbia
14 A. Right.
15 Q. To, what, calm down KLA --
16 A. Just to get the situation under control and get people to calm
18 Q. Okay. Thank you.
19 MR. HANNIS: If we could go to the next page, 35 in English and
20 page 42 in the B/C/S.
21 Q. It's still the same meeting and Holbrooke is the speaker. The
22 first entry:
23 "Need to do a formal report to NATO/OSCE on non-compliance."
24 Mr. Djurdjic asked you some questions about a provision in the
25 agreement about reporting. Do you recall, was there a formal report that
1 was written and sent to OSCE after this?
2 A. There was. It went to the Permanent Council. I think that
3 Ambassador Walker even flew down there to brief it.
4 Q. Okay. And while we're still in private session, I wanted to
5 follow-up on those reportings. You were asked yesterday by Mr. Djurdjic
6 about reporting, and in one of your answers where you were talking about
7 letters of protest about non-compliance you said at page 84, line 16:
8 "I remember some documents that Mr. Walker wanted on the record
9 that clearly defined non-compliance issues. One was in the form of a
10 letter that went in December, verbally, primarily to Mr. Milosevic."
11 When you say "verbally, primarily," how does that work with a
12 letter? Do you understand? I see letter as something written. Do you
13 hand it to him and tell him what's in it or ...?
14 A. Ambassador Walker would often make his notes and what he wanted
15 to say. If -- you know, about the letter that's in question here -- he
16 certainly may have given a letter of non-compliance to make
17 Ambassador Miles in the embassy and of course State Department aware of
18 it through that channel, as he would the Permanent Council but also
19 delivered verbally his unhappiness with the non-compliance issues that we
20 were struggling with to Mr. Milosevic. So I would tell you that it would
21 be both written and it would be verbal.
22 Q. Thank you. And near the end of your testimony you were asked
23 about the letters being delivered to Mr. Milosevic, and it was suggested
24 to you that one was delivered to him in December, I think on the 15th,
25 when you and Miles and Holbrooke met with Milosevic?
1 A. Yes, sir.
2 Q. And I think you testified that you recalled that Walker
3 delivered that 23 November letter about definitions and sort of broad
4 parameters of the KVM mission sometime in late November, when you and he
5 met with Milosevic; correct?
6 MR. HANNIS: I see Mr. Djurdjic on his feet.
7 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I'll be brief. I was referring to
9 the letter of November 23rd, and I never mentioned any letter of
11 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
12 MR. HANNIS: Neither am I.
13 Q. My question is --
14 JUDGE PARKER: Carry on, please, Mr. Hannis.
15 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
16 Q. My question is: Is it possible that the letter of the
17 23rd of November was delivered on both dates, first by Mr. Walker in late
18 November and later on by Holbrooke and Miles?
19 A. It's possible. When Mr. Holbrooke came into town he took a lot
20 of information with him, the DMZ, Malisevo map, some KVM reporting, I
21 wasn't in the room when he delivered a lot of that material, but it
22 definitely would be possible. That would be typical of Mr. Holbrooke.
23 Q. And by doing so, that's a more formal presentation than it coming
24 from Mr. Walker?
25 A. Which is why Mr. Walker wasn't present.
1 Q. And based on your experience in dealing with the federal
2 commission for cooperation with the OSCE, did sometimes Sainovic and the
3 others insist on strict technicalities and formalities when you were
4 running into obstacles about getting them things resolved?
5 A. Constant technicality issues, yes.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 MR. HANNIS: We can go back into open now, Your Honours.
8 JUDGE PARKER: Open.
9 [Open session]
10 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
11 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
12 Q. Just a few more, Colonel. You were asked about what the KVM did
13 in relation to stop weapons smuggling. Did KVM have any authority to
14 deal with weapons being smuggled into Kosovo?
15 A. No, sir.
16 Q. Who was that a job for in Serbia, if you know?
17 A. I would think that the border guards would be in large part
18 responsible for those weapons that were coming in.
19 Q. Next you were shown yesterday at page 92, line 10, Exhibit D160,
20 which is UN Resolution 1199. I won't pull it up. I'll read. You were
21 shown paragraph 4(a) and Mr. Djurdjic asked you if you would agree that
22 that only called on Yugoslavia
24 "Q. Only in relation to the civilian population and to withdraw
25 security units."
1 I would indicate to you that the document -- the UN Resolution
3 "Cease all action by the security forces affecting the civilian
5 My question is: Those joint VJ and MUP actions that you saw in
6 Kosovo, even though they may have been directed at KLA, in the manner in
7 which they were carried out were those actions affecting the civilian
9 A. They absolutely were. They were, in general, sweep operations.
10 And by "sweep" I mean they included all personnel, all people,
11 population, in the village. It didn't discriminate between the two.
12 Q. All right. Thank you. And the last one I want to ask you about,
13 Exhibit 835, which is the agreement about the KVM mission. Mr. Djurdjic
14 made the point that the primary purpose was to maintain the cease-fire?
15 A. Yes, sir.
16 Q. And I have a question. In your efforts to verify whether there
17 was compliance with the cease-fire, did KVM requests from Mr. Sainovic
18 and that group that you met with that you be advised in advance when
19 there were going to be movements of MUP or VJ in carrying out some of
20 these anti-terrorist actions?
21 A. Yes, we had asked for advanced notice. At least 24 hours we had
22 asked for.
23 Q. And did Mr. Sainovic agree to do that?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Was that important to you in being able to carry out your job?
1 A. Very much important to us, yes, sir.
2 Q. Because if you were only going to be notified a week after that
3 occurred, how would that help you do any verification?
4 A. It was one of the frustrations of the mission. We just didn't
5 get timely coordination for being able to be in front of some of these
6 operations or accompany these operations.
7 Q. Okay. And if you only got reports a week after they happened,
8 you might as well have been in Hawaii as Pristina?
9 A. Yes, sir.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 MR. HANNIS: I have no further questions, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much for that, Mr. Hannis.
13 You'll be pleased to know that that's the end of the run.
14 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
15 JUDGE PARKER: We would like to thank you for coming once again,
16 for the assistance you have been able to give. You are free to return to
17 your normal activities. The Court Officer will show you out. We would
18 thank those who have assisted you in your time here.
19 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
20 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much.
21 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
22 [The witness withdrew]
23 JUDGE PARKER: We are at the point of an adjournment for some two
24 weeks. We hope in that time, A, Mr. Hannis, the Prosecution will be able
25 not only to review its case and its position to be sure and have clearly
1 in its mind what else needs to be done so that there is no further hiccup
2 in the presentation of the Prosecution case.
3 MR. HANNIS: I'll convey that to the team, Your Honour, and we'll
4 make our best efforts.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Good. And efforts are made to ensure the
6 witnesses are here. In the last couple of weeks we've been slipping
7 fairly badly on performance and losing time. We would hope that can be
8 behind us now and things will move along.
9 While this break will be of immediate assistance to the
10 Prosecution, it's also one that should assist the Defence a great deal in
11 collecting your thoughts and finalising your preparation with a view to
12 the steps that need to be taken when the Prosecution case finishes, and
13 if necessary to -- looking ahead to the preparation and presentation of
14 the Defence case. As we have indicated that should that be the course
15 taken, it will -- should not be expected that there'll be a long break
16 between the end of the Prosecution case and the start of the Defence
17 case. We want to keep the trial moving, so we would encourage Defence
18 counsel to be giving thought ahead during this fortnight's break.
19 With those words of encouragement, we hope that the break is of
20 assistance to all parties and we resume again on Tuesday afternoon, the
21 22nd, I think, Courtroom I, I'm told. So we look forward to seeing you
23 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.36 p.m.
24 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 22nd day of
25 September, 2009, at 2.15 p.m.