Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 13926

 1                           Monday, 26 April 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.18 p.m.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Good afternoon.  While we are waiting for the

 6     witness to come in, the Chamber would mention that on the 25th of March

 7     the Defence applied for the amendment of two documents admitted as

 8     Defence Exhibits D636 and D703 which had been uploaded incorrectly in

 9     e-court.  Now leave to amend the exhibits is granted.  Exhibit D636 shall

10     be identified as document D011-1858 for the B/C/S version and D010-4417

11     for the English translation.  Page 3 of the English translation of

12     Exhibit D703 shall be removed from the e-court as it was erroneously

13     uploaded.

14                           [The witness entered court]

15             JUDGE PARKER:  Good afternoon, sir.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good afternoon.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  Would you please read the affirmation which is

18     shown to you.  Read it aloud.  Thank you.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

20     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  Please sit down.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Popovic.

24             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

25                           WITNESS:  MILAN CANKOVIC

Page 13927

 1                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

 2                           Examination by Mr. Popovic:

 3        Q.   Good afternoon, Mr. Cankovic.

 4        A.   Good afternoon.

 5        Q.   Mr. Cankovic, before we begin your testimony today, I'm going to

 6     ask you, first of all, to pause a little bit after you hear the question

 7     since we are both speaking the same language.  So make a pause and then

 8     begin your answer because in that way we will make it possible for the

 9     interpreters to do their job properly.

10        A.   I understand.

11        Q.   Sir, can you please tell us your first and last name?

12        A.   I am Milan Cankovic.

13        Q.   When were you born and where?

14        A.   I was born on the 8th of March, 1948, in the Republic of Croatia

15     in Zagreb.

16        Q.   Were you a member of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and if

17     yes, from what date?

18        A.   I was a member of the Ministry of Internal Affairs from 1976

19     until the 31st of December, 2002.

20        Q.   And on the 31st of December, 2002, did you retire?

21        A.   I retired on the 1st of January, 2003.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Can you briefly explain to us what your duties were

23     in the Ministry of Internal Affairs during your period of work there?

24        A.   Yes.  In 1976 and then until 1978, I was working on the

25     exploitation of the communication system in the MUP.  From 1978 until

Page 13928

 1     1981 I worked as a course leader and lecturer at the high school for

 2     Internal Affairs education, and I dealt with communications courses from

 3     1981 until 1993 or 1994, I don't know exactly.  I worked on monitoring

 4     measuring systems in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  All of this was in

 5     the communications administration.

 6             From 1994, I think, I was transferred to the police

 7     administration where I worked on procurement of communications equipment,

 8     and vehicles.  Also different parts for vehicles.  I worked on these

 9     assignments in the police administration until 2001 when the gendarmerie

10     was formed, and this is where I was the chief of the communications

11     department.  I stayed there until I retired, until the 31st of December,

12     2002.

13        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Cankovic.  I'm just going to put one question to

14     you for the purposes of the transcript, since in a few places in the

15     transcript it said you worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Were

16     you working in the Ministry of Internal Affairs or the Ministry of

17     Foreign Affairs in the Republic of Serbia?

18        A.   All of the posts I held were in the Ministry of Internal Affairs

19     of the Republic of Serbia.  I never worked in the Ministry of Foreign

20     Affairs.

21        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Cankovic.  You told us briefly which jobs you

22     worked on, so to summarise, I would put this question to you:  All of the

23     duties you performed during your professional career, did they all have

24     to do with communications?

25        A.   Yes, all the duties in the Ministry of Internal Affairs that I

Page 13929

 1     had had to do exclusively with communications.

 2        Q.   Can you please tell us something about your education?

 3        A.   I'm an electrical engineer.  Engineer of telecommunications by

 4     profession.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Cankovic, I'm going to ask you to specify for us

 6     exactly which duties you carried out in the Ministry of Internal Affairs

 7     in 1998 and 1999 until the time that the NATO bombing ended.

 8        A.   In 1998 and 1999 I was a member of the staff in Kosovo and

 9     Metohija which had its seat in Pristina.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             MR. POPOVIC:  [Interpretation] I would now like to see Exhibit

12     P760 on our monitors, please.

13        Q.   And while we are waiting for the document to be shown,

14     Mr. Cankovic, can you please tell us when in 1998 did you become a member

15     of the staff, and exactly which staff was this?

16        A.   I was appointed a member of the staff on the 11th of June, 1998.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Now, I'm going to ask you to look at the document

18     that we can see on the screen.  This is a decision on the composition of

19     the staff leaders and members of the staff of the Ministry of the

20     Interior for the Autonomous Province for Kosovo and Metohija, and I'm

21     going to ask to look at page 2 of this document right away.  On page 2 at

22     the bottom of the document you can see the following:  In Belgrade, 11th

23     of June, 1998, this was signed by assistant minister, head of the

24     department, Vlastimir Djordjevic.  I'm also going to ask you to look at

25     the top of the page.

Page 13930

 1             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we scroll the document up a

 2     little bit, please.

 3        Q.   Can you please read in paragraph 9, what it says in paragraph 9.

 4        A.   Number 9 it says:

 5             "Captain Milan Cankovic providing communications, equipment,

 6     vehicles and other equipment in the police administration of the ministry

 7     as the assistant staff leader for radio communications."

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please tell us whether this is you?

 9        A.   Yes, this is me.

10        Q.   And did you become a member of the staff on the basis of this

11     decision?

12        A.   I became a member of the staff on the basis of this decision, but

13     for a very brief period of time.

14        Q.   Thank you.  We are going to speak about this in a minute.  First,

15     I would like to ask you to answer some questions in relation to this

16     decision.  First of all, let us go back to page 1 of the document.  Can

17     you read the title of this decision.

18        A.   "Decision on the composition of the staff leaders and members of

19     the staff of the Ministry of the Interior for the autonomous province of

20     Kosovo and Metohija."

21        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Cankovic.  Can you please tell me to whom was this

22     staff responsible for its work?

23        A.   The staff was responsible for its work directly to the chief of

24     the department, to Lieutenant-General Vlastimir Djordjevic.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Can we again look at page 2 of this document, please.

Page 13931

 1     Mr. Cankovic, if you look at the Roman numeral II, that paragraph, can

 2     you tell us who were the members of the expanded staff?

 3        A.   The members of the expanded staff were the heads of secretariats

 4     of the interior in the territory of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and

 5     Metohija.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  If you look at these 14 persons that are mentioned in

 7     the decision, can you please tell me which departments they are from, all

 8     of these members of the Ministry of the Interior?  If necessary, we can

 9     go back to page 1, if you need to look at that.

10        A.   No, not needed.  I am aware of the first page.  All of the

11     members were from the public security department.

12        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Cankovic.  Earlier you said that on the basis of

13     this decision, your term of duty was very brief.  Can you please explain

14     what you actually meant by that?

15        A.   What I wanted to say was that already on the 16th of June, 1998,

16     I received a new decision in which the minister of Internal Affairs of

17     the Republic of Serbia appointed me a member of the Kosovo and Metohija

18     staff that was headquartered in Pristina.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             MR. POPOVIC:  [Interpretation] Can we look at Exhibit P57.

21        Q.   Before we look at that Exhibit, Mr. Cankovic, did you receive

22     this decision personally that was issued by Mr. Djordjevic on the 11th of

23     June, 1998?

24        A.   I did personally receive both decisions.  The decisions assigning

25     me by the chief of the department, and also I personally received the

Page 13932

 1     minister's decision.  I received this decision by the minister in

 2     Pristina though.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  You can see on the screen in front of you something

 4     that I'm going to ask you to read, and that is the title of the decision

 5     of the 16th of June, 1998.

 6        A.   Decision on the establishment of the ministerial staff for the

 7     suppression of terrorism.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Now I'm going to ask to see the last page of the

 9     decision.  This is page 3 in both B/C/S and English.  Mr. Cankovic, can

10     you please tell us who signed this decision?  Who issued the decision?

11        A.   The decision was signed personally by Minister Stojiljkovic.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we go back to page 1 now,

14     please.

15        Q.   And I'm going to ask you to look at the persons referred to as

16     the head, deputy head, and the members of this staff in the document.

17     And when you look at the contents of page 1, please, let us know so we

18     can continue to look at the names that are contained on page 2.

19        A.   The head of the staff was Major-General Sreten Lukic.

20        Q.   Thank you.  You don't need to read it, it's written down here.

21     You can read it to yourself then I will put the question to you after

22     that.

23             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we now please look at page 2 of

24     the same document.

25        Q.   When you look at these names, the names of the members of the

Page 13933

 1     staff, do you know in which MUP department these persons worked?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   And can you please tell us?

 4        A.   If we start from the Chief of Staff, he is from the public

 5     security department.  His deputy was from the state security department.

 6     The commander of the special unit was from public security.  The

 7     commander of the unit for special operations was from state security.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  We don't need to continue.  My question is whether

 9     staff members -- the staff members were from both departments of

10     security?

11        A.   Yes, that is correct.  They were from both security departments.

12        Q.   All right.  After the last named member, Dobrasin Krdzic, the

13     paragraph below that refers to members of the extended staff.  Can you

14     please tell us who the members of this staff were?

15        A.   The members of the expanded staff were the chief of secretariats

16     for Internal Affairs centres and branches of the department of state

17     security in the territory of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and

18     Metohija.

19        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Cankovic.  Can you please tell us if the chief of

20     the public security department could issue instructions or orders to

21     members of the state security department?

22        A.   No, he couldn't do that in any event.

23        Q.   Please tell me who could issue instructions and orders to members

24     of both departments.

25        A.   This could be done only by the head of both departments, and that

Page 13934

 1     was only the minister of the Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia.

 2        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Cankovic.  Can you look at the same decision and

 3     the same page.  Can you look at the paragraph marked with Roman II.  When

 4     you look at that, just read it to yourself, and you can give us a brief

 5     comment on whether what is written there was actually put into practice.

 6        A.   Yes, it was.

 7        Q.   In brief, what was the role of the staff for the suppression of

 8     terrorism in the area of Kosovo and Metohija?

 9        A.   To organise and control the work in that domain.

10        Q.   Did this entail all units of the Ministry of the Interior in the

11     territory of Kosovo and Metohija?

12        A.   We could see from the document itself that it applied to all the

13     units of the MUP in Kosovo and Metohija, those participating in

14     anti-terrorist operations as well as the regular force belonging to the

15     respective secretariats in Kosovo and Metohija.

16        Q.   When you refer to the units participating in anti-terrorist

17     operations, what units do you have in mind?

18        A.   The units which participated in anti-terrorist operations were

19     the PJP Units, the SAJ, as well as the JSO.

20        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Cankovic.

21             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please scroll up in the

22     Serbian, which is page 2 in the English.

23        Q.   Mr. Cankovic, I would kindly ask you to look at the Roman numeral

24     III which is at the bottom of your page.  Tell me this:  Who was the

25     staff answerable to, that is to say, the person in charge of the staff

Page 13935

 1     had to report to whom?

 2        A.   We can see from paragraph 3 that the staff was answerable

 3     directly to the minister.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Can we see here who they were obliged to report to?

 5        A.   The staff had to report to the minister of the interior of the

 6     Republic of Serbia who established it.

 7        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Cankovic.  One other thing, before we move on to

 8     the next page of the document, let's do that first.  The next page is

 9     actually the last page in both versions.  We could see what is stated in

10     the decision.  Did it work in practice?

11        A.   Yes, it did.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Let's look at paragraph 6 which is the last paragraph

13     of the document.  In the first sentence it is stated:

14             "With the coming into force of this decision, the following shall

15     cease to be valid:"

16             And we have a number of decisions listed.  Do we also see the

17     decision of the 11th of June, 1998?

18        A.   Yes, it's here.  As well as the decision of -- yes, that's what

19     the decision actually ends with, with that particular decision.

20        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Cankovic.  Between the 16th of June, 1998, and the

21     date when the staff was established by the minister, all the way until

22     the units withdrew from Kosovo and Metohija, was there any other minister

23     of the interior staff in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija?

24        A.   No, there was no other staff.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Who was your immediate superior in 1998 and 1999, and

Page 13936

 1     I mean between June 1998 and June 1999 in particular?

 2        A.   My immediate superior during that period, because I was a chief

 3     in his staff, was the head of the staff General Sreten Lukic.

 4        Q.   When you say that you were a chief in his staff, what were you

 5     the chief of?

 6        A.   As we can see from the decision, I was the chief of

 7     communications.

 8        Q.   During 1998 and 1999, did you receive all orders solely from the

 9     head of the staff for the suppression of terrorism in the territory of

10     Kosovo and Metohija?  I have the same period in mind.

11        A.   Yes, exclusively from him.

12        Q.   I'd like to put a number of general questions about the

13     functioning of the staff whose member you were.  First of all, where was

14     the seat of the staff?

15        A.   The seat of the staff was in Pristina.  To be precise, for awhile

16     we were in the secretariat building in Pristina which was before the air

17     campaign, and after that we changed locations, although the staff was

18     always in Pristina.

19        Q.   How frequently were the staff meetings held?

20        A.   Meetings of the staff were in a way held daily when circumstances

21     allowed, but when there were anti-terrorist operations underway, such

22     meetings were not held while they lasted.

23        Q.   What was the situation like during the bombing?

24        A.   During the bombing, the situation was completely different

25     because there were interruptions in communications, lines, and our

Page 13937

 1     inability to use any communications means.  We had to rely on slow

 2     courier connections, and we couldn't exchange information in a fast and

 3     efficient way.  Hence, meetings were held seldom.  However, certain

 4     chiefs of secretariats and other staff came to the staff whenever an

 5     opportunity arose.

 6        Q.   Who attended the staff meetings?

 7        A.   The staff meetings were always attended by the head of the staff,

 8     his deputy, and assistants along their professional lines, as well as

 9     chiefs within their respective domains.  That was for the most part the

10     composition of such staff meetings in Pristina.

11        Q.   In the decisions we could see that mention was made of an

12     expanded staff.  What did that entail?

13        A.   The extended staff had weekly meetings.  There were members of

14     the staff present headed by the head and his deputy, as well as

15     secretariat chiefs from the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija.

16     Next, there were unit commanders and PJP Units, as well as the SAJ

17     commanders and the JSO commanders.

18        Q.   Did the situation change once the air campaign began as opposed

19     to what it was in 1998?

20        A.   Of course the situation was no longer the same.  There were less

21     members in attendance.  For example, there were some secretariat chiefs

22     who only managed to reach the staff and its head once or twice.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Were there any working hours of the staff?  And if

24     so, what was it?

25        A.   There were regular working hours in normal conditions.  The staff

Page 13938

 1     worked between 8.00 a.m. and 3.00 p.m., then there would be a break, and

 2     then it would work again between 7.00 and 9.00 p.m., and between 9.00

 3     p.m. and 8.00 a.m., there was always a duty officer there, and that duty

 4     officer was either the deputy head of the staff or one of the chiefs.  Of

 5     course, these working hours did not apply in the course of operations

 6     because then the staff worked round the clock for as long as such

 7     operations lasted.

 8        Q.   Who headed those meetings?

 9        A.   If I understood you properly, all meetings were held by the chief

10     of the staff and his deputy.

11        Q.   Can you tell the names?

12        A.   Sreten Lukic and his deputy, Mr. Gajic, who was there on behalf

13     of the state security department of sector.  In Mr. Gajic's absence, Mr.

14     Vilicic.  Was usually there.  But I think it was already 1999 that that

15     happened.

16        Q.   How long did such meetings usually last?

17        A.   For the most part we tried to keep them as short as possible

18     because of other obligations that the staff members had.  If the expanded

19     staff sat, that included unit commanders who also had their respective

20     duties.  On average it would be between one and two hours.  When we had

21     sessions of the expanded staff it would usually take longer because

22     secretariat chiefs usually submitted oral reports on the situation in the

23     field, and in such situations, meetings took longer.

24        Q.   Did you attend all of the meetings of the staff for the

25     suppression of terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija?

Page 13939

 1        A.   Due to the amount of work I had, I seldom attended such meetings,

 2     but I was always kept informed of all the tasks issued to me.  I would

 3     receive them from other members of the staff who took notes of what was

 4     important for me.  These were usually Mr. Adamovic or Mr. Mijatovic.

 5     This is how we co-operated.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  What were your specific tasks in the staff?

 7        A.   My task first and foremost was to secure communication between

 8     the staff and field units.  When I say communication, I mean radio

 9     communication.  This also included phone lines, but there wasn't that

10     much work to be done there because the secretariat in Pristina had their

11     own communications department, and following my instructions they

12     assigned telephone lines.

13             As for radio communication, I took direct part in that part of

14     the work, and it was mostly led by me.  My task was to enable

15     co-operation between the staff and the communications administration, as

16     well as to set up radio channels for operations, to draft call lists and

17     reprogramme radio sets, and a number of other things.  But most of my

18     time was spent doing the things I just mentioned.

19        Q.   Thank you.  We'll deal with each of the tasks you mentioned, but

20     before that, tell me whether you submitted reports to anyone concerning

21     your work?

22        A.   If you have in mind oral reports, I did, daily, after each and

23     every task.  If you have in mind any written reports, then I did not.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Who did you report to orally?

25        A.   To the chief of the staff.  To the head of the staff.

Page 13940

 1        Q.   Thank you.  You mentioned the reprogramming of radio sets, what

 2     do you have in mind?  What type of task was that?

 3        A.   When PJP Units were engaged, which had come into Kosovo and

 4     Metohija, they had to bring along their regular radio sets which they

 5     otherwise used in their respective secretariats.  Those radio sets were

 6     not programmed so as to be compatible with the system we used in the

 7     territory of Kosovo and Metohija.  We had much work there to reprogramme

 8     them to have our standard channels preset as well as operational channels

 9     used exclusively by the staff and to preset a command channel in addition

10     to the regular and operational channels as well as to introduce the

11     so-called simplex type of communication.

12        Q.   All right.  Very well.  And you also mentioned setting up an

13     operations radio channel, and now in your answer again you refer to the

14     command channel or the channel for operations.  Can you please explain

15     what these channels are and how did you set them up?

16        A.   In Kosovo and Metohija there was a radio network, regular radio

17     network.  The radio network worked on that principle for actions.  So

18     when we are talking about one type of network, we can talk about the

19     other type.  One was a regular network and the other one was an action

20     network.  The first one was permanent and the other one was on an

21     as-needed basis.  Each detachment had its own channel when going off on

22     an anti-terrorist action.  It was a unique channel that everybody had,

23     and that also included the head of the staff, the Chief of Staff.  There

24     were also channels of the semi-duplex type which could function in micro

25     locations.

Page 13941

 1             So this was the basis on which it functioned.  These repeaters

 2     and channels of the units that were operational would be used as needed,

 3     and they were on repeaters or relays where you also had the equipment for

 4     regular channels.  They went through the same channels.  These were just

 5     regular facilities.  For example, above Prizren we had a station at Sara

 6     then near Djakovica.  We had the repeater station at Cabrat.  If we are

 7     talking about Pec, we had such a facility at Mokra Gora.  The one for

 8     Pristina was at Butovacki Breg.  The one that covered Giljane was at

 9     Zeleni Vrh.  Urosevac was covered by Bukova Glava, and there was a joint

10     channel on Bukova Glava for all the secretariats that converged towards

11     Pristina, towards the staff.

12        Q.   I'm just asking you for a clarification.  When you are setting up

13     an operations communications network, who can participate in this network

14     and in what manner?

15        A.   The radio communications during anti-terrorist operation or

16     actions for specific areas would have specific facilities.  For example,

17     if it was Kosovo, the repeater station at Mokra Gora would be active --

18     I'm sorry, did I say the Kosovo area or the Metohija area?  Let's say

19     Metohija, that area would use the repeater station at Mokra Gora and the

20     one at Vukovar Glava, the one at Cabrat above Djakovica.

21             Now, since there were many mountainous rugged areas and it wasn't

22     possible for some parts of units to be able to communicate all the time

23     and on the basis of the type of terrain that the action would be carried

24     out on, I had confirmation repeater station.  I would decide on lower

25     elevations where I would set up such repeater stations in order to

Page 13942

 1     reinforce the communication system.  We had these semi-duplex type of

 2     communications that proceeded via repeater stations.  Of course units

 3     could communicate amongst themselves at some micro locations using the

 4     simplex type of communications, but this is something that has a shorter

 5     range.

 6        Q.   We will come back to this in more detail.  Just a small

 7     digression, how did all of this function after the NATO bombing began?

 8        A.   After the bombing began and the radio relay facilities in Kosovo

 9     and Metohija were destroyed, it actually didn't function.  The systems

10     were destroyed.  There was no power supply, and it was not possible to

11     maintain these communications, and they were downed.  There was only

12     communication via radio that could be supported through mobile repeater

13     stations, and they covered a much smaller area than the earlier repeater

14     stations would be able to cover when they were in working order.

15        Q.   Thank you.  I would now like to go back to the very beginning

16     when we are talking about actions, and then we will come to this

17     particular thing.  So then I would ask you to provide a more specific

18     example illustrating how all of this functioned.  First of all, can you

19     please tell us how you received assignments in the staff relating to

20     anti-terrorist actions that would be conducted in the area of Kosovo and

21     Metohija?

22        A.   Once actions were planned, once these plans were completed, and

23     once the section where a certain action would take place would be

24     established, I would then receive maps from Mr. Adamovic or

25     Mr. Mijatovic, excerpts of maps, topographical maps where the axis of

Page 13943

 1     movement of specific units would be marked.  On the basis of that, I

 2     would figure out the area where -- the area that needed to be covered by

 3     a radio network.

 4        Q.   You said at the beginning of your answer once the plans were

 5     complete.  Are you aware who planned these actions?  Do you know?

 6        A.   The actions were planned by the chief, the deputy chief, the

 7     operations chief of the staff, including Mr. Mijatovic and Mr. Adamovic.

 8     And as needed, very often some others would be invited to participate.

 9     Some commanders, for example, or commanders of the PJP or the SAJ Units

10     or the JSO Units depending on the terrain where they were for possible

11     suggestions that they could make, but they didn't participate in the

12     planning all the time.

13        Q.   Thank you.  And did you take part in these planning actions?

14        A.   No.

15        Q.   Can you please tell me if you know if there was any co-ordination

16     between the Army of Yugoslavia and the MUP staff in these planning

17     activities?

18        A.   As far as I know, yes, there was, because Adamovic or Mijatovic

19     were mostly communicating with the corps in Pristina where the Army of

20     Yugoslavia was.

21        Q.   As far as communications are concerned, I'm, first of all,

22     thinking of the relationship between the army and the police and the

23     communications that the MUP had and that the army had.  What was the

24     relationship between these two networks?  Were they compatible?

25        A.   No, I'm really not familiar with the system of communications

Page 13944

 1     that they had, they were carrying them with them.  But I really didn't

 2     know what sort of equipment they were.  We had our radio stations that

 3     the commanders in the field carried.  The co-operation mostly boiled down

 4     to perhaps some superior officer of the army being together with the

 5     police unit or vice-versa.

 6        Q.   And can you please tell me if there was a possibility for the

 7     Army of Yugoslavia to use the frequencies used by the police or for the

 8     police to use frequencies used by the army, and for these communications

 9     to intersect or to be used together?

10        A.   No, this wasn't possible and never was possible.  Generally,

11     according to the frequency division plan, this is not permitted.

12     According to the general plan, the army had its own range of frequencies,

13     and the army and the police had their own, the railway system had its

14     own, the PTT services had their own range of frequencies, so you could

15     never combine these two.

16        Q.   And now that we are talking about equipment, did the police use

17     similar equipment in its communication system as the army in its

18     communication system?

19        A.   The army was always big and inert in comparison to us, and this

20     probably applies to every army, I'm not going to go into that.  So their

21     system of communications was based on the radio relay system.  It was a

22     completely different communication signal system from ours.  They

23     probably had more of that kind of communications in their vehicles, in

24     their transporters, but I really don't know how their system functioned.

25        Q.   Thank you.  You told us more or less how the actions were

Page 13945

 1     planned, but can you tell us how the preparations for these actions were

 2     carried out?

 3        A.   Well, preparation for action is more of a different activity than

 4     this one because in preparation for the action, people would assemble in

 5     the staff who were in charge of the action.  This would be the Chief of

 6     Staff, deputy Chief of Staff, then you would get the commander of the

 7     Special Police detachments, the commander of the special anti-terrorist

 8     unit, the commander of the unit for special operations, the chiefs of the

 9     secretariats.  Especially those from the secretariat would participate in

10     the area where the action would be carried out.  This would be the

11     broader composition, and then the planning and the assignment of tasks

12     would take some more time.  The participants in the actions would also

13     address these meetings.  This is how I understood it to be done.

14        Q.   And did you attend these preparatory meetings often?

15        A.   When they were making their plans and agreements, I was already

16     out in the field.  I was already making preparations.  Before they would

17     get together, I already would have received my working assignments, which

18     I extracted from the map, which they used later, and then together with

19     my group of technicians and communications people, we would go and carry

20     out our assignments.  Excuse me, yeah, because this is what we had to do.

21     We had to be prepared at a specific time.  For example, if the action

22     would begin at 5.00 a.m., I already had to have everything ready by 3.00

23     a.m.  Everything had to be ready before.

24        Q.   Thank you.  And what was the situation when the NATO bombing

25     began?  Did things work in exactly the same way as you have just

Page 13946

 1     described, or can you please specify when preparations were carried out

 2     in this way that you just described?

 3        A.   No, this couldn't be.  It couldn't be done any more because

 4     members of the narrow inner staff and the expanded staff couldn't

 5     actually get together.

 6        Q.   When you say they couldn't meet and that things were different,

 7     which period are you talking about?

 8        A.   I'm talking about the period of the bombing.

 9        Q.   And how were tasks assigned, or how were units informed about

10     their tasks at the time, how were preparations carried out?

11        A.   Well, at that time we tried to do something by using mobile radio

12     communication systems, but later this became very dangerous, especially

13     with the destruction of the repeater stations.  Any sources of radiation

14     became dangerous.  So we did it with a lot of fear, and then once -- if

15     we had to do it, then we would do it anyway but then we would try to stay

16     as far away from these facilities as possible.  Mostly the communications

17     were done by courier.  That was how it was done in that period.  For

18     example, the messenger for Prizren would have to go and come back

19     conveying his message two or three times a day because the message would

20     be urgent.  So this is how our communications were then proceeding in

21     this way.

22        Q.   Thank you.  When you say command channel, what do you mean by

23     that, what does that mean?

24        A.   The command channel was used by commanders of detachments or

25     units in the field, I'm talking about police units now.  They were

Page 13947

 1     connected directly to the Chief of Staff.  Only commanders of those units

 2     in the field could use that channel, and the staff chief.  Each unit, as

 3     I said, also had their own repeater stations and then if they were in

 4     some broader area of a company or so, then they had their own internal

 5     repeater station, just like the secretariats each had their own internal

 6     repeater stations.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please tell us which units took part or were

 8     participants in this command channel?

 9        A.   Just like I said in the beginning, these were units that were

10     carrying out actions.  These were the PJP, SAJ, and JSO Units.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please tell me after the anti-terrorist

12     action would be completed, was this command channel -- or did this

13     command channel or these communications set up specially for that

14     particular action cease to operate?

15        A.   This action radio network would stop functioning as soon as the

16     units returned to their starting positions.

17        Q.   Thank you.  And can you please tell me, this action radio

18     network, was it set up for each individual anti-terrorist action that was

19     carried out in the area of Kosovo and Metohija?

20        A.   Yes, it was, for each one.  If we are talking about

21     anti-terrorist actions which were larger, which encompassed larger

22     swathes of territory and if they included several units.  However, the

23     same thing applied in actions with just one company or one detachment.

24     Actually, they would then mostly use the simplex type of communication.

25     They would communicate amongst each other because this would be in a

Page 13948

 1     village or a smaller town.  And they would have a working channel,

 2     regular working channel connecting them to the staff, so in case of any

 3     kind of emergency or anything, they could use this regular channel.  And

 4     ultimately it was their duty to call in in case of any kind of

 5     intervention or if they had a call from the Chief of Staff or deputy

 6     Chief of Staff.

 7             And I can mention that in the situation when regular radio

 8     communications were used, where all secretariats could listen in, then

 9     scrambled communications, scrambling would be used for precaution sake

10     and only short messages would be relayed.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Tell me, did you partake directly in the actions for

12     which you were charged to set in place a radio communications system on

13     the action channel?

14        A.   Well, I left nothing to chance.  When a repeater system which

15     used relay station could be employed, and this was the case where

16     operations took place in a flat area and where radio stations could be

17     normally used, I would be on standby to make sure that units did not use

18     channels they were not designated to use.  However, where an operation

19     involved a larger swath of territory and where an operation was of a

20     larger scale, which involved rugged terrain, and made it possible for

21     units to find themselves in areas where radio communications would not

22     operate because of the various obstacles, I would put in place the

23     so-called mobile repeaters.  Since it was otherwise impossible for me to

24     set up stations of this sort, I had to follow the unit and set up

25     repeaters for micro locations.  I don't know on how many occasions this

Page 13949

 1     must have been, but at least six or seven, eight times I was in such a

 2     situation.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Cankovic, do you know up until what time in 1998

 4     were anti-terrorist operations conducted in the territory of Kosovo and

 5     Metohija, or rather, to make it simple for you, up until what period of

 6     time were you in charge of setting up these action radio communication

 7     systems you spoke of?

 8        A.   Well, it was in late September or early October already that the

 9     radio stations that were in the outlying area such as Sviljen and Mokra

10     Gora, which were difficult to reach, and it was already cold, I

11     dismantled the radio communication systems since no more operations were

12     expected.  At least this is what we were told.  I dismantled the stations

13     and took all the equipment along, and I can tell you that my radio

14     communication systems were no longer used.

15        Q.   Do you know that in October of 1998 the Milosevic-Holbrooke

16     agreement was reached?

17        A.   Yes, I'm aware of it.

18        Q.   Are you aware of the fact that under the agreement verifiers were

19     expected to arrive in Kosovo and Metohija?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   Did you have any contact with the verifiers?

22        A.   No, not I myself, save for the chance encounters in the staff in

23     Pristina.

24        Q.   Thank you.  From the month of October up until the start of the

25     NATO bombing, did you take part in any of the operations in Kosovo and

Page 13950

 1     Metohija, and did you set up any action communication systems in that

 2     period?

 3        A.   Well, as I've told you, I no longer engaged in any such activity.

 4     I had by that time dismantled all of my equipment.

 5        Q.   Mr. Cankovic, did your duties and assignments change in any way

 6     after the start of NATO bombing on the 24th of March, 1999?

 7        A.   Well, yes.  As I said, mobile repeaters were used in order to

 8     have radio communication systems up and running.  However, it did not

 9     help much.  I was very much engaged in the relocation of the staff which

10     changed locations at the time.  And this had to be done.  The radio

11     communications were operational until the SUP building was hit, and this

12     was the first major obstacle we were confronted with.

13        Q.   Thank you.  We will get back to that later.  Tell me, on how many

14     occasions during the bombing was the Pristina staff relocated?

15        A.   Well, we have to draw a clear distinction because the staff per

16     se was never housed in one location.  When it comes to the staff leader,

17     well, they changed location at least ten times, perhaps even more.  Since

18     the staff would normally be housed in two or three locations, segments of

19     it would be relocated, but other segments not that often.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Were all these locations where elements of the staff

21     were housed equipped with radio communication systems?

22        A.   During bombing when we started relocating the staff, up until the

23     29th, it was still possible for the Pristina communications department to

24     provide telephone lines and special telephone lines for the staff leader

25     and all the other members of the staff, including the telegraphy, because

Page 13951

 1     the SUP building was used where all these lines were up and running.  We

 2     also had the radio sets, but we only had receivers, not transmitters.  If

 3     we wanted to use transmitters, then it had to be done elsewhere.  And

 4     this was, of course, for security reasons to protect the staff.

 5        Q.   Can you tell us what the special telephone line is?

 6        A.   The special telephone line is one used in the secretariat or in

 7     the Ministry of the Interior.  There was a certain degree of protection

 8     involved because the switchboards for the various telephone lines were in

 9     the headquarters of the Ministry of the Interior unlike the ordinary

10     telephone lines which had their switchboards in post offices.  We had

11     this special telephone line in the Ministry of the Interior, and we had

12     hired a special line from the telecommunications company, and that's how

13     it worked.

14        Q.   Thank you.  What became of the communications systems as of the

15     start of the bombing on the 24th of March?  You mentioned the 29th.  Can

16     you specify which month it was, and what happened with the communications

17     system?

18        A.   It was on the 29th of March that the secretariat building in

19     Pristina was destroyed.  At that point all the special lines that existed

20     with these secretariats in Kosovo and Metohija and the ministry and other

21     secretariats across Serbia were down.  The telegraph was not operational,

22     which meant that dispatches could no longer be sent from the staff and

23     the secretariat in Pristina to all the other secretariats.

24             In other words, what remained were only local radio networks, and

25     especially so later on when Butovacki Breg and Goles were destroyed.

Page 13952

 1     Butovacki Breg was not that important but Goles was because the telegraph

 2     and telephone system which covered Serbia went through that particular

 3     station.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  What happened after the 29th of March, what were the

 5     developments that followed?

 6        A.   Well, after the 29th of March, we were practically left only with

 7     the local switchboards, and we had some sort of radio communications in

 8     Pristina and through the PTT.  We had communications with the

 9     secretariats and the ministry up until the point when the post office

10     building was destroyed, at which point the regular telephone lines across

11     the town were also destroyed.  None of the secretariats were in contact

12     with Pristina any longer and vice-versa.  The line with Belgrade was

13     established through the existing optic cable, which was relocated to the

14     new switchboard, as it was called at the time.  The optical line was

15     established via Nis and on to Serbia.

16        Q.   Mr. Cankovic, from that point on, what was the means of

17     communications used by the staff combatting anti-terrorist activity with

18     units that were deployed in Kosovo and Metohija?

19             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please repeat his answer.

20     The interpreter didn't catch it.

21             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Mr. Cankovic, the interpreters didn't hear your answer.  Can you

23     please repeat your answer to my question.  What was the means of

24     communications used by the staff combatting anti-terrorist activity with

25     units in Kosovo and Metohija?

Page 13953

 1        A.   If we are referring to the period following bombing and the

 2     destruction of the various buildings, that is to say, the building of the

 3     secretariat and post office in Pristina, the only reliable means of

 4     communications was through couriers.

 5        Q.   Can you tell us what was the means of communication used by the

 6     staff with the ministry in Belgrade?

 7        A.   The staff communicated with the minister through the optic cable

 8     which went from Pristina via Nis on to Belgrade.  But let me tell you

 9     this, this cable did not belong to the MUP of Serbia.  It was only the

10     optic cable used by the telecom of Serbia, and many town lines were

11     connected to it as well.

12        Q.   I see that my question was interpreted as being what was your

13     communication with the ministry in Belgrade, whereas, I asked what was

14     your communication with the minister, and that's the answer you gave us.

15             Now, this communication that ran through the optic cable, was it

16     used by the Pristina staff, could it be used by the staff itself to

17     communicate with the minister in Belgrade?

18        A.   Since there were quarters of town where communication systems

19     were destroyed, there could be no communications directly from the

20     location where the optic cable was initially connected.  We tried to use

21     locations where we could get connected to and have communication.

22     Wherever elements of the staff, including the staff leader were housed,

23     they had this connection, and they had the possibility to use the

24     communication system.

25        Q.   What types of communication could be used by way of this cable?

Page 13954

 1        A.   Well, one could transmit verbal messages over the telephone line

 2     and written messages by use of facsimile, a fax machine.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know who it was that the staff leader informed

 4     after the NATO forces started bombing the area, that is to say, after the

 5     month of March, 1999?

 6        A.   Before and after bombing, he always informed or reported to the

 7     minister and was always in contact with him.  He would report to him

 8     about the security situation in Kosovo and Metohija, about the conduct of

 9     operations.  He would always report directly to the minister, and this

10     was the situation both before and after bombing.

11        Q.   How come you know this, Mr. Cankovic?

12        A.   I know this because on several occasions I would be the duty

13     officer in the staff.  I had to be there as a communications officer to

14     make sure that the system was always up and running.  It was not his duty

15     to be in that particular location at all times.  He could abruptly decide

16     to relocate the staff, in which case I would be duty-bound to put a

17     communication system in place.  Normally, he would choose a location

18     where the system was already operational.  And wherever a minister would

19     be -- wherever a call would be placed for the minister, I would be there

20     to respond, and I'm talking about situations where he was absent.

21        Q.   Mr. Cankovic, your answer has not been interpreted fully.  Can

22     you please repeat your answer.  How do you know this?  You said that the

23     staff leader communicated directly with the minister.

24        A.   I can say that I personally heard the staff leader, Mr. Lukic,

25     talk to the minister, not once but several times.  Even I myself when I

Page 13955

 1     was a duty officer by the telephone line when the staff leader was absent

 2     received calls from the minister who told me that Lukic should return the

 3     call as soon as he got back.

 4        Q.   Mr. Cankovic, did you know whether the head of the staff informed

 5     anyone else about things save for the minister?

 6        A.   I never heard him do that, and I don't think there was any need

 7     for him to do so.

 8        Q.   Did you know that some dispatches were sent to the Ministry of

 9     the Interior?

10        A.   Dispatches could not have been sent any other way save by

11     facsimile.  I do know that.  But I'm not familiar with the contents of

12     any dispatches though.  I must say this, though, we could only transmit

13     poor copies and for the most part we ended up resorting to the use of

14     couriers.

15             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Your Honours, I think

16     this is a good time for our first break.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  We will have the first break now.  We must have an

18     adjournment now for half an hour.  We resume at 4.15.  A Court Officer

19     will assist you in the break.

20                           [The witness stands down]

21                           --- Recess taken at 3.43 p.m.

22                           --- On resuming at 4.17 p.m.

23                           [The witness takes the stand]

24             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Mr. Popovic.

25             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

Page 13956

 1        Q.   Mr. Cankovic, did you keep radio station logs or phone books for

 2     such channels that you set up?

 3        A.   I did.

 4        Q.   Can you explain to us what these station lists or logs were?

 5        A.   Such logs for different channels were used basically for the same

 6     purpose, as one would for regular radio channels used by the

 7     secretariats.  All units, all PJP Units, that is, as well as all SAJ

 8     Units and the JSO were in that log.  They were each assigned a number of

 9     frequencies and channels they were to use.  These channels and

10     frequencies were permanent and the log was permanent throughout the

11     duration of operations and the existence of operational channels.  The

12     only thing that differed was the unit that was in the field at that point

13     in time.  They had their respective log-books, and I never had to do this

14     all over again.  The only issue was how many units were in the field and

15     then those units would use their respective code-names based on the

16     lists.

17        Q.   Thank you.  In the process of drafting such logs, have you ever

18     resorted to the use of code-name Morava?

19        A.   It was used as part of the regular log, and it was in use in

20     Serbia proper.

21        Q.   To have it reflected more accurately in the transcript, I wanted

22     to ask you whether you used it in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija?

23        A.   No, never.

24        Q.   Thank you.  In the process of creation of operational logs, did

25     you ever use the call-sign of Skorpioni?

Page 13957

 1        A.   No, never.

 2        Q.   Did you use the same call-signs on operational and regular

 3     channels?

 4        A.   In the sense of the staff?

 5        Q.   Well, generally speaking.

 6        A.   No.  The staff had operational call-signs, and for the staff of

 7     the interior ministry, the call-sign in Pristina was Kosava in periods of

 8     operations.  In regular conditions concerning the secretariats and

 9     regular tasks, the call-sign was Ruby or Rubin.

10        Q.   Mr. Cankovic, in the course of 1998, did you see General

11     Vlastimir Djordjevic in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija?  And if so,

12     when, on what occasions?

13        A.   In 1998 as of my arrival in Kosovo to the staff, I did see

14     General Djordjevic on a few occasions.  I saw him at least twice or three

15     times in the field.  I also saw him at least two or three or even four

16     times in the Pristina SUP in the staff premises that is.

17        Q.   Thank you.  When did you see him in the field, if you can recall

18     that?  What were the circumstances?

19        A.   On those occasions when I saw him I believe them to be important.

20     The first one was in Malisevo, I had a number of reasons to be with my

21     union.  The first reason was given that Malisevo is in the rear and could

22     not effectively be reached by my repeater stations, I was supposed to set

23     up a mobile repeater station.  Secondly, if we -- in case of entering

24     Malisevo, we were supposed to set up a duty operations office and set up

25     a radio equipment in the OUP building which had previously been occupied

Page 13958

 1     by terrorists.  Mr. Djordjevic was there when I saw him.  That was on the

 2     first occasion I entered Malisevo.

 3             Another occasion was in the operation towards Klina and Jablanica

 4     and Glodjane.  It was difficult terrain for radio communication, and I

 5     was there with some equipment.  We entered a village and before that

 6     there had been a clash with the terrorists and the village was completely

 7     deserted.  Afterwards there was no resistance whatsoever.  On that

 8     occasion, we found basically all of the inhabitants in the mosque.  It

 9     was in summertime.  It was quite hot.  And we reported that there were

10     people in the mosque.  Some commanders came and took them out.  There

11     were people fainting and there were children.  It was not an easy scene.

12     Mr. Djordjevic was there.  We inquired who would be a representative of

13     the village.  They said that they were afraid of terrorists, and I

14     supposed this was correct because the villages we went through before

15     that were also deserted.  So I believed people had pulled out.

16             I particularly remember this one because of the grave situation

17     with those people.  We spent the night in that village, although I don't

18     know whether Mr. Djordjevic did so.  In any case, we sat down with the

19     village representative, with the village elder, and had a discussion with

20     him.

21             I also saw him in the staff, although I had much to do and he was

22     quite busy touring secretariats and units.  Well, for the most part that

23     was it.

24        Q.   Thank you.  When you refer to the village when you saw him, what

25     village was that?

Page 13959

 1        A.   I think it was Jablanica.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  You said you saw him in the staff.  Did

 3     Mr. Djordjevic attend the meetings of the staff in 1998 when you saw him

 4     in the staff building?

 5        A.   Mr. Djordjevic was not a staff member.  He was under no

 6     obligation to attend any meetings of it.  He did, however, come there on

 7     a number of occasions and he attended some meetings, but his presence had

 8     no particular effect, in the sense that he wasn't there to deal with

 9     anything in particular.  Of course, he held consultations and things like

10     that, but that was the extent of it.

11             In the secretariat building, he had a small office.  I know that

12     because I had installed a regular phone line in his office.  We did not

13     install a special line because he wasn't there permanently.  Special

14     lines were only assigned to officers who were in their office all time.

15     For him, however, this was just a side office.

16        Q.   Thank you.  In 1999, did you see General Djordjevic in Kosovo and

17     Metohija, and if so, when?

18        A.   In 1999 I saw Mr. Djordjevic -- the minister was there then as

19     well because there was a government session in Kosovo.  I saw the prime

20     minister, the late Mirko Marjanovic there, as well as a number of other

21     ministers.  I remember we lined up in front of the secretariat building,

22     and we reported to Mr. Marjanovic, the prime minister.  I'm positive that

23     Mr. Djordjevic was there as well.

24             On that day I went to Belgrade.  I was planned to go the day

25     before that because I had to take over some equipment there.  However, I

Page 13960

 1     was asked to stay and they were even jokingly telling me that I could

 2     join the government on their plane back to Belgrade.  I do remember that

 3     I was supposed to bring some equipment back.  That was sometime in the

 4     morning, perhaps around 10.00 or 11.00 or perhaps around noon.  In any

 5     case, they all went to attend the government meeting, and I was told that

 6     they were to go to Belgrade afterwards.

 7             As for any tasks of mine in that regard, they were completed by

 8     the time of that meeting and I went to Belgrade.  In any case, I did see

 9     Mr. Djordjevic on that occasion.  That was the only time I saw him in

10     1999 in Kosovo and Metohija.  If we are talking about the time when I was

11     in the staff, I also saw him on, say, another couple of occasions.  One

12     of them was during a trip similar to the one I just referred to.  It was

13     in Belgrade in their so-called staff.  In the staff where the minister

14     was, or rather, in that building in Lole Ribara Street -- well, at that

15     time, they were in the building of Commercial de Banca.  The chief of the

16     communications administration also had his office there, and I came to

17     see him three or four times, and on one such occasion I saw

18     Mr. Djordjevic, or perhaps on two such occasions.

19        Q.   Thank you.  When you are referring to submitting a report to

20     Mr. Marjanovic, the prime minister, can you tell me who reported to him?

21        A.   I was on those staffs a number of times and reports were usually

22     given by such officers who had completed military academies.  In this

23     particular case, it was Adamovic.  However, during a previous period it

24     was Colonel Arsenijevic.  In any case, on this occasion it was Adamovic.

25     He submitted his report to the PM Mirko Marjanovic in the presence of the

Page 13961

 1     minister of the interior, Vlajko Stojilkovic.

 2        Q.   You also said that it was in the morning at around 10.00 or 11.00

 3     or perhaps at around noon.  Can you be any more precise than that, if you

 4     can, of course?

 5        A.   Not from this point in time, I can't be any more precise.  I

 6     don't think it was around noon.  It was probably sometime before that,

 7     although I don't know when.  First of all, we waited for the plane to

 8     land, and we were in front of the building throughout that time.  In any

 9     case, time passed slowly, and I do not have a clear memory of it.

10             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we please see

11     P144 next.

12        Q.   Mr. Cankovic, on your screen you will see a decision.  It says:

13             "As of 31 May 1999, Captain Milan Cankovic, employee of the

14     Ministry of the Interior police administration shall cease to carry out

15     special security related tasks in the MUP staff in Pristina where he was

16     deployed on 1 May [as interpreted] 1998."

17             Mr. Cankovic, did your duties in the MUP staff or the suppression

18     of terrorism in Pristina cease by virtue of this decision?

19        A.   Yes, that is correct.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] I think that in the transcript,

22     line 8 it states from the 1st of May, 1998, but it should say from the

23     1st of June 1998.  Yes, thank you.

24        Q.   Mr. Cankovic, during 1998 and 1999, did you ever see or hear of

25     any plan or agreement within the Ministry of Internal Affairs according

Page 13962

 1     to which the population -- the Albanian population would be expelled from

 2     the territory of Kosovo and Metohija?

 3        A.   No, I did not.

 4        Q.   During 1998 or 1999 did you see or hear of any plan or agreement

 5     in the Ministry of Internal Affairs to expel the Albanian population and

 6     thereby change the ethnic structure of the population in Kosovo and

 7     Metohija?

 8        A.   No.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Popovic, did you mean May 1998, June 1998, or

10     the year 1999 when you corrected the transcript?

11             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, when I corrected the

12     transcript, I was thinking of the 1st of June, 1998, because that is what

13     the date is in the document, the original document.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  We may be looking at something different.  We are

15     seeing the year 1999.

16             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] I don't see anywhere 1999 in the

17     English translation.  The mistake is 1st of May, 1998, and it should

18     correctly read the 1st of June, 1998.  This is what it says in the

19     original, and in the English I can see that the date says the 1st of May,

20     1998.  It should correctly be the 1st of June, 1998.  The date I'm

21     talking about is in paragraph 2 of the decision where it says, is no

22     longer going to be carrying out the duties in the police administration.

23     The document -- as of 1st of June, 1998.  The document is dated the 30th

24     of May, 1999.

25             Your Honours, a brief explanation.  Mr. Cankovic was sent on the

Page 13963

 1     1st of June, 1998, and the decision was dated the 1st of June, 1998.

 2     With this decision, he is no longer being assigned to the post from the

 3     1st of June, 1998.  So the decision whereby he is no longer supposed to

 4     be at that assignment is the 1st of May, 1999.

 5             The English translation in paragraph 2 should state the 1st of

 6     June, 1998.

 7                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  We think we understand what you are saying,

 9     Mr. Popovic.

10             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

11             JUDGE PARKER:  In the original the date seems to be 01.06.1998.

12             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, precisely.

13             Thank you, Mr. Cankovic.

14             Your Honours, I have now completed my examination-in-chief of

15     this witness.  Thank you.

16             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you, Mr. Popovic.

17             Ms. Petersen.

18             MS. PETERSEN:  Thank you, if I could just have one second to set

19     up the podium.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Take two if you need.

21                           Cross-examination by Ms. Petersen:

22        Q.   Good afternoon, sir.  In 1998 on a day-to-day basis, what were

23     some of the usual tasks that you would perform?

24        A.   In 1998, well, we can split that into two periods.  Until the 1st

25     of October and from the 1st of October.  Up until the 1st of October, as

Page 13964

 1     we said, actions were being conducted against Albanian terrorists, and in

 2     those kinds of assignments -- well, you heard mostly about those kinds of

 3     assignments.  I don't have anything particular more to say about that.

 4             After the 1st of October, after the agreement that the

 5     Verification Missions should be sent to the Kosovo and Metohija area, I

 6     no longer had any tasks in that area.  During that period, I had

 7     assignments relating to the withdrawal or the pulling out of equipment

 8     which was located in the places which I referred to earlier.  And I can

 9     say a little bit more about that.  So there was quite a lot of equipment

10     there.

11             Then my other assignments were to get the equipment back, store

12     it.  Units were still changing over, and they spent 45 days in the field

13     and then switched, and this was happening continuously.  The units were

14     not all being changed at the same time.  So I always had new units, I had

15     to issue instructions, direct them in their work so I had work also in

16     the staff itself.  These were my duties roughly.

17        Q.   You spoke about setting up radio communications out in the field

18     during an action prior to October of 1998.  When you would set up these

19     radio communications, who could receive and listen into that channel

20     within the MUP?

21        A.   We had communications on channels that were not used for regular

22     radio communication.  These were channels dedicated -- actually, these

23     were channels on a different frequency range from the usual one, if that

24     means anything.  The regular radio network used by the secretariats

25     within Kosovo, and this also applies to the Serbia as a whole, this was

Page 13965

 1     done on VHF.  My systems of communications were ultrashort UHF, and it

 2     was set up where there were already repeater stations and relay stations

 3     which were either military, post office, or TV channels.  So in that

 4     sense, the radio communications that I was setting up were used only by

 5     the units for anti-terrorist actions.  The ones that I mentioned, this

 6     was the PJP, the SAJ, and the JSO, they were using those communications.

 7     Those communications were used from the moment that an action was

 8     launched and were used only until the end of the action and the return of

 9     the units to their, let's say, home base.

10             After that the communication system was dismantled and not used

11     anymore.  These communications could only be followed, exclusively be

12     followed by people from these units and by those in the staff in

13     Pristina.  Of course some undesirable elements could also monitor these

14     communications, but we didn't really record any intrusions or incursions

15     into our communications network.  I never had an occasion to do that.

16        Q.   So just to make sure that I understand, during the operation, the

17     units involved in the operation could listen to this radio station or

18     channel, I'm not sure the technical term, and also the staff in Pristina

19     was also able to hear it?

20        A.   Not listen in, but participate and work on that channel, yes.

21        Q.   Thank you very much, sir.  Now, moving to the NATO bombing.  What

22     were the regular tasks that you would perform on a day-to-day basis

23     during that period?

24        A.   During the bombing, my primary assignments were, just like in

25     regular conditions, to secure existing and possibly new communications

Page 13966

 1     for the staff with units that were out in the field as much as possible

 2     and with the ministry, the minister that the staff was accountable to.

 3     That was the primary task.

 4             Secondary tasks were to have everything that needed to be done by

 5     the units in the field which were constantly moving in terms of

 6     maintenance or repair we would do.  They would bring this equipment to

 7     us, and this we would describe as kind of on-going, daily work.

 8             So I was mostly sticking close to the staff and making sure in

 9     all possible ways that these communications were functioning properly.

10     In the beginning there were situations when this equipment that we had,

11     I'm talking about the mobile communications equipment, the same equipment

12     that was being used at the relay stations and which was now being used at

13     some lower elevations for security reasons because of the bombing, and

14     this was quite dangerous because any kind of emission of vibrations,

15     frequency, or energy was a possible target, so we would repair or go to

16     those facilities only when this was essential.  But these type of

17     communications were not used on a regular basis.  They were not

18     permanent.  They were something that posed quite a danger, so people who

19     had to deal with issues with that type of equipment were quite concerned

20     and were exposed to a considerable amount of danger while performing

21     these tasks.

22        Q.   Are you aware of whether in Belgrade they had their own

23     communication staff there to perform a similar function to you to make

24     sure that their communications were working in Belgrade?

25        A.   You couldn't have a communications staff in Belgrade.  You could

Page 13967

 1     only have communications that would be attached to the staff, and that's

 2     what did exist.  And I did say earlier that I saw Mr. Djordjevic at that

 3     staff sometimes.  I had to make a connection between him and the Belgrade

 4     centre.  So you had the chief of that communication centre sitting there.

 5     In a way, I was the main person in the area, and the person who is in

 6     charge of these communications would always be close to the staff.  As

 7     opposed to us, let's say that that staff had a little bit more room and

 8     possibility to set up communications with other staffs because the main

 9     post office in Belgrade was not knocked down, so the possibility of

10     having normal telephone calls, not special telephone communications, was

11     working.  And the system for special telegraph and telephone connections

12     was destroyed.  So all they had at their disposal was just regular

13     telephone communications, telephone lines, but they had much more

14     potential or capacity than we did.

15             MS. PETERSEN:  I see Mr. Popovic.

16             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Popovic.

17             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  I have an

18     objection exclusively to the transcript.  I'm listening to what

19     Mr. Cankovic was saying, and line 22 absolutely does not correspond to

20     what he said in the Serbian.  I actually never heard that sentence at

21     all.  Perhaps it could cause some confusion.  It's quite general.  I

22     agree that in the Serbian the witness absolutely did not say that and

23     that could give rise to some further questions that I would just like to

24     warn the counsel or the Chamber, I don't know whether she believes that

25     this is something that would need to be further clarified or established,

Page 13968

 1     but simply this was not stated in the Serbian.

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  Ms. Petersen, page 41 in the area of line 22, I

 3     leave it to you whether you see it as of significance or not.

 4             MS. PETERSEN:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 5        Q.   Sir, I would like to clarify your answer a bit in a couple of

 6     ways.  Initially I thought I understood you to say there was not a

 7     communication staff in Belgrade who dealt with communication issues, but

 8     as your answer continued, it seems that there is a communication staff in

 9     Belgrade.  Could you just explain whether there exists people who deal

10     with communication issues in Belgrade much as you did in Pristina?

11        A.   I understood you the first time and I understood you now, but you

12     need to understand me.  There is no communication staff.  Only there is a

13     communication facility in the staff.  Just like I am a representative for

14     the communications in the Pristina staff, there is a communications

15     representative at the staff in Belgrade, the staff where the minister is.

16     In that staff we had Mr. Vasilije Joksic who was the chief of the

17     communications administration for Serbia.  Down in the staff is where I

18     was sitting pursuant to a decision by the minister where I was the chief

19     of communications for Kosovo and Metohija.

20        Q.   So you handled Kosovo and Metohija.  There was a different

21     individual who dealt with this in Belgrade; is that correct?

22        A.   Yes, that's correct.

23        Q.   Now, the transcript earlier quoted you as saying that you had

24     seen Mr. Djordjevic, I believe, in the -- let's see what the exact word

25     is.  It says:

Page 13969

 1             "And I did say earlier that I saw Mr. Djordjevic at that staff.

 2     Sometimes I had to make a connection between him and the Belgrade centre.

 3     So you had the chief of that communication centre sitting there."

 4             Was that an accurate translation of what you said, and if not,

 5     you can feel free to correct that at this point?

 6        A.   No, the translation is not correct.  I could not set up a

 7     communication in Belgrade for Mr. Djordjevic.  My job was to set up a

 8     communication line to the Chief of Staff in Pristina and the other

 9     members of the staff who were not at the same place.  For example, you

10     had three or four locations where parts of the staff were.  So I was

11     trying and I was successful in securing communications for all of them

12     which after the post office was bombarded in Boles [as interpreted]

13     consisted of telephone communications which was made from the town post

14     office in Pristina using optic cable which went through Nis to Belgrade.

15     That was the communication line which was used by the Pristina post

16     office and the parts of town which were connected to that exchange.

17             So let's understand each other.  This was not a communication of

18     the SUP, the MUP, the army.  It was a way to relay communications via the

19     PTT Serbia facilities.  So we were the users of those telephones and

20     those numbers.  The telephones were city telephones, the phone numbers

21     were city telephone numbers, there was no special connection.  Thus, I

22     could only secure communications to the chief of the staff and parts of

23     the staff in Pristina, whereas Mr. Joksic with his departments and work

24     lines, in this case, this was, you know, only the section for telephone

25     traffic, he would provide communications to the minister and the members

Page 13970

 1     of the staff at the ministry in Belgrade.

 2        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Now, in this trial, we've heard from a

 3     Mr. Deretic.  Do you know Mr. Deretic?

 4        A.   Yes, I know Deretic.  At the time I was in Pristina, Deretic was

 5     the chief of the communications department in Pristina.

 6        Q.   And he testified that it was the responsibility of the

 7     communications department in Pristina, it was his responsibility to take

 8     on responsibility for SUPs throughout Kosovo.  Are you aware of that

 9     also?

10        A.   Of course I knew about it and of course that is correct.  So I

11     was assigned, as I said at the beginning, to a chief communications

12     amongst units in the field and the Chief of Staff or the staff in

13     Pristina, that was my main activity.  I said that at the very beginning.

14     Mr. Deretic was taking care of and taking care so about the system of

15     communications which was used in peacetime.  For all secretariats, he was

16     in charge of telephone communications, telegraph communications.  He was

17     in charge of special telephone communications.  All that was under the

18     SUP and the secretariats Milos Deretic was in charge of.

19             So I'm only saying that this when we were working on that to

20     secure telephone radio communications for the Chief of Staff and other

21     members of the staff, of course that was something that had to be done by

22     Milos Deretic, but I was also there to decide when and where a certain

23     communication would be installed.  In that sense, if you understood me

24     literally, that I was the one doing that, that I was the bearer of the

25     telephone exchange, that is not so.  But I plan.

Page 13971

 1        Q.   Can you explain your responsibility -- you mentioned the duty

 2     centre.  During the NATO bombing, what was your job responsibility with

 3     regard to the duty centre, if any?

 4        A.   I had nothing to do with the duty centre.  Nothing whatsoever.

 5     Because the duty centre is something that is a permanent body and had to

 6     be constantly present.  So I could never be sure that I would be in one

 7     place for the next half an hour or so, so I could never be a member of

 8     any kind of duty centre.  If you saw from my testimony, I was very rarely

 9     at these, how shall I put it, meetings about preparations, the work, and

10     let me put it that way, these actions and all that kind of thing.  But I

11     was a participant in that in the sense that I was the one who was

12     securing communications for those units that were operating in the field.

13     And I explained the way in which I did this.

14        Q.   Sir, during the NATO bombing at what location did you generally

15     work?

16        A.   I don't understand the question specifically.  Which locations do

17     you mean?  You mean the locations where the staff was or which locations

18     where I was doing what?  If we are talking about locations where I was

19     working for the staff, that was, for example, like I said, you know, the

20     staff itself changed at least ten locations.  I'm thinking about the

21     chiefs of staff, members of the staff depending on what they were doing

22     in order not to disturb one another and ultimately it was not desirable

23     to have the entire staff in one place for security reasons.  These

24     others, let me put it that way, other parts of the staff, we did not

25     really change over so much.  But I was obliged to monitor whether the

Page 13972

 1     communications were provided, whether this was working properly, and

 2     sometimes, if necessary, and this is something that I said in the

 3     beginning and this was being like that for awhile only in that initial

 4     period after all of these bombings and all of that, it was necessary to

 5     do something with that radio communications network, for example, some of

 6     these places with these mobile repeater stations, yes, but this was

 7     really brief, and I really cannot take credit for that kind of work

 8     myself.

 9        Q.   Well, let me ask you this way:  How often were you actually in an

10     office setting, and how often were you out in the field?  I guess I'm

11     wondering, were you more travelling to different areas, fixing radio

12     towers or fixing technical equipment away from an office, or were you

13     more located in an office?

14        A.   This may sound rather impossible to you, but it was, as I say, in

15     addition to the jobs I've just referred to, I also visited the

16     secretariats.  If you can take my word for it, I went through certain

17     zones which were not controlled by the police in order to arrive at a

18     different secretariat, and if I had to do that, I did.  Whether I was

19     crazy enough to do that or not, that's for someone else to judge.

20        Q.   Well, were you travelling around to these secretariats most of

21     the time, or were you usually in Pristina in an office?

22        A.   For example, I spent a lot of time in various offices.  For

23     example, the head of the staff would leave and there were none of those

24     who were supposed to stand in for him along professional lines, then I

25     would assume that duty.  I was part of technical personnel.  There was

Page 13973

 1     always someone next to him in charge of police and operational work.  I

 2     frequently stayed to replace him while, for example, he attended a

 3     meeting in a different part of the staff.  In any case, my job was --

 4        Q.   I'm sorry.  I could just stop you there.  Are you saying that you

 5     stood in for Lukic when he was absent?  That you were acting as the chief

 6     of the MUP staff in his absence?

 7        A.   No, no.  Wherever Lukic went, he had a telephone line available.

 8     If an office had been assigned to him and if there was a regular city

 9     line there, if he went to another building and someone called him back to

10     the other office, someone was supposed to be there to tell that person

11     that Mr. Lukic was in the field and absent.  I could only act as his

12     secretary of sorts.

13        Q.   How often would you do that?  It sounds like you were quite busy,

14     so how much did you have time to just sit in an office and answer phone

15     calls?

16        A.   Let me tell you this:  During the last period I tried to spend as

17     much time as possible in the office, but I couldn't really.

18        Q.   I mean how much time did you spend sitting in Lukic's office

19     while he was absent acting as his receptionist?

20        A.   Well, it's not that I was only a receptionist.  I could have been

21     in Mijatovic's office, for example, while Mijatovic was absent and then

22     someone would call him, and I was there to answer the phone and say that

23     Mr. Mijatovic wasn't there and that a message could be left with me.  Or

24     I could tell that person at what number Mr. Mijatovic could be reached

25     at.  The head of the staff never told me where he went.  He would either

Page 13974

 1     attend meetings in some other parts of the staff or something else, I can

 2     speculate whatever it was.

 3        Q.   Okay.  I'm just trying to understand.  You said earlier that you

 4     were in a lot of places.  You were busy.  You were running around dealing

 5     with things, and now you are telling us that you are spending time

 6     sitting in the office of other people answering their phones, and I'm

 7     just trying to understand how much of your time you spent doing that

 8     because it sounded like you were pretty busy.

 9        A.   I was pretty busy, but since we are talking about offices, I

10     never spent this much time in an office.  I said that I would spend half

11     an hour, an hour at a time in an office, but having this discussion with

12     you one would believe that I spent at least half of my time during

13     aggression in any office.  I was in the first, second, or third office at

14     any point in time, and it could just so happen that I would stay in the

15     office with another staff member.  It could just so happen that Mr. Lukic

16     was not in his office all the time, and the minister wasn't in his office

17     all the time in Belgrade either.  In his absence someone was supposed to

18     be there to take calls.  In other words, there always needed to be

19     someone on the end of the line.

20        Q.   Sir, I'm trying to understand from you how much time you did

21     that, and I think we need to break this down because your answer is a

22     little confusing.  First of all, did you yourself have an office?  Your

23     own office?  Or were you sharing with a group of other people in the MUP

24     staff?

25        A.   Well, at that time I did not have an office of my own.  My office

Page 13975

 1     at that time was wherever Mr. Lukic was and where the other parts of the

 2     staff were, but I was seldom in such premises.  And when I say seldom, I

 3     have in mind, say, a 24-hour period.  During such a period, I would spend

 4     perhaps an hour in an office, and the rest of the time, I was basically

 5     in the field.

 6        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.  And when you say, "at that time I did not have

 7     an office of my own.  My office was wherever Mr. Lukic was," do you mean

 8     that your office was wherever his office was, not that you were

 9     constantly with General Lukic?

10        A.   Yes, precisely.

11        Q.   Okay.  All right.  Thank you.  Now, you said that the MUP staff

12     itself was often housed in different locations so when you say that, were

13     you always in the location that Lukic was housed in when there was moving

14     around?

15        A.   Mr. Lukic could never take up a different office or a building

16     without previously consulting me.  He could envisage any particular

17     location, but if we could not introduce a telephone line there, it meant

18     nothing.  I was constantly with Lukic for that reason.  And out of, say,

19     three or four proposals he put forth about where he wanted to take

20     shelter or an office, I first needed to check whether there was a

21     possibility to establish phone lines and then I would assign him an

22     office.  I was always nearby as well because I never knew when he would

23     want to change next.

24        Q.   Now, you just said you were constantly with him, with Lukic for

25     that reason.  I would just like to clarify that.  I mean, it sounds like

Page 13976

 1     you would go, you would set up, if he was moving an office, you would set

 2     up the communication.  Did you need to be around him any longer that it

 3     would take to do that, or is that what you meant?

 4        A.   No.  When I say that, when I say constantly with him, one would

 5     conclude that he changed offices every 20 minutes and that I was with him

 6     all time.  But he would spend two or three or four days in a single

 7     location.  In certain locations he spent as many as seven days.  In the

 8     meantime there were other locations where lines had already been set up.

 9     This is what I had in mind.

10        Q.   So just to be clear, you were not travelling around with General

11     Lukic constantly, or in his presence on a regular basis?

12        A.   I never travelled around with General Lukic.

13        Q.   All right.  Thank you.  Now, you stated, when you were answering

14     questions from Mr. Popovic, that you did not take part in any of the

15     planning of MUP operations or actions.  So my question to you is:  Your

16     testimony, then, about how these actions were planned is not based on

17     your firsthand knowledge; is that correct?

18        A.   Yes, definitely.  And I wasn't interested in any such thing.  I

19     am not a true policeman so to say and I'm not an operative.  I did take

20     part in operations and in planning, but the planning of communication.

21     If we see that as planning, then it is.  Participation also is

22     participation, however, but the planning of operations and their

23     implementation in terms of combat, this is something I did not

24     participate in.

25        Q.   And you also testified that you did not take part in the

Page 13977

 1     preparation of the operations other than your own work where you would go

 2     out into the field and you would have it set up by 3.00 a.m. if it

 3     started at 5.00 a.m.  So your testimony about how the units involved

 4     would prepare, that's also not based on your own firsthand knowledge or

 5     experience; correct?

 6        A.   Of course, that is true.  While I was in the field, commanders

 7     came to the staff and they would discuss the implementation of a plan.

 8     However, for me it was not important.  The only thing important to me was

 9     the area where the operation was to take place.  My clock started running

10     as of the moment when the plan was complete.  As soon as I received a

11     definitely plan in the sense of area, the clock started running.  If a

12     plan was completed at noon and then there's a gathering of units and

13     their discussion which goes on until 3.00 or 4.00 p.m. because they all

14     have their own questions and the operation is, say, in the territory of

15     Djakovica, I need to leave Pristina upon preparing all of the equipment

16     to go in the field.  I had a team of my own with which I worked on my

17     part of the plan.  Then I would draft my own plan.  Based on that plan,

18     depending on whether that was before the bombing or after or the time

19     before February, I decided which repeater stations I would turn on, what

20     other assets I needed, whether I needed mobile repeater stations and what

21     personnel.  Those were the details.

22             Secondly, since each PJP detachment and the SAJ and JSO ...  I

23     had to get into touch.  I had to check whether they had enough radio

24     stations, but sometimes they didn't.  It could just so happen that they

25     too needed equipment.  We also needed to work on the issues pertaining to

Page 13978

 1     the tasks those guys were supposed to carry out in the field as

 2     signalsmen.  This was what the situation was like, and that's how things

 3     developed.

 4        Q.   Now, after an operation or an action was completed, would you

 5     receive any report about what happened during the action?

 6        A.   No.  As I said, I participated three, four, or five times when I

 7     had to use mobile repeater stations.  In other situation, my job was to

 8     decide the main feature such as the relay station at Mokra Gora.  I would

 9     stay there and follow developments in the field from there in terms of

10     radio communication.  I was in touch with the signalsmen attached to the

11     field units.  That was my work.  When there was redeployment or advancing

12     or pulling out, when they left their units, their areas and could no

13     longer be reached by their repeater stations, I would then direct the

14     signalsman in question to use a different channel or a different repeater

15     station belonging to another unit to establish communication.  That was

16     my work throughout operations.

17             When an operation was finished, I would stay at the feature

18     awaiting the return of the units to their deployment area.  Their

19     commanders would then go to the staff working probably on the -- their

20     reports.  In the meantime, I would dismount my equipment and go back.  If

21     the operation took until 4.00, 5.00, or 6.00 p.m., I couldn't reach the

22     staff before 8.00 or 9.00 p.m.  I could only receive new tasks from

23     Mijatovic or Adamovic if there was to be the continuation of that action

24     the next day.  Or if there was other operation, plans would be drafted

25     anew and the whole story began again.  If an operation took several days,

Page 13979

 1     I would be in a single location, much as I was during operations which

 2     took only a day.

 3        Q.   As chief of communications for the MUP staff, what kind of

 4     reporting did you personally receive, if any?  I don't mean to suggest

 5     that there was any, but if you did, what was it?

 6        A.   I never received any reports from anyone.

 7        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.  And I think that you said in your testimony

 8     that you also were not familiar with the content of MUP dispatches?

 9        A.   If I did not send a dispatch, I was not familiar with its

10     contents, and I had no right to be, or unless I was one of the

11     addressees.

12        Q.   Well, did you generally read MUP dispatches?

13        A.   No.  Firstly, there was no time.  Secondly, I had no interest in

14     it.

15        Q.   All right.  Thank you.  You also said in your testimony that you

16     didn't write any written reports to anyone, but you would give oral

17     reports to General Lukic.  Could you just tell us briefly what the

18     general subject matter of those reports would cover.

19        A.   When we say that I gave reports to Mr. Lukic, I meant to say that

20     he was my superior and I was under an obligation to plan or comment on

21     communications issues.  However, he wasn't privy to it in the sense that

22     this was not part of his work.  In that sense, I could not submit a

23     report to him, because to him it meant nothing.  Communications were in

24     order.  The staff was content with the work I did, and I was part of that

25     staff during the previous period.  I had three or four terms of service

Page 13980

 1     with that staff.  I was familiar with the area.  I was familiar with the

 2     profession, and I enjoyed their full support.

 3             The same went for Deretic in his domain.  He could never submit

 4     reports to me.  He did his work, and he could receive reports in turn

 5     because he was a chief too.  However, I as a chief was under no

 6     obligation to report to anyone, not even the communications

 7     administration in Belgrade because I was in a staff where the minister

 8     was.  There was a line of command.  Lukic was my superior and the

 9     minister was superior to him.  That was the end of it.  As to how they

10     communicated and who gave what tasks to whom, that's a different matter.

11        Q.   Okay.  You said in your testimony that you did not ever see the

12     call-sign Morava used.  This was also true in 1998?

13        A.   Let us understand each other.  The code-name of Morava is in the

14     code-names log used by the secretariat in Pristina for their regular

15     tasks.  They were in touch with MoravaMorava was a duty office in the

16     MUP of Serbia.  It existed as such in the list of code-names, but of the

17     Ministry of the Interior of Serbia.

18             However, while on the topic of lists or logs, as well as

19     operational logs, Morava never figured in any of my logs.

20        Q.   Okay.

21             MS. PETERSEN:  I see we are approaching the time for the break.

22     This would be a good time, if that's convenient for the Court.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  We will have the second break now.  We

24     resume at 6.00.

25                           [The witness stands down]

Page 13981

 1                           --- Recess taken at 5.28 p.m.

 2                           --- On resuming at 6.00 p.m.

 3                           [The witness takes the stand]

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  Ms. Petersen.

 5             MS. PETERSEN:  Thank you, Your Honours.

 6        Q.   Now, sir, you testified that you seldom attended MUP staff

 7     meetings.  So is it fair to say that your testimony about what when on in

 8     these MUP staff meetings was not your own firsthand knowledge?

 9        A.   Everything I testified about concerning MUP staff meetings has it

10     do with those meetings I attended.  It is all firsthand knowledge.  I'm

11     not sure what you have in mind.

12        Q.   Well, you told us that you seldom attended MUP staff meetings.

13     About how many did you attend?

14        A.   If you have in mind the meetings of the expanded staff, then

15     there was one such meeting.

16        Q.   Okay.  So your testimony is based on the one meeting that you

17     attended?

18        A.   I don't know in what part, but let's stay with that.

19        Q.   I'm not sure I understood what you just meant.

20        A.   I attended one extended MUP staff meeting, and I testified about

21     that based on that one meeting about that one meeting.

22        Q.   All right.  Thank you, sir.  Now, in evidence in this case we

23     have quite a few exhibits that are minutes of MUP staff meetings, and

24     we've also heard some testimony from other witnesses about MUP staff

25     meetings.  And in the interests of time, I won't go through all of these

Page 13982

 1     with you, but I would just put to you that there are a number of these

 2     meetings in 1998 and 1999 where General Djordjevic is in attendance,

 3     where the security situation in Kosovo is discussed, and where plans

 4     about Kosovo are made.  And my question to you is, you weren't

 5     necessarily in those meetings; correct?

 6        A.   Yes, I did not participate in the making of any plans for Kosovo.

 7        Q.   All right.  Thank you, sir.  So at page 33 and 34 of the

 8     transcript where you stated that General Djordjevic in 1998 came to

 9     Kosovo but to no particular effect, you weren't in those meetings with

10     him, so you really don't have firsthand knowledge of how he participated;

11     correct?

12        A.   The question was whether I saw Mr. Djordjevic in Kosovo in 1998

13     and 1999.  I said I did, and I explained where.  I said I saw him -- had

14     I seen him at any meetings, I would have said so.

15        Q.   Sir, I believe you stated an opinion at page 33 and 34 that

16     General Djordjevic came to Kosovo for no particular effect.  Now, because

17     you weren't attending meetings with him, you don't really have a basis

18     for saying that, do you, sir?

19        A.   I didn't say that I thought I saw him.  I said I did see him and

20     I told you when and where.

21        Q.   All right.  I think we are miscommunicating here, but I will move

22     on.  There is one exhibit that I'd like to show you from a MUP staff

23     meeting.

24             MS. PETERSEN:  If we could have P689 up on the screen.

25        Q.   Now, sir, this is a meeting of a -- minutes of a meeting of a MUP

Page 13983

 1     staff for 2 December 1998.  And in my review of these minutes, this was

 2     the one that I saw your name.  Does this -- where I saw your name.  Does

 3     this refresh your memory that this was the MUP staff meeting that you

 4     attended?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   All right.

 7             MS. PETERSEN:  If we look at page 3 in both the B/C/S and in the

 8     English.

 9        Q.   And I can just read it.  Midway through the page, right after it

10     says the meeting commenced:

11             "Major General Sreten Lukic stated that on 27 November 1998 in

12     Belgrade, a meeting at the Ministry of the Interior, which was chaired by

13     minister Vlajko Stojiljkovic, was attended by the chiefs of department

14     for the public security and the state security, assistant ministers, head

15     of the MUP staff in Pristina, and Nikola Sainovic.  The current security

16     situation in Kosovo was examined in the meeting in which the duties and

17     further engagement of members of the police in Kosovo were defined.  The

18     essence of the meeting was to continue execution of anti-terrorist

19     actions aimed at suppressing terrorism in Kosovo ... "

20             Now, do you recall General Lukic in this meeting talking about

21     how he had just met with minister Stojiljkovic and with the chiefs of

22     department meaning General Djordjevic and then also the chief of the

23     state security department?  Do you remember him talking about that in

24     this 2 December 1998 MUP staff meeting?

25        A.   Certainly I do.  It was the only meeting I attended, and it was

Page 13984

 1     very important for us.  It would have been unreasonable for me not to

 2     remember it.  What you just read out is what I can see for myself.  The

 3     suppression of terrorism in Kosovo at the time of these events -- well,

 4     that was no longer.  As far as I know at that time -- well, not at that

 5     time, but for two or three months before that there had been no

 6     activities concerning suppression of terrorism in Kosovo.  The great

 7     problem of the time is what we discussed after the reports were submitted

 8     by the officers, were terrorist attacks against units and the casualties

 9     we suffered in such attacks.  It was agreed that fire should be returned

10     proportionately in such occasions.  There was a lot of arms smuggling and

11     other things.  That was the way I understood it.  It was decided that we

12     should adequately respond to the terrorist attacks carried out against

13     field units.  That was the goal of it.  I don't know how Sainovic could

14     say that.  As far as I recall, he was the main person in charge of the

15     mission that was there monitoring the situation in Kosovo.  I don't

16     understand how he could have said this.

17             Secondly, I claim that there were no operations because I would

18     have been in charge of establishing communications.  That did not take

19     place.  As of September, or rather, October, it never happened again

20     because I dismantled the equipment, and it was no longer at those

21     features.  This is my explanation, if you accept it.  I have no other

22     explanation.  There were no anti-terrorist operations at that time, but

23     there were terrorist attacks and lots of casualties among the policemen.

24     If there are reports to that effect, you could check that against what

25     I'm saying.

Page 13985

 1        Q.   I would just like to clarify one thing, I think the transcript

 2     missed the part of the question, so just to clarify the question:  Was do

 3     you remember -- do you recall General Lukic saying in this MUP staff

 4     meeting that he had been to a meeting with the minister and the chiefs of

 5     department for the public security and the state security, public

 6     security, of course, being General Djordjevic?  Sir, that was -- do you

 7     agree that that was the question that you heard?

 8        A.   Yes, I do agree.  But I wasn't there at that meeting which was

 9     attended by General Lukic.

10        Q.   Correct.  That was a meeting in Belgrade.  I'm just asking you

11     about this MUP staff meeting.

12             Now, sir, I would like to clarify one thing.  You stated with

13     authority that there was no -- there were no anti-terrorist operations

14     after October.  However, in light of the fact that you didn't participate

15     in planning, wouldn't it be more accurate to say that there were no

16     anti-terrorist actions for which you set up radio communications?

17        A.   No one could approve an action like that because that would mean

18     suicide for units which would be without radio communications in that

19     situation in the field in Kosovo.  So I can say that in the territory

20     where each village was a fortress unto itself and to have policemen enter

21     that village and to be without the support of communications, there would

22     be no chance for anything like that.  Simply that is impossible.

23        Q.   Okay.  So you are not aware of any MUP actions in Podujevo or in

24     Racak in 1999 or after October 1998?

25        A.   I can say that these were actions for which the activation of

Page 13986

 1     action channels was necessary.  I did hear of Podujevo.  This was during

 2     the war, maybe the 25th, 26th, 27th, I'm not sure about the date.  It was

 3     at the beginning of the bombing campaign.  This was a crime committed

 4     against innocent people in Podujevo.  I did hear of that crime.  I know

 5     there were victims who were children, women.  In such a situation, even

 6     one victim of that kind is too much.  I mean, this is really something

 7     that I do know that happened.  I know that it took place, but as far as I

 8     know, it was no action.  It was simply a crime.  To do something like

 9     that is a crime, and this is how it was described in the press too.

10             Unfortunately, I say again because of my own duties and the

11     duties of everyone in the staff this passed, and in the course of those

12     events there were many victims.  There were people who were killed.

13     Among them policemen, terrorists, those killed by NATO bombs, but let's

14     say this was collateral damage, whatever you want to call it.  But this

15     particular thing is a crime.

16             As for Racak, this is something quite different again.  This was

17     an anti-terrorist action of a smaller scale and communication systems

18     were not required there.  This was a small area.  I think I said in the

19     beginning that -- which were the situations in which such connections

20     were activated.  If we had some small area where radio, hand-held radios

21     were within range, this would be okay.  They could use regular channels

22     and by using the regular channels meant that this was not something for

23     which channel -- action channels were necessary.  There were some actions

24     where it was possible to have the whole of Kosovo within range and to

25     have communication with the staff.  I didn't really take part in things

Page 13987

 1     like that.  Well, this was a small action, but it's not a small action

 2     per se.  There were many casualties there, but it was an anti-terrorist

 3     action on a minor scale.

 4        Q.   And, sir, just to be clear, when you spoke of Podujevo, you are

 5     speaking about something that happened during the NATO bombing, not any

 6     action that took place starting in December of 1998?

 7        A.   No, no.

 8        Q.   All right.  Now, sir, you stated in your testimony that you were

 9     familiar with the October Agreements with the OSCE; do you recall stating

10     that?

11        A.   Yes.  I was just acquainted.  I was just familiar with it.

12        Q.   Were you aware that the MUP had to reduce their numbers in Kosovo

13     under that agreement?

14        A.   I know that it did reduce the numbers, not that it should have

15     reduced the numbers, and I know that because the units that were coming

16     to Kosovo later required much less equipment from me than the ones who

17     came before.  This was definitely true.

18        Q.   But is it your testimony that you are not aware that was one of

19     the requirements of the agreement?

20        A.   No, I do know about that, and I know about it just the same as I

21     knew that the mission would be in the terrain that we would need to keep

22     them in good regard, that we needed to co-operate with them --

23             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not understand the last two

24     or three sentences of what the witness said.

25             MS. PETERSEN:

Page 13988

 1        Q.   Let me just stop you there.  If we can be a little bit more

 2     focused on the answers, we can get through with you tonight possibly,

 3     sir.  I think you answered the specific question.  Were you aware that

 4     the MUP also had to return heavy weapons that they had?  Yes or no, were

 5     you aware of that?

 6        A.   No, I didn't know that piece of information.  This is outside of

 7     my duties.  Not MUP, I don't know what sort of heavy equipment MUP had.

 8     Perhaps they did have something.  I know that the army had such weapons.

 9     I'm just a technical person so anything else really is something that I

10     know very little about, and I don't know what the distinction would be,

11     the line of distinction between light and heavy weaponry.  That is

12     something that I really don't know.

13        Q.   I'm really asking you these questions, sir, just to see if you

14     understood the effect, whether these agreements had a significant effect

15     on MUP activities in Kosovo.  Were you aware of that, that it affected

16     MUP activities in Kosovo?

17        A.   You know, unfortunately with this agreement which was good and

18     should have been realised and was realised to a good part by the MUP,

19     actually had a result that anti-terrorist attacks were stepped up.  We

20     had many more problems in terms of terrorism than before the agreement.

21        Q.   Sir, my particular question to you was whether these agreements

22     affected the MUP in Kosovo.  Did you understand that they affected the

23     MUP's activities in Kosovo?

24        A.   This is what I'm trying to say but in a kind of reverse way.  So

25     the MUP for the most part respected everything.  Well, let's talk about

Page 13989

 1     people, let's not talk about weapons --

 2        Q.   Sir, this is not my question to you.  Let me move on to the next

 3     question which is, were you aware that it was General Djordjevic who

 4     negotiated for the MUP when these agreements were finalised with the

 5     OSCE?

 6        A.   I am hearing this for the first time.

 7        Q.   All right.  Thank you, sir.  Now, there's also evidence in this

 8     case that General Djordjevic was actively involved in the summer

 9     offensive in Kosovo in 1998.  And, in fact, General Djordjevic himself

10     testified here, and he said at page 10031 of the transcript:

11             "In 1998 when the situation was most difficult I was down there,

12     meaning Kosovo, all the time."

13             Now, sir, based on your own observations of General Djordjevic in

14     Kosovo, does that comport with what you observed in 1998?

15        A.   I said that I saw Mr. Djordjevic, you know, there.  I know that

16     Mr. Djordjevic -- yes, I saw him in the field.  I know that

17     Mr. Djordjevic was in the staff too.  I saw him at the staff as well.  So

18     I know that Mr. Djordjevic was sitting in the office where I installed a

19     telephone that he would use.  This was a town line, not a special line.

20     He had access to the staff, he could enter the staff whenever he wanted.

21     He could have, I don't know how to say, I mean, it's nothing disputable.

22             Mr. Djordjevic spent the bulk of his time touring the units.

23     Most of the time he spent also touring the secretariats.  More or less

24     his stay there was approximately like that.  In the staff itself at the

25     meetings, I don't know if he attending them.  Well, I attended them

Page 13990

 1     seldom myself, but I did used to see him there.  I was still kind of

 2     there, yes.  I don't know exactly what to say to you about that.  He was

 3     in Kosovo in the capacity that he was in there.

 4             As far as command and control, that was in General Lukic's hands.

 5     If General Lukic permitted him to do any command and control, that was up

 6     to General Lukic.  That was a matter between the two of them, and that is

 7     something that I don't know.

 8        Q.   Okay.

 9             MS. PETERSEN:  If we could just look at one exhibit.  P699.  Just

10     the first page of that.

11        Q.   Now, if we could just look at the top of this, sir.  Do you see

12     this is a dispatch from the MUP staff?  It's incidents of the last 24

13     hours on 20th of April, 1999.  And do you see at the top that this is

14     addressed to both the minister and to General Djordjevic?  I'm just

15     asking at this point if you can see that?

16        A.   Yes, I see it.

17        Q.   Now, sir, were you aware that the dispatches that went up to the

18     ministry, that those were addressed both to the minister and to General

19     Djordjevic, that he also received these?

20        A.   Yes, I see that.  Well, this can be unclear to me because I know

21     that in the earlier period it just went to Stojiljkovic, and what this

22     here could possibly be that it possibly went to Djordjevic in the event

23     that Stojiljkovic was absent, perhaps that could be the justification.  I

24     don't know what else it could be.  Because if it was just for purposes of

25     information and if it was sent to Mr. Djordjevic, then there would be

Page 13991

 1     enough reason to be sent to the other chiefs of administrations.

 2        Q.   Sir --

 3        A.   But this here could --

 4        Q.   Sir, you told us that you are not familiar with the content of

 5     these dispatches.  So why are you saying now that you know General

 6     Djordjevic did not receive these at any time?  Why would you know that?

 7     You've told us that you are not familiar with the content of these.

 8        A.   No, I was never informed or familiar with the content.  Never.  I

 9     was not interested in any of the dispatch contents.

10        Q.   And, sir, I would put to you that there are other exhibits which

11     I will not go through now.  I could, for the record, name P694, P698.  I

12     won't go through those just to save time, but these also are addressed to

13     General Djordjevic.  Is it your testimony you are not aware of that?

14        A.   Yeah, I really don't know anything about that.  I have never seen

15     them, no.

16        Q.   Okay.  So I just would like to return to P57, the last page, and

17     I don't even know that we need to go back to it, I think we can remember

18     this is the June 16th, 1998 document from Minister Stojiljkovic.  Point 3

19     says that the head of the staff shall report to the minister about his

20     own actions and the actions of the staff, et cetera.

21             Now, you testified, sir, that not only were you aware of this

22     point 3, but you testified that you were aware in practice that this is

23     how it happened; correct?  That was your testimony?

24        A.   Yes, correct.

25        Q.   All right, sir.  We have just gone through numerous things, all

Page 13992

 1     of these after June 16th, 1998, I will list them now, that General

 2     Djordjevic after June of 1998 was actively involved on the ground in the

 3     summer -- in that summer offensive in Kosovo.  That he participated in

 4     numerous meetings of the MUP staff in 1998, 1999, meetings where you were

 5     not in attendance, that you were in attendance at a MUP staff meeting

 6     where General Lukic said he had gone to Belgrade and met with both the

 7     minister and General Djordjevic about the security situation in Kosovo

 8     and the MUP in Kosovo, and General Djordjevic was also in charge of

 9     negotiations for the MUP in October of 1998, another fact of which you

10     were not aware.

11             Sir, my question for you is:  How do you have any knowledge or

12     basis with your lack of knowledge about the activities of Mr. Djordjevic

13     and what he was doing to say that this point number 3 in practice did

14     take effect?  You can't say that, can you, sir?

15        A.   All I can say is that Mr. Djordjevic did not take part in the

16     planning of actions.  We are talking about a period when he was there,

17     before October.  He did not participate in actions.  Mr. Djordjevic for

18     the most part was with the units.  Mostly with the units.  I know that

19     for a fact, and the people -- on the basis of the people who were there

20     and who were with him, this was something that was talked about.  When he

21     would come to a certain sector and visited the people who were there in

22     the trenches, this was a major thing.  So this was something that was

23     talked about.  I can say one thing, I'm under oath.  I was at the staff

24     when the telephone would ring and the minister would reply or actually,

25     Mr. Djordjevic would answer the minister's call and then he would ask for

Page 13993

 1     Mr. Lukic next to him.  So you could not --

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please repeat what he is

 3     saying.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] These are details and he did not --

 5     and for me as a clerk, this was something very strange.  We were in the

 6     room, Mr. Djordjevic, Mr. Lukic, and myself who was there for some reason

 7     or other.

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  The entire witness's

 9     answer was not interpreted because it was not very clear.

10             MS. PETERSEN:  I see Mr. Popovic.

11             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, you've got the picture.  Yes.  You may need

12     to retrace your steps a bit.  Good luck.

13             MS. PETERSEN:  Thank you, Your Honour.

14        Q.   Let's break this down a little bit.  First you just said that,

15     "all I can say is Mr. Djordjevic did not take part in the planning of

16     actions."  Since you yourself didn't take part in the planning of

17     actions, you don't know that, do you, sir?

18        A.   Yes, that is true.  But so when the action was being worked out

19     at the time I was at the staff.  I was at the staff.  When the action is

20     worked out, I get the plan first.  I said that.  So I am there and then I

21     should whether Mr. Djordjevic was inside or not, whether he had gone in

22     or had come out, and I didn't see him, and believe me, so the first

23     person who would receive a document about the completion of a planned

24     action was me.  I think that this was -- this was definitely so.

25        Q.   You would receive a map, correct, sir?

Page 13994

 1        A.   Correct.  But I would receive the map inside.  I would not

 2     receive it outside.  I would receive it inside, and I would be given it

 3     by Mr. Mijatovic or some other colleague of his.  He would explain to me

 4     what it was about, and I would go.  Thus, this was so.  We can twist it

 5     now this way or that way, but that's how it was.

 6        Q.   Sir, the main question is, I just went through with you a series

 7     of things after June 16th, 1998, showing General Djordjevic being

 8     involved in Kosovo, participating in plans about Kosovo, negotiating on

 9     behalf of the MUP with regards to Kosovo, all after June 16th, 1998 when

10     this document by the minister was signed.  Many of those things you said

11     you were not aware of.  So my question to you is simply:  Because of your

12     lack of knowledge of Mr. Djordjevic's activities and doings, you can't

13     really say whether he was or was not out of the loop?  You yourself don't

14     have that firsthand information; is that fair to say?

15        A.   Yes, that is fair to say.  I didn't say anything that I didn't

16     know, but the things that I do know, that I'm sure of, that's what I did

17     tell about, yes.

18        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.  Now, you've already testified that you were

19     not around General Lukic all the time.  You didn't go to all of the

20     meetings with General Lukic that he went to, did you?

21        A.   Right.

22        Q.   Okay.  And you didn't listen into his telephone calls, did you?

23        A.   No.

24        Q.   And you didn't review his telephone logs; correct?

25        A.   Correct.

Page 13995

 1        Q.   Okay.  So while you can tell us that he had a certain number of

 2     conversations with Minister Stojiljkovic, you certainly can't say who

 3     else he did or did not have conversations with at other times; correct?

 4        A.   I can say that he spoke with some other persons who were perhaps

 5     not that important, but as far as co-operation of this kind, and we are

 6     talking about situations that were delicate situations, these were

 7     conversations.  I was on a couple of occasions, or three occasions there

 8     when the minister called.  I picked up the phone because I was there to

 9     hold that telephone.  When somebody else comes, they continue and I go

10     off on my job, so that is the truth.  It's also that's the truth that he

11     spoke with the minister, meaning talked and referred or reported about

12     the situation and the events in the field.  It is true that always thus

13     any event that happened as far as terrorist attacks and such-like was

14     something that he had to inform him about first.  That is certain.  That

15     is for sure like that.

16             And now if somebody was on the other side instead of the

17     minister, just like I was there sometimes instead of Lukic, we can say

18     that perhaps some deputy minister was there, he could have conveyed

19     everything to the minister, but the minister could not tell me what I

20     should convey to Lukic in the same way.

21        Q.   Sir, what I'm asking you is although you can say that you heard

22     Lukic talking to the minister on several occasions, you can't tell us

23     that Lukic never spoke to on the phone or communicated with in some other

24     way someone else, such as General Djordjevic?  You couldn't represent

25     that, could you?

Page 13996

 1        A.   Of course not, of course I couldn't do that.  Naturally I could

 2     not do that.

 3        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.  Now, you have testified that you weren't part

 4     of the planning operations, you weren't part of the preparation for

 5     operations, you didn't get reporting on operations afterwards, you

 6     weren't familiar with the content of MUP dispatches, and, in fact, that

 7     that didn't interest you.  So my question to you was, is this:  You've

 8     testified that there was no plan to expel Albanians from Kosovo.  If

 9     there would have been such a plan, sir, it is not very likely that you

10     would have known about it; correct?

11        A.   As far as such important things that were happening, there had to

12     have been some kind of staff meeting which would have to have been

13     attended by all because what we are talking about now is a very serious

14     matter.  It could not have been at a staff meeting or something and to

15     have reached me from somewhere and to have been talked about.  If

16     something like that did take place, I would have had to have been there

17     at the staff because this was a very important thing.  This could have

18     been some kind of secret meeting, some secret agreement that we had to

19     have known about, and to have been able to implement it, but I really

20     don't know anything about it.  Had this really been happening and we in

21     the staff didn't know anything about it, then that would be quite a

22     different matter.

23        Q.   Well, sir, anti-terrorist operations were quite important; right?

24        A.   The most important at the time.

25        Q.   And you didn't participate in planning those; correct?

Page 13997

 1        A.   I didn't participate in the planning of those, in the

 2     implementation of the, let's say, military operations, but I did know

 3     what was going on in the field because I was there a number of times and

 4     in the process of setting up radio communications I could follow what was

 5     going on in the field as could the head of the staff in Pristina.

 6        Q.   And, sir, your focus was on whether the radio communications were

 7     working; correct?  Your focus, and, in fact, you've testified that you

 8     were not interested in combat operations and the strategy of actions,

 9     that was not of interest to you; correct?

10        A.   Correct.  But, as I said, I had to follow the functioning of the

11     entire radio network.  For example, if they couldn't hear each other, it

12     was a problem I had to solve.  If one was trying to call another who

13     couldn't hear him, and of course, I could overhear their conversations,

14     and it is only natural that some of it remained in my memory.

15        Q.   All right, sir.  But it's fair to say that you were not aware of

16     all of the plans of combat actions of the MUP, and in light of that, if

17     there would have been a plan to expel Albanians, it easily could have

18     slipped by you; fair to say?

19        A.   I truly don't know of the existence of such a plan, but I do know

20     that an enormous amount of people during the bombings left the territory

21     of Kosovo and Metohija.  I truly know that.  Great many of them.

22     Especially in the Drim valley towards Kacanik and Macedonia.  Also there

23     were many going towards Bujanovci and Presevo.  There were other

24     inhabitants, Serbs, Roma, who left the territory of Kosovo.  At the time,

25     it wasn't very popular for officers to take their families out of Kosovo,

Page 13998

 1     but civilians were fleeing en masse.  It wasn't easy to be there as bombs

 2     fell and refugee columns were struck.  We can only discuss expulsions in

 3     that context.  This is how I see it.  And amidst all that are for someone

 4     to organise an operation to expel anyone, well, it wasn't necessary.

 5     People started fleeing.

 6             MS. PETERSEN:  Just one second, Your Honours.  Those are all the

 7     questions that I have for the witness.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you, Ms. Petersen.

 9             Mr. Popovic, any re-examination?

10             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.

11                           Re-examination by Mr. Popovic:

12        Q.   Mr. Cankovic, in your testimony you said you attended one meeting

13     of the MUP staff in its extended composition.  However, as for the inner

14     staff meetings, how many such meetings did you have occasion to attend?

15        A.   Well, there were many more such meetings.  Many more.

16        Q.   Thank you.  During those meetings of the inner staff, could you

17     have drawn any conclusions about the functioning of the MUP staff in

18     Pristina and the way operations were planned and prepared?

19        A.   At those meetings, it was mainly tasks that were issued.  For

20     example, communications tasks to me, and the situation and the staff

21     itself was discussed for the most part.

22        Q.   Thank you.  My learned friend asked you how you knew of the plans

23     and operations that were implemented.  I have this question of you:  When

24     you received maps based on which you were supposed to set up

25     communication lines, what was shown there?

Page 13999

 1        A.   On those maps one could see the movements of the units which were

 2     to take part in that particular anti-terrorist operation.  Where I set up

 3     communication lines, there were usually three, four, or up to six units

 4     involved.  They were indicated in red or blue indicating their axes of

 5     movement, and one could conclude what the goal of that particular

 6     operation was by looking at it.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  I'd like to go back to General Djordjevic now.  In

 8     1998 when you saw him in the field and you said it was in Malisevo and

 9     Jablanica, if I'm not mistaken, to your knowledge did he have any command

10     role in those operations?

11        A.   General Djordjevic had no command role to play.  He never used

12     our radio lines.  He was never in any of our lists of call-signs.  In

13     such a situation, he had to keep in touch with the staff.  He was never

14     on any radio lines or communications, however, with the staff.  This is

15     what I claim in full responsibility.

16        Q.   Thank you.  When you said that you saw General Djordjevic in the

17     MUP staff in Pristina in 1998, did you see him issue any orders to anyone

18     at the staff or in the staff?

19        A.   I truly don't know.  I don't know how he spent his time there.  I

20     don't know.  I know that there were no staff meetings at which

21     Mr. Djordjevic -- Mr. Djordjevic participated in terms of contributions

22     or as the head of such meetings.  There were no such things.  Maybe he

23     had some arrangements with Mr. Lukic, but at the meetings, the meetings

24     of the inner staff, he was never in charge of those.

25        Q.   Thank you.  You started discussing a certain event when the

Page 14000

 1     minister called and Mr. Djordjevic picked up the phone.  The interpreters

 2     were unable to put that in the transcript.  Could you please repeat your

 3     description of that event.

 4        A.   It seemed unusual that the minister called and that his answer

 5     was -- his phone call was answered by the chief of the sector.  And that

 6     they did not speak following that, but that the minister simply asked to

 7     speak to the chief of the staff.  And then they -- the chief of the

 8     sector simply gave the receiver to the head of the staff, and following

 9     that I left.

10        Q.   Mr. Cankovic, you said you were present when Lukic called from

11     the staff to report to the minister.  Were you ever present when

12     Mr. Lukic called Mr. Djordjevic from the staff premises?

13        A.   I answered that question already, I believe, but I also said that

14     it wasn't completely impossible that he did so.  In any case, I did not

15     hear it.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see P699.

18        Q.   Mr. Cankovic, you were shown this document by my learned friend.

19     Look at the heading of this document, please.  What is its title?

20        A.   Survey of incidents, events, and intelligence of security

21     significance recorded in the period between 600 hours on 19 April to --

22        Q.   600 hours on 19 April to 600 hours on 20 April 1999.  I'd like to

23     assist you since we are running out of time.  Please look at item 1, what

24     does it say?

25        A.   Attacks by NATO armed forces.

Page 14001

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please go to page 2 now.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Cankovic, is there a subheading or a subtitle on

 4     this page?

 5        A.   I don't see it.

 6             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Let's go to page 3.

 7        Q.   Mr. Cankovic, what does item 2 say?

 8        A.   "Terrorist attacks."

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Let's go to the next page, please.

11        Q.   Can you tell us what is the title of paragraph 3?  Perhaps we can

12     zoom in.  Thank you.

13        A.   "Serious crimes committed."

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] The next page.  Please zoom in.

16        Q.   What does paragraph 4 say?

17        A.   "Persons of Albanian and other ethnic communities fleeing from

18     the territory of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija."

19             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] The last page in the Serbian,

20     please, and I think this is the last page in the English version.

21        Q.   What does paragraph 5 say?

22        A.   "Other."

23        Q.   Mr. Cankovic, in this survey of intelligence related events

24     concerning that date, is there any mention of terrorist activities?

25        A.   No.

Page 14002

 1             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours, this

 2     concludes my redirect.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you Mr. Popovic

 4                           Questioned by the Court:

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I have very few questions, Mr. Cankovic.  What

 6     was your rank in 1999?

 7        A.   I was a captain, and I was retired as one.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And did you wear a uniform at the time?

 9        A.   I never wore a uniform because I always worked on such things

10     which would quickly destroy my uniform or make it extremely dirty.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  You testified about a meeting of the

12     Serbian government in Kosovo in 1999.  When did this meeting with the

13     government take place?

14        A.   That meeting was held on the 15th of January, 1999.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You told us that you had the opportunity to go

16     back to Belgrade with one of the planes with your equipment.  Did I

17     understand that correctly?

18        A.   You did not.  That was a joke made by my colleagues.  I was

19     supposed to go to Belgrade on that day, and I did, to pick up the

20     equipment, and I also had a free weekend.  I was supposed to go the day

21     before, but I stayed another day because the prime minister was supposed

22     to arrive.  As the chief of communications, I was supposed to be there in

23     particular for security reasons.  Once they went to attend the meeting, I

24     headed towards Belgrade in a vehicle.  My work-mates jokingly said that I

25     could join the government on the plane back to Belgrade but, of course, I

Page 14003

 1     couldn't.  I was supposed to bring all the equipment along.  Had it not

 2     been for that, I may have been on that plane.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you, I missed obviously the word

 4     "jokingly."  Do you know where Mr. Djordjevic went after the meeting of

 5     the government with the prime minister?

 6        A.   I actually can't say.  Perhaps around 2.00 or 3.00 p.m., I headed

 7     towards Belgrade.  I had to leave the territory in daylight.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Can you tell me where Mr. Djordjevic went after

 9     the meeting of the government?

10        A.   It wasn't meeting concerning the prime minister.  Yes, they went

11     to attend the government session and then they had lunch together.

12     That's what was planned.  As for what truly happened later on, I really

13     don't know.  I don't know what the protocol was.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You don't know where Mr. Djordjevic went after

15     this event in Pristina?

16        A.   No.  I wasn't really interested in where the prime minister was

17     or --

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  My last point, you qualified the event, the

19     incident in Podujevo just as a crime and not as an action.  Are you aware

20     that there were at least two units of the SAJ were present just --

21     arrived just before the crime was committed and even more units of the

22     MUP?

23        A.   As for any units that were there, I could only have been aware of

24     that if their commander would come in requesting some additional

25     equipment or something of that sort.  But as for my knowledge of any

Page 14004

 1     units entering or leaving, that is something I really had nothing to do

 2     with.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We've heard the evidence of one of the commanders

 4     of the SAJ, and he told us that he was given maps with a clear indication

 5     on which axis his unit should move.  You are not aware of that?

 6        A.   No, I am not.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Can I conclude from your answer that you are not

 8     aware of all orders issued in that way from the MUP staff by handing over

 9     marked maps to you to convey them to the units?

10        A.   I never handed over maps to the units.  I received maps that I

11     was interested in, and these were usually excerpts, photocopies of

12     topographic maps.  But I never handed over any maps to anyone, not even

13     as a mail person.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Do you know if the telephone communication from

15     Podujevo, from the OUP Podujevo to Belgrade was working that day?

16        A.   No, I don't know that.  I don't know whether the communication

17     line in Podujevo was in operation that day.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

19             JUDGE PARKER:  That concludes the questions for you.  Thank you

20     for your attendance here and for the assistance you have been able to

21     give, and you are now free to go back to your normal activities.  When we

22     rise, a Court Officer will assist you from the courtroom.

23             The Chamber now adjourns until tomorrow at 2.15.

24                           [The witness withdrew]

25                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.04 p.m.

Page 14005

 1                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 27th day of

 2                           April, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.