1 Tuesday, 2 February 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.
5 JUDGE PARKER: The witness is to be brought in. Good morning.
6 Unfortunately our start was delayed by a technical problem, but
7 apparently it is resolved now.
8 [The witness takes the stand]
9 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning. The affirmation you made to tell
10 the truth still applies, and Mr. Popovic is continuing with his
11 questions. Please sit down. Thank you.
12 WITNESS: BRANKO KRGA Resumed
13 [Witness answered through interpreter]
14 Examination by Mr. Popovic: [Continued]
15 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General.
16 A. Good morning.
17 Q. We will continue.
18 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] I will ask the witness to be shown
20 Q. It's your tab number 26, General.
21 You can see the document, it's called proclamation to the
22 citizens of Kosovo and Metohija. Are you familiar with it?
23 A. I know that a document with these contents was broadcast on the
25 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page in both
2 Q. I'll ask you to look at the last paragraph after the subheading
3 "Albanians." It says:
4 "Only living together without hatred and contempt leads to a
5 happier future, a carefree childhood for our children, regardless of
6 religion or nationality. Let us all together make an effort to restore
7 peace to our lands. Return to your homes and your everyday work. Do so
9 Was this something that was conveyed as a message to the Albanian
10 minority in all of Serbia and in Kosovo and Metohija and does this date,
11 the 7th of April, 1999, is it consistent with what you recollect?
12 MR. STAMP: Your Honours, I have been very hesitant to intervene
13 when there have been -- there has been quite a lot of leading questions
14 in chief. But this one is leading and very badly leading, having regard
15 to what the witness said in the previous testimony. In any case, in
16 chief, counsel should ask the witness non-leading questions.
17 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Stamp, I can't disagree for a moment with what
18 you say, but Mr. Popovic is quoting a document. And was -- he then
19 asked, Was this something conveyed to the Albanian minority.
20 How is that leading?
21 MR. STAMP: Well, I think having regard -- well, he puts it to
22 the witness as it were that it was conveyed to the Albanian minority. He
23 leads him on that score. In his previous testimony he was saying that he
24 was not sure that this document was even translated to Albanian.
25 JUDGE PARKER: Are you speaking of testimony yesterday?
1 MR. STAMP: No, Your Honour. In the 92 ter statement which is
2 part of the record of his evidence.
3 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] May I, Your Honour?
4 JUDGE PARKER: Carry on, please, Mr. Popovic.
5 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Without wishing to go into a
6 debate, I just read out a passage under the subheading "Albanians" and
7 the text that follows. If this is not enough in terms of grounds for
8 such a question, I will rephrase.
9 Q. Sir, would you look at this last paragraph and tell me to whom it
10 was addressed?
11 A. It's obvious that it was addressed to Albanians.
12 Q. Did what I just read reflect the position of the General Staff of
13 the Army of Yugoslavia at that moment, and did it reflect their attitude
14 to ethnic Albanians?
15 A. Yes, this is a reflection of the attitude of the General Staff,
16 but it was also quite obvious that only this road leads to proper
18 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Can I now ask for D006-0287.
19 Q. Your number 27. We see a document called "Briefing 27/99." The
20 date is April 1999. Could you focus on bullet point 7 under paragraph 2,
21 and it says:
22 "According to foreign ex-pats, the operation of land forces could
23 begin within 15 days, and it could involve around 100.000 soldiers."
24 What was the reaction of the General Staff upon receiving
25 information that a land operation could begin involving 100.000 troops?
1 A. We followed closely all the developments concerning the
2 possibility of lands operation. I told you that such information
3 circulated in the media and in some intelligence sources. Of course, at
4 that time we were not sure whether the operation would go ahead or not.
5 We knew that within the NATO various options were being considered in the
6 war against Yugoslavia including that possibility.
7 However, we did not manage to learn whether the decision had
8 actually been made to go ahead with the land operation. We were,
9 therefore, forced to carry out preparations for any contingency,
10 including that, because even as non-military experts can understand, the
11 army takes some time to prepare, so we conducted partial mobilisation,
12 training, and deployment of units on the axis where we expected a land
13 operation could go forward.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 On the same page, the last paragraph reads:
16 "In north eastern Albania, training camps, Bajram, Curri, Has,
17 and Kuks were re-activated to train Albanian terrorists. Weapons for
18 terrorists were being supplied to Albania and Macedonia."
19 Can you comment briefly?
20 A. Yes, this is one kind of information we received that such
21 training was conducted in training centres in the north-east of Albania.
22 Of course, we were sensitive to this issue, we monitored what was going
23 on with these men who were being trained there, whether they were going
24 to be sent into our territory, with what kind of objectives and
1 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see D006-89 and
2 D006-0296. The first number in B/C/S and the second number in English.
3 Q. It's called land operations -- "NATO Land Operations Against
4 SFRY." And here in item 2 it says:
5 "In both options, the aggressor is reckoning on Siptar forces
6 from the territory of Macedonia and Albania to spear-head the first
7 echelon of ground forces. They are being armed, equipped, and trained at
8 the moment."
9 Can you tell us how topical this information was and were you
10 expecting that to take place within a short time?
11 A. Yes, this is what our information was and we were trying to
12 predict what course it would take, if it happened. Our information that
13 the first waves of attack across the FRY border would involve forces of
14 Albanian terrorists from Albania and Macedonia. This was soon followed
15 by an attack in Kosare by strong forces from Albania. However, they were
16 rather unsuccessful with great losses on both sides and then they moved
17 the focus of attack to the axis of Morina where they again failed to
18 penetrate our territory.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] May I ask to tender this document.
21 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
22 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D537, Your Honours.
23 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] P1331 will be our next document,
25 Q. Your tab 28. General, this is a session of the collegium of the
1 Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command held on 9 April 1999. We will look
2 at page 2 in B/C/S and the same page in English.
3 You say the proclaimed objectives of the aggression were, first,
4 to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, second to neutralise the military
5 the power of the FRY, three to preserve the credibility of the US and
6 NATO, while the real objective is punishing the FRY and forcing it to
7 accept a peace agreement that would ensure the bringing in of NATO forces
8 into Kosovo and Metohija and seizing that part of the territory from the
10 Are these really the objectives as you presented them to the
11 collegium, and did they prove to be indeed part of NATO strategy?
12 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] We have the wrong page in both
13 languages. Page 2.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, let me say that this
15 is one of the collegium meetings where we considered the situation in
16 greater detail. I told you that during the war collegium meetings took
17 place every day, but two weeks into the war, this was a proper occasion
18 to consider the situation in greater detail. This presentation made is
19 based on all my information that I gained thus far and the objectives, as
20 I saw them, in their plans. We received that information from all sorts
21 of sources, our operative intelligence sources, agents, and others.
22 Most of these were -- had been implemented by that time or were
23 being implemented. When I say that, I mean primarily the resolving of
24 the status of Kosovo and Metohija and separating it from the territory of
1 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we now look at page 5 in both
2 B/C/S and English.
3 Q. On page 5 you say:
4 "The second option, if combat operations continue, is to bring in
5 armed Siptars supported by NATO. This option is increasingly likely
6 after the prospect of the planned withdrawal of the so-called
7 Kosovo Liberation Army and the Siptar people from Kosovo and Metohija
8 which has realistically created a difficult humanitarian situation."
9 Could you explain this planned withdrawal?
10 A. We had that information that in the movements of population there
11 was an intent to portray them as a humanitarian catastrophe in the eyes
12 of the international public, and when a large number of people find
13 themselves in a relatively small area, it does look like a humanitarian
14 situation. Indubitably, there were attempts to manipulate these people
15 with I a view to achieving certain goals that they thought they could
16 achieve that way and those objectives were continued bombardment and
17 infliction of the greatest possible losses on the army and the police in
19 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see page 8 in both
21 Q. On page 8 in paragraph 3 in B/C/S and I believe it will be
22 paragraph 4 in English you say:
23 "Bearing in mind the earlier outlined aims and the cruelty of the
24 aggressor, switching to the peace option would not be easy to achieve,
25 but we are convinced that it is possible, and in that sense if we quickly
1 make the right moves, there is room for real optimism."
2 A. We constantly sought to restore peace and to find a peaceful
3 solution. Here I presented a variety of options how the situation could
4 develop, and I unequivocally favoured the political solution, the
5 peaceful solution. However, this did not happen. Instead, the war
6 continued for another two months.
7 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] May I now ask for D183.
8 Q. Your tab 29. It's called "Directive to Engage the Army of
9 Yugoslavia in Defence Against the NATO Aggression," dated 9 April 1999.
10 On page 1, subheading 2.1, it says:
11 "Aims and tasks of the aggression: To prevent a humanitarian
12 catastrophe, to neutralise the military power of the FRY, and to maintain
13 the credibility of NATO and the US, while the real objective is to
14 inflict as heavy casualties on the VJ as possible, to force the FRY --
15 THE INTERPRETER: Could we slow down, please, both the counsel
16 and the witness are going too fast.
17 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. General, I will now ask you what the interpreters are asking us,
19 namely to slow down. We are both speaking too fast. After my question,
20 please wait a few seconds before you start answering, and I will try to
21 slow down too.
22 So your answer has not been recorded and you need to give us
23 again your comment on 2.1.
24 A. I think a comment is almost superfluous because it turned out, as
25 the war went on, that what is written here came to pass.
1 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we have page 5 of this
2 document, please. Page 6, paragraph 1, in English.
3 Q. In item 2 we see the concept and idea of strategic defence:
4 "Engagement and use of the Army of Yugoslavia in defence against
5 NATO forces should take place in two stages with complete implementation
6 of the Geneva Conventions on international law of warfare and
7 humanitarian law."
8 Do you know that the Army of Yugoslavia developed certain
9 documents to be given to every soldiers to educate them about the
10 international law of warfare and international humanitarian law?
11 A. Yes. Such documents were prepared. I must say, it was I who
12 proposed at the collegium meeting that they be prepared. And they
13 contained excerpts from international humanitarian law for officers and
14 for servicemen. They were prepared in a useful format so that they could
15 easily be carried on one's person in a pocket.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] We will move to the next document,
18 please. D504. The number that might be easier is D008-2858.
19 MR. STAMP: Can I inquire whether this one is notified, or
21 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I think you have been
22 notified. There was an additional notification sent by the Defence on
23 the 31st of January. Could we please see page 6 of this document.
24 Q. We see that it is a combat report; it's number 30 in your binder.
25 It's combat report number 23, dated the 16th of April, 1999. On page 1
1 it said:
2 "Under the guise of a humanitarian operation, the first part of
3 main forces who should take part in the ground operation against
4 Kosovo and Metohija are being brought into Albania."
5 Was there still a real danger of a land operation in the area of
6 Kosovo and Metohija on the 16th of April?
7 A. Yes, at the time, there was still concern on our side that there
8 might be a land operation.
9 Q. Can you please have a look at page 6. Under item 5, security
10 situation in the Yugoslav army, in the second paragraph it reads:
11 "The enemy attaches exceptional importance to psychological and
12 propaganda activities. In order to justify the continuation of the
13 aggression, in addition to stressing the humanitarian catastrophe and
14 ethnic cleansing, he now also stresses documentation of mass graves which
15 have allegedly been detected and located by satellites and mass rape."
16 On the 16th of April, did you have any information that there
17 were mass graves in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija?
18 A. No, at the time, as far as I remember, we did not have any
19 information that would indicate that. I think that this is another
20 example of how a problem, even if it existed, could be resolved
21 differently through propaganda. That is to say that the information
22 could be submitted to the state organs of our country, which would
23 certainly take measures to that effect if it was determined that the
24 information was correct.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see the next
2 document, it's D006-0300.
3 Q. It is your tab 31.
4 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] But before we move to this
5 document, Your Honour, I will tender the previous one because the number
6 is not 3504, but the one I told you, D008-2858, if it could please be
7 admitted into evidence.
8 JUDGE PARKER: Which document is that, Mr. Popovic?
9 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it's the document that
10 we just discussed. It's the combat report number 23, dated the
11 16th of April, 1999.
12 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. It will be received.
13 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D538, Your Honours.
14 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we now please go
15 back to document D006-0300.
16 Q. General, this is the briefing 43/99, the date of this document is
17 the 21st of April, 1999. Under item 5 it reads:
18 "According to the available information, transport to Albania of
19 24 Apache helicopters and 18 VBR should be completed. As part of the
20 reinforcements for the enemy forces in our region, around 300 members of
21 the 82nd VPD of the US OS arrived in Albania. Parts of this division
22 arrived in BH earlier, and the arrival of its members in Macedonia has
23 been announced. According to our information, the Italian contingent,
24 2500 members, will also be completed today in Albania."
25 So it was on the 21st of April. Could you please comment on
1 this. Does this mean that there was mass bringing in of forces to the
2 borders of FRY?
3 A. Yes, following the reactions of the armed forces in our
4 surrounding countries. We learned that the Apaches were moved from
5 Germany to Albania which was later on confirmed in the media. The Apache
6 helicopters are very efficient, and we were certainly afraid that they
7 might be used because we would certainly have increased losses due to the
8 attacks of these helicopters. Other elements of armed forces which are
9 listed here also caused concern on our part if they were to be directly
10 used in the area of Kosovo and Metohija.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I tender this
13 document into evidence.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
15 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D539, Your Honours.
16 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see document
17 D006-0306. It's a Defence document.
18 Q. General, it is your tab 32. It is a report 47/99, the date of
19 this document is the 25th of April, 1999. If you could please focus on
20 item 8.
21 "Manipulation with the Siptar refugees are continuing. They are
22 being sent around in circles on the border between Macedonia and Albania
23 which is organised by the CIA
24 Just a brief comment?
25 A. It was another piece of information we received that the number
1 of refugees was being represented as greater than it actually was.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please move on to the next
4 page of this document.
5 Q. Under "proposal," it reads:
6 "Since we are manipulating the Siptar refugees and using them to
7 justify the continuation of the aggression to public opinion, it might be
8 a good idea to call on them again to return to their homes and reject the
9 'care' that the NATO member countries are providing for them."
10 Here I would ask you to say primarily what was the character of
11 these calls and did you really wish for these people to return to their
13 A. Firstly, we understood quite well what problems could follow on
14 the basis of this manipulation with a great number of refugees, and that
15 really caused dissatisfaction of the public which is quite normal, so we
16 wanted, through this proposal, to stop this treatment of those people and
17 to call on them once again to return to their homes. I cannot say
18 whether that really happened or not, whether another proclamation was
19 issued or not because I do not remember that.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] I tender this document into
23 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D540, Your Honours.
25 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see the
1 document D006-0107.
2 Q. It is your tab 34, General.
3 General, it was a briefing held on the 30th of April, 1999, and
4 under your name on the first page it says:
5 "Activities were stepped-up for three reasons, the weather has
6 improved, fuel tanks have been provided, on the eve of Chernomyrdin's
8 Could you please firstly explain to us the stepped-up activities;
9 what does that mean? And then if you can please explain the third
10 reason: "On the eve of Chernomyrdin's visit;" what does that mean?
11 A. The stepped-up activities meant firstly that the NATO air force
12 was used and so were the cruising missiles. It is well known that the
13 numbers differed during the war from 3 to 500 until 1.000 sorties, we
14 noticed that at the time when the nights were clear in Belgrade, which
15 was rare, that the activities were stepped-up. That meant that the
16 number of sorties increased, as was the number of cruise missiles which
17 were launched. We believe that this was additional pressure against our
18 side and also against the mediators so that the conditions which had been
19 imposed would be accepted as soon as possible.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I tender this
23 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D541, Your Honours.
25 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see D006-0265. It
1 is a Defence document, and it's your tab 35.
2 Q. General, this is report number 73, dated the 4th of May, 1999,
3 under item 3. It says:
4 "The military and political situation in Macedonia" --
5 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] That is on page 2 in the English
6 version of this document.
7 Q. You say the following:
8 "We have obtained intelligence information that NATO has made a
9 decision for a large number of Siptar refugees to be transferred to
10 Macedonia, apparently because there are serious problems with the
11 distribution of humanitarian aid due to abuse by local Albanian
12 authorities. This implies new changes to the ethnic composition of
13 Macedonia in favour of the Siptar minority.
14 "During his recent visit to Macedonia, a senior military leader
15 of the so called KLA, said that NATO leaders had told him that Macedonia
16 is an artificial creation which should be divided and that the Macedonian
17 authorities no longer existed, because the Alliance has a major say in
18 making key decisions. On that occasion, he instructed Siptar nationals
19 to direct all their activities, including refugees and operations of the
20 so-called KLA, towards Macedonia."
21 First of all, as you were the chief of the intelligence
22 administration in the General Staff, do you know about the
23 greater Albania project?
24 A. The greater Albania project is well known to every citizen, I
25 believe, because it has been public for a long time. Several versions
1 are posted on the internet, and it was certainly familiar to us in the
2 intelligence administration.
3 Q. And did this project of greater Albania include the territory of
4 Macedonia and the ethnic Albanians who live there?
5 A. Yes, on the maps which are available --
6 MR. STAMP: It's leading. I mean, I hesitate to rise, but a lot
7 of these questions are leading. I rise in respect to only some that
8 might be controversial.
9 JUDGE PARKER: They are controversial, are they, Mr. Stamp?
10 MR. STAMP: Most of them are not, but occasionally, including
11 this one, is controversial to a degree.
12 JUDGE PARKER: If you are aware of that subject matter,
13 Mr. Popovic, if you could be careful not to lead in respect of it.
14 Thank you.
15 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] I will take that into account,
16 Your Honour.
17 Q. General, I will then ask you to comment on the quotations from
18 this paragraph which we just read out, and if you could tell us whether
19 these predictions were confirmed in future?
20 A. As for the greater Albania project, I already said a few words.
21 I think this is something well known and generally known. In the western
22 part of Macedonia, there was really a series of armed incidents between
23 Albanian groups and Macedonian authorities. After that, peace was
24 established on the basis of the Ohrid Agreement.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] I tender this document into
3 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
4 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D542, Your Honours.
5 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, could we please see
7 Q. That is your tab -- just a second. 37. You can see that this is
8 briefing number 64/99. The date of this document is the 12th of May.
9 And if you could please focus on item 4, and if we can comment on it. I
10 wouldn't read it out as it's a lengthy paragraph. If you can please read
11 paragraph 4 and provide a brief comment, please.
12 A. Yes. We presented the data that we obtained about the strength
13 of NATO forces in the surrounding countries. This was confirmed later
14 on. As I said yesterday, General Jackson at the Kumanovo negotiations
15 confirmed that they had been in the area for three months already and
16 that they were waiting to enter the territory of Kosovo and Metohija.
17 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please see the next page
18 both in B/C/S and in English. If we could see the subtitle "Proposals"
19 which read:
20 "It is necessary to take several steps with good media coverage
21 after talks with one of the international representatives who have good
22 representation in the international community, and these steps need to be
23 taken in a series that would show our willingness for a political
24 resolution of the proposal."
25 And under 2:
1 "That the commission for the estimate of damage from the
2 aggression should send a request to the UN and other relevant
3 international institutions which would -- may enable them to see the
4 degree of destruction and of the damage done to the civilians."
5 If you could please make a brief comment.
6 A. This was part of our continued resolution to try to find a
7 peaceful solution and for refugees to return, so we even said that it was
8 possible for our troops to withdraw. We wanted to show some goodwill for
9 resolving the problem. As for the other proposal, it was the result of
10 really widespread damage caused during this war and the wish that the
11 international factors be involved so that the facts would be established,
12 especially the suffering of the civilian population which was becoming
13 more and more frequent.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] I tender this document into
17 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
18 THE REGISTRAR: It will become Exhibit D543, Your Honours.
19 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we please see
21 Q. General, it is your tab 36. This is report number 90 on the
22 activities of Albanian OS and Siptar terrorist forces in the border area
23 with Kosovo and Metohija. We'll only focus on the first sentence which
25 "In the north-eastern Albania in Papaj, Kocanaj, and Ragam,
1 members of the so-called KLA, 1.500 of them in each of these places, are
2 undergoing 15-day training under the command of NATO officers. The
3 groups have been formed from Siptars, from the diaspora, and refugees
4 from Kosovo-Metohija."
5 According to your information, was there a link between NATO and
6 the members of the so-called KLA?
7 A. During the combat operations, we established a number of facts
8 which testified to this link, and then, later on, in various documents
9 and materials, it was undoubtedly confirmed.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I tender this document
12 into evidence as well.
13 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
14 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D544, Your Honours.
15 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we please see
17 Q. General, it is your tab 38. This is report number 23 dated the
18 19th of May, 1999, which reads:
19 "Through an indirect source, who is said to be reliable, we have
20 acquired photocopies of the topographical maps, which the KLA gave to
21 American representatives in Macedonia on the 15th of May, 1999. Drawn on
22 the maps are the precise positions and co-ordinates of the Yugoslav Army
23 and MUP units and also the areas which they are not allowed to target -
24 areas where KLA units and Siptar refugees are situated."
25 Could you please comment on this report. Are you familiar with
1 it, and do you remember this?
2 A. Yes, we received this information from our sources on the ground,
3 and it confirms what I just said about the co-operation and contacts
4 between the NATO forces and the Albanians on the ground which was beyond
5 a doubt.
6 Q. General, the following five pages are the excerpts from these
7 maps. I wouldn't dwell on each of these because of the time constraints,
8 but were these maps enclosed with this report, the maps which can be seen
9 as part of this document?
10 A. Yes, of course, the maps were enclosed with the report.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] I tender this document into
13 evidence, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
15 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D545, Your Honours.
16 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we please see the
17 document Y016-2926. To make it easier for my colleagues from the
18 Prosecution, it's number 4030 from their 65 ter list.
19 Q. General, this is the briefing on the 22nd of May, 1999. Under
20 item 2 there are quotations of what you said. And what I'm interested in
21 is where you say that there are four points of this disagreement --
22 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter notes that this cannot be found
23 in the document. Could the counsel please repeat.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is well known that at the time a
25 series of peace initiatives had begun in the international community and
1 various mediators were trying to find some resolution and to end the war.
2 There were various assumptions and various problems.
3 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. General, I'm sorry to interrupt you, but because of the
5 transcript, the question that I asked you was not recorded, so I shall
6 repeat it. It is on page 1 under item 2, when the Major-General Krga --
7 that's dash number 5, and it says there are four key contentious issues,
8 1, cessation of bombing; 2, composition of forces; 3, withdrawal of VJ;
9 and 4, raising of indictments.
10 Could you now please continue with your answer.
11 A. By that time, many initiatives had been raised in the national
12 community to stop the war. All sorts of mediators raised different
13 contentious issues. You see that one of them is cessation of bombing,
14 that really meant the conditions that had to be met for the bombing to
15 cease. Many advocated the idea that bombing should cease and then
16 political negotiations would follow. On the other hand, NATO insisted
17 that bombing would continue until all the said conditions have been met.
18 Another point here is the indictments to be issued against
19 political and military leaders of Yugoslavia that was already on the
20 agenda, and the issue was debated whether indictments should be issued or
22 Q. At that time, this is the 22nd May, 1999, how did you view this
23 issue of possible indictments, you and the intelligence administration of
24 the Army of Yugoslavia?
25 A. Well, I must say we did not deal with the possibility of
1 indictments too much. It's a legal issue. We focused on monitoring the
2 military forces in the region. But it was clear to us that issuing
3 indictments while the war was still going on would not contribute to
4 terminating the war and restoring peace. It could only cause additional
5 friction, mistrust, and discontent. We thought it would be better to
6 establish an interface with Yugoslav authorities to find a peaceful
7 solution, and there would always be enough time to raise indictments if
9 Q. You said that issuing indictments was not an issue that you dealt
10 with, but did you deal with -- did you read the indictments to see what's
11 in them?
12 A. Well, yes, when the first indictments appeared, it was a new
13 development and of course we had to review them to see what's in them,
14 but still the focus of our work were defence issues and monitoring the
15 engagement of NATO forces and such.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] May I ask for this document to be
18 admitted into evidence.
19 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D546, Your Honours.
21 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we now have
23 Q. Your tab 39. This is briefing number 77/99, dated 25 May 1999.
24 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we look at para 6. That's
25 page 2 in B/C/S and in English. Thank you.
1 Q. "Siptar refugees are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the
2 treatment they are getting in Macedonia. A rising number of refugees are
3 returning. Yesterday, about 4.000 refugees re-entered Kosovo from
4 Macedonia through the Djeneral Jankovic border crossing."
5 Can I have your comment.
6 A. This shows, again, the treatment these refugees were getting.
7 They were coming back to the area held by our forces which means that
8 they did not have any real fear from us. They did not fear that they
9 could be targeted by us. We accepted that as a hard fact, and to the
10 best of our ability, we tried to help them return to their homes or
11 wherever they wanted.
12 Q. Thank you. And then under the subheading conclusion, para 1, it
14 "We should not expect that the aggressor would lower the
15 intensity of strikes, regardless of the Russian criticism of the
16 aggressor's latest action. As long as a political decision enabling NATO
17 to safely withdraw from the conflict is pending, the attacks will
19 Again, can I have a brief comment from you.
20 A. Of course, already at that time even in NATO member countries
21 there were many initiatives to stop the war. They were searching for a
22 way to put the best face on it and to save the credibility of NATO, a
23 concern that was present from the very beginning.
24 Of course, there was internal disagreement. Some member
25 countries advocated the soon-as-possible cessation of attacks, whereas
1 other countries thought that intensive strikes should continue until the
2 authorities in Belgrade accept all that was demanded of them.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] I tender this document.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
6 THE REGISTRAR: It will become Exhibit D547, Your Honours.
7 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] D006-0325 will be our next
9 Q. Your number 40. Briefing number 78/99. 26 May 1999.
10 Paragraph 2, passage number 3:
11 "Up to 1200 hours, a total of about 420 sorties were registered,
12 including about 325 flown by combat aircraft, including long-range B-52s
13 and B-1B bombers, which is more than average, probably due to favourable
14 weather conditions but also to put pressure at a time of intensive
15 diplomatic initiatives. Announcements that the list of targets will be
16 expanded to include food processing plants and silos were also made, with
17 the aim of putting additional pressure and causing anger among the entire
19 Now, can I ask you to clarify what kind of pressures were placed
20 on Yugoslavia at the time of intensive diplomatic initiatives, and
21 explain this reference to a broadened list of targets. What was that to
23 A. We already noted through analysis that at the time of diplomatic
24 initiatives, the number of sorties always increased. We saw that as a
25 sort of pressure and a demonstration of the Alliance's readiness to go
1 full hilt until their conditions are met. Some of the NATO moves were
2 indicative of that, such as continuing to bomb a target that had already
3 been destroyed. Also, some of them threw bombs into the Adriatic Sea
4 after a completed assignment. We thought that that was a sign of their
5 own displeasure that the war was continuing against the very unequal
6 enemy. As for the broadening list of targets, we monitored this
7 possibility to include civilian targets and references to possible
8 inclusion of food processing plants and silos which would, of course,
9 cause an environmental catastrophe.
10 It's a well-known fact that power plants were bombed and there
11 was even mention of possible bombing of the nuclear reactor in the Vinca
12 institute, and we thought that even the possibility of bombing such
13 targets was known to NATO planners to be a sure-fire way of causing
14 outrage among the population.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] I ask for this document to be
17 admitted, please.
18 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
19 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D548, Your Honours.
20 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Now may I ask for D006-0258.
21 Q. It's your number 41, General. Report number 33 on KLA activities
22 to procure arms. 29 May 1999.
23 "According to information from a reliable source, a Siptar group
24 was in France a couple of days ago to purchase weapons for the KLA. The
25 group was most probably led by the newly-appointed chief of the KLA staff
1 for Kosovo, Agim Ceku."
2 This report is about the purchase of weapons for the KLA from
3 various sources. Tell me, at that time, on the 29th of May, was this an
4 on-going issue, the purchase of weapons for the KLA?
5 A. This went on all the time. They were constantly looking for
6 modern weapons. And after the war, all sorts of well-known foreign TV
7 stations made programmes about this. We monitored those activities, but
8 we never managed to detect all their channels and sources.
9 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I tender this document.
10 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
11 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D549, Your Honours.
12 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] D006-0256 will be our next
13 document, please.
14 Q. Tab number 42 for you, General. Report number 34 dated
15 31st May, 1999. In paragraph 2 we read:
16 "According to this source, this well armed and organised group is
17 repressing the Siptar population in order to recruit new fighters for the
18 KLA and to drive the others from their homes and force them to become
20 Your comment, please.
21 A. Yes, this is another report that confirms the pervasive efforts
22 to drive people from their homes and make them move out to create this
23 picture of a humanitarian catastrophe.
24 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can the document be
25 received, please.
1 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D550.
3 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. D006-0329, please.
4 Q. Tab 43 for you, General. Briefing number 87/99. June 1999.
5 4 June 1999.
6 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Page 2 in B/C/S and English,
8 Q. The subheading reads:
9 "Reaction to our acceptance of the principles."
10 And it begins with:
11 "The Italian Main Staff commented ..."
12 Could you read it to yourself, General, and comment.
13 A. Yes, in these reactions and comments by the Italian Main Staff,
14 we see confirmation of certain things we mentioned before. First of all,
15 it is confirmed that many NATO member countries were inclined to stop
16 this war as soon as possible. Second, it also turned out that there had
17 indeed been a lot of disagreement among the allies concerning the
18 conditions on which the war should be stopped. And it is very indicative
19 and noteworthy to see this announcement that the situation will change
20 considerably in favour of the Albanians once the Yugoslav security forces
21 withdraw, that is, the MUP, and the KLA will be strengthened.
22 I must say, we did expect that with the army and MUP withdrawal
23 from Kosovo, the KLA would be disarmed and only the KFOR would remain in
24 place. However, we all know now that this didn't happen. A protection
25 force was established from these forces, and now the security forces of
1 Kosovo are taking over.
2 This has unfavourable repercussions on the peace in the region.
3 General Jackson who visited Belgrade twice and talked to me in detail
4 told me that they had opted for this decision in order to keep under
5 control these armed Albanian groups in the framework of the
6 Kosovo Protection Corps. If they had disarmed them, they would not have
7 complied anyway, and they would have only continued to be a problem.
8 But we see that this situation continues to be complex to this
10 Q. Thank you.
11 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] May I ask to -- may I ask this
12 document be received.
13 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, as Exhibit D551.
15 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Now, may I ask for
17 Q. Tab 44, General. Here we see, General, that pursuant to a
18 decision of the Assembly of Serbia and after the peace plan of the
19 European Union and the Russian Federation has been accepted, a team of
20 the Army of Yugoslavia is authorised. We see the members of the team,
21 and your name under number 6. Then it goes on to say that:
22 "On behalf of the Army of Yugoslavia, the team is authorised to
23 hold negotiations with the authorised representatives of NATO and the
24 armed forces of the Russian Federation on all issues pertaining to the
25 implementation of the European Union and Russian Federation peace plan
1 and to sign documents relating to the withdrawal plan of units from the
2 territory of Kosovo and Metohija."
3 First of all, let me ask you, were you indeed on this team that
4 conducted negotiations on this peace plan? And then explain the nature
5 of the peace plan that was eventually signed.
6 A. Yes. As we can see here, I participated in these negotiations
7 from the 6th to the 9th of June, 1999. The nature of the document signed
8 was indicated in its name, military technical agreement. The members of
9 the army that took part in the negotiations with the KFOR were not
10 authorised to conduct political negotiations. Political negotiations had
11 been completed earlier at the level of Mr. Ahtisaari, in the state
12 leadership of Serbia; and the decision to accept this initiative was
13 ratified by the Assembly of Serbia and the Government of the
14 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. And we soldiers only had to carry out
15 the technical aspect of the agreement.
16 I must say that our counter-parts in the KFOR headed by
17 General Jackson treated us professionally as colleagues with whom an
18 important job was to be done. They treated us fairly. They did not push
19 us to the wall to accept any concessions that we had not been prepared to
20 accept. The first version was not accepted because we insisted some
21 provisions needed to be changed, such as the breadth of the land zone,
22 and that's why negotiations took three days.
23 The greatest stumbling point was the resolution of the
24 UN Security Council. We insisted on the recognition of that resolution,
25 whereas the KFOR representatives, including General Jackson, tried to
1 persuade us that we were representatives of a sovereign state and we were
2 entitled to agree to the entry of international forces in our territory.
3 The very fact that we were able to insist on certain points is proof
4 enough that these negotiations, while the war was still going on by the
5 way, were rather fair.
6 Q. Thank you. Do you know how many troops of the NATO Alliance were
7 on the borders of the FRY at the moment the agreement was signed?
8 A. We were able to see these troops because we were on the base
9 where some of them were deployed. 50.000 were ready to enter Kosovo and
10 Metohija, although at that moment there were not exactly 50.000, there
11 were just over 40.000.
12 Q. Thank you. General, did you at any time in 1998 or 1999 learn of
13 or see any plan at the level of the leadership of Yugoslavia, the
14 military leadership of Yugoslavia to expel the Albanian population of
16 A. With full professional, personal, and moral responsibility, I can
17 say that I have never seen such a document, nor have I ever attended a
18 meeting or a conversation where any of the influential people or
19 officials would have mentioned anything of the sort. It is well known
20 that dozens of thousands of Albanians were living at the time in
21 Belgrade, the capital, that they still live in the southern areas of
22 Serbia, and neither during the conflict nor at any time before or later
23 was there any intention to drive them out.
24 The only plan was to resolve whatever problems we had in a
25 civilised manner, politically. This was a constant in our policy. And
1 this is still the prevailing sentiment in the General Staff in the army
2 as far as I know.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this is the end of my
5 direct examination. I have no further questions of the witness, and I
6 see it's time for the break. And, yes, one more thing before I finish, I
7 would like to tender this last document.
8 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the document will become
10 Exhibit D552.
11 JUDGE PARKER: We will adjourn now and resume at 11.00.
12 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.
13 --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Stamp.
15 MR. STAMP: Thank you very much, Your Honour.
16 Cross-examination by Mr. Stamp:
17 Q. Good morning, General.
18 A. Good morning, Mr. Prosecutor.
19 Q. One of the documents you were shown earlier today is D180.
20 MR. STAMP: Could it be brought up.
21 Q. This is a proclamation of the citizens of Kosovo-Metohija. I
22 think you said you suggested that it be circulated. I just bring it up
23 to remind you what we are talking about. Do you remember that?
24 A. Yes, yes.
25 Q. Good. Now, do you remember that you were cross-examined about
1 that by Mr. Hannis when you came here to testify in 2007?
2 A. Yes, I remember that.
3 Q. I would just like to refer briefly to what you said about it.
4 MR. STAMP: If we now could move to D520. That's the transcript
5 of the witness's testimony that was received in evidence under Rule 92
6 ter. I should point out now that I'm on my feet and it crossed my mind,
7 Your Honour, that Defence had tendered two documents, one under seal and
8 an unredacted version. And I think D520 is the unredacted version. In
9 any case, could we move to page 16904 of that transcript. That is the
10 number on the transcript itself. I'm not sure of the e-court number.
11 Q. Close to the bottom of the page at line 10, Mr. Hannis asked you
12 to look at 3D753. That was the exhibit number in that case.
13 MR. STAMP: And, Your Honours, for the record that exhibit is the
14 same as D180 in this case.
15 Q. And he asked you at line 18:
16 "Do you know when this was created and who created this
17 particular document?"
18 You said:
19 "As far as I know, it was created around that date, and that is
20 the date of the document. It was broadcast in the media, that can be
21 checked. But as I said, I can't vouch for the authenticity of the text
22 myself because I didn't work on it myself, so I can't say how authentic
23 it is."
24 And he went on to ask you:
25 "Well, can you you show us or can you point out to us where
1 there's evidence, hard evidence, that it was actually circulated to any
2 of the persons that might have an interest in it or be affected by it?
3 First of all, where is the version in the Albanian language? Is there
5 And you said --
6 MR. STAMP: This is on the next page.
7 Q. So he asked:
8 "First of all, where is the version in the Albanian language? Is
9 there one?"
10 And you said:
11 "I really wouldn't know that. Of course there should have been,
12 but whether there was or there wasn't, I really don't know."
13 So that evidence remains -- or it is your evidence today or
14 yesterday that that evidence is true?
15 A. Yes, yes, of course it's true.
16 Q. Do you personally know how, if at all, this was circulated?
17 A. I know that it was circulated in the media, but whether it was
18 distributed in any other way as leaflets or posters on walls, I really
19 wouldn't know that.
20 Q. You would agree with me, General, that once war begins, and
21 indeed in the build-up during the war, there's a certain degree of
22 propaganda that is created and published by both sides?
23 A. In principle one might give a positive answer, but I must say
24 with full responsibility that we had absolutely no time to deal with any
25 sort of propaganda, but, rather, all the steps that we proposed and made
1 were made, frankly, with the intention to resolve the issues that existed
2 and to resolve everything that our initiatives were focused on.
3 So as for this document, there was no propaganda intention, no
4 trick or deception behind this, but really a wish to neutralise what was
5 very present in the international media about a humanitarian catastrophe.
6 And for us this would have been the best option had the Albanians
7 accepted to return to their homes. By that, this great problem of
8 humanitarian difficulties that they were faced with would have been
9 neutralised to a great degree.
10 I agree, and I can confirm that it would be good if this had been
11 published or broadcast in Albanian and in English and in Macedonian so
12 that this would cover all the aspects of the crisis.
13 Q. I suspect you are telling me that your side did not engage in war
14 propaganda; is that your position?
15 A. As far as I know, our side did not intentionally engage in war
16 propaganda --
17 Q. Very well.
18 A. -- aimed as causing any sort of confusion or anything else.
19 MR. STAMP: Could we look at D543 briefly, please. And if we
20 could go to the last page.
21 Q. D543 is one of these briefings on the 12th of May that you or
22 your staff put together for you, according to your evidence.
23 MR. STAMP: If we could just look at the last page very quickly.
24 Q. This proposal 1:
25 "Several moves must be made one after the other with good media
1 coverage (after talking to some of the international representatives with
2 good standing in international community) to show our readiness for
3 political solution to the conflict, the return of refugees, withdrawal of
4 units, et cetera."
5 Let me put it this way, you would agree with me that your side,
6 during the conflict, sought to make use of good media coverage to achieve
7 its purposes? Yes, do you agree or not?
8 A. I agree that the interest of our side was to be adequately
9 represented in the media, but that did not necessarily have to imply
11 Q. While we are on this document, I think you told us that these
12 briefings were drafted for you in preparation for your presentations at
13 the collegium meetings and at other meetings of the Supreme Command or
14 the General Staff. Is my understanding correct?
15 A. Yes, the briefings were prepared for my presentations at the
16 meetings which were held daily. These were the meetings of the
17 Supreme Command staff.
18 Q. And I'd like to just go back to something you said when you were
19 last here, when you were being asked questions by the Prosecutor.
20 MR. STAMP: And if we could return to that exhibit, the
21 transcript. I think it's D520. Page 16855.
22 Q. Starting at line 17. Or let's start from line 11 to get the
23 entire question. You were asked:
24 "You testified yesterday about the various sources of information
25 you had in the intelligence administration. You've said that that
1 included communiques from the state officials from the major countries.
2 You also used partially media reports. You used sources from military
3 and civilian diplomacy and various operational sources. What do you mean
4 by 'operational sources'?"
5 You said:
6 "Well, you probably know that every intelligence service, in
7 addition to public sources and the technology, has operative sources,
8 that is, agents of different categories and different levels."
9 Then you were asked:
10 "And were any of these paid agents, paid by the army
12 Your answer was:
13 "There were all sorts of agents, but the paid ones were easily in
14 the minority because we didn't have much money to pay them."
15 And you were asked --
16 MR. STAMP: And if we could move on to page 18656.
17 Q. "Based on your years of intelligence work, would you agree me
18 that some of those sources from whom you got intelligence had to be
19 viewed with a certain amount of skepticism or you would take their
20 information, as I would say in my language, with a grain of salt;
22 And your answer was:
23 "Absolutely, I think that applies to all intelligence services in
24 the world."
25 And that remains your testimony; correct?
1 A. Yes, certainly.
2 Q. Notwithstanding that, that some information may be incorrect, I'd
3 ask you about a couple of these briefings.
4 MR. STAMP: Could we look at D524. D524, please.
5 Q. This is a General Staff report on intelligence -- on KLA
6 intentions of the 9th of March --
7 MR. STAMP: Okay. D524 is the document with Defence number
8 D008-3977. We have it here now.
9 Q. Let me read from your testimony yesterday in respect of this
10 document, and this is at page 10568, line 8:
11 "Unfortunately, everything that was indicated here actually
12 happened, kidnappings, killings, media propaganda, recruitment of new
13 members, et cetera."
14 The document states that the KLA with foreign assistance had
15 drafted plans for staging a massacre of innocent Albanians and members of
16 the OSCE which would provide a legal basis for activating the forces to
17 extract the verifiers, and thus entry of a NATO KOV into Kosovo and
18 Metohija. That part of it I had a little bit of concern. Was there a
19 massacre of members of the OSCE; did that actually happen?
20 A. There was no major incident such as the one in Racak, but there
21 were individual attacks and murders in various places, but not a major
22 incident such as the one in Racak, as far as I remember. This did not
23 happen at this period.
24 Q. Maybe I'm not asking the question with proper focus. You said
25 yesterday that everything that was stated in this report actually
1 happened, and I'm looking in the report and seeing -- one moment.
2 A. As far as I remember, the Defence counsel asked me about the
3 first paragraph.
4 Q. Very well. Let me --
5 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Popovic.
6 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'm not sure if there
7 is a need for me to react, but the witness's answer was not that
8 everything that is included in this report happened. In his answer, the
9 witness stated what did happen and mentioned certain things such as
10 kidnappings and murders and so on, so I believe that the question that he
11 confirmed that everything that is mentioned here happened is not really
12 correct because he did not say that during the examination-in-chief.
13 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
14 MR. STAMP:
15 Q. Mr. Krga, during your examination-in-chief referring to this
16 document you said everything -- unfortunately everything that was
17 indicated here actually happened, kidnappings, killings, media
18 propaganda, recruitment of new members, et cetera.
19 Do you see paragraph 1 of this document referring to kidnapping
20 and killings?
21 A. Yes, I can see that.
22 Q. And you see in paragraph 2 it says here that "the KLA, with
23 foreign assistance, are drafting plans for staging a massacre of innocent
24 Albanians," --
25 A. We had --
1 Q. No, no, you see, the question now is -- or let me read -- I wish
2 to ask you about the kidnapping of members of the OSCE. May I just say
3 that I see from a clear reading of paragraph 1 of the report that
4 counsel's intervention was correct, I can see that. You said here the
5 KLA with foreign assistance has drafted plans for staging a massacre of
6 innocent Albanians and members of the OSCE verification mission. Did you
7 receive information that the KLA had a plan for massacre of members of
8 the OSCE?
9 A. In the reports which we sent to other users, each passage was
10 written on the basis of some kind of information or report which we
11 received from various sources, including the ones that you just
12 mentioned. There is not a single sentence here that is not --
13 Q. Did you communicate that to any member of the OSCE that there was
14 a KLA plan to massacre them?
15 A. As far as I remember, we did not; but we did inform the organs on
16 the ground, the 3rd Army and Pristina Corps Commands which were in
17 contact with them, but I cannot claim whether they informed them about
18 this or not.
19 Q. Did you ascertain what is the nature of this foreign assistance
20 for the massacre of OSCE verifiers?
21 A. We did not continue any investigation to establish whether this
22 was true or not. It says here that these were the plans, so this does
23 not necessarily mean that every plan will be carried out. We received
24 information that there were such plans, and this is why we notified those
25 who are listed here to take certain measures so as to ensure that this
1 plan would not be carried out.
2 Q. Yes. General Krga, please -- thank you for the information, but
3 can I just ask the question again.
4 Did you ascertain what is the nature of this foreign assistance
5 for the massacre of the OSCE verifiers? Who are these foreign elements
6 or factors involved in this plan?
7 A. From this point in time, I cannot remember with any reliability
8 whether anyone was mentioned by name or by institution that would make it
9 more precise. We just mention it here in general terms, we just said
10 foreign elements, and I really can't remember any more than that now.
11 Q. Can you remember where you got this information from? What was
12 the source of this information?
13 A. We daily received 100 or more reports and I really cannot
14 remember who the source of this one was.
15 Q. Let's look at D550. And it's the same question I want to ask you
16 about the source of these reports that entered into your briefings.
17 MR. STAMP: D550 has Defence number D006-0256.
18 Q. And this is information that you obtained through what you
19 describe here as intelligence work about the activities of the KLA in
20 Kotlina. Do you know the source of this information -- the original
21 source of this information?
22 A. After 11 years, I really find it difficult to remember who was
23 the operative source by first and last name or what was the structure
24 that forwarded this information to us. I really can't remember.
25 Q. Well, can I just ask you a couple of questions about the system.
1 Basically this information might have been received within the system by
2 a variety of different sources on the ground, maybe an agent who whisper
3 it, maybe electronic reception devices, it could be a variety of means to
4 obtain information of this nature; correct? You can't nod, you have to
5 answer verbally. Is that correct what I just said?
6 THE INTERPRETER: The witness is waiting for the interpretation.
7 MR. STAMP: Sorry.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm waiting for you to finish, and
9 then I will answer. Yes, you are completely right about what you just
10 said that the source is -- the possible sources are very different.
11 There are various.
12 MR. STAMP:
13 Q. And you had various types of these sources within Kosovo and
14 Metohija itself?
15 A. Yes. In Kosovo and Metohija we also had varied sources.
16 Q. So would field sources, for example, agents in the field report
17 up to a field officer who will report up to a regional directorate that
18 eventually would report up to you in the headquarters in Belgrade?
19 A. Basically it was just as you now expressed it.
20 Q. Do you recall generally about how many field agents you had in
21 Kosovo itself?
22 A. In Kosovo we had an intelligence outpost where there were several
23 agents continually, but we also sent agents from Nis and from Belgrade
24 and they would establish contact with their operative connections, so
25 that the number varied quite a lot from one day to another.
1 Q. About how many agents would you have there continually in 1999
2 during the intervention?
3 A. If I remember well, around five.
4 Q. And these agents would have various sources of information on the
5 ground in Kosovo? Each one of these agents would have various sources of
6 information on the ground in Kosovo?
7 A. Yes, in Kosovo and abroad, in foreign and neighbouring countries.
8 Q. But the five agents that were continually posted in Kosovo in
9 1999, were they responsible for gathering information in places outside
10 of Kosovo, or was their primary focus Kosovo?
11 A. It was their responsibility to engage operative sources in Kosovo
12 and in south Serbia, to gather intelligence within Serbia and beyond its
14 Q. Did they submit their reports up to you, or did they submit
15 reports at all in writing?
16 A. Yes, certainly. Each of these reports was drawn up based on a
17 written report. I mean, this report that we wrote at the head office.
18 It was produced based on the reports of our agents.
19 Q. You also had - I think it's your evidence, tell me if I'm
20 correct - agents who were based in countries, in foreign countries?
21 A. Naturally like other intelligence services, we had our sources in
22 foreign countries as well.
23 MR. STAMP: Let's look at a document you were shown, P1333. This
24 is the minutes of the collegium of the General Staff of Yugoslavia on the
25 2nd of February. Page 14 in English, 13 in B/C/S. And you could focus
1 on the bottom where Major-General Krga speaks.
2 Q. You said in a discussion about Russia:
3 "I would like to add something" --
4 MR. STAMP: Counsel is on his feet.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Popovic. The pages.
6 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] The page in B/C/S I don't think is
7 the right one. The witness needs to follow. In the B/C/S version, we
8 don't see the passage when Mr. Krga speaks. I believe it's page 12, only
9 if we scroll up. I think this is it.
10 MR. STAMP:
11 Q. You said:
12 "As early as 1991, while I was an envoy there," and that's in
13 Russia, "I said in reports to this effect that we shouldn't fool
14 ourselves that Russia would support us in the manner in which ... Carried
15 away by emotions, the Slavic soul, and so on. Russia is not ruled by the
16 Slavs or the by the Orthodox people, it is ruled by Jews, who are in
17 collusion with the Americans, and we cannot expect any support from
19 Was this opinion which you expressed based on your own experience
20 as an envoy or was it based on a report from intelligence sources?
21 A. Well, that's my experience from the time when I served there as a
22 diplomat for three years. Many of our people who visited Moscow in those
23 times of crisis were trying to establish a relationship with the Russians
24 on these grounds that I mentioned here, Orthodox Christianity, common
25 Slavic roots, et cetera. I was trying to say that all that doesn't
1 matter, that one should not think in terms of those categories because
2 Russia had changed and their leaders are guided by their own interests
3 rather than imaginary categories like Slavic roots, et cetera.
4 Q. Yeah, here you said they were ruled by Jews. That aspect, is
5 that the result of your experience, or was it intelligence?
6 A. Well, members of the Jewish community there had great influence
7 on the authorities; they had a lot of power. That's the experience I had
8 from my tenure in Moscow. When I said that, I meant primarily the
9 then-minister of foreign affairs of Russia, Mr. Kozyrev who often times
10 stated publicly and showed in many ways that he was talking to others in
11 regard to the Yugoslav crisis rather than worrying about our interests.
12 Q. So you would agree with me that this comment of yours, at least
13 to some degree, reflects your attitude towards ethnic issues?
14 A. No, by no means. My view when ethical -- ethnic issues are
15 concerned is quite clear. I do not discriminate on the grounds of
16 ethnicity. This was just a caution, a warning to those who were
17 expecting that Russians were going to help us as a brotherly Slavic
18 nation as Orthodox Christians. I was just trying to say that when the
19 Russians are concerned, we have to be more realistic in our expectations
20 of support.
21 Q. Very well, let's move on.
22 You referred to information you received of Kosovo Albanians
23 returning home, I think, one of the documents you were shown. There was
24 an indication that there were some 4.000 Kosovo Albanians who had
25 re-crossed into Serbia. It's a document dated the 25th of May.
1 MR. STAMP: D547.
2 Q. Can you remember this source, the original source of that
4 A. I really can't recall the original source of that information.
5 11 years later, you will understand, it's not easy to recollect every
7 Q. Did you, while you were in Belgrade during the NATO intervention,
8 become aware of how many Kosovar Albanians had crossed the border into
9 Albania and Macedonia in March, April, and May?
10 A. I don't understand. Is that a question?
11 Q. Yes, I'll ask it again.
12 While you were in Belgrade in 1999 during the NATO intervention,
13 did you know how many Kosovo Albanians had left Kosovo to Albania and
14 Macedonia in March, April, and May?
15 A. As you know, there was all sorts of information and all sorts of
16 figures circulating. I was not able to know to what extent the media
17 exaggerated the numbers. I don't think that anybody had real numbers.
18 We were simply that kind of situation.
19 Q. Did you or anybody in the government at the time make an effort
20 to get information from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees,
21 from the office of the High Commission for Refugees?
22 A. My service and I did not seek this data. I'm not sure about
23 others. Of course, it sounds logical that somebody should have sought
24 that information. But you will understand that the service I was heading
25 had its hands full monitoring the attacks of the NATO Alliance against
1 us. That absorbed all our time and all our attention.
2 Q. Do you know, just as a ball-park figure, that by the
3 25th of March when you referred to some 4.000 refugees returning home,
4 that by that time approximately 800.000 Kosovo Albanians had left their
5 homes? Sorry, withdrawn.
6 The document you were shown, D547, when you spoke about 4.000
7 persons returning home, 4.000 Kosovo Albanian refugees returning home,
8 that was not dated in March, it was the 25th of May, very close to the
9 end of the conflicts, when there were some negotiations in place. Will
10 you agree with me that by then, by then some 800.000 Kosovo Albanians had
11 already crossed the border going in the opposite direction?
12 A. I cannot quite agree because I am not aware of that precise
13 figure, whether it's exact or it's a little less or a little more, I
14 could not confirm.
15 Q. I'm giving an approximation. You knew that somewhere in that
16 region, 7-, 800.000 Kosovo Albanians had left their homes, didn't you?
17 A. I knew that there were many of them, and to me 1.000 would still
18 have been too many.
19 MR. STAMP: Counsel is on his feet.
20 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Petkovic -- Popovic.
21 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Just regarding the
22 record and the interpretation, lines 13 and 14 are not quite what the
23 witness said. The witness exactly said "whether it's exact or it's a
24 little less or a little more," not just "whether it's exact or it's a
25 little more." We can also check the tape if necessary.
1 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did mention the whole
2 answer, "whether it's exact or a little less or a little more."
3 JUDGE PARKER: Carry on, please, Mr. Stamp.
4 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honours.
5 Q. You said yesterday in respect to the BBC News report of the 1st
6 of April that you were shown - which is D532, so maybe you could bring it
7 up - that these press conferences, instead of being taken seriously, were
8 usually just one more piece of information which we had to verify and
9 check it out ourselves. And very often we found that incorrect data and
10 untruths were being presented. 10596.
11 What sort of checks would you make when or if you heard news
12 reports of massacres committed by Serbian or forces of the FRY in Kosovo?
13 A. I recall reports that 100.000 people, for instance, were killed
14 in Kosovo, and reports that there was an operation conducted.
15 Q. We heard that yesterday that there were these reports which
16 weren't true. And I'm not here saying that everybody report that was
17 issued by anybody during this war is true. I'm just asking you what were
18 these checks; you said you had to verify and check it out yourself. What
19 was the nature of the verification process and the checking process when
20 you received reports that there were massive crimes committed by forces
21 of the FRY in Kosovo?
22 A. I've already said that it was not our principal work to deal with
23 events in Kosovo-Metohija. Our job was done primarily outside the
24 borders of Kosovo. And in Kosovo-Metohija we focused on the KLA. I
25 can't say that we took every report and every press conference someone
1 held and then ran our own checks. We couldn't do that. We had too much
2 to do with regard to the combat activities of foreign countries against
3 our country. Maybe these reports were checked by someone else, I cannot
4 say for sure. You know that we also had the security service of the
5 Army of Yugoslavia that dealt with those internal security issue; we had
6 the Ministry of the Interior; there were authorities on the ground. I
7 suppose they were more involved in that kind of issues.
8 Q. Well, for the time being I'm only asking you about what you said
9 yesterday in respect to the BBC
11 "... press conferences like that being just one more piece of
12 information in which we had to verify and check out ourselves."
13 Can I take it from your answer now that you were not responsible
14 for and you did not participate in checking out these things, these
16 A. Formally speaking, it was not our job to check such reports. If
17 we had been able, we, of course, would have checked them. We checked
18 some information emanating from these press conferences through our
19 intelligence sources in other countries to confirm or to discard, but we
20 did not react to every press conference by launching an inquiry or an
21 investigation. It would have been impossible with our capacities.
22 Q. If we look at this one, there is something very important and
23 very concrete referred to in this one that I would imagine that you check
25 MR. STAMP: If could you scroll down this document, please.
1 Q. I'll read it:
2 "Major-General John Drewienkiewicz, former head of the OSCE's
3 Kosovo Verification Mission, gave moving details of the refugee exodus
4 from Kosovo. He said there was evidence that ethnic Albanians had been
5 beaten, robbed, raped, and murdered all over the Serbian province. He
6 added that there were reports of a mass grave near Prizren."
7 Now, this is not a general thing, this is something concrete, a
8 mass grave near Prizren. Did you check and verify that report? Whether
9 it was correct?
10 A. No, we did not engage our resources to check this statement.
11 Q. You said earlier that you had the Ministry of the Interior, there
12 were authorities on the ground, was it the responsibility of the
13 Ministry of the Interior to check these allegations, especially something
14 as concrete as an allegation of a mass grave in the vicinity of Prizren?
15 A. It's difficult for me to speak on behalf of the Ministry of
16 the Interior but I suppose if they had been interested -- but I suppose
17 they were interested in this report and wanted to check it, not only
18 they, but the units on the ground, I mean army units.
19 Q. I mention the Ministry of Interior because you referred to them
20 earlier indicating that they would be the ones interested in checking
21 that. We have evidence before this Court from some of the people who
22 participated in burying or disentering the bodies of Kosovo Albanian
23 civilians from two mass graves in the vicinity of Prizren. Did you,
24 during the war, know that these two mass graves existed?
25 A. No, no, I really didn't know about the existence of those mass
2 Q. We have evidence before the Court that during a joint
3 police/military operation in Meja in April 1999 upwards of 300 Kosovo
4 Albanians were killed by Serbian security forces. Were you aware of that
5 during the war in 1999?
6 A. No, I say once again that my focus of activities was on following
7 foreign armed forces, rather than the incidents on the ground.
8 Q. We have evidence before this Court that on or about the
9 26th of March, 1999, in the vicinity of Suva Reka -- not in the vicinity
10 of Suva Reka, in Suva Reka town itself, an entire family, but mostly the
11 women and the small children of that family, dozens of them, were
12 massacred by Serbian security forces. Some of their bodies were
13 transported to Prizren, and later on some of them were found in mass
14 graves in Serbia itself. Did you, during the war, know anything about
16 A. No, I really did not have any information about the crimes you
18 Q. What is striking is, one, we have evidence before the Court
19 presented by the Defence that responsible people,
20 Major-General Drewienkiewicz spoke about the mass grave near Prizren; we
21 have evidence from victims that the persons, woman and children mostly I
22 remind you, killed in Suva Reka were killed in broad daylight in the town
23 itself; and we have evidence before the Court that this killing at
24 Suva Reka was also broadcast in the international press. Whose
25 responsibility would it be to verify and check the truth of these
1 reports? Would it not be the MUP of Serbia?
2 A. I really cannot talk about who had what legal obligations among
3 other institutions that were part of the state administration or the
4 state in general because I don't know the details of all this. Each
5 institution had its legal authority and also rules according to which it
6 behaved during the conflict.
7 Q. According to your knowledge and experience as a general formerly
8 in charge of intelligence and intellectual as well, I say that because of
9 your education and training, was it not the MUP that was responsible to
10 investigate these allegations, to verify and check these allegations?
11 A. Well, based on general ideas about this, one could say that the
12 Ministry of the Interior and the organs of power on the ground and
13 whoever was there were all responsible for what you are talking about.
14 But let me say once again, I cannot assert that and, above all, I do not
15 have at my disposal any documents on the basis of which I could say
16 anything of that sort with any reliability.
17 Q. You testified earlier that you read the MOS indictment -- sorry,
18 withdrawn. You testified earlier that you read the indictment that
19 become public on the 27th of May against President Milosevic,
20 President Milutinovic, and others; is that correct?
21 A. I was basically informed about the indictment through the media,
22 but I did not have the document as such at the time.
23 Q. Didn't you say earlier that you read it?
24 A. No, as far as I remember, I didn't say that I read it, but that I
25 was made aware of it by the media and in conversation.
1 Q. I think you said that when the indictment appeared, you had to
2 review them "we had to review them to see what's in them." You recall
3 that, that you had to review them to see what's in them?
4 A. No, I really did not review the indictment as a document.
5 Q. Very well. I'm referring to page 21, lines 22 to 25. But were
6 you at least aware at that time that the indictment cited specific
7 instances of crimes allegedly committed by forces of the FRY and Serbia?
8 A. No, I didn't know that at the time either. I knew that the
9 subject of the indictment were the crimes allegedly committed by the
10 forces of FRY in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, but I did not know
11 anything about the specific locations, the number of victims and so
12 forth. I did not know the details about that.
13 Q. What, if any -- or, I'll ask a general question so you could
14 speak and describe fully what I want to know about.
15 What were the lines of communications that your department,
16 intelligence gathering, had with the MUP for Serbia? Did you exchange
17 information with them, and if so, by what means?
18 A. The information which was presented here shows that when we
19 assessed that the MUP structures could be interested in specific pieces
20 of information, then we would forward that to the MUP organs. Let me
21 note that at the time within the Ministry of the Interior, there was also
22 the state security service which was later separated and became the
23 security and intelligence agency, so we mainly directed the reports to
24 them. And occasionally, when there was information that had to do with
25 the army and the units, we would receive that from them, but that was
2 Q. Did you go to Kosovo during the NATO intervention?
3 A. No, I did not go there during the war. I only went once to Nis
4 which is a town in southern Serbia.
5 Q. Did you meet with Mr. Djordjevic during the war?
6 A. As far as I remember, I did not.
7 Q. Did you know him up to the time of the war?
8 A. Mr. Djordjevic was performing a high duty. He was a public
9 personality, so to speak, and of course I knew him.
10 Q. Can I take it from your answer that as a senior member of the
11 army you would, of necessity, have had to have some sort of professional
12 association with him? You knew him in his capacity as chief of the
13 public service department?
14 A. Well, I said I did know him as someone who was a public figure,
15 but we did not socialise then or later, simply each one of us had his own
16 preoccupations, and professionally we did not have many contacts.
17 MR. STAMP: Can we look at D523. And I'm moving on to something
18 else, Your Honours. If you could move to page 16 in the English, which
19 is page -- I am sorry, I don't think I have the page in B/C/S. But if we
20 could find in the Serbian version the last paragraph before
21 paragraph 2.2.
22 Q. Having read that, General, just the last paragraph before 2.2
23 begins, will you agree with me that by early 1999 - this is a document of
24 February 1999 - the FRY leadership, the Serbian leadership was aware that
25 ethnic tensions were running high in Kosovo and there was a real risk
1 that Serbs in Kosovo as well as elements within the security forces may
2 commit crimes against Kosovo Albanians?
3 A. From the paragraph you mentioned, there is no crime that would
4 follow. It follows that, as I noted, there was a likelihood that the
5 Serbian and Montenegrin population might organise themselves to defend
6 themselves, not to commit crimes. Now, of course, in armed conflicts,
7 various things may happen. And this is why I formulated it that way in
8 order to note that and to remind those responsible to take measures to
9 ease the tensions so that this would not happen, so that murders,
10 liquidations, kidnappings wouldn't continue because such things then
11 cause reactions, that is, the effect of the spiral of violence in war
12 when one act of violence causes another, and we saw what this led to. So
13 this was really a sincere intention to do something as a preventative
14 measures so that what I talk about here would not happen or would not
15 keep happening.
16 Q. But you were aware of the risk of self-organised Serbs as well as
17 security force members attacking Kosovo Albanian people in Kosovo?
18 JUDGE PARKER: Do you have an answer?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Firstly, the security
20 services do not do this self-organisation. They are state services which
21 are precisely organised. And when we talk about citizens, I noted here
22 the possibility that they might organise themselves in order to defend
23 themselves to put up resistance, so as a reaction to crimes against them
24 or any other activities that might jeopardise their lives and property.
25 And my assessment was, as you can see in the last part of the sentence,
1 that this might further complicate the existing situation in
2 Kosovo-Metohija and make it more complex, and that was why I brought this
4 MR. STAMP:
5 Q. General Krga, I suggest to you that the leadership of the FRY in
6 Serbia took advantage of this prevailing situation, this obvious danger,
7 to put in place a plan to expel the Kosovo Albanian population or a
8 substantial portion of that population as a solution to the problems they
9 were having there.
10 A. Was that a question?
11 Q. Yes. I suggest that to you. Do you accept that or do you reject
13 A. I cannot accept your claim, because I said that I have not seen a
14 single document that would indicate anything like that, nor was I ever
15 present during a single conversation that would point to an intention to
16 expel the Albanian population. I really believe that there is no
17 authority with any responsibility that could ever presume to expel a
18 million and a half Albanians or whatever their number was without the
19 international community reacting to that. I believe that something like
20 this really did not exist. And never in a single document, and I have
21 seen thousands of documents, did I see anything of the kind that you are
22 saying now. And I'm telling you that with full responsibility, with my
23 moral and professional responsibility. So that is what I assert to you.
24 Q. You wouldn't, would you, General, expect such an illegal plan to
25 be documented, would you?
1 A. Well, in principle, there could be some virtual plans, but I'm
2 telling you that I never saw a written document nor did I ever hear a
3 conversation to that effect.
4 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honours, I have nothing further in
6 Your Honour, may I just indicate that the Prosecution, of course,
7 relies on the evidence which is part of the evidence in this proceedings,
8 that is the evidence in the previous proceedings tendered under Rule 92
9 ter, in particular the cross-examination of this witness, as with any
10 other. There are documents that were used in the cross-examination
11 which, when one reviews the evidence, these documents are noted with the
12 exhibit numbers of the prior case. All of them that the Prosecution
13 wants the Court to take cognizance of have already been entered into
14 evidence, so I will not be seeking to enter -- or tender any of them, but
15 they have different exhibit numbers now in this case.
16 I could read them to the Court, but I think, as a general
17 principle, maybe a system could be found to facilitate the review of this
18 material by the Court when it comes to review the totality of the
20 Maybe I should just ask if it's necessary at this point to read
21 out the present exhibits numbers of those document that were used in
22 cross in the previous case?
23 JUDGE PARKER: As to the general question, Mr. Stamp, clearly a
24 cross-referencing of exhibit numbers would be of benefit both for final
25 addresses and for the Chamber's deliberation, and a table of that
1 cross-referencing would be, therefore, very helpful. I do not know if
2 counsel have discussed this between them because you could also
3 facilitate cross-examination and examination. I suggest there should be
4 some discussion and the matter then raised again.
5 The second part of your question is the particular exhibits
6 today. If you plan to rely on particular exhibits today, it would help
7 us and it could well help Mr. Popovic if you could read into the
8 transcript now those documents upon which you rely with the two exhibit
9 numbers. Thank you.
10 MR. STAMP: I see counsel on his feet. I don't know if --
11 JUDGE PARKER: I am sorry, Mr. Popovic, I thought you were
12 standing there nodding agreement.
13 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, I certainly agree
14 with some points. But, first of all, I think that my colleagues from the
15 Prosecution and we as a Defence should make an agreement about how to
16 continue doing this. This sort of practice would cause some problems for
17 the Defence, primarily because the exhibits which were used during the
18 cross-examination of the witness in the Milutinovic case would not be
19 presented here, which was the practice with all the documents that were
20 used for the cross-examination of Prosecution witnesses when the Defence
21 tendered each document that was used during the cross-examination at the
22 time. For the simple reason that this Trial Chamber would have insight
23 into these documents, and also that we could present these documents to
24 the witness again so that he would give every answer to each of these
1 And in addition to this, there is another problem with this, and
2 it is that the cross-examinations and then the redirects of witnesses
3 which already testified in different cases were conducted by counsels for
4 the Defence by six Defence teams, and if this system was accepted, then
5 the Defence would also need to submit a number of other documents which
6 represented the redirect or response to the documents which the
7 Prosecution used during their cross-examination. And I think that
8 thereby some confusion would be created in the case in connection with
9 the exhibits and the weight they have and how the Trial Chamber would
10 weigh them.
11 So I think that during the break it would be best if we could
12 consult with our colleagues from the Prosecution and then see what
13 position we might take on this. Thank you.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. Could I make it clear that the
15 transcript has been received in evidence in this trial and is popularly
16 relied on by both Defence and Prosecution for their respective purposes,
17 and where relevant will be referred to by the Chamber in its
18 deliberations and decision.
19 In this case, we are told that all exhibits relevant to this
20 case, all documents relevant to this case that were the subject of
21 cross-examination and examination in the previous evidence are already
22 exhibits before us. So there is no problem of exhibits not being before
23 us that are relevant.
24 That, at least, is what I understood from Mr. Stamp. Whether
25 that was confined to cross-examination or whether it extended beyond that
1 to re-examination, I do not know, and that certainly could be the subject
2 of discussion between counsel.
3 We would take the view, to make it clear, that, A, it would be
4 helpful to have a cross-referencing between exhibit numbers in this trial
5 and documents that are referred to in the transcript of witnesses.
6 Secondly, that if there is a document dealt with in the previous trial
7 that is considered to be material by either party, they should consider
8 whether or not it is tendered in this trial. If it is not, we will not
9 be taking it into account.
10 Is that enough to help you in your discussions? We have reached
11 a time now for the second break. We will adjourn and resume just after
13 --- Recess taken at 12.33 p.m.
14 --- On resuming at 1.03 p.m.
15 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Stamp.
16 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honours. As indicated by the Court
17 or directed by the Court, it would only be the documents that are
18 exhibited in this case that would be considered by the Chamber. What I
19 propose to read now is just a cross-reference of the documents that are
20 associated with this testimony in MOS that were used by the Prosecution
21 in MOS which are already exhibits in this case.
22 JUDGE PARKER: Do you mean Milutinovic?
23 MR. STAMP: Sorry, forgive me. When I say "MOS," I mean the
24 Milutinovic case.
25 JUDGE PARKER: It would be fancier if you used Milutinovic.
1 MR. STAMP: Thank you very much, Your Honours. I'm so sorry.
2 So this is a cross-reference of the Milosevic trial case numbers
3 or exhibit numbers to the case numbers, exhibit numbers in this case for
4 the documents used in cross-examination of this witness. The document
5 Milutinovic et al. Exhibit 3D934 is D539. Milutinovic et al. document
6 3D898, is D528 in this case. Milutinovic Exhibit P941, is P1341 in this
7 case. Milutinovic et al. Exhibit P935, is P965 in this case.
8 Milutinovic et al. Exhibit P939, is P902 in this case.
9 Milutinovic et al. P938, is P1339 in this case. Milutinovic et al.
10 P1878, is P1328 in this case. Milutinovic et al. P1487 is P1236 in this
11 case. Milutinovic et al. P1966, is D00104 in this case.
12 Milutinovic et al. P1999 is P933 in this case. And Milutinovic et al.
13 3D692 is D219 in this case.
14 I think that's it, Your Honours. But may I just have a moment to
15 cross-check one thing.
16 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
17 MR. STAMP: Lastly, Your Honours, Milutinovic et al. document
18 P1967 is D -- is D00105 in this case. Thank you, Your Honours.
19 In due course, Your Honours, what is proposed is that the
20 Prosecution will give a full cross-reference which we will provide to the
21 Defence for their cross-check and subsequently file for the record.
22 Thank you very much, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE PARKER: That will be most helpful, thank you, Mr. Stamp.
24 Now, Mr. Popovic.
25 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this position of the
1 Prosecution sets some tasks before the Defence because there were
2 redirects in the Milutinovic case, and in these redirects, certain
3 documents were are used that have different numbers in our case.
4 Therefore, we will submit to the Trial Chamber the numbers, the documents
5 used in the Milutinovic case that we should focus on when redirect
6 transcripts are read from the Milutinovic case, and we will submit these
7 in writing after we conduct redirect examination of this witness.
8 Re-examination by Mr. Popovic:
9 Q. [Interpretation] Sir, in connection with your evidence today, I
10 would like to show you D532 on the screen. [No interpretation]
11 JUDGE PARKER: We are not getting interpretation at the moment.
12 THE INTERPRETER: Technical error.
13 JUDGE PARKER: It's been corrected now. Thank you.
14 THE INTERPRETER: If the question could begin again.
15 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. I will repeat. How did you treat information that you received
17 through press conferences such as the summary you received in this
19 A. I've said already that we've had all sorts of experiences
20 regarding information presented at press conferences. Often times,
21 information presented at press conferences turned out to be inaccurate,
22 and we lent less credence to sources of information like this as a
23 result, less than we would have given them if they had proven to be
25 Q. So you are speaking based on your -- on the basis of your past
1 experience with information presented at press conferences, that's your
2 first sentence in the previous answer. Could you be more precise. Based
3 on what experience and for what reason did you treat this information in
4 that way?
5 A. I believe I've already mentioned that there were all sorts of
6 stories that at the beginning of the war 100.000 Albanians had been
7 killed, that there were widespread rapes; and it was quite clear that
8 this information and the numbers were exaggerated. And this led us to
9 adopt the view of such information that we adopted.
10 Q. Thank you. General, on page 54 of your testimony today, lines 1
11 through 5, the Prosecutor stated that the FRY and its leadership had a
12 plan to expel ethnic Albanians in whole or in part to solve their problem
13 there. And you give an exhaustive answer in the passage that follows.
14 However, line 9 is a bit controversial in my view, maybe because of the
15 way it was interpreted into English. Your answer in English begins with
16 the words, in interrogative form, I don't know whether it's correct or
17 not. The transcript reads "Can I not accept ..." That's why I want your
18 answer to be given again, to avoid confusion.
19 A. As far as I can remember, in response to that question, I said
20 quite positively that I have never seen a document or attended any
21 meeting where anyone mentioned expelling Albanians.
22 Q. Thank you, General.
23 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] These were all my questions,
24 Your Honour.
25 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
1 Questioned by the Court:
2 JUDGE BAIRD: Mr. Krga, there are a few questions I wanted to ask
3 you to clear certain things up in my mind, you understand. In answer to
4 Prosecution counsel a while ago, you said that you were basically
5 informed about the indictment through the media but you did not have the
6 document as such at the time. You recollect this? Now, he asked you
7 whether you had said earlier that you had read it and your reply was:
8 "No, as far as I can remember, I did not say that I read it, but
9 I was made aware of it by the media and in conversation."
10 Do you recollect this?
11 A. Yes.
12 JUDGE BAIRD: I want to direct your mind, Mr. Krga, to the
13 evidence you gave yesterday when you said that:
14 "When the first indictment appeared, it was a new development."
15 And, of course, you had to review them to see what was in them.
16 And my question to you now is what did you mean by review them to see
17 what was in them?
18 A. If I remember well, I believe that related to the first
19 indications that there is an indictment and that there are indictments.
20 I had reports that indictments were being prepared, and I believe that's
21 what my answer pertains to, reports that there were indictments in
22 preparation, but I really didn't see any indictments at that time.
23 JUDGE BAIRD: You reviewed them to see what was in them, did you?
24 A. No, no. At that time, when the indictments were issued, I did
25 not see them.
1 JUDGE BAIRD: I see. Now, again, counsel for the Prosecution
2 asked you earlier that while you were in Belgrade in 1999 during the NATO
3 intervention, whether you knew how many Kosovo Albanians had left Kosovo
4 for Albania and Macedonia in March, April, and May. And your reply was
5 that as far as you knew there were all sorts of information and all sorts
6 of figures circulating. You were not able to know to what extent the
7 media exaggerated the numbers, and you didn't think that anybody had real
8 numbers. You recollect this?
9 Now, then, let me direct your mind to your evidence yesterday
10 where you said in answer to Mr. Popovic that, as far as your proposal to
11 set up admission points for refugees, you had previously recorded:
12 "Their departure from the FRY and their return. They were moving
13 in circles. And so we came to the conclusion that it would be good, a
14 good idea ... to take back these people."
15 Now, what did you mean that "we had previously recorded their
16 departure from the FRY and their return"?
17 A. As far as I remember, I didn't say that we recorded their
18 departure or return, and we, I mean, we in our service really didn't do
19 that; it wasn't our job. And the idea that they should be admitted back
20 in an organised manner when they came back was first of all to relieve
21 their suffering, and secondly to improve the image of Yugoslavia which
22 was predominantly negative at the time in terms of treatment of refugees.
23 JUDGE BAIRD: Thank you. Let me get it quite clear, you are
24 saying that you did not say "we had previously recorded their departure
25 from the FRY and their return" yesterday? You didn't say that?
1 A. I did not say that yesterday, and we did not do that. I don't
2 know how it was --
3 JUDGE BAIRD: Thank you very much indeed. Thank you. Now, one
4 last question, Mr. Krga, you said yesterday that depleted uranium was
5 used in Kosovo in the NATO bombing and it was also used outside of Kosovo
6 and the rest of Yugoslavia. You said that outside of Kosovo there were
7 five locations where it was used, and, as Chief of the General Staff, you
8 personally went there to evaluate the situation. Now, do you recollect
9 this? Yes.
10 A. Yeah.
11 JUDGE BAIRD: Now, can you tell us what were those five locations
12 outside Kosovo?
13 A. Those five locations were villages around the town of Vranje.
14 One of them was Borovec I remember. I can't remember exactly those
15 micro-locations, but they are in the immediate vicinity of the town of
16 Vranje, between Vranje and Bujanovac.
17 JUDGE BAIRD: Was there any mass exodus on account of those
18 munitions there?
19 A. Those locations that we registered as locations where depleted
20 uranium was used, we marked them and cordoned them off prior to
21 decontamination so that citizens were aware of these locations. In most
22 cases, those micro-locations are outside villages, outside populated
23 areas, so that as far as I know there was no mass exodus on that account.
24 JUDGE BAIRD: Mr. Krga, I thank you very much indeed. Thank you.
25 JUDGE PARKER: Just to follow-up on that last question, it's not
1 clear to me when you are saying that the five locations, they were
2 followed up, cordoned off, and marked, are you saying that happened as
3 the weapons fell or at some time later? Can you help me there?
4 A. Generally speaking, during the war, we checked every location
5 that was bombed by radiological detectors to see if there was any
6 radiation; and if we found that depleted uranium munitions had been used
7 we would mark it, we would mark such locations and cordon them off. And
8 I cannot tell you now precisely whether it was on the same day or within
9 three or five days, we tried to do it as promptly as possible, to the
10 extent that we were able to in the conditions of air-strikes, continuing
12 Now, detailed study and establishing the numbers, all that was
13 done after the war. Cordons were put in place, the micro locations were
14 isolated, and then we made plans for decontamination. It usually
15 concerned territories where tanks or armoured combat vehicles were
16 stationed because NATO tended to use this ammunition on these locations.
17 JUDGE PARKER: What, then, led you as Chief of the General Staff
18 to visit the five locations in Serbia but outside Kosovo? That would
19 have been some three to four years later, if I understand your evidence
21 A. Yes, we began decontamination later. We could not organise
22 ourselves immediately because this is a quite complex technological
23 process. So in agreement with the civil authorities, the Ministry for
24 the Protection of Environment and the institute of nuclear technology in
25 Vinca we set up teams which then carried out the decontamination. And at
1 the time when I was the Chief of General Staff, this task was not yet
2 completed. But it was almost completed and so I visited the members of
3 the army who were charged with these tasks. I remember that I once went
4 there together with the Minister for the Protection of Environment, that
5 was Ms. Andjelka Mihajlov, I was on a visit together with her. So I was
6 not directly charged with this; I was just visiting the area and
7 supervising the work of our professional teams which were involved in
8 this work.
9 JUDGE BAIRD: Mr. Krga, I do apologise, but I have a question, a
10 bit tangential to the one my brother just asked you. Now, you said the
11 refugees were returning to Kosovo which meant that they do not have any
12 real fear that they would be targeted by the authorities. Now, did they
13 have any fear of depleted uranium at all?
14 A. I cannot say how much they knew about the use of depleted
15 uranium, whether they were informed about this or not. It depends what
16 part of Kosovo and Metohija they were returning to. What we managed to
17 record, and we couldn't do all that precisely because we had to leave the
18 territory of Kosovo, was that not all parts of the territory of Kosovo
19 and Metohija were hit with this sort of ammunition, so that I really
20 don't know to what extent the people who were returning were informed
21 whether their village or town included any spot that was hit by this kind
22 of ammunition.
23 JUDGE BAIRD: So they wouldn't have left Kosovo because of
24 depleted uranium, would they?
25 A. I couldn't say that. I could not answer with either yes or no.
1 It is certain that they were aware at the time, both these people and the
2 people living around the town of Vranje, what were the dangers of the
3 ammunition with depleted uranium. Had they been fully aware that, they
4 would probably have sought some short of shelter and wouldn't have
5 remained close to that area.
6 JUDGE BAIRD: Thank you so much. Thank you.
7 JUDGE PARKER: You will be pleased to know that that completes
8 the questions for you. The Chamber would thank you for your attendance
9 here and for the assistance you've been able to give us. You are now, of
10 course, free to go, and the Court Officer will assist you from the court.
11 Thank you.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 [The witness withdrew]
14 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Popovic.
15 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Mr. Djurdjic will
16 examine the next witness in the examination-in-chief, and I think he will
17 have some proposals in connection to that.
18 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I think
20 that my colleague Mr. Popovic should first propose the documents which
21 the Defence has in its mind in connection with cross-examination in
22 agreement with Mr. Stamp and inform the Chamber about the documents just
23 like Mr. Stamp did. And I think that as we have gone this far in terms
24 of time, my proposal would be to begin the examination-in-chief of the
25 next witness tomorrow.
1 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Popovic, you are asked to fill in time.
2 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] I will do my best, Your Honour.
3 Now I will tell you what are the documents which the Defence used in the
4 Milutinovic case during its redirect of this witness and which they noted
5 during the examination. So we have a document which is 3D692 in the
6 Milutinovic case, it is now the document D219. The document which has
7 the number P1966 in the Milutinovic case is now Exhibit of Defence D104.
8 Prosecution Exhibit from Milutinovic case P1967 in this case is
9 registered as D105. Exhibit of the Prosecution P938 is in this case
10 number P1339. And we still have one more exhibit, it's Exhibit 3D685 in
11 the Milutinovic case, which is now registered as D523 in this case.
12 I just don't know -- during the break the Prosecution and the
13 Defence discussed this manner of tendering documents into evidence and we
14 agreed that it should be so in this case, but I did not realise whether
15 Mr. Stamp wishes this to be practice and that we should go on doing it
16 that way or if it was only the case now, because as Defence we would have
17 some difficulties with this as there is a great number of documents that
18 have been used and also considering the facts that we don't have access
19 to the documents in the same way that the Prosecution does in the sense
20 of what is in e-court from the Milutinovic case.
21 And, therefore, perhaps if lists were prepared in advance, that
22 might facilitate things and allow both the Prosecution and the Defence to
23 do this more easily. Now, whether at the beginning or at the end, I
24 guess this should also be a matter of agreement, but I think we should
25 reach some sort of consensus if this is a proposal on how to act in
1 future. This is the only thing that was not quite clear to me at the end
2 of our discussion.
3 JUDGE PARKER: From the Chamber's point of view, we accommodate
4 what is convenient to counsel, but our present understanding is that
5 there will be a composite list prepared cross-referencing the numbers of
6 the exhibits in this trial which are also used in the Milutinovic trial
7 in the course of material parts of the examination, cross-examination, or
8 re-examination of a witness who is called here. So that if reading the
9 transcript of the previous trial, counsel or the Chamber wishes to look
10 at a document being referred to, the Chamber will have a cross-reference
11 table to identify the number of the exhibit in this trial.
12 Underlying that understanding are two propositions: First, if it
13 is not an exhibit in this trial, the Chamber will not be referring to it,
14 even though it may be referred to in the transcript in the Milutinovic
15 trial. Second, it, therefore, follows that if either Prosecution or
16 Defence want a particular document for the purposes of this trial, they
17 will need to tender that document in the course of examination-in-chief
18 or cross-examination so that it becomes an exhibit in this trial. And
19 I'm sure, Mr. Popovic, that you can discuss with Mr. Stamp and overcome
20 any inconvenience you may have in obtaining access to a document that was
21 used in the Milutinovic trial and which may not presently be readily
22 available to you.
23 [Trial Chamber confers]
24 JUDGE PARKER: The majority of the Chamber is persuaded to
25 Mr. Djurdjic's eloquence and takes the view that we should adjourn at
1 this point rather than commence the next witness. With that great
2 indulgence, we will adjourn now and resume tomorrow at 9.00. That humour
3 not masking the fact that we are already getting concerned about the
4 progress of time in this case. We adjourn now until 9.00 in the morning.
5 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.39 p.m.,
6 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 3rd day of
7 February, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.