1 Thursday, 8 February 2007

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Docherty, when we took the break yesterday, I

7 said we would decide on the question of whether the witness could be asked

8 about proportionality.

9 Consistent with the decision that we took earlier in relation to

10 another witness, the Chamber will rule that questions asked about

11 proportionality may be put to the witness, and the reason is this: That

12 ultimately whether a particular response was sufficiently disproportionate

13 so as to negative self-defence is ultimately, and will always be, a matter

14 for the Trial Chamber. But this witness can say whether, on the basis of

15 the training that he had and his military experience, a particular

16 response was proportionate or not proportionate. The legal

17 characterisation of the response as being proportionate or

18 disproportionate is a matter, and will always remain a matter, for the

19 Trial Chamber.

20 WITNESS: DAVID FRASER [Resumed]

21 Examination by Mr. Docherty: [Continued]

22 Q. Good morning, General.

23 A. Good morning.

24 Q. General, I want to ask just a couple of questions about the

25 Bosnian Serb response to the attack on the Lukavica barracks, and then I

1 have a couple more issues I want to talk to you about and then this direct

2 examination will conclude.

3 Yesterday, you gave us some hallmarks of what you, as a Canadian

4 officer, would consider a proportionate response, and I want to take those

5 up in turn. The Serbian response to the attack on the Lukavica barracks,

6 was it a like-versus-like, I believe was the phrasing you used, response?

7 A. Indirect fire from the Muslims was replied by indirect fire from

8 the Serbians, but it was a lot more and not directed to the headquarters.

9 It was just directed to the city.

10 Q. And if I can just flesh out this idea of like being responded to

11 by like for just a moment, does that mean to you that, for example, a

12 rifle should be replied to by a rifle, a tank by a tank, and so forth; or

13 if one finds a enemy tank in an open place, could one, without violating

14 these principles, for example, call in an air-strike on that tank? Could

15 you respond to that, please.

16 A. If you found a tank in a field, it would not be unreasonable or

17 unacceptable to use air or another asset to take care -- to deal with the

18 tank, because you go through the process of, is it a military target. If

19 you want to destroy the tank, use the best system you can to destroy the

20 tank and also mitigate or minimise any collateral damage. So it's not

21 unreasonable.

22 Q. And then turning back to the response to the Lukavica barracks

23 attack. Was proper attention paid by the Bosnian Serbs to minimising

24 collateral damage in that response?

25 A. In my opinion, no.

1 Q. Are you able to generalise -- because I believe that you testified

2 that there were a number of times when the Bosnian Serb forces would

3 respond to fire within the city by the Bosnian Muslims. Can you, on any

4 level of generality, say if the Serbian responses were typically

5 proportionate or typically disproportionate; and, if you say yes to that,

6 then I will ask you to elaborate a bit.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. All right. And can you tell us, first of all, at what level of

9 generality? Was this most of the responses, some of the responses, half

10 of the responses, that you saw?

11 A. I would generalise it by saying that most of the response was

12 disproportionate. There was, if I could, please, an opinion by most of

13 the people that I worked with that it was -- if one Muslim was killed-- or

14 one Serbian was killed, we would probably expect about ten Muslims would

15 be killed in response.

16 Q. And when you say that most of the responses you saw were

17 disproportionate, was there any particular way in which they were

18 generally disproportionate? Was it in paying no attention to collateral

19 consequences? Was it responding to non-military targets? Was it

20 responding in unlike kind? Are you able to generalise about that?

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Docherty, are you treating collateral damage

22 as being parallel with a proportionate or disproportionate response? I

23 don't necessarily see the two things as being the same. I mean, a

24 response could be wholly proportionate and yet collateral damage is

25 caused. It strikes me that the criteria for assessing the proportionality

1 of a response doesn't necessarily have anything to do with collateral

2 damage.

3 MR. DOCHERTY: Your Honour, I am using collateral damage as a

4 hallmark of a proportionate response, and the reason that I'm doing so is

5 I'm attempting to follow the methodology that was laid down by this

6 Chamber in the direct examination of Major General Nicolai, where the

7 Chamber directed me to first elicit from the witness the criteria that the

8 witness would use to assess proportionality. Since General Fraser

9 yesterday indicated that paying attention to or minimising collateral

10 damage would be one of the things he would use in assessing

11 proportionality, I am therefore asking him to apply his criteria to the

12 topic.

13 And, of course, I pay heed to what Your Honour said this morning,

14 that, of course, this is for the Trial Chamber, and if the Trial Chamber's

15 criteria do not match those of the witness, then of course the Trial

16 Chamber will assess the matter differently.

17 But, as I say, I'm trying to follow what I'll call the Nicolai

18 methodology of having the witness give the criteria, then asking the

19 witness to apply those criteria to the facts he observed while in

20 Sarajevo.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well. Yes. But it wouldn't be correct to

22 say that the Trial Chamber had laid down the methodology. That was

23 Mr. Nicolai's approach, as it appears to be the approach of the brigadier

24 as well.

25 MR. DOCHERTY: I take that correction, Your Honour.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, please proceed.

2 MR. DOCHERTY:

3 Q. General, the question that was pending was whether there was any

4 way in which Bosnian Serb responses to Muslim attacks were

5 disproportionate or whether they varied in that disproportionality and the

6 manner of their disproportionality.

7 A. My observation was that the Serb response was disproportionate.

8 It was greater.

9 Q. Okay. Thank you.

10 Changing topics now --

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: At that level of generality, it is not helpful.

12 I think he has to say in what way. Ultimately, we'll assess it. It's for

13 the Trial Chamber to assess it ultimately. But he has had experience; he

14 has had training in this field, If his evidence is to be of assistance to

15 us, it has to be given at a more empirical level, it seems to me, at any

16 rate.

17 MR. DOCHERTY:

18 Q. In your last response, General, you said: "My observation was

19 that the Serb response was disproportionate," and then you added the

20 sentence: "It was greater." When you say "It was greater," can you

21 elaborate on that a bit more; and, if possible, incorporate into your

22 answers specific observations you made while serving with the United

23 Nations in Sarajevo.

24 A. My experience was that in regards to sniping, if a Serbian

25 civilian was killed, we would receive -- expect a lot more Muslims killed

1 as a response to that, and, again, the general opinion was ten to one.

2 As a result of the attack on Lukavica barracks, which was a series

3 of mortar rounds coming out from the Muslim side, the artillery that came

4 back from the Serbians was extensive and it lasted for quite some time.

5 It was disproportionate to what the Lukavica barracks received actually in

6 the way of shelling.

7 MR. DOCHERTY: Is that helpful, Your Honour?

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: So we had the Muslims using mortar rounds in

9 their attack on the barracks and the response was with artillery. It "was

10 extensive and it lasted for quite some time." Is it the fact that

11 artillery was used or the extent of it and the duration that would make it

12 disproportionate, in your view?

13 THE WITNESS: First of all, the attack on Lukavica barracks was

14 against the corps headquarters and the response was directed to the city,

15 and the response was not directed, in my opinion, to a military target.

16 You know, the way I would have looked at it would have been, if you can

17 find the Muslim mortar base-plate position that shot the rounds at the

18 Lukavica barracks, that would be legitimate and proportional. The

19 response, though, was just a general firing of artillery back at the city

20 and for some time. So it wasn't just one salvo; it was multiple salvos

21 over and over again. It was -- again, what was the target on the ground?

22 I couldn't determine what the target was on the ground. It seemed to be

23 more general, just aimed at the city. And there was an awful lot more

24 coming in than the rounds that were coming out of the city that went after

25 Lukavica barracks.

1 In my opinion, from my training, I would question what the target

2 was and was it proportional, because it was just a continuous barrage

3 coming at the city for some time.

4 [Trial Chamber confers]

5 JUDGE HARHOFF: General, can I ask you to clarify this, because it

6 seems to me that your first response to counsel's question was that it was

7 the weaponry and the duration that constituted the disproportionality of

8 the response. You said, if I'm not mistaken, that the fact that artillery

9 was used in response to mortar attacks was part of it, and the other part

10 of it was that it lasted for some days. And then, in response to Judge

11 Robinson's questions, you then added that it was rather the indiscriminate

12 nature of the response that constituted the disproportionality. Now,

13 which is it? Is it one or the other or is it both, really?

14 Do you understand my question?

15 THE WITNESS: Yes, I was just waiting for the screen.

16 It is, in fact, both, and as a military officer, our training is

17 not -- it's a whole bunch of factors that have you to combine all

18 together. Proportionality is only one factor that must be considered in

19 conjunction with the other factors; military necessity, military -- was it

20 a military target, collateral damage. I mean, it's an equation that's all

21 added together.

22 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you. But we need exactly all the elements

23 in that equation.

24 THE WITNESS: Okay. Let me just rephrase it again to make sure

25 that I'm clear on what I said.

1 The Muslims fired at a military target called Lukavica barracks

2 headquarters. No issues there.

3 JUDGE HARHOFF: Did they hit?

4 THE WITNESS: It was in the vicinity of -- I mean, again, in my

5 opinion, it was a legitimate target, military target. There were

6 civilians around it, but the rounds landed in the area of the

7 headquarters, because we were getting reports from French soldiers who

8 were actually at the headquarters that they were under mortar attack,

9 which was coming out of the city. So they just happened to be in the spot

10 where it was a Serbian military target, and that was okay in that sense.

11 Because we didn't assess that the Muslims were firing at the French

12 soldiers; they were firing at the Serbian headquarters. Military firing

13 at military, so that was okay.

14 The response, though, the response that came back, was not fired

15 at what we could assess as military targets. So that's one criteria that

16 didn't seem to be met. It didn't appear to have looked at collateral

17 damage; that's another criteria for returning fire. And it was not like,

18 you know, you fire four rounds, you fire four rounds back; it was there

19 was a tremendous volume of fire that came back and it was sustained for

20 some time. So, yet again, it appeared, again from our point of view, as

21 disproportionate, too.

22 So the three criteria didn't seem to be met with the response from

23 the Muslim side: military target, proportionality, and consideration for

24 collateral damage for civilians who were in the area.

25 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you. For further clarification, I would

1 need to ask you: Were the military -- the Bosnian military targets, were

2 they accessible? Could that have been detected, where they were? Was it

3 possible to hit them?

4 THE WITNESS: In short, no. The Muslim mortars would move around

5 the city and they would fire -- making it very, very difficult for the

6 Serbs to reply because they were intermingled and mixed in with

7 civilians. And they did that purposely because it would make it hard, and

8 if there was a response, it would be, you know, putting civilians at risk.

9 JUDGE HARHOFF: The fact that the Bosnian sides were roaming

10 around in the city and firing their mortar shots, would that have any

11 impact on your assessment of the proportionality?

12 THE WITNESS: In short, yes, it would. From my experience,

13 because you can't find the fire unit that fired the shot and because it

14 was moving around and inside a civilian area, as a soldier, I would not be

15 able to fire back at all. I would have to just accept it, because, A, I

16 couldn't find the target; B, the potential for collateral damage to

17 civilians, it would preclude me from firing back at that target. It ...

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: You just, in response to Judge Harhoff, spoke of

19 the three criteria of military target, proportionality, and consideration

20 of collateral damage for civilians who were in the area. But I find that

21 a little confusing, because we are talking about criteria for determining

22 proportionality, but you have included proportionality among the

23 criteria. Your three criteria, I repeat, were military target,

24 proportionality, and consideration for collateral damage. It's not clear

25 to me how -- it's not helpful to have proportionality as one of the three

1 criteria for determining proportionality, unless you were speaking of

2 three criteria for something else, something other than proportionality.

3 THE WITNESS: Let me give you another example. If there was a

4 sniper up in a tower, the ideal thing would be to use another sniper to

5 take out that individual. Some people would probably use a tank. They

6 could use an airplane and destroy the entire tower. You have taken out

7 the tower -- you have taken out the sniper and the sniper was a military

8 target. You could have satisfied the collateral damage. If there are no

9 civilians around, you just destroy the tower. But was that proportional?

10 In my training, that would be disproportional. You don't need to destroy

11 the entire tower to take out one sniper. There are other systems you can

12 use to do that in a far more judicious way.

13 It is not black and white. It is a judgement call. And I spent

14 all my time making judgement calls to apply those three criteria and try

15 to apply the minimum amount of force to achieve the effect that we need to

16 achieve based on military targets.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Would your military manual contain something on

18 this issue?

19 THE WITNESS: On proportionality, sir?

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

21 THE WITNESS: As I tried to explain, it's -- you try to do like

22 with like and you don't try to use excessive --

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, no. I'm talking about a manual. Most armies

24 have a manual, and I was trying to find out whether the manual for the

25 Canadian Army would have something on proportionality.

1 THE WITNESS: It does exist.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: It does. All right. Thanks.

3 MR. DOCHERTY:

4 Q. Just to be clear, before we leave this topic, General, when you

5 talk about collateral damage, what sorts of people are we talking about as

6 far as collateral damage goes? Who are the victims of collateral damage?

7 A. Well, collateral damage is more than people. It's places and

8 things. For example, schools, churches, other areas that may be

9 designated as places and things that we're in the allowed to shoot at.

10 And there are rules about what we can and cannot shoot. So collateral

11 damage, again, is a generic term that has also further definitions and

12 requirements. It is most frequently used to talk about civilians, people.

13 Q. I'm going to leave this topic now and I'm going to ask you about

14 the command and control of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, the Bosnian Serb

15 forces, during your time in Sarajevo.

16 Do you have an opinion as to who -- let me back up. Yesterday,

17 you gave some testimony and you mentioned an officer with the last name of

18 Indic; you testified, I believe, about higher Serbian leadership in Pale.

19 That's the origin of the question I'm about to ask you, which is: Who, in

20 your opinion, during your time in Sarajevo, was effectively in command of

21 the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, and what are the reasons for that opinion, if

22 you have one?

23 A. It was my assessment that the corps commander was in command and

24 in control of the corps.

25 Q. And what was the name of that corps commander in the latter part

1 of your tour?

2 A. General Milosevic.

3 Q. We talked a little bit yesterday about protests.

4 MR. DOCHERTY: I'm going to the court officer at this time to call

5 up ter number 2065.

6 And, Your Honours, for purposes of the record, this will be

7 evidence that is relating to scheduled sniping incident number 1.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Docherty.

9 MR. DOCHERTY: Your Honour.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: You asked the witness, who, in your opinion,

11 during your time in Sarajevo, was effectively in command of the

12 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, and what are the reasons for that opinion. He

13 has stated that, in his view, General Milosevic was in command, but he

14 hasn't given the reason for saying why, in his view, he was effectively in

15 command.

16 MR. DOCHERTY: That's why I called for the document.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: The documents. I see.

18 MR. DOCHERTY: I'm going to have questions based on the documents

19 that will flesh this out.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Very well. Thanks.

21 MR. DOCHERTY:

22 Q. On the screen in front of you, General, there should be a letter.

23 Do you recognise this document, first of all?

24 A. Yes, I do.

25 Q. Could you tell us, please, what this document is.

1 A. It is a protest from General Rose to Dr. Karadzic regarding

2 sniping incidents on the 8th of October, in Sarajevo.

3 MR. DOCHERTY: And, again, for purposes of the record, Your

4 Honour, scheduled sniping incident number 1, the evidence has been that it

5 occurred on the 8th of October, 1994.

6 Q. Is this a kind of letter that was -- when you testified about

7 protest letters, is this one of the types of things you had in mind?

8 A. Yes, it is.

9 Q. All right. Following the mailing -- this letter has a date on

10 it. Could you tell us what that is?

11 A. It's dated the 9th of October, 1994.

12 Q. And do you know, was there a meeting which followed this letter

13 with Serbian leadership?

14 A. I'm not sure.

15 Q. Let me show you a document.

16 MR. DOCHERTY: If I could ask the registrar to display ter number

17 2067, and in particular e-court page 2 of that document, paragraph number

18 5. But if we could see the first page first because I want the witness to

19 see the date.

20 Q. General, on the screen in front of you now there is a document.

21 Can you tell us, first of all, what kind of document is this?

22 A. This is a summary of a meeting between General Mladic and General

23 Rose near Pale. It's typical for summarising meetings that were conducted

24 between the parties.

25 Q. The first sentence under "Summary" says: "Rose met with Mladic

1 today near Pale."

2 For those of us, like me, who are not good at reading military

3 times and dates, is there information here that will tell us what "today"

4 is?

5 A. Can we just blow that up a little bit.

6 MR. DOCHERTY: Mr. Registrar, can we expand the boxed portion just

7 a little bit.

8 Q. Does that help, General?

9 A. Yeah. It would have been on the 10th of October.

10 MR. DOCHERTY: And if we could please see e-court page 2, numbered

11 paragraph 5.

12 Q. And I'll just pause for a moment and let you and everyone else

13 read numbered paragraph 5.

14 All right. Now, I want to continue with this topic. You

15 indicate, or the document indicates, that it is General Rose taking up

16 this shooting on a tram with fairly senior leaders. What sorts of

17 incidents would be taken up with these relatively senior leaders?

18 A. Sniping was a major issue that my general and General Rose would

19 raise with the warring factions because of the psychological impact it had

20 on the population. And also, after a while, incidents would slowly build

21 up and it would have to generate into a major discussion like this one -

22 and I was at this meeting - where, in fact, we would try to get the

23 situation under more control. But sniping was a major discussion point

24 between the factions that we were dealing with.

25 Q. And I'm going to show you another document relative to sniping.

1 Before I do that --

2 JUDGE HARHOFF: Counsel, sorry, could you please ask the witness

3 to elaborate a little on this; namely, the question of whether sniping was

4 always a topic on the agenda for all the meetings between the UNPROFOR and

5 the warring parties, also the Bosnian side.

6 MR. DOCHERTY:

7 Q. General, was sniping more frequently -- which warring faction was

8 spoken to more frequently or was the recipient of more protests regarding

9 sniping?

10 A. We talked about sniping, we talked about shelling, and we talked

11 about freedom of movement with all the factions. We talked about a number

12 of different issues that were affecting either side. We talked about more

13 issues with the Serb side than we did with the Muslim side because the

14 Muslims, in this case, were inside of Sarajevo and they were the ones

15 being contained. Freedom of movement was affected by them. But we did go

16 and talk to them about issues about shelling, issues about sniping

17 against, you know, non-military targets, for example. The discussions

18 were wide-ranging and we talked to both parties, but in this particular

19 case we were talking to the Serbs.

20 Q. Just to try and follow up a little more on Judge Harhoff's

21 question. Are you able to say that one side or the other did more sniping

22 on civilians that had to be addressed by the United Nations in meetings

23 and letters and so forth?

24 A. We dealt more with the Serbs on sniping than we did on the Muslims

25 on sniping.

1 JUDGE HARHOFF: I guess my concern was just to establish through

2 this witness that sniping was not just something that was, you know,

3 discussed every now and then, but it was always a very important part of

4 the agenda for all meetings. That was my concern.

5 MR. DOCHERTY: And that may vary by the type of meeting, but I can

6 explore that with a few questions.

7 JUDGE HARHOFF: Could you?

8 MR. DOCHERTY:

9 Q. What we're looking at now, General Fraser, is minutes of a meeting

10 by General Rose. Give us an idea of how senior within the UN hierarchy

11 General Sir Michael Rose was at this time.

12 A. General Rose commanded all the UN troops in Bosnia, the actual

13 country. He worked for General Dilaprow [phoen], who was the force

14 commander for all of UNPROFOR. The fact is that General Rose would deal

15 with those issues that were most significant to the country, and he would

16 limit his engagements principally with the senior leadership on the

17 Serbian side, either General Mladic, Dr. Karadzic, or on the Muslim, with

18 the president, the vice-president, the prime minister. And corps

19 commanders were the purview of my general to talk to, the two warring

20 faction corps commanders. But when it came to certain issues that could

21 be significantly destabilising or an escalatory matter for the city, as it

22 pertained to Sector Sarajevo or the DMZ, General Rose would certainly get

23 engaged to try and keep the situation -- implore the leadership to get

24 control of the situations. In this particular case, it was sniping. We

25 would be talking about shelling, we would be talking about other --

1 freedom of movement, utilities, just, you know, things that people need to

2 go about their lives, because we were there to protect the people as much

3 as anything else.

4 Q. And so a meeting like the one we've got the minutes of in front of

5 us, this is not a daily occurrence.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ms. Isailovic is on her feet.

7 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this is becoming

8 really impossible to follow. I'm trying to follow the interpretation, and

9 in French it's very difficult, it's extremely fast, and there is a big

10 gap. We're a few lines away from what is being said and it's very

11 difficult. Can we please slow the pace. Please slow the pace so that

12 interpretation is possible. Thank you.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Ms. Isailovic. I think both the

14 witness and Mr. Docherty will have heard that. It's really a complaint.

15 The dialogue, it's too fast. Please observe a pause between question and

16 answer.

17 MR. DOCHERTY: Yes, Your Honour.

18 Q. A meeting like the one we've got the minutes in front of us, this

19 was -- how frequently were high-level meetings like this convened?

20 A. Not very often. This was only when the situation was getting

21 grave.

22 Q. What about corps level, one level down? How frequently were there

23 meetings to talk about sniping, talk about shelling, talk about freedom of

24 movement, at the level of the general, whose military assistant you were?

25 A. They were more frequent than what General Rose would engage. And

1 then the battalion commanders under us would have even more discussions

2 with their counterparts, the brigade commanders. So the lower down you

3 got, the more the dialogue was almost continuous. And my general would

4 engage with the corps commanders again on issues that required their

5 attention to keep the situation in check and under control.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 MR. DOCHERTY: Your Honour, at this time I will tender the two

8 documents that I have been using, ter number 2065, the letter from General

9 Rose to Dr. Karadzic, and ter number 2067, which is on the monitor just

10 now.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: They're admitted.

12 THE REGISTRAR: Ter number 02065 will be admitted as Exhibit P204,

13 and 02067 will be admitted as P205, Your Honours.

14 MR. DOCHERTY: And if we could now see 65 ter number 01973, which

15 I believe is already in evidence as Prosecution Exhibit 3.

16 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Mr. Prosecutor, before you move on

17 to the next subject.

18 General, you said regarding the command of the Sarajevo-Romanija

19 Corps, yes, that General Milosevic was de facto commander, that he had

20 control. But then you are also talking about meetings of Lieutenant

21 General Michael Rose with Dr. Karadzic or General Mladic.

22 During those meetings or after these meetings, General Mladic

23 denied what was happening with snipers or shelling. It seems to me,

24 therefore, that the one having effective control on the operations was

25 him. So how can you explain that particular situation? On the one hand

1 we have General Mladic himself who seems to be in control and on the other

2 hand we have General Milosevic who also has control? Is there a

3 contradiction or not?

4 THE WITNESS: I don't see a contradiction. I see a higher

5 commander -- a higher commander, General Mladic's intent and direction

6 being adhered to and followed by General Milosevic. In the military chain

7 of command, the guy at the top gives out his orders, his intent, and the

8 subordinates follow that; and they, in turn, give out orders and intent

9 and they follow that. So it is a series and a degrees of command and

10 competency.

11 At the corps level, when we would go to the corps commander and

12 protest either sniping, shelling, freedom of movement, normally afterwards

13 we would get an improvement in the situation. But over time, there may be

14 too many situations that would be unacceptable to General Rose and the --

15 amelioration or the situation on the ground would be too tense and he

16 would get engaged and go up to Milosevic's bosses on this side - it would

17 be General Mladic - to say, "You have to take this and be more serious

18 about it and slow it down." And it was not uncommon for both parties to

19 say they didn't do it. That was always -- the opening statement was: "We

20 didn't do it." And then you would just argue and then they would go away

21 and things would get a little better in most cases.

22 Yes, Mladic was the boss. Yes, he had significant control and

23 command because he was directing operations not only in Sarajevo but for

24 the rest of the country. But within that little box called Sarajevo,

25 General Milosevic was the guy in command.

1 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Indeed. I'm sorry, I was waiting

2 for the end of the interpretation so that I could understand well.

3 You say that General Milosevic was de facto commander. According

4 to your military experience, can you have a commander who is also a pawn,

5 so to speak? He has the title but maybe not the control. So can we have

6 a commander who in fact is not really, de facto, the commander?

7 THE WITNESS: I'm not sure it's as simple as that, because all

8 subordinate commanders must follow the orders of their superiors. In

9 short, if a subordinate has a problem with the superior commander's

10 orders, he always has the option of quitting, if he cannot do it. But the

11 chain of command is designed that the subordinates execute the orders of

12 their commanders within the intent of the commander -- the superior

13 commander's direction. It's a hierarchy and that's how we operate. I

14 wouldn't phrase it as a pawn. It is a chain of command where we would

15 have a dialogue with our boss about how to do things based on the

16 information on the ground, and that's how the military is structured.

17 I'm not sure I have answered your question, but that's how I see

18 it.

19 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. Yes, you have

20 answered my question. Thank you.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a minute

22 [Trial Chamber confers]

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please proceed, Mr. Docherty.

24 MR. DOCHERTY: I called for the wrong ter number. The ter number

25 I need is actually 1973, and I would ask if that could be shown, please.

1 Q. General Fraser, do you recognise the document that's on the screen

2 in front of you?

3 A. Yes, I do.

4 Q. What is this document, please?

5 A. It is an agreement on the elimination of sniping activities in the

6 Sarajevo region.

7 Q. And it might be off -- who has signed this document?

8 A. It is signed by General Karavelic, the commander of the Muslim

9 corps; General Mladic, the commander of the Serbian corps; and General

10 Rose.

11 MR. DOCHERTY: If I could ask the registrar to scroll down because

12 there's a date beside General Rose's signature.

13 Q. There's a date to the right of General Rose's signature. Can you

14 tell us what that is, please.

15 A. It is the 14th of August, 1994. And it's also signed by Viktor

16 Andreev, who was the political advisor for General Rose.

17 Q. Are you aware of how this document, this agreement, came into

18 being? What was the genesis of it?

19 A. I wasn't there at the time when the negotiations took place, but

20 it was as a result of the escalating sniping incidents around Sarajevo,

21 and the intervention of General Rose to try to get control of the

22 situation and bring things back down to a more reasonable level.

23 Q. Now, following up on this question of command and control, is the

24 signature on this document by General Karavelic and General Mladic, the

25 two corps commanders, something from which you can draw any conclusions

1 about who had control over sniping in the Sarajevo area?

2 A. Normally, after these types of meetings and agreements, in this

3 particular case the situation would get better, which would indicate to me

4 that both of these gentlemen had control over their troops and were able

5 to pass down orders to stop the sniping.

6 Q. Did the United Nations do any studies into the effectiveness of

7 this Anti-Sniping Agreement?

8 A. Yes. The French did keep statistics on sniping, how many people

9 were shot on both sides.

10 MR. DOCHERTY: I'm going to ask to look at that study now, and I

11 will ask the registrar to call up ter number 2011, e-court page 4.

12 Before I get into that, at this time, Your Honour, I will tender

13 ter number 1973, the Anti-Sniping Agreement of 14 August 1994.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: We admit it.

15 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P206, Your Honours.

16 MR. DOCHERTY:

17 Q. On the screen in front of you now, General Fraser, is a document

18 with a number of dates on the left-hand margin and then some numbers in

19 the body. Do you recognise this document, is my first question?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. What is this document?

22 A. This is a summation of wounded/killed of Serbs and Muslims for the

23 Sarajevo area.

24 Q. And this is a little -- might be a little hard to interpret. Can

25 you just walk us through what this document shows or how this data is

1 organised and how we should read it.

2 A. What we would normally do is track, in this particular case, the

3 number of sniping incidents in the city, where they took place; who was

4 wounded, in the first column, which was Muslims; how many Muslims were

5 killed; how many Serbs were wounded; how many Serbs were killed. We would

6 take that information. We would use it to conduct our discussions with

7 the applicable warring factions to say -- go to them with empirical data

8 and facts of incidents so that it would be a focused discussion. We would

9 give them that information, and the objective was to reduce and to

10 eliminate sniping against civilians.

11 Q. Now, on the far left series of numbers, it's labelled "BiH

12 Wounded." Is that Bosnia and Herzegovina wounded?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Two questions about that. First of all, we see -- rather than

15 months, we see specific dates on the left-hand side. In other words, this

16 doesn't appear to be a linear sort of chart. The specific dates, does

17 that mean that individuals were killed or wounded on those specific dates?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Up near the top we are seeing single-digit numbers. Later on, for

20 example, July 29, August 5, and August 19, we are seeing double-digit

21 numbers. What conclusion, if any, can you draw about the effectiveness of

22 the Anti-Sniping Agreement from the data that is in the chart in front of

23 you?

24 A. Well, before it took place there was a significant problem, and

25 after it, there still continues to be a problem.

1 Q. Are the numbers after it smaller or larger or the same as the

2 numbers that gave rise to the agreement in the first place?

3 A. Right afterwards the number spikes to, I think -- it look like 12

4 there, and then it drops back to the levels that existed predating the

5 agreement.

6 Q. And from this data can you draw any conclusions about whether the

7 corps commanders who signed the Anti-Sniping Agreement had control over

8 sniping in the Sarajevo theatre?

9 A. I'm not sure if they had control or if they ignored the document

10 that they -- the agreement they signed. But there was no effect of the

11 negotiations or the agreement based on these facts.

12 Q. I'm going to show you a couple of other documents relative to

13 sniping.

14 MR. DOCHERTY: Before I do that, Your Honour, I'll tender ter

15 number 2011, the study on the effectiveness.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: We admit it.

17 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P207, Your Honours.

18 MR. DOCHERTY: And now, Mr. Registrar, if I could please ask for

19 ter number 01939.

20 Q. General, I'll ask you to take a moment and look at that document.

21 When you've familiarised yourself with it and are ready to proceed, please

22 indicate that.

23 A. Okay.

24 Q. What kind of a document is this?

25 A. This is a direction to all the units inside the Sarajevo-Romanija

1 Corps from the deputy commander indicating that there is a problem; that

2 the reports that are being written are not being reviewed by the

3 commanders, the subordinate commanders, and the direction is that the

4 commanders will personally get involved, or the Chief of Staff, to make

5 sure that the orders from higher are being applied, and that the reports

6 that are coming back are accurate.

7 Q. Now, a few minutes ago you were talking about the chain of command

8 in the armed forces. Does this document bear on the discussion and on the

9 role or the limits on the -- excuse me. Does this document bear on a

10 discussion of chain of command and of subordinates' relationships with

11 higher officers in a military organisation?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Okay. Could you elaborate on that, please, and tell us how this

14 sheds light on that discussion.

15 A. This document indicates to me that the deputy commander of the

16 corps was unhappy, not satisfied, that the subordinates were either

17 following his orders or the subordinate commanders were actively engaged

18 in controlling their troops in what was going on. This document really is

19 a measure, an order to get the chain of command more engaged in

20 establishing control over what was going on at that time, which was July

21 of 1994.

22 MR. DOCHERTY: And then before -- first of all, Your Honour, I

23 will tender this document, ter number 01939.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's admitted.

25 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P208, Your Honours.

1 MR. DOCHERTY:

2 Q. And then I have one last topic that I want to cover with you,

3 General. But before I do, I want to circle back to something we were

4 talking about a little while ago, which was the response to the attack on

5 the Lukavica barracks. Your discussion of criteria for returning fire,

6 your discussion of proportionality, was heavily oriented towards using the

7 response to the Lukavica barracks attack as an example.

8 Were there other like situations that you observed during your

9 time in Sarajevo where Muslim fire from within the city received a

10 response from the Bosnian Serb side that you would consider not to meet

11 the criteria you've explained for the responsible use of military force?

12 A. I don't have any other specific incidents that I could relate to

13 you right now other than just my general impression of all the incidents.

14 So I can't be more specific than I was.

15 Q. What about your general impression? What would your general

16 impression be?

17 A. My general impression was the Serbs were definitely in control of

18 all the movement and the situation inside the city. They used all their

19 means available to keep control and control freedom of movement, control

20 the psychological aspects of the city, through the sniping and through

21 shelling, be it mortars mainly.

22 Q. The last topic I want to talk with you about, and then this direct

23 examination will be over, are you familiar with the term from your time in

24 Sarajevo "modified air bomb"?

25 A. Yes, I am. That was something that came up at the very end of my

1 tenure in Sarajevo.

2 Q. What is a modified air bomb?

3 A. It is a bomb that has some sort of makeshift apparatus put onto it

4 so that it can be used as a vehicle that can fly but has no guidance

5 system. You just aim it, you launch it off, and it will go wherever the

6 ballistic capabilities and the aerodynamic capabilities of this improvised

7 device are. And it lands based on if it runs out the fuel, or, more

8 likely, the aerodynamics of it are it just flops down. It has no military

9 value, in my mind.

10 Q. Have you ever seen such a contraption before you went to Sarajevo?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Ever seen one since?

13 A. No.

14 Q. You're a military office -- a senior military officer with decades

15 of experience in the Canadian Army. You have had training on what kind of

16 weapons are appropriate for what kind of battlefield situations. Is that

17 a fair statement?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Was there ever a time when you, as a commander, would say, "Send

20 me the modified air bombs. I need one."

21 A. No.

22 Q. Did you ever see modified air bombs on the Bosnian Muslim side of

23 the confrontation lines?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Did you ever see launchers for modified air bombs on the Bosnian

1 Muslim side of the confrontation lines?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Do you have an opinion from your time in Sarajevo as to the effect

4 these devices had on the psychology of the civilian population of the city

5 of Sarajevo?

6 A. They were psychologically very devastating for the people to hear

7 that these things existed, and if they did fire, my only experience was it

8 sent shudders through all of us, including the UN.

9 Q. How does the explosive capacity of one of these devices compare

10 with a mortar round? We've been talking a lot about mortar rounds and

11 that's why I ask.

12 A. They were normally larger, much larger.

13 MR. DOCHERTY: I have no further questions, Your Honour.

14 JUDGE HARHOFF: Counsel, can I just ask you to complete this

15 examination regarding the weaponry, because we were told a couple of days

16 ago about a gun called M-85, a machine-gun, I understand. Could you ask

17 the witness about the range and precisionness of this weapon.

18 MR. DOCHERTY:

19 Q. General, are you familiar with the weapon that Judge Harhoff is

20 asking about? I think it might be an M-84 but perhaps M-85,

21 automatic-fire rifle?

22 A. No, I'm not familiar with the M-85.

23 Q. Okay. What about the M-84?

24 A. Those numbers don't mean anything to me.

25 MR. DOCHERTY: Sorry, Your Honour. I have no further questions.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

2 Ms. Isailovic to cross-examine.

3 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, thank you.

4 Cross-examination by Ms. Isailovic:

5 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Witness. I am Branislava

6 Isailovic, attorney-at-law and member of the Paris Bar Association. I'm

7 the legal counsel for General Milosevic in these preceding. You know he

8 is the accused in these proceedings. You know the procedure because

9 you've also testified in the Galic case. We will now proceed with the

10 cross-examination and we will talk together of the various issues that you

11 already discussed with the Prosecution. I would like to discuss with you

12 a few matters.

13 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] To begin with, I would like to ask

14 my case manager to pull up on the screen a 65 ter map, 2927. This is a

15 document -- a document that was admitted as a Prosecution Exhibit P194.

16 Q. While we're waiting for this map - it will take a while - I would

17 like to begin with a few questions on your military career, or, rather,

18 the experience you gained in Sarajevo.

19 In the statement you gave in 1997, but also yesterday during your

20 testimony, you talked about the generals for whom you worked, do you

21 remember, Generals Soubirou and Gobillard?

22 A. I do remember Generals Soubirou and Gobillard, yes.

23 Q. They were generals from the French army; is that correct?

24 A. Yes, they were. General Soubirou was the deputy commander of the

25 6th Armoured Division and General Gobillard was the commander of the 11th

1 Parachute Division. That was the 11th Parachute, not 12th.

2 Q. You were in Sector Sarajevo, and as far as the command for Bosnia

3 and Herzegovina, I believe the British generals were commanding; right?

4 A. Correct. Sector Sarajevo was part of Bosnia and Herzegovina which

5 was broken down into a number of sectors, and General Rose was the

6 commander there when I got there and he was subsequently replaced by

7 General Rupert Smith.

8 Q. So there were, let's say, cultural differences, from a military

9 point of view, between those two sets of generals; is that correct?

10 A. They were culturally different as British and French, but they

11 shared a common bond as being soldiers in arms.

12 Q. As an assistant to Generals Soubirou and Gobillard your role was,

13 among other things, to translate, so to speak, to be a link between those

14 two cultures. Because you're a Canadian yourself and I believe that you

15 speak fluently both languages, English and French. Am I right in saying

16 that?

17 A. I would say it's a bit of a stretch to say that was a conduit, a

18 link, between two cultures. They were able to communicate quite

19 effectively themselves. They did not need me to translate for them.

20 General Soubirou spoke very good English; General Rose spoke very

21 good French. General Gobillard and General Rupert Smith didn't speak as

22 well, but they were able to communicate effectively. And I just happened

23 to be there because it was a UN force and I was just the military

24 assistant. And yes, at the time I could speak very good French. I would

25 say in the ten years since then, my French skills have actually

1 diminished.

2 Q. But regarding those cultural differences, from a military

3 standpoint, could you elaborate on what they were exactly?

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Has he said there were cultural differences?

5 Ms. Isailovic, I'm not sure whether he agreed with your proposition.

6 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] No, no. He mentioned military

7 cultures, not cultural differences but differences from the point of view

8 of military culture. Maybe we could see the statement. He believe he

9 said something to that effect.

10 Q. In your statement, the statement you gave in 1997, maybe I could

11 refer you to that part of your statement, because for me it is a very

12 interesting part.

13 General, would you like to see that part of your statement in

14 which you mentioned those differences in the military culture of the

15 French Generals and the British Generals?

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: If that's in the statement and you wish to show

17 him, show it to him. It's not a matter for him.

18 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Very well. I'll keep that

19 question for later because we have the map. It takes a long time to pull

20 it up on the screen, so let's have a look at it.

21 Mr. Registrar, could we enlarge the map. We need to see also the

22 whole top part of the map. Could we enlarge it, or zoom. Yes, yes, thank

23 you.

24 Q. General, we discussed this map yesterday; do you remember?

25 A. Yes, I do.

1 Q. You will agree with me that there are various markings already

2 drawn on this map. For instance, within the blue line, starting from the

3 top left part, we have "111 vbbr." This is the biggest mark. Can you see

4 it?

5 A. Yes, I can.

6 Q. Do you know that these are the zones of responsibility of the

7 units belonging to the 1st Corps of the ABiH?

8 A. That's what the map shows and that would be consistent with what

9 was happening on the ground.

10 Q. Can we agree that there are various markings on the map? We have

11 some letters that are bigger than others and, of course, smaller ones.

12 But at any rate, can we agree that they covered the whole territory within

13 the blue line?

14 A. This map would indicate there are a series of units that cover the

15 area inside and around the city of Sarajevo.

16 Q. Can we agree on the fact that it is the 12th Division of the 1st

17 Corps of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina which was within that blue

18 line?

19 A. I'm not sure I see where you see the 12th Division on that map. I

20 don't see that. Can you help me out here? I see brigades; I don't see a

21 division.

22 Q. General, in fact, I wanted you to tell me if you recalled that at

23 the time there was a division called the 12th Division whose commander

24 was, I believe, a general, General Fikret Prevljak?

25 A. I remember the 1st Muslim Corps under Karavelic, the brigades, and

1 I do remember General Fikret. I do not recall that he was a division

2 commander. My recollection was he was a brigade commander, commanding, if

3 it's the same guy, commanding the Mount Igman area, just on the southern

4 side of the airport.

5 Q. At any rate, you said that you saw the various locations of the

6 brigades, is that correct, within this blue line on the map?

7 A. I can read where the brigades were based on the map. I did not

8 personally, nor did my general, deal with brigades. We dealt exclusively

9 with the corps commander and the headquarters.

10 Q. General, I would like to go back to your long experience as a

11 military officer. Please tell us if these locations of the various

12 brigades also included the locations of military objectives, targets. I'm

13 talking about, for instance, the headquarters of all these units, again

14 located in this blue line.

15 A. Yes, they did.

16 Q. To your opinion, although I'm pretty sure I already know the

17 answer because you mentioned the Lukavica barracks a moment ago which was

18 the headquarters of the army of Republika Srpska, were all these

19 installations military targets?

20 A. Yes. Lukavica barracks was -- I knew where that was and it was a

21 military target. I could tell you that the Muslim corps headquarters was

22 downtown. It was a target but it was completely surrounded by other

23 civilian buildings. It would be very difficult, I would say, to engage,

24 and it never was in the entire time I was there.

25 Q. Let's remain theoretical. You took the example of the Lukavica

1 barracks, saying that it was the headquarters and that it could be a

2 military target, a legitimate military target. Could the same criteria be

3 applied to any headquarters?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And the fact that a headquarters is located within an area where

6 there are civilian installations, does that cancel the military nature of

7 that headquarters?

8 A. It does not cancel the military nature of the headquarters. It

9 makes the prosecution of any action against that headquarters extremely

10 difficult, if not almost impossible.

11 Q. Let's now move on and talk about specific example, the Lukavica

12 barracks. Did you know that Lukavica was a residential area in Sarajevo?

13 A. Yes, I did.

14 Q. If I continue along the lines of your reasoning, can it be said

15 that it would be hard to assess the military nature of this headquarters,

16 which, in fact, is located in a residential neighbourhood?

17 A. The Lukavica barracks is a legitimate military target, as I would

18 define it. The fact that it was also in a neighbourhood is a significant

19 consideration when you're talking about collateral damage. But compared

20 to its Muslim counterpart, it was much -- it was a cleaner situation, but

21 it was no less difficult because of the potential for collateral damage

22 with the residents and the civilians around the area.

23 Q. General, may I conclude from this that it would have been very

24 difficult to fight in urban settings, in general?

25 A. Fighting in urban settings is a very, very hard thing for a

1 military to do, any military. Fighting around Sarajevo during the time I

2 was there, it was particularly difficult for both parties.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ms. Isailovic, it's time for the break, and we

4 will adjourn.

5 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

6 --- On resuming at 10.51 a.m.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please continue, Ms. Isailovic.

8 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

9 Q. Witness, please, General, we just finished before the break when

10 you were saying that combat in Sarajevo during your mandate was extremely

11 difficult for both warring factions, and we'll continue on this. Could

12 you please look at the map on the screen and focus on the location of the

13 105th Brigade, the 152nd Brigade, and the 115th Brigade.

14 Can we agree to say that the areas of responsibility of those

15 three brigades were located in a very dense part of town? We see a lot of

16 buildings, I mean, in this brownish colour. So can we agree with that?

17 A. The areas where the brigades are includes a very dense part of

18 Sarajevo, but it would depend on where they actually deployed their troops

19 within that area. And I can't agree just based on this. It is a

20 particularly difficult area, but there are some open areas in that region.

21 Q. General, does the location of these brigades and their

22 headquarters also involve other military facilities which normally

23 accompany any unit being deployed?

24 A. Normally, yes.

25 Q. And did you acquire any information on this during your stay in

1 Sarajevo as General Gobillard's and General Soubirou's military assistant?

2 A. Can you be more specific? Because I did not normally deal with

3 brigades; I dealt specifically -- or mainly with the corps headquarters.

4 Q. Yes. I was rather calling on your general knowledge, and you

5 answered affirmatively. Then I asked you a practical question on Sarajevo

6 at that time, when you were the military assistant to these two generals.

7 If you don't know, I mean, of course you can answer by just saying that

8 you don't know.

9 A. I don't know.

10 Q. Earlier when we talked about proportionality -- and we accepted to

11 discuss this with you, and it's an important issue, but you have a lot of

12 experience in this area and you have very specific knowledge concerning

13 this. And you said that a response when you're being attacked from a

14 densely populated place is very difficult. So my question is: What can a

15 commander do when he is placed in such a situation?

16 A. The commander in a situation like that, hypothetically, has to

17 consider what I described earlier - military necessity, proportionality,

18 collateral damage. In some cases, the commander would not be able to

19 reply, as we did not reply every time that we, in the UN, were being shot

20 at. Because although we could identify a military target, because of

21 proportionality and collateral damage, we could not satisfy those

22 conditions; therefore, we did not fire back because of the surrounding

23 areas. It's that difficult. But having said that, we will go back and

24 protest to the party that did that, as our reply, our response.

25 Q. General, defending the territory that you occupy, is that a

1 military necessity?

2 A. It depends on the territory that you're defending. In the case of

3 Sarajevo where the Muslims were defending the city, yes, that was

4 required.

5 You asked me: "Defending the territory that you occupy, is that a

6 military necessity?" I mean, the short answer would be yes. But, you

7 know, why are you defending the territory in the first place? I think I'm

8 inferring from your question: Why defend Sarajevo? Am I right?

9 Q. Can we agree by saying that it's a military necessity for the two

10 military factions, the two parties involved?

11 A. In short, yes. But the circumstances where we found ourselves,

12 looking at this map, the difference was what got us to that point would

13 have been the Serbs doing enough advance and offence, and they got to the

14 point where they couldn't take the city so they stopped and dug in. So

15 you had two forces opposing each other, with the city being the objective;

16 one to defend it and one to get it.

17 Q. So if we look at the map again, can we agree to say that that blue

18 line represents the position of the BiH army and the red line is the

19 position of Republika Srpska? Do we agree on that?

20 A. Yes, we do.

21 Q. And behind that red line, to your knowledge and using your memory,

22 were there any territories that were inhabited by civilians?

23 A. Yes, there were.

24 Q. Behind that red line, were there civilian objectives or facilities

25 also, targets?

1 A. I don't think I understand "civilian objectives or facilities,

2 targets." Civilians are not targets. Can you rephrase your question,

3 please.

4 Q. Yes, I'm thinking about civilians that could be -- I'm using the

5 Geneva Protocol, you know, civilian objectives. It's a word that

6 describes not just people but also buildings, facilities, of a civilian

7 nature.

8 A. If the objective is to take a building or a city, for example, the

9 condition that the commander has to make sure is that he doesn't engage

10 "non-combatants," is the term we would use, or civilians who were not

11 part of the conflict.

12 Q. General, does this apply to all factions?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. So what about the location of the BiH army and its brigades, the

15 ones I mentioned earlier when we started?

16 A. Their problem was accentuated by the fact that you had a Serbian

17 corps surrounding the city, indicated by that red line, and they were

18 defending the city from the Serbian advance. And to do that, they found

19 themselves actually interspersed amongst the civilians. Again, this is

20 the characteristic of urban warfare. It is very hard for both the

21 defender and the attacker.

22 Q. Yes, General. I'm not a military expert. I know nothing about

23 the military. But let's talk about military advantage. In the end, isn't

24 it a huge military advantage to have all your facilities interspersed

25 within civilian objectives?

1 A. In one sense it is an advantage because it makes it harder to

2 engage, and in the other sense you are actually exposing civilians to

3 greater risk, which commanders have to take into consideration too. So

4 it's a -- you've got two considerations. There's an advantage and the

5 disadvantage.

6 Q. So, General, we can talk about a reasonable commander and the

7 standards used by a reasonable commander, and so here's my question: What

8 does this reasonable commander do? Does he just give up or continue and

9 pursue defending the interests of his party, pursuing its own military

10 necessity?

11 A. A reasonable commander would probably consider the risk to

12 civilians and try to mitigate that risk to civilians and not put them into

13 harm's way when he is, in fact, in a conflict with another military

14 force. And in the event that a military commander faces another military

15 commander who has interspersed himself in amongst civilians, it makes his

16 job far more difficult, and, as I said earlier, in some cases it would

17 prevent him from engaging that other military commander because of the

18 potential for harming civilians.

19 Q. Thank you, General. I think I understand things better now and I

20 fully agree with you regarding what you said on July 5th, 2002, when you

21 were cross-examined in the Galic case. On page 11238 - I will read this -

22 these are your words:

23 "[In English] How do you get inside to a target that is surrounded

24 by non-combatants? It is a soldier's worst nightmare."

25 A. I absolutely agree. I said it.

1 Q. [Interpretation] So let's go back to the map. Earlier you said

2 that the red line -- well, looking at the red line, we see that Sarajevo

3 was encircled. Is that true?

4 A. Yes, it is.

5 Q. But there's an entire part located close to where we have the

6 marking "102nd Brigade," where the airport is located, close to the

7 airport. Do you see that part of the map?

8 A. Yes, I do.

9 Q. And there, the red line is cut. It stops.

10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. Now, if we could please have on the map, if you could use the pen,

12 and point to the airport so that we can --

13 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Actually, I'm asking for the usher

14 to come and help move the map up so we can see the airport and the

15 surroundings. Please scroll up slightly.

16 Q. Yesterday, General, you annotated a few locations with that pen.

17 I'm sure you're familiar with the use of this electronic pen and how we

18 mark maps now. So could you please first mark on the map where the

19 airport is located.

20 A. [Marks].

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Sorry, Ms. Isailovic. Earlier you said to the

22 witness that the red line is cut, it stops, and he affirmed that. May I

23 be shown where that is on the map? And that's where the red line is cut?

24 THE WITNESS: The red line goes -- can you just clear off the map

25 again.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Where is the cut in the red line?

2 THE WITNESS: Well, there is a gap, in fact, right here. Do you

3 see where the 155 number is, sir?

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: No. Yes, yes. I see 155.

5 THE WITNESS: There is an actual gap between there, between the

6 red lines.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: But there are several gaps in the red lines.

8 [Trial Chamber confers]

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: So what was the significance of the cut in the

10 red line? I'm asking you, Brigadier.

11 THE WITNESS: It just denoted where in fact -- the airport

12 actually separated the two warring factions, and there was a little gap in

13 there where, in fact, the city wasn't completely encircled. There was a

14 little area that was left open. And it was during that -- it's in that

15 area, and using the airport, that in fact ground supply convoys for the

16 city came in and out. And in fact that's how the Muslims actually got in

17 and out of the city, too, through the infamous tunnel that went underneath

18 the airport and through that gap that went from the 155 marking, somewhere

19 in and around there, and went across into Butmir. That's how you got in

20 and out of the city.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, thank you.

22 Proceed, Ms. Isailovic.

23 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24 Q. So you talked about the tunnel. You mentioned that. So I no

25 longer need to ask the question of whether there was a tunnel or not. So

1 could you please continue with the exercise we were engaged in and

2 actually circle the airport.

3 A. [Marks].

4 Q. Thank you. And please place an A, letter A, for "airport."

5 A. [Marks].

6 Q. Now, to your knowledge and according to what you remember, where

7 was the entry and the exit of that tunnel located, that tunnel that was

8 actually going all the way under -- that was going to the runway of the

9 airport?

10 A. I never actually saw the -- got into the tunnel. The area that I

11 was told where it was, the entrance or the exit, there was one somewhere

12 around there, and the other one was somewhere around here.

13 Q. Both sides say there is an exit and an entry. Now, is it true to

14 say that after the exit, so I'm talking about the exit on the west side,

15 that after that, this is territory controlled by the BiH army?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. General, military-wise, this is quite an important means of

18 communication between units that are inside the blue line that we

19 mentioned earlier and the territory covered by the 104th Brigade that can

20 take us to Mount Igman. So this is a very -- a quite important military

21 link; right?

22 A. Yes, it is.

23 Q. And as far as you remember - so if you don't remember anything,

24 you know, just tell us - the territory after Mount Igman, did that provide

25 sufficient depth to the unit of the 1st Corps, to the BiH army?

1 A. I don't -- I'm not sure I understand what you mean by "depth."

2 Q. Well, I think it's a military expression, military jargon. I'm

3 not teaching you military terms, but I learned this. I investigated

4 military jargon. If you say what went behind, at your back, you've got

5 enough depth, you've got a good amount of territory, it's an advantage

6 military-wise to be able to have a safe back, if I can say so.

7 A. In that particular case I would agree with the use of the term

8 "depth." But in this particular case, that was the route in and out of

9 Sarajevo. So it's not depth; it's just the route.

10 Q. Yes. But there we had the Igman road, and this road was

11 controlled by the BiH army unit; right?

12 A. Yes, it was. And it was extensively used by the Muslim civilians.

13 Q. Civilians. Was it also used by the military of the BiH army?

14 A. Yes, it was.

15 Q. So then can it be considered as a legitimate military target?

16 A. It can, as long as you don't kill civilians.

17 Q. So we'll come back to the problem of how to make a difference

18 between the two.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a minute.

20 [Trial Chamber confers]

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, please proceed.

22 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

23 Q. Yesterday, you were asked to show where Lukavica is. Could you

24 please do that again on this map and place an L where Lukavica is.

25 A. [Marks].

1 Q. And --

2 A. Can you blow up that map for me, please.

3 Q. I think we have to first keep this one. So let's erase the L,

4 please. Erase the L. The A is also erased, unfortunately, so please

5 place the A again, as in "airport."

6 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, could we please have

7 this map tendered, and I would like a number, please.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, it's admitted.

9 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D44, Your Honours.

10 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Now, we have to erase everything

11 in order to be able to zoom the map, and we just need a slight zoom.

12 Q. Do you see where Lukavica is located now that it's been zoomed in?

13 A. Yes, I do.

14 Q. Please place an L next to Lukavica, and then an I on Ilidza, if

15 possible.

16 A. [Marks].

17 Q. Did you know that the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, whose commander was

18 General Milosevic, had in its area of responsibility these two locations,

19 Lukavica and Ilidza? Were you aware of that?

20 A. Yes, I was.

21 Q. To your knowledge at that time and according to your memory, did

22 those two places, Lukavica and Ilidza, communicate? How could I

23 communicate with L?

24 A. They did communicate with each other. How they did it, I don't

25 know.

1 Q. Well, according to you, what's the distance between I and L?

2 A. Between 5 and 6 kilometres.

3 Q. So if you can just remember in your head where those two locations

4 are.

5 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] And I need the original map. We

6 need to zoom back out, if possible.

7 Q. If you could keep in mind where Ilidza and Lukavica are, because

8 they're going to be very small on the map once we have zoomed out.

9 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] So can we please display the map,

10 and we don't need to tender this one. Please slightly zoom.

11 Q. And could you please place an L on Lukavica again, if you can see

12 it and locate it.

13 A. [Marks].

14 Q. And an I on Ilidza. Thank you.

15 A. [Marks].

16 Q. If you could please draw a line, a straight line, between those

17 two.

18 A. [Marks].

19 Q. To your knowledge, did the units that were within the zone of

20 responsibility of Ilidza and Lukavica move along the straight line? Could

21 they do that?

22 A. I don't recall if they did. It's probably unlikely, but I don't

23 recall how they moved back and forth to each other.

24 Q. Did Serbian civilians move along the straight line, to your

25 knowledge?

1 A. My memory is pretty foggy on this one, but there were some

2 movement across the airport that was controlled by the UN. I just can't

3 remember what the details of the moment across the airport were for the

4 people there. It's been too long.

5 Q. General, with another witness here, with Mr. David Harland -- I'm

6 sure that name rings a bell. He was a person who was in charge of

7 humanitarian affairs, so of course he was more versed in this than you.

8 He mentioned a road used by military units and by civilians on the Serbian

9 side who were on the territory controlled by the army of Republika Srpska

10 going from point I to point L, all around that red line which we have on

11 this map. So yourself, have you ever heard about this "Salvation Road"?

12 I believe it was called "Salvation Road" or "Road of Life" by the

13 Serbians.

14 A. I can't remember that.

15 Q. If Mr. Harland is right, a road of this nature, would that

16 represent a military necessity that must be defended?

17 A. It would be an important road for the Serbian army to get across.

18 That much I would agree with.

19 Q. Thank you.

20 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] I'm asking if we could please

21 tender this map and get a number.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, it's admitted.

23 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D45, Your Honours.

24 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] And now if we could have the blank

25 map again on the screen, and zooming in slightly, please.

1 Q. So, General, yesterday, when the Prosecutor was asking you

2 questions you talked about elevations and you discussed the elevations

3 that can be seen on this map; some being on territory controlled by the

4 BiH army and others on the territory controlled by the army of Republika

5 Srpska. Do you remember having discussed these elevations?

6 A. Yes, I do.

7 Q. We talked about Debelo Brdo. Could you please place a cross, an

8 X, where Debelo Brdo is located.

9 A. [Marks].

10 Q. Yesterday, you talked about the location and there was a

11 superimposition, if I could say so, of several units. So UNPROFOR and

12 both warring parties were located on that elevation at different heights.

13 Do you remember that?

14 A. I remember the Serbs were just to the south and the Muslims were

15 just below where the UN position was.

16 Q. In yesterday's transcript this is not extremely clear, which is

17 why I'm going back to the same question. Did Serbs occupy Debelo Brdo?

18 That's my first question.

19 A. No.

20 Q. Then, when you talked about the location of the army of Republika

21 Srpska, did you think about another elevation that could have been

22 occupied by this army around Debelo Brdo? There was a superimposition.

23 A. What I remember was that the UN had the best piece of ground there

24 because they were right on the very top. And the Muslims were just down

25 below and the Serbs were just down to the -- you know, on the southern

1 part of the -- of that map. It was an important piece of ground.

2 Everybody wanted it, and quite frankly, the UN had the best piece of

3 ground there to keep -- but it was something that both sides really wanted

4 to get.

5 Q. Can we agree -- I hope that we can all see that elevation all

6 together. But the slope occupied by the BiH units and the height all the

7 way to the place occupied by the UNPROFOR, all this gives a good vision of

8 the city of Sarajevo. You can really -- it overlooks the city, the city

9 as a whole. Yesterday, you talked about "Sniper Alley," for example. So

10 on that slope there is a good vision of it.

11 A. Yes, pretty good. It's a long ways away, though.

12 Q. Now, let's go back to the elevation occupied by the Serbs that was

13 close to Debelo Brdo. Do you remember the name of that other elevation?

14 A. No.

15 Q. Would it refresh your memory if I said Zlatiste?

16 A. Again, I can't remember the name.

17 Q. It doesn't really matter. The name doesn't really matter.

18 Could you describe the geographical position of that other

19 elevation that you talked about yesterday? Where was it located in

20 relation to Debelo Brdo? This was an elevation that was occupied by the

21 Serbian units close to Debelo Brdo.

22 A. What I recall were positions that the Serbs occupied, which was a

23 ridge line, that had good observation down into the city. And it was

24 along the southern red line delineating where the Serb position was, going

25 off to the east.

1 Q. Can we agree on the fact that it's even further away from the city

2 centre than Debelo Brdo?

3 A. That is true.

4 Q. Does the name Vidikovac ring a bell?

5 A. These are names that are just -- they're not in my memory right

6 now.

7 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] We will need that map for the time

8 being, because we haven't shown much. Let's have a clean version of that

9 map again. Could we zoom in to the part where the 101st Brigade is.

10 Q. General, can you see the Mojmilo mount on this map? Yesterday,

11 you put a cross on the map. This mount is, in fact, a ridge, a ridge

12 line, quite a long one. Could you please draw a line to indicate Mojmilo.

13 A. [Marks].

14 Q. Do you remember the time when you went to Lukavica? Do you

15 remember that there was a mount overlooking Lukavica?

16 A. I don't recall.

17 Q. Anyway, yesterday you said that, to your knowledge, Mojmilo mount,

18 whatever its size, was occupied by the units of the army of Bosnia and

19 Herzegovina; is that correct?

20 A. It was in Bosnian control.

21 [Trial Chamber confers]

22 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] We won't need to keep this marking

23 on the map. I would like, once again, to have the clean version of the

24 map, please. Could we zoom in on the part where the marking "105th

25 Brigade" is.

1 Q. General, yesterday we mentioned Sedrenik; do you remember? And

2 could you please put an X on Sedrenik.

3 A. If I recall, it's around here. Oh, pardon me. There it is.

4 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we erase the first X,

5 please. The first one.

6 Q. And next to the X could you please put an S.

7 A. [Marks].

8 Q. To your knowledge, Sharpstone/Spicasta Stijena, was it close to

9 Sedrenik? Could you please indicate it on the map.

10 A. My memory would say it's around this area up here. It's in the

11 north.

12 Q. Could you please put an S -- well, not an S, I guess. This is

13 Spicasta Stijena, or Sharpstone. This is located inside the blue line; is

14 that correct?

15 A. From what my memory is.

16 Q. In any case, in this part of town, the lines between both warring

17 factions were quite close. Would you agree with me on that?

18 A. Yes, they were very close.

19 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would like to

20 retain this map with the markings on it.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

22 THE REGISTRAR: That will be admitted as Exhibit D46, Your

23 Honours.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: May I just ask what this small "bb" means. We

25 have a bigger "bbr," which I think is brigade, and then a smaller "bb" in

1 several places.

2 THE WITNESS: That would be a battalion. So in the hierarchy of

3 organisations in the army, you'd have a corps, you'd have a brigade, you'd

4 have a battalion, you'd have a company, a platoon, and then a section.

5 JUDGE HARHOFF: General, could you then clarify, just to follow up

6 on Judge Robinson's question, in the middle of the map here we see

7 "105.BBR." Would that would be the 105th Bosnian Brigade that had its --

8 that was placed there? And where was its headquarters? Is that the flags

9 or ...

10 THE WITNESS: Again, just reading the map, that would be the 105th

11 Brigade's area. It appears that there were a number of battalions.

12 Inferring from the map, the headquarters would -- I'm assessing, are those

13 flags, is where those headquarters would be. But I can't read Bosnian map

14 symbols. And my knowledge doesn't go down to battalion headquarters or

15 brigade headquarters because we didn't visit them.

16 JUDGE HARHOFF: So can you help us explain what do the flags and

17 the double flags symbolise? And the square flags -- triangular flags and

18 square flags.

19 THE WITNESS: I can't answer that question, because I don't know.

20 But where the flags are, given where the battalions are, my assessment

21 would be that that would be the battalion headquarters. So, for example,

22 if you look at "2BB" and you look at the flag - I think it says 2 in

23 there, so I'm guessing right now that that would be the battalion

24 headquarters - and the one to the right of it, it might say a 1. But,

25 again, I can't read these maps.

1 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.

2 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. General, just to conclude the examination of this map, there is --

4 well, there are two symbols where you indicated S. They look like heavy

5 weaponry directed towards the line or something like that. Did you use

6 those symbols in your army as well?

7 A. We use similar symbols.

8 Q. And what do they represent, these two signs, similar to arrows?

9 A. They both look like -- the bottom one I think might be a mortar

10 and the top one some sort of Howitzer, something like that.

11 [Trial Chamber confers]

12 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. So as a commander, if you put such symbols on the map, does that

14 mean that this heavy weaponry is there?

15 A. In theory, yes.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: We have a matter not related to the proceedings

17 that I have to attend to.

18 [Trial Chamber confers]

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please continue.

20 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I just wanted to

22 point out to His Honour Judge Harhoff that it's not the Bosnian Brigade.

23 It can only be the 105th Mountain Brigade. It can't be the Bosnian

24 Brigade. I just wanted to explain to Judge Harhoff that it's the 105th

25 Combat Brigade or the Mountain Brigade.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Tapuskovic.

2 Mr. Docherty.

3 MR. DOCHERTY: I just want to register my objection to counsel

4 testifying in the case. If the witness knows the answer and knows what

5 the symbols mean, the witness can testify.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's perfectly true.

7 Let me hear from the witness.

8 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, just a question for Your Worships, should

9 I change my transportation arrangements for this afternoon?

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: I will deal with it at the break.

11 THE WITNESS: Okay, sir.

12 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Before the Chamber conferred, we had a very interesting question.

14 We were talking about the locations of heavy weaponry. Maybe you could

15 read what is already in the transcript; by this I mean the answers

16 provided by the witness so that I don't have to read them myself, and then

17 I will continue.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, continue.

19 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. General, we've put an X on Sedrenik. We've discussed Sedrenik a

21 lot already over the last few days. Do we agree that the symbols

22 representing those heavy weaponry have been placed too close from a

23 residential neighbourhood, i.e., those heavy weaponry was placed too

24 close, according to what you learned in Canada?

25 A. You can't make that conclusion just by where the symbols are on

1 the map. I mean, that's a lot of territory. And there, again, appears to

2 be a lot of open space there, too. So you'd have to see the ground

3 itself.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] I believe we still have the map on

6 the screen. Can I have the blank map again, please. Could you please

7 enlarge the part where we can read "111th vbbr."

8 Q. General, yesterday, the Prosecutor asked you questions about Mount

9 Zuc; do you remember?

10 A. Yes, I do.

11 Q. To your memory, who had control over this mount?

12 A. The Muslims.

13 Q. Can you see here, too, the symbols? To your military knowledge,

14 could you tell us what they could represent?

15 A. Again, it looks like some sort of Howitzer gun, right beside the

16 "1 bb," and it also looks like some machine-guns.

17 Q. Could you please put a Z on Zuc, letter Z, or Z.

18 A. [Marks].

19 Q. On Zuc.

20 A. [Marks].

21 Q. Where the Howitzers are, is that the place that you identified as

22 being Zuc yesterday?

23 A. I think it is, yes.

24 Q. But could you please now put a Z on Zuc, because the Z you have

25 just placed is not on Zuc.

1 A. [Marks].

2 Q. You've also identified another mount, Mount Hum; is that correct?

3 A. Yeah.

4 Q. Could you please, then, replace your first Z by an H, please.

5 A. [Marks].

6 Q. Do you remember who was in control on that particular elevation?

7 A. The Muslims had control over this whole area.

8 Q. Would you agree with me to say that all this territory between Z

9 and H has a lot of elevations, mounts?

10 A. It's very hilly, yes.

11 Q. And were all those mounts, hills or mounts - because Zuc and Hum

12 are quite high, according to what we can see on the map - are they all

13 oriented towards a part of territory which is not as hilly, as high? I'm

14 talking about the territory controlled by the army of Republika Srpska.

15 A. I just remember these two areas were dominating in this region. I

16 can't really recall what the area to the north-west was looking at, like,

17 where the Serb position was. I think it was actually a little bit lower.

18 Q. Thank you very much.

19 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

20 annotated map into evidence.

21 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we admit it.

23 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D47, Your Honours.

24 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

25 Let's now move on to another matter, namely, sniping. I would

1 like my case manager to pull up the photograph P201. This exhibit was

2 admitted into evidence yesterday. Thank you.

3 Q. Yesterday, you talked about a sniper's nest that you were able to

4 visit with General Gobillard in the spring of 1995.

5 A. Yes, that's correct.

6 Q. Do you remember where --

7 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, we have to wait for a

8 minute.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a minute, please.

10 [Trial Chamber confers]

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, please continue.

12 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] So let's go back to that

13 photograph.

14 Q. We agreed to say that here we have a sniper's nest that you

15 visited with General Gobillard in the spring of 1995. So, General, if you

16 remember, could you show us, where is the line separating the territory

17 controlled by the BiH army and the territory occupied by the other army on

18 this photograph?

19 A. The red line indicates on this -- the bottom half of the slide

20 would be the Muslim side and the top half would the Serbian side. It's

21 the best way to describe it off this map. That red line actually

22 delineates the river. Muslims were north of the river and Serbs were

23 south of river.

24 Q. So the river Miljacka is the line, and it separates the two

25 warring factions. But the three high-rises that we see and that are

1 closest to us, do you see those four sky-scrapers? The line is actually

2 going through those sky-skrapers or high-rises. Do you see them?

3 A. I see the four high-rises. They are actually north of the river.

4 In fact, there's another little one that's just behind them, and the

5 line -- don't look at the line because the line is supposed to follow the

6 line, as I was asked yesterday, where the river was. But I see the four

7 high-rises.

8 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Now I'll ask a question to the

9 registrar. We have been taught in e-court, so is it possible to make

10 markings on this very picture?

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: May markings be made?

12 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honours, that's possible.

13 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] So --

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Docherty.

15 MR. DOCHERTY: The original, since -- will it be saved in its

16 current form? Because this is a Prosecution exhibit, as it is now.

17 THE REGISTRAR: Just for clarification, the parties have the

18 option of either bringing up the original image with no markings and

19 making markings on it or bringing up an image that has already been

20 marked, making additional markings and tendering that exhibit which will

21 contain the original markings and any additional markings that have been

22 made.

23 MR. DOCHERTY: I would respectfully ask, since this is a

24 Prosecution exhibit that the Defence now seeks to alter, that we start --

25 I mean, there's only two marks on it. We could start over fresh, because

1 I'd like the Prosecution exhibit, which was introduced to illustrate a

2 particular point, left the way it is. If that can be done. Thank you.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's fair enough.

4 Did you understand that, Ms. Isailovic? You should introduce your

5 own exhibit.

6 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, but I thought --

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Can't it be done technologically? Can she not

8 have access to the same but without the markings?

9 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

10 THE REGISTRAR: The parties can access the original image with no

11 markings by referring to the original exhibit number, if it's been

12 admitted; and if it hasn't been admitted, the original 65 ter number can

13 be referred to.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Docherty can assist there now.

15 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, fine. The 65 ter number is

16 2819.

17 While it's being pulled up, there's a technical question I would

18 like to ask the registrar. Can we use two different colours in one single

19 picture? Can we make markings in two different colours? Could the

20 registrar please answer.

21 MR. DOCHERTY: That's what I was going to suggest. And if that's

22 possible, if the Defence could mark in blue, for example, I would have no

23 problem with that.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, it's much ado about nothing, then. Well,

25 yes, the Defence can mark in blue.

1 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] That's the whole purpose of the

2 exercise, actually.

3 Q. So, General, please, with the blue pen, could you please draw that

4 same line, but please don't draw it in the towers, you know, if you

5 could -- because, of course, the towers are on the other side of the

6 river. So draw the line but don't draw the line through the towers, if

7 possible.

8 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Meanwhile, may case manager has

9 pulled up a blank photo.

10 THE WITNESS: So which one do you want me to -- it's a different

11 photo.

12 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] It's not the same picture,

13 unfortunately.

14 We'll continue with the photograph that's on the screen, but could

15 we have the other -- the marked one, P201. Could we have P201 on the

16 screen, please, and we'll mark it with the blue pen.

17 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

18 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, General. We're

19 having a bit of problems with technology. Obviously it's not our strong

20 point.

21 Q. Now we have the photograph on the screen, and with the blue pen,

22 could you please draw a line along the separation line. Could you please

23 draw a blue line along the separation line, the river Miljacka, but not in

24 the towers. Just avoid drawing a line through the towers.

25 A. [Marks].

1 Q. So can we agree that the high-rises are on the territory

2 controlled by the BiH army?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And the towers are facing that red brick building that you marked

5 with a cross.

6 A. Some of them are.

7 Q. Yesterday, we took advantage of your military knowledge regarding

8 the possible use of snipers inside cities and the general use of sniping.

9 So first, for today's -- what we're doing today, could we first agree on

10 what sniping is, what the concept of sniping is, so that we all talk about

11 the same thing? When I say "sniper," what exactly comes to mind for you?

12 A. A very specialised, highly skilled shooter who has an excellent

13 field-craft in the ability to move in and out of places without being

14 seen. And his targets are of a particularly high value. And we want to

15 use him to capitalise on his marksmanship and his field-craft to get in

16 and out of positions.

17 Q. Thank you. When you're talking about the sniper gun, a sniper

18 rifle, there, again, could we agree on the concept of the sniper rifle,

19 the weapon used by the sniper, by this marksman, would be a sniper rifle.

20 Is that it?

21 A. Normally.

22 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, I have to read the

23 transcript and read my question because that's not exactly what I meant.

24 Q. What I'm interested in is the definition of that sniper rifle, of

25 that weapon.

1 A. Snipers choose weapons based on distance and what they want to try

2 to accomplish. Most sniper rifles have telescopic scopes on them and they

3 can use different calibres to decide what they want to do; heavier

4 calibres for longer ranges and maybe lighter calibres for getting in

5 close, just being able to move the thing back and forth. Snipers pick and

6 choose all sorts of different weapons based on what they have to do.

7 For example, the French had principally two sniper rifles for

8 their snipers. They had a .50 calibre Beretta, very, very large, and then

9 they also had a -- I think it was a 7.62-millimetre rifle.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ms. Isailovic, we're going to take the break now.

11 --- Recess taken at 12.16 p.m.

12 --- On resuming at 12.39 p.m.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please continue.

14 I should said to both parties that I'm not satisfied with the

15 progress being made in the trial. When time-limits are set, they should

16 be complied with. The estimates of time have been -- some of them have

17 been quite out. In one case we had two hours as the estimate and the

18 examination-in-chief was six hours and 40 minutes. The estimates that we

19 have made for the duration of the case have been based on those times that

20 have been given to us.

21 So I expect more rigour and discipline from both parties, and

22 there's no better person to begin with than the Defence. So that's what I

23 have to say to you, Ms. Isailovic. Let's have rigour and discipline and

24 focus in the cross-examination.

25 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I believe that the

1 time that the Defence will have has to do with the time that the in-chief

2 took. See, according to what has happened during the in-chief, you know,

3 I prepare my own cross.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Generally, Ms. Isailovic and Mr. Tapuskovic, you

5 have had more time than the Prosecution. I asked for a breakdown and it

6 shows that the Defence have spent more time in cross-examination than the

7 Prosecution, and fairly significantly more time.

8 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] May I say something, Your Honour?

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

10 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] There was recently a witness that

11 was examined by the Prosecution for three days. I managed to cross him in

12 one day, although I could have used more. We are really doing our best

13 for that purpose. A recent Prosecution witness testified in chief for

14 three days and my cross-examination took only one.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: I did refer to that case as six hours and 40

16 minutes spent in examination-in-chief.

17 How much time did the Prosecution spend, Mr. Court Deputy, for

18 examination-in-chief of this witness?

19 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let's proceed, and just tell me how much time

21 Ms. Isailovic has spent.

22 Please proceed.

23 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.

24 Just before I resume, I believe that the count of time can be

25 explained by Rule 92 ter. In this rule, you know, the Prosecution can

1 present, as evidence, some statements that we spent some time on earlier,

2 and I believe the time we use there, of course, must be longer than the

3 time used by Prosecution for the 92 ter witnesses.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, that is perfectly true, because they are

5 really using the shorter and abbreviated method of presenting. So I take

6 that into account. But I can assure you that I will not stand by or sit

7 and have any unfairness or injustice done to the Defence. I value

8 cross-examination, but it must be pointed, it must be relevant, you know,

9 and focused.

10 Yes, proceed.

11 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

12 Q. Let's go back to our photograph that's in front of us. Could you

13 please look at the building on which you placed a cross. Am I right to

14 say that this building is very close to the confrontation line separating

15 the two warring factions?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. General, in urban conditions, so when war is being made within a

18 densely populated area, with a lot of buildings, do the buildings located

19 on the borderline, about the same thing as what trenches would represent

20 in a meadow or in a field?

21 A. Every one of those buildings in that picture represents a trench.

22 Every one.

23 Q. Is it legitimate for the party defending the territory located

24 behind that trench, represented by a building, isn't it legitimate for

25 that party to defend its territory and to use this building, for example,

1 as a place where it would station weapons?

2 A. In this particular case, yes.

3 Q. Let's go back to what you remember regarding that sniper's nest.

4 You talked about holes that had been made in the walls, spider holes.

5 A. That's correct. There were little holes that were knocked through

6 the wall.

7 Q. There were also sandbags.

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. According to your military knowledge, what could these sandbags be

10 used for?

11 A. They could be used for shoring up holes, acting as protective

12 measures, or they could also be used as supports to rest weapons or

13 yourself on. Multiple uses.

14 Q. Those holes that you noted when you were touring that building

15 with General Gobillard, would they be identical if you want to place

16 weapons that have an optical sight or weapons that don't have an optical

17 sight? Would they be the same holes?

18 A. Yes. A hole is a hole. You can point anything out of it, with or

19 without a scope.

20 Q. Am I right in saying that there is no cause and effect

21 relationship between finding a hole and knowing that a sniper is going to

22 be used, a sniper as we defined it today?

23 A. Having a hole doesn't indicate that a sniper used it; it just

24 indicates a potential position where somebody with a rifle could use and

25 fire from.

1 Q. A plain shooter, who would be a member of one of the units of the

2 Republika Srpska army, if he wanted to shoot using a simple rifle would

3 use that same hole.

4 A. He could.

5 Q. To put it another way, the fact that there are those holes and

6 that those sandbags were there does not necessarily imply that marksmen

7 were using that spot.

8 A. It just implies that somebody was using that spot for something

9 other than what it was designed for, because a hole, spider hole, has a

10 military purpose, to either go through or shoot through, and sandbags are

11 normally designed to help defenders to use that position, to enhance it.

12 Q. So you're saying to make those shots more effective, you're

13 talking about the shots fired by a rifle or the shots made with a sniper,

14 sniper rifle, as we said today?

15 A. I do not make much difference between a rifle and a sniper rifle

16 because it has the same effect when you fire it against a target.

17 Sandbags, in positions that I saw, would make it easier for somebody who

18 want to the fire a rifle to fire at a target.

19 Q. Earlier we talked about the buildings on the confrontation line

20 and we said they could be assimilated to trenches in a field. Now I'd

21 like to ask you questions about the shots themselves and their impact on a

22 particular item that is taken as the target.

23 Are there differences to be noticed on the target of a specific

24 shot? Are there differences according to the type of rifle that's being

25 used, i.e., a plain rifle, on the one hand, and a rifle with a sight?

1 A. The impact on a target -- if you shoot a soldier, there is a

2 certain effect in impact. If you shoot a civilian, there's a different

3 impact. And there is more of a psychological impact shooting a civilian

4 than there is -- if that's how I understand your question. No? Okay.

5 Q. No. I was talking about the physical, the impact created by a

6 bullet when a bullet hits a particular object or a person, which is of

7 course a tragic event, but that happened. Can you make a difference and

8 determine whether the bullet was shot with a simple rifle or with a sniper

9 rifle?

10 A. By examination of whatever was hit by the round, you can determine

11 what kind of rifle fired it. You can't say whether or not it was a sniper

12 rifle or not, because the rifle is the same in a lot of cases. The scope

13 just gives you better accuracy. But having watched soldiers fire for 26

14 years, there are some exceptionally good shots, people who can fire rifles

15 without a scope. It's a function of distance.

16 Q. Now, let's go back to the photograph. We have the four towers

17 just opposite the line, the separation line, i.e., the Miljacka river. Do

18 you think that these towers would offer a good position towards the units

19 that are deployed on the other side of the river defending the army of

20 Bosnia and Herzegovina?

21 A. Yes, those would be potentially good positions for the other side.

22 Q. Let's take an example, and here I'm trying to take advantage of

23 your knowledge and experience. If there was a shooting between both

24 sides, i.e., between the towers and the buildings on the opposite side,

25 could it be that the civilian targets which would be stuck in the middle

1 could be hit but unintentionally, of course?

2 A. It is possible but unlikely.

3 Q. Why are you saying "unlikely"?

4 A. If we're talking about snipers, snipers are skilled marksmen.

5 They will take some time and care to line up the target, and, assuming

6 that the target is a military target, it is it unlikely that they will

7 miss. That's why they are called snipers and that's why they are as good

8 as they are. And even a rifleman, based on my experience, is normally

9 proficient in the firing of their weapon, and before they fire their

10 weapon, they do go through that shoot criteria that I said yesterday. And

11 if there is a doubt about possibly hitting a civilian -- and I've seen

12 soldiers, even in Sarajevo, not take the shot if they thought there was a

13 doubt about hitting somebody they didn't want to hit.

14 Q. General, in a space such as the one that is shown in this picture,

15 is it very likely that a bullet could make a ricochet?

16 A. Ricochets are very possible.

17 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] I would now like to turn to my

18 case manager so that she pulls up 65 ter document 2819 on the screen.

19 My apologies. I'd like to tender that photograph into evidence

20 and I would like an exhibit number.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we admit it.

22 THE REGISTRAR: As D48, Your Honours.

23 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Let's now move on to the next

24 photograph.

25 Q. General, this picture shows a different view. I'm sure you're

1 familiar with what's depicted on this picture, because we're going to have

2 a look at the Holiday Inn hotel area.

3 First of all, could you tell us where the confrontation or

4 separation line was between the two warring factions, please. Could you

5 indicate it?

6 A. It follows along the river. I won't draw through the buildings,

7 but if you follow the red line, it goes behind that building. You see

8 that line goes behind the building and, again, just follows along.

9 Q. Now, General, could you indicate on this picture what you called

10 yesterday "Sniper's Alley."

11 A. [Marks].

12 Q. Will you agree with me to say that in between the confrontation

13 line and "Sniper's Alley" there's a stretch of land quite heavily built,

14 this being part of the territory controlled by the army of

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

16 A. That's true.

17 Q. Now, the towers dominating in the background, are you in a

18 position to identify those towers and tell us what their name was?

19 A. These two towers, I think they were called the Unis towers. The

20 Holiday Inn, we talked about. And I can't remember what this tower was

21 called.

22 Q. Do you remember the building of the assembly?

23 A. That was that one right there.

24 Q. This tower located, let's say, between the assembly and the

25 Holiday Inn, do you know -- yes, this one. Do you know what its purpose

1 was?

2 A. I don't recall.

3 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] I'd like to keep that photograph

4 with its markings, knowing that I will go to back to this photograph

5 eventually. But, first of, all I would like to show to the witness parts

6 of the statement he gave in 1997.

7 Could we have an exhibit number, please.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

9 THE REGISTRAR: This will be admitted as Exhibit D49, Your

10 Honours.

11 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] I would like to ask my case

12 manager to bring up Exhibit DD00-0522. Let's move on to page 11 -- no,

13 before that, let's have a look at page 1.

14 Q. Witness, this is the first page of your statement. Do you

15 remember the time when you gave that statement to the Office of the

16 Prosecutor of this Tribunal?

17 A. I do.

18 Q. Do you recognise your signature on this document?

19 A. I do.

20 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Let's have look at page 11. I do

21 have to apologise because we didn't find this declaration in e-court, so

22 we had to photocopy my own copy. Please ignore the numbers. I have

23 numbered a few paragraphs and I have put the number 72.

24 Q. Could you please re-read that part and I will ask a few questions.

25 A. Okay.

1 Q. Now, let's leave that statement aside for a moment, and let's go

2 back to the photograph with its markings, which has now become D49.

3 General, you have had the opportunity to read your statement. Do

4 you still confirm what is in it?

5 A. I do.

6 Q. Now, I would like you to show the buildings you've identified in

7 your statement as being buildings used by the ABiH as sniping positions?

8 A. Well, as I said in the statement earlier, we had gotten reports of

9 them using the assembly building and the Unis towers.

10 Q. Would it be possible to place circles around A and U with the blue

11 pen, please.

12 A. [Marks].

13 Q. General, would you agree with me to say that those two buildings

14 and the way they were used during the conflict give a good position and a

15 good view over "Sniper's Alley"? This is the name that you use yourself.

16 A. They're good positions, yes.

17 Q. And as regards civilians and tramways, are these good positions to

18 shoot on, on these targets?

19 A. Possibly, yes.

20 Q. During your period of service in Sarajevo, did your investigations

21 show that there were other snipers' positions along this street, Zmaja od

22 Bosne, that you called "Sniper's Alley"?

23 A. Well, for whose side are we talking about now? Are we talking

24 about the north side of the river or the south side of the river?

25 Q. I'm talking about the north side of the river.

1 A. Potentially, yes.

2 Q. Could you possibly remember those positions, locations?

3 A. Well, any building. By the same token, we had no information

4 that -- as I said yesterday, I only knew of one case where allegedly the

5 Muslims were firing at their own people, and I didn't hear of anything

6 else along "Sniper's Alley" of positions that they would be using against

7 that road. But the buildings themselves.

8 Q. But, of course, on the other hand, you cannot exclude that other

9 buildings may have been used as snipers' positions.

10 A. No.

11 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Let's tender this photograph into

12 evidence first.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

14 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D50, Your Honours.

15 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Now I would like my case manager

16 to pull up on the screen 65 ter document number 1904.

17 My apologies. This is not the right document. It should be 65

18 ter document 1917.

19 Q. Yesterday, if you remember, Mr. Prosecutor showed you this

20 document.

21 A. Yes, I remember seeing that.

22 Q. General, do you remember the date or the time when General

23 Milosevic was first referred to as the commander of the Sarajevo-Romanija

24 Corps, approximately?

25 A. I know it was very early on in my tour, but I can't remember the

1 exact date. But I still recall that he was also part of the corps

2 previous to that.

3 Q. But you don't remember the exact date when he took his function of

4 corps commander.

5 A. Not exactly. It might been the May/June period, but I don't

6 know. I don't recall.

7 Q. Would you agree with me that the date of this document is June

8 25th, 1994?

9 A. Yes, it is.

10 Q. And will you agree with me, too, that on the first page of that

11 document - and I'd like you to read what is written here and then I will

12 ask you a few questions - the activities of snipers from both sides are or

13 have increased, mainly on the southern and western areas of Sarajevo. And

14 then we talk about Grbavica and a few other places as well.

15 A. That's correct, yes.

16 Q. And then after this, the document continues with a figure, average

17 number, the average number being ten per week, including civilians and

18 military.

19 A. That's exactly what it says.

20 Q. That the situation may lead to an escalation.

21 A. Correct.

22 Q. The date of this document is June 25th, 1994.

23 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] I would like the exhibit 65 ter

24 1973 to be shown.

25 This is document 1973, a 65 ter document which was admitted into

1 evidence as Prosecution Exhibit 206. Here it is. This is the

2 Anti-Sniping Agreement.

3 Q. Please read the date of this document.

4 A. It's dated the 14th of August, 1994.

5 Q. Could you please have a look at the signatures on this document.

6 Can you read them?

7 A. It is signed by Karavelic, Milosevic, Rose and Viktor Andreev.

8 And they date it the 14th of August, 1994.

9 Q. Now, once again, I'd like to take advantage of the knowledge

10 gathered during your stay in Sarajevo, and I would like to you explain to

11 us something about this agreement. This is an agreement in which some

12 notions or concepts are used, and after this agreement has been signed, it

13 is then interpreted to be implemented; and in doing so, of course, one has

14 to remember what the parties were aiming at when they did conclude that

15 agreement.

16 Now, what's interesting for me in this particular agreement is the

17 notion of "sniper."

18 A. In fact, it's the notion of sniping activities, which is not a

19 sniper. It's slightly different.

20 Q. General, to your memory, what was the purpose of this agreement?

21 Was the aim to suppress all shots coming from the sniper rifles, from all

22 rifles in general, or all the shooting coming from sniper rifles?

23 A. The intent behind this agreement was to get both parties to stop

24 shooting at each other, sniping, which was inclusive of snipers but not

25 just exclusive -- it didn't exclude everyone else. Anybody who was firing

1 at those targets, the intent here was to have everybody stop shooting.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Docherty.

3 MR. DOCHERTY: Your Honour, I apologise for interrupting

4 Ms. Isailovic's cross-examination. I'm just looking at the time. I know

5 that General Fraser was very keen to be able to travel back to Canada and

6 not be held over the weekend. I don't know if that's possible. I can

7 tell the Court that right now I have no re-examination, based on what I

8 have heard so far. I don't know if Judge Mindua has to go to the other

9 trial this afternoon. I know this courtroom is empty. The Prosecution is

10 willing to sit longer if it will help General Fraser get out of here this

11 afternoon.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, Ms. Isailovic, how much longer do you

13 intend to be?

14 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Well, Your Honour, I have many

15 issues to discuss with this witness who is, for me, very important for the

16 Chamber. I'm facing quite an uncomfortable situation, because when I

17 started my cross-examination -- well, I started it and then have I'll have

18 to stop it, but, of course, I do understand the desire expressed by the

19 General. Maybe Mr. Docherty could have thought about this issue a bit

20 earlier on. In this case, I could have adjusted my cross-examination to

21 the duration of the examination-in-chief.

22 So here, in fact, I'm being faced with quite an uncomfortable

23 situation. I would have loved to accede to the General's desire, but on

24 the other hand, of course, what is at heart here, as far as I'm concerned,

25 is to defend my client's interests. I'd rather favour the interests of

1 the defence of General Milosevic in this case

2 [Trial Chamber confers]

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: When was the General planning to travel?

4 THE WITNESS: My flight was scheduled for 3.30 this afternoon.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: I don't think you'll make that. You won't make

6 that. It's 25 past 1.00.

7 THE WITNESS: We're pretty close to when I ...

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: And when is the next flight? It's tomorrow.

9 THE WITNESS: The staff would have to find me another flight.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, you are an important witness. The evidence

11 is important to the Defence.

12 But I still want to know how much longer you plan to be,

13 Ms. Isailovic. I wouldn't like you to think that you can go on and on and

14 on and on. That will not be permitted.

15 MS. ISAILOVIC: No. I just wanted to use the same time that was

16 used by the Prosecutor.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Oh, you're well beyond that time. You're well

18 beyond that time. So don't take that course. But I don't apply those

19 times mechanically, so tell us how much longer you will be.

20 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Well, Your Honour, I need to

21 finish on the issue of sniping, a few questions, a document, and then a

22 few questions; and then I wanted to discuss two matters. But then it is

23 up to you to decide, and I will abide by your decision. But I don't think

24 that I have used more time than the Prosecutor for that witness.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, you have. Yes.

1 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Time flies.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, you have, because the direct was an hour and

3 58 minutes, and when we came back this afternoon you had already done an

4 hour and 44 minutes, when we came back from the last break.

5 I believe we are in a position to go beyond the scheduled time for

6 the adjournment at 1.45, because I have been involved in a decision which

7 would have the staff leave at 2.00, all staff. So if the staff here can

8 stay for, say, another half an hour, we could go to a quarter past 2.00,

9 at the latest.

10 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

11 I'd like my case manager to pull up 65 ter document 0211 --

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: I just make it clear that you are not to utilise

13 the time if you don't have to. I was just setting that as an outside

14 limit.

15 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] I understood.

16 Let's have a look at page 3.

17 Q. General, please, this is a document you saw with the Prosecutor

18 yesterday. "Assessment of the Results." This assessment was made on

19 September 15th, 1994, one month after the enforcement of the Anti-Sniping

20 Agreement. Is that correct?

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. So now could you please read what's on the screen. It's an

23 assessment. On the second paragraph, it says that the ideal situation

24 would be to have no shots whatsoever, to reach the figure zero, but there

25 are a few reasons to show that it would be impossible. And in the line it

1 says "because of provocation shots," that's in one of the bullet, [In

2 English] "and lost bullets increasing the confrontation line close to

3 inhabited areas."

4 [Interpretation] So we agree that there was a problem of lost

5 bullets throughout the conflict. Do we agree on that?

6 A. That was a probably, yes.

7 Q. I'll now quickly move on to another question.

8 Yesterday, we talked about the anti-sniping task force; do you

9 remember that?

10 A. Yes, I do.

11 Q. In your statement -- maybe we could take a look at it. This is

12 document DD00-0522. On page 14, please, paragraph 94, could you please

13 read it quickly.

14 You're talking about a problem regarding the investigations made

15 by UNMOs. They weren't quite reliable regarding your sector anyway. Is

16 that it?

17 A. UNMOs varied depending on which country you were dealing with.

18 Overall this sector did not rely on UNMOs. We used our own soldiers and

19 units to do the investigations where we could.

20 Q. So after obtaining information, did your sector make its own

21 report on a very specific incident? Did you make your own report?

22 A. The sector was fairly rigorous in making reports on anything that

23 it investigated. The French were very good. They would always write up a

24 report and that would be passed up to the appropriate authority.

25 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Now, if we could take a look at

1 document DD00-0581. The first page, please. I wanted to show you a

2 report on an investigation made by the sector and by UNMOs, but we're

3 having problems.

4 THE REGISTRAR: The document I have in e-court, DD00-0581, is

5 three pages but all three pages are blank.

6 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Well, we did what we were supposed

7 to do to have it on e-court. Let's move to document DD00-0575, please.

8 The document is in French.

9 Q. Is that a problem for you?

10 A. Let me read it and I'll tell you if it is.

11 Q. These two documents, the one that unfortunately was not uploaded

12 and this other one, were a combination. Could you tell us the nature of

13 this document we have here on the screen in French.

14 A. It appears to be a summary of an incident that happened on the 4th

15 of September. Sharpe seems to be reporting. And it is a chronological

16 event from 10.37 to 10.45, what happened. It looks like two shots were

17 fired.

18 Q. Could we agree to say that the figures here are the time? 10.37,

19 10.40, that's the time; right?

20 A. That is correct. That is the time when actions were taking place

21 there, and it was explained what actions took place at that time.

22 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please take a look at

23 page 2 of this document.

24 Q. And 1930, 7.30 p.m., can you read what is written at 1930.

25 A. I think it says that they had contact with the liaison information

1 officer from the 105th Brigade, BiH. They declared -- it was on the

2 position occupied by Dacoy, saying that after the investigation ...

3 Q. Yes. And then in the next paragraph it says that -- what does it

4 say, according to where the shots originated from?

5 A. I think it says that a Bravo 50 machine-gun fired on a BSA

6 position located at Orlovac, 93256250. I think that's what it says.

7 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, if we could take a look now

8 at page 3, please.

9 Q. Read what happened at 3.00 p.m.

10 A. I think it's a -- correct me if I'm wrong, but I think they

11 identified a group of three buildings 200 metres to the north. They're

12 just identifying where they thought the shots came from.

13 Q. The name Breka, does it ring a bell?

14 A. No.

15 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, the point -- it

16 would become -- firstly, if it could be shown on the document we tried to

17 have, and it couldn't be uploaded. But I have it as a hard copy.

18 We'll ask for a number for this document, please, just so that I

19 can tender it.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

21 THE REGISTRAR: I'm sorry, which document was that?

22 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Document DD00-0575.

23 THE REGISTRAR: That will be admitted as Exhibit D51, Your

24 Honours.

25 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] One last question regarding

1 sniping. If we could please call up document 65 ter 428. While it is

2 being displayed, I will ask a few questions, if I may.

3 Q. First, this name of Zmaja od Bosne road, the name "Sniper Alley,"

4 I'm interested in that. When did you hear that name mentioned for the

5 first time regarding that street, that avenue?

6 A. When I actually arrived on the ground as part of my handover, they

7 showed me where "Sniper's Alley" was. That's what we called it.

8 Q. So you're saying "I was shown." Could you tell us who showed you

9 that and who told you that that was the name of that street?

10 A. My predecessor, Christian De Bergeron, when he took me around and

11 showed me the area, and when I was going around with my boss, I mean,

12 that's when I first found out where that route was and what it was called.

13 Q. Did he tell you how this name came about, how it was coined, and

14 when it started being used?

15 A. It was coined because all of the sniping activity that took place

16 along that route. When it was actually coined, that, I don't recall. I

17 don't think he ever told me when it was. It just was.

18 Q. But sniping, when you think about the word "sniping," it's not the

19 only place where it occurred.

20 A. That is correct, but it happened to be most infamous place where

21 sniping occurred.

22 Q. At the time did you know of another route, a safer route that

23 could be used instead of that "Sniper's Alley"?

24 A. There were other routes that you could take further into town and

25 you could sneak your way through. That route happened to be where the

1 tram -- the tram used that route and that's where people used that route.

2 And we put up a lot of passive barriers along that route and other routes

3 to try to mitigate the potential threat to civilians.

4 Q. Yes, regarding that route, the fact that the tram was using it,

5 we're interested in this because we have looked at quite a few number of

6 tram incidents. So who decided whether the tram would be running or not?

7 Was it your sector that was in charge of that kind of decision?

8 A. It was the Bosnian Muslim authorities.

9 Q. General, at the time did you know how decisions were made? Maybe

10 they used to get information from your sector to assess the safety of the

11 time, to see whether it was safe or not to run the tram?

12 A. I don't ever recall them coming to us asking us for advice on

13 running the tram. I do recall that they would make assessments based on

14 their own evaluation and they would complain to us in fact if they were

15 getting too much sniping activity against the trams and asking us to do

16 more. A lot of that would come through either Minister Muratovic or

17 through the Presidency itself, through one of the three key figures, the

18 President, the Vice-Pesident, or the Prime Minister.

19 Q. Can we conclude from this that the BiH army and the BiH government

20 were controlling whether trams would be running or not?

21 A. Yes, that is correct.

22 Q. Can we agree to saying that they were a warring faction in that

23 sector on -- at the same time. Simultaneously they were also a warring

24 faction?

25 A. They were one of the three parties involved in the conflict in

1 Bosnia, yes. They were also just trying to run a city too.

2 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Let's move to a document that we

3 use quite extensively here. It's a Defence exhibit, D41. Could

4 we please pull it up and enlarge it.

5 Q. General, could you please help us to try and understand this

6 first -- this cover page. You see it on the screen, please?

7 A. Yes, I was just waiting for the --

8 Q. Outgoing -- whatever, that's the document that we're looking at?

9 A. This is a situational report for the period covering 27 February

10 from 0001 Alpha time zone to 1700 Alpha. It is from headquarters UNPROFOR

11 and -- pardon me, yeah, from BH command which was General Rose's

12 headquarters, and it's going to headquarters Zagreb and informing all the

13 sectors. So it has an info addressee block and has an internal addressee

14 block.

15 And in this particular one, three big points were aircraft fired

16 at the airport, four injured people on the tram, shooting in Sarajevo, a

17 UN convoy was fired at at Srebrenica, and then it goes into a general

18 assessment. Standard situation report.

19 Q. But what I'm interested in now is how these reports were actually

20 drafted. In Sarajevo you had a sector. There was the BH command and the

21 UNMO command. So did all three groups take place in drafting such

22 reports? Did all three groups actually provide information in order to

23 compile that report for that very day. Is that how it worked?

24 A. Everybody in the chain of command was responsible for meeting

25 information requirements for their higher headquarters. Simplistically we

1 would -- the force commander up in Zagreb would be asking for a report at

2 a certain time per day that would cover a certain period of time. General

3 Rose or Smith would have to comply with that, and they would put in the

4 information that the force commander was looking for and what also

5 transpired during that day. In turn, my headquarters would have to reply

6 to that, to give them the information that they needed to fill that report

7 out for the force commander and for the Bosnia-Herzegovina commander, read

8 Rose and Smith.

9 It was a -- it was a big pyramid series of reports and returns

10 that meets not only your commander's requirement but the requirements of

11 your higher and telling people what was going on during the day. In this

12 particular case, three major incidents were reported that were shown right

13 there at the message.

14 Q. So this document is 23 pages long. If you could please help us

15 understand how it's organised.

16 So can we please move on to page 2. It starts with an

17 assessment. And then paragraph 3 it says "faction activity." And, for

18 example, regarding the tram. After that figure 8, could you please read

19 that passage, starting there.

20 A. The passage starting at 8. "Eight times small arms rounds were

21 fired at a tram near Holiday Inn" - and gives the grid - "injuring four

22 (not confirmed) people. The origin is assessed as being in the Vrbanja

23 bridge/red building area" - gives a grid - "where a fire-fight between

24 both factions occurred at the same time. The tram service was halted. A

25 proposed reconnaissance of the crew pack area was cancelled due to

1 non-cooperation" --

2 Q. Thank you. Finish off with the tram. When the sector is being

3 mentioned, Vrbanja bridge/red building area, and then right after that

4 there's a series of figures. What exactly does this represent?

5 A. Those figures are map coordinates that help people go to a map and

6 find out where the Holiday Inn is, for example, or where Vrbanja

7 bridge/the red building area is so they can actually see a map and put

8 together the details in this report to a map.

9 Q. So, those BP -- that BP with those figure, like BP 912589, does

10 this help find a sector or a very specific point on the map?

11 A. It helps to find a very specific point. Every map has got both a

12 Alpha and numeric reference. You have to know which maps we're looking

13 at. You go, first of all, to Bravo Papa, and then you go to that grid

14 number. 912 is the first three numbers, they're important, 589, it's

15 called in -- in military jargon it's a six-figure grid reference which

16 will give you an actual point on the ground. Just to help you to

17 visualise what -- where it is we're talking about.

18 Q. Yes, one more thing. In the report, we find out that this

19 incident with the tram is on three different places in the report.

20 Because on page 9, for example --

21 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] If we could please move to

22 page 9 and show it on the screen.

23 Q. Here after the heading is paragraph 2, Sector Sarajevo. And on

24 the fourth paragraph in Sector Sarajevo, could you please read that again,

25 starting at "a tram travelling." Could you please read it out loud?

1 A. "A tram travelling between BP 910593 and BP 907592, was fired at,

2 reportedly resulting in one confirmed civilian casualty and possibly three

3 other casualties. The confirmed casualty suffered a leg injury. The

4 estimated origin of fire was" -- and it gives where that was. "Tramway

5 service ceased following the incident. During the same time period, both

6 sides were involved in a fire-fight 300 metres away in the area of the

7 Vrbanja bridge," and gives the location, and I think that it says,

8 "machine-gun confirmed has been -- machine-gun was been attributed to

9 both the BiH and BSA for the event overall."

10 I'm not sure what that CFV means.

11 And then it goes to say what happened at 0950. "A few small arms

12 bursts were fired at an aircraft."

13 Q. Yes, thank you. We wanted to obtain your assistance for that "MG"

14 and then "CFV," because I thought that CFV meant cease-fire violation. Am

15 I right in having guessed that?

16 A. Yeah. That's -- that's a good deduction. Yeah.

17 Q. And MG?

18 A. The way I read that would be machine-gun.

19 Q. So in the report, there's also mention of the weapon that was

20 used. Is that it?

21 A. It appears from the reading of this that that's what it is saying,

22 yes.

23 Q. And also, it says [In English] Vrbanja bridge.

24 [Interpretation] So when you're saying -- when it is mentioned

25 like that, is it -- could it be an area that would be wider and broader

1 than just the plain Vrbanja bridge? Is that -- or -- or is it the Vrbanja

2 bridge and only the Vrbanja bridge?

3 A. I can't tell from reading this report how it transpired from this

4 report. You would have to go down to the report from the next lower level

5 and ask -- and get more details on what happened at that incident.

6 Q. Yes, but in that same report, this is also mentioned on page 23,

7 and there the UNMOs are mentioned. Paragraph H, please. Paragraph H, as

8 in Hector. Could you scroll down to H?

9 Here this incident is mentioned for a third time. This is made --

10 compiled from information obtained by UNMOs, and there's quite a

11 discrepancy between what was described on page 2 and what was described on

12 page 9. Discrepancies mainly have to do with the number of shots. Would

13 you agree with me?

14 A. This is not unusual that in an incident like this when you get

15 multiple people reporting you will get multiple pieces of information, and

16 you'll have to piece it together like a detective to figure out what

17 happened.

18 I think what is clear is one female was hit in the leg and the

19 tram was shot. The number of rounds fire, I mean, it's pretty hard. You

20 have to figure out, you know, visual reports for people coming -- how many

21 rounds did they see, how many holes were in the tram. It's not uncommon

22 that you get a lot of information that's not quite synchronised that you

23 have to piece it together. It's a difficult process.

24 Q. My last question regarding this report is the following. There's

25 information on specific evidence in three places. So, according to you,

1 is there one part of the report that takes priority over others or not?

2 Because this could be quite confusing for somebody reading this report.

3 It's hard to understand, and -- so is one part taking priority over the

4 others?

5 A. No. How the report is normally written is you get the bottom line

6 up front with the bullets of what was important, that the commander who

7 sends out the report wants his commander, his boss above him, to note.

8 The report will then start off with a general overview of the situation in

9 his specific area of responsibility. In this case, the report would have

10 been from -- Bosnia and Herzegovina, the whole country. Then each sector

11 then goes into more and more detail. So the further you get into the

12 report, the more detail you get on incidents and whatnot. And then there

13 is a whole series of routine reports on things as much as -- like, how

14 much fuel you have, how much food you have, just routine matters. So the

15 further you get into it, more and more detail.

16 And a whole bunch -- if you looked at the distribution list, a

17 whole bunch of people read this report and take a whole bunch of things

18 out of it for their own purposes. But its intent is to paint a picture of

19 what is going on, to give enough information, accurate information, so

20 that things like what we talked about earlier for General Rose to go and

21 talk to the people and to say, Look, this is happening, we need to get

22 control over this. And the importance of reports is to get the

23 information up as fast as possible, and sometimes that information is

24 truncated. It's complicated and not completely accurate, and over the

25 days they would have refined this.

1 Q. But overall can we conclude out of this report that there was an

2 exchange of fire and that as a consequence the tram was shot, the

3 consequence of this exchange of fire. Is that something that could be

4 inferred from this report without really going into the details?

5 A. I also read in the report that, in fact, there appears to almost

6 two things happening here. This was an engagement at a bridge, and there

7 appears to have been some sort of sniping activity on the tram. So we

8 could have actually two incidents actually being reported in one

9 paragraph. That's how I'm -- I'm actually inferring from this report.

10 So if the allegation is did the shooting from the Vrbanja bridge

11 actually hit the tram, I'm reading something else here. I'm reading the

12 report the tram was actually specifically targeted, from what the words

13 are saying here, "sniper fire against a tram." That is a very deliberate,

14 definite action. That's what it says there, and that's what I would take

15 away from that paragraph H.

16 Q. So out of this report, do you read that it was deliberate, a

17 deliberate action?

18 A. What I read from this is, is it appears from paragraph H the tram

19 was sniped at.

20 Q. But of the two other paragraphs, could you be as sure? Because as

21 I said earlier, the -- if incidents is related in those three places in

22 the report, so are the two others as sure?

23 A. Well, from the earlier paragraph, it -- all it was was a statement

24 that there was a fight going on at the Vrbanja bridge. There was no

25 direct correlation made from there that the fighting there actually

1 impacted on the tram. In fact, this tells me, gives me for detail from

2 that to say I think there were two things happening in the same time

3 period; a fight at Vrbanja, and sniping against a tram. That's what I'm

4 getting out of this report.

5 Q. Can we look at page 2 again, please, then. Page 1 -- A,

6 paragraph A. Sector Sarajevo, paragraph A. Out of this paragraph, out of

7 this report ...

8 A. Well, again, having read the more details, again I would infer

9 from this that while there might have been fighting going on at Vrbanja

10 bridge, someone in this area might have directly targeted and sniped at

11 the tram at the same time. Because it -- again, it's -- when I put those

12 two pieces together, that's kind of the picture I'm getting when I read

13 this report.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: I have just been informed that --

15 [French on English channel]

16 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: If that is so, then I owe Judge Mindua an

18 apology. He will have no break whatsoever.

19 JUDGE MINDUA: It's okay.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just five minutes. Five minutes -- five

21 minutes.

22 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise in advance. Everybody

23 is going to hate me. But one last question.

24 Could you pull document DD00-0573.

25 Your Honour, this is an order from the commander of the 1st Corps

1 of the BiH army. Unfortunately, we have no translation in English. But

2 maybe the interpreters could help us. All I need is the translation of

3 two sentences in this order.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, can that be translated.

5 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes. So today we did mention a

6 few personalities, Mr. Karavelic, for example. He was the commander of

7 the 1st Corps of the BiH army. And could you please read the following

8 sentence? I will read it, actually. The heading is: "Treatment of

9 UNPROFOR forces. UNPROFOR forces are to be treated in the following

10 manner. The units being infiltrated into the demilitarised zone through

11 the 20-kilometre exclusion zone past the UNPROFOR forces are to be taken

12 in full secrecy. The bringing in and the deployment of units is to be

13 covered up and camouflaged. Units attacking from the front lines in the

14 exclusion zone and in the UNPA zone, in accordance with the agreement

15 dated the 13th of August, 1993, in the stage of being brought in, in the

16 approach stage and the stage when they come into contact, should also take

17 measures to cover up this activity until the units are brought" --

18 Q. Have you heard this? And could you read the date that is written

19 on this document. If we could scroll up a little. Scroll -- scroll the

20 other way around, please. Scroll up.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: This is the last question.

22 MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes.

23 Q. The date, please?

24 A. 30th of the 9th, 1994.

25 Q. So here comes my last question. Do you remember an event that

1 occurred on October 6th, 1994, when the units of the BH army going through

2 the safe area actually slaughtered 19 members of a health corps belonging

3 to the army of Republika Srpska?

4 A. I do recall the incident. I also -- my understanding was it was

5 not a completely -- it wasn't a complete health unit. In fact, it was a

6 Serbian headquarters that had a health staff attached to it, and it was a

7 violent attack. I do recall that.

8 I do recall that -- in fact, I think it was the Serbian corps had

9 asked us to go and try to find one individual, a female, who was not

10 accounted for. We went back to General Karavelic and asked him if he knew

11 about the whereabouts of this one person that was unaccounted for, and he

12 did not know and -- but he said he would look. We never did find out what

13 happened to that female.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. We must stop now.

15 Any re-examination?

16 MR. DOCHERTY: No, Your Honour.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Brigadier, that concludes your

18 evidence. We thank you for giving it and you may now leave.

19 In any event, we will be adjourning now.

20 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.17 p.m.,

21 to be reconvened on Monday, the 12th day

22 of February, 2007, at 9.00 p.m.

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