1 Tuesday, 13 July 2010
2 [Prosecution Closing Statement]
3 [Open session]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
6 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning. We sit today to hear the final
7 submissions in this case of the Prosecution.
8 Mr. Stamp.
9 MR. STAMP: Thank you very much, Your Honours, and good morning.
10 For the record, I'm Chester Stamp, along with Ms. Daniela Kravetz and
11 Ms. Priya Gopalan for the Prosecution and Ms. Line Pedersen is our case
12 manager here to assist us today.
13 I suspect, Your Honours, that this is the last time that I will
14 be formally addressing you on my feet in this trial. It is probably my
15 last appearance if all runs -- goes well, it will be. And I think I
16 would like at the beginning to acknowledge some persons who participated
17 in the running of this case which for me at least personally has been a
18 very major event in my career as counsel.
19 It has been a year and a half since this case commenced. It has
20 been a very efficient and fast-moving case, in my view, it's faster than
21 most. And there are many persons, some here in court, some not here in
22 court, who assisted in making that happen. I'd like to thank my
23 colleagues from the Prosecution side, the lawyers who appeared in court
24 before Your Honours and many other lawyers who did not appear in court
25 but were outside of court preparing the motion, researching, and doing
1 what is necessary for us to come before you to present this case.
2 We are also thankful to the support staffing of the OTP, the
3 trial support section, the language assistants, investigators, analysts,
4 and our interns. We recently completed the job of putting together a
5 pre-trial brief [sic] in which we tried to discuss most of the important
6 evidence in this case, thousands of exhibits and a couple hundred
7 witnesses, and many of them worked way into the night and into the
8 mornings to get it before the Court on time and in very good order and in
9 very good shape I hope Your Honours will find.
10 We could not have proceeded, Your Honours, without the work or
11 the assistance of those who work in court, in the language booths. They
12 had to put up with lawyers who spoke too fast. It seems most times that
13 I was the most culpable or the one who received the most complaints.
14 They had to put up with overall emotional witnesses and their work is
15 much appreciated. The court reporters who recorded the proceedings and
16 produced a transcript so we could review them early. Those in the
17 technical booth also have to be acknowledged because they have assisted
18 us to manage and to use the high level of technology that we have
19 available with us in court. And the members of the Victims and Witnesses
20 Section, the Registry in total. We appreciate their work and I make
21 special mention of those who have worked with us in court as well as
22 those at the Victims and Witnesses Section. Without the witnesses
23 coming, the trial could not proceed and they worked efficiently to bring
24 the witnesses to The Hague
25 them, attend to their comfort, while they were here in The Hague
1 I'd like to acknowledge counsel and the parties on the other
2 side. In the course of this case, they have always been very
3 professional in the way they related to us when we had to work together.
4 And finally, I'd like to thank the Chamber for the manner in which you
5 have conducted the trial and the kind courtesies that you have extended
6 to us.
7 I don't know if counsel should have too much useful to say to the
8 Court after a trial that is so long. If we haven't presented the
9 evidence over a year and a half clearly enough for the Court to seize our
10 case, then perhaps it's -- it might be a little bit too late to do
11 anything about that. However, I'll try my best, Your Honours, to make or
12 to deal with one or two issues I think or to -- of importance, go to the
13 core of what Your Honours have to consider as you evaluate the evidence.
14 And I will not deal with the evidence in too much detail. I think that
15 has been dealt with quite comprehensively in the Prosecution's final
16 trial brief and I hope not to and don't intend to repeat that too much.
17 I will just deal with a couple of core issues and I will spend some time
18 dealing with some matters raised in the Defence brief which I believe
19 ought to be met by the Prosecution and before we rest.
20 Your Honours, having failed to resolve the issue of non-violent
21 and violent separatism on the part of the majority Kosovo Albanians in
22 Kosovo and as conditions for continued Serbian rule deteriorated in
23 Kosovo, the leadership of the FRY and Serbia, including politicians,
24 military figures, and the police leadership embarked on a plan to modify
25 the ethnic balance in Kosovo in order to ensure continued Serbian control
1 over that province. This objective was impossible to achieve without
2 resorting to criminal means, that is the forcible expulsion of a
3 substantial part of the Kosovo Albanian population. Those criminal means
4 took the form of a widespread and systematic campaign of terror and
5 violence directed at the Kosovo Albanian population. Various persons,
6 command structures, and entities played different but complementary roles
7 in the execution of the plan and the public security sector of the
8 Ministry of the Interior of Serbia, which the accused commanded, had a
9 vital role to play.
10 This trial, Your Honours, is not about the crimes of the KLA.
11 There were crimes committed on both sides. It is neither about the
12 larger political issues of the independence or separatism of Kosovo.
13 These are relevant but ancillary issues. This case is about the
14 liability of one of the principal persons responsible for this planned
15 campaign involving specific crimes charged in the indictment.
16 During this case we have heard witnesses and seen documents that
17 revealed Mr. Djordjevic's position and authority at the apex of the
18 public security sector of the MUP and his actions and conduct in that
19 capacity which were in support of the plan. The Defence asserts - and
20 this is one of the main issues in this trial - and they do so at
21 paragraph 311 of the brief and throughout the case that there was no
22 common plan, that the evidence does not amount to an organised campaign
23 but of isolated incidents perpetrated by random individuals. That's what
24 they've said in the brief. This, Your Honours, is an attempt to minimise
25 and localise the crimes that the Chamber have to consider. The plan to
1 expel the Kosovar Albanian population or a substantial portion thereof
2 and to prevent their return is borne-out by the scale of the crimes and
3 the pattern of the crimes, which is discussed at the -- in the final
4 trial brief of the Prosecution from paragraphs 458. Approximately
5 800.000 Kosovar Albanians were expelled, thousands murdered in less than
6 three months in this relatively small geographical area.
7 One can readily perceive the organised pattern from the
8 crime-base evidence, that is, the evidence of the victims who survived
9 and the observers on the ground. That is what I refer to as crime-base
10 evidence. Typically there were joint VJ and MUP assaults on village --
11 villages and population centres, and the Kosovo Albanian population was
12 expelled through violence and threats of violence and other persecutory
13 acts. Often the personal identification cards were confiscated and
14 destroyed and their homes destroyed to prevent their return. Sometimes
15 groups of them, mostly men, were separated from the fleeing populace and
16 killed. The Kosovar Albanian population was thoroughly terrorised and
17 this resulted in further mass exodus. The evidence reveals, Your Honour,
18 that practically the same pattern of expulsions was occur -- or were
19 occurring at disparate locations throughout Kosovo and Metohija. It is
20 submitted, respectfully, that the crime-base evidence considered in its
21 entirety is sufficient to prove that there was a widespread and
22 systematic campaign.
23 In addition to this, a finding that there was a widespread and
24 systematic campaign against Kosovar Albanian population is confirmed by
25 the evidence of the clandestine transportation of the bodies of over 800
1 Kosovar Albanian persons to Serbia
2 graves. The bodies that were transported to Serbia and buried there to
3 cover up the crimes is, Your Honour -- Your Honours, unchallenged
4 evidence. And the Chamber is entitled to draw certain inferences from
5 this unchallenged evidence. Some of them are pretty obvious, including
6 one that the remains of these victims or these persons were the remains
7 of persons who were victims of murder and that the parties who organised
8 this transshipment and concealment were aware that they were murder
9 victims and not combatants or victims of the accidental killings but
10 murder victims. There must have been awareness of that. And the parties
11 who organised this transshipment and concealment were conscious of their
12 guilt or their participation in these murders; that is, these weren't
13 killings that arose from the activities of the KLA, for example, or
14 ordinary crime. The reasons why the bodies were moved so far and so much
15 resource and effort was put in place to move over 800 bodies, hundreds of
16 miles to be concealed in mass graves must have been because the persons
17 involved in the movement were responsible for these killings. And it is
18 obvious also, I think, that this was the result of high-level planning
19 and organisation. It is manifest that an operation to ship so many
20 bodies so far involving so many people must have been planned very
21 carefully and from a high level.
22 These points again have been set out and the evidence in support
23 of these points have been also been set out in the final trial brief, but
24 these, it is submitted, are clear inferences that the Court is entitled
25 to draw from the mere fact of the transport of these bodies, which is
1 evidence that has not been and indeed cannot be challenged.
2 Another incident -- inference can be drawn from this evidence,
3 Your Honours, an inference and the Prosecution submits the sure inference
4 is that the murders were the consequence of a planned campaign. The
5 sheer scale and number of the victims is proof enough by itself, but this
6 is not the only aspect that the transshipment of the bodies establishes.
7 Careful analysis of the forensic evidence in its entirety of Sterenberg,
8 the forensic archaeologist, the DNA
9 from the Madrid
10 forensic anthropologist and the OMPF list of missing persons establishes
11 that the human remains of Kosovar Albanians found at the mass graves in
13 committed at many different times. The bodies came from a multitude of
14 crime sites all over Serbia
15 this is overwhelming evidence, it is submitted, of a planned, widespread
16 and systematic campaign, not merely random killings. If it were random,
17 the persons involved in the transit and concealment of the bodies would
18 not know where to gather all of these bodies from all of these crimes.
19 Your Honours, what I'm saying is that these bodies that were found in
21 and they were gathered up and hidden, but there were many incidents
22 spreading all over Kosovo, right through the indictment period of
23 reported killings and murders, where all these bodies were gathered up
24 and taken and concealed in Serbia
25 It proves more than just planning. It proves, it is submitted by the
1 Prosecution, knowledge of these various murders.
2 P815, that is Exhibit P815, comprises exhumation reports by
3 Sterenberg on behalf of the International Commission of Missing Persons,
4 the ICMP. It details the process of exhumations of the three mass graves
5 at Batajnica, Petrovo Selo and Bajina Basta in the area of Lake Perucac
6 in Serbia
7 us that 705 bodies or body parts from 705 individuals at least were found
8 at Batajnica, 75 at Petrovo Selo, and 48 at Bajina Basta.
9 Following DNA
11 ICMP provided us with those -- with the lists of the persons identified
12 which is contained in P818, which I think is before on the screen. And
13 it lists the hundreds of persons whose bodies were identified from the
14 mass graves in Serbia
15 page, perhaps. There are over 600 -- I think it lists 650 persons,
16 Kosovo Albanians, whose bodies were found in this grave. We heard the
17 evidence about the Suva Reka massacre from Shyhrete, Hysni Berisha and
18 Hebib Berisha. These are some of them who were found years later,
19 including babies, at Batajnica.
20 After the completion of the identification procedure, the bodies
21 were returned to the families by the United Nations mission in Kosovo and
22 the cases closed were applicable. P477 is a consolidated list of persons
23 reported missing in Kosovo to the ICRC, that's International Commission
24 of the Red Cross and other international organisations which was
25 consolidated by the UN Office of Missing Persons and Forensic, the OMPF.
1 And importantly, when the ICRC and other bodies recorded the information
2 or the reports of the disappearance of these persons in Kosovo, they also
3 recorded the dates when these persons were recorded as having disappeared
4 and the location of the event where the persons were reported to have
5 disappeared from. I just put it on the screen to remind the Court of
6 this document which is in evidence. You will see in the columns fourth
7 from right or fifth from right, the date of the event and the location of
8 the event where the persons on this list disappeared from. The names on
9 this list, the ICRC list -- the OMPF list of unaccounted persons includes
10 many of those whose remains were identified in mass graves in Serbia
11 it demonstrates, Your Honours, that the murders and the violence in
12 Kosovo and Metohija were not random, isolated events but were the result
13 of the execution of a plan.
14 And to give the Chamber a better idea of the widespread and
15 systematic nature of the crimes and the cover-up, I have merged these two
16 exhibits, that is, I have merged the ICMP list of identified victims
17 found in the three mass graves in Serbia with the information from the
18 OMPF and the ICRC, showing the location of the events and the dates of
19 the disappearance. And before you now, Your Honours, there is a
20 consolidated spreadsheet. Happily, the ICRC and OMPF lists were
21 submitted in evidence in spreadsheet formats so the Chamber would be able
22 to do much of what I propose to do.
23 This spreadsheet only includes those cases where the remains were
24 recovered for the mass graves in Serbia and those -- and who were
25 identified and the locations and places where they were killed and
1 disappeared or disappeared were recorded. And what I've done first is
2 assort the sheet by the place of the event of the disappearance of these
3 victims. These are persons, I remind the Court, who were found -- or
4 whose remains were found at Batajnica. If we look at this, scroll down,
5 we see a variety of places, Cabrat, Dardania, Pec, Djakovica, many of
6 these found at Batajnica, Izbica, Skenderaj, Pec, Kacanik, Kosovo Polje,
7 Landovica, Ljubanic, Pec, Meja. There will of course be many from Meja
8 because in one particular incident on the 27th of April, 1999, at least
9 300 men weaponry murdered and disappeared. Their bodies, this shows were
10 found, at Batajnica.
11 People from the village of Ramoc
12 a lot of evidence about people being expelled and murdered in these
14 If we were to represent what we see here on a map, and this is
15 Annex C, we can't represent each individual killing but we can represent
16 the concentrations of the killings, we see that the bodies found in
18 have occurred right across Kosovo. There ought to have a bigger circle
19 to the south of the map to represent the Suva Reka massacre, but the
20 Suva Reka massacre on the 25th of March, for some reason, was not
21 reported to the ICRC so it does not come up on their list. So that
22 massacre is not represented here. The ICRC list, Your Honours, is not
23 exhaustive. This just indicates some of the murders and we can have an
24 idea of the spread.
25 Another important matter which the ICRC list can assist the Court
1 with if we analyse it on a spreadsheet is the spread, if we sort it by
2 the date of the killings or the date of the disappearances, we see that
3 the persons whose bodies were found in Serbia were killed over a long
4 period of time right through the indictment period. March, we could
5 probably go quickly; April, different dates in April, different dates in
6 March; May, different dates; 8th of June; and we see one at the bottom,
7 7th of July. So I should advise the Court that that one is in the ICRC
8 records, a disappearance which -- but I take it Your Honours would
9 understand that in records of this nature that the ICRC would keep -- the
10 odd error would creep in. It does not affect the substance of the
11 records in respect to the killings. One error -- I think an error was
12 made in recording the date, does not affect the record in respect to
13 thousands of people.
14 So, Your Honour, this is not merely, as the Defence suggested in
15 their brief, a massive criminal enterprise, but it is also one of
16 significant complexity. And the recovery and transshipment of the bodies
17 from so many crimes committed at so many or on so many occasions could
18 only have been achieved, it is submitted respectfully, if there was
19 knowledge of these crimes and high-level planning and management.
20 The parties who organised the collection and transfer and
21 concealment of these bodies in Serbia
22 murders as they were ongoing. The collection of the remains of the
23 victims of murder committed on so many different days at these disparate
24 places is clear evidence, it is submitted, of planning and organisation
25 and also of knowledge of the ongoing killings because only persons with
1 the knowledge of the killings from these various places where they
2 occurred would have been able to carry this out.
3 And the Prosecution submit respectfully that the forensic
4 evidence viewed broadly and in its totality entitles the Court to make
5 this finding as a safe and sure finding, not only that it was widespread
6 and systematic but that it was planned.
7 The Defence said at paragraph 308 of its brief that it defies
8 logic that there was a plan, but it is submitted, Your Honours, that this
9 forensic evidence in reality shows that there could be no other logical
10 and reasonable explanation but that there was a plan.
11 There is, if I could move on, an additional question the Chamber
12 could grapple with and it is whether or not there was just a campaign of
13 killings or of persecutions or whether these organised killings,
14 obviously systematic, were also related to the deportations which the
15 Prosecution alleges is the motivation for all of these crimes that were
16 committed against the Kosovar Albanians. The Prosecution submits that
17 the answer to this question could only be yes and that it is a certain
18 and safe conclusion, that if these murders fell within an organised
19 scheme then the related deportations were also organised and planned.
20 Many of the victims, including those referred to in the ICMP
21 report including whose remains were found in mass graves, disappeared
22 from places and at times where according to the evidence tendered in the
23 trials there were mass expulsions of Kosovar Albanians.
24 If we -- and we could look through, and I invite the Court to do
25 so, look through the column for group disappearances and if we sort that
1 by place, these are when the reports of groups having been killed, we see
2 that many of them occurred in places where there were massive
3 deportations of Kosovo Albanians. And if we -- once you scroll down for
4 group deportations you see Izbica, the Izbica killings, massive
5 deportations. The striking one of course is always Meja because there
6 were so many persons killed in the Meja incident, but the evidence of the
7 people who were witnesses to the Meja incident, particularly Pnishi, I
8 hope I got his name right Martin Pnishi, Dedaj, and Nike Peraj told of
9 massive deportations that were associated with the murders that occurred
10 there. And I'll return briefly to the Meja incident when I come to
11 discuss the crime base.
12 But for the time being if I could just remind the Court that the
13 victims of Meja were found at Batajnica.
14 As we are speaking about deaths and evidence of killings,
15 Your Honours, if we could look briefly at Annex C to the -- well, to the
16 proof of death chart, which is annexed to the Prosecution pre-trial brief
17 [sic]. The proof of death chart refers to evidence relevant only to the
18 named victims of murder incidents that are specifically charged in the
19 indictment. The other lists which I just went through deals with -- one
20 list deals with all of the identified victims from the mass graves in
22 that they receive in respect to disappearances. The proof of death chart
23 is more narrow and more specific. It just deals with the names of those
24 who are specifically listed in the indictment for the specific count of
25 murder. The remains of some of these victims, however, were found in the
1 mass graves in Serbia
2 found at Batajnica, Izbica; in Schedule F were found at both Batajnica
3 and at Petrovo Selo; and most of the Meja victims were found at Batajnica
4 and Meja is Schedule H.
5 The chart, Your Honour, consolidates in one place for easy
6 reference by the Chamber the evidence in respect to each of these named
7 victims. It is not evidence, but we proffer it as part of the final
8 submissions, and I think it can assist the Court in locating the forensic
9 evidence referred to each of the deceased persons insofar as proof of
10 these specific charges of murder in the indictment is required. And it
11 includes forensic evidence in respect to the examination of those human
12 remains and also the identification evidence, mainly DNA evidence and to
13 some degree the evidence of the murder of these persons. The proof of
14 death chart is not on the screen. I think this is the ICRC chart. When
15 one scrolls through this, one will see that many of the victims or most
16 of the victims were men, which is consistent with the viva voce testimony
17 before the Court, that in the course of these expulsions men were taken
18 away and shot while the rest of the population was expelled.
19 The evidence reveals, as Dr. Baraybar testified, that the vast
20 majority of the scheduled victims of murder whose remains were recovered
21 in a state that was susceptible to forensic examination died from
22 gun-shot wounds inflicted on persons who were not engaged in combat.
23 These were murder victims. Baraybar and his team used the most advanced
24 methodology of forensic anthropology to reach these conclusions as the
25 state of decomposition in many of these bodies was far advanced.
1 There has been some challenge in the course of the trial as to
2 whether or not Dr. Baraybar and his team could make findings on the cause
3 of death, having regard to the state of these human remains.
4 Dr. Baraybar testified before the Court and he told the Court
5 about the modern techniques available in his field to review human
6 remains, particularly bones, and to come to forensic conclusions. I
7 respectfully invite the Chamber to review the proof of death chart, and
8 where there is evidence from viva voce witnesses as well as forensic
9 evidence in respect to a killing or the cause of death, it will become
10 readily apparent to the Court that evidence of the crime-base witnesses
11 with particular killings is materially consistent with the forensic
12 evidence of Dr. Baraybar as well as the evidence presented through
13 Dr. Baccard.
14 I turn now to the issue of the individual criminal liability of
15 the accused as a participant in the plan.
16 So the Prosecution submits, Your Honours, there -- that the
17 evidence establishes that there was a widespread and systematic campaign
18 that was planned, there was a joint criminal enterprise. And it is in
19 the nature of things that this joint criminal enterprise could not have
20 been effected without the participation of the police. Mr. Djordjevic 's
21 knowledge and conduct at all relevant times, as proven by the evidence,
22 establishes his liability as a participant in this plan and also for
23 aiding and abetting the perpetrators of the crimes charged.
24 The evidence discussed in the Prosecution's final trial brief
25 establishes that he knowingly made significant contributions to the joint
1 criminal enterprise and assisted in the commission of the crimes by,
2 among other things, participating in the arming of non-Albanian civilians
3 and disarming Albanian villages; participating in the co-ordination of
4 joint VJ/MUP operations through the Joint Command and the command
5 structure of the police; and in these operations crimes were committed.
6 He authorised, along with Minister Stojiljkovic, the use of paramilitary
7 groups and volunteers, particularly, particularly, the Skorpions which
8 committed many of the crimes charged. And he, most tellingly, played a
9 leading role in concealing the crime of murder, concealing the bodies
10 that were located in the mass graves in Serbia.
11 He acted in concert with other persons named in the indictment,
12 but primarily with the minister of interior, Minister Stojiljkovic.
13 Your Honours, although the Defence, particularly the accused in his
14 testimony, would invite the Court to come to a view that there was
15 tension and disagreement between the accused and his minister at the
16 relevant time and the accused was not in agreement and was not a willing
17 participant in the acts and conduct that led to the police participation
18 in these crimes, it is submitted, Your Honour, that a full examination of
19 the evidence discloses that they worked together, they fit together like
20 hand in glove.
21 And without reviewing all the evidence that we have pointed out,
22 I would respectfully just refer the Court to one series of dispatches by
23 both of them which demonstrates the point that these were not men working
24 and pulling in opposite directions, but they were pulling together.
25 If we look at P85. This is a very important exhibit,
1 Your Honours. This is a record of a meeting of the 17th of February
2 where the plans for the operations during which many of the crimes that
3 we are -- we have to consider were committed were discussed. Present at
4 the meeting was the minister, as one can see; and immediately before him,
5 the accused, Mr. Djordjevic. And if we move to page 3, we see at the end
6 of his presentation the minister issues the following tasks. It reads:
7 "Our forthcoming tasks are as follows ..."
8 And in the middle of those bullet points, he says:
9 "Approach and engage volunteers carefully, linking their
10 engagement through the reserve police force when assessed as necessary."
11 The next day, on the 18th of February, 1999, Mr. Djordjevic
12 issued the dispatch which is P356. We have the front page before us. If
13 we could move on. We see him at item 7 saying:
14 "Through intensified intelligence and other measures and actions,
15 carry out necessary checks, complete lists, and establish complete
16 control over volunteer and paramilitary units and their members."
17 And if we could go back to the front page of this dispatch, this
18 is dispatch number 312 of the 18th of February, 1999. The plans having
19 been made at around that period -- we move to the 24th of March, 1999,
20 when the -- they were about to be executed. And if we could look at
21 P702, which is a dispatch by the minister. And in the first paragraph of
22 that document we see the minister says:
23 "It is necessary to intensify the enforcement of measures that
24 were ordered as per our dispatch number 312 of the 18th of February,
1 Clearly, Your Honours, in regard to the engagement of
2 paramilitaries and volunteers, something that led to enormous crimes,
3 Mr. Djordjevic and Mr. Stojiljkovic were pulling in the same direction.
4 It was their dispatch, 312. Having referred to their dispatch, although
5 it was signed by Djordjevic, but their dispatch, the minister says:
6 From that dispatch "you are to enforce in particular the
7 following measures: "
8 Look at paragraph 5:
9 "You shall register all volunteer and paramilitary units and
10 their members and keep them under control in case that you might need to
11 engage them."
12 This seems to have presented some problems for the Defence in
13 writing their pre-trial brief [sic] because I notice their final brief.
14 At paragraphs 102 to 104, they tried to explain away the clear meaning of
15 these words, or I think it's a matter that they have given up trying to
16 explain away the clear meaning of these words. Some Defence witnesses,
17 insiders, subordinates of Mr. Djordjevic, came to tell us that the words
18 he used and the words the minister used did not mean that they were
19 planning to engage paramilitaries and volunteers. Well, we expect that
20 from those witnesses.
21 But what the Defence has argued in their pre-trial brief [sic]
22 now is that the minister was doing one thing and Mr. Djordjevic was doing
23 something else. They say at paragraph 102 that Djordjevic's order, the
24 one that he signed, was aimed at preventing paramilitary and volunteer
25 units from gathering and operating; conversely, the minister was
1 instructing that former volunteer units could possibly be admitted if
2 they met the requirements. Djordjevic, they say, was preventing; the
3 minister was enabling.
4 Well, Your Honours, respectfully, that just doesn't wash. The
5 minister -- the minister's dispatch of whom the first addressee, the man
6 at the top of the list, was Mr. Djordjevic, speaks of "our" dispatch and
7 says to enforce in particular "our" instructions. So they weren't
8 pulling in different directions; they were part of the same team, members
9 of the joint criminal enterprise.
10 That Mr. Djordjevic participated in acts that furthered the joint
11 criminal enterprise, Your Honours, I respectfully submit, is beyond
12 dispute. He participated in the engagement of the Skorpions; that is
13 admitted. We see these documents of him facilitating the engagement of
14 paramilitaries. He was involved and admitted that he hid or participated
15 in concealing several truck-loads, I think at least six truck-loads of
16 bodies of up to 8 -- beyond 800 in Serbia
17 victims of the crimes that we charge. So his participation or acts and
18 conduct that participated to the JCE, it is submitted, are beyond issue
19 in this case.
20 The interesting point or one interesting point in the case and
21 his state of mind, knowledge; when he was doing all of these things, what
22 did he know. The essence of Mr. Djordjevic's defence is that he had no
23 command responsibility for the police in Kosovo. I think we have
24 dispatched that one in the pre-trial brief [sic], and I won't be
25 repeating those arguments here. He had the power, he had the command
1 over them. He had no command responsibilities for those police he's
2 saying, at least those engaged in the anti-terrorist actions. He's
3 saying that he did nothing to contribute to the JCE. I think,
4 Your Honours, that it is clear that the opposite is true. And mainly
5 he's saying that insofar as there were crimes committed, he, as the chief
6 of police, did nothing because apart from the Podujevo incident he knew
7 nothing about these crimes. That is the pith and gravamen of his
8 defence. When I did what I did, I knew nothing about these crimes
9 specifically, I knew nothing or I knew not that these crimes were
11 One of the questions for the Chamber, Your Honour, is this: If
12 you accept that there was a campaign, a widespread and systematic
13 campaign of violence, including murders against the Kosovo Albanians with
14 the hundreds of killings and expulsions, did Mr. Djordjevic as chief of
15 the regular police of the country have a duty to act to protect the
16 safety of the endangered population and did he discharge his duty to act
17 in that way or did he, on the other hand, knowingly act to assist and
18 support the campaign? The Prosecution says that not only did he fail in
19 his duty to protect the endangered population, but he actively
20 participated in facilitating the commission of the crimes. One of the
21 critical elements in answering this question is, as I indicated, an
22 analysis of his state of mind at the relevant time. Because if he knew
23 that the crimes were being committed or would be committed when he acted
24 as he did, particularly in concealing the bodies, he's liable for
25 contributing to the joint criminal enterprise and aiding and abetting
1 their commission.
2 The accused elected to testify; that's his right. He probably
3 did so having regard to his rank as chief of the regular police and it
4 was thought that he needed to explain certain things that he did. The
5 Prosecution does not say that he has any obligation to prove or disprove
6 anything, but he has raised a defence and it is for the Trial Chamber to
7 evaluate his testimony and to make of it what you think fit. His defence
8 primarily is that he knew not.
9 In evaluating his testimony, Your Honours, I ask you to bear in
10 mind that the accused is a trained lawyer who spent 30 years in the
11 police force, the last part of which he was in a very powerful position
12 as an assistant minister and chief of the public security section. He
13 said when he testified that at the relevant time he was aware in general
14 terms that there may have been crimes committed somewhere, as every war
15 is accompanied by crime. But apart from Podujevo, he never became aware
16 of specific allegations during the indictment period. He told you,
17 Your Honours, further that he never became aware of specific allegations
18 during the remainder of 1999. He told Your Honours that he never became
19 aware of the allegations against the police force in Kosovo in the year
20 2000. In his testimony, Your Honours, he told you that in the year 2001
21 he did not become aware of the allegations against the police force in
22 Kosovo. He said specifically he did not even know about the Suva Reka
23 massacre, a crime for which ultimately a SUP chief would be charged,
24 until many years later when the persons were charged in Belgrade. He
25 never knew about the Mala Krusa massacre of scores of people which was
1 published in the international press at the time and was subject to the
2 indictment made public in May 1999 against his boss, Mr. Stojiljkovic.
3 He never knew about it until 2003 when he got the indictment against him.
4 That is what he told you. And Your Honours will have to consider whether
5 or not you believe that, whether or not, to put it unforensically,
6 whether you can buy that, whether it evokes in your mind reasonable
7 doubt. That perhaps is the best way to put it.
8 Stojiljkovic was indicted for these crimes in 1999, 1999, May
9 1999. He was burying bodies with Stojiljkovic in May 1999 and he tells
10 the Court that those crimes that Stojiljkovic was indicted for, he did
11 not know about them until 2003.
12 I remind the Court that the bodies found in Batajnica from the
13 evidence were of persons killed right up until the end of May 1999. I'm
14 reminded that the president of the country, Milosevic, was extradited to
15 The Hague
16 heard about until 2003. Your Honours, I assume that any interested
17 party, any interested party in the world knew about these crimes and it
18 is beyond belief that the former police chief of the country did not know
19 about these crimes. It is beyond belief that when he did what he did he
20 did it in complete ignorance of these crimes.
21 Your Honours, if I may respectfully again go unforensic. I ask
22 the Court not to buy that. He could not have participated as he did and
23 become so deeply involved without knowledge of what he was doing. And,
24 Your Honours, as a matter of fact that doesn't fit the type of persona
25 that all the senior police officers who testified described him as, all
1 internationals who knew him described him as, as a leader of strong
2 decisive personality. That doesn't fit that he would be engaged in these
3 huge crimes of concealing bodies or -- acts, call it that, of concealing
4 bodies in complete ignorance.
5 When he testified, Your Honours, it was to explain the evidence,
6 uncontrovertible evidence, as to what he did. And he was asked some
7 questions, he was asked to explain some things, and in the course of his
8 testimony I submit and I ask you to find, because he could not answer
9 satisfactorily primarily questions about what he knew, he resorted to a
10 defence or a claim that he acted under duress. He found himself in a
11 situation where it became difficult to explain how he could have done
12 what he did and not know what he was doing, and eventually said: Well, I
13 did it because I was -- I feared for my life. He said I -- that he acted
14 as he did because he was afraid for his life because of what he
15 understood to be a serious threat from the minister.
16 He does not know the minister to be a dangerous man, but he knows
18 evidence to you. He says dangerous things were happening in Serbia
19 the time and he felt afraid because he understood the minister to be
20 threatening him. Your Honours, he tried to explain his conduct and his
21 state of mind to the Court for over one week in his evidence in chief
22 when he was being asked questions by counsel for the Defence, and he was
23 asked many times about his motivation for doing what he did and not once
24 did he say it was because he was afraid.
25 He wrote a letter in June 2004 to the "Nedeljni Telegraf," this
1 is P1474. And it spent pages explaining his motivations. He did not say
2 that he did what he did because he felt threatened for his life. He
3 addressed this Court in his opening speech in January 2009 and he
4 discussed his motivations for doing what he did, for burying these murder
5 victims and concealing the crime of murder. He did not say then that he
6 did it because he was afraid for his life. So Your Honours would have to
7 consider whether he said that during cross-examination because he was
8 being asked hard questions and he reached a point where he could not
9 explain why he did it and he could not explain his state of mind.
10 Besides, Your Honours, we see from the evidence which is
11 discussed in the closing brief that there were some events in October
12 2000, and he claimed that he was threatened not only by the minister but
13 by two assistant ministers and they tried to force him to resign and they
14 tried to get him to do certain acts that he thought would endanger
15 Serbian lives and he refused, refused to comply with what the minister
16 ordered him to do. That evidence is important for two things, it shows
17 that he could refuse, he could stand up and say no and not commit crimes;
18 but it also shows, Your Honours, that the minister as the political boss
19 of the Ministry of the Interior could not use the police without the
20 participation of Mr. Djordjevic. That is why he had to resign when he
21 refused to do what the minister told him to do. They wanted him to
22 resign, to put in somebody in his place who would comply. That is the
23 most or among the most telling evidence of his power, the power invested
24 in him as chief of the public security sector. The minister couldn't use
25 the police without him.
1 And we see also that even in the Defence brief at paragraph 582
2 to 583, even the Defence argues that when Djordjevic couldn't put up with
3 the shipment of the bodies anymore, he merely told the minister that it
4 had to stop and it stopped. That is a concession from the Defence. So
5 the defence, if you call it that, of duress of what he did doesn't wash.
6 He knew what he was doing, Your Honours, and he was acting to further the
7 joint criminal enterprise.
8 The Defence at paragraph 427 of the brief alleges that
9 Mr. Djordjevic sought to investigate the issues of bodies even after the
10 war, but the minister prevented him - they said "prevented him," as if
11 the minister could force him, could coerce him. Again, that type of
12 argumentation has no foundation on the evidence, and it is rebutted by
13 the fact that Mr. Djordjevic remained in office for many months after the
14 minister was removed from office. And in that period of time when the
15 minister was out of the way, he did none of the things that he admitted
16 he ought to have done but did not do.
17 Your Honours, I submit respectfully that that -- the evidence
18 shows that he played a voluntary role in furthering these offences. He
19 acted wilfully and voluntarily with knowledge, not under duress, not
20 under coercion.
21 The Trial Chamber is entitled to find that his participation in
22 the concealment of the bodies was voluntary. A Judge of fact can infer
23 knowledge and intent from the voluntary conduct of an accused person.
24 The Trial Chamber is entitled to find from Djordjevic's conduct,
25 particularly his participation in the concealment of the bodies, that
1 there is no other reasonable inference available on the evidence but that
2 he possessed the relevant awareness and intent to further the crimes that
3 were being committed. The bodies were from a continuing campaign of
4 murder right throughout the indictment period, and he was concealing them
5 while the murders were ongoing. He must have known what he was doing.
6 To put it another way, Your Honours, you may conclude that he had
7 sufficient knowledge and intention. If the circumstances in which he
8 engaged in this cover-up were so suspicious and his alleged failure to
9 make inquiries were so clearly deliberate that there is no other
10 reasonable explanation other than he was fully aware of the entire scheme
11 and his role in it. It bears repeating that a man of his stature, a man
12 of it ilk described as he was by so many people, including his former
13 subordinates and the senior internationals who met him, could not have
14 become deeply involved without knowing what he was doing. And the
15 Trial Chamber, it is submitted, should not allow what would appear in his
16 evidence to be his wilful blindness to be an avenue for escaping
17 liability of participation in the JCE and aiding and abetting the
19 And it is to be noted, Your Honours, having regard to the charts
20 I showed you, that had he acted appropriately on the first occasion when
21 he became aware of these murders -- of these bodies, it is unlikely,
22 nearly impossible, impossible, that the remaining murders would have been
23 committed. Had he done just one or two things in his capacity as chief
24 of police for the country to discharge his responsibility, to protect the
25 endangered population, thousands would be alive.
1 There are other areas, if I may move on, it is respectfully
2 submitted, other areas of his testimony that the Court may well find
3 raises grave concerns about his sincerity when he testified.
4 Mr. Djordjevic gave different accounts about what happened after the
5 discovery of the corpses, and I'll read them quickly as I see time is
6 moving quickly -- quicker than I am.
7 In his letter of June 2004 to the "Nedeljni Telegraf," P1474, he
8 said when he got the call from Mr. Golubovic:
9 "I immediately proposed that the complete criminal process be
10 conducted there. Immediately after that conversation, I informed the
11 minister about everything and a half hour later, he issued an order for
12 me for the bodies to be transported to Belgrade for autopsy and further
14 In his opening statement he told the Court:
15 "I thought that the regular police crime investigation had to be
16 carried out in accordance with the law and this is what I insisted on in
17 my conversation with the chief of the SUP in Bor; however, having
18 received additional information and in light of the fact that the local
20 minister about all that and he took all the decisions that followed."
21 So he's out of it, having informed the minister. When he
22 testified he gave a third account as to what he did immediately upon
23 hearing about these bodies. He said that the order of the minister --
24 that he went to the minister immediately and that the order of the
25 minister was that after routine procedures the bodies should be buried in
1 the vicinity where they were found.
2 He sought to explain away these contradictory statements by
3 saying that in his previous renditions he left things out or he wasn't
4 being accurate, but that his testimony was to be believed because he was
5 being complete and accurate in his testimony.
6 Mr. Djordjevic in the course of this trial testified at another
7 war crimes trial by videolink, and we saw his testimony in that case.
8 It's P1508. He told the Judges in that trial in respect to the important
9 issue as to his whereabouts in Kosovo in 1999, he said he was in Kosovo
10 only once in 1999 along with the minister. He misled the Chamber because
11 we know from the evidence here, which he accepts, that he was there
12 several times in 1999. When I put to him that he had recently misled
13 another Trial Chamber when giving evidence, he said that what he told
14 them there was probably a mistake. This is at transcript 9970 of the
15 10th of December, last year. What he told them was a mistake but he
16 insisted what he was telling you was the truth. It's a matter for you.
17 It's a matter for you as to whether that type of error making causes you
18 grave concerns about his sincerity when he testified.
19 Your Honour, we have testimony about the circumstances in which
20 he ended his career in the police force. He said that he fled Serbia
21 when he became aware that a criminal report had been filed against him
22 for abuse of office and that it was not because of his involvement in the
23 bodies' concealment. Your Honours will have to consider what were the
24 real reasons for his flight, for the ending of his career in the police
25 force so precipitously -- I think so precipitately and his sudden
1 departure from his homeland. Because flight can be evidence of a guilty
2 mind and it is for the Tribunal of fact, at the end of the day, to
3 consider whether there is any other reasonable explanation for flight,
4 apart from knowledge of guilt. Is it a coincidence that just when the
5 news regarding the find of the mass graves at Batajnica was brewing in
6 the media in Serbia
7 because of this investigation for abuse of office?
8 K84, (redacted)
9 (redacted) received certain information
10 and spoke to Mr. Djordjevic about it at the initial stages of his
11 investigation. At that time Mr. Djordjevic was still in Serbia.
12 Mr. Djordjevic told him what happened happened, and that was the end of
13 the conversation. You recall these were two senior policemen who had
14 known each other right throughout their careers. This is not something
15 that is a regular event in the police force in Serbia or anywhere in the
16 world, that in the -- just on the outskirts of the capital hundreds of
17 bodies are found in a mass grave. Djordjevic's response: What happened
18 happened. He did not give K84 any assistance apart from that, nothing,
19 not a word, not a word did he tell K84 about what he came to this trial
20 to tell this Trial Chamber.
21 When the Working Group sought to interview him again, they could
22 no longer locate him and Mr. Djordjevic was declared a wanted person by
23 the police so he could be brought in for questioning.
24 I ask Your Honours to recall the evidence that while the -- the
25 new about the find of the mass graves was breaking, and shortly after
1 what Mr. Djordjevic described at his retirement, he met with Mr. Lukic
2 and K83. K83 was one of the drivers of the trucks that was shipping the
3 bodies from Serb -- from Kosovo to be concealed in Serbia. He met with
4 Lukic and K83 during that period -- sorry, K93. And it was decided that
5 K93 would be transferred away from Belgrade to work in a town on the
6 other side of the country away from the spotlight.
7 Djordjevic could find time to meet with Mr. Lukic for that
8 purpose, but he couldn't find time to tell the investigator, K84, who was
9 investigating the bodies, what he came to tell us. He couldn't find time
10 to write a letter to say: This might assist you in your investigations.
11 He could find time to continue a cover-up.
12 Djordjevic's suggestion, if I could just add, in explaining this
13 meeting with Lukic and K93, he said that he just happened to be back in
14 the building as a pensioner and dropped in Lukic's office when the
15 meeting took place is really very, very strange because he also tells us
16 that it was Lukic who was the one who called him in and gave him his
17 letter of retirement to sign against his will. So his explanation as to
18 how he came to be in Lukic's office is unusual, to say the least, but the
19 fact is that the testimony is that in that office at that time it was
20 decided to transfer away from Belgrade
21 the truck drivers. And after that, Djordjevic fled Belgrade and remained
22 a fugitive until 2007.
23 Djordjevic went to great lengths -- perhaps, Your Honours, it is
25 JUDGE PARKER: It is indeed, Mr. Stamp. We will have the break
1 now and resume at 11.00, if that's convenient.
2 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.
3 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.
4 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Stamp.
5 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honours.
6 In explaining how he came to end his career in the police force,
7 Mr. Djordjevic during his examination-in-chief said that he was dismissed
8 from the police force on the 3rd of May, 2001. Later on, when he was
9 presented with his request for retirement, he changed his testimony,
10 saying that he was retired on the basis of his request not dismissed.
11 His evidence became that he was retired without his knowledge. He says
12 that he was summoned to Mr. Lukic's office on the 4th of May, where a
13 request for early retirement already written up was presented to him and
14 he simply signed it.
15 The cross-examination he was asked why he signed. He said he did
16 not want to cause any problems. If the state had decided to retire him,
17 he was willing to accept it. And this is what -- or how, according to
18 him, he would have the accord to believe his 30-plus-year career in the
19 police force ended. He said that when he signed the request he was aware
20 that he would not be entitled to his full pension. Prior to signing it,
21 he did not discuss it with the minister, nobody, neither the minister,
22 Lukic, or anyone told him that he was going to be pensioned off at a
23 lower pension than he would have been entitled to. He did not inquire or
24 protest the decision because as far as he was concerned the decision had
25 already been made. That is his explanation as to how he left the force
1 so quickly, and again that is a matter for you to consider whether or not
2 you believe him.
3 When it was put to him that he would have been entitled to appeal
4 the decision had he not signed this request, he obfuscated first by
5 saying he didn't know. He said he didn't know whether he could appeal.
6 And when it was put to him that in many documents where he had
7 transferred or removed senior police officers, including SUP chiefs,
8 there was a paragraph at the end of these documents telling them that
9 they had a right to appeal within a certain time and he had signed many
10 of those documents. He eventually accepted that he was entitled to
11 appeal. His attempts to explain how he ended his career and his flight,
12 Your Honours, become an era in his testimony that the Prosecution submits
13 you should review cautiously. It is a matter for you, but the evidence
14 indicates clearly that he was not being sincere with the Court as to how
15 his career was terminated.
16 His claims that he fled his homeland, Serbia, because of his
17 fears of arrest are not of any merit. Even he says that the charge or
18 the charge that he heard was being investigated against him of abuse of
19 office was spurious.
20 It does not square up at all, Your Honours, that a man with his
21 career would flee because he has heard of a spurious allegation made
22 against him for a relatively minor charge.
23 So it is a matter for you to consider, Your Honours, whether or
24 not his flight at that time when the bodies were discovered and the
25 investigation started, investigation which interestingly included,
1 according to the testimony, investigators from this Tribunal. But
2 Your Honours should consider whether his flight arose from his own
3 knowledge of his guilty participation and whether or not there is any
4 other reasonable alternative to that finding.
5 Turn now to another aspect of the case, Your Honour, Racak and
6 the evidence of K86, a police officer or former police officer who
7 testified that on the onset of that operation on the 15th of January,
8 1999, Mr. Djordjevic was present with the SUP chief and the Urosevac
9 police chief at the Stimlje police station. K86, a very important
10 witness for the Prosecution, his evidence shows that Mr. Djordjevic
11 continued to exercise oversight and command responsibilities over the
12 police in their activities in Kosovo in 1999. I think it is as a result
13 of this that the Defence has launched an attack on the credibility of
14 K86, comes in various ways. They say at paragraph 86 that he was not
15 aware of Marinkovic's presence on the 15th and had he been present there
16 on the 15th he would have had to know that the Racak investigation
17 started on that day and that Marinkovic was present. The Defence
18 assertion seems to be or they seem to be saying now that K86 was not
19 there on the 15th. They make a point, Your Honours, but there is no
20 citation of the trial record for any of those propositions on which they
21 made the point. It says in paragraph 86.
22 At paragraph 87 the Defence purports to contradict K86's
23 testimony that deputy commander Mitrovic was at the police station that
24 day by claiming that he was on sick leave, that is, deputy commander
25 Mitrovic was on sick leave and they cite to D138 in support of that
1 assertion. I invite the Court to have a look at D138. It does not
2 support in any way the Defence assertion that deputy commander Mitrovic
3 was on sick leave that day.
4 At paragraph 90 they also sought to attack his credibility
5 because he had recently been treated for post-trauma stress syndrome. I
6 would submit that that doesn't reflect on his credibility on the matters
7 that he had to testify about here, and the Defence could not identify any
8 contradiction or inconsistency nor offer to the Court any reason why he
9 would be untruthful to this Court.
10 Your Honour, he -- the defence is that Mr. Djordjevic arrived
11 there on the 18th just that make sure that there was an investigation.
12 K86 says he saw him there on the 15th and K86 could not be mistaken
13 because it is not a matter of the date, 18th or 15th, it's a matter of
14 the circumstances. K86 says he saw him there the day of the operation.
15 He related the sequence of events and the circumstances in which he saw
16 him there. So he could not be mistaken. On the day the operation
17 started, he saw Mr. Djordjevic there.
18 Your Honour, not only is K86's evidence to this Court internally
19 consistent and seamless, but it is to some degree confirmed by P1555,
20 which is the transcript of the testimony of the SUP chief Janicevic, who
21 testified before the ICTY in the Milosevic case where he was
22 cross-examined. He said that he, as the SUP chief in charge of the
23 operation, was present there on the 15th and Mr. Djordjevic was there on
24 the 15th as well. Your Honours, the Prosecution notes and accepts that
25 this is hearsay evidence. Mr. Janicevic is not before the Court and this
1 Defence has not had an opportunity to cross-examine him, and therefore
2 that must diminish the value of P1555. In addition, this is a statement
3 about the acts and conduct of the accused, and that as well would
4 diminish the weight of it. However, it is submitted that it is entirely
5 within the Trial Chamber's discretion to attribute to it whatever weight
6 it thinks fit at this point in the case when the Chamber is evaluating
7 all the evidence and doing so in light of all of the evidence,
8 particularly of those persons who testified about this event. And while
9 conceding and accepting that there are factors which diminish the value
10 of P155 [sic], the Prosecution submits that the evidence of Janicevic,
11 the SUP
12 reliability and lends some support and corroboration to K86's evidence
13 regarding the presence of Djordjevic at the Stimlje police station that
15 Mr. Djordjevic -- to move on. Mr. Djordjevic was the man in
16 charge of the police in Serbia
17 him that way. All the senior MUP generals, all the senior police
18 generals, all the senior politicians, and that is why he was the
19 policeman that featured in all the negotiations with internationals in
20 respect to Kosovo and signed all of -- and signed many of these
21 agreements, particularly the October Agreements in 1998. The fundamental
22 purpose of the October Agreements was to maintain a cease-fire in Kosovo,
23 and you have before the Court K -- I'm sorry, P836, an understanding
24 between KDOM and the Ministry of the Interior signed by Mr. Byrnes,
25 Mr. Djordjevic. Interestingly, if I could read from Mr. Djordjevic's
1 testimony at 10118 of the transcript. He said:
2 "Shaun only saw me on negotiations. It wasn't me who decided to
3 participate in negotiations, no. It was the president of Serbia and the
4 minister of interior who decided that. I had spent years and years in
5 Kosovo and what Byrnes said was quite natural. I knew every village,
6 every hamlet, every path, every road, and I knew the circumstances there.
7 But far be it that I was the supreme decision-maker there."
8 Of course the Prosecution does not, does not, suggest that
9 Djordjevic was at the head of the joint criminal enterprise. The
10 allegations are that he, like Lukic, like other policemen - not all the
11 policemen but some policemen, senior policemen, senior army
12 commanders - participated. And the fact that Milosevic or Mr. Sainovic
13 or Mr. Stojiljkovic were senior to him and perhaps were the leading
14 figures and the original orders and plans emanated from them is not
15 inconsistent with Mr. Djordjevic's guilt if he participated with
16 awareness of what he was doing.
17 But this quote from Mr. Djordjevic indicates that, as Mr. Byrnes
18 said, he was very knowledgeable about Kosovo and he was in command. He's
19 appointed by, no less, the president of the country and the minister. If
20 we look to 837, P837, this is a record of a meeting in Belgrade of the
21 same date, the 25th of October, 1998. In this agreement, again signed by
22 Mr. Djordjevic and other very senior personnel, agreement was reached to
23 scale-down the operations of police and VJ units in Kosovo. Djordjevic
24 having signed both of these agreements would be aware of their
25 requirements. If we look at page 2 and with -- you see:
1 "With these goals in mind, the state authorities of the FRY have
2 announced the following measures," and move on to page 3. And these are
3 some of what is agreed.
4 If you look at paragraph 3:
5 "Police -- special police will resume their normal peace time
6 activities. Heavy weapons and equipment remaining under MUP control in
7 Kosovo will be returned to cantonments and police stations."
8 So Mr. Djordjevic was aware of the requirements of these
9 agreements, and he violated these agreements through his involvement in
10 the Racak action. In that action the VJ and the MUP thwarted the very
11 purpose of the agreements by attacking the KLA without informing the
12 observers, and thereby they destroyed the fragile cease-fire and caused
13 the cease-fire to collapse. According to Mr. Philipps, after that the
14 regular meeting between the KVM and the liaison group stopped, and as
15 Byrnes testified, at the end of the day Racak destroyed the October
17 One matter before I move on in respect to the agreements, and I
18 don't wish to engage too much in any -- in submissions about the KLA.
19 They, it is conceded, committed crimes themselves. But the Defence in
20 their brief at paragraph 66 says:
21 "As noted above, the purpose of the October Agreements was to
22 verify the maintenance of cease-fire by all elements; however, the KLA
23 was not a signatory to any of these agreements and the evidence shows
24 that the suggestion that they become signatories was rejected by the KLA
25 Main Staff. Their refusal to agree to a cease-fire and their action to
1 the contrary are important factors in this intervening period."
2 The evidence that the KLA's absence from the October negotiations
3 was mainly because of the demands by the Serb and FRY officials. If we
4 could look at P87. It's the record of a meeting on the 2nd of November,
5 1998, minutes of the meeting of the operations inter-departmental staff
6 of the suppression of terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija held at Beli Dvor
7 palace in Belgrade
8 participating President Milutinovic, Mr. Sainovic, Mr. Stojiljkovic,
9 Mr. Andjelkovic Mr. Perisic, Mr. Pavkovic, Mr. Djordjevic,
10 Mr. Stevanovic, Mr. Lukic.
11 At page 2, General Pavkovic speaking on behalf of the
12 Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija stated that just days after the
13 signing of the October Agreements to participants -- may I re-read that.
14 General Pavkovic said at page 2:
15 "Efforts by foreign country to have the legitimacy of the
16 so-called KLA as the armed force of the Siptar secessionist movement
17 recognised by including the KLA in the solution of the Kosovo question
18 was also very unfortunate for us."
19 At page 13 of the same meeting or of the same document in respect
20 to the same meeting, FRY President Slobodan Milosevic reminded the
21 participants of the fact that influential international factors,
22 especially German and the US
23 position of a negotiator with the legal organs of our government, but the
24 attempt was successful thwarted.
25 So the proposition of the Defence at paragraph 66 of their brief
1 does not square up with the record. Mr. Vasiljevic, General Vasiljevic,
2 Your Honours, was another important witness in this case, an important
3 witness for the Prosecution. He was a senior member of the VJ and he
4 testified about Skorpions, paramilitaries in Kosovo, crimes that were
5 committed, their incorporation into the MUP, the fact that it was
6 well-known or could be easily discovered that the MUP was incorporating
7 criminal elements. I won't go over that. That is well recited, I think,
8 in the Prosecution's final brief.
9 But he also testified about the 1st of June meeting, another very
10 important meeting, the 1st of June meeting in Pristina, a meeting of the
11 Joint Command that was attended by Mr. Djordjevic. This -- the Defence
12 claims that Mr. Djordjevic -- Mr. Vasiljevic is either mistaken or not
13 being honest when he says that Mr. Djordjevic attended this meeting. We
14 see no motive presented as to why Mr. Vasiljevic would make something
15 like this up, and he was cross-examined in quite significant detail about
16 his evidence that Mr. Djordjevic was present at this meeting and
17 responded carefully, ably, and convincingly, it is submitted. He could
18 remember Mr. Djordjevic's presence at that meeting because Djordjevic was
19 well-known within Serbia
20 first time they had met. So it was remembered before him that he was
21 meeting this well-known figure. He recalled that they met later on at a
22 meeting in July 1997, but this was the first time they met and it was
23 therefore memorable to him. In fact, he remembered a specific comment
24 Mr. Djordjevic made and if we could move to private session just for one
25 moment, Your Honours, I would be grateful.
1 JUDGE PARKER: Private.
2 MR. STAMP: He remembered specifically -- oh, sorry.
3 [Private session]
12 [Open session]
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're back in open session.
14 MR. STAMP: So, Your Honours, what that general would be doing in
15 the field would be something that would be known to General Djordjevic,
16 and it is reasonable and consistent that General Djordjevic would make
17 that comment in respect to Mr. -- to that general's absence.
18 Mr. Djordjevic was coming from the seat of the MUP in Belgrade and so was
19 that general that he spoke of, they were coming from the same place, and
20 he would know where that general was.
21 The Defence called Mr. Stojanovic, General Stojanovic, who at the
22 relevant time I think was a lieutenant-colonel and the chief of the
23 security section in the command of the Pristina Corps, to say that
24 Mr. Djordjevic was not present at that meeting on the 1st of July. And I
25 ask Your Honours to reflect carefully on the evidence of Mr. Stojanovic.
1 He was generally an incredible witness who tailored his evidence
2 specifically to refute the testimony of his subordinate Nike Peraj who
3 testified about various crimes that were committed in Meja. And he
4 tailored his testimony specifically to refute the testimony of his
5 superior, General Vasiljevic, but he's incredible primarily because of
6 his absurd denial of any VJ wrong-doing. Most noticeably, Your Honours,
7 he denied knowledge of the expulsions and murders that happened during
8 the joint police/VJ operation at Meja. He's an intelligence -- the chief
9 intelligence gatherer, the chief of security section for the Pristina
10 command, and he would have the Court believe that he was not aware of
11 this type of information.
12 Your Honours, the Prosecution submits that when all the evidence
13 is weighed together, General Vasiljevic's evidence is acceptable and
14 reliable and the Court can act on it safely.
15 If I move on quickly to the alternative mode of liability under
16 Rule 7(3). The Prosecution's case is based primarily on evidence of the
17 accused's knowing participation or contribution to the joint criminal
18 enterprise and aiding and abetting and planning the crimes under
19 Rule 7(1). However, the same evidence supports convictions under
20 Rule 7(3) mode of liability. In fact, Your Honours might well think that
21 this is the least troubling part of the case as evidence in respect to
22 his responsibility or his individual criminal liability under Rule 7(3)
23 is quite clear and straightforward. Most of it is beyond dispute; the
24 remainder of it has been admitted by the accused. I won't go through the
25 evidence in detail. That again has been set out in our pre-trial brief
1 [sic], but we'll submit very quickly that the evidence establishes that
2 Mr. Djordjevic's liable as a superior under Rule 7(3) for all the crimes
3 charged in the indictment that were committed by members of the RJB
4 because the elements required for his liability under Article 7(3) are
5 fulfilled, primarily the subject of admissions. There was a superior --
6 one, there was a superior -- Your Honours, so far -- may I just say this
7 before I continue. So far I have said "pre-trial brief" many times and I
8 meant final trial brief. At all times I mean the final trial brief and
9 not the pre-trial brief.
10 The first element for 7(3) liability is that there was a
11 superior/subordinate relationship between Djordjevic and the persons who
12 committed the underlying crimes in the sense for Rule 7(3) that
13 Djordjevic had a material ability to prevent and punish members of the
15 Secondly, he knew or he had reason to know that the underlying
16 crimes were about to be, were being, or had been committed and he failed
17 to take -- certainly he failed to take the reasonable and necessary
18 measures to prevent his subordinates from committing the underlying
19 crimes or to punish them subsequent to their commission. It is submitted
20 that the Podujevo incident is an unambiguous example of Mr. Djordjevic's
21 individual criminal liability for murder under Rule -- or under
22 Article 7(3). The perpetrators of the murders, members of the Skorpion
23 unit, were incorporated into the public service -- public security sector
24 as reserve policemen and were, therefore, his subordinates in the sense
25 that he had the material ability to punish them at the minimum to cause
1 and ensure that effective investigations were committed -- were commenced
2 to inquire into allegations that they had committed crimes. At his level
3 that is a minimum that would be expected of him and that is his material
4 ability to punish under the law.
5 Now, before I move on there is -- there was in the course of the
6 case some dispute as to whether or not the Skorpions had been
7 incorporated into the SAJ
8 incorporated into the police as MUP reservists, but Mr. Stalevic and
9 Mr. Simovic and even the accused seem to be suggesting that at the time
10 of the Podujevo massacre they were not under the command of the SAJ, the
11 Special Anti-Terrorist Unit. However, we see now that the Defence in its
12 final trial brief has stated and seems to concede or accept now on review
13 of the evidence that the reservists were attached to the SAJ, indicating
14 that the Skorpions were under the SAJ command. This is at Defence final
15 trial brief paragraphs 479, 480, 481, 483, 484, 488, 496, 509, and 511.
16 It probably does not matter that much because if there were
17 reservists in the police force it does not really matter if they had been
18 attached to the SAJ
19 the ambit of his material ability to effect investigations, to punish.
20 So these reservists, the Skorpions, committed this crime and the
21 second element is notice. In this case he received from Mr. Simovic
22 actual notice that some of these men had murdered civilians, including
23 women and children. He admits that. There is no issue on the second
24 element of actual notice.
25 Thirdly, he failed to adopt any measures, any measures at all
1 available to him to ensure that his subordinates, particularly
2 Mr. Simovic, take any steps at all to investigate the incident and to
3 identify the perpetrators. On the contrary, he acceded to Mr. Simovic
4 sending away the perpetrators from the scene without any investigation;
5 and worse, later he ordered Mr. Trajkovic to disband and disperse them
6 without ensuring that investigations had been conducted to identify the
7 perpetrators of this horrible massacre. He admitted these things, that
8 he did all of these things, he took no steps in respect to the
9 investigations and he accepted their removal from the scene without
10 investigations and their dispersal without any inquiries being made. He
11 says his failure is because it had been report to him and it was his
12 belief on the evening of the 28th when he spoke to Mr. Simovic that the
13 OUP of Podujevo had been informed and that the OUP would conduct an
14 investigation, and that is why he did nothing.
15 But, Your Honour, his failure to do anything becomes even more
16 egregious when we see the reports that he was receiving the next day. If
17 we could look at D296. D296 is a MUP staff daily report for Kosovo on
18 the 29th of March, and you see here it covers a period 0600 hours on the
19 28th of March -- sorry, 28th of March, 1999, 0600 hours, to the 29th of
20 March, the period of the massacre. Paragraph 5 is for serious crimes
21 committed. And if you look through it, Your Honours, you will see at
22 paragraph 5 for serious crimes committed nothing.
23 Your Honours, I ask you to assess the accused as a reasonable
24 police officer, as a man endowed with all the attributes that we know
25 about Mr. Djordjevic as chief of the police. His subordinates or he's
1 told that his subordinates lined up 20-odd women and children and shot
2 them, killing I think it was 16. Some lived to come and testify. He
3 doesn't do anything about it because it's supposed to be investigated.
4 The very next day it comes on his desk, the report, from the people who
5 are supposed to be investigating it and they say there is no serious
6 crime. What would any reasonable police chief do? What is his duty
7 under Article 7(3)? His excuse for doing nothing is that he thought
8 something was being done on the 28th. Now he knows, now he receives
9 indications at least that nothing is being done.
10 Your Honours should review the record of his testimony when he
11 was asked about this. He could not explain why he did nothing, having
12 received it, having been advised that nothing was being done. He merely
13 just insisted that he was told previously that the OUP would be brought
15 Your Honours, it is noteworthy that no investigations at all were
16 conducted under the -- of this horrendous crime, and although there is
17 evidence that the investigating judge was brought to the scene, the
18 evidence is that they were brought to the scene three days later.
19 According to Mr. Vasiljevic they were brought there three days later and
20 they presented a -- they did an on-site report three days later of I
21 think about two pages in respect to this crime.
22 Disciplinary proceedings or investigations for disciplinary
23 purposes within the police force would not have been sufficient for mass
24 murder, but Djordjevic also had a duty to do internal disciplinary
25 investigations, if only, if only, to identify who were the perpetrators
1 and end their career in the force or stop them at least from carrying
2 weapons until they were charged criminally.
3 The Prosecution submits that Mr. Djordjevic had two
4 responsibilities, to ensure that his subordinates on the ground took all
5 the steps necessary of collecting evidence, interviewing people, and
6 bringing -- and starting or initiating a criminal investigation. He did
7 not do that. And he also had a responsibility to take internal
8 disciplinary investigative steps to identify the perpetrators and at
9 least relieve them of duty until they were charged. As it turned out,
10 because he did nothing, many of these shooters who murdered these women
11 and children returned to Kosovo in April when Mr. Djordjevic authorised
12 that the Skorpions be regrouped and sent back. They returned to Kosovo
13 under the auspices of the police because of his failure.
14 These failures, Your Honour, or these elements in respect to
15 7(3), Article 7(3) liability for Podujevo are all admitted.
16 Before we look at the requirements of the law enforcement
17 agencies, I should point out that the Defence trial brief at 693,
18 paragraph 693 and elsewhere, claims that Mr. Djordjevic would not know of
19 the crimes that were being committed in Kosovo because the daily reports
20 that were coming up from the MUP staff and the SUPs did not include these
21 crimes. And we see one, and this is a very interesting document, very
22 interesting document, D296, because it shows clearly that Mr. Djordjevic
23 must have known of the policy of his senior policemen in Kosovo covering
24 up crimes, covering up massacres against civilians. He knew on the 28th
25 that a score of women and children were lined up and shot by his
1 subordinates. The next day his senior subordinate in Kosovo does not
2 report that this crime occurred. I asked him: Well, what did he do
3 about it? Nothing. Did he call up the SUP chief, MUP staff chief, and
4 say what is a serious crime in your books? No. Why? His answer was:
5 Well, I heard that the thing was being investigated.
6 Your Honours, that was not the point. The point is: What does
7 he do when he realises that his subordinates are not reporting serious
8 crimes? Nothing. The Court is entitled to find that he was aware of the
9 policy of covering up serious crimes and he did nothing because he agreed
10 with it and he facilitated it as the head of the service. If we could
11 look quickly at D855, this is a long criminal procedure of the former
12 SFRY, but it was operational in Serbia
13 Judge Marinkovic. Go quickly to Article 151, 1-5-1:
14 "If there are grounds to suspect that a crime which is
15 automatically prosecuted has been committed, law enforcement agencies
16 must take the steps necessary to locate the perpetrator of the crime, to
17 prevent the perpetrator or accomplice from hiding or fleeing, to detect
18 and preserve the clues to the crime and articles which might serve as
19 evidence and to gather all information which might be of use to effective
20 conduct of criminal proceedings.
21 "... law enforcement agencies must take the necessary
22 information from individual citizens ..."
23 Your Honours, I ask you -- I will not read it all, but these
24 reflect the usual responsibilities of policemen on the ground, although
25 an investigating judge should turn up to take charge of the
1 investigations, policemen on the ground have a responsibility to inquire,
2 apprehend, collect evidence until the investigating judge is arriving.
3 If we could look at Article 152, paragraph (1), I ask the Court to review
4 these laws more carefully when time permits:
5 "Authorised officers of law enforcement agencies have the right
6 to send persons found at the scene of the crime to the examining
7 magistrate or to detain them until he arrives if such persons might
8 provide information important to the criminal proceedings and if it is
9 probable that they could not be interrogated at a subsequent date ..."
10 If we look at 154, paragraph (2):
11 "If the examining magistrate is unable to come to the scene
12 immediately, law enforcement agencies may themselves conduct an inquest
13 on the spot and order the necessary expert evaluations, except autopsy
14 and exhumation of a corpse. If the examining magistrate reaches the
15 scene during an inquest he may undertake to perform these actions. The
16 public prosecutor shall be informed about everything done."
17 Your Honours, Mr. Simovic was told that the Skorpions committed a
18 crime, sent away the men, didn't detain them, he didn't wait for the
19 investigating magistrate to come, he didn't collect any evidence. The
20 investigating magistrate did not arrive until three days later when some
21 of the bodies were still there, three days. In that period of time the
22 police had responsibilities. The police did nothing, and the steps taken
23 by the MUP after this incident were manifestly inadequate and
24 Mr. Djordjevic must have known they were manifestly inadequate.
25 If we look quickly at P1591, page 4, it's a record of
1 Mr. Simovic's interview at the Prokuplje trial in 2001 or 2002. Said:
2 "For the third or fourth time now, the Court insists that I give
3 my final opinion about who, or whose member, fired at the civilians."
4 It is clear, Your Honours, that those Judges were shocked and
5 outraged by Mr. Simovic's inaction, his failure to do what was his
6 responsibility to do. Mr. Simovic reported his inaction to
7 Mr. Djordjevic. Mr. Djordjevic did not express the same outrage and did
8 not do his duty to ensure that his commanders on the ground investigated
9 this crime.
10 Your Honours, I ask you to review even the concern and the
11 questions by this Chamber to Mr. Simovic when he testified from 13623 to
12 1327 -- 13627 of the transcript. It was manifest, manifest, that
13 Simovic, having been in charge of these men, leaving -- he left the same
14 day and hightailed it to Belgrade
15 the scene, any investigating judge. He sent away the men, and that is
16 what he told Mr. Djordjevic; Mr. Djordjevic did nothing.
17 I won't bother to go over the question and the answers put to
18 Mr. Simovic by this Court, also clearly outraged by his inaction. It
19 seemed, Your Honours, that the only person who was not outraged by the
20 inaction of the police to investigate this was the commander,
21 Mr. Djordjevic.
22 On the issue of 7(3), these admissions by the accused, entitles
23 the Judge -- the Chamber to find that all of the elements have been
24 satisfied and to find him guilty under 7(3), Article 7(3) for this
25 murder. The Prosecution further submits that in light of
1 Mr. Djordjevic's own evidential guard against participation in the
2 concealment of the bodies, he is also liable under Article 7(3) for each
3 and all of the incidents of murder specifically enumerated in paragraph
4 75 of the indictment. The evidence proving the required elements for
5 conviction under 7(3) are again not susceptible to reasonable dispute
6 being mostly admitted by the accused.
7 The evidence in respect to several murder sites specifically
8 referred to in the indictment, Suva Reka, Podujevo, Bela Crkva,
9 Mala Krusa, Milos Gilic Street, Pusto Selo, and Suceska is that the
10 perpetrators of these massacres included policemen who were Djordjevic's
11 subordinates under Rule 7(3) -- Article 7(3). This is -- and when I say
12 subordinates under Article 7(3), I make a distinction between whether or
13 not he was in Kosovo because he says that he was not in Kosovo and he was
14 not commanding them in the operations, but for purposes of Article 7(3)
15 they are subordinates if he had a material ability to punish them, and at
16 his level his material ability would be to ensure that disciplinary and
17 criminal proceedings are commenced against them and he had that power.
18 That is not disputed.
19 He admitted in his evidence, Your Honours, the second element,
20 that at the time when he participated in the concealment of the human
21 bodies he was aware that these bodies or these were the bodies of victims
22 of crimes and he accepted in his evidence that he was aware of the
23 possibility that the perpetrators were police officers. This is at 10011
24 of the record. That, according to the jurisprudence and Article 7(3), is
25 sufficient notice, inquiry notice. The difference in Podujevo, with
1 regard to Podujevo, he was told specifically about that crime, he had
2 specific notice. Here he had inquiry notice, this is ought-to-know
3 section. He was put on inquiry, he accepts that. A superior will be
4 deemed to have reason to know when he's possessed of information
5 sufficiently alarming to justify inquiry.
6 I submit to the Court that 800 dead bodies being concealed is
7 sufficiently alarming to justify inquiry. The information may be general
8 in nature and does not need to include specific details about unlawful
9 acts which have been committed, so he has admitted to that element.
10 He has admitted to the third element in respect to these murders,
11 Your Honours, because he said that he knew that it was his duty to
12 properly investigate these killings, that he should have acted
13 accordingly; and he admitted to this Court that he failed to do so. In
14 this context he said in cross-examination, and I quote:
15 "I acted the way I did at the moment. I accepted his," that's
16 the minister's, "orders without opposing him. I'm aware that this was a
17 big mistake I made but what happened cannot be made undone. I'm ashamed
18 of my deeds and I believe that the Court's decision will be adequate and
19 I will be held responsible for what I did."
20 Transcript 10006. He has admitted all the elements, all the
21 formal elements required for conviction under Rule 7(3) -- Article 7(3)
22 for murder in respect to all of the scheduled murder incidents in the
24 Your Honours, the Prosecution further submits that in respect to
25 all the other incidents of murder involving perpetrators from the public
1 service department and having regard to the admissions made,
2 Mr. Djordjevic knew or ought to have known that murders of
3 Kosovo Albanians were being committed by his subordinates in Kosovo and
4 that, as he put it, to quote him:
5 "The situation required a full check and that all the facts
6 needed to be established."
7 And that:
8 "A commission or a group ought to have been set up to investigate
10 This is transcript 9723 to 4 and transcript 10002.
11 Again, the Court is entitled to act on the admissions that he has
12 made before you.
13 Your Honours, I move on to a variety of issues, matters in the
14 Defence brief which at the beginning I indicated I wanted to meet,
15 because it is the position of the Prosecution that many of these
16 propositions are erroneous, not based on the evidence or mis-characterise
17 the evidence. And I wish to begin by making a correction to the
18 Prosecution's final trial brief. At page 304, paragraph 1232, footnote
19 3336, the reference to K84 should be removed and the correct citation
20 should be Djordjevic at transcript 9973 to 9975, Exhibit P1508, P815,
21 pages 31 to 35.
22 Another correction is at paragraph 567 of the Prosecution's
23 closing brief, third sentence, 35 -- it is -- I'll read the third
25 "35 to 37 corpses were later exhumed and identified as having
1 originated from Kosovo."
2 This is in relation to the mass grave at Bajina Basta, Lake
3 Perucac. And the footnote in respect to the sentence I just read was
4 cited to Mr. Baraybar. That is not correct and that footnote should be
5 removed. The proper footnote or the proper reference is K84 at
6 transcript 2043 to 2046 and transcript 2075, both in closed session; and
7 also P394. And to just explain that a little bit further, K84 was
8 investigating these mass graves in Serbia gave an estimate of 37 corpses
9 found at Bajina Basta at the site of Lake Perucac
10 would be aware that the forensic anthropologist who actually did the
11 excavation and disinterment of the bodies counted at least 48 bodies.
12 And -- right. I'm corrected also. The proper citation, therefore, or
13 the evidence in respect to the 48 individuals is Sterenberg P815, that's
14 the excavation report at page 37, paragraph 1.
15 The Defence claims, and I'll just run through some of these
16 matters very quickly. The Defence claims at paragraph 586:
17 "Not a single piece of evidence was presented during the trial
18 that would in any way associate Mr. Djordjevic with the event at
19 Petrovo Selo."
20 That is the mass graves at Petrovo Selo. This is manifestly not
21 the case, Your Honour. There is evidence that entitles the Court to
22 infer that he was a party to the operations of burying bodies at the --
23 at Petrovo Selo. This is set out in the Prosecution's closing brief at
24 paragraphs 303 to 305. There are several items there which makes it
25 readily apparent that Petrovo Selo was part of the same operation as
1 Batajnica. However, there's an additional point that was not addressed
2 in the brief. The original refrigerator truck that was found floating in
3 the Danube
4 evidence of Mr. Radojkovic who destroyed it and also Mr. Golubovic is
5 that the truck, the truck, from Batajnica was transferred to the MUP
6 facility in Petrovo Selo and destroyed there. So that an additional
7 piece of evidence showing that the Petrovo Selo burial operations is part
8 of the same transaction as the Batajnica burial operations that the
9 accused admitted to.
10 The Defence argues at paragraphs 559 to 560 of its brief that
11 there is no evidence that shows that the order to destroy the truck in
12 which the bodies had been found -- I'll just read it. I'll quote it,
13 Your Honours:
14 "There is no evidence that shows that the order to destroy the
15 truck in which the bodies had been found was a consequence of any direct
16 order of Vlastimir Djordjevic."
17 This is in paragraphs 559 to 560 of the brief.
18 Your Honours, this is splitting hairs or even worse it's
19 decimating hairs because the Defence admitted or Mr. Djordjevic admitted
20 at transcript 9726, line 16, that on the minister's instructions he told
21 Djordjevic to destroy the truck. So I don't know if the Defence is
22 trying to say that it was not a direct order of Djordjevic simply because
23 Mr. Djordjevic said that he convoyed the minister's instructions, but
24 that is splitting hairs. Djordjevic ordered the destruction of the
25 trucks by his own admission.
1 And Mr. Golubovic in his testimony at 1715, that's 1715 and 1755
2 to 56, he said too that Djordjevic told him to have the refrigerator
3 lorry destroyed, and so it was. Defence, if I could move on, argues for
4 several paragraphs, 549 to 554 that the concealment operations in Tekija
5 were not intentionally kept secret. They appeared to focus on the
6 question of whether Mr. Djordjevic officially classified this as a state
7 secret. There is no merit in this argument, Your Honours.
8 Mr. Djordjevic himself testified at transcript 9721 that he instructed
9 Mr. Golubovic:
10 "All further action in relation to this should be kept
11 confidential so that the public was not informed."
12 If I could move on, the Defence make the repeated assertion in
13 their brief that Mr. Djordjevic intended to have the bodies autopsied at
14 some point. They go so far as to suggest that the bodies -- that
15 Mr. Djordjevic wanted the bodies to be autopsied in Tekija and that he
16 intended the bodies at Batajnica to be autopsied eventually. This is
17 obvious or this is opposite to the clear evidence that there was never
18 any intention to autopsy or properly process these bodies. And I ask the
19 Chamber to review the Chamber's own questioning of Mr. Golubovic in this
20 regard at page 1746 of the reference. The transcript indicated that
21 Presiding Judge Parker asked:
22 "Well, what I'm not clear about then is why if you had no
23 pathologist and no judge, either municipal or district, and no
24 prosecutor, you would have thought of burying these bodies that night."
25 And the answer:
1 "Well, the reason was we had to move the refrigerator truck
2 further off the road because the people who were near the refrigerator
3 truck said that there was already a stench spreading of decomposing
4 bodies. It just couldn't stay like that without being dealt with, so
5 that was the reason for us trying to deal with this as quickly as
7 Effectively, avoidance or evasion of a direct question put to him
8 by the Court, and it continues on and on in that reference in the
9 transcript to questions being asked about this supposed intention to have
10 these bodies autopsied.
11 The claim that Mr. Djordjevic was interested in forensic
12 examinations at a later time has no foundation on the evidence,
13 completing lacking in merit. Mr. Djordjevic had no intention of doing so
14 and he never did so, nor did he at any time when he had the opportunity
15 up until 2007 and even beyond inform anyone of the location of these
16 bodies. To the contrary, he took steps to maintain the cover-up until
17 the bodies were discovered by others. I ask the Court to note that after
18 the conflict in June 1997, Mr. Trajkovic, according to him in his
19 evidence, expressed concern about the bodies being at his, that is,
20 Mr. Trajkovic's, base. Mr. Trajkovic, if you recall, Your Honours, was
21 head of the SAJ
22 spoke to Mr. Trajkovic and accepted the potential need to move the bodies
23 away from Batajnica, that is, just to continue the cover-up.
24 The Defence made allegations in respect to ethnicity. At
25 paragraph 604, the Defence says in its brief that Mr. Djordjevic did not
1 know about the ethnicity of the bodies. Your Honours, this does not
2 square up with Mr. Golubovic's testimony or even Mr. Djordjevic's own
3 testimony. Mr. Golubovic testified that he told Mr. Djordjevic that the
4 victims were dressed in the fashion or the manner of Kosovar Albanians
5 and the truck had markings of having come from Prizren. Mr. Djordjevic
6 testified at 9730 of the transcript:
7 "He(the minister) said that since I was already familiar with the
8 matter and that I knew from our previous contacts that these were bodies
9 which came from Kosovo and Metohija, in other words, that these were the
10 bodies of Albanians, that it was necessary to bury them ..."
11 So Mr. Djordjevic's evidence contradicts this proposition.
12 In fact, at different parts of the Defence brief, the Defence
13 seems to make the concession that Mr. Djordjevic knew where the bodies
14 came from because the minister told him. So in the final trial brief --
15 in their final trial brief at paragraph 557, they state that having
16 realised that General Djordjevic was resolved to have the matter
17 investigated, the minister told him that he, himself, was behind the
18 whole story, that there had been some incidents in KiM, that is, Kosovo
19 and Metohija, and that something had to be done to conceal the bodies.
20 So this is the Defence's own submission elsewhere in the brief,
21 indicating that the -- that Mr. Djordjevic was aware of the ethnicity of
22 the victims, that they came from Kosovo.
23 And the Defence, when they made that submission, they cited to
24 Djordjevic's testimony at 9723 to 4 and what he actually said at 9723,
25 line 24, and thereafter:
1 "Only after he had realised," that's he, the minister, "had
2 realised that I was commited to taking steps in order to clarify the
3 whole matter, me made it known to me that he was fully behind. That
4 certain incidents had happened down there and that something should be
5 done in order to prevent the revelation of the finding of these bodies
6 because of the whole NATO campaign and bombing."
7 So the Defence is conceding that when Mr. Djordjevic said that
8 the minister referred to these bodies having come from "down there,"
9 Mr. Djordjevic was, in fact, actually referring to down there in Kosovo
10 and Metohija. Respectfully, Your Honours, it is submitted that there is
11 no real doubt or issue that Mr. Djordjevic was aware that these bodies
12 were of Kosovar Albanians.
13 The Defence in its final trial brief argues in respect to the
14 Skorpions that final -- that -- sorry, that background checks were
15 properly conducted. That's paragraph 480. MUP police administration
16 performed background checks of the men based on SUP records. Firstly,
17 the Defence makes its claim without citing any evidence in support of
18 this claim, and the Prosecution submits that there were no background
19 checks on these men. The Skorpions contain men who had criminal records,
20 their general reputation was of a criminal type, and I'm quoting
21 General Vasiljevic at 5662 of the record:
22 "Their general reputation was of criminal types in their ranks,
23 problematic people, people with criminal records."
24 The Skorpions were not even trained. Stoparic testified that he
25 had to give them a crash course in using weapons or some of them a crash
1 course in using weapons, and according to Witness K92 who was involved in
2 or gathering together these Skorpions, Mr. Djordjevic did not inquire
3 about whether or not they had received any training. He just accepted
5 So that submission by the Defence that these men -- that there
6 were in fact proper checks made is not supported, they haven't cited
7 anything to support it, and the evidence is to the contrary. Indeed, no
8 one involved in the recruitment or command of this body of men was able
9 to say that they had in fact been checked and screened. They merely said
10 that they were supposed to be, police administration was supposed to do
11 this, but nobody said anything that supports the Defence submissions.
12 Identification and I give -- before I move on, I gave a reference to
13 Mr. Vasiljevic just now in terms of what he said about the fact that
14 these Skorpions contained persons' criminal records. The proper
15 citation, it's transcript 5667.
16 Defence in its final trial brief, at paragraph 485, argues that
17 the perpetrators of the Podujevo massacre could not be identified at the
18 crime scene. The references usually given in support of this proposition
19 do not support it and this is mere argumentation. As a matter of fact,
20 the evidence in respect to Podujevo is quite clear, nothing was gone, so
21 it cannot be argued that the perpetrators of the massacre could not be
22 identified. However, we should recall the evidence of Mr. Stoparic that
23 some of the Skorpions who objected tried -- these are the foot soldiers,
24 some of the men on the ground who participated in this sort of thing,
25 they, themselves, tried to do an inquiry themselves. Who were the ones
1 who participated in it? And that inquiry was stopped and there was no
2 follow-up. So the assertion by the Defence that they could not be
3 identified has no merit, particularly because no efforts were made to
4 identify them as was the requirement of the law.
5 There is a lot of submissions in respect of the Skorpions about
6 Trajkovic being effectively responsible for the reservists. Many of
7 these submissions the Court will, no doubt, look at the references and
8 assess them for what they are, but the Prosecution does not deny, even
9 though the Defence in its -- in making many of their references, are
10 quite wrong. But Trajkovic was the commander of the reservists and was
11 responsible for their actions. We accept that, but Trajkovic himself
12 said that he reported to Mr. -- he was the direct subordinate of
13 Mr. Djordjevic.
14 Mr. Vasiljevic's evidence in regard to the paramilitaries
15 generally and the Skorpions in particular is of significant importance in
16 this case, especially when the Court considers questions as to why men of
17 this quality should be incorporated into a police force. And so, of
18 course, the Defence sought to attack his evidence, one means being at
19 paragraph 506 where they say that his evidence in regard to the
20 information that he got on the paramilitaries operating in Kosovo was
21 preliminary and unconfirmed. They say that Mr. -- or they tried to
22 impugn his credibility when they say that he denied the facts contained
23 in D210, a report of the security administration of the Supreme Command
24 Staff. Well, he did deny or did not -- or refused to accept the facts in
25 that document, but this does not make him an unreliable witness. In
1 fact, it demonstrates that the report itself was unreliable and its
2 authenticity questionable. If we review the record at transcript 5913,
3 we'll see it clear from the intervention of the Presiding Judge that the
4 doubts about the authenticity of D210 was clearly raised by the witness.
5 The Prosecution submits that Mr. -- General Vasiljevic's credibility
6 could not be rationally impugned on the basis of his refusal to accept
7 that document.
8 Various other claims are made about Mr. Vasiljevic, one of them,
9 the last one which I'll address, is the claim made by the Defence that
10 all - and they say all - the evidence provided by Mr. Vasiljevic
11 concerning crimes and paramilitary units was preliminary and unconfirmed.
12 And the reference that the Defence makes in its trial brief is to
13 transcript 5897, and that does not support the Defence assertion that
14 Mr. Vasiljevic's information was unconfirmed.
15 As a matter of fact, Your Honours, Mr. Vasiljevic actually
16 rejected the Defence proposition that these were preliminary reports and
17 said that the reports and information he received was not initial
18 information and what -- and he received reports in great detail about the
19 operations of these paramilitary units, which is a natural thing. He's a
20 chief or the deputy chief of the security administration in the VJ. They
21 are in operations. He would be expected to know in detail about the
22 movements and the operations of other armed paramilitary groups in the
23 area where the VJ was. So even in terms of logic, in addition to the
24 evidence, General Djordjevic -- General Vasiljevic's evidence is reliable
25 and credible, it is submitted.
1 The Defence at paragraphs 512 to 514 seem to argue that there
2 were no paramilitary units in Kosovo during the war. This is probably a
3 misunderstanding because that is completely and wholly contrary to the
4 evidence. I won't deal with that any further.
5 The Defence argues in its closing brief at paragraphs 605 to 608
6 that the arming of civilians was done in an undiscriminatory way in
7 compliance with the Law on Defence. The Prosecution submits that this
8 was not unmeritorious. The arming was done along ethnic lines. During
9 1998 and 1999 the MUP and VJ covertly armed over 600.000 [sic]
10 non-Albanian citizens from local villages and towns, and they referred
11 to, quite specifically, many of the documents referred to them as
12 non-Siptar population. And without further ado, I would just submit that
13 this is -- -- and the number is 60.000, not 600.000. 60.000 men,
14 civilians, sorry, were armed and these were of Serbian ethnicity. This
15 would be a very, very high proportion of the Serbian population in
17 And Mr. Cvetic, SUP
18 8139, confirmed that the ethnic Albanians were excluded from these RPOs.
19 Defence argument, again at paragraph 609 of the brief, is that
20 there is no evidence whatever that Mr. Djordjevic had any knowledge or
21 that he received any information about the engagement of the armed and
22 non-Albanian population in 1999. They say that there is no evidence
23 whatever that he knew about these armed persons. I submit, Your Honours,
24 that he clearly knew about the policy in 1999 and of the plans to use
25 them. I'd ask the Court to look briefly at P85. I used the document
1 earlier. It's one of the important documents of the case. This is the
2 17th of February meeting, 17th of February, 1999, meeting, at the stage
3 where operations that would lead to all of these murders and all of these
4 expulsions were planned and being discussed.
5 Mr. Lukic reported in Mr. Djordjevic's presence that RPOs in
6 nearly all villages inhabited by Serbs:
7 "RPOs in all villages inhabited by Serbs are very active.
8 Meetings have been held with all the RPOs and they were attended by
9 General Stojanovic and Lieutenant-Colonel Blagoje Pesic. Their work and
10 engagement have been assessed as good."
11 JUDGE PARKER: Is that a convenient time, Mr. Stamp?
12 MR. STAMP: Yes, Your Honour, it is.
13 JUDGE PARKER: We'll adjourn and resume at five minutes past
15 --- Recess taken at 12.34 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 1.04 p.m.
17 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Stamp.
18 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honours.
19 Moving on to the defence's submission in respect to the
20 Joint Command at paragraphs 298 and 299 and elsewhere in the brief, they
21 assert that the Joint Command was just a series of information sharing
22 meetings that no orders could be given at Joint Command meetings and that
23 it did not continue to exist after October 1998. The Defence's position
24 is fundamentally inconsistent with the extent of evidence detailing the
25 Joint Command's existence and actions in both 1998 and 1999, and this is
1 addressed at length by the Prosecution in its brief at paragraphs 267 to
2 311. And one specific allegation of the Defence that there were
3 different participation -- because there were different participants at
4 each meeting indicates that there were people simply exchanging
5 information from the ground. This is at paragraph 299 of the brief.
6 Ignores the fact that it is easily discernible from the Joint Command
7 minutes that there were core members that attended most meetings or
8 virtually every meeting to the point that if one of them did not attend
9 the absence would be specifically recorded in the minutes. So the fact
10 that other persons participated does not negate the fact that this was a
11 command structure.
12 The Defence argues that - and this is in paragraph 22 of its
13 brief - that the Joint Command is left as the only source of action of
14 the alleged joint criminal enterprise. This is elaborated upon further
15 in paragraph 297 of the brief where they say that by abandoning the
16 theory of the Supreme Defence Council commanding all forces in executing
17 the alleged plan, this modification leaves the so-called Joint Command as
18 a main source of charged plurality of an alleged joint criminal
19 enterprise. This is not correct. And I invite the Court to refer to
20 paragraphs 20 to 25 of the indictment, particularly paragraph 20, which
21 sets out the leading members of the JCE. The Supreme Defence Council and
22 the Joint Command are two of the organisations, two of the instruments or
23 command structures that were used to effect the JCE, but the plurality,
24 if one can call it that, or the membership of the JCE is set out in
25 paragraph 20 of the indictment. And the members of the Joint Command use
1 several command bodies as instruments to effect the JCE.
2 Now in this trial some of these command bodies are more or less
3 relevant to the liability of the accused. The SDC which we haven't led
4 much evidence on is more relevant to the liability of political accused
5 and the chief of the VJ who are not before the Court. But the
6 Prosecution does not abandon any theory in respect to the SDC.
7 In respect to the crime base evidence, the Defence at
8 paragraph 686 seems to challenge the evidence of [indiscernible], the
9 UNHCR regarding the number of refugees and the fact that he said the vast
10 majority of the refugees were Albanians. They say that his numbers are
11 confusing because in his final summary, P734, he refers to 896.000
12 refugees and that does not match up with the cumulative estimate of
13 780.000 refugees of 10 June 1999
14 The Prosecution does not dispute that this -- there is a
15 difference here, but there can be no real dispute that approximately
16 800.000 Albanians left Kosovo from the 24th of March to the 10th of June,
17 1999. In addition to the UNHCR's number, the MUP's own reporting shows
18 similar numbers and also shows that the refugees were Albanian. On the
19 1st of May, 1999, over a month before the end of the NATO intervention,
20 it was reported in P694, and is a MUP report, that 715.158 persons
21 "belonging to the Siptar national minority" had left the territory of
22 Kosovo and Metohija. And this is the figure to the end of April 1999.
23 So the figures are more or less consistent between the UNHCR and the
24 Defence document and the Defence document also accepts that these were
25 Kosovo Albanians.
1 The Defence generally in respect to the crime base, they argue
2 many places in their brief but primarily from paragraphs 669 and
3 thereafter that the crime base witnesses could not identify the
4 perpetrators of the crime against them. Specifically we had translation
5 difficulties in court where the witnesses identified colours. Some
6 witnesses said they saw "milicija" on police uniforms, but "milicija" was
7 no longer on uniforms. Many witnesses describe the forces as wearing
8 green; however, this isn't sufficient because some KLA units wore green.
9 Many people described the MUP as wearing ribbons, but the MUP changed the
10 ribbon colours according to the schedule each day, and some witnesses'
11 description of the ribbons did not correspond with the schedule.
12 It is submitted, Your Honours, that there can be no serious
13 question that the crime-base witnesses knew the Serb forces; namely, the
14 VJ soldier, the MUP policemen, the paramilitaries, and the armed Serb
15 civilians, they knew about the crimes that were being committed against
16 them. There is a difference, Your Honour. It might well be said that a
17 witness might not be able to identify an individual because of the
18 circumstances in which an event occurred, but this is not a matter of
19 identifying an individual. It's identifying a group of persons and it is
20 submitted that it is not a sequence -- a commendable or a meritorious
21 submission to say that Kosovar Albanians could not tell the difference
22 between police and soldiers and could not tell the difference between
23 police and armed Serb civilians. These crimes, Your Honours, were
24 committed in broad daylight, most of them, and the civilian witnesses
25 were in the presence of these perpetrators for significant periods of
1 time before they were expelled from their homes. So it is submitted that
2 these Kosovar Albanians would have seen policemen in their municipalities
3 and villages and knew what policemen looked like, knew what they wore.
4 And we have detailed -- in our closing brief, in respect to each
5 individual crime site, the documentary evidence, much of these from the
6 VJ, that corroborates these witnesses showing that VJ and MUP forces were
7 indeed deployed and present in these areas conducting operations at the
8 relevant time. And again, Your Honours, it is submitted that it is a
9 non-commendable argument to suggest that Kosovar Albanians civilians in
10 being expelled from their homes would not know the difference between the
11 KLA and a Serb soldier or policeman.
12 The Defence at paragraph 708, paragraph 70 -- well, 720 made the
13 general argument that people left because of fear of NATO bombing.
14 People left because of fighting between the force and the KLA, but not
15 because of the acts of the Serb forces. Without going into the evidence,
16 the submission very quickly is that the witnesses consistently referring
17 to themselves and a whole class of people, their villages, everybody were
18 leaving, they were consistent in saying that they left because they were
19 forced out, they were expelled and they feared for their lives because
20 they were aware of persons being murdered and otherwise abused. These
21 witnesses were from different parts of Kosovo, they had different
22 backgrounds, and in most cases they didn't know each other. The only
23 thing in common, Your Honour, was their expulsion, the confiscation of
24 their ID cards, and other indicia which we have discussed in the final
25 trial brief in the section on the patterns of the crime.
1 In their final trial brief, Your Honour, the Defence addressed
2 each crime site in turn, and in the section the Prosecution has noted
3 that in some circumstances they misstate or mis-characterise the evidence
4 of the witness and they often make claims without any supporting
6 It is not possible at this stage to go through all of them. I
7 just ask the Court to exercise caution in -- as I believe the Court will
8 in reviewing the evidence which is referred to.
9 I have some examples to highlight which are not exhaustive, and
10 even of these examples I will not go through all of them. For example,
11 in respect to Pristina, the Defence brief states at paragraph 817 that
12 K14 only left Kolevice having been forced to do so by unidentified
13 persons, that is, after her brother spoke to unidentified men at the door
14 of the place in which they lived. They decided it was dangerous for them
15 to stay. That is not a proper characterisation of the evidence. She
16 said uniformed policemen and soldiers came to their home and told them to
17 leave, and they did as they were told. This is at 8993 of her transcript
18 and P1325, which is her statement. The Defence in respect to Pristina
19 and in respect to Bala, the witness Bala, they state in paragraph 813
20 that the identifications of Bala and her family were not taken at any
21 point in time. And the purpose of this submission is to dilute the
22 evidence in respect to the confiscation of IDs, and it is misleading
23 because Bala directly observed Serb forces taking and destroying
24 Albanians' identification.
25 They were asked, it was Bala's testimony, and this is in P41 of
1 her statement and at transcript T2344, they were asked for their IDs, but
2 they did not have them and they told that to the Serb forces. And
3 because there were hundreds or thousands of people, the Serb forces did
4 not continue or force them to give up their IDs. If I may re-read this.
5 Because there were so many people there, the Serb forces did not continue
6 asking for everyone's IDs.
7 In respect to Suva Reka -- and I indicate to the Court that this
8 is not even close to the amount of mis-characterisations the Prosecution
9 submits exist, but I just move on quickly to Suva Reka, which is the
10 place of the Berisha family massacre.
11 At paragraph 770 the Defence says, if I may -- I'll move on from
12 this one because I cannot find the correct cite, but I think the Defence
13 in respect to Podujevo -- in respect to Suva Reka, yes, the second
14 paragraph -- the second sentence of the paragraph of 770 the Defence
16 "According to 62, the whole town, the whole town of Suva Reka
17 in the hands of the KLA ."
18 They don't cite to where and when 62 is supposed to have said
19 this. No citation of the record is made. And this is contrary to the
20 evidence of Hysni Berisha, Halit Berisha, K83, Shyhrete Berisha, who were
21 living in the town at the time. K83 was, in fact, a policeman who
22 witnessed a murder at Suva Reka. So this is an unsupported statement
23 about what was happening in Suva Reka. The KLA were not operating there.
24 There was some KLA presence 2 or 3 kilometres away from Suva Reka town;
25 namely, on the right side of the road to Prizren in the village of
1 Dobrodeljane and Semetiste and on the road to Restane about 2 kilometres
2 from the town.
3 So that statement is not correct, and in any case it would not --
4 well, it boggles the mind to see how that would explain the massacre.
5 Paragraph 773, the submission is that the Suva Reka incident was
6 an incident in fact involving individuals acting for personal reasons.
7 Well, this is an argument that the Prosecution submits that this defies
8 logic, that this killing could be simply personal reasons. Having regard
9 to the number of policemen present and participating in the event in the
10 middle of the town that day, it's clear that the Berisha murders were
11 preplanned. The evidence of the police K83 directly indicates that when
12 he arrived back at the police station he was sent off to join the others
13 or other policemen who were committing the murders.
14 And shortly after the massacre occurred, the mayor of the town
15 Boban Vuksanevic [phoen], arrived with a truck to remove the bodies and
16 this indicates that they must have known about or known in advance about
17 the massacre. And we also have the policeman Velickovic whose evidence
18 was that after the killings there was an order that came down from
20 expel the Kosovar Albanians.
21 The Defence argument in respect to Milos Gilic, this is not a
22 mis-characterisation; it's an argument which we submit lacks logic. They
23 argue at 841 that Dren Caka, being only 10 year's time, was not able to
24 identify the forces, could not say -- or the Court should not accept his
25 testimony in respect to who committed the massacre. He, Your Honour, if
1 you review his testimony and I respectfully ask that you do so, he could
2 describe the uniforms or the police who came to Vesa's house on the night
3 of the 1st of April. He could describe -- he could identify the uniforms
4 on the Exhibit 1301 which was a photo-board of police uniforms with
5 police uniforms and other uniforms. And he identified photos 913, 14,
6 and other photos, quite properly police uniforms.
7 And when the Defence showed him different patterns of uniforms,
8 he could identify, and this is D360, they showed him that and he could
9 identify the blue uniforms worn by the police. And he has been
10 consistent. We -- he was young at the time, but this was a situation
11 where he was with his family and there is no issue that he could not see
12 who the perpetrators were and -- in that town where he lived did not know
13 policemen and could not, as a class as a group of people, tell who
14 policemen were. Even if he could not see or identify an individual, but
15 he would know who policemen were.
16 And he has been very consistent in his testimony as to who the
17 perpetrators were in both testimonies -- in previous testimonies and also
18 in the video that was filmed when he was in a field hospital in April
19 1999 in Albania
20 shown in the course of the evidence.
21 In respect to Djakovica, the Defence claims that at paragraph 813
22 that Lizane Malaj who was also in Korenica testified that those in mixed
23 uniforms told them to go to Albania
24 [phoen], an officer of the MUP, returned the civilians to their village.
25 This shows that there was no plan to deport or forcibly transfer and
1 certainly none involving the MUP. This is, it is submitted, misleading.
2 If one reviews her evidence at transcript 809 to 818 and 830 to 832 and
3 865, her evidence was that on the 4th of April the police expelled her,
4 her family, and other families from Korenica and they all left in a
5 convoy. She agreed, accepted, that they were later ordered back to
6 Korenica. But the Defence ignores her testimony that on the 27th of
7 April about 35 men, some wearing blue camouflage, others wearing green
8 camouflage, and others wearing mask, entered her courtyard, robbed the
9 people, separated out the men, and ordered her and the rest of her family
10 to walk to Albania
11 found at a police base in Batajnica later on. And the fact that the
12 bodies, Your Honours, are found at a police base and part of this police
13 cover-up, indicates that it was policemen who did the shooting of these
15 So that is to clarify the -- what is said about her evidence.
16 And if I may just make one quick point here in this regard. The
17 Prosecution does not say that every senior policeman or police or soldier
18 in Kosovo was a participant. So the fact that somebody might have
19 assisted some of these refugees. For example, Nike Peraj, one of the
20 Prosecution witnesses, a soldier testified that when he went up the
21 valley there were so many killings going on that he was able, along with
22 some other police officers, to stop some of the murders. So we don't say
23 that it is impossible that on occasions some police officers and some
24 members of the army were repelled by what was happening and acted to stop
25 it when they could. So the fact that they were sent home at one point in
1 time does not negate the evidence in support of a plan.
2 And the Defence states that at 753 in respect to Prizren, that
3 Latifi's testimony shows that he voluntarily left for Albania and was not
4 deported or forcibly transferred. Further, his documents were not taken
5 at any point. Your Honours, Latifi clearly said that the chief of police
6 of Prizren ordered all the local residents to leave and go to Albania
7 He clearly states that the people were expelled and this is in his
8 statement page 38 and it's P779. He also said -- statement that at the
9 border crossing their documents were taken away. What he said is that he
10 managed to hide his driver's licence, but all the other documents were
11 taken away. So they -- the evidence is completely contrary to the
12 submission that he left voluntarily. Defence makes claims in respect to
13 Witness Krasniqi in respect to the same site, Prizren, that his documents
14 were not confiscated, and this is at paragraph 755 of their brief. He
15 did say, Your Honours, that he did not personally give up his documents,
16 but his evidence was that at the check-points along the way to the
17 Albanian border the police were confiscating the documents of many
18 people. So his evidence should be looked at in that context.
19 Your Honours, I have come to the end of the submissions I have to
20 make. As I indicated, there are materials that the Prosecution could
21 address you on further; however, the Prosecution believes that the Court
22 is fully seized of this matter and is satisfied in leaving the matters in
23 the hands of the Court for your consideration. The Prosecution submits
24 that having regard to the evidence heard, all the evidence heard in this
25 case, the Court has enough evidence before it to make a safe and sure
1 finding beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty, both under
2 Articles 7(1) and Article 7(3), on all counts of the indictment as
4 Thank you very much, Your Honours, for your patience. May it
5 please you.
6 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Stamp.
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE PARKER: We will adjourn now to resume tomorrow at 9.00 to
9 hear the Defence closing submissions. I never see you there, you're
10 behind the television screens, Mr. Djordjevic.
11 We will resume at 9.00 tomorrow morning.
12 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.34 p.m.
13 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 14th day of
14 July, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.