1 Wednesday, 24 February 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
5 [The witness takes the stand]
6 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
8 JUDGE PARKER: Please sit.
9 The affirmation you made still applies.
10 I thought you'd sat down, Mr. Djurdjic.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I did.
12 I'm finished. I just have an administrative issue. There was a mistake
13 in e-court. We have notified the OTP about it. When the transcript of
14 the witness was being uploaded, which is D011-3778, it should be D723
15 under seal; and D011-4037 is D724. Could we please make that correction.
16 D723 and D724 are the new numbers.
17 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
18 Ms. Petersen.
19 MS. PETERSEN: Thank you, Your Honours.
20 WITNESS: MOMIR STOJANOVIC [Resumed]
21 [Witness answered through interpreter]
22 Cross-examination by Ms. Petersen:
23 Q. Good morning, sir. My name is Paige Petersen. I'm going to be
24 asking you some questions today.
25 A. Good morning.
1 Q. During 1998 and 1999 did you know the accused in this case,
2 General Djordjevic?
3 A. Yes, during 1998 I saw the accused, Mr. Djordjevic, on one
5 Q. Okay. Let's break this down a little. So -- well, first let's
6 follow that up. You saw him on one occasion in 1998?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And what was that?
9 A. I saw Mr. Djordjevic in late July 1998 in the office of the Chief
10 of Staff of the Pristina Corps, General Lazarevic. When I entered they
11 were sitting down, having coffee, and engaging in an informal discussion.
12 Q. Was it a meeting, or was it just an informal talk between him and
13 General Lazarevic?
14 A. It was an informal conversation between the two of them.
15 Q. Now, did you personally know General Djordjevic?
16 A. No, I didn't know General Djordjevic personally. I did know,
17 though, that he was chief of the public security sector of the Ministry
18 of the Interior of Serbia
19 Q. All right. Thank you, sir. And did you -- so you knew who he
20 was, although you didn't know him personally?
21 A. Yes, exactly.
22 Q. Was that from television or from the official capacity that you
23 held, or how was that?
24 A. I knew about him based on the official capacity as well as
25 through the media.
1 Q. Okay. And during the NATO bombing period, did you know of
2 General Djordjevic, his official capacity at that time?
3 A. After the NATO bombing period, Mr. Djordjevic was chief of the
4 sector of the MUP of Serbia and assistant minister to the Ministry of the
6 Q. And he had that position -- did he have that position during the
7 NATO bombing as far as you know?
8 A. As far as I know, he stayed in that position even after NATO
10 Q. But I just want to be clear about the period of the NATO
11 bombardment. Is it your understanding that that was his position at that
13 A. During the NATO bombardment, as far as I know, he was assistant
14 minister of the interior of the Republic of Serbia
16 Q. And during the period of the NATO bombing, did you see General
17 Djordjevic in Kosovo at all?
18 A. During the bombing of the -- of the NATO Alliance, I didn't see
19 Mr. Djordjevic in the area of Kosovo and Metohija.
20 Q. In the capacity that General Djordjevic held, if he would have
21 visited Kosovo, is that something that you would have known about likely?
22 A. In the capacity he had at the time, I didn't need to know of his
23 visit. However, given that he was a senior official, I believe I would
24 have been informed of his visit to Kosovo and Metohija.
25 Q. Were you aware of General Djordjevic visiting Kosovo on the 16th
1 of April, 1999?
2 A. No, I was not.
3 Q. Were you aware of General Djordjevic being in Kosovo on the 18th
4 of April, 1999?
5 A. No. It is possible that Mr. Djordjevic did visit Kosovo briefly
6 in the company of the minister of the interior, but I had no information
7 to that extent.
8 Q. All right. So I would just submit to you at this point General
9 Djordjevic testified in his own Defence in this case and he told us that
10 he was, in fact, in Kosovo on these two dates, the 16th and the 18th of
11 April. So can we agree, in fact, sir, that you would not necessarily
12 know if General Djordjevic was in Kosovo? You would not necessarily have
13 been informed?
14 A. Yes, we agree.
15 Q. Now, sir, at this point in time as you sit here today what's your
16 relationship with General Djordjevic?
17 A. There's no relationship. I'm merely appearing as a witness in
18 his Defence case.
19 Q. Sir, so he's not someone who you know very well or at all?
20 A. I wouldn't quite agree with you. He's not someone I know well,
21 but he's not someone I don't know at all either. The position of
22 assistant minister of the interior and chief of the security sector is a
23 public function. Through the media in the 1990s I frequently heard of
24 General Djordjevic's activities.
25 Q. Thank you, sir. Now, you have told us that in 1998 and 1999 you
1 were the chief of the security department in the Pristina Corps command.
2 Do I have that right?
3 A. Not of the security department, but the security section of the
4 Pristina Corps.
5 Q. The security section. All right. And I believe you've said that
6 before that beginning in 1993 you were the deputy chief of the security
7 section in the Pristina Corps; is that correct?
8 A. Yes. Between 1993 and 1996 I was deputy chief of the security
9 section in the command of the Pristina Corps.
10 Q. At what point in 1998 did you become chief?
11 A. I didn't become chief in 1998. It was in 1996.
12 Q. All right. So in the testimony when you've been asked whether
13 you were chief in 1998 and 1999, that was the position you held but you
14 had assumed it even earlier; is that your answer?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. All right. When in 1996 did you become chief?
17 A. On the 12th of April, 1996.
18 Q. Okay. And you said that one of the tasks of the security section
19 was providing security for the corps commanders; is that correct?
20 A. One of the tasks of the security section of the Pristina Corps is
21 providing security detail for senior officials and officers, including
22 the corps commander when stationary and in movement.
23 Q. So who else did the security sector provide security for? And we
24 can talk specifically about 1999. So there was General Lazarevic, the
25 Pristina Corps commander. Who else?
1 A. The security section was tasked with providing security to the
2 corps commander as well as the Chief of Staff of the corps. There is a
3 list of persons who are -- provided security when stationary and in
4 movement, and these two people are on the top of the list. However, this
5 is done through military police units that I was in charge of
7 Q. Okay. And that leads to my next question: What was your role in
8 terms of providing security for these people, you specifically?
9 A. In the security section of the command of the Pristina Corps
10 there are two assistant chiefs, that is to say my assistants. One
11 assistant is in charge of counter-intelligence. He is there to put in
12 measures aimed at preventing agents from functioning. The other
13 assistant is for security and staff affairs who, professionally speaking,
14 is in charge of military police units. That assistant uses military
15 police units in order to provide security to the persons enjoying
16 protection; in this case, the corps commander and the Chief of Staff.
17 Q. So the security detail itself came from the military police unit;
18 is that correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Now, were you responsible for assigning that security detail on a
21 day-to-day basis based on where General Lazarevic was?
22 A. No, that was not one of my duties. It was a duty of my assistant
23 for staff and security affairs. With appropriate checks, the most
24 reliable personnel was chosen with the assistance of the person in charge
25 of the military police.
1 Q. All right. So I believe you testified in Milutinovic - correct
2 me if I'm wrong - but it wasn't necessary for you to know where General
3 Lazarevic was every day?
4 A. Yes, I still claim that. It is not an obligation of a superior
5 to report to his subordinate; it is the other way around. When General
6 Lazarevic let me know of his whereabouts, then, of course, I was aware of
7 it, but in certain situations as my superior he was under no obligation
8 to inform me of his activities.
9 Q. Now, during the period of the NATO bombing, did the security
10 sector under your guidance provide security for the 3rd Army commander,
11 General Pavkovic?
12 A. No. General Pavkovic, commander of the 3rd Army, during the NATO
13 bombing when he was within the area of responsibility of the Pristina
14 Corps was always escorted by his security detail from the 3rd Military
15 Police Battalion, which is under the command of the 3rd Army and
16 stationed in Nis
17 were requests put in to expand his security detail. We would provide
18 assistance to the security detail of General Pavkovic, and we would
19 select people from the Pristina Corps and its MP battalion. However,
20 such requests came in seldom.
21 Q. What would cause something like that to take place, you being
22 requested to expand the security detail of General Pavkovic?
23 A. A cause could be that there was a threat to General Pavkovic's
24 safety and security. This could have come about if he were travelling to
25 Kosovo, touring certain units which were close to combat areas.
1 Q. So you said this happened seldom. About how many times did this
3 A. I can't recall exactly. Say whenever General Pavkovic was in the
4 border belt or when he had to go from Kosovo to the area of Metohija,
5 since all roads were exposed to Albanian terrorist attacks.
6 Q. So are we talking about something closer to one or two times that
7 his security needed to be expanded, or was it something more like 10, 15
9 A. During the NATO aggression, General Pavkovic quite rarely visited
10 front-line units in Metohija. I believe that was quite seldom. If
11 you're expecting me to tell you how many times exactly, that's really
12 something I can't recall now.
13 Q. Thank you, sir. And I assume if you did not need to know General
14 Lazarevic's schedule every day, you probably didn't need to know it for
15 General Pavkovic either; is that fair to say?
16 A. I didn't need to be familiar with the schedule of
17 General Pavkovic and his activities, since he was commander of the
18 3rd Army. He was not under the competence of my security service.
19 According to the regulation, I should have been familiar with the
20 activities of General Lazarevic, but it was his discretionary right to
21 decide whether he would ask of me as his security chief to provide a
22 military policeman for his escort or not. It was up to him whether he
23 would inform me of his whereabouts at any point in time. That was his
24 right as commander.
25 Q. Now, aside from regulations, what we're interested in here in
1 this courtroom is what, in fact, took place. Did you, in fact, know
2 where General Lazarevic was on most days? Did he inform you of that or
3 did you, in fact, not?
4 A. General Lazarevic throughout the NATO aggression had a squad of
5 military policemen which did not change. They were always escorting him.
6 If there was greater risk in his movement calling for additional people,
7 he would turn to me asking for that. So it was the same unit, the same
8 people who constantly escorted and provided security to
9 General Lazarevic.
10 Q. So just to be clear, other than those occasions when he requested
11 special security from you, you didn't need to be tracking his
12 whereabouts; is that fair to say?
13 A. Yes, that's fair.
14 Q. Thank you, sir. During your time in Kosovo, did you work closely
15 with General Pavkovic? And I'm speaking about your whole time in Kosovo,
16 from 1993 until 1999.
17 A. I worked with General Pavkovic beginning with 1996 because he
18 came to Kosovo and Metohija in 1996 to assume the position of the chief
19 of operations organ in the command of the Pristina Corps. For a while
20 General Pavkovic as the corps commander was my direct superior following
21 that period. As with all other of his assistants, I also co-operated
22 with General Pavkovic professionally. In January 1999, when he was
23 appointed commander of the 3rd Army, my contacts with General Pavkovic
25 Q. They ceased entirely?
1 A. No, not entirely. Not until -- well, occasionally we met by
2 chance or if he visited a certain unit while I was there we had regular
3 contact. But all contact with General Pavkovic did cease in 2000 when I
4 completed the national defence school, when I was assigned to another
5 duty not within the security service, although up to that time my entire
6 career was in that service.
7 Q. Would you say based on your working relationship with
8 General Pavkovic which started in 1996, did he respect you as far as you
10 A. General Pavkovic respected my professional attitude.
11 Q. Did he listen to what you had to say?
12 A. For the most part he accepted our proposals, but it was his
13 right - as any commander's - not to have to accept them. He had to
14 listen and acknowledge our proposal, but he didn't necessarily have to
15 adopt them.
16 Q. Was it your perception that he generally took you seriously?
17 A. Yes, it is.
18 Q. What kind of a leader was General Pavkovic?
19 A. General Pavkovic, whom I've met in 1996 as I've already said, is
20 one of the best staff officers of the army of the FRY. I can freely
21 state that, given the fact that I was stationed in ten garrisons
22 throughout my career; therefore, I had numerous superiors. He was quite
23 courageous, given the fact that during the time when he was the corps
24 commander he frequently went to the front lines where there was combat.
25 But as any other person, he had flaws as well.
1 Q. Would you say that you were close to him?
2 A. Generally speaking, General Pavkovic was never that close to the
3 security service. I think the roots of this situation reach back into a
4 period that preceded his arrival in Kosovo and Metohija, at least that's
5 what I was told. He had some trouble with the security service during
6 his time in the Belgrade
7 did not have any strong positive feelings about the security service
8 generally speaking or indeed about me because I was part of that service.
9 There is a widespread opinion in the VJ that given the nature of the job
10 done by the security service it might end up harming some people were
11 they to make a misstep. This was the feeling that prevailed among a
12 certain group of officers, and General Pavkovic belonged to that group.
13 Q. And that's because you're supposed to report on them if they do
14 anything wrong, is that correct, or commit a crime? Let's be more
16 A. Yes. Each of our members, regardless of the rank or level, were
17 under an obligation as soon as they realised that a crime had been
18 committed to immediately report this, and this obviously pertained to any
19 command level at all.
20 Q. During your time in Kosovo, did you work closely with General
22 A. Yes. I was close with General Lazarevic. Every time you perform
23 some tasks, for example, in an army setting, in a military setting,
24 you're likely to work better with some people and not so well with
25 others. You could say that I worked well with General Lazarevic, and I
1 would call him a top-notch professional.
2 Q. And were the two of you close?
3 A. No. I always did my best to keep my relationships with my
4 superiors perfectly in compliance with the regulations and professional
5 standards. I tried not to take things to a private level. I was
6 subordinated to both General Pavkovic and General Lazarevic. I had
7 respect for them as my superiors, and I would regularly keep them
8 informed on anything that was going on in my own domain.
9 Q. I think we need to clarify something here. On the previous page,
10 page 11, line 22, I believe your answer -- when I asked whether you
11 worked closely with General Lazarevic your answer was:
12 "Yes, I was close with General Lazarevic."
13 And I believe you just told us you were not close with General
14 Lazarevic. I think we should clarify. Are you saying that you were
15 close with him in terms of a working relationship but not personally
16 close outside of work? Or can you just clarify in your own words?
17 A. I'm in a position to fully confirm what you have just suggested.
18 I was close with him in terms of our professional lives. Nevertheless, I
19 did not privately socialise with him outside work.
20 Q. Thank you, sir. Would you in your perception say that
21 General Lazarevic respected you professionally?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And he would listen to what you had to say?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. All right. As chief of the Pristina Corps security section, who
1 specifically would you receive reports from?
2 A. As chief of the security section of the Pristina Corps, I would
3 receive reports from my direct subordinates from the security organ in a
4 purely technical sense. The security organs of subordinate brigades in
5 this specific case, those from subordinated battalions. After July 1998
6 a forward command post was set up in the Djakovica garrison. There was
7 always an experienced operative working there who would regularly submit
8 reports from this forward command post. As for the Pristina Corps
9 brigades, there was several combat groups that were set up. In each of
10 these combat groups there were security organs, and it was their duty to
11 report back to the brigade security officer. And then the brigade
12 security chief would come back to me with all this information.
13 Q. So each brigade stationed around Kosovo had officers within it
14 who were part of the security organ; is that correct?
15 A. Each brigade from the Pristina Corps stationed in Kosovo and
16 Metohija had an officer who was the chief of the security organ, then
17 there would be an administrator, another officer or normally an NCO. And
18 whenever combat groups were set up, they would have an officer or an NCO
19 within them who worked there as a security officer.
20 Q. So the combat security -- the security officers in the combat
21 unit would report up to the brigade level, and then all of those security
22 officers in the various brigades would report up to you; is that
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And how often would this reporting occur?
1 A. As I have pointed out several times while giving evidence now and
2 earlier, there was an obligation for security chiefs in the brigades
3 every morning and every evening to use their communications equipment and
4 submit their reports to me. Every time an anti-terrorist operation was
5 completed, they had to submit a written report on the progress of the
7 Q. I just want to make sure I'm understanding this. Outside of when
8 there was a terrorist operation, were they still reporting to you every
9 day and night, or was that only when there was a terrorist operation, an
10 anti-terrorist operation, I'm sorry?
11 A. Each and every day throughout 1998 and 1999, both mornings and
12 evenings, they were submitting to me oral reports, telegrams, and such
13 documents as envisaged by the Rules of Service. These regulated reports,
14 if you like, would normally follow their oral reports. Then they would
15 put together a telegram and this would be followed by a batch of original
16 documents, normally much more extensive. The methodology of our work
17 sets out exactly how they arrived at this information, what sort of
18 information they had, what methods they used while obtaining this
19 information, what was the reliability of the information, how they
20 processed the information or what they did with it, what was their
21 assessment, what was their analysis, what measures were they proposing,
22 and what requests were they making vis-à-vis the security section of the
23 Pristina Corps.
24 Q. So is it accurate to say that you would get a phone all every
25 morning and every evening followed by these other things that you've just
1 spoken of?
2 A. Those were oral reports, and as I said these were followed by
3 written reports.
4 Q. Thank you, sir. And what type of information were these officers
5 in the security organs supposed to report to you?
6 A. Their duty was to inform me about any security-related
7 intelligence in a unit or in a zone of responsibility. Each
8 brigade-level unit in Kosovo and Metohija had its own zone of
9 responsibility. Those security organs that covered the border belt, or
10 rather, the Albanian border had the duty to report on the situation along
11 the borderline as well.
12 Q. When you say "security-related intelligence," what does that
14 A. I'll try to explain. Let us take the example of an
15 anti-terrorist operation. The security officer would be under an
16 obligation to talk to me in the morning, to tell me that on such and such
17 a day such and such an operation was planned involving such and such
18 forces, the objective being this or being that. And then that same
19 evening the operation would normally be completed. The brigade chief
20 would talk to me to tell me about the progress of the operation, were any
21 of our soldiers killed, what were the steps taken by the Siptar
22 terrorists, were any of them taken, were there any unlawful actions
23 committed by the army during the operation, were there any instances of
24 poor command. Their duty was to do this by mail as soon as possible.
25 They were to submit a detailed written report on any operation at all
1 that was launched and completed.
2 Q. So one of their responsibilities is to report to you whether
3 there was any criminal conduct or misbehaviour on the part of the VJ
5 A. Yes. Any issues at all that had to do with the work of the
6 military security service.
7 Q. Now, during times when there was not an operation going on, what
8 kind of information would you get in these morning and evening reports?
9 Would you get intelligence information about the KLA from these people?
10 A. This wasn't really intelligence information. The military
11 intelligence service was in charge of that. I was in the
12 counter-intelligence section, the security section, which is different.
13 In such situations my subordinate security organs would be under an
14 obligation to submit oral and written reports to me, much the same as
15 before. But now these reports for the most part concerned the situation
16 across the units because some soldiers would be wounded, there were
17 disciplinary infractions, sometimes criminal offences. Nevertheless,
18 when there was no operation that was underway these reports would
19 normally relate to such intelligence as was gathered concerning certain
20 locations, concerning manpower, concerning the composition of the
21 Albanian terrorists or indeed their intentions and objectives.
22 Q. I'd like to talk to you about the relationship between the
23 security section and the military police battalions for a bit. Now,
24 yesterday you said that primarily in the Pristina Corps when we speak
25 about the military police we are speaking about the 52nd Military Police
1 Battalion; is that correct?
2 A. No, no, no. In addition to the 52nd Military Police Battalion,
3 and I'm talking about 1998, please, bear that in mind, in the Pristina
4 Corps there were another two military police companies, A-class military
5 police companies, one of them with the 549th Motorised Brigade in the
6 Prizren garrison, and that was its name, the 549th Military Police
7 Company. The other A-class unit was with the 125th Motorised Brigade and
8 it was called the 125th Military Police Company. On the eve of the NATO
9 aggression, in addition to these two brigades that within their
10 establishment had military police companies, all the other brigades to
11 immobilise their own military police companies, meaning each brigade had
12 a military police company in it and these were subordinated to their
13 respective brigade commanders. The 52nd Military Police Battalion was a
14 unit attached to the corps, but it was independent. It was a corps unit
15 that was independent and directly subordinated to the corps commander.
16 Q. Directly subordinated to the Pristina Corps commander?
17 A. Yes, that's right.
18 Q. Now, you told us yesterday -- actually, I believe this was two
19 days ago now, that the military security service is technically in charge
20 of the military police; is that correct?
21 A. No. The military security service is in charge of
22 counter-intelligence work and staff security work in any unit including
23 the 52nd Battalion of the military police. In an operative sense, if
24 that's what you're asking and I'll try to simplify, who exactly did
25 security work in the 52nd Military Police Battalion --
1 Q. Let me --
2 A. -- that was my --
3 Q. Let me just clarify, sir, on the 22nd of February on page 7 of
4 the transcript, I realise these now have page numbers, but it's page 7 of
5 that day, at line 14 you were asked:
6 "What are the competences of powers of the military security
7 services vis-à-vis the police?"
9 "The military security service is technically in charge of the
10 military police and its work, the technical aspects of the work of the
11 military police."
12 And I'm just asking you to confirm: Is that the case?
13 A. I'll clarify. Right now your question was: What about in an
14 operative sense? Who did security work in the 52nd Battalion? And
15 that's what I was trying to explain. It was my assistant for staff
16 security, who even in a technical sense would have been in charge of
17 supplying the appropriate equipment and training military police units,
18 generally speaking, as well as any personnel-related matters. In a
19 technical sense, yes, it was in charge of military police units, not just
20 the 52nd Battalion but also all the other companies across the brigades.
21 Q. Now, I believe two days ago you told us that security officers
22 including you can't order a single unit, even a military police unit; is
23 that a fair statement?
24 A. Completely fair, yes. This is about deciding on the unit's
25 involvement, on its use. Military security officers had no power or
1 authority over any units, including any military police unit. Only the
2 brigade commander could have issued any orders. As for the 52nd
3 Battalion, only the commander of the Pristina Corps had the power to
4 issue any orders to it because the unit was directly subordinated to him.
5 Q. Now, in Milutinovic you explained - and this is at page 162 of
6 that exhibit, your Milutinovic testimony - that the security service
7 proposed the use of units of the military police; is that accurate?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And I'll read a little more here. In your Milutinovic transcript
10 at page 5, line 15, you stated:
11 "The organs of the military security service in technical and
12 professional terms are in charge of the military police organs."
13 Then you were asked:
14 "Do the military security service organs have the right to issue
15 orders to the military police?"
16 You answered:
17 "No, only the commander of the unit that has military police
18 units within its formation has the right to do so. The military security
19 service organs proposed to the commander of such a unit how the military
20 police units are to be -- should be used."
21 Is that your statement, sir?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Now, if we could look at Prosecution Exhibit 1341.
24 Now, sir, these are minutes of the collegium of the VJ
25 General Staff for 25 February 1999
1 MS. PETERSEN: And if we could just go to page 15 in English and
2 I believe page 15 in the B/C/S, although I had a difficult time matching
3 this up. But I believe it's page 15 and if it's not I'm sure my learned
4 friend will let me know if he's not seeing the same thing.
5 If we could go to the bottom of the page on page 15 of the
7 Q. We see that General Dimitrijevic is about to speak. Now, at this
8 time what was the position of General Dimitrijevic?
9 A. Colonel-General Aleksandar Dimitrijevic at the time was the chief
10 of the security administration of the General Staff of the VJ.
11 Q. So he was your superior's superior; is that fair to say, sir?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. All right. Now, let me just check with Mr. Djurdjic, are you
14 seeing where General Dimitrijevic is about to speak? We have the right
15 page? All right, thank you. If we could go in the English to the next
16 page where we actually see what he says. He says:
17 "With respect to the departure of an anti-terrorist battalion
18 from the 72nd Special Brigade for KiM, I found it inappropriate that
19 nobody had every consulted me about it. I had been informed about a
20 written order and the dispatch of the best anti-terrorist unit only after
21 it had arrived down there. These initial moves demonstrate that this
22 unit will not be used properly. Part of the unit has been resubordinated
23 to the 52nd" --
24 THE INTERPRETER: Could you slow down, please, thank you.
25 MS. PETERSEN: Sorry. Thank you.
1 Q. "... has been resubordinated ..."
2 JUDGE PARKER: Carry on, please.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Just one thing. Page 14 in the
4 Serbian, that is what my learned friend is reading from, because it goes
5 on at page 15. Dimitrijevic appears on page 14 of the Serbian, which is
6 what my learned friend is currently reading from.
7 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
8 MS. PETERSEN: Thank you for the record, sir.
9 Q. And just not to read too much of this, going down General Curcin
10 speaks and then we hear briefly from General Ojdanic, and then
11 Dimitrijevic says again:
12 "At any rate, it is clearly stipulated that police units are to
13 be used at our proposal, and we presumably know better than anyone else
14 to what use these units can be put. My only objection was that we should
15 be consulted."
16 Now, in looking at this, sir, would you agree with me that the
17 security sector took seriously their ability to propose the use of these
18 military police units?
19 A. If I may explain the essence of what General Dimitrijevic said
20 here. You see, while giving evidence yesterday I said that the
21 anti-terrorist battalion, being one of the battalions belonging to the
22 72nd Special Brigade during the NATO aggression, was resubordinated to
23 the 3rd Army and then to the Pristina Corps. Given the fact that the
24 military security service essentially under the regulations has three
25 channels or lines of work, as it were, one of them being
1 counter-intelligence, the other being terrorism, and the third line of
2 work being organised crime, if you look at number 2, terrorism, the
3 security service would make proposals to the appropriate commands
4 concerning the use of anti-terrorist units. In the case at hand, General
5 Dimitrijevic's observation here boils down to what follows. Why was the
6 unit detached from the 72nd Brigade and attached or seconded to the
7 Pristina Corps, resubordinated to it, without him being consulted? Let
8 me remind you of this, nevertheless, the Guards Brigade, the 72nd Special
9 Brigade and the Parachuters Brigade were part of another corps which was
10 called the Special Forces Corps. This Special Forces Corps was stationed
11 in Belgrade
12 complaining to General Ojdanic, who was Chief of the General Staff at the
13 time, which boils down to the following: Why was the anti-terrorist
14 battalion resubordinated and sent away without his prior consent? And
15 then if you go to the last line he openly complains about the following.
16 He says: I think the expert, the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Army probably
17 made that proposal and who does he have in mind there? He means
18 Colonel-General Ljubisa Stojmirovic, who before he took up his post as
19 Chief of Staff of the 3rd Army was commander of the Special Forces Corps.
20 So what is Dimitrijevic saying here? That General Stojmirovic
21 got the Chief of the General Staff to have that battalion sent or
22 resubordinated to the Pristina Corps, making General Dimitrijevic himself
23 quite unimportant in the process.
24 Q. And it appears that he is re-asserting the right of the security
25 sector to propose how those military police units are used, correct?
1 He's making clear that he should have been consulted about this?
2 A. Here is what he's saying: He should have been consulted, but not
3 necessarily asked. It is an inviable right for any commander to take a
4 decision because General Dimitrijevic was actually General Ojdanic's
5 subordinate, and the battalion could not be sent away without a decision
6 from the Chief of the General Staff. Therefore, General Ojdanic need not
7 necessarily have asked him. If we talk about military rules or
8 behaviour, if we talk about good business practice and communication, he
9 could have opted to ask him to consult with him, but he was certainly
10 under no obligation to talk to him.
11 Q. Sir, yesterday you were shown a number of telegrams --
12 MS. PETERSEN: I'm finished with this exhibit.
13 Q. You were shown a number of telegrams from the Pristina Corps
14 security section, which I believe is you, and the 3rd Army security
15 section. A lot of these were in the form of telegrams; is that correct?
16 A. Yes, most were.
17 Q. All right.
18 MS. PETERSEN: If we could look at D749, please, the first
19 page -- first we'll look at the first page in both English and B/C/S.
20 Q. Now, sir, you were shown this two days ago, and it appears that
21 this is a Pristina Corps command security department telegram from 19th
22 of December, 1999 [sic]; am I accurate on that?
23 A. Yes, you are.
24 MS. PETERSEN: And if we could look at the last page in B/C/S,
25 e-court page number 3.
1 Q. I note that there's no signature on this page; is that correct?
2 A. That is correct. If you want me, I'll explain. Most telegrams
3 do not have a signature. That is why originals are kept in the archives.
4 When I draft this telegram late in the evening and summarise a report for
5 the command for that day, I then give the text to those in the code
6 department responsible for encoding it and sending it on to this superior
7 command. They receive my telegram in this version, but I guarantee that
8 all this information is original and true. You can see my initials
9 there, meaning that I drafted the telegram, as I did most of them.
10 Q. So you would say that this copy of the telegram is an authentic
11 copy of your telegram, even though it has no signature?
12 A. Is completely authentic.
13 Q. Thank you, sir. Yesterday -- or actually, I'm -- you've got two
14 days of testimony, so sometimes I'm not sure if it was yesterday or the
15 day before, but at some point in your testimony the last two days when we
16 were looking at these Pristina Corps security department telegrams, it
17 appeared that a number of these telegrams contained information from the
18 state security department or section; is that correct?
19 A. We exchanged information regularly. Some information came from
20 the State Security Service, some information was our own, some came from
21 the 14th counter-intelligence group. I would put that all together in a
22 single telegram.
23 Q. All right, sir.
24 MS. PETERSEN: If we could look at Prosecution 65 ter 02945.
25 JUDGE PARKER: While that is happening, page 23, line 21, you
1 gave the date of the last exhibit as 19th of December, 1999. I think it
2 should be 1998.
3 MS. PETERSEN: You're very correct, Your Honour. Thank you.
4 Q. Sir, is that a picture of you in this article?
5 A. Yes, it is.
6 Q. And is this an interview you gave to the Nedeljni Telegraf on, I
7 believe it is the 22nd of November, 2000?
8 A. 2000.
9 Q. All right. Thank you, sir. If we could look at page 5 in the
10 English and in B/C/S on page 4, the first full paragraph in the first
11 column. And the type is very small in the B/C/S so I will read this out
12 because I'm not sure if you'll be able to make it out.
13 Now, this article you're criticising the MUP and some others for
14 failing to adequately address terrorism in Kosovo as it built up in the
15 1990s. And on page 5, midway through the second paragraph in the English
16 it says:
17 "That which is true is that the state security delivered some
18 information to the army about the directions of the entry of terrorists
19 and weapons from Albania
20 responsibly claim that the majority of the information was not true.
21 Acting on that information in a certain number of cases, we engaged
22 significant forces, but it almost always turned out that that was not
23 necessary, by which we were exhausting the people and maybe leaving some
24 other directions of entry open. Not once the question was asked to which
25 degree was reliable and verified the information that they would provide
1 us with sometimes."
2 Is that your statement, sir?
3 A. Yes, this is my statement. Perhaps I should clarify something.
4 There were frequent situations in which representatives of the State
5 Security Service forwarded information, stating that along a certain
6 route towards Albania
7 burden of sorts carrying weapons, and then we had to allocate certain
8 units from our combat disposition to set up ambushes and spend all night
9 there. On several occasions such information proved incorrect because
10 there were simply no terrorists passing there. This further exhausted
11 our forces, and this is what I was referring to in the interview.
12 Q. Thank you, sir. I'd like to ask you a little bit about your role
13 in the Pristina Corps command. You were part of the Pristina Corps
14 command; is that correct?
15 A. Certainly.
16 Q. Okay. And what meetings did you attend related to that?
17 A. Do you have in mind the question in the interview or the meetings
18 of the Pristina Corps?
19 Q. No, sir. I'm not asking you about the exhibit at this point.
20 Just -- I'm asking you about a new topic now. And I should be a little
21 more precise. I mean regular meetings. I'm sure you had various
22 meetings here and there, but what regular meetings were you part of as
23 part of the Pristina Corps command?
24 A. By function I was a member of the Pristina Corps commanders'
25 collegium comprising the Chief of Staff of the corps, the chief of the
1 operations department, assistant commander for logistics, assistant
2 commander for morale, chief of the security section, as well as assistant
3 commander for garrison affairs. As for the meetings of the collegium of
4 the corps commander, these were held during 1998 regularly. And after
5 the NATO aggression, there were never such comprehensive meetings with
6 all of those people in attendance.
7 During 1998 I briefed on all security aspects in the units and
8 information I gathered in the field. I also carried out analyses and
9 proposed measures to the corps commander. In 1999 the Pristina Corps
10 command was never in a single location. It was dispersed per or by
11 command organs. For example, the logistics organ was in one location,
12 the morale organ and second operations organ on a third location. They
13 were all in the general area of Pristina. Therefore, due to the
14 air-strikes and constantly changing situation in units, movements, as
15 well as numerous problems of the corps, it was impossible to have full
16 collegium meetings. During 1999 there were meetings, though, of the
17 corps of the collegium. For example, when decisions needed to be made,
18 the Chief of Staff and the commander would meet and they would call us
19 individually if they needed any of us to join them.
20 Also, on -- of my own initiative when I had information that were
21 of significant security interest, I was under an obligation to locate the
22 commander and convey it to him.
23 Q. Did you know about actions that the Pristina Corps had planned
24 for its units in your role?
25 A. Not necessarily. I received certain information from the
1 operations organ who was supposed to plan such actions and draw maps, but
2 if I didn't know when such actions were planned at least I was always
3 informed of such actions after their taking place.
4 Q. Did you take part in any capacity in planning the actions of the
5 Pristina Corps?
6 A. In the staff part when a plan is drawn up is something I never
7 participated in, but I did participate in activities before any decisions
8 are made. Whenever asked, I was supposed to provide a security
9 assessment in certain locations where the action was supposed to take
10 place. I was supposed to provide information on the presence of
11 terrorists, their personnel numbers, weapons, plans, deployment, as well
12 as information on any fortifications. I forwarded such information to
13 the operational affairs organ, who kept that in mind when planning the
14 operation. He needed to decide which forces we needed and in which
15 manner such an action would be executed.
16 Q. This seems like pretty important information to have before an
17 anti-terrorist action, do you agree, know what you're going up against?
18 A. Anti-terrorist actions were not planned solely based on my
19 information. There was also information coming from the staff in Kosovo
20 and Metohija as well as information from the state and public security
21 sector and the 14th counter-intelligence group, which was under -- which
22 was not under my command. Some information also came from the security
23 organs of the military district which was under the command of the
24 3rd Army. Some information also came from field commanders who
25 encountered terrorists all the time.
1 In addition to the counter-intelligence service there was also an
2 intelligence service in the Pristina Corps command. When all that
3 information found its way to the operations organ, it was only then that
4 they would start drawing up plans for a specific anti-terrorist action.
5 Q. Now, these other sources of information, were some of these
6 channelled through you? All of these individual people weren't coming to
7 meet with the Pristina Corps command, were they? Was it channelled
8 through you to pass on that information?
9 A. No. I apologise. It seems that this microphone is off.
10 My answer is no. Information coming from the 14th
11 counter-intelligence group and intelligence organs as well as security
12 organs of the military district, including information from the state and
13 public security sector did not need necessarily go through my hands for
14 me to forward them to the organs of the Pristina Corps. It is true that
15 I exchanged information with them, but it was possible for the Pristina
16 Corps command to call the chief of the state security sector and ask him
17 for an assessment. He could also call the commander of the 14th
18 counter-intelligence group to receive information. We did exchange
19 information, but it wasn't necessary to have all of them, in particular
20 the intelligence organs because they were separate and they followed a
21 different method since the assistant commander for intelligence affair
22 was also subordinated to the commander of the Pristina Corps. He
23 informed him of the situation in Albania, about the border belt, as well
24 as all the other issues that fall within their remit.
25 Q. Sir, I'm speaking specifically about the planning of an operation
1 and your role in assisting that. Are you telling us that before an
2 operation, instead of just getting information from you about the
3 security situation that they would hear from all these various groups
4 about all their information?
5 A. No. For the most part they received information from the
6 security section of the Pristina Corps, and they relied heavily on that
7 information because that information was most of the time correct. But
8 the commander had the right to seek opinion from the field commanders as
9 well as other organs. However, the biggest part of information came from
10 the security section of the Pristina Corps in terms of possible planning
11 of any anti-terrorist action.
12 Q. And just to help clarify this, I think your testimony, sir, in
13 the Milutinovic case at page 143, you were asked:
14 "Did you participate in the preparation or plans for combat
15 actions or manoeuvres of the various units of the Pristina Corps?"
16 And you said:
17 "I participated in the part which related to giving over
18 information and providing knowledge about the locations, plans,
19 intentions, strength of the Albanian terrorists, and that information I
20 sent to the chief of the department for operations of the corps command."
21 Is that a fair statement of your role and planning in assisting
22 in the plans for operations?
23 A. Yes. I see nothing in dispute. There is no difference between
24 what I said then and now. The operations department and its chief serve
25 as the brain when it comes to any planning of operations by the Pristina
1 Corps. As I said then I say now, that I forwarded information to the
2 chief of operations who would then follow it up with the core of the
3 command and the corps commander because not the entire command
4 participated, only those officers for whom the corps commander believed
5 he needed for a specific operation.
6 Q. Thank you, sir. And it seems that it would be important for this
7 information to be as up-to-date as possible; would you agree with that?
8 A. That information was always up-to-date. In my view, we had very
9 able personnel. I believe our information was very reliable throughout
10 1998 and 1999. Of course it's a different matter as to what use that
11 information was put. After the war certain terrorist leaders published a
12 number of books, such as the book of Ramush Haradinaj, and by having read
13 that I was able to conclude that at the time we had very good
15 Q. And I'm asking you something slightly different. I don't doubt
16 that your information was very up-to-date. I'm asking you -- it was
17 important for the commanders and the command of the Pristina Corps to get
18 that most up-to-date information for that anti-terrorist action, is that
19 fair to say, for them to know this information?
20 A. Yes, in full. They always wanted information, and we were always
21 in the field, so the pace of work was very fast.
22 Q. So before an anti-terrorist operation they would probably need to
23 know things like: Have the terrorists shifted positions? Have they
24 gained reinforcement? Have they gotten better weapons? Things like
25 that, that would be important to pass on?
1 A. That is partially true. It is true that they needed to have the
2 type of information you specified; however, primarily they had to know
3 the locations, which settlements, which geographical and topographic
4 features are held by the terrorists and by what means and forces. They
5 needed to know about their system of defence in terms of engineering and
6 mining. They needed to know who is in command, the manning levels, and
7 the type of weapons. They needed to know what the force morale was and
8 what those forces planned to do in the ensuing period. They also needed
9 to know whether there were experts, so to say, foreign mercenaries or
10 instructors from other countries such as was the case. We also needed to
11 know what were their pull-out routes and links to other terrorist staffs.
12 This was a host of problems and issues that was always kept up-to-date,
13 and it was constantly assessed.
14 Q. And the command would need to know that information as of right
15 then, not two weeks ago or even a week ago; they would need to know what
16 is the situation with regard to those things right now. Is that fair to
18 A. Yes, daily and in real time.
19 Q. Thank you, sir.
20 MS. PETERSEN: I see we have reached the time for the break.
21 Before we do, I would seek to tender Prosecution 65 ter 02945.
22 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01543.
24 JUDGE PARKER: We will have the first break now resuming at
1 [The witness stands down]
2 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
3 --- On resuming at 11.07 a.m.
4 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, my inadequate
6 explanation concerning an administrative question was apparently not
7 sufficiently clear. I believe I should leave it to Ms. O'Leary to
8 explain what this is about.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Things are best left in the hands of experts,
10 Mr. Djurdjic. I'm learning that every day.
11 Ms. O'Leary.
12 MS. O'LEARY: Thank you, Your Honour. While I don't claim to be
13 an expert, I will say that what we were seeking was leave of the
14 Trial Chamber to replace D723, which is under seal, and D724, which are
15 the trial transcripts from Milutinovic et al. of this witness,
16 Mr. Stojanovic. The ones that were entered into evidence on Monday
17 actually were missing the 11 December 2007
18 So we've reloaded them at the numbers given by Mr. Djurdjic this morning.
19 So we're just seeking a ruling from the Trial Chamber to replace those in
20 evidence. Thank you.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, that is granted.
22 [The witness takes the stand]
23 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Petersen.
24 MS. PETERSEN: Thank you, Your Honours.
25 Q. Sir, in your Milutinovic transcript you said at page 5, line 5:
1 "The organs of the military security service participate in the
2 actions that precede the institution of criminal proceedings."
3 Do you recall saying that?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. [Microphone not activated] --
6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
7 MS. PETERSEN: All right.
8 JUDGE PARKER: That was my fault.
9 MS. PETERSEN: Okay.
10 Q. In layman terms, sir, does that mean you would -- you in your
11 section would investigate crimes?
12 A. It means that I and my department or the members of my
13 department, as soon as we found out about a crime that occurred, would
14 first inform our superiors, after which we would take such steps and
15 measures as were required to initiate criminal proceedings, the objective
16 being to arrest the perpetrator or at least keep the perpetrator from
17 escaping. It means securing the crime scene, it means gathering any
18 information that might prove helpful in shedding light on the commission
19 of the crime. And if the perpetrator was arrested and handed over to the
20 appropriate judicial authorities, we would then follow any further orders
21 and requests by the investigating magistrate.
22 Q. So you would secure the crime scene; is that correct?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And when you say it means gathering any information that might be
25 helpful, does that include both interviewing potential witnesses and
1 gathering physical evidence?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And what was your responsibility with regard to that evidence?
4 Would you keep the evidence secure?
5 A. We would normally familiarise the relevant judicial authority or
6 prosecutor with the evidence, and the evidence would then be duly handed
7 over to the appropriate judicial authority.
8 Q. Sir, how was an investigation - and I'm using the term
9 "investigation" to basically describe what you just spoke of, is that a
10 fair word, "investigation," to describe what your unit was doing during
11 this period?
12 A. Perhaps that term is not entirely appropriate, but gathering
13 appropriate information and gathering evidence that might help shed light
14 on a crime.
15 Q. So, sir, we don't have to repeat all that, would you agree with
16 me that we can use the word "investigation," and it will mean what you
17 just said? Can we agree on that?
18 A. Yes, we could.
19 Q. All right. Thank you. How was an investigation triggered?
20 A. An investigation would normally be preceded by gathering
21 information to the effect that a specific crime was committed. After
22 that a team would go to inspect the scene, secure the scene, and carry
23 out investigative steps. And then the forensic team would draw up a
24 criminal report. Any persons potentially having knowledge of the crime
25 would be interviewed. Statements would be taken and recorded. Any other
1 items or objects might be gathered that could help with the investigation
2 of the crime in question. There was a whole set of steps and rules to be
4 Q. In the very first instance, how did you learn of a potential
5 crime that needed to be investigated?
6 A. There were two ways -- or rather, there were many ways.
7 Sometimes a commander in a unit would report a crime or else any member
8 of a certain unit would report a crime or else we would use our
9 operatives to receive -- in the units to receive intelligence indicating
10 that a crime was committed without the relevant superior officer in that
11 unit necessarily being aware of the crime.
12 Q. Just so I am sure I understand, when you talk about your
13 operatives in the unit, are those the people who are within the security
14 organ, or are you talking about people who were acting as operatives
15 unbeknownst to the unit?
16 A. The security organs of any unit - and this applies to any service
17 or indeed any army in the world - work more or less in keeping with the
18 same methods. There is a methodology that is prescribed in terms of
19 gathering information and intelligence. One of the ways to go about this
20 is through agents or associates. That's what we called them. These
21 positions, so to speak, existed in all units. Wherever there was
22 something going on and wherever there could be expected some enemy
23 activity, within the army or against the army.
24 Q. So these associates within the units would tell you if some of
25 the troops, for example, were actually meeting with the KLA and were
1 possibly going to desert; would that be an example?
2 A. Yes. They would tell us that whenever they had information like
4 Q. Now, you said that the security organs in the brigades would
5 report up to you every day and night. Was that a source of learning
6 about any crimes that were committed by VJ units?
7 A. Yes. That worked through my subordinates, the security organs in
8 the brigades, and that was my basis for establishing whether a crime was
9 committed or not.
10 Q. So you've listed, just to make sure I have this all, getting
11 information from your subordinates in the security organs within those
12 units; possibly a commander would tell you that one of his troops had
13 committed a crime; or an officer may come forward and say that a crime
14 was committed; or your associates may say something is going on in the
15 unit. Were those your basic sources of information that would then lead
16 to an investigation?
17 A. Yes, or else we could use the chain of command. As you
18 suggested, one of the commanders comes forward and reports this to his
19 own security chief. To me, for example, or his own brigade security
20 chief. Or the security officers would do their work in the unit, they
21 would receive information like that, and they would go up the chain and
22 report it.
23 Q. What types of crime were within your sector's authority and
24 competence to investigate?
25 A. Any type of crime committed in the line of duty.
1 Q. So primarily you were looking -- or maybe exclusively, correct me
2 so that I'm accurate. You were looking at crimes committed by the VJ; is
3 that correct?
4 A. Partially true, yes. Any crimes committed by the VJ, committed
5 by any member of the VJ, but also including those crimes committed
6 against the unit commands, institutions, or members of the VJ.
7 Q. And so in those instances primarily you would be talking about
8 terrorists or others who tried to subvert the VJ; is that an accurate
10 A. No. Enemy activity and illegal activity against the army was not
11 a thing that pertained to terrorists alone. There was a broad spectrum.
12 You had illegal intelligence activity, terrorist activity, links between
13 organised crime from that area and some members of the army. There were
14 regulations governing the work of security organs detailing the
15 procedures. It wasn't just about any crimes committed by the terrorists
16 targeting army units or army commands. This covered all of the other
17 crimes committed within the army or indeed against the army, thus a broad
19 Q. Sir, I have sort of a general question that I just want to make
20 sure I understand. It seems in your description of your job you have two
21 important functions. One of them is intelligence or possibly
22 counter-intelligence, I'm not sure how you would describe it,
23 intelligence of information that may be harmful to the VJ such as KLA
24 activity or whether other people are meeting with the KLA or whether
25 troops within the VJ are doing something disloyal. So you have that one
1 the one hand. Is that accurate?
2 A. The work of the security service breaks down in the roughest of
3 terms into two sections. One is counter-intelligence. I spoke about
4 that a while ago. This is key. Nearly 90 per cent of our activity comes
5 down to that. This is, to be perfectly clear, military
6 counter-intelligence. So that's the counter-intelligence component. And
7 then the breakdown within counter-intelligence is as follows: Preventing
8 any agents from taking action against the army, any army facilities or
9 members, or against the country's defence as a whole. The other
10 component is unclosing -- monitoring and intercepting any terrorist
11 activity within the army or indeed against the army. And the third
12 component is uncovering, monitoring, and intercepting any criminal
13 activity within the army or any links between criminal activity within
14 the army and external factors within the territory. The other function
15 that you asked me about today is really about taking pre-emptive measures
16 within unit commands and institutions, normally those of general
17 significance or broader significance. This has to do with safety and
18 security. For example, running military police units, for example,
19 securing military facilities or high-ranking military persons or
20 preventing the theft of weapons, pre-empting acts of sabotage, and so on
21 and so forth.
22 Q. So counter-intelligence includes, for example, your information
23 about the KLA, that would be classic counter-intelligence information; is
24 that fair?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Are you also including in counter-intelligence gathering
2 information about whether VJ units or troops are engaging in crimes? And
3 when I mean crimes here, I'm not talking about crimes against the army
4 like, you know, treason or desertion. I'm talking about crimes against
5 others, crimes against the population. Do you include that in
7 A. Yes, yes.
8 Q. All right. Thank you, sir. Now, when we're talking about crimes
9 by the VJ, are you -- is part of your responsibility to investigate any
10 kind of crime committed by the VJ?
11 A. It is my duty and legal obligation to investigate any illegal
12 activity committed by any member of the army. In a technical sense, yes,
13 it would be something for the military security service.
14 Q. So that would include crimes against civilians, correct?
15 A. By all means.
16 Q. That would include any instance where members of the military
17 murdered a civilian? Would it include that?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Rape?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Looting?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. How about expelling civilians from their homes, would that be a
24 type of crime committed by a VJ member that you would be responsible for
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Now, during the period of the NATO bombing and before that in the
3 summer of 1998, the MUP and [Realtime transcript read in error "the
4 movement of] the VJ worked closely together, correct?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And just to correct the transcript, page 41, line 2, it's the
7 MUP, M-U-P, and the VJ worked closely together.
8 Now, during a co-ordinated action between the MUP and the VJ,
9 were security organs in those units supposed to report up to you about
10 any crimes that the MUP might have committed?
11 A. No. Again I'll have to take you back to the laws and regulations
12 governing the work of military security organs. The only thing they're
13 in charge is their own members and their own ranks; nevertheless, any
14 person would have been under an obligation including military security
15 officers. As soon as they came across information that there was a crime
16 that someone else committed, to report this to their own superior
17 commander or their own superior officer down the more technical chain.
18 In this case that would have been me. That is, if they ever came across
19 information like that. But it wasn't in their job description to follow
20 that sort of thing. It would have been illegal for them to monitor or
21 follow closely what the MUP people were doing. This was something that
22 was down to the State Security Service.
23 Q. Sir, we've heard from a Defence witness, Mr. Gojovic, and I
24 believe he spoke about a duty of all officers, all military officers,
25 that if they were aware of a crime they were to report on it. Are you
1 aware of that, or could you assist us with that rule?
2 A. I'll try to explain. For example, there was a joint action being
3 performed by the MUP and the army. Very often they don't operate along
4 the same axes or indeed in the same areas, rather, they simply
5 co-ordinate. If you have an action like that being performed and now one
6 of the military security men comes across information suggesting that a
7 member of the MUP committed a crime or indeed violated the provisions of
8 international law of war, this person would have been under an obligation
9 to immediately report this to the appropriate army unit commander, the
10 commander of the unit that was involved in the action, and also to report
11 this to the superior security officer, that is, me. And I would be
12 forwarding this information to the appropriate MUP authorities and to the
13 appropriate state security authorities.
14 Q. All right. So if a security officer became aware of a MUP crime,
15 they should report that information to you; is that correct?
16 A. Yes, that's correct. But he has no authority to launch an
17 investigation or indeed take any other steps. This would have been
18 illegal. This would have clashed with the regulations because there were
19 other bodies that were in charge of that, the state security bodies and
20 Ministry of the Interior, of which the State Security Service was a
22 Q. Thank you, sir. You would agree if in co-ordinated actions where
23 the VJ is supporting the MUP, if in those actions the MUP is repeatedly
24 committing crimes that would be something that's important for you to
25 know, would it not?
1 A. I'm not sure about this formulation of yours whereby you said the
2 MUP is repeatedly committing crimes. In any case, as I've told you,
3 concerning information on any illegal acts that we received, we were
4 duty-bound to report on that.
5 Q. And when this information involved someone from the MUP, once you
6 reported on it do you know what would happen at that point, who would
7 take over?
8 A. If we received some information of a member of the army
9 committing something like that, then those responsible to undertake
10 measures would be the superior commanders or in this case those competent
11 were organs of the Ministry of the Interior as well as security organs,
12 state security organs.
13 Q. And at that point, and I'm speaking specifically about
14 information about the MUP committing crimes, you would not follow it
15 after that point?
16 A. No, we were under no legal obligation to do so.
17 Q. Let's speak for a minute about when you learn of information that
18 a member of the VJ has committed a crime. Can you just tell us
19 specifically once you learned about that and you begin the investigation,
20 how do you -- what's the next step? What then happens with that case?
21 A. If we learned of an army member having committed a specific
22 crime, we would first inform the competent commander. Second, we would
23 undertake a number of measures to have that perpetrator arrested as
24 quickly as possible so as to prevent him from fleeing. We would also
25 secure the crime scene with the help of military policemen and undertake
1 measures there. If the perpetrator is arrested together with all
2 material evidence and conclusions of an on-site investigation, he is
3 handed over to an investigating judge. If a perpetrator is unidentified
4 or fleeing, we also undertake all measures in terms of collecting
5 evidence and an on-site investigation, and we submit a criminal report
6 against an unidentified perpetrator. Following that, we resume taking
7 measures in order to establish who the perpetrator is and any other
8 follow-up activities which may have to do with the specific crime.
9 Q. When does your role end in the investigation?
10 A. My role in the investigation does not end with the submission of
11 a criminal report and the case file being handed over to the competent
12 court. We would also have to undertake all other measures requested by
13 the investigating judge if a person needed to be brought in, if witness
14 statements needed to be taken, anything that may lead to an official
15 indictment being issued against the perpetrator of a crime.
16 Q. So your section has a role up until the period of indictment. Do
17 you continue having any role up until a particular individual is
18 convicted or their case terminates?
19 A. After an indictment is issued, we can only act following an order
20 of the competent prosecutor, otherwise we wouldn't take any other
22 Q. Thank you, sir. Now, when we just -- when we spoke a minute ago
23 about the obligation of a security officer to report to you if they
24 learned of the MUP committing a crime, how often did that happen during
25 the period of the NATO bombing that you heard from your security officers
1 that the MUP was committing crimes during operations?
2 A. You probably wanted to ask me how frequently that happened --
3 Q. Yes, how frequently or how many times, if you can estimate that.
4 A. It was quite seldom. The zones of combat activities of army
5 units did not correspond to the zones of activity of MUP units. Also
6 axes of engagement and the activities in question did not necessarily
7 correspond. Security organs mainly focused on the activities of the
8 army; however, if we got by information of that nature, of which there
9 were very few such as cases of lack of discipline or certain MUP members
10 being found while looting Albanian property, then we advised their group
11 commander who, in turn, was supposed to inform the competent commander of
12 the MUP unit participating in that action.
13 Q. And your testimony is that this occurred quite seldom?
14 A. Depending on the type of crime you want to know. If these are
15 simple criminal offences, then this occurred quite frequently. If you're
16 asking me about the crime of inhumane treatment, then that was quite
18 Q. Yes, I think we're most interested here in crimes against the
19 civilian population in Kosovo. How frequently did you receive reports
20 from your security organs that the MUP was engaging in crimes against the
21 civilian population, and specifically the Albanian civilian population?
22 A. I basically cannot recall any information like that, but I did
23 receive information concerning the problem of co-ordination with the MUP.
24 It was stated that in certain locations after combat activities, no
25 sanitation and hygiene measures were taken. And in such areas,
1 individual corpses were found. That is why the line of command and the
2 line of the security service was used to pass on that information. I
3 always passed that information on to the MUP staff and the State Security
4 Service in Pristina. This was also done by the corps commander.
5 Q. Sir, when you speak of sanitation and hygiene measures after
6 combat activities, does that mean cleaning up dead bodies from the
8 A. In the military there was an instruction on sanitation and
9 hygiene measures. That instruction prescribes the measures to be
10 undertaken in terms of sanitation and hygiene after combat, including
11 what units are to participate, what services, and the procedures. Army
12 units were in charge of sanitation and hygiene measures in those areas in
13 which they had carried out combat activities; whereas, MUP units were
14 responsible to do the same in those zones where they had combat
16 Q. And by sanitation and hygiene measures, do you mean getting rid
17 of the dead bodies that are out on the combat field?
18 A. Yes, certainly. Selection and removal of corpses as well as the
19 procedure to be followed with those corpses, then evacuation of the
20 wounded. On occasion there were also animal corpses. So this is an
21 entire set of measures.
22 Q. Thank you, sir. Now, on Monday at page 16, line 6, of the
23 transcript you were asked about some of the background history of the KLA
24 in Kosovo, and you stated:
25 "The key moments which were the cause of the worsening situation
1 in Kosovo-Metohija that year," and I believe we're talking about 1998 at
2 this time, "were actually two events ..."
3 And then you went on to discuss those two events, and one of them
4 you discussed at page 16, line 13, you said:
5 "The terrorist group commanded by Jashari in February in Likosane
6 from ambush attacked a vehicle of the minister of interior of Serbia
7 I think that may be a translation error. I don't think it's
8 actually Minister Stojiljkovic. You probably were saying of the Ministry
9 of Interior; is that correct?
10 A. Yes, correct. It was a patrol vehicle of the Ministry of the
11 Interior. The MUP members were on patrol. It wasn't a vehicle of the
12 minister of the interior.
13 Q. Thank you, sir. And you went on to say:
14 "On which occasion they killed four policemen and wounded two.
15 In the ensuing clash during the night due to poor visibility and general
16 chaos the attack was repelled and then by subsequent MUP activity Adem
17 Jashari's house was surrounded in Prekaz. He was liquidated on that
18 occasion. The liquidation of Adem Jashari is very important because the
19 Albanian separatists chose to use solely forceful means to achieve their
20 proclaimed goals."
21 Sir, this last sentence is a little unclear to me. Do you mean
22 there that the liquidation of Adem Jashari led or caused Albanian
23 separatists to employ forceful means, or did you mean something
25 A. The Albanian terrorists in Kosovo and Metohija had previously
1 before this event -- and I was referring to the time as far back as 1990
2 when the Republic of Kosovo
3 to establish a parallel police military force. Then I spoke about 1993
4 when the 14-member group of terrorists was arrested who were members of
5 the illegal Ministry of Defence of Kosovo who admitted to having included
6 in their plans a plan to organise 15 brigades of 500 men each and to
7 establish operational zones in Kosovo, which coincided, which was rather
8 odd, with the operational zones as they existed in 1998 and 1999.
9 Next, I said that in 1994 they made a final decision, that is to
10 say the national movement for Kosovo, that violent means must be used to
11 secure the independence of Kosovo. They even put together a study in
12 three volumes, which I believe the Prosecution has. They worked out in
13 detail the tactics and strategy of their, as they called it, "liberation
14 war" to be rid of the occupier. This is the tactics they employed in
15 1998 and 1999. The killing of Adem Jashari was just a trigger which
16 marked the beginning of the implementation of that plan.
17 Q. So how specifically did the killing of Adem Jashari worsen the
18 situation in your view?
19 A. I will explain. In the transcript it is incorrect that
20 immediately after the attack on the MUP vehicle in Likosane the
21 subsequent action took place. It was a few days later that Adem
22 Jashari's house was surrounded. After clashes which lasted for a number
23 of days, he was killed since he refused to surrender to the MUP. Adem
24 Jashari was a resistance symbol and the symbol of an independent Kosovo
25 in the minds of Albanians.
1 As of the 1980s he had been carrying out terrorist attacks
2 against MUP members. There were many MUP members in Srbica, Glogovac, in
3 Donji, and Gornji Prekaz who were killed from ambush where his terrorist
4 unit was active. A large monument was erected to honour him after the
5 war in Kosovo. That is why they saw that point in time as important.
6 Their key extremist was killed. And as I said yesterday, and this
7 testifies to the synchronicity of events, in March right after his murder
8 of the Main Staff which was in Switzerland
9 dispatched parts of its Main Staff to the north of Albania, and a number
10 of personnel headed by Hashim Thaqi, Ramush Haradinaj, and Kadri Veseli,
11 and Jakup Krasniqi were transferred to Kosovo with the basic aim of
12 organising and preparing an armed rebellion of Albanians in Kosovo and
14 Q. Now, sir, during the attack or the action on the Jashari
15 compound, it wasn't just Adem Jashari who was liquidated, as you put it,
16 was it? Many members of his family were killed during that action also,
17 were they not?
18 A. The army did not participate in that action. It was done by the
19 MUP. I was well informed of that action. Mr. Jashari had barricaded
20 himself in two family homes. After several days of fighting and calls
21 for surrender, he did not allow the members of his family to leave the
22 house and surrender to the authorities. He personally killed his cousin
23 or nephew, who was trying to get through the door. He was on his way out
24 to surrender. There is an Official Note about that. He killed him
25 personally. He was such an extremist and hated Serbs so much that he was
1 ready to liquidate his entire family rather than allow them to surrender.
2 His brother was also killed in that action and other people, although I
3 don't remember who precisely. In any case, he did kill his cousin when
4 he tried to surrender to the security organs.
5 Q. Now, for a little context here, if we could please look at
6 Prosecution exhibit 741, and in the English if we could go to page 35 and
7 in the B/C/S page 36, paragraph 2.
8 Sir, this is an exhibit that has been admitted in this trial.
9 It's a report from Human Rights Watch. It's called "Humanitarian Law
10 Violations in Kosovo," and it was distributed in October 1998 by
11 Human Rights Watch. If we look at the last paragraph on page 35 in the
12 English and beginning second paragraph on page 36 in the B/C/S:
13 "The police attacked Prekaz and the Jashari compound again on
14 March 5th, 1998
15 evidence suggests that the attack was not intended to apprehend armed
16 Albanians considered 'terrorists' by the government, but as Amnesty
17 International concluded in its report on violence in Drenica, 'to
18 eliminate the suspects and their families.'"
19 If we go to the next page, page 28 -- I'm sorry, page 36, and I
20 think it continues in the B/C/S on the same page:
21 "Testimonies collected by human rights groups and journalists
22 indicate several cases of extrajudicial executions and unlawful killings
23 from excessive force.
24 "An estimated 58 ethnic Albanians were killed in the attack,
25 including 18 women and ten children under the age of 16, and then
1 summarily buried by the police before autopsies could be performed."
2 Now, sir, I know you may not have seen this report from
3 Human Rights Watch, but the estimate of 58 ethnic Albanians, including 18
4 women and ten children under the age of 16, were you aware that that many
5 people were killed in the action on the Jashari compound?
6 A. I will answer. In the proofing for this testimony I was able to
7 read the Human Rights Watch report in detail. I believe that the report
8 is superfluous in several regards. Firstly, when it refers to the
9 victims in Kosovo and Metohija, such victims should be identified by
10 their first and last name and other data, just as the criminals or
11 perpetrators are always identified by their first and last name. I
12 didn't read this portion specifically, but in some other places in the
13 report it seemed to me that the research undertaken by that organisation
14 was aimed to have all the victims in Kosovo and Metohija who were killed
15 in terrorist and anti-terrorist actions as well as those killed in the
16 border area and killed by NATO airplanes and liquidated by Albanian
17 terrorists because some Albanians had refused to be mobilised, they
18 wanted to have all those victims shown as people killed due to inhumane
19 treatment and because of the violations of international humanitarian law
20 and the laws of war.
21 In this particular example concerning Prekaz and the Jashari
22 family, I know that on the same day the location was visited by basically
23 all accredited ambassadors in the FRY. They entered Jashari's house and
24 until I saw this report I had never heard of any MUP organs having killed
25 and then buried 50-plus Albanians whose bodies were not autopsied. First
1 of all, there were no so many people in these two houses, the house of
2 Mr. Jashari and his brother.
3 MS. PETERSEN: If we could just go to page 40 in the English,
4 please, and I'm not entirely sure what page this would be in the B/C/S
5 that corresponds to page 40. It says page 32 in the -- and maybe a
6 translation is not as important because these are just names.
7 Q. But, sir, you said that names of the victims here were not
8 identified. If we look down this list we can see a 74-year-old, a
9 72-year-old, going down the list we see a 13-year-old, an 11-year-old, a
10 16-year-old, a 12-year-old, an 8-year old, another 7-year-old. Going
11 down, a 16-year-old, a 12-year-old.
12 So, sir, you would agree there are names of these people who were
13 in the home and ages to back up this claim?
14 A. With all due respect for the victims shown here as well as all
15 other victims in Kosovo and Metohija, I wanted to draw your attention to
16 the following: It is correct that there are names here including
17 children, which is a sorry fact, but I wanted to put forth another
18 thesis. Were all these people killed during the attack on the Jashari
19 compound, or were they killed in all actions during 1998 and 1999?
20 Q. Well, sir, this is a list of people who were killed on the attack
21 at Donji Prekaz from March 5th to 7th
22 ones who were killed in a nearby village, but I'm not referring to those
23 at this point.
24 A. It all depends on when the Human Rights Watch conducted this
25 investigation. Was it three, four, five, ten days later or a full year
1 after the event in the village of Prekaz
2 Q. Well, let me ask you this, sir: Does this coincide with what you
3 were aware of taking place in the action at the Jashari compound?
4 A. No, it does not coincide with what -- with my knowledge at the
6 Q. All right. If we could go back to the article in the Nedeljni
7 Telegraf. I don't recall the exhibit number now. It was 65 ter 02945,
8 and I am informed that it is P1543. If we could look at that and go
9 to in the English version page 13, and if you could scroll down to the
10 box at the bottom, and if we could look at the B/C/S page 3, and if we
11 could just scroll down to the very bottom over to the box there on the
12 left-hand side. And I'll just read this, sir. This is your interview
13 with the Nedeljni Telegraf. You state:
14 "Already in the first armed conflict with the OVK, the members of
15 the MUP demonstrated incapable and unfit. The first organised attack of
16 the members of the OVK on the members of the MUP of Serbia took place on
17 the 28th February, 1999
18 On that occasion four members of the MUP were killed while two were
19 wounded. In this conflict, which lasted two days, it was demonstrated
20 that the members of the MUP are not capable of effectively confronting
21 the escalated terrorism in the area of Kosmet. Due to bad planning, the
22 anti-terrorist units of the MUP and the State Security Service used too
23 great of a force in the action which followed, aiming to neutralise the
24 terrorist group of Adem Jashari in the village of Gornji Prekaz
25 Srbica. Such usage of force resulted with unnecessary civilian victims
1 which provoked a reaction and rapid escalation of terrorism in the entire
2 Kosovo and Metohija, especially in the area of Drenica."
3 Sir, was this your statement to the Nedeljni Telegraf?
4 A. Yes, this was my statement to Nedeljni Telegraf. Nevertheless,
5 in the document you showed me a while ago it said about 80 or about a
6 hundred victims. My information at the time suggested, although I myself
7 was not involved nor indeed was the army involved, that the figures
8 regarding casualties were more about 30-ish. The visibility was poor.
9 This was at about midnight
10 vehicle was attacked because there was firing some civilians were hurt,
11 but not two or three days later when the Jashari family home was
12 attacked. There was an attack on that MUP vehicle because of the low
13 visibility and because of the fog in Likosane. That was when some
14 civilians came to grief. It wasn't as a result of the attack on the
15 Jashari family home or at least that was what my information suggested at
16 the time.
17 Q. Now, sir, just to have accurate information, I believe the
18 Human Rights Watch report didn't say a hundred casualties but 58, just so
19 we're clear on that.
20 But, sir, if we look at your statement here in the Nedeljni
21 Telegraf, it says:
22 "Due to bad planning the anti-terrorist units of the MUP and the
23 State Security Service used too great of a force in the action which
24 followed, aiming to neutralise the terrorist group of Adem Jashari in the
25 village of Gornji Prekaz near Srbica. Such usage of force resulted with
1 unnecessary civilian victims ..."
2 Do you agree you were not talking about the initial ambush of the
3 MUP vehicles. Your criticism here is precisely with the following action
4 against Adem Jashari?
5 A. Yes, I will agree with you. Nevertheless, this is a newspaper
6 piece, not an original document. What I'm saying here is the action that
7 followed, meaning after the MUP vehicle was ambushed that night --
8 nevertheless, I will agree with you as far as what you say about the
9 newspaper piece goes. Nevertheless, 58 victims -- it doesn't make any
10 difference. Even if there had been a single victim, that would have been
11 dramatic. But I'm talking about February 1998 and what I was doing at
12 the time based on the information I was receiving from the state security
13 and the MUP, the suggested number of casualties was about 30.
14 Q. Now, sir, you say that this was just a newspaper piece, not an
15 original document. But if we look at the first page, if we go to page 1
16 in English and if we go to page 1 in B/C/S -- I don't think that's page 1
17 in English. Thank you.
18 And if we look at the first paragraph you say:
19 "Although it is not common - it is even a precedent - for a
20 member of a military security service to talk to the newspapers about
21 such important issues, I still decided to do it because of the truth
22 about the fighting in Kosovo and Metohija and because all of those men of
23 mine whom I was sending to the most dangerous spots day and night so that
24 we could have true and timely information about that which the
25 separatists, terrorists, and their foreign mentors prepare for us, to
1 speak up and say the truth. I will answer all your questions but under
2 the condition that first you allow me five to six minutes to say what is
3 bothering me."
4 Sir, you spoke with them because you wanted to tell the truth
5 about what you saw in Kosovo and Metohija; is that not correct?
6 A. Yes, that's what the entire article suggests. I don't think I'll
7 dispute anything about that.
8 Q. Thank you, sir. And are you aware that General Djordjevic was on
9 the staff that drew up the plan for the action on the Jashari compound?
10 A. No, I wasn't aware of that.
11 Q. Thank you, sir. Moving on to a different topic now, I would like
12 to ask you a question -- some questions about a few names and ask if you
13 knew these people during the relevant time-period, the period of the NATO
14 bombing. Did you know a Sreto Camovic?
15 A. Sreto Camovic, chief of the Djakovica state security department,
16 yes, I certainly knew him.
17 Q. And did you know Nikola Micunovic?
18 A. Yes, I did.
19 Q. And what was his position?
20 A. I believe he was a major by rank. He was an assistant clerk with
21 the military department in Djakovica, their headquarters being in Pec.
22 The Djakovica office was a branch office of Pec.
23 Q. Thank you, sir. And I believe you spoke of Sergej Perovic
24 yesterday, you knew him?
25 A. Sergej Perovic, captain 1st class was chief of security in the
1 52nd Rocket and Artillery Brigade of the anti-aircraft defence.
2 Q. So was he someone who had a responsibility to make these morning
3 and evening reports to you?
4 A. Yes, by virtue of being a security chief in a brigade.
5 Q. Thank you, sir. And Veroljub Zivkovic, did you know him?
6 A. Colonel Veroljub Zivkovic was Chief of Staff of the Pristina
7 Corps in 1999.
8 Q. And where was he located during the NATO bombing?
9 A. In Djakovica, he was commander of the Pristina Corps forward
10 command post there.
11 Q. And Stevo Kopanja?
12 A. Stevo Kopanja was the commander of the 52nd Military Police
14 Q. Now, you know -- you seem to know these people and what they were
15 doing pretty well. Were you yourself during the NATO bombing campaign in
16 Djakovica frequently?
17 A. Both in 1998 and 1999 I was on the move all the time and so were
18 my security officers. We weren't working in an office at the time. We
19 were all over the place. I was guiding the work of my team of security
20 officers in 1998 and 1999. Just because it was more difficult -- it was
21 getting more difficult to move about, I was beginning to spend more time
22 in the Djakovica garrison as well.
23 Q. So during the period of the NATO bombing, how often would you be
24 at the Djakovica garrison?
25 A. It's been 11 years, hasn't it? Well, twice a month or
1 thereabouts. I spent a total of perhaps five or six visits there.
2 Q. And each visit, would it be a visit for a day, or would you stay
4 A. It would always be a single day, always at the forward command
5 post. All the chiefs would be there, the brigade chief, the 52nd
6 Artillery Brigade, and combat group chiefs from the battalions deployed
7 along the border. They would brief me on the situation, and we would
8 agree on any future tasks and assignments.
9 Q. Sir, when you would travel from Pristina to Djakovica, about how
10 long did that take during the period of the NATO bombing, travel time?
11 A. Sometimes it would take quite a long time. In normal
12 circumstances at one point in time -- well, at different points in time
13 there were roads that you couldn't use because they were cut off, the
14 Kosovska-Mitrovica-Pec road and the Pristina-Pec road and the
15 Pristina-Prizren road, and the only road that was always under our
16 control and remained throughout under our control was the route across
17 Mount Strbac
18 Nevertheless, if you're asking me about the time it would have taken me
19 to reach Djakovica in normal circumstances, it would have taken about an
20 hour and a half driving. In wartime circumstances, certainly not under
21 three hours.
22 Q. Thank you, sir. Now, you grew up in Djakovica, correct?
23 A. Correct. I was born there. I went to elementary school there
24 and secondary school too. After that I was off to military academy.
25 Q. And what area of Djakovica did you grow up in?
1 A. I spent my childhood days in a village. I come from a family
2 that back in 1933 first came to Kosovo and Metohija, a village called
3 Dobrivare [phoen] on the banks of Beli Drim. This is east of Djakovica,
4 a distance being some 12 kilometres. After 1968 we were in Djakovica
5 town itself. Our house was right next to the bus terminal there and also
6 right next to one of the two barracks that existed at the time in
8 Q. At the time of the NATO bombing, did you still have a home in
10 A. Yes. I had a house until the army and the police withdrew.
11 After that all Serb houses, including mine, suffered the same fate. The
12 roofs were set ablaze. I found out from other sources that after that an
13 Albanian had moved in and revamped or rebuilt the whole building. This
14 was a house shared by my uncle and my father. At my uncle's initiative
15 the house was sold off in 2005. Right now I own two flats in Djakovica
16 belonging to my brothers, and I have a total of 12 hectares of land, and
17 my father has no intention of selling that.
18 Q. So before the end of the NATO bombing you did not sell your
20 A. No, it wasn't before 2005. There are judicial records and other
21 types of records showing that, land registry.
22 Q. Thank you, sir. Now, you spoke yesterday that -- about a person
23 named Nike Peraj. You knew Mr. Peraj well, correct?
24 A. Yes, that's right.
25 Q. And I believe in the Milutinovic case you described him as your
1 friend for many years; does that sound correct?
2 A. Well, an acquaintance of many years.
3 Q. And be aware if we go into any topic that we need to go into
4 private session in your answer, let me know if we need to do that.
5 A. We respected everyone who tried to enhance general security in
6 Kosovo. When I say a "friend," a long-time acquaintance of many chiefs
7 who came there before me. Let me tell you about an example that I base
8 this on. In 1997 I went to see him in his home at a wedding. His cousin
9 was getting married, and I was there as a guest of honour. There was a
10 group of Serbs there. He would often come to see me in Djakovica. We
11 would brew some brandy or something. And whenever he was passing
12 through, he was a cosmopolitan, quite simply. He associated equally with
13 Serbs and Albanians.
14 Q. And you said yesterday that you had met his father also; is that
16 A. Yes, that's right. I met both his father and his brother.
17 MS. PETERSEN: Your Honours, if we could just quickly go into
18 private session, I have just one or two questions.
19 JUDGE PARKER: Private.
20 [Private session]
11 Pages 11882-11884 redacted. Private session.
19 [Open session]
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're back in open session.
21 JUDGE PARKER: We will adjourn now for the second break and
22 resume at 1.00.
23 [The witness stands down]
24 --- Recess taken at 12.31 p.m.
25 --- On resuming at 1.01 p.m.
1 [The witness takes the stand]
2 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Petersen.
3 MS. PETERSEN: Thank you, Your Honours.
4 Q. Sir, I'd like to ask you about one other individual, Milos
5 Djosan, I think you mentioned him yesterday.
6 A. Milos Djosan, colonel, commander of the 52nd Rocket Anti-aircraft
8 Q. And yesterday you were shown the statement of Nike Peraj. You
9 said you've read this statement?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And one thing that you corrected was in paragraph 6, the
12 description of Milos Djosan was incorrect; is that right?
13 A. I don't know which description exactly you mean.
14 Q. Let me refer to it. In Exhibit P313, paragraph 6, it said that
15 Colonel Milos
16 responsible for the VJ units in the municipality of Djakovica
17 Milos Djosan was also responsible for MUP reservist units, and you stated
18 that that was inaccurate, correct?
19 A. Yes, you're right.
20 Q. Okay. I just wanted to give you some additional information and
21 get your answer to this. In the testimony of Nike Peraj, which was in
22 February of last year, this is at transcript page 1189, he makes a
23 correction to this paragraph. He states:
24 "It should say 'Colonel Milos Djosan.' He was a commander of the
25 52nd Brigade ARBR and he was responsible for this brigade only, not
1 responsible for MUP reservist units."
2 And then he went on to say in the next question:
3 "Would it be correct to say that he was responsible for VJ
4 reservist units also?"
5 And he said in answer:
6 "He was responsible for regular forces and reservist forces," and
7 they're speaking about the VJ.
8 Now, hearing that correction, sir, would you still say paragraph
9 6 inaccurate, or is that corrected in your opinion?
10 A. Colonel Milos Djosan was in charge of the 52nd Artillery Rocket
11 Brigade, which as its part also had military conscripts who had been
12 mobilised. He was only in charge of the conscripts within his brigade.
13 Q. All right. Thank you, sir. I have one other question for you.
14 We spoke just before the break of Nikola Micunovic, correct, and you said
15 that you know him?
16 A. Yes. Nikola Micunovic worked in the military secretariat in Pec
17 in Djakovica.
18 Q. Sir, were you aware of a nickname for Nikola Micunovic?
19 A. No.
20 Q. You didn't hear him called Dragan?
21 A. No.
22 Q. Okay. Thank you. Sir, in 1999 did you know an individual named
23 Milutin Prascevic?
24 A. No, not in 1999, but --
25 Q. I'm sorry, 1998 --
1 A. -- for many years before that.
2 Q. I'm sorry, in 1998. That's my error. Did you know him in 1998
3 and up until 1999?
4 A. Certainly. He is a relative on my wife's side. He is her
5 uncle's brother.
6 Q. Do you have a term for that, a term to describe that?
7 A. My wife's father and Milutin Prascevic's father were brothers.
8 Q. Okay, so he is your relative?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And how long did you know Mr. Prascevic?
11 A. Ever since I got married in 1982, that's how long I've known him.
12 Q. And can you explain what his occupation was?
13 A. Milutin Prascevic was a desk officer in the service for
14 combatting crime in the SUP
15 Q. All right. I'd like to give you a little more information again
16 and get your answer to this. Yesterday, as you were being shown the
17 witness statement of Nike Peraj, in paragraph 58 it said -- it described
18 Prascevic. It says:
19 "He used to be the chief of the state security in Djakovica."
20 Now, you said that that was an error, correct?
21 A. Absolutely incorrect. The head of the state security sector was
22 Mr. Camovic.
23 Q. Thank you, sir. And in Nike Peraj's testimony, transcript page
24 1191, he was asked if he had any corrections to his statement and he said
25 with regard to paragraph 58:
1 "This is not correct. Milutin Prascevic was never a state or
2 public security chief. He was an inspector and not even a senior
3 inspector, just an inspector. That's what he was, just an inspector, as
4 I said, not a senior inspector in the MUP."
5 Is that more accurate, sir, based on your knowledge?
6 A. I know him very well. He's a relative. He was a desk clerk in
7 the crime prevention service of the SUP
9 Q. So your answer is he did work for the MUP in Djakovica. You say
10 he's a desk clerk as opposed to an inspector, but you agree he worked for
11 the police in Djakovica?
12 A. He worked in the secretariat of the interior in Djakovica, and
13 his job description was as I've already said.
14 Q. Thank you, sir. Now, I'm -- this may sound like a silly question
15 but I need to ask you for the record. Were you aware that Mr. Prascevic
16 was killed in 1999?
17 A. Yes. I heard that from my relatives because my family at that
18 time resided in Djakovica as well as the Prascevic family. I knew that
19 he was killed in an ambush near Djakovica. I only learned of the
20 circumstances of his death later on.
21 Q. When you say "an ambush," who was the ambush by?
22 A. I don't have that information, and I never investigated. What I
23 can remember being said by his wife and cousins, and they probably
24 received that information from MUP representatives, what is that before
25 his murder there had been an incident. In a location near Djakovica a
1 MUP patrol was attacked. By Motorola they asked for MUP backup.
2 Prascevic, without waiting for the others, sat in a vehicle and went
3 there with another person to help his comrades whose vehicle had been
4 attacked from fire-arms. During that intervention he was killed and
6 Q. And was your understanding that the attack was from the KLA?
7 A. At the time that was not my conclusion. I cannot recall the date
8 when he died, but I think it was in 1998 when the terrorists were
9 basically everywhere. But I couldn't get any information as to who
10 killed him.
11 Q. Sir, wasn't he killed in April of 1999?
12 A. It is possible, but a lot of time has passed. I described to you
13 how he was killed, but I can't recall exactly when it was. It may as
14 well be, as you say, in April 1999.
15 Q. All right, sir. And are you saying that he was killed in an
16 ambush, an attack, but you don't know if it was by KLA terrorists?
17 A. No, I don't. All I know, and I didn't busy myself with that too
18 much, was that he was killed in an ambush en route to helping his
19 associates who had been ambushed previously. I can only suppose that the
20 terrorists killed him, but I can't conclude that with any degree of
22 Q. Well, sir, who in April of 1999, who else is going around
23 ambushing and shooting at the MUP?
24 A. In 1999 only terrorists opened fire on MUP members.
25 Q. Now, sir, are you telling us today that your own relative was
1 killed in an ambush and you were not -- you did not take any actions to
2 find out who the perpetrators were?
3 A. Madam, you keep asking me whether I took any measures in cases
4 where I wasn't competent to. Milutin Prascevic was a SUP worker. MUP
5 organs must have taken some measures to investigate the event. They
6 probably did everything they had to. They had an on-site investigation.
7 As far as I recall, he had been wounded to the head and died en route to
8 the hospital. I never undertook any measures to investigate. This was
9 not my job. There were organs in charge of that.
10 Q. Now, sir, it may not have been your job to investigate the death
11 of MUP officers, but isn't -- wasn't it part of your job to know what the
12 KLA was doing? They're the perpetrators here, are they not?
13 A. During 1999 I had so many obligations that I didn't know which
14 one to turn to first in terms of my function. To conduct an
15 investigation I wasn't competent to do was something I didn't have time
16 for. It is -- it was enough for me to be told by his family members of
17 the way he was killed.
18 Q. All right. So just to be clear, your testimony to this Court is
19 that as intelligence chief who is supposed to be on top of what the KLA
20 is doing, when circumstances appear that your relative was killed in an
21 ambush by the KLA you took no further steps to ascertain who the killers
22 of your relative were?
23 A. Milutin Prascevic was a member of the MUP and not the Army of the
24 FRY. Had he been an army member, in that case I would have been obliged
25 to together with the military police and others to investigate all the
1 details surrounding his death. However, for me as his relative, it was
2 enough to know about the rough circumstances of his death and that the
3 MUP organs had shared all the information they had during the
4 investigation with his family members. Why would I have investigated
5 that? Following that logic, whenever a relative of mine would have been
6 killed, I basically would have said, "Well, MUP organs are no longer
7 competent," and I would have conducted my own private citizen's
9 Q. Sir, are you aware how many others were killed with your
11 A. No, I don't know that. I think there were others, but I can't
12 say that with certainty. It's been a long time. I think some were
13 wounded, and there may have been another casualty, although I don't know
14 any details.
15 Q. Thank you, sir. Did you travel to Djakovica to attend
16 condolences for Prascevic?
17 A. Yes, I went to Djakovica to attend condolences; however, I didn't
18 attend the funeral itself. I was there on that day in the morning to see
19 his family and express my condolences. Then I returned to Nis. The NATO
20 aggression was underway and by my function I had no time to spare in such
21 war-like circumstances.
22 Q. Okay. So you recall now that this was during the time of the
23 NATO aggression, not in 1998?
24 A. Yes, yes, I was wrong.
25 Q. Thank you, sir. And so did you just stay for one day in
1 Djakovica when you went to attend condolences?
2 A. Just one morning I went to his family house, or rather, to the
3 yard of his family house where there were another 100 citizens to express
4 my condolences. I spent a short time there and went on to attend to my
6 Q. All right. And during the time that you were in Djakovica for
7 these condolences, did you see Nike Peraj?
8 A. Nike Peraj as far as I knew was also on quite good terms with
9 Milutin Prascevic. I seldom visited Djakovica since I worked in Pristina
10 where my family was, but I do know that they occasionally socialised. On
11 the day of the condolences, I came across Nike Peraj seated on a bench
12 together with other locals. He also came there to express his
14 Q. Do you remember who the other locals were who were sitting by
15 Nike Peraj?
16 A. In Djakovica the population structure was such that there were
17 the least Serbs in all of Kosovo and Metohija, only 3 per cent. In
18 Djakovica there are three small enclaves where there are Serb houses, one
19 of which was next to the bus station. There were other citizens there,
20 neighbours, relatives, my wife was there, his brothers were there, so the
21 family, all of the relatives.
22 Q. All right. Thank you, sir. Now, yesterday you were shown Nike
23 Peraj's statement, and you had already read this statement prior to
24 yesterday, though, correct?
25 A. I had also read it before my testimony in the Milutinovic case.
1 What I noticed was that he gave several statements.
2 Q. Well, I'm not asking you about that, sir. I'm asking you about
3 the P313 that you looked at yesterday. You had read that previously,
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. All right. And you were told that in paragraph 59 that Nike
7 Peraj said that on the day, he called it the funeral for Prascevic, on
8 that day he heard you say in the presence of Camovic, Micunovic, another
9 individual named Kovacevic, and Perovic that at least a hundred heads
10 must be eliminated and houses burned in retribution for the killing of
11 Prascevic. And I think you've made your position clear, your position is
12 that you did not say this. Is that accurate?
13 A. Please, I repeat, such a meeting of that sort was never held, I
14 never attended it, and I never said something of the sort. The whole
15 statement of Nike Peraj came about as a result of pressure which he
16 probably experienced after the withdrawal of the army. He was pressured
17 by the terrorists and for his own safety he was forced to give such a
19 Q. Sir, in paragraph 60, and I just want to make sure that we are
20 working from accurate information, in paragraph 60 of P313, Peraj
22 "The meeting referred to was informal. A discussion within a
23 group that had gathered for a completely different purpose and
24 Stojanovic's order could more accurately be described as an emotional
1 So we're not talking about a formal meeting here where you stood
2 up and ordered everyone to eliminate a hundred heads; what's more
3 accurately being described is a group that was gathered for another
4 purpose, entered into a conversation about this, and you in an emotional
5 state after the death of your relative made this statement. Do you
6 recall that happening?
7 A. I repeat, there was no formal or informal meeting. Emotionally,
8 I never react in this way.
9 Q. All right. Thank you, sir.
10 Now, it's my understanding that one of the reasons you've given
11 for why this could not have happened at all is that you yourself couldn't
12 give orders. You didn't have the authority to command. Do I understand
13 that right?
14 A. I never had any command authority. I could never issue orders.
15 However, your conclusion is incorrect. Not that it didn't happen because
16 I held no such authority. I'm simply telling you that this is a
17 notorious lie contained in the paragraph you referred to and that not a
18 single sentence in it is correct.
19 Q. Well, sir, beyond -- we understand that you're saying you did not
20 say that. Beyond that, though, I believe you've given reasoning in your
21 prior testimony that this could have never happened anyway because you
22 had no authority to issue such a command. Is that accurate?
23 A. Everything I said previously is correct, and everything I said
24 today is too.
25 Q. All right, sir.
1 MS. PETERSEN: If we could now have P338 on the screen, and if we
2 could just first go to the first page in both the English and the B/C/S
3 to identify what the document is.
4 Q. Now, sir, as you can see here this is the war diary for the 52nd
5 Military Police Battalion. Do you see that?
6 A. Yes.
7 MS. PETERSEN: And if we could go to page 6 in the English and
8 page 9 in the B/C/S, please. And if we look -- the B/C/S is good. If we
9 can scroll down to in the English the entry for 13 April 1999.
10 Q. It says -- it briefly describes that a company was formed, made
11 up of one platoon from the 1st company of the -- I believe that's the
12 military police battalion, maybe you can tell us what 1st CVP means.
13 A. Military police company.
14 Q. All right. Thank you. And it describes how a military police
15 company was formed. And if we look down at the last full paragraph from
16 the bottom just before point 3 it says:
17 "Upon arrival in the Morina border post we were tasked by the
18 chief of the PrK security department to capture the border post in the
19 village of Kamenica. The task was carried out ..."
20 Now, that's you, is it not, sir?
21 A. I'm the security chief. Do you want me to comment more
23 Q. Well, first let's make sure we're clear on that. It's referring
24 to you as the security chief, correct?
25 A. That's right.
1 Q. Okay. Now, is this not an example of you giving a task to a
2 company of the military police and them doing it?
3 A. No. This is not an example of me giving a task to the military
4 police company. Each unit keeps a war log-book, a diary. This one
5 belongs, as can be seen, to the 52nd Battalion of the military police.
6 It's not kept by the commander. It is often kept by whichever officer is
7 placed in charge of this by the commander. These war diaries are not
8 always precise. Sometimes they're not even written up properly. This
9 company numbers 100 members, 100 soldiers or men, and they can confirm
10 this. I received an assignment from the commander of the Pristina Corps
11 to take this company to the Morina barracks area and to hand it over to
12 Lieutenant-Colonel Goran Jevtovic, who was one of the officers at the
13 forward command post of the Pristina Corps command in Djakovica. This
14 company, pursuant to orders from the corps commander, was to launch an
15 attack on the left wing of the Albanian terrorists in relation to the
16 Morina barracks because there was a danger that they would be linking up
17 from there with the terrorists at Smonica and Junik and succeed in making
18 that corridor that I spoke about yesterday down which a large group of
19 terrorists could then pass. It says here, Pursuant to my order, and I'm
20 saying, No, I conveyed the order of the Pristina Corps commander. That
21 is what I did, and I was not in charge of this operation or indeed the
22 order. My job was to hand the unit over to Lieutenant-Colonel Jevtovic
23 and a number of other officers who were at the Morina barracks at the
25 Q. So you conveyed the order from the Pristina Corps command?
1 A. Yes, yes.
2 Q. Now, sir, often when a command is issued by a commander of a
3 unit, they got that order from above, would you agree?
4 A. Every order comes from above.
5 Q. All right. And the person conveying that order from above needs
6 to have the authority to do so, do they not?
7 A. Yes. I was authorised by him to take the company there, to march
8 them there, and to convey his order to Lieutenant-Colonel Jevtovic. I
9 assume that the Djakovica forward command post knew they had received
10 word through their communications equipment as to how exactly the company
11 would then proceed to be used.
12 Q. So you would agree that someone off the street could not simply
13 come in and pass along an order to a unit and have them follow it? There
14 needs to be some authority behind the words?
15 A. In this case and in my assessment, the corps commander ordered
16 the Chief of Staff, who was the commander at the forward command post, to
17 receive that company and to use it in keeping with their previous
18 agreement. I'm not sure what it is. The assignment is stated here. My
19 assignment was to take the company there and hand them over at this
20 pre-agreed location where they were to report.
21 Q. Now, sir, I think we can agree this entry in the war diary says:
22 "We were tasked by the chief of the PrK security department to
23 capture the border post. The task was carried out ..."
24 In their view they had received the task from you. Of course it
25 may have come from a superior commander, but they responded to a task
1 that came from your lips, did they not?
2 A. We could speculate about a number of theorys here. Whoever wrote
3 this up may not even have heard my conversation with the company
4 commander as to what their assignment was to be. It is difficult to draw
5 up a number of theorys here, but what I'm telling you is the truth. I
6 was not in command of that company in that operation or in command of any
7 unit at all ever.
8 Q. Well, sir, let's be careful not to get hung up on semantics here.
9 I think we understand your position that you were not a commander of a
10 unit leading a troop into battle; that position is clear. However, you
11 told this unit to do something, you tasked them to do something on this
12 occasion, maybe it came from above - that sounds reasonable - and they
13 then did it. That's all I'm saying. Can we agree on that?
14 A. No, we can't, no way. Regardless of the level of command that
15 the order was issued from, I personally did not issue such an order to
16 this unit. I repeat, I conveyed to Lieutenant-Colonel Jevtovic who had
17 previously been informed also by the forward command post because the
18 Chief of Staff and the commander had heard about the fighting at Kosare
19 that this company was to be there and they knew -- and later on I brought
20 them there and I returned. I went back. I was not directly ordering
21 them, and I was not there on the spot during the actual implementation of
22 the task.
23 Q. Sir, I think we're getting caught up in the semantics again. I
24 am saying merely that you spoke this order to them. You told them this.
25 You are saying, "I conveyed it to them." Those sound like the same thing
1 to me.
2 A. I conveyed the order. I spoke to the company commander, not the
3 soldiers who were there all lined up. I spoke to their company commander
4 that they should go there and that what they had to do was what the corps
5 commander had told me, that was to hand them over to Lieutenant-Colonel
7 Q. And they then did that, correct, what you had conveyed?
8 A. As far as I know, they did that, yes. And they took Kamen C4.
9 That's what I received in my reports. We were monitoring the fighting at
10 Kosare. Many people were killed there in order to ease the frontal
11 pressure by the terrorists. In terms of military strategy they had to
12 attack from the flank. This was a dominant feature, Kamen C4 straddling
13 the very border between the Republic of Albania
14 of Yugoslavia
15 Q. All right, sir, now we -- you were asked questions about the
16 Caragoj valley operation, and I'd like to speak with you about that a bit
17 now. Do you agree that there were two platoons of the 52nd Military
18 Police Battalion who took part in that action?
19 A. Yes, two platoons of the 52nd Military Police Battalion. They
20 were subordinated to the 125th Motorised Brigade.
21 Q. All right. And the 52nd Military Police Battalion itself was
22 located in Pristina, is that correct, the larger battalion; is that
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. All right.
1 MS. PETERSEN: I'm about to go on to an exhibit now. I see we
2 only have about five minutes left. I could go on to that, or we could
3 end for the day.
4 JUDGE PARKER: I take it you won't finish with the exhibit in
5 that time.
6 MS. PETERSEN: I may not.
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE PARKER: We will then adjourn. We continue again tomorrow
9 at 9.00 in the morning.
10 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.
11 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 25th day of
12 February, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.