1 Tuesday, 27 October 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning. There are protective measures for
6 this witness which has the effect that members -- in this courtroom, that
7 members of the public are not able to be present because of the physical
8 configuration of this courtroom. The Chamber would mention that a
9 Mr. van Odijk will by order of the Chamber be able to view the
10 proceedings. He is a representative from Utrecht which the Chamber is
11 meeting today, and in those circumstances, he will be, by special order,
12 able to view the proceedings in our physical arrangements from what would
13 normally be the public gallery.
14 If the witness could be brought in, please.
15 [The witness takes the stand]
16 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning.
17 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honours.
18 JUDGE PARKER: Could I remind you the affirmation that you made
19 to speak the truth still applies.
20 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Kravetz. Oh, we are well past you,
22 Ms. Kravetz.
23 Mr. Djurdjic. I had completely lost you in the cloud of the ...
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
25 WITNESS: JOHN CROSLAND [Resumed]
1 Cross-examination by Mr. Djurdjic: [Continued]
2 Q. Good morning, Colonel, sir. Before I go on with putting my
3 questions to the Colonel, I should like to inform the Trial Chamber that
4 the Prosecution has agreed to redacted proposal regarding exhibits used
5 in the Milutinovic case except for one which was taken off the list which
6 I will be using in the cross-examination. Ms. Kravetz was very fair in
7 that regard, so that we can continue or should Ms. Kravetz agree to that
8 as well?
9 JUDGE PARKER: We are happy to take your assurance in her
10 presence that she is in agreement. Carry on.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
12 Q. Colonel, I should like to ask you in connection with the
13 telegrams that we referred to yesterday, the initials DA refer to whom?
14 A. The DA is defence attache, which is me.
15 Q. Thank you. Now, I should like to ask you a question in
16 connection with a part of your statement yesterday in which you stated
17 that you made some photographs in Donje Prekaze in March 1998. Did you
18 see those photographs during the proceedings here before this Chamber?
19 A. I can't remember to be honest whether they came before the Court
20 or not. As you know, I've made several appearances here, but I cannot
21 verify that they came before the Court.
22 Q. Thank you. But they have not been shown to you on this
23 particular occasion?
24 A. Not as far as I am aware, sir, no.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we have document D005-0657
2 brought up on the screen. Paragraph 20 of the statement.
3 Q. Colonel, this is the statement which you gave to the
4 investigators from the 5th to the 7th of December, 2000. I would kindly
5 ask you to take a look a paragraph 20, in which it is stated -- was that:
6 "It's likely that there were paramilitaries such as Arkan's
7 Tigers in Kosovo, I was never able to make a positive identification.
8 Members of all units, the VJ, JSO, the PJP and the SAJ, involving in
9 Kosovo wore bandanas around their heads and other types of non-standard
10 kit to varying degrees. Under such circumstances, it would not have been
11 surprising for members of these units to be mistaken as members of
13 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Ms. Kravetz.
14 MS. KRAVETZ: Your Honours, I just want to point out that the
15 protective measures that apply to this witness include the redaction of
16 some personal details on the cover page of the statements that are used
17 during his testimony, and I was just seeing that the version that is
18 being used, at least in the the B/C/S, in the e-court system does not
19 contain those redactions, and the redactions that had been granted by the
20 Milosevic Chamber in 2002 were the redactions of his place of birth and
21 date of birth. So if my learned colleague is going to be using any prior
22 statements, those details should be redacted from the first page of the
24 JUDGE PARKER: The issue will be whether a redaction is possible
25 from the e-court version before it comes up on the screen.
1 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
2 JUDGE PARKER: We will deal with the matter by not broadcasting
3 the exhibit publicly. Carry on please, Mr. Djurdjic.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
5 Q. Does the passage which I've just read out reflect what you stated
6 to the investigators in December 2000, sir?
7 A. I think so. What I'm trying to convey is that in this particular
8 situation there was a room for misidentification of various forces, and I
9 was, therefore, using my own intelligence and observation to make this
10 particular statement, if you will, in Defence of the Vojska Yugoslavia
11 because there were journalists travelling throughout Kosovo, as you are
12 well aware, who were making claims possibly based on their experience in
13 former Balkan conflicts.
14 Q. Thank you. Thank you, Colonel.
15 Colonel, you say that you have direct knowledge of the
16 situation in Kosovo and Metohija, so I should like to ask you kindly
17 to describe for me a village, a typical Albanian village house that you
18 visited, if you visited such houses.
19 A. I visited many -- most of the villages within Kosovo itself,
20 having spent nearly, from 1996 to 1999, nearly three years in Kosovo. A
21 typical Albanian village could consist of as many as or as little as
22 three to five
23 Some of these houses were what one would call peasant cottages, others
24 were extremely big buildings showing the prosperous nature of trade
25 within Kosovo.
1 Q. Thank you, Colonel. What I'm interested in is these typical
2 houses in Kosova-Metohija are called towers, so bearing in mind what you
3 have just said that there would be a couple of houses in a village, were
4 there any walls encircling those houses, of what material were those
5 walls and what were they like, generally speaking?
6 A. Yes, many of the houses had a walled enclosure in which the
7 family would live, perhaps many families. And this was a -- very much a
8 typical example of Albanian houses.
9 Q. Thank you. And was it customary bearing in mind the fact that
10 the largest percentage of the Albanians were Muslim faith, that as a rule
11 there were no windows facing the streets, or facing a vantage point from
12 which one could see the interior of the house, in other words?
13 A. I would say some of the houses were like that, sir. Others had
14 windows facing the street or facing any other direction. I mean, yes,
15 they were very private houses and very prosperous houses, some of them,
16 as I've already said. I think man ever since he started has built a
17 house and surrounded himself for normal protection in order to keep his
18 family safe, and this is the particular way that the Albanian people do
19 it, and yeah, very nice for them.
20 Q. Thank you. Will you agree with me when I say that also in 1998
21 -- both in 1998 and -- 1998 and 1999 most of the conflict in Kosovo took
22 place in the rural areas between the KLA and the forces of the FRY?
23 A. No, sir, I can't agree with that. There were -- there was
24 conflict. It began in the Drenica area to the west of Pristina about 25,
25 30 kilometres. It then spread as the conflict grew and the areas of --
1 in Pec and Djakovica were destroyed, the Albanian areas. So it came into
2 the towns, into -- both into the town and the rural areas.
3 Q. Thank you. Yesterday you told us that you saw devastated
4 villages and you never referred to any damaged towns.
5 A. I can't recall I was asked to, sir, but as I've just stated, I
6 went to Djakovica and the entire Albanian market area was destroyed. If
7 I remember correctly, in about August, July/August 1998, and the same
8 took place in Pec. Also I think in Mitrovica and in Urosevac, to my
9 memory, yeah.
10 Q. Thank you. When resistance was being offered from the houses
11 that is you described, what were they in your perception, in terms of
12 military fortifications?
13 A. No, these were not military fortifications, sir. These were
14 normal houses. If we go back to Donje Prekaze, the Jashari family house
15 was a normal Albanian house with a walled garden around it which if as a
16 soldier you were attacking, yes, it could resemble a fort. But in fact,
17 it was a normal civilian house as we've been describing. So to a
18 soldier, yes, it's an objective which he may have been ordered to take or
19 destroy, but in real life, it is another house. Another person's house.
20 Q. Thank you, Colonel. We are talking about civilian houses, but if
21 they are being used for military purposes, if defence and resistance are
22 being offered from those houses, it is in that sense that I ask you
23 whether the facilities were well fortified.
24 A. No, I disagree. I mean, to widen the discussion in other
25 conflict areas, Northern Ireland, for instance, we would be shot at from
1 houses. If you are going to be shot at, if you are sensible, you tend to
2 put bricks and mortar between you and the person who is going to shoot at
3 you to give you protection. That doesn't mean to say that the house is a
4 protected house.
5 So inevitably, houses will get damaged, property will get
6 damaged if, if a fire fight develops around this objective, so.
7 Q. Thank you. Please tell me how did the KLA offer resistance to
8 the forces or the FRY when there was fighting, and did you ever
9 eye-witness any combat action yourself?
10 A. The KLA had fortifications all the way down the road from outside
11 of Orahovac to one of their major headquarters at Malisevo. These were
12 trenches dug alongside the road on vantage points as normal defensive
13 positions. Did I observe fighting? As I've stated in my reports, many
14 times. I was present when shell fire was being directed at various
15 areas: Junik, Prilep, Riznik, many other villages around Kosovo.
16 Q. Thank you. You mentioned Junik and the shelling of it. How far
17 were you from Junik when you observed that?
18 A. I think if I remember correctly, about 1 or 2 kilometres. I
19 could see the town of Junik
20 Q. Thank you. You've just now told us that you were about a
21 kilometre or two away from it. What was the time that you are referring
23 A. Do you mean the date?
24 Q. I mean the month.
25 A. Sir, I've drafted over 80 reports, I've made several appearances
1 in front of the court, I would not wish to mislead the Court. I am
2 afraid you'll have to refer back to the reports that I made. I cannot
3 recall individual reports some 12 years ago. Junik was probably, in a
4 guess, sometime between May, June, July of 1998. But I don't wish to be
5 specific because I -- much water has gone under the bridge since then.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please now have Exhibit D7.
8 Q. That will be, sir, a piece of video footage showing the visit of
9 Mr. Holbrooke to Junik in June 1998.
10 [Video-clip played]
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Top it right there, please, for a
13 Q. Colonel, is this the kind of wall which is typical of compounds
14 enclosing houses in Kosovo and Metohija?
15 A. I'd say it's fairly typical, yes.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we go on, please.
18 [Video-clip played]
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Colonel, you notice that this is footage of Albanian television
21 about the visit of Mr. Holbrooke in June 1998. Am I right when I say
22 that we never saw any devastation in this footage that you refer to?
23 A. That's correct, yes.
24 Q. Thank you. But I shall be fair, and I'm going to show you
25 another video which is from - just bear with me for a second - 16th of
1 August, 1998.
2 MS. KRAVETZ: Your Honour.
3 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
4 MS. KRAVETZ: I'm going to object to the use of this video. We
5 have not received any information from the Defence as to the providence
6 of this video. We don't know who filmed it, when it was filmed, where it
7 was filmed. We have simply been informed of -- given a date and a
8 locality, but we have no way of verifying that it's accurate. So I will
9 object to the use of this video during cross-examination.
10 JUDGE PARKER: Is this an exhibit already, Mr. Djurdjic? I think
11 you said it was Exhibit D7.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honours, it is D7, and
13 it has already been used. And now we are going to view Junik, the 16th
14 of August, 1998. It was received from the RTS, radio television Serbia
15 the other videos, that is. But this one from the 16th of August, I
16 believe, was used by the Defence -- no, all the remaining three are by
17 RTS, and the 16th of June one. And they were obtained through the
18 national council for cooperation with the International Tribunal of
19 The Hague
20 JUDGE PARKER: Is the one that you have just shown an exhibit in
21 this trial?
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. D7 is the first video
23 that we saw. It has been tendered and admitted.
24 JUDGE PARKER: I'm told, Ms. Kravetz, it was admitted on the 30th
25 of January, this year.
1 MS. KRAVETZ: Your Honour, I'm not objecting to the use of D7
2 which is the video we just saw; it's to the use of the subsequent videos
3 that my learned colleague intends to use which have been listed in his
4 notification for cross-examination for this witness. And I'm objecting
5 on the grounds that I have just stated.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, all the videos were
7 on our cross-examination list. I have not brought any new exhibits now.
8 They have been entered into e-court and submitted to the Prosecution as
10 JUDGE PARKER: They haven't previously been tendered, these
11 remaining videos; is that correct?
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] No, no, they have not. That is
13 what I'm about to do.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Very well. We will see whether the witness is
15 able to sufficiently identify what is displayed for the Chamber to be
16 able to accept them as an exhibit. For that purpose, you may show them
17 to the witness.
18 [Video-clip played]
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Colonel, did you recognise Junik from these buildings and streets
21 that were just shown?
22 A. That's an impossible question to answer. I mean, that is very
23 typical of the area in Kosova-Metohija, as you well know. That could
24 have been anywhere within Kosovo.
25 Q. All right. Let's continue. Colonel, you said yesterday that in
1 mid-1998, 50 per cent of the territory of Kosovo
2 controlled by the KLA. Is that correct, did I understand that correctly?
3 A. That is correct, sir. I did qualify it by saying control in what
4 was, throughout 1998 and 1999, a very moving, fluid situation. But they
5 had blocked the three of the main roads across Kosovo, as I indicated
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see
8 Exhibit D002-4026.
9 Q. Witness, sir, could you please mark that area of Kosovo and
10 Metohija on the map which was controlled by the KLA before the start of
11 the summer offensive.
12 A. Your Honours, the map is barely readable to be quite honest. But
13 if this is Pristina here then Mitrovica, I presume, is up in this area.
14 The northern road was blocked roughly in the area of Rudnik, which is
15 about here. The middle and main route from Pristina to Pec was blocked
16 approximately at Lapusnik, roughly in that area.
17 JUDGE PARKER: [Microphone not activated] Can I ask you to pause
18 there, and if you could mark the areas that you have identified in
19 progressive numerical order so we start with number 1.
20 THE WITNESS: Sorry, Your Honour, 1 is at the top here, sir.
21 JUDGE PARKER: And that is?
22 THE WITNESS: That is the route from Mitrovica through a place
23 called Rudnik.
24 JUDGE PARKER: Could you mark with number 2.
25 THE WITNESS: With great respect, Your Honour, this map is
1 virtually -- well, is unreadable.
2 JUDGE PARKER: To my eyesight, it is not readable.
3 THE WITNESS: Rudnik, sir, is roughly in this area here where I
4 put 2. Roughly, sir.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
6 THE WITNESS: The next route is from Pristina where I've put
7 the 2, running through Pristina across the middle of Kosovo with Drenica
8 to the north and coming towards Pec in the west over here, if that is
9 Pec. I think Pec might be further. It's either there or there,
10 depending -- I mean the scale of this -- with respect, Your Honours, the
11 scale of this map, I have no idea.
12 JUDGE PARKER: If you could put a 4 against Pec.
13 THE WITNESS: It's one of these two places here, so either here
14 or here. This may be the pass into Montenegro beyond Pec itself.
15 The third route, Your Honours, is down to this town here.
16 JUDGE PARKER: We'll see if the lower half of the map from
17 Pristina down can be brought up to a more visible scale.
18 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
19 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
20 JUDGE PARKER: We will receive the map that you have presently
21 marked with the markings you've identified, numbers 1 to 4 as an exhibit.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D382.
23 JUDGE PARKER: And now if we can have from the lower half,
24 showing just Pristina and below. Is that easier for you to follow?
25 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honours, a little bit easier, yeah.
1 We have Pristina up here, sir. Down towards through Lipljan and down to
2 Stimlje, and the road was blocked in this area here.
3 JUDGE PARKER: And if you could mark number 5 against that area.
4 Thank you.
5 THE WITNESS: That was also the area of the Racak incident that
6 was mentioned yesterday, Your Honour. And then the last route came down
7 and then along the southern border here through the mountains of Strpci
8 and into Prizren itself.
9 JUDGE PARKER: If you could mark Prizren with a number 6.
10 THE WITNESS: There, sir.
11 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
12 THE WITNESS: And it was this southern most one that was open
13 through the period that I was being questioned about.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. Would you like this an exhibit now,
15 Mr. Djurdjic? It will be received.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D383.
17 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
19 Could we please see this map one more time.
20 JUDGE PARKER: The one that is on the screen now or the earlier
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] No, a new map without markings.
23 We have tendered this. No, the same area that you have shown.
24 Q. Colonel, could you please mark that one road that you mentioned
25 from Pristina to Prizren?
1 JUDGE PARKER: We'll wait until we get an unmarked display.
2 There it is.
3 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, Pristina and the southern -- the two
4 southern routes, one went to Stimlje and was blocked just to the west of
5 Stimlje. The alternative route was to go down further south and to turn
6 off up into this area here, Strpci, and then on to Prizren as indicated.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Thank you, Colonel, but let me ask you, is it correct to say that
9 from Pristina one had to go to Urosevac; and at Nerodimlje you had to
10 deviate to Strpci; and over the Sar Planina, you had to go over the
11 Sar Planina to get to Prizren. It was the so-called partisan route?
12 A. That is correct, from history, yes.
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I seek to tender this
14 into evidence.
15 JUDGE PARKER: Is that any different from what we saw on the
16 previous map, Exhibit D383? The witness marked each of those locations.
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Colonel, could you please draw these two, three, lines for us to
19 be able to get to Prizren. So Pristina, this lower line, and then
20 Prizren, just draw a line so that we can see which rout had to be taken
21 to Prizren.
22 A. Your Honours, you come south from Prizren, pass Lipljan, on down
23 to Urosevac. And then you turn west up into the Sar Planina, the
24 mountain area, over and into Prizren which is here. This is the mountain
25 area which Mr. Djurdjic is talking about.
1 Q. And please draw the line up until Prizren. Finish it.
2 A. [Marks]
3 Q. Thank you.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this map into
6 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
7 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D384, Your Honours.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now see Defence
9 Exhibit D005-0685.
10 Q. Colonel, can you see in the heading, or the letterhead, this is a
11 conversation that took place on the 25th of June between
12 Mr. Milovan Negovanovic [as interpreted] and you. Do you know
13 Mr. Milovan Negovanovic?
14 A. Sorry, obviously I've not seen this document before.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let us please turn to page 3 for
16 the witness to be able to see it.
17 THE WITNESS: Yes, Negovan Jovanovic was the colonel who was in
18 charge, Your Honours, of the foreign liaison service to which all defence
19 attaches in Belgrade
20 people -- personnel in the Vojska Yugoslavia.
21 MR. DJURDJIC:
22 Q. Colonel, a little while ago we mentioned that and drew those
23 maps, but here under item 2, Mr. Jovanovic is stating that the so-called
24 KLA, that is, he is quoting your words. So I would like to know whether
25 your position is reflected there.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please go back to that page
2 where there is item 2.
3 Q. Where it says the so-called KLA is increasingly revealing its
4 fundamental characteristic of a terrorist organisation which has no
5 qualms in liquidating its members for the slightest disobedience,
6 something that has become more apparent recently. However, what is
7 worrying is that the impression that the terrorists are controlling more
8 and more territory.
9 Of particular concern is the information that the following roads have
10 been cut off and are under the control of the following communications:
11 Kosovska-Mitrovica, Rudnik-Pec-Pristina-Komorane-Pec, and
12 Timlje-Suva Reka-Prizren." Correction, Stimlje. Is that what you
13 discussed with Mr. Jovanovic?
14 A. That is correct, sir, and as I've been attempting to imply to the
15 Court that throughout the conflict from the beginning or middle of 1996
16 when I first went down to Kosovo until 1999, I saw my job as the defence
17 attache to report accurately on both sides as the situation developed,
18 and as is written here quite correctly and as I've indicated to the
19 Court, that was the situation which was agreed to by Pukovnik Jovanovic
20 and myself when we were speaking together on the date of this particular
22 I think the point I would like to make is that having observed
23 counter-insurgency operations in many areas, the terrorists are called
24 by one man terrorists, by the other men freedom fighters. And it is up
25 to the states in question as to how they deal with them. And what one
1 was attempting to do was to provide correct information on the state
2 of both sides in this particularly difficult conflict which I was
3 privileged enough to observe.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let us please turn to page 2 in
6 both versions.
7 Q. Colonel, under item 3 it is stated that you pointed out as a
8 particular problem the Yugoslav Albanian border and the prevention of
9 future transfers of NVO
10 the infiltration of manpower from Albania
11 A. That's correct, sir.
12 Q. Thank you. And under 4 it is stated:
13 "The main reason why the MZ," which stands for the international
14 community, "failed to characterise the KLA as a terrorist organisation is
15 the impact that the mass media and the reporting from KiM have, which is
16 still in favour of the Albanians."
17 A. That is I think a correct picture, sir. And If if you go down to
18 the second paragraph, it says:
19 "This is not the first time that Colonel Crosland has tried to
20 convince us he is doing his utmost to have an objective view..."
21 And I would maintain that that is exactly what my reports
22 were. I reported on both sides as accurately as possible, fully
23 respecting that within, then, the sovereign state of the Federal Republic
24 of Yugoslavia
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Let us go to page 3
2 Q. In the last paragraph, Colonel, it says:
3 "He reiterated several times that his views were dismissed by the
4 persons he talked to and the institution he informed, and that he had
5 thus also, perhaps, jeopardized his career. He expressed his regrets at
6 the official stances of the MZ, international community, and pointed out
7 that it was his impression that the understanding of the KiM problem was
8 slowly changing, which can be seen from the latest messages the MZ and
9 NATO forwarded not only to the FRY authorities -- so forwarded not only
10 to the FRY authorities, but also to the Albanians in KiM, regarding the
11 cessation of the KLA's armed actions and the necessity to continue
13 A. You've raised several points there, sir. My career -- it's a bit
14 of a joke. I am a professional soldier, I speak as I see it. I'm not
15 paid -- I'm paid to give proper, correct information. I made assessments
16 as I saw it on the ground. I did learn Serbian, so I did understand your
17 language to a reasonable degree. I, therefore, attempted to put the
18 viewpoint from the Vojska Yugoslavia concerning what then, as I've stated
19 before in court and under oath, the KLA was a terrorist organisation. I
20 don't think I can be any more fairer than that.
21 That having been said, as my reports have indicated on many
22 occasions, unfortunately the disproportionate use of force throughout
23 Kosova-Metohija resulted in very adverse publicity for the Serbian
24 security forces. And as events have unfolded, Kosovo is now no longer
25 part of Serbia
1 Q. Thank you, Colonel. Sir, could you tell us at that time, that is
2 in mid-1998 and in the summer of 1999, what kind of weapons did the KLA
4 A. Again, sir, I've made many reports, and therefore the accuracy of
5 those initial reports are what I would ask the Court to look at. If I
6 remember correctly, in the early stages of this conflict, the KLA were
7 fairly lightly armed with Kalashnikovs rifles, some rocket-propelled
8 grenades. But as I've indicated, they were no match for the fire-power
9 that could be brought to bear on them by the Serbian security forces.
10 Later in 1998 and early 1999, there was a major improvement,
11 as I've indicated in various reports, that the KLA had been resupplied
12 with more up to date and more powerful, if you will, weaponry. But
13 that is a summary. The detail would be in my reports, so.
14 Q. Thank you. Did you have information about artillery in the
15 possession of the OVK with the range of 3 to 4 kilometres?
16 A. I don't recall that being mentioned, no, sir.
17 Q. Thank you. And mortars of various calibres?
18 A. I think there may have been mortars at some stage, yes, sir.
19 Q. Then RPG 7?
20 A. As I said to you earlier, sir, there were certainly -- I saw RPG
21 and variants, I think in September or October, yes.
22 Q. Thank you. In your statements you say that weapons were brought
23 into the territory of Kosovo
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we again see map D002-4026.
25 Can we see the southern portion of the map, please. Scroll up the
1 Pristina part, so down from Pristina as much as possible. Yes, thank
3 Q. Could you mark for us the route via which illegal weapons entered
4 the territory of Kosovo
5 A. Again, Your Honours, this map is not easy to follow, but I'll try
6 and mark some things. First of all, Prizren is here. This is the border
7 between Albania
8 roughly in this area here, up through the mountainous area of Pastrik to
9 the north-west of Prizren. Djakovica is here and again through this
10 entire area across the mountains, there were many routes that would then
11 be directed past Djakovica up towards Klina which is somewhere -- this
12 map is very -- I think that's Suva Reka, up towards the Drenica which is
13 roughly in this area up here, Your Honours.
14 So this was the supply route and through this area here in
15 Pec, to the west of Pec. Those in rough terms were some of the routes
16 that we understood men and combat supplies were being brought in. And
17 as I've mentioned in my statement to Pukovnik Jovanovic that this was an
18 area of concern to the international community and to ourselves who were
19 attempting to deal with the problem with the Serbian authorities.
20 Q. Thank you, Colonel. Here you have underlined Malisevo. I should
21 like to ask you in connection with your information about Malisevo in the
22 beginning of summer in 1998.
23 A. Yes, sir, on what particular point do you want to question me on?
24 Q. I should like to know whether the weapons which passed via the
25 border was to be directed to Malisevo and then to Drenica, and, in fact,
1 whether the KLA headquarters was in Malisevo.
2 A. As far as I know, sir, that was one of the major headquarters I
3 visited. Several of these headquarters in Drenica, Vojcnak [phoen],
4 Lausa, Mitrovica, Bajgora, and south of Pristina in the area of Magora
5 [phoen]. So I visited several of the headquarters. And as to your
6 specific question of whether the weapons went through Malisevo, I
7 couldn't possibly tell you. But one would presume that in any
8 organisation there was a direction, and we understood the direction was
9 towards the area of Drenica, just to the west of Pristina.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I seek to tender this
12 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
13 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D385, Your Honours.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Colonel --
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] But can we see Exhibit 927 which
17 is on the 65 ter list. Could we turn to page 2, please.
18 Q. Colonel, these minutes from a meeting of the collegium of the
19 General Staff of the 29th of June, 1998. And in it Major-General
20 Branislav Milovanovic, as you can see at the very beginning, underlines
21 the measures that NATO is planning to put in place or has already
22 executed, a part of which in the context of the resolution of the Kosovo
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now turn to the next page,
1 Q. Here he gives some NATO data, and on page 3, rather page 2, I'm
3 "The strength of the KLA is about 3.000 men. It's best trained
4 section numbers about 500 people, divided into groups of five to six?
5 They are mostly equipped with light infantry arms and mortars -- and
6 throwers. And Most of them brought from Albania. According to available
7 information, their combat training is organised in camps in Albanian
8 territory, more specifically in Bajram Curi, Kukes. It is conducted by
9 Albanians, former JNA officers, Mujahedin, and Muslims from Bosnia
10 Since the end of 1998, the Kosovo Liberation Army leadership
11 has been taking measures to strengthen the combat power of its units.
12 For the purpose of protecting settlements, the structure of the armed
13 formations has been re-organised on the clan principle."
14 Is this the information that was available to NATO at this
15 particular time, namely in June 1998?
16 MS. KRAVETZ: Your Honour, I object to that question. That is
17 outside the scope of knowledge of this witness. I don't know why he is
18 being asked about information available to NATO at the time.
19 JUDGE PARKER: First, is this document one dated in 1998? I
20 thought it was a 1999 document. It's reporting in the paragraph from
21 which you've just been reading, "since the end of 1998 the KLA leadership
22 has been taking measures," which suggests that it is a 1999 document.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have to read it
24 the way it is written, but obviously it is a mistake. The date is the
25 29th of June, 1998, and General Milovanovic is adducing data that are
1 available to NATO, that are in the possession of NATO.
2 JUDGE PARKER: You are suggesting that the document is correctly
3 identified on the first page as a June 1998 document, and that there is
4 an error in the date end of 1998 in the last paragraph on the page that's
5 now open.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Not only that, Your Honours, but
7 also in the translation into English. It is mistakenly misstated 29th of
8 June, 1999. That is also a mistake.
9 JUDGE PARKER: We seem to be doing very well with mistakes.
10 Whatever the date then, which is a matter of uncertainty, whether it is
11 June 1998 or 1999, the question perhaps for Mr. Crosland is whether he is
12 in a position to verify what is reported as the knowledge of NATO about
13 forces. Can you help us with that, Mr. Crosland?
14 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour, I'll try. In any
15 counter-insurgency operation the ability to accurately state what a
16 terrorist organisation has, its strengths, what we would call its order
17 of battle, I would suggest is usually exaggerated for very obvious
18 reasons, because the security forces would rather be facing slightly less
19 than what they put on paper for the reasons of securing the force with
20 which to deal with the problem.
21 The figures that are mentioned here of -- are hard core of,
22 whatever it is, 3-, 4-, 500, and about 3.000 in total, I wouldn't
23 disagree with. As I've said, it's always very difficult to tie down
24 counter-terrorist forces because obviously they are very covert and
25 wary of their security and don't really wish to advertise that they
1 are larger or smaller than is anticipated or is reported in the news.
2 I don't know whether if that helps Your Honours or not. But
3 these figures I would -- I wouldn't disagree with them in principle.
4 And the two areas mentioned, Bajram Curi and Kukes were forward operating
5 bases, if that's the correct term, in Albania from where considerable
6 reinforcement of the KLA took place throughout 1998 and 1999.
7 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you for that. Are you able to comment on
8 whether these numbers or something like them would be known at that time
9 to NATO?
10 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I suspect within the NATO intelligence
11 hierarchy they had good access to what was close to these numbers, yes,
13 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. Does that help you, Mr. Djurdjic?
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, it does, but the colonel is
15 modest here.
16 Q. What is your contribution to the information that was available
17 to NATO?
18 A. Sir, as you are well aware, I am but one small pebble on the
19 beach. I, as I've indicated to you, reported as factually and as
20 accurately as possible, and my assessment from Kosova-Metohija would be
21 placed alongside other intelligence sources, and these would all be mixed
22 together to come out with a possibly more accurate, possibly not so
23 accurate, picture of what was happening on the ground in Kosovo.
24 Q. Thank you. In view of your constant contacts as the defence
25 attache with the foreign liaison section of the VJ and of the Ministry of
1 Defence, do you know that in July 1999 [as interpreted], the chief of the
2 General Staff requested from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that
3 measures be taken against the Republic of Albania
4 assistance they were rendering to the KLA, logistical assistance in
5 materiels in terms of expertise, et cetera?
6 A. Sir, I recall that I was shown by either Colonel
7 Negovan Jovanovic, or General Dimitrijevic a map on which the
8 Vojska Yugoslavia had portrayed the incidents on the border that they
9 said had happened. I have no reason to particularly -- I looked at the
10 board, and the number of incidents seem, to me, reasonably true.
11 I was grateful for that information which I relayed back to my
12 Ministry of Defence, as I said, by way of indicating the seriousness of
13 the situation and what might happen in the future. So that was
14 valuable intelligence from our point of view, and I forwarded it back
15 to my superiors.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, page 25, line 2, it
17 is stated in July 1999, whereas it should be July 1998.
18 JUDGE PARKER: It appears to be another of those unresolved
19 questions, Mr. Djurdjic.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would not have
21 intervened, but the infallible Marie O'Leary warned me of this fact.
22 Q. Thank you, Colonel.
23 Did the Army of Yugoslavia, the VJ, present data that in the
24 first half of 1998 from -- seven soldiers [realtime transcript read in
25 error "747"] had been killed by KLA fire and that over 40 had been
2 A. You are asking me if I remember that specific detail, I'm afraid
3 I can't recall. I was, as I indicated to you just now, I was shown a map
4 of the incidents that had happened mainly along the border because that
5 was the primacy of the Vojska Yugoslavia at that particular phase of the
6 campaign. As to this -- the particular incident that you speak about, I
7 can't, in all honesty, recall that. If I have mentioned it somewhere in
8 one of my reports, I apologise, but I can't recall it, truthfully.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic, at page 25, line 24, you are quoted
10 as having suggested, "747 members of the VJ killed by KLA fire." I think
11 your suggestion was much more modest, was it not? Seven.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes. I said seven wounded and --
13 seven killed and 40 wounded. And the interpreters remark it was
14 interpreted as such.
15 Q. Colonel, we talked a lot about the village of Prilep
16 when I say that in that area there was permanent fighting from 1998 until
17 up to the point when you -- or throughout your stay in the FRY until
18 March 1999?
19 A. Sir, as I mentioned yesterday to the Court, the road going north
20 from Djakovica to Decani and on to Pec was in all aspects the front line.
21 And yes, the area around Prilep, which was a -- by the roadside there,
22 there was a small MUP position that was probably continuously under fire,
23 or on a daily basis under fire, I should say, from the KLA in that area.
24 I wouldn't -- I've reported that on many occasions.
25 Q. Am I right when I say that the KLA also opened fire at Prilep
1 from a distance?
2 A. Yes, that's quite correct, sir, yeah.
3 Q. Thank you. Will you then agree with me when I say that the area
4 of fighting between the KLA and the forces of the FRY actually resulted
5 in the damage to the facilities in between, because both sides were
6 interested in the road, in the communication which passes through that
7 particular village?
8 A. Inevitably damage was occurred between the two forces with
9 fighting. I refer you back to my reports where, again, there were
10 pictures taken of Prilep, and I have no idea where they are now, but
11 Prilep was literally 20 centimetres high. All the houses had been
13 Q. Thank you. Tell me, please, Colonel, have you seen the
14 photographs that you referred to just now during the proceedings, during
15 the trial?
16 A. The reason I'm thinking, Your Honours, is again I've made many
17 visits to the court. I can't remember that these photographs were sent
18 back to the Ministry of Defence and whether these were handed over along
19 with most of my reports, I'm not privilege to know that action.
20 Q. Thank you. Let's leave aside the other cases, the other trials
21 for now, but at this trial you have not seen those photographs?
22 A. Not on this particular time, no.
23 Q. Thank you, Colonel.
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I see that you are taking a sip of
25 your water, and I believe, Your Honours, it is time for our break now.
1 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, it's a convenient time, is it, Mr. Djurdjic?
2 We will have the first break now and resume at 11.00.
3 [The witness stands down]
4 --- Recess taken at 10.26 a.m.
5 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.
6 [The witness takes the stand]
7 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
9 Q. Colonel, I would like to dwell on Prilep for awhile. Do you
10 remember that in November MUP members were killed there and that their
11 vehicle was hit by an anti-armour projectile? Have you heard my
12 question, sir? Do you remember that in November 1998 a vehicle was hit
13 by an anti-armour weapon which resulted in the deaths of some MUP members
14 in the village of Prilep
15 A. Sir, I don't specifically recall this incident where three
16 members of the security forces were killed. However, as I said in the
17 earlier session, that it was clear there had been a resupply of more
18 powerful weapons to the KLA in October/November, and yes, I saw in one of
19 the headquarters anti-personnel or anti -- sorry, rocket-propelled
21 This was -- as I indicated earlier to the Court, this road from
22 Djakovica to Celani [phoen] Pec was the front line for many months from
23 March up until the finish of the campaign, so there were many such
24 incidents along this stretch of road.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see document
1 D005-0043. Page 1978 toward the end, and then 1979.
2 Q. The Prosecutor's question says:
3 "On the 20th of November, two Serbian police officers both from
4 the north-east of Serbia
5 Decani where their vehicle was hit by an anti-armour weapon." And on
6 page 1979, lines 22 and 23 says:
7 "Their vehicle was hit by an anti-armour weapon, what does that
9 And you are quoted as saying at the bottom of the page:
10 "Very close to this time, I can't exactly remember the date, but
11 I visited the KLA headquarters here at Riznik, close by Riznik, which is
12 the zone of Ramush Haradinaj, and they were very keen to show us off a
13 new range of automatic weapons; sniper rifles; and Panzerfaust, which
14 were anti-tank weapons; sniper rifles which had just arrived on the
15 latest resupply from Albania
17 A. [Microphone not activated]
18 Q. Thank you. And -- but the KLA, when they missed their target and
19 hit a building, do they not demolish buildings with such weapons?
20 A. Of course there will be damage, sir, yes. One accepts that.
21 Q. Thank you. I would like to ask you something else, something I
22 should have asked you at the beginning, but I didn't remember. Did you
23 know that the political objective of the KLA was the cessation of Kosovo
24 and Metohija from the Republic of Serbia
25 -- in other words, by force, and the creation of a greater Albania?
1 A. When I took up my position as defence attache in Belgrade in
2 July 1996, I studied as best as I could the very complex history of this
3 whole area in the Balkans, and the various conflicts that had taken place
4 going back to Kosovo Polje in 1389, and the claims of Albanians to Velika
6 problem, I'm not certain many people did. It's very complex. So within
7 history, there was always this claim that Velika Albania, greater
9 depending on which set of historical maps you look at, you can see this
10 problem displayed in many ways. So one presumes that this was part of
11 the KLA's, Kosovo Liberation Army's aims, possibly.
12 Q. Thank you. Do you know the first part which matters more to me,
13 that Kosovo and Metohija should secede from Serbia by use of force?
14 A. Sir, I think I can remember that being a stated aim of the KLA
15 when discussions were carried out with the KLA. When I met them, one
16 reminded them that Kosovo was a part of the sovereign state, former
18 particular aim. And this had been stated by President Milosevic very
19 forcibly in 1990.
20 Q. Do you remember, sir, the declaration of the KLA, dated 29 April
21 1998? It was published in the Bujku paper.
22 A. It doesn't come readily to mind, no.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see
25 Exhibit D005-0443, page 1905.
1 Q. Colonel, you can see your reply to the Prosecutor's question: We
2 can pass over to the report dated 14 April, and I'm interested in
3 paragraphs 3 and 4. Sorry, 30th of April.
4 "The KLA issued a nine-point statement on the 29th of April,
5 published in Bujku, the mass circulation radically inclined Albanian
6 language Pristina newspaper, saying that the homeland was in a state of
7 war and was fighting to liberate and unify Albania's occupied
8 territories. The statement called on Albanians," as said, "to review
9 their stand. It was a duty of the free part of their homeland to help
10 the occupied part. The KLA was ready to strike against the enemy at the
11 right time. However, the KLA was ready to take part in talks with the
12 enemy, but only after the occupying troops had left and with the
13 mediation of a third party. Any agreement without its presence would be
14 invalid. The statement appealed to the frustrated and faint-hearted who
15 were trying to plunge the people into defeatism and anarchy and who were
16 trying to remove themselves from the scene."
17 Do you remember that telegram you sent on the 30th of
18 April 1998?
19 A. With the greatest of respect, sir, as I've said many times, I
20 can't remember every single report. If that is what was sent then, then
21 that is the statement that I would stand by. And I think, as I've
22 explained to the Court just now, that these statements were coming out
23 all the time from the Kosovo Liberation Army, and one was attempting to
24 report the progress or lack of it on both sides as various incidents
1 Q. Thank you. In line 16 through 19, the question was:
2 "Mr. Crosland, just specifically referring to the statement that
3 the homeland was in a state of war and was fighting to liberate and unify
4 Albanian occupied territories, did you ever while you were there at the
5 time come across those kinds of statements from KLA members?"
6 And you answered in lines 20 through 23, on page 1905:
7 "Yes, Your Honours. All the time was the view put forward by
8 the KLA and other personnel, that this was a mission to retake what
9 was called by the Serbs Velika Albania
10 These are your words from the Limaj case.
11 A. Yes, sir, I don't have any problem with that. That is a
12 statement which I stand by, and I think I've tried to explain to the
13 Court it was the situation at the time.
14 Q. Thank you. Colonel, do you remember what the situation in the
15 field was like in mid-July 1998?
16 A. As I've said many times to the Court, the situation was very
17 fluid with one side getting the upper-hand and then the other side
18 retaliating all through the area of the period of 1998 until the security
19 forces, as I've said again in many reports, seemed to begin a more
20 concentrated effort to clear the major routes across Kosovo in
21 September/October of 1998. But during that entire period, as I've tried
22 to make it clear, attacks from the KLA and retaliation from the Serb
23 security forces were a daily occurrence.
24 Q. In this trial I see that your reports from early June until the
25 7th of August, I believe, are missing. So there is a gap. And I think
1 you said that you were at Malisevo on the 1st of July, 1998, do you
2 remember that?
3 A. It will be in one of my reports, yes. I think that was the first
4 time we went into Malisevo, yes. If I remember correctly. I apologise
5 if it's wrong. The reason there may be a gap is because our eldest
6 daughter got married in England
7 Balkans I was ordered home by the boss, my wife, to attend the wedding.
8 Q. Colonel, your wife is right, but we have a report that you
9 returned on the 25th of June, which means that from that date on you were
10 present here. But you went there, if I'm not mistaken, to verify whether
11 at Malisevo there was the OVK -- sorry, the KLA headquarters at that
13 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
14 Q. And what did you find out, sir?
15 A. If that date is correct, and I accept that that may be the date,
16 and forgive me if it's wrong, we drove north from Orahovac out of Serb
17 control into a KLA check-point. We were stopped and searched. We were
18 then escorted into Malisevo, and my report of that particular occurrence
19 mentions the facts, some of which I can recall.
20 Along the road there were very minor defensive positions,
21 small trenches, on the way to Malisevo. In Malisevo I seem to recall
22 there were probably, I don't know, 100, 150 KLA. Some were dressed in
23 black which appeared to be their police equivalent. And I was
24 interviewed for, I think, three hours.
25 We were then -- I said if I was not released there would be
1 problems because I was expected in Djakovica to meet other people, and
2 eventually the KLA decided to release me and my warrant officer to
3 continue our journey northwards.
4 Q. Thank you, Colonel. Page 1952 corroborates that you are right.
5 On pages 24 and 25 you were asked why you had gone to Malisevo on the
6 1st of July. You gave the same answer that you have just repeated. Is
7 it correct that you were first stopped by a man who looked oriental to
9 A. There was one particularly unpleasant individual who, yes, was of
10 Middle East appearance. I think there were also, and I think in my
11 report it states that there may well have been fighters from other
12 countries from Europe
13 the Balkan conflicts. There have been mercenaries who have come to
14 engage in a cause, which gives them a job to do.
15 Q. Thank you. Did you speak to that individual, and if so, in what
16 language did you speak with that soldier who was unpleasant?
17 A. As far as I remember, sir, he would not engage in any form of
18 conversation, and if I remember correctly, he was the only person who was
19 openly hostile towards myself.
20 Q. Thank you. I asked this question because I know that you were in
21 the Middle East so you may have been able to communicate with that person
22 in Arabic, but it appears that you didn't.
23 Who was the chief of that staff at Malisevo? Did you identify
24 the person amongst those fighters?
25 A. Again, sir, it might well be in my report. You are asking me now
1 under oath. I can't, to be honest, remember the names of various
2 individuals, so I don't wish to make a statement which is not correct.
3 Q. Anybody can make a mistake especially after so much time, but if
4 the Main Staff is at Malisevo, and you went there to establish whether
5 that was the case, then probably after initial difficulties you wanted to
6 meet someone who was in charge, a commander of that staff, and were you
7 able to reach the commander on that occasion?
8 A. I think with respect, sir, you are slightly simplifying the
9 situation. My warrant officer and myself were -- we carried the
10 licna karta, the identity card of Yugoslavia
11 the KLA. They had, in effect, captured us in their terms. And I was
12 taken at gun point to the headquarters, which I've identified before was
13 in a black and white building in the centre of Malisevo, and I was
14 interviewed, it was more interrogation if one is quite blunt, and I was
15 more concerned with the welfare of my warrant officer who was on his own
16 outside. And, therefore, this discussion, if we are going to put it
17 correctly, took place between me and a number of members of the KLA whose
18 names at this, 12 years on, I cannot remember.
19 But the situation was not as peaceful as you suggest. There was
20 a fair degree of hostility towards us which is understandable if you are
21 dealing with counter-insurgency forces. They are obviously concerned
22 about their own security and the fact that you may be threatening that
23 security by visiting their location. So one understands that and you
24 behave in a fairly guarded manner, or both sides behave in a guarded
1 Q. Thank you, but you stood up to the challenge and went there. And
2 thank God you were released, many weren't. But you went to Malisevo
3 again on the 25th of July, what was it that prompted you to do that on
4 the 25th of July?
5 A. As the defence attache accredited to the former Yugoslavia
6 the VJ, I was entitled under my accreditation to travel anywhere within
7 former Yugoslavia
8 of bounds. I did not recognise the authority of the KLA and, therefore,
9 insisted that I was totally within my rights to travel on this particular
11 Now, I knew the risks concerned, but in order to try and, as I
12 said, report as accurately and as fairly as possible on both sides of
13 the problem, I decided to carry out this particular visit.
14 Q. Colonel, I haven't interrupted you so far and I don't wish to do
15 so in the future, but for the sake of time economy, I would ask you to
16 give shorter answers.
17 But when you went to Malisevo on the 1st of July to see
18 whether there was a headquarters there, why did you go there again on
19 the 25th of July? That was my question. Had you -- whether or not
20 you had established contacts with the KLA in the meantime, it's better
21 for you to explain than for me to elaborate.
22 A. Sir, I can only repeat. And Your Honour, a question of time for
23 the sake, I won't repeat it. I went to Malisevo on the second visit in
24 order to see if there were any changes to the first visit. And that's
25 part of a principle of gaining intelligence. You can go and see an
1 incident on one occasion, and then when you return to that particular
2 incident or place, the situation can have changed. And that is why, as I
3 did around the whole area in the Drenica and around western Kosovo and so
4 on and so forth, I would go back on repeated times to see what the
5 situation was, how it had developed.
6 Q. Thank you. And had anything changed on the 25th of July when you
7 were there? And who received you at the KLA headquarters? And what was
8 the conversation about?
9 A. Again, sir, if you are asking specific details, and without
10 wishing to report erroneously to the Court, I must refer you back to the
11 reports that I wrote at the time. And if you produce those reports, then
12 the Court can see the detail of my reports as and when I wrote them.
13 To ask me to repeat things some like 12 years later on I think
14 is -- does not do anyone's understanding of the situation -- doesn't
15 make it any better, or clearer, rather.
16 Q. Very well. Colonel, can I ask you this: In the area from
17 Orahovac to Malisevo, had the situation changed in any way between the
18 17th of July?
19 THE INTERPRETER: Sorry, I did not hear the other date. Sorry.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I shall repeat the question; it
21 wasn't heard.
22 Q. Colonel, according to your information, had anything happened and
23 had the situation changed between the 17th of July and the 25th of July
24 1998 in the area between Orahovac and Malisevo?
25 A. Sir, with respect, my reports of those dates, if they are
1 correct, I'm sure they are, will be what is written in those reports is
2 the most accurate version I can give. And, therefore, I can't recall the
3 specific reports to hand. As I said, I would ask to you look at those
4 reports and then we can discuss them, if that is what is required.
5 Q. Colonel, do you recall that on the 17th of July Orahovac fell
6 into the hands of the KLA?
7 A. I seem to recall that that was correct. Orahovac was a very
8 important area, not least of all because it supplied an awful lot of
9 [indiscernible] to the whole of Serbia
10 businesses in Orahovac that really didn't want anything to do with either
11 side of the military organisations. They wanted to get on with their
12 business of making wine and continue their lives without being
13 interrupted. So if that is the date the city was retaken, then I would
14 accept it, yes.
15 Q. By the KLA?
16 A. I think that's correct, sir, yes.
17 Q. Thank you. And from the 17th to the 25th, do you also remember
18 other places that were taken by the KLA?
19 A. Sir, with respect, I've said many times, the situation flowed
20 backwards and forwards. As one side moved forward, the other side moved
21 back. And, therefore, the reports that I made at the time would indicate
22 the ebb and the flow of that particular conflict. But as to specific
23 dates 12 years from the time it happened, I can only refer you back to my
24 reports at the time, sir.
25 Q. Thank you. In your statements and your reports you say that the
1 forces of the FRY on the 25th when you were leaving, i.e., when you left
2 Malisevo, actually launched an action to liberate Malisevo. Do you
3 recall that?
4 A. That is in my report, sir, yes, and that is correct. There were
5 two, as I've stated, two combat teams on the Lapusnik and Kijevo on the
6 main Pristina-Pec road, and we came across these two combat groups that
7 were preparing to carry out an assault on to Malisevo.
8 Q. Thank you. Do you remember returning again and, I don't think
9 that I am mistaken, with the defence attache of the United States in
10 September -- in August to Malisevo?
11 A. If that is in a report, sir, then that report is correct. That
12 was the one written at the time.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now have on the screen
15 Defence Exhibit D005-0697. That is a video.
16 MS. KRAVETZ: Your Honour, I'm going object to this video on the
17 same grounds that I objected to the earlier video. We have no
18 information as to the providence of this video. We don't know who filmed
19 it, where it was filmed, when it was filmed, so we are unable to know
20 anything about the locality that's shown on the video.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. Once again we'll see whether the
22 witness is able to assist. If not, well, then it can't be an exhibit.
23 [Video-clip played]
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Colonel, did you recognise the place that we just saw in this
1 video footage?
2 A. Yes, I did, sir. That is the area of Malisevo. There is a
3 report of mine that shows the incident of the armoured personnel carrier
4 being hit by a mine, and that is in one of my reports. The interview
5 being carried out by the MUP pukovnik was shown on Dnevnik on the local
7 I think, if I may suggest, the point you are trying to make is
8 the village is without damage. I would say that, yes, this happened
9 before the incident we are talking about when the Serb forces decided to
10 go in and clear the area of Malisevo. I would humbly remind yourself
11 that I took around members of the Trojka and the G8, many ambassadors,
12 including Lord Ashdown on two occasions, and they themselves saw massive
13 wanton damage. But at this particular stage, Malisevo was untouched, but
14 it did not remain so, because the shops where the jewellery and the
15 costume, which I can actually remember since you've shown me the picture,
16 that whole area was subsequently destroyed. And a further village just
17 outside of Malisevo where there was a school, I picked up 12,
18 120-millimetre shells that had been fired into the school itself. Thank
20 Q. Thank you, Colonel. This is the 29th of July news reel, 1998 of
21 course. And it is true that you were there also subsequently. You left
22 it on the 25th, and according to your statement, you returned to Malisevo
23 on the 29th to see what it looked like.
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I should like to seek to tender
25 this exhibit, Your Honours.
1 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
2 THE REGISTRAR: The video will become Exhibit D386, Your Honours.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can I ask the usher for us to
4 again see the video D005-0698.
5 MS. KRAVETZ: And once again, Your Honour, I object to the use of
6 this video on the same grounds as the earlier video that was shown.
7 [Video-clip played]
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 Q. Did you recognise this footage, Colonel?
10 A. That appears to be footage of Malisevo, but, my comments are
11 exactly the same. When that was taken, I don't know. If you are
12 questioning the accuracy of my reports, then all I can offer to the Court
13 is that you have to go back to view the original reports.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this exhibit
15 also. This is the 16th of August, 1998.
16 Q. Colonel, I obtained this footage --
17 JUDGE PARKER: The video will be received, but it needs to be
18 made clear, Mr. Djurdjic, that we have no evidence as to the date of the
19 recording of any of these videos.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I apologise, this is
21 a slip-up on my part because I did not bring the material from which it
22 is evident what I ask for and what I received from the archives of the
23 RTS. But this exhibit was used in the Milutinovic case. But I shall do
24 so subsequently, rest assured.
25 THE REGISTRAR: The video will become Exhibit D387, Your Honours.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Colonel --
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now see Defence document
5 Q. Colonel, this is a directive of the General Staff of the VJ of
6 the 28th of July, 1998. GROM-1998. And you are familiar with this
7 document, you've seen it before. In this first passage under 1, Roman
8 numeral I, the Chief of Staff is providing data on the number of members
9 of the insurgence, as you refer to them.
10 A. With respect, sir, that is the estimate of the General Staff of
11 the VJ. And as I've said, that's their take, their estimate of the
12 problem that they are facing. And the numbers, as I've already indicated
13 to the Court, could be less or could be larger.
14 Q. Thank you, Colonel. In the context that you had with
15 General Perisic, did he reiterate these data that you can see in this
16 directive to you?
17 A. Again, sir, you are asking me very specific questions and very
18 specific dates that were -- or may have been referred to in my reports at
19 that period. Therefore, to comment in general terms under oath is not
20 something I'm prepared to do. If I made a statement, then could I humbly
21 suggest that it's presented, and we can discuss that statement.
22 But you are asking me to make an assertion on events, as I said, 12 years
23 ago where there are or there may be relevant reports which are critical
24 to this part of the trial.
25 Q. Colonel, I told you that I wish to ask you questions that you
1 haven't been asked by others, and I ask you this question because the
2 meeting with the Chief of General Staff at the time in which this
3 directive was adopted or thereafter was, after all, an event that one
4 should recall and would recall. And I know that you have not seen this
5 directive, but I ask you whether through contacts and conversations - and
6 you did say that you had conversations with General Perisic - he ever
7 referred to the kind of numbers that we saw here? This is the kind of
8 forces that he referred to. So do you recall that?
9 A. With great respect, in very general terms I've already said, yes.
10 But if you are going to be more specific about it, then we need to get
11 back into the dirt and find these particular reports. But in general
12 terms, these were the figures that the Vojska Yugoslavia briefed people
13 on and that is their appreciation of the situation at that time.
14 Q. Thank you, Colonel.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now scroll down to Roman
16 numeral III
17 Q. Colonel, this chapter is about the engagement of the
18 Yugoslav Army, and we have the first stage which is:
19 "In the zone of the Pristina Corps, secure the state border
20 towards the republic of Albania
21 intensity and in depth, while in the zone of the 2nd army and navy, with
22 increased intensity. In the zone of the Pristina Corps, protect the
23 units and military facilities from the operations of the sabotage and
24 terrorist forces and secure that the Yugoslav Army units supply routes
25 are passable. By quick action in conjunction with the forces of the MUP
1 of the Republic of Serbia
2 terrorist forces in the territory of Kosovo
3 special order from the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army."
4 My question is, were you familiar or acquainted with such a
5 role in engagement of the army in the period after the adoption of
6 this directive in context with members of the Yugoslav Army?
7 A. I think, if I remember correctly, sir, it was not until
8 General Ojdanic addressed the Belgrade Attache Association, I think it
9 was the 27th of August, where it was made clear for the first time that
10 the Vojska Yugoslavia was engaged in counter-terrorist operations in
11 Kosovo and Metohija. As I've stated many times, the Vojska Yugoslavia
12 aims in Kosovo were to secure the international border between Albania
13 and Macedonia
14 kilometres, to secure the Pristina Corps bases, their exercise areas, and
15 also to secure the lines of communication throughout Kosovo, which as
16 I've stated many times, was then a sovereign part of former Yugoslavia
17 I have no problems with any of these particular aims, as I've
18 said to you on several occasions.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I'll come back to what you have
20 just said, but for the sake of continuity, can we see D177 now, please.
21 Q. Colonel, now here we have an order by the commander of the
22 3rd Army of the 29th of July, 1998. Do you agree that this is an order
23 which is based on the directives that we saw just awhile ago?
24 A. That is the normal command process in that the chief of the
25 General Staff gives his orders to his field commander. In this case, the
1 commander Nis
2 the operational commander of the Pristina Corps within the operational
3 area of Kosovo. And, I think, if I may just add, that this is -- just
4 backs up what I said sometime ago, that the Serbian security forces were
5 winding themselves up for a major operation after August time, which is
6 what I've said on many occasions.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I should now like to show you a
9 document, the number of which is D167.
10 Q. Colonel, these are the rules of service of the Yugoslav Army
11 which were in force in the relevant period that we are now discussing. I
12 should like to ask you to take a look at Article 473. Is it fair to say,
13 Colonel, that according to this article of the rules of service, units of
14 the army may be used to counter outlawed sabotage terrorists and other
15 armed enemy groups, or to prevent or eliminate a state of emergency under
16 a decision by the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the
17 Supreme Defence Council?
18 A. Sir, I wouldn't beg to differ on this at all. All I would offer
19 to the Court is that there is proportionate force and disproportionate
20 force. How a nation deals with a counter-insurgency operation, as we are
21 currently seeing in some of the troubled areas of the world today, is a
22 matter for the national bodies that control those particular countries.
23 In this particular case, I think without any doubt, there is
24 clear evidence that there was massive destruction and movement of
25 personnel who, on the whole, were not initially engaged against the
1 Serbian security forces. I was in the position of having to report
2 this process which I have attempted to do with very detailed reports
3 which cover this entire area. The order from the Chief of the
4 General Staff is an order that that gentleman must defend, and I'm not
5 going to comment on a senior general's orders to his troops who are going
6 to carry out his orders.
7 A. Thank you.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] And I call document D004-3006.
9 Can we see it on the screen, please. Sorry, I was just corrected. It is
10 Exhibit D331.
11 Q. Colonel, this is a report of the forward command post of the
12 3rd Army sent to the General Staff on the 9th of August, 1998. Let us
13 skip Roman numeral I and continue with Roman numeral II, the first
14 paragraph. Am I right when I say that the commander of the 3rd Army
15 reports to the Chief of General Staff about the activities? Could you
16 tell us where these villages are, Gramocelj, Prilep, Shaptej, and
17 Glodjane, from where fire was opened on MUP and VJ members from infantry
18 weapons, rocket-launchers, machine-guns, mortars, and recoilless guns?
19 A. Sir, I'd remind you that on the 8th of August, 1998 -- I'll
20 retract that statement. What would you like me to say, please?
21 Q. I can see here that KLA activities are mentioned in the villages
22 of Gramocelj, Prilep, Shaptej, and Glodjane, that fire was opened at MUP
23 and VJ members from infantry weapons, rocket-launchers, machine-guns,
24 mortars, and recoilless guns.
25 A. Sir, we are talking about the same areas that we have discussed
1 discussed in considerable detail and which I've recognised were under
2 fire for a lot of the time in 1998/1999. And these villages of Glodjane,
3 Prilep, Riznik keep reappearing, which indicates the intensity of the
4 operations in this area, you know, relatively close to the boarder of
6 Q. There is this abbreviation BST, that stands for recoilless guns,
7 which goes to show that the KLA were using such guns.
8 A. If that was in the report, sir, then I would accept it.
9 Q. Thank you. Let us take a look at item 3. Am I right when I say,
10 sir, that in this item it is stated that army units support MUP units in
11 accordance with the decision on engagement?
12 A. If that is what appears in this report, I'm sure it is true. I
13 just draw the Court's attention to the amount of ammunition fired.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] And could we please show item 5.
15 Q. Under 3:
16 "The commander of the 3rd Army decided to support MUP units in
17 routing the DTS in the area of the villages of Gramocelj,
18 Prilep, and Glodjane, with the aim of pushing the DTS away from the
19 Djakovica-Decani-Pec main road"?
20 A. Sir, that's in total agreement what I've been saying throughout
21 this discussion.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see document
24 D005-0691. Just a moment. Ms. O'Leary will immediately say if I got the
25 number right.
1 Q. These, sir, are the minutes of a meeting between army command
2 organs at the forward command post and the commanders of subordinated
3 units which was held on the 17th of August. And about Junik, please take
4 a look at paragraph 6. The sixth paragraph:
5 "The army commander stated that Junik had not been destroyed,
6 that there were no civilian casualties, and that there were no mass
7 graves of which the world had been accusing us. These were facts which
8 the VJ stood by while everything else is either propaganda or politics
9 that must be opposed by all other members of society and the state
11 A. Sir, I think I've been trying to explain to the Court that one
12 was attempting to report accurately as possible and that some of the
13 claims that the media and other people were making in the worldwide press
14 were not correct, so I stand by what I've said. My reports at the time
15 were accurate and correct.
16 Q. Thank you. And now -- but do you agree that at that time the
17 commander of the 3rd Army was General Samardzic?
18 A. Forgive me. Which date are we now talking about, please?
19 Q. The 17th of August, 1998.
20 A. With respect, sir, if this general has signed this paper, then he
21 was presumably the person who wrote it, so I would accept that, yes.
22 Q. Thank you. In principle do you know who was commander of the
23 3rd Army from about mid-1998 until the end of that year?
24 A. Initially I think it was General Pavkovic who had been the corps
25 commander in Pristina. When exactly he changed over to 3rd Army
1 commander, I'm not -- I cannot recall.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let us see document D004-2953,
4 please. I apologise again, actually it's Exhibit D333.
5 Q. Colonel, this is an order issued by the General Staff on the 17th
6 of August, 1998. What you see in the first paragraph is the following:
7 "It is stated that in the period from the 13th to the 15th of
8 August, a team of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army carried out a
9 tour of inspection of part of the commands and units."
10 An order is issued with regard to that so let us go to page 2 and
11 take a look at item 4. Is it correct that the Chief of General Staff,
12 under 4, orders that part of the sabotage and terrorist forces from --
13 should be prevented from spilling over to KiM territory in the area of
14 the Raska Polim district and the Jablanica and Juzma Morava district.
15 Coordination is to be continued and joint action with the MUP forces and
16 in keeping with the assessments, support -- the MUP forces should be
17 supported in destroying the DTG
18 of the main tasks of the VJ units."
19 A. Sir, if those are the orders given by the Vojska Yugoslavia, then
20 I presume they are correct.
21 Q. All right.
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] All right. Let us see the last
23 page of this document, please, where you will see the signature.
24 Q. Can you see that this is signed by the Chief of General Staff,
25 General Momcilo Perisic?
1 A. That's correct, sir. But I think this was, if I remember
2 rightly, possibly General Perisic's last visit down to the operation
3 area, but I can't be certain of that.
4 Q. I don't know that, but we'll see about that later.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see document
6 D004-2965, please. I am again being corrected, it's Exhibit D334.
7 Q. Colonel, we have before us an order by the commander of the
8 3rd Army. In the introductory part it says:
9 "Pursuant to GS VJ orders, strictly confidential number 02/10-91
10 of 17 August 1998
11 combat readiness of all command and units engaged in the area of KiM to a
12 level that would ensure the successful completion of tasks, I here by
14 Please take a look at item 4(a)on page 4. Items 4(a) and
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I'm referring to page 4 of the
17 English version, and in B/C/S the page number is 2, I believe.
18 Q. Colonel, at the level of the 3rd Army, is this order an
19 implementation of the order of the General Staff, dated 17 August 1998,
20 which we saw a short while ago?
21 A. It appears to be the normal process of orders down the chain of
22 command, sir, yes.
23 Q. Thank you, Colonel.
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now please see document
1 Q. Colonel, this is a directive of the General Staff of the VJ of
2 the 16th of January 1999. The heading reads "Directive to engage the VJ
3 to prevent forced introduction of a multinational NATO brigade in KiM."
4 I wanted to go through all these documents to cover the period -- let me
5 ask you what was the political and security situation in mid-January
6 1999? Can you enlighten us? I'm of course referring to Kosovo and
7 Metohija and Yugoslavia
8 A. In January 1999 the Court would be aware that a Kosovo
9 Verification Mission
10 General Drewienkiewicz, DZ for short. I think that had been in position
11 since October 1998, or thereabouts. As we heard yesterday, there was
12 ongoing incidents in the area of Podujevo, and then in the new year there
13 was the serious incident at Racak.
14 It was quite clear then that probably a political solution was
15 not going to be -- was not going to succeed. And therefore both sides,
16 I would suggest, were considering the very serious position that we
17 were now facing in Kosova-Metohija, and that, as we all know, developed
18 into NATO bombing in March.
19 Q. Thank you. But in the introduction we see the mention of a
20 forced introduction of a multinational brigade.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let us now go to page 2 and item
23 Q. And I will read out to you the relevant paragraph.
24 "The introduction of a multinational brigade would be preceded by
25 an ACTORDER by the NATO command."
1 I would be interested in your comment about this ACTORDER. When
2 was it first implemented, and how did things develop?
3 A. Sir, with great respect, an ACTORDER is issued by the Supreme
4 Allied Commander Europe
5 Wes Clark. I think for a mere colonel to offer comment on his orders is
6 not appropriate. I believe the ACTORDER -- the ACTORD, was asked for by
7 General Clark I think in October or November 1998. And this was a
8 process of escalating the pressure on the FRY to come to some arrangement
9 by way that the situation could be salvaged before action took place on
10 both sides of the border.
11 I was in Kosovo when this order was given and part of the order
12 was that the Vojska Yugoslavia would withdraw back to its bases, which
13 again is detailed in one of my reports, and the Vojska Yugoslavia did
14 withdraw back. And one of the problems that I had mentioned to my
15 superiors was that if the Serbian security forces withdrew from
16 certain areas, then this space could be, maybe, would be filled by the
17 KLA. And that again is detailed in one of my reports.
18 Q. Thank you, Colonel. I don't want to interrupt you, I will
19 continue from where we broke off.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I think it's time for a break.
21 JUDGE PARKER: It is a convenient time. We will have the second
22 break. We resume at 1.00 for what will be a nearly three quarter of an
23 hour session. 1.00 we resume.
24 --- Recess taken at 12.28 p.m.
25 --- On resuming at 12.59 p.m.
1 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic, you have some matter to raise?
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. Let the
3 witness come in.
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] What we have to do is to -- we
6 need to have the Prosecution reiterate its agreement to the admission of
7 the Defence exhibits used by the Defence. The Prosecution has in fact
8 agreed, but we also have to seek your leave for its admission into the
9 case file. This was the instruction I was given, that I was to seek it.
10 JUDGE PARKER: You would like to have one or a number of exhibits
11 admitted, Mr. Djurdjic? A number?
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, according to the
13 list that the OTP agreed to.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Well, if it's by agreement, we will most certainly
15 receive what you propose.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 JUDGE PARKER: Are you going to move for them individually, or do
18 you move for them all to be admitted?
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Frankly speaking, I do not
20 understand, but I believe that individually is the way we want to
21 proceed, for an individual number to be assigned to each document.
22 JUDGE PARKER: They will be received. There are five of them, I
23 believe; is that correct?
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] There are four, Your Honours.
25 JUDGE PARKER: I have a list of five. Which on that list is the
1 one which you are not tendering?
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It is D004-2681. That is in fact
3 a book which is on the list.
4 JUDGE PARKER: Very well. The other four will be received. I
5 will pass the list to the Court Officer, and the last one on that list
6 will not be received. She will now announce the numbers for them.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, exhibit numbers will be assigned as
8 follows: 65 ter 4012 will become Exhibit D388; 65 ter 2136 will become
9 Exhibit D389; Defence document D005-0688 will become Exhibit D390; And
10 the last document, D005-0693 will become Exhibit D391. Thank you.
11 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
13 Q. I apologise, Colonel, but let us latch on to where we broke off
14 before. So this directive was adopted at a time when there was an
15 impending danger for the FRY of the activation of the ACTORD. Would you
16 now please look at Roman numeral II, page 2, the use of the VJ, last
17 sentence. "In coordination with the forces of the MUP of the Republic of
19 introduction, and prevent them from acting in concert with NATO forces."
20 That is the first stage.
21 Am I right when I say that this directive anticipates --
22 foresees the coordinated action of the forces of the MUP and of the VJ
23 forces in the event of the activation of the order?
24 A. It seems a perfectly reasonable assumption to be made by the
25 forces of Yugoslavia
1 possible attack from NATO.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can I now turn to 3; namely item
4 3.1. The tasks of the 3rd Army, that is on page 4.
5 Q. Does it say by your request the following units shall be
6 subordinate to you, BG-252/252, armoured brigade from the 1st Army, the
7 BG-37/37th Motorised Brigade from 2nd Army, and BG 3 Tactical Group Vihor
8 from the KSJ special unit corps?
9 A. That is what it says, sir, and these are some of the units that I
10 think I reported on being present during the last days of my time down in
11 Kosovo. So those are correct, as reported in my reports, sir.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we now look at
13 Defence Exhibit D343.
14 Q. Colonel, this is an order by the commander of the 3rd Army of the
15 27th of January, 1999:
16 "For the use of the 3rd Army in preventing the forceful
17 introduction of a NATO brigade, it's routing, and the destruction of
18 Siptar terrorist forces in Kosova-Metohija?"
19 Would it be fair to say that this was in fact the implementation
20 of measures stemming from the directive of the 16th of January, 1999
21 which was brought by the Chief of the General Staff of the Army of
23 A. This appears to be following the normal military chain of
24 command, so, yes.
25 Q. And under item 4, number 4, that is also on page 4, it is also
1 ordered that in the event this order is put into practice in concert with
2 MUP forces, DTS should be countered and prevented from linking to or
3 cooperating with the NATO Brigade.
4 A. Again this seems quite standard procedure, and linking with the
5 MUP would be totally proper and correct.
6 Q. Thank you, Colonel. Now, I should like us to go back to October
7 1998. What do you know about the Holbrooke-Milosevic Agreement?
8 A. With respect to the Court, I don't see how I can possibly answer
9 that question. I mean, I knew that Ambassador Holbrooke was in talks
10 with President Milosevic, but what they said together, I was not present
11 at, so I can't offer any help on that particular question.
12 Q. But do you know whether any agreement was reached between
13 Holbrooke and Milosevic?
14 A. Again, sir, the Ambassador Holbrooke was there, if I remember
15 correctly, right up until March the 22nd, 23rd, when it was quite clear
16 that the negotiations had failed, and that's really my only comment.
17 Q. Thank you. We shall move on. Do you know anything about the
18 agreement on the Kosovo Verification Mission and the subsequent
19 October Agreements that were reached in 1998 between the FRY on the one
20 part, and NATO on the other, and the OSCE, naturally?
21 A. Sir, this is --
22 Q. Excuse me, to make things short, if you did participate in that
23 and if you have any information, please tell me so; if not, tell me so
24 also so that we do not lose any time over any information that might have
25 been imparted from a third source or second-hand information?
1 A. Sir, I will not be rushed in my answers. You are asking detailed
2 questions; I'm attempting to give you the correct answers. I was part of
3 the -- I briefed the Verification Mission in Belgrade. I placed them in
4 position in Kosovo. But as to other detailed planning that took place
5 between the Verification Mission, OSCE, I was far too busy doing other
6 things in Kosovo. I was obviously aware of these negotiations, and I was
7 informed as appropriate. But it was important that the KVM, the Kosovo
8 Verification Mission
9 parties that had been engaged in Kosova-Metohija, mainly ourselves as the
10 defence attaches and the Vojska Yugoslavia.
11 Q. I do apologise, it was never my intention to rush you. I just
12 wanted us to clarify to see whether we can indeed discuss that topic or
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now see Exhibit P836.
15 Q. This is an agreement between KDOM and the Ministry of the
16 Interior of the Republic of Serbia
17 October, 1999, between Messrs. Djordjevic and Byrnes. Were you
18 acquainted with the content of this agreement?
19 A. Not as far as I was aware, sir. I know Mr. Byrnes because we
20 worked quite closely. But as to this -- as to this document, no.
21 Q. Thank you. I should like to now ask you to assist us in one
22 matter and to explain something to us. Please take a look at item 3,
23 this sentence:
24 "The police will use the Orahovac-Suva Reka-Dulje-Malisevo road.
25 And in the coming 15 days, it will not move along the Malisevo-Orahovac
1 road. The Malisevo-Orahovac road must remain fully open at all times for
2 unimpeded and free traffic of flow of people and goods."
3 You are familiar with the terrain in question, and therefore I
4 should like to ask you this: From Malisevo to Orahovac, as the crow
5 flies, what is the distance, the direct distance along that road in
7 A. I think it's between 12 and 15 kilometres, approximately.
8 Q. Thank you. If we had a better map, I should like you to draw it
9 for us on the map, but as it is not very good copy, let us at least have
10 it in oral statement. So during those 15 days, the road would be
11 available for the traffic of policemen from Orahovac to Suva Reka and
12 then to Dulje and Malisevo. I believe that from your experience,
13 according to what you have stated in your statements, you yourself moved
14 along that road. How many kilometres was that?
15 A. From where to where, sir? From Orahovac to Malisevo?
16 Q. From Orahovac to Suva Reka, that is what is written here,
17 Orahovac Suva Reka, and then on to Dulje?
18 A. If you go on the direct route from Orahovac on the cross-country
19 route, it's probably 10 to 15 a kilometres to Suva Reka, and then a
20 further 8, 9 kilometres to Blace. If you go from Orahovac south down to
21 Zrte [phoen] and then to Prizren and up, I would think it's approximately
22 40 or 50 kilometres.
23 Q. Thank you. Did you also factor in the road from Dulje to
24 Malisevo in that distance? You said Orahovac to Suva Reka and then
1 A. Dulje-Malisevo is approximately 16 kilometres.
2 Q. So it would be approximately around 60 kilometres, this
3 circuitous road, to be precise?
4 A. Yeah, approximately so, yes.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we now take a
6 look at P837, please. It should be there. It should be in your domain.
7 Q. This is page number 1 which is not of the essence because the
8 substance of the document is on the second and third pages of this
9 document, and that is what the question refers to. Do you remember or
10 did you perhaps participate in the visit of General Clark and
11 General Naumann in Belgrade
12 of which was this agreement of the 25th of October, 1998, which deals
13 with army units which remain outside barracks. As far as I know you
14 participated in those meetings?
15 A. I helped the American embassy with various meetings, but I don't
16 recall specifically attending this meeting because it's an extremely
17 high-powered meeting with General Naumann and General Wesley Clark there
18 as well. So, I'm sorry, I don't think I can help you on this.
19 Q. Please take a look at item 5. I didn't mean that you
20 participated in the making of this agreement in it's -- but that you
21 participated later in its realisation, in its adoption, and that you are
22 familiar with this particular item 5. It is stated here, Colonel, that
23 except for VJ units currently re-enforcing border guard units, all other
24 elements of the VJ remain Kosovo will return to garrisons except for
25 three company-strength teams which will remain deployed there. Each will
1 be tasked with protecting lines of communication between, A, Pec,
2 Lapusnik, Pristina; B, Djakovica, Klina; and under C, Prizren, Suva
3 Pristina. These three company-strong groups will return to garrison not
4 later than one week after the signature of the political agreement."
5 A. I've already told the Court that I monitored these three company
6 battle groups moving back to their barracks as detailed, and I think at
7 that particular time I passed the information direct to General Clark's
8 office, so I saw that they, as I've stated already, that the
9 Vojska Yugoslavia had complied with the order that they would withdraw
10 back to their barracks as detailed.
11 Q. Thank you. Colonel, do you agree with me when I say that the FRY
12 honoured the October Agreement and that the ACTORDER was never activated?
13 A. The initial ACTORD was never activated, no, because the FRY
14 [realtime transcript read in error "never"] complied with what was
16 Q. Thank you, Colonel. And then you assisted in the introduction of
17 the Kosovo Verification Mission, that's what you said. I would now like
18 to go through some reports of the Kosovo Verification Mission to see
19 whether you have any knowledge about some interesting events, and
20 therefore I would like to call Exhibit D157.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Before you move on, Mr. Djurdjic, page 59,
22 line 24, the answer of the witness is said to conclude because the FRY
23 never complied with what was required. I thought his answer was the
24 opposite, that they did comply?
25 THE WITNESS: That's correct, Your Honour. Sorry.
1 JUDGE PARKER: Just so that that is noted. Thank you.
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
3 Q. Colonel --
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] This doesn't seem to match. I
5 said D157. That's it.
6 Q. The first paragraph under the heading KLA, General Jankovic, it
8 "The most significant activity by the KLA was in the
9 General Jankovic line. Prior to the fighting this week, this region had
10 been quiet; only the strategic [indiscernible]. The KLA activity has
11 been limited to a small and insignificant inactive militia. Although
12 support could always be found from across the border in Tetovo, It would
13 appear that over 100 KLA crossed the border and encouraged the locals to
14 leave. The incentive to move into the region is unclear, although a
15 number of possibilities exist. By encouraging" --
16 Now, the following item reads:
17 "By encouraging the movement of internally displaced persons,
18 IDPs, the international media was able to claim a Serb offensive was
20 Colonel, we are speaking about the end of February and the
21 beginning of March. Are you familiar with the activities of the KLA
22 in the territory of the Kacanik municipality, I believe? And the
23 villages are Kotlina, Livelja [phoen], and that area.
24 A. I think, sir, there was an attack in that area at this particular
25 time and one or two MUP were killed, and hence the comments in this
1 Kosovo verification paper, which as it says is a draft paper laying out
2 what they think the situation is at the time.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please go to page 2
5 in the English version.
6 Q. It says here:
7 "The KLA forces in the Podujevo area were able to carry out an
8 attack in the town itself - effectively beating the Serbs."
9 Were you familiar with that, and were you in Kosovo and
10 Metohija at that period?
11 A. Again, sir, there is a report of mine, I believe, on this
12 particular instant that the -- one of the KLA headquarters by Mitrovica,
13 by Gora and Bradas, a village closer to Podujevo, and the KLA had carried
14 out an assault because this -- this main route going north from Pristina
15 through Podujevo to Kursumlje and on to Nis was the main supply route for
16 the Vojska Yugoslavia and all forces in there, and therefore not
17 unnaturally, the VJ and the MUP required to keep this route open, and
18 therefore a threat by the KLA to their main logistic supply route was
19 critical to their operations.
20 Q. Thank you. But here the victory of the KLA in the town of
21 Podujevo is alleged.
22 A. Sir, as I've said many times, the one force would gain the
23 upper-hand and then some days later the other force would retake it. So
24 if the KLA called it a victory, that is entirely up to them.
25 Q. Thank you. Unfortunately we broke off because it was time for a
1 break, and you were speaking about your apprehension that after the
2 October Agreement, once the military withdraws, the vacated areas would
3 be taken by the KLA which eventually happened. Did I understand you to
4 say that, sir? Or is it, did I actually correctly understand you to say
6 A. That is correct, sir. And I've given that in evidence to the
7 Court, and I believe it's in several of my reports, again attempting to
8 make my seniors understand the difficulties of this particular scenario,
10 Q. Thank you.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we see D002-4026. It's a map.
12 Q. Let me first ask you, Colonel, to tell me which territories those
13 are that were taken by the KLA when the VJ and other security forces
14 withdrew and all that after the signing of the October Agreements in
16 A. You are asking a totally unanswerable question. My reports at
17 the time specified the changes of occupation, and this happened
18 throughout Kosovo. You are quite right in saying that the KLA attacked
19 Podujevo. They were then driven out of Podujevo. When the VJ combat
20 groups withdrew under the NATO ACTORDER, the KLA followed up, and several
21 MUP were killed, I think, on the main Pristina-Pec road in the area of, I
22 think, Lapusnik Kumeranje [phoen]. So wherever there was a movement of
23 Serbian security forces out of an area, the KLA would come back in. I
24 mean, this happened all over Kosovo and Metohija.
25 Q. Thank you, but we have information that the military withdrew to
1 the barracks apart from those three companies under the agreement, and
2 that the police continued to engage in their activities in accordance
3 with the agreement. Mr. Zurapi who was Chief of Staff of the
4 Supreme Command of the KLA said that the KLA had occupied a greater
5 territory than it had held before the summer offensive in 1998.
6 A. I'm not quite sure on how to answer that question. I've
7 indicated that during 1998, and I have stated in reports that
8 approximately 70 per cent of the area was under KLA command, and that
9 flowed backwards and forwards. If this gentleman has stated that, then I
10 can't raise any comment on that, I'm afraid.
11 Q. Thank you, Colonel.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let us now return to Exhibit D157
13 and go to the end of page -- or to the bottom of page 4 of the English
14 version, please.
15 Q. Summary of events prior to 28 February 1999:
16 "KLA appeared to have moved into the region in force and combined
17 with a militia to a total force of 120 to 160. Locals heard some
18 shooting from the village of Stremce
19 coordinates. "This village is virtually cut off during to a heavy fall
20 of snow, and therefore any suspected activities cannot be confirmed by
21 the locals, making them susceptible to rumour. The KLA told the
22 villagers in the region to move out, nearly all of whom obliged by the
23 27th of February, leading to an IDP report on the 28th of February,
25 Colonel, did you know at the time that the KLA was misusing
2 A. This is an OSCE KVM report. At that particular time I think I
3 was probably one of the very few defence attaches still down in Kosovo,
4 so if I was not in that area, then I can't confirm or deny this
5 particular report, so I'm sorry, but you will have to ask people
6 concerned with the KVM OSCE.
7 Q. Colonel, these reports are just a tool for me to ask you whether
8 you -- about your knowledge. Did you know at the time that the KLA was
9 misusing civilians to their ends to create an apparent humanitarian
11 A. I think with respect, sir, there was a human disaster, and there
12 had been for several weeks. There had been many reports of internally
13 displaced persons, as I indicated already in the Pagarusa valley, and one
14 had seen villages on the move carrying all their worldly wealth in carts.
15 I think what I've said answers the question.
16 Q. Colonel, the question is simple, it follows from these reports
17 that the KLA drove out people from their settlements and thus creating an
18 apparent humanitarian disaster, invited journalists who kept reporting
19 about that. Did you have knowledge of that at the time or not? I don't
20 think that's a difficult question to answer.
21 A. What you are inviting me to say is that the KLA was responsible
22 for the internally displaced personnel. They may well have contributed
23 to it. It was not a one-sided effort. The actions of the Serbian
24 security forces had also contributed to it. The media was now growing in
25 strength in Kosova-Metohija, and therefore, whoever could get the
1 headlines got the credit. And it's simply a question of public relations
2 on both sides, which, as we know, is very powerful with the media able to
3 flash this -- these incidents around the world in a matter of seconds.
4 Q. Thank you. Let us just go through one more document. I believe
5 there's enough time left. Do you know, sir, that toward the end of 1998
6 and in 1999, the objective of the NATO member states was to be present in
7 Kosovo as a military Verification Mission?
8 A. Sir, if I understand your question, the Kosovo Verification
10 time to have a breathing space and to attempt to come to some peaceful
11 solution in this area. And, therefore, the Kosovo Verification Mission,
12 I believe, was accepted by the FRY authorities and headed, as I've said,
13 by Ambassador Walker and General DZ, and they carried on their duties
14 until early 1999 when they had to withdraw, on March 19th, I think.
15 Q. Thank you. You have mentioned a number of soldiers who were
16 involved in the verification and who were members of the KVM as a
17 civilian mission. And I have here a statement by Mr. Vollebaek which
18 says that in March of -- in March 1999, Mr. Milosevic was opposed to the
19 presence of NATO forces in Kosovo for the purpose of the completion of
20 the verification.
21 MS. KRAVETZ: Your Honour, I would kindly ask my learned
22 colleague if he could indicate the source of this statement that he is
23 reading out, and if it could be displayed to the witness so he can review
24 it before he is answering that question.
25 JUDGE PARKER: I am afraid we've run out of time for both of
1 those things to occur. That will have to be taken up tomorrow. If you
2 can get that documentation organised to assist the witness tomorrow.
3 We must now adjourn to resume tomorrow at 2.15 p.m.
4 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, with respect, I'm sorry to interrupt.
5 I had heard, or I was informed that I would be released today. If I'm to
6 be kept tomorrow, sir, and it's 2.00, then I'm going to have logistic and
7 business problems back in the United Kingdom. I appreciate this is minor
8 request with Mr. Karadzic and other people around, but ...
9 JUDGE PARKER: I am sorry, it's not a minor request, and I don't
10 know the source of your information that you would be finished today.
11 The cross-examination is continuing. It needs to finish. My present
12 expectation is that it will finish tomorrow and re-examination, so that
13 you can expect to be free after tomorrow. But we cannot do anything
14 about that. We are programmed to sit either morning or afternoon, and we
15 have been programmed tomorrow to sit in the afternoon at 2.15 so we can't
16 -- there are no spare courtrooms, so we can't sit in the morning. I'm
17 sorry about that. I hope you will be able to re-organisation in some
19 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE PARKER: We adjourn now until tomorrow at 2.15.
21 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m.
22 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 28th day of
23 October, 2009, at 2.15 p.m.