Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 4781

1 Friday, 20 April 2007

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.

7 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

8 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.


10 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit.

11 You may begin, Mr. Docherty.

12 MR. DOCHERTY: Good morning, Your Honour. Good morning,

13 Mr. President.

14 Your Honour, one short matter, and it is all right if the witness

15 is here before I commence. This witness is a serving officer in the Dutch

16 Armed Forces and like the officer that we had here a few weeks ago has

17 been brought to the Tribunal from active service in of an Afghanistan. I

18 have 45 minutes on direct. I do not anticipate using all of this. And I

19 have told the Dutch army, which is quite concerned about scheduling, that

20 I believe that the witness will be free to go at 1.00 this afternoon or

21 earlier, and I just say that for the information of those present.

22 Sir, could you please begin by--

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please bear in mind, that while we will try to

24 accommodate the witness, the business of the court takes precedence.

25 MR. DOCHERTY: I never doubted that, Mr. President, but I also

Page 4782

1 didn't want to put that on the record at quarter to 1.00, which I think

2 would be not desirable.

3 Examination by Mr. Docherty:

4 Q. Sir, could you please begin by introducing yourself, tell us your

5 name and date of birth.

6 A. I'm Ronald Eimers, I'm a Dutch citizen, and I was born on December

7 20th, 1961.

8 Q. What is your occupation?

9 A. I'm an officer in the Dutch army.

10 Q. How long have you been in the Dutch army?

11 A. Since March 1983.

12 Q. And in the Dutch army, what rank do you currently hold?

13 A. I'm an infantry major.

14 Q. What is your current assignment with the Dutch army?

15 A. I'm the OPs officer with an armoured infantry battalion deployed

16 in Afghanistan right now.

17 Q. Major Eimers, on the 10th of November, 1995, did you meet with

18 people from this Tribunal and give a statement.

19 A. Yeah. That was the first time I was asked to reveal any

20 information about my period serving as an UNMO in Sarajevo?

21 Q. And on the 13th of October of 2006, did you meet again with people

22 from the Tribunal and give a statement?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Since you came to the Hague the day before yesterday, have you had

25 a chance to review those statements in the English language?

Page 4783

1 A. Yes, I have.

2 Q. And when you did that, did you find that those written records of

3 the statement accurately showed what you had said on those two occasions?

4 A. Yes, I have.

5 Q. If we were to ask the same questions that the investigators asked,

6 today, would we get the same answers that you gave on those two-- on those

7 two earlier dates?

8 A. Yes.

9 MR. DOCHERTY: Mr. President, at this time, I tender those two

10 statements. The one from 1995 has 65 ter number 3112. The one from 2006

11 has 65 ter number 3113.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We admit them.

13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter number 03112 becomes Exhibit

14 P584. 65 ter number 03113 becomes P585.


16 Q. Major, in answering a question a couple of manipulates ago, you

17 made reference to being an UNMO in Sarajevo. Can you tell the Court what

18 month and date you began your UNMO Sarajevo in -- I'm sorry, month and

19 year, and what month and year you ended your UNMO service in Sarajevo?

20 A. I started in October 1994 until April 1995.

21 Q. During your time in Sarajevo, what part of the Sarajevo area were

22 you stationed in?

23 A. For the first week, I was stationed in an UNMO team in Vogosca in

24 the north of Sarajevo; and the rest of my period, I was staged in

25 Hrasnica, which is in the south of Sarajevo.

Page 4784

1 Q. And just for refreshing memory, Hrasnica is that area sort of

2 sandwiched between the airport and Mount Igman; is that correct?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. Okay. Major, during the time that you were in Sarajevo and,

5 specifically, during the time that you were in Hrasnica, could you tell us

6 in two or three sentences what your duties were. What was your job? Why

7 were you there?

8 A. In the first couple of weeks, I served as a team member. Later

9 on, I became the team leader. The tasks that we were to fulfil was to

10 observe what was going on in that area from the military perspective, so

11 what was going on between both warring factions where the front lines

12 were, and actually had an all the actions were from the military point of

13 view.

14 And, secondly, to monitor what was going on on the civil side,

15 say, the humanitarian aspect.

16 Q. All right. So the second part, would that be more certain with

17 civilians?

18 A. Correct, yeah.

19 Q. Now, I'm going to switch topics a bit here, Major, with my next

20 question.

21 During your career in the Dutch armies infantry, have you had the

22 occasion to command units that have mortars within them?

23 A. Yes, I have.

24 Q. Can you tell the Court, briefly, what that experience consists of?

25 A. For two years, have I been a company commander; and, in my

Page 4785

1 company, I had a mortar squad which I directly commanded and I was

2 responsible for its training and its operational deployment.

3 Q. All right. And at other times in your career, even if you are not

4 commanding mortars, have you had occasion as an infantry officer to use

5 mortars or to interact with mortar crews?

6 A. I have up till now.

7 Q. And based on that experience, are you able to tell by observing a

8 mortar crew whether they are good at what they are doing?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. All right. And you chuckle when you say that. Why is that?

11 A. Well, the fact is that we are deploying mortars right now in

12 Afghanistan, and I'm currently working with them on a day-to-day basis.

13 Q. Okay. While in you were in Hrasnica, did you have opportunity to

14 observe the work of mortar crews within the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps of the

15 army of Republika Srpska?

16 A. Yes, especially during my first week when I was deployed in

17 Vogosca. We, on a day-to-day basis, met the crews that were in the hills

18 north of Sarajevo.

19 Q. And based on that experience, was that enough of an opportunity

20 for you to form an opinion as to how good these crews were as -- as mortar

21 crews?

22 A. Officially, they were, at that time, only there to do maintenance

23 to the mortar pieces and the artillery pieces that were officially in the,

24 how do you call it, Weapons Collection Point. But, like I said, we talked

25 to them on a day-to-day basis, and we, yes, could have a fair opinion

Page 4786

1 about their skills and drills.

2 Q. Later on, in Hrasnica, did you observe mortar fire when it fell,

3 that was fired from Sarajevo-Romanija Corps mortars?

4 A. Well, we never actually observed falling of the grenades, but we

5 did observe the results of that.

6 Q. And based -- would observing those results give you a basis for

7 drawing any conclusions about the quality of the mortar crews who had

8 fired those grenades?

9 A. When I look back on the context in which the fire actually was

10 fired, I'm pretty sure that they were always pretty accurate and they must

11 have known what they were targeting.

12 Q. Now, I want to elaborate on a couple of points in your second

13 statement, the one from 2006, and specifically I'm going to go through

14 paragraphs 36 and 37.

15 In paragraph 36, you make reference to UNMOs occasionally needing

16 to arrange cease-fires. Do you know what I'm referring to?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Can you give the Court some examples or a description, whatever is

19 easiest for you to explain, when it was that an UNMO would need a

20 cease-fire in order to carry out that UNMO's job?

21 A. Well, there were several occasions in which civilians got hurt

22 during military exchange of fire, occasions in which there were

23 casualties, and we saw it fit and our duties to relieve them from the

24 areas that they were at that moment in and get them to safety; or at

25 moments when actually UNMOs were in danger and we tried to get a situation

Page 4787

1 in which we could get out the cross-fires.

2 Q. All right. Did you yourself personally ever have to arrange one

3 of these short cease-fires?

4 A. Definitely, yes.

5 Q. And did you speak to colleagues of yours who had also had to

6 arrange these short cease-fires?

7 A. Yes. That was pretty easy, because there was one operational

8 radio net for all UNMOs in Sarajevo. So whenever a situation like that

9 occurred, every UNMO in the area in the vicinity of a radio would listen

10 in and hear what was going on.

11 Q. All right. Based on that, can you tell the Court what procedure

12 would UNMOs follow if they needed to have a cease-fire for half an hour,

13 20 minutes, what have you. In order to get some civilians out or in order

14 to get themselves out, what would they do?

15 A. First of all, we would call in to our OPs officer in the PTT

16 building and, secondly, we would call into the guy called Lima, which was

17 the LO on the BSA side and actually lived in Lukavica Barracks, or to what

18 we referred as Papa. He was the LO on the Bosniak side.

19 Q. All right.

20 A. They would do their business then inside the HQs, and we would get

21 confirmation that the fire would be stopped.

22 Q. Now, you mentioned this person Lima, and I take it that's not the

23 real name. That as the radio call sign?

24 A. That's the call sign of the guy, because the UNMOs in Lukavica HQ

25 shifted, of course, as well. Most of the time there were two, and their

Page 4788

1 call sign was Lima.

2 Q. And was Lima always in Lukavica Barracks?

3 A. No, it was not. They had to do their administrative patrols,

4 they had to bring in their reports to PTT building, et cetera, but,

5 basically, their station was Lukavica Barracks.

6 Q. And you mentioned a moment ago they actually had their

7 accommodation in Lukavica Barracks?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. When you or your colleagues called Lima, if the request was agreed

10 to, do you have an estimate of typically how long it took before fire

11 ceased?

12 A. Especially when the LOs were inside Lukavica Barracks, it would

13 take about five minutes.

14 Q. And during the time that you were an UNMO in Sarajevo, was there

15 an opportunity for you to see the kind of communication equipment that the

16 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps had?

17 A. No. I have never personally witnessed the actual equipment they

18 used, but I was told by the guys called Lima that they had very modern

19 equipment to scan our radios. So the actual radio message from us wasn't

20 that necessary and the action of Lima never was that necessary, because

21 they knew what we were radioing.

22 Q. If I could jump in at this point with a follow-up question.

23 Did Lima describe to you the equipment was used for Lukavica to

24 communicate with Sarajevo-Romanija Corps units in the field around

25 Sarajevo?

Page 4789

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Could you tell the Court what Lima told you about

3 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps' ability to communicate with units in the field?

4 A. They used radios and telephone land lines.

5 Q. From a military point of view, how sophisticated were the

6 communications within the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps? How advanced?

7 A. I guess it is fair to say that they used the same kind of means

8 that I used in my army.

9 Q. Now, during the time that you were an UNMO in Hrasnica, did you

10 also have the occasion to meet with small unit commanders within the

11 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps?

12 A. During my stay in Hrasnica, I once had a longer meeting with the

13 brigade commander in Ilidza. It was during the cease-fire period, and he

14 showed us his positions in the east -- sorry, in the west of the Hrasnica

15 area.

16 Q. Besides this meeting with the brigade commander during the

17 cease-fire period, were there other occasions when you met with commanders

18 of other small units, maybe on a briefer or a less extended basis but,

19 nonetheless, met with them and talked with them?

20 A. No. The only other time when I met with commanders was in my

21 first week when I was in Vogosca, and the only meeting I then had with one

22 of the commanders was during a funeral. So it was very brief and not

23 about military aspect.

24 Q. During any of these conversations, did you talk with small unit

25 commanders, whether it was the brigade commander or one of these other

Page 4790

1 short meetings in Vogosca. Did you have any conversations about how much

2 independent decision-making authority they had?

3 A. No, not that specific. But I was always under the impression that

4 it was a tight chain of command.

5 Q. When you say you are "always under the impression there was a

6 tight chain of command," what do you base that impression on? What facts

7 did you observe that led you to form that impression?

8 A. The way that the military hierarchy inside their ranks was obvious

9 gave me the impression that they were doing their things in a military

10 perspective that I was very familiar with. So considering the situation

11 that the entire Sarajevo area was not that big, and they had the right

12 means of communication, it was clear to me that they would have a proper

13 chain of command and proper lines of communication, just like I was used

14 to.

15 Q. Just like in the Dutch army?

16 A. Yes, correct.

17 Q. Now, were you ever -- during the time that you were travelling

18 around the Sarajevo area, there were a number of checkpoints in the area;

19 is that correct?

20 A. Yeah. The areas that were not immediately covered by trenches,

21 especially the roads, were always occupied with checkpoints from both

22 sides.

23 Q. And I want to limit this for now to the checkpoints by the army of

24 Republika Srpska, the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. Were you ever stopped at

25 those checkpoints or held up at those checkpoints?

Page 4791

1 A. Yes, I was on a number of occasions.

2 Q. And did you ever have a conversation with the people manning the

3 checkpoints about whether they had the authority on their own to make the

4 decision whether to stop you or whether to let you proceed about your

5 business?

6 A. We always made conversation obviously because you wanted to get

7 through; but on a number of occasions when we were definitely stopped, we

8 tried to find out why and it was made clear to us that it was because it

9 was ordered so, and especially because they knew that my team was from the

10 Bosniak side. They knew that getting to Mount Igman, especially in the

11 winter, for us it was absolutely needed to cross these checkpoints to use

12 the what was called the Olympic road to get to the higher ground of Mount

13 Igman, which was part of my team's AOR as well. They knew that if we

14 couldn't cross they would stop us and, therefore, limit freedom of

15 movement completely.

16 And on a number of occasions -- occasion, we had this

17 conversations and it was made clear to us that the order came way from the

18 top to stop us, and they would still be freedom of movement for the other

19 team, especially those that were deployed on the Serb side. But for the

20 Bosniak side teams, we would be stopped and sent back.

21 Q. I'm going to move on now to paragraph 37 of your second statement,

22 in which you say that it was your opinion that were there no "rogue

23 elements" - those were your words - operating in the Sarajevo area. First

24 of all, do you stand by that statement today?

25 A. Yes, I do. I have never seen any of those elements operate or

Page 4792

1 even present.

2 Q. All right. And, lastly, speaking again of liaison officers, you

3 talked about Lima who was an SRK officer inside Lukavica. Did the UNMOs

4 also have liaison officers inside Lukavica?

5 A. Yeah, that's what I said. The guy called Lima was an UNMO.

6 Q. Oh, okay.

7 A. He had direct contact with liaison officers from the Corps.

8 Q. I apologise. I think I misunderstood. I thought Lima was the

9 call sign of the SRK liaison officer?

10 A. No, no.

11 Q. It is the UNMO liaison officer.

12 A. Correct.

13 Q. And just to be clear, that UNMO liaison officer would then speak

14 to an SRK opposite number?

15 A. Correct.

16 Q. Okay. Thank you for the clarification.

17 In that you were both UNMOs, you and people filling the Lima job,

18 did you ever speak with those UNMO liaison officers about conversations

19 they had had inside Lukavica Barracks with officers of the

20 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps?

21 A. Every now and then, but very briefly.

22 Q. Were there conversations that you had with UNMO liaison officers

23 about things SRK officers had said, regarding level of response they would

24 make to Bosnian attacks or damage inflicted on the Serbian side by Bosnian

25 attacks?

Page 4793

1 A. Yes. It was made clear to them and, therefore, to the entire UNMO

2 community that whatever attacks would be launched on the Serb side,

3 whether it was military or civilian, would be retaliated at least twice as

4 hard.

5 Q. During your time as an UNMO in Hrasnica and the observations that

6 you made of the situation, was that prediction of that threat in fact

7 carried into action, in your opinion?

8 A. There was a couple of times that we got word that there were Serb

9 civilians killed on one day, and then we could predict the next day we

10 would get mortars incoming in the area where I lived, yes. And that

11 actually happened.

12 MR. DOCHERTY: Mr. President, Your Honours, that concludes the

13 direct examination. I have no more questions in chief for the witness.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic.

15 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours. My

16 learned friend Mr. Docherty was very concise, and I will do my best to

17 conclude my cross-examination as soon as possible and that Mr. Eimers will

18 be able to resume his professional duties soon

19 Cross-examination by Mr. Tapuskovic:

20 Q. Good morning, Mr. Eimers. I appear for Mr. Dragomir Milosevic

21 here as his Defence counsel. My name is Branislav Tapuskovic,

22 Attorney-at-law, and I would like to question about some assertions

23 contained in your statement. I would appreciate it if you could be as

24 precise as possible in your answers and brief in the interests of time,

25 which is always pressing here.

Page 4794

1 First of all, I would like to ask you about the statement you gave

2 on the 13th of October, 2006 because, in a way, it is more precise in

3 explaining the matters you have dealt with in your first statement. But I

4 would also like to go through your first statement, given on the 10th and

5 11th October, 1995. That's Prosecution Exhibit P584. I would single out

6 some passages in that statement that deal with general matters, and we

7 will go into details in your second statement.

8 You have the statement in front of you, and you can confirm that

9 it indeed reflects your answers to the questions of investigators. Is

10 that correct?

11 A. That's correct.

12 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we move to page 2.

13 Q. In this first paragraph, if you would be so kind as to confirm,

14 you were a member of the infantry. You did not specialise in mortars at

15 the time.

16 A. At the time I was in the infantry, yes, and my experience with

17 mortars were limited then as to now.

18 Q. We see here that you said in the former Yugoslavia you were from

19 the 26th October, 1994 until the 26th of April, 1995. Is that correct?

20 Was your last day the 4th of April? It's written in the second paragraph.

21 A. The 4th of April was my last day in Sarajevo, and the 26th of

22 April was the last day in the mission.

23 Q. I'm asking this because the 4th of April is an important moment

24 that the Trial Chamber should learn certain things about, but you were

25 first in Vogosca which falls within the area of responsibility of the

Page 4795

1 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps; is that correct?

2 A. That's correct. Like I already said, during the first week, I

3 served in the Vogosca team.

4 Q. Since you spent eight days there, could you explain to the Trial

5 Chamber the geographical position of Vogosca relative to the hills above

6 it? Was it in the foot of Zuc hill in a depression, in a valley?

7 A. The position of the accommodation was in the centre of Vogosca,

8 and the area of operations was limited to the -- to the east to the Blazuj

9 area and -- sorry to the west to the Blazuj area; and to the east, it

10 covered the hillsides over-watching Sarajevo until the -- the area of the

11 television tower. So the area just over Sarajevo, north of Sarajevo, was

12 inside the area of operations of the team.

13 Q. Mr. Eimers, I'll try to simplify my question. Vogosca was at the

14 foot of mountains, or rather, hills that were under the control of the BH

15 army. It was below Zuc mountain and Hum.

16 A. Well, either I don't get the question correct or, otherwise, I

17 would have to say that the Vogosca area was controlled by the BSA and not

18 by the BH army.

19 Q. Maybe I was really not clear. I know that Vogosca was under the

20 control of the Bosnian Serb army, but who controlled Zuc hill and was

21 Vogosca at the foot of that hill? Could you confirm that Zuc hill was

22 under the control of the BH army?

23 A. I cannot confirm that simply because I don't remember the name Zuc

24 hill, and therefore I cannot point out where it actually is.

25 Q. I appreciate that you can't remember the name, but was Vogosca at

Page 4796

1 the foot of a hill that was controlled by the BH army?

2 A. Vogosca was at the foot of a hill, and even more south it was

3 controlled by the BH army. But like I said before, I can't point out the

4 actual location that you're referring to.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: If it were shown to you on a map, would that

6 help?

7 THE WITNESS: Probably, yeah.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Why don't you show it to him on a map?

9 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I don't think that

10 would be necessary because the answer I got from the witness is that

11 Vogosca was indeed at the foot of a hill. He just can't remember the name

12 of the hill, but he confirmed that it was at the foot of a hill.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well.

14 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. I have just a few questions with regard to this statement, as I

16 said. This was page 2 in B/C/S and page 3, paragraph 7 in English. Now

17 we are on page 4 in B/C/S.

18 Do you see the paragraph that begins with the words: "After my

19 arrival at Hrasnica on 8 November." Could you please focus on the third

20 sentence of that paragraph that says: "At the beginning of my stint in

21 Hrasnica, there was not that much shelling."

22 Could you confirm that it was a period in which there were not

23 many of those incidents, militarily speaking?

24 A. In the beginning of my stay in Hrasnica, there was a lot of

25 military activity, but it was not shelling, no.

Page 4797

1 Q. Thank you.

2 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we now look at English page

3 4, and it's page 5 in B/C/S.

4 Q. Second paragraph in the English version says: "As from 20th

5 November 1995, the attack on Bihac started and we were not allowed to go

6 out. So, in that period, we did not conduct any investigations. After

7 the air-strikes of 21st November 1994, it was relatively quiet in my

8 area."

9 Could you tell me, first, what kind of air-strikes occurred in

10 November 1994?

11 A. In that period of time, NATO airplanes conducted air-strikes

12 somewhere in the -- in the theatre, and the impact of that was that we

13 really didn't know which way the situation from the military point of view

14 concerning the UNMOs was going. It happened before and the UNMOs were in

15 those periods that the air-strikes happened before really under pressure.

16 And there was no telling at that time which way it was going to go

17 with things like freedom of movement and the fact that we were deployed

18 outside military barracks and living inside civilian areas. And during

19 the first phase, we were ordered to stay in the house, and like I said, it

20 was a difficult to say which way it was going to go. Eventually, the

21 situation cleared up and we were allowed to do our job again.

22 Q. These air-strikes --

23 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]

24 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. These air-strikes did not occur in the area of responsibility of

Page 4798

1 the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps; in other words, not in the area of Sarajevo,

2 if I understood you correctly?

3 A. No, that's correct.

4 Q. And that was the reason why your superiors gave you the order not

5 to leave your compound. There were no other activities that would be

6 dangerous to you, were there?

7 A. No. The fact that we were ordered to stay in our accommodation

8 did not come from the UNMO chain of command, who at that time was relative

9 to the fact that the Bosniak army thought that for our safety it was

10 better that we stayed in. We actually had a guard in front of our house.

11 Q. And that was always a member -- there was always a presence of the

12 Bosnian army in Hrasnica.

13 A. Yes, there was.

14 Q. And could you confirm just one more thing. This month of November

15 was relatively quiet, wasn't it? At least that's in your statement.

16 A. Well, as always -- the difference between things like the shelling

17 which occurred in an instant and the things that we thought were regular

18 military activities and those military activities were ongoing on a day to

19 day basis especially on the Mount Igman road also referred as the logistic

20 road going up or down Mount Igman in the BiH controlled pocket of

21 Hrasnica. Other military activity was in that period relatively calm,

22 yes.

23 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Witness, could you --

24 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I'm primarily interested in

25 shelling. Shelling targeted Hrasnica, right? Oh, I'm sorry.

Page 4799

1 JUDGE HARHOFF: Counsel, could you ask the witness -- could you

2 ask the witness for how long they were ordered to stay inside their house

3 in November 1994?

4 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Yes, Mr. Eimers. Could you explain to the Chamber for how long

6 did you have to stay there under the guard placed outside your house by

7 the BH army?

8 A. As I recall, it lasted three or four days, and then the tension

9 seemed to have gone down and we were allowed to go out again.

10 Q. When I asked you a moment ago, and you did give me some sort of

11 answer regarding this state of relatively quiet, I asked it in terms of

12 shelling. Was it quiet in terms of shelling? There no shelling and

13 therefore it was relatively quiet?

14 A. Yes. From the point of shelling, it was relatively calm, yes.

15 Q. Right. And just below this passage, the fourth paragraph on page

16 4 in English, page 5 in B/C/S, you said: "The BH army was preparing an

17 attack on the southern part of Igman -- Mount Igman. The first actions

18 that foreshadowed it started early recall in December south of the

19 demilitarised zone."

20 Now, could you describe to the Trial Chamber what were those first

21 warring actions, as you put it in your statements -- statement, what were

22 they like? What were they?

23 A. The Bosnian army at the time prepared a ground strike in the

24 direction of Gorazde, and they started the strike with long lasting mortar

25 attacks in a non-occupied area, at least by civilians. There were a

Page 4800

1 couple of military strong points on both sides of the Olympic road.

2 The mortar attack lasted for a couple of hours, and then was

3 followed by the ground move with - sorry for not counting - at least 200

4 soldiers. The attack lasted for, I believe, two or three days and then

5 was cancelled by lack of success.

6 Q. They encountered resistance from the Bosnian Serb army. Is that

7 logical?

8 A. Well, yes, it is. They attacked Bosnian Serb army-held terrain.

9 They defended that, especially because it was in an area where there were

10 no civilians living. It was just a military confrontation.

11 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Now, could we move to page 6 in

12 B/C/S, which is English page 4, paragraph 6.

13 Q. I just want to ask you one more thing in your first statement.

14 Before that, could you tell me this: You mentioned Gorazde.

15 Isn't this axis along which the BH army was attacking in the area of

16 responsibility of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps facing Trnovo; and maybe if

17 they had broken out, they would have reached Gorazde? Could you say that,

18 because Trnovo was very close to you there?

19 A. That's correct, yes.

20 Q. Now, could you look at this paragraph where you say - that's on

21 page 4, paragraph 6 in English - "As from 24th of December there was a

22 cease-fire, so it was also a quiet period after that date."

23 Is that correct?

24 A. Yeah, that's correct.

25 Q. Now, in the following passage, you speak about the first following

Page 4801

1 major incident on the 18th of February, 1995.

2 A. Yeah, that's correct.

3 Q. Since you covered all the rest in your other statement of 13th

4 October, 2006, I will move to that statement now, and that's Prosecution

5 Exhibit P585.

6 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Could this document be shown to

7 the witness, please. It is his statement of the 13th of October, 2006.

8 Q. Is that your statement, please?

9 A. That's correct.

10 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please look at page 4 of

11 the B/C/S version, and it is paragraph 8 in the English version.

12 Q. In that paragraph, you indicate where the house that you were

13 staying in was situated in Hrasnica, and then you go on to say that: "From

14 our post, we could see Ilidza and the road climbing up Mount Igman."

15 Yes or no?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. Can you tell Their Honours whether it is correct to say that

18 Ilidza, which you mention here, is situated at the foot of Mount Igman and

19 is under full control geographically of Mount Igman? Ilidza is in a

20 valley?

21 A. That's correct, yes.

22 Q. At the time when you were posted in Sarajevo from October 1994

23 until April 1995, that was how it was throughout that period; isn't that

24 right?

25 A. That's correct, yes.

Page 4802

1 Q. The separation line between the two parties was where the Famos

2 factory was situated, and part of that factory was under the control of

3 the BiH army and another part by the VRS. Can you confirm that?

4 A. Yes. The confrontation line east of Hrasnica was actually in

5 the -- inside the factory, yes.

6 Q. Can we say, then, as you are a military man, that for both sides

7 that factory was a military target?

8 A. Since it was occupied by military only, I would say yes.

9 Q. From the position where your house was located as observers, did

10 you have the full -- a full view of the area towards the tunnel going

11 under the airport and a full view of the roads as well?

12 A. From the house, we couldn't see the tunnel area because there was

13 the township of Butmir in between; but from the rooftop of our house,

14 actually from the bathroom, we could see up to the Mount Igman road to the

15 west and we could see the Famos factory area to the east, yes.

16 Q. Hrasnica itself, and everything around you, you said a moment ago

17 that some soldiers for a certain period were guarding your house and you

18 couldn't come out. Was this mainly a location predominantly occupied by

19 soldiers of the BiH army?

20 A. Well, no, it wasn't. They never came into the house. They always

21 stayed outside in front of the house, and they would just make sure that

22 basically we couldn't get out, expect for some administrative affairs,

23 like getting food. We were allowed out to go to the market, but that was

24 it.

25 Q. Mr. Eimers, that was a misunderstanding, I think. I wasn't

Page 4803

1 referring to the people -- the soldiers standing in front of your house.

2 I was meaning, generally speaking, in Hrasnica there was an entire brigade

3 of the BiH army. Isn't that right?

4 A. That's correct. The 4th Brigade was in the Sokolovici/Hrasnica

5 area. That is correct, yes.

6 Q. How many men roughly would there be there? I know that a brigade

7 has a certain number. But according to your own knowledge what you were

8 able to see roughly, how many troops were there?

9 A. Well, it was one of the reasons we were there, actually, but we

10 were never able to establish an estimate on that. First of all, the

11 soldiers were normal citizens during the day, and they moved during the

12 night up to the military positions east and west and on Mount Igman.

13 During the transition from their houses to the trenches, they weren't

14 always wearing military clothes so it was very difficult to estimate

15 whether they were actually during those moves doing soldier activities,

16 military activities.

17 The trenches, when they were occupied, not during the cease-fire

18 period, that is, we were never allowed to see them. We were not allowed

19 to get that near to the trenches or even talk to soldiers that were in the

20 trenching during that time. So the estimate on how many soldiers there

21 were actually in that valley, I cannot answer. I have no idea.

22 Q. But can we say that because this was a military zone, a military

23 area close to a very important place; that is, the separation line, that

24 there weren't many -- or rather, the confrontation line, there weren't

25 many civilians there, were there?

Page 4804

1 A. Well, the confrontation line in the west was in a very open

2 terrain and there were hardly any civilians in that area; but on the east

3 side, in the Famos factory area, the apartment buildings were maybe only

4 100 metres away from the Famos factory. So the civilians over there in

5 the east were very close to the confrontation line. In the Mount Igman

6 area, there were hardly any civilians.

7 Q. Is it implied that you mention that the 4th Brigade of the ABiH

8 army was there that they this their facilities, command post, and

9 everything that a military unit, called a brigade, needs to have,

10 normally?

11 A. Yes. The HQ of the 4th Brigade was actually in Sokolovici.

12 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we now move on to paragraph

13 14, please. It is page 7 of the B/C/S version and page 4 of the English.

14 Q. So as not to spend too much time on it, can you just confirm that

15 what it says here is true, that in most cases, especially in December,

16 there was a cease-fire in force; and during that period of time, you

17 mostly controlled the trenches, whether they were being expand, enlarged;

18 that you entered the trenches of both sides; and there was nothing else

19 apart from that. It was a relatively quiet period. Can you confirm that?

20 A. Yes. We were especially tasked to outline the trenches from the

21 beginning of the cease-fire so that we could control whether there was

22 expansion or that there was just cleaning activities going on throughout

23 the entire cease-fire period while it lasted until somewhere in the end of

24 February.

25 Q. I should now like to draw your attention to paragraph 17.

Page 4805

1 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] That's page 8 of the B/C/S.

2 Q. And the end of that paragraph. If necessary, of course, can read

3 through the whole paragraph, but I'm just asking you to focus on the end.

4 In the English version, I think it goes on to the next page.

5 So I should like to read to you the following: "The Bosnian army

6 did nothing to protect civilians in the area of the tunnel and this

7 protect the their operations."

8 Does that mean that the BiH army, as is stated here, was using

9 civilians to protect their military activities, as you have stated here?

10 A. That's correct, yes.

11 Q. And then you go on to say: "The nature of this tunnel was that it

12 was used by both civilians and soldiers."

13 Is that true?

14 A. That's correct, yes.

15 Q. Is it right to say that every day there were people coming and

16 going through that tunnel from Sarajevo. Quite a number of soldiers were

17 passing through going in some various directions. Did you see that during

18 your mission and stay there, in Hrasnica?

19 A. I saw that on many occasions, yes, simply because we had to use

20 the same road going into Sarajevo, as local military and civilians had to.

21 Q. And in paragraph 18, you point out that: "In Hrasnica, no one

22 else was in control expect soldiers." Is that right, too?

23 A. That's correct, yes.

24 Q. And then you go on to say that: "In the winter of 1994 to 1995,

25 they would withdraw from the United Nations."

Page 4806

1 Who do you mean? The soldiers of the Bosnian army? Did you mean

2 them?

3 A. I have no idea what you mean actually.

4 Q. Mr. Eimers, in paragraph 18, I have just read out what you stated

5 about Hrasnica, and then you say: "In the winter of 1994/1995, they would

6 withdraw from the United Nations because the Americans were supporting

7 them with training and supplies."

8 When you say "they," who do you mean? Do you mean soldiers of the

9 army of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

10 A. No. I mean the actually UN activities that were deployed over

11 there; first of all, the UNMOs, but UNHCR and other agencies as well. So

12 not the UN as an institution, but the UN agencies that were working in

13 that area. The fact that they were supported by others meant that they

14 were less depending on the guys that were already there; meaning, like I

15 said, institutions like UNHCR or the UNMOs.

16 Q. Mr. Eimers, we are forced here to focus on military problems, and

17 there is mention here of Americans supporting them with training. First

18 of all, is it true that the Americans were assisting someone with

19 training; if so, in what way?

20 A. During the winter of 1994/1995, first of all --

21 MR. DOCHERTY: Mr. President.


23 MR. DOCHERTY: I have an objection to the relevance of this line

24 of questioning concerning the -- it has no bearing on the allegations in

25 the amended indictment.

Page 4807

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, I'm not sure what it is leading to.

2 Let me hear the answer.

3 THE WITNESS: During the winter of 1994/1995, it became obvious

4 that the Bosniak army was getting support from other nations and by other

5 means than we were used to, especially Americans were sighted. I

6 contacted them myself on a number of occasions, and we witnessed American

7 advisors with the Bosnian army high-rank officers in areas like the high

8 ground of Mount Igman, obviously teaching them how to act military

9 operations.

10 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Thank you. Will you now look at the next paragraph, paragraph 19:

12 "In October and November 1994, the Bosnians tried to break the siege

13 from the Igman Olympic road area," as you said a moment ago; but then you

14 add: "They fired 200 mortar shells as hour from Mount Igman."

15 Is that true?

16 A. That's correct, yes.

17 Q. And then paragraph 21, you say there in the second sentence:

18 "There was no proof of the existence of artillery guns inside Hrasnica,

19 but they had mortars."

20 Is that right?

21 A. That's correct, yes.

22 Q. And then further down, you say: "Both sides could handle the

23 mortars very well."

24 Is that correct?

25 A. In my professional opinion, that's correct, yes.

Page 4808

1 Q. But in your first sentence, in paragraph 21, you say: "Once we

2 were looking for a gun, but we never found it." The gun or cannon that

3 you were looking for was it within the zone of responsibility of the BH

4 army?

5 A. On a number of occasions, we got hearsay information that heavy

6 weapons were used or at least moved in certain areas, and then we would be

7 tasked to go after them. Like it's mentioned here, in Hrasnica, there

8 was a one-time moment in which it was believed that there was an artillery

9 piece in the area of Hrasnica itself. We were tasked to go after it, and

10 we never found it. Mortars we did find occasionally, yes.

11 Q. Paragraph 22 in the B/C/S, that is page nine. You say in that

12 paragraph: "The high ground, Mount Igman, was in Bosnian hands; whereas,

13 the Serbs would fire at the end of the Mount Igman road from Ilidza."

14 Is that right?

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. And then paragraph 24, you say that: "The Famos factory was the

17 front line."

18 You have already explained that, but I would like to inquire into

19 the events that you describe as incidents that occurred while you were

20 there.

21 In paragraph 26, you refer to an incident that occurred on the

22 27th of February, 1995, when a woman, a civilian, was killed in Hrasnica;

23 that is, in the area controlled by the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Is

24 that right?

25 A. That's correct, yes.

Page 4809

1 Q. But before I ask you about paragraph 26, can you confirm something

2 that you explained in your first statement, that on the 18th of February

3 in the morning, which means before the 27th of February, ten days before

4 that on the 18th of February, three Serb soldiers were killed. Is that

5 right?

6 A. Soldiers or civilians or the Serb side being killed, I never was

7 able to confirm that in person. But we had UNMO teams deployed on the

8 Serb side as well, and it was their task to confirm that. So the fact

9 that Serbs had been killed in previous days was brought to me through

10 chain of command, being the UNMO command, yes.

11 Q. And there's no question that this was during a cease-fire.

12 A. Like I stated somewhere else in -- in the text, it said that

13 during the end of February, it was very clear to all parties that the

14 cease-fire was not going to result in a final solution. The end of

15 February was marked by several incidents, actually marking the beginning

16 of the next phase of what might be described best as war; and in March,

17 they really went off again.

18 So the incidents described fit into that pattern, yes.

19 Q. When you were describing this event of the 27th of February, you

20 explained that. Is it true that the woman was killed in a house? Is that

21 so?

22 A. That's correct, yes.

23 Q. Is it true that that house was not directly hit; but several

24 metres from that house, there was a tree and the shell hit the branches of

25 that tree and then a fragment killed this woman in her apartment? Is that

Page 4810

1 right?

2 A. That's correct, yeah.

3 Q. And can you confirm what you say in paragraph 26, and also in

4 paragraph 7 of your first statement, that two Serb civilians were killed a

5 day before that?

6 A. Well, I cannot confirm it. Only thing I can confirm is that that

7 is what I was told, yes.

8 Q. Paragraph 30.

9 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Perhaps I can finish the cross

10 even before the break.

11 Q. So we come to paragraph 30. You say there, when talking about the

12 period when you were in Vogosca: "Never, when I was present," and you're

13 talking about the Serb side, "were there protests about civilians being

14 killed."

15 First, can you tell us, were there civilians casualties in Vogosca

16 while you were there?

17 A. Well, yes, there was. The only event that I can elaborate on is

18 like it is described in article 30, saying that an 80-year-old man was

19 killed in the suburbs of Vogosca when he was walking in the fields, and

20 that is the only thing, the only event that could be proved while I was

21 there, especially because later on we happened to run into funeral. But

22 like it is stated, most of the time, as far as I know all of the time, we

23 were not reported civilians being killed on the BSA side.

24 Q. You testified to this yourself. You said, in the statement, they

25 did not protest, the Serbs did not protest about this. They would bury

Page 4811

1 their people without making any protests. Is that right?

2 A. That's correct, yes.

3 Q. Thank you. Paragraph 31. Here you explain events along the

4 logistics route, which went from the tunnel next to Hrasnica, through

5 Hrasnica towards Igman. You say in paragraph 31: "The army of the

6 Bosnian Serbs firing from Ilidza with anti-aircraft rockets would hit

7 civilian vehicles on the road."

8 Is that right?

9 A. Yes, that's correct.

10 Q. And then you go on to say: "The army of Bosnia-Herzegovina did

11 use civilian vehicles along this road for logistic purposes for both

12 military and civilian purposes."

13 Is that right?

14 A. That's correct, yeah.

15 Q. "One could not tell whether there were civilians or military in

16 those vehicles."

17 Can you confirm that, too?

18 A. Yeah. That's correct, simply because the vehicles moved at night;

19 and during the day-time, there was hardly any traffic. So the -- it was

20 always dark when the vehicles came down or went up.

21 Q. In any event, in most cases, these were vehicles that were being

22 used for military purposes.

23 A. Well, I wouldn't say -- or at least I can't prove that it was in

24 most cases. But the vehicles that went up served two purposes; military

25 and civilian. The -- a lot of vehicles that used this road were to supply

Page 4812

1 Sarajevo in the broader sense, especially the civilian necessities. Yes,

2 it was used for military purposes as well, and sometimes they used the

3 same vehicle for both purposes at the same time.

4 Q. A little further down, you explain something when you say: "In

5 my time in Sarajevo, I never saw tanks in Sarajevo."

6 But then you say, and I quote: "There were trucks with

7 machine-guns on the back, light and heavy anti-aircraft guns."

8 Is that true, too?

9 A. That is correct, yes.

10 Q. Were there trucks going into the direction of Igman and coming

11 from Sarajevo, and because there were machine-guns on them and light and

12 heavy anti-aircraft guns were the target of fire?

13 A. As far as I know, no. The only time we actually witnessed the

14 heavy machinery being there was on the BSA side in the Ilidza area. We

15 never witnessed heavy military equipment being brought up or down through

16 the logistic road on Mount Igman.

17 Q. But if you would look at another sentence in that same paragraph,

18 and I quote, could you explain that for us, please. "This was not a

19 factor that would be taken into consideration during attacks on the

20 logistic road. These weapons were concerned to be heavy weapons."

21 You're talking here about the logistic road going to Igman and

22 about heavy weaponry going along that route. Is that right?

23 A. No, that's not right. I mention only the heavy equipment being

24 used by the BSA from Ilidza to fire at the logistic road, and we never

25 have gotten any proof that the heavy weapons that may have been in use by

Page 4813

1 the Bosnian army were taken through that route as well.

2 Q. Paragraph 38, please. You refer to paragraph 17 in your first

3 statement. That is the incident of the 18th of February, 1995, and that

4 was the date when the three Serb soldiers were killed. Let us see how you

5 refer to it here. You say that: "The weather was getting better and

6 military activity started to proceed again, though it was officially still

7 a cease-fire period."

8 Is that right?

9 A. That's correct, yes.

10 Q. Then you added: "The Serbs started blaming the United Nations for

11 everything the Bosnian were doing."

12 Is that so?

13 A. Yes. It was the time where both parties started their strategic

14 moves towards who was to blame for an official ending of the cease-fire,

15 and this went on and on on a day-to-day basis at that time.

16 Q. And could we also clear up what you say in paragraph 44, and that

17 would complete my cross-examination.

18 Mr. Eimers, you left on the 4th of April, left Hrasnica that is.

19 Around that date, around the 4th of April, were there quite -- was there

20 quite a lot of conflict between the two warring sides? Did the BH army

21 achieve certain results in relation to the positions it held around the

22 Famos factory during your stay there?

23 A. No. I think that especially the -- the way the trenches were laid

24 out and the situation in the Famos factory was that the -- the war in the

25 sense of gaining ground had come to a complete standstill, and that the

Page 4814

1 fighting in those areas was just to make sure that everybody knew that

2 they were still there, both sides did. Sometimes there is was fierce

3 fighting, but in the end I think everybody knew that it was not going to

4 get to any military result in those areas.

5 Everybody knew that the areas that the areas that may have been

6 more suited for a military attack that should lead to big success were in

7 other areas around Sarajevo and not in the Hrasnica area itself.

8 So, at that time, there was a really breakout of war again, but I

9 don't think that the Hrasnica area was an area where both parties expected

10 success at that time.

11 Q. I understand what you are saying. But as you were in Hrasnica,

12 you said here in your first sentence: "In paragraph 20 of my first

13 statement, I describe an all-out attack with all kinds of weaponry being

14 fired that started a few days before I left."

15 Is that correct? Does that mean that before you left, those few

16 days before you left, what I have just read out was happening?

17 A. That's correct, yes.

18 Q. And then you say towards the end, and that brings me to my last

19 question. Allow me to read it all. I quote: "During the winter, the

20 Bosnian army was supported and equipped by the Americans. We saw them

21 doing reconnaissance all over Sarajevo to see whether they would succeed.

22 This became a massive attack to Vogosca to the north, to break the siege,

23 which failed."

24 Is all this correct, what you have said here, both with respect to

25 the assistance of the Americans, and the attack through Vogosca?

Page 4815

1 A. Like I stated before, I'm 100 per cent sure that there was a huge

2 American involvement during the winter; and, yes, the attack from the

3 north to break the siege started just after I left; and, yes, it failed.

4 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Eimers.

5 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Docherty, are you going to re-examine.

7 MR. DOCHERTY: I have two questions.


9 Re-examination by Mr. Docherty:

10 Q. Major Eimers, I want to clear up one point. The first time I was

11 asking you questions, we went through your experience with mortars as a

12 Dutch officer. You remember that. And then at the beginning of the

13 cross-examination, Mr. Tapuskovic asked you, "Well, isn't it so that you

14 have more experience with mortars today than he did back then." Do you

15 remember this exchange?

16 A. Yes, I remember.

17 Q. In the 12 years since you have left Sarajevo, and the 12

18 additional years of professional experience that you have gained, has

19 anything about that experience caused you to change the opinions you have

20 expressed today or the opinions that are in the statements that have been

21 introduced into evidence?

22 A. No, I haven't. It has just been made more clear to me that what I

23 witnessed during my stay in Sarajevo was correct.

24 MR. DOCHERTY: I have no further questions, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Major Eimers, that concludes your testimony. We

Page 4816

1 thank you for giving it, and you may now leave.

2 We'll take the break now. We adjourn.

3 --- Recess taken at 10:31 a.m.

4 --- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.

5 [The witness entered court]

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

8 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.


10 [Witness answered through interpreter]

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit.

12 Mr. Whiting, you may begin.

13 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Mr. President. Good morning,

14 Mr. President, Your Honour.

15 Examination by Mr. Whiting:

16 Q. Good morning, sir. Could you please state your name for the

17 record.

18 A. Berko Zecevic.

19 Q. Your first name is Berko?

20 A. Berko Zecevic.

21 Q. Sir, do you have a copy of a report that you wrote in connection

22 with this case at the request of the Office of the Prosecutor?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And you can open it up. It's that report in front of you.

25 A. Yes.

Page 4817

1 MR. WHITING: Your Honours, the 65 ter number of this report is

2 3118, and I would ask that it be given an exhibit number at this time.


4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes P586.

5 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, I'm not going to use the e-court system

6 to go to pages of this report because it's my understanding that everybody

7 in the courtroom; Your Honours, the legal officers, the Defence, the

8 accused, the witness, ourselves, the interpreters, the court reporter,

9 everybody has a copy of the report in their own language. If I could just

10 confirm that, before I proceed.

11 I see no dissenting nods or shakes of the head, so I will proceed

12 that way.

13 Q. Professor Zecevic, I'm focussing on the first chapter of your

14 report where you set out your qualifications. I'm going to quickly go

15 through your qualifications; and unless there is an objection, I'm just

16 going to summarize them and ask if you agree that I have summarized them

17 correctly.

18 From the 1st of August, 1975, until May of 1992, you worked at the

19 Pretis factory in Vogosca?

20 A. Da. [No interpretation]

21 Q. That factory produced artillery and rocket ammunition and aircraft

22 bombs. You worked in the research and development centre, and your

23 primary fields of work were rocket motors and warheads and developing new

24 rocket projectiles; is that correct?

25 A. Yes.

Page 4818

1 Q. Also, since 1976, you have been a member of the faculty at

2 Sarajevo University's Faculty of Mechanical Engineering; first in the

3 Mechanics Department and at a later date in the Department of Defence

4 Technology. You are still a member of that faculty today. Is that

5 correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. In 1992, May of 1992, you left Pretis and became the Deputy

8 Commander of the Centre for Military Industry within the Main Staff of the

9 ABiH and that ceased to exist in mid-1993; is that correct?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. At the end of 1993 until mid-August of 1994, you were employed by

12 Unis, which did research of weapons and armaments for the ABiH?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. During the war, you were tasked specifically with investigating

15 two incidents in Sarajevo; the shelling of the Markale market on the 5th

16 of February, 1994, which is now known as Markale 1, and the air bomb

17 incident at the TV tower on the 28th of June, 1995. Is that correct?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Professor, aside from those two incidents where you were

20 specifically tasked with investigating, did you have other occasions

21 during the war to observe the effects of air bombs or other weapons?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Can you give us an estimate of -- of how frequently or how many

24 times you observed that?

25 A. For personal reasons, because my profession has to do with

Page 4819

1 ammunitions and their testing, logically I was interested in practical use

2 of weapons, not in testing conditions only. Since I lived in Sarajevo at

3 the time when it was constantly exposed to shelling by mortar and rocket

4 systems, the things that I had learned before the war from books could be

5 seen in practice.

6 I first had occasion to see in January 1994, at the invitation of

7 one of my students, an occasion to see the remnants of one rocket

8 propelled bomb. In 1995, when there were more frequent incidents in the

9 vicinity of my house at the distance of 500 to 1.000 metres, there were

10 several impacts of such projectiles. I went out on site to see the

11 effects.

12 I will not speak of artillery and mortar projectiles that were a

13 daily occurrence on the entire area of Sarajevo, and every time I walked

14 around town I had occasion to see detonations of such projectiles.

15 Q. Now, Professor, for your benefit, or for the benefit of everyone

16 else in the courtroom, I'm going to tell you how I'm going to conduct my

17 examination today. I am going to divide it into three parts.

18 The first part will be to talk briefly about how modified air

19 bombs were constructed and what types existed during the war.

20 The second part will be to talk more specifically about some of

21 the characteristics of modified air bomb; for example, their range, their

22 accuracy, matters such as that.

23 And then the third and final part will be to go through all of the

24 specific incidents that you analyse in your report that are related to our

25 indictment. There are, I believe, 11 in all. We will briefly go through

Page 4820

1 each one to talk about the conclusions that you reached.

2 Now, turning to the first matter, I want to talk about how air

3 bombs were constructed, modified air bombs. First, could you tell us what

4 kinds of bombs were used to conduct modified air bombs, and here I am

5 focussing on what types of explosive charges in these bombs were used.

6 A. In Sarajevo, in the period of 1994/1995, three types of modified

7 air bombs were registered. Two of them were manufactured in Pretis

8 factory before the war, and another type, from my knowledge and from

9 insight into the remnants, was manufactured in Russia. The first was a

10 modified air bomb OBAD-500. It had four rocket mortars enabling it to be

11 launched at a range of 3.5 to 4 kilometres. It had fuel air explosive and

12 a very complex system for identifying the moment of impact; several types

13 of fuses; and it was effective in the area where it fell.

14 The other two types were FAB-100, where the standard body of a

15 100-kilogram bomb was used. FAB was a Russia acronym for "Fugasnaya

16 Aviatsionnaya Bomba," and another type had a mass -- and the number 400 in

17 the name meant it weighed 100 kilograms. It had a rocket motor, and its

18 range was five to six kilometres.

19 Most of the bombs that fell in the environment of Sarajevo or

20 inside Sarajevo of this type had TNT that is solid explosive charge. The

21 other bomb, FAB-250, which weighed roughly 250 kilograms, was for the most

22 part equipped with three rocket motors, had a range of close to eight

23 kilometres; and from what I know and from what I had occasion to see with

24 my own eyes in Sarajevo, it did not use solid explosive charge. It used

25 fuel air explosive instead.

Page 4821

1 Q. Now, in that answer, you talked about two different types of

2 explosive charges, of the -- solid explosive charge or TNT and the fuel

3 air explosive charge. Could you describe briefly for the Trial Chamber

4 what the differences are between these two explosive mechanisms or charges

5 on impact. What differences do they produce when they explode?

6 A. Differences are huge. When it detonates, an air bomb with the

7 solid explosive such as TNT pressures are created inside the bomb of 200

8 to 250.000 bars. That is a temperature of four to 5.000 degrees

9 centigrade. A blast wave is created in detonation of very high

10 intensity, but its characteristic is with the increase of distance from

11 the centre of explosion its effects diminish.

12 In addition to the so-called blast effect, a bomb equipped with

13 sold explosive charge, TNT, has a prominent fragmentation effect, because

14 a bomb like FAB-250 should have 20.000 fragments of various sizes. They

15 move at a velocity of 1.800 to 2.000 metres per second and can create vast

16 devastation against humans and structures even very far from the centre of

17 explosion.

18 Speaking of bombs with fuel air explosives, the concept is very

19 different. A bomb -- the bomb is equipped with a substance that is

20 primarily fuel. It does not contain an oxidator, and that bomb is

21 destroyed before it takes effect. The liquid inside the bomb disperses in

22 the air, mixes with the air, and only then are secondary fuses activated,

23 which activate the detonation process in several points in the surrounding

24 area.

25 What is also important is the pressure during the detonation of

Page 4822

1 such a bomb, pressure of ten, 20, 30 bars. But the area of that

2 overpressure effect is very large, and it has very large lethal effects on

3 human bodies and surrounding structures. And as you could notice from the

4 war in Iraq in 1991 and 2002, such bombs played a very important role in

5 the destruction of structures and tunnels.

6 Q. Now, Professor, you -- in that last answer, you said that the a

7 TNT or solid explosive charge produces an enormous number of fragments on

8 explosion, some 20.000. Does a fuel-air bomb produce any fragments?

9 A. A fuel-air bomb also produces familiarities, because in order for

10 the liquid to go out of the body, the body has to be destroyed, which

11 means that a smaller quantity of solid explosive also has to be used.

12 That also coughs fragmentation, although fragments have smaller velocity,

13 a smaller range, and they don't really have any function in the lethal

14 effect against structures and humans. Their primary role is as a

15 consequence of the destruction of the body.

16 Q. Now, in an earlier answer, when you described that there were

17 three types of bombs modified into modified air bombs, you said that two

18 of them were produced at Pretis. Could you tell us which two were

19 produced at Pretis, just so we're clear?

20 A. It's FAB-100 and FAB-250.

21 Q. And when these bombs were produced at Pretis -- first of all, when

22 did they first start being produced at Pretis, what year, if you recall?

23 A. I came there to Pretis in 1975, and already it was serially

24 manufactured. If we look at the code of FAB-100 bomb, we see M173. In

25 Yugoslavia, it was customary that when a certain new weapon is introduced

Page 4823

1 in the arsenal, it gets a code that indicates the year it was introduced.

2 So we have 75, 80, et cetera. There are several variants with modified

3 shapes, but this bomb was certainly produced in 1975.

4 Q. And when it was produced then in 1975 and the years later, what

5 was its intended mode of delivery; that is, how was it going to be dropped

6 or launched on a target at that time? How was that designed and intended?

7 A. The very name, aircraft bomb, tells us about the intent. The idea

8 was that a fighter plane carries a number of bombs that are dropped from

9 either a high altitude or from high velocity flight. So the bomb would be

10 dropped from an aircraft, fuses were activated, and the bomb would drop in

11 free-fall or it have a breaking chute system to reduce possible negative

12 effects for the carrying aircraft.

13 Q. I'm sorry. I interrupted you. Okay. That's fine. That's

14 sufficient. Thank you.

15 When did these bombs, the FAB-100 and the FAB-250, start to be

16 modified so that they could be launched from the ground rather than being

17 dropped from an aeroplane.

18 A. My first encounter with it was in 1993 in the theatre of

19 operations close to Vogosca. That's when the first -- when one FAB-100

20 was first launched.

21 In 1995, I had occasion to see an FAB-250. From the documents

22 that I had opportunity to find in the Pretis factory, after the war, I saw

23 that sometime in February 1994, there was a first reference to the

24 development of two launchers for modified bombs by the military

25 technical -- Military Engineering Institute from Belgrade.

Page 4824

1 But I want to emphasise that my first real encounter with fuel-air

2 rocket propelled bombs was in January 1994. In 1994, more intense work

3 was carried out in the vicinity of Sarajevo on the modification of

4 aircraft bombs.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Are you in a position to say whether these bombs

6 had been modified anywhere else in the world before that time?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was a Russia bomb, OBAD-500, used

8 in Chechnya that was modified. Later in 2004 and 2005, the Russians

9 modified this system and produced a new system, Boran or TS-1. The

10 initial intention of the Russians was to use fuel-air bombs in order to

11 neutralise minefields in areas where their troops would be moving.

12 And my opinion is that one of the types of those bombs that were

13 modified at the time and that were used in Chechnya in the 1990s was for

14 the first time used to target Sarajevo in January 1994. You can find in

15 reports on Chechnya, references to intensive use of fuel-air rocket

16 propelled bombs against the town of Grozni. In my opinion, the

17 modification of aircraft bombs, FAB-250, was an attempt to create the

18 KREMA-4 Russian bomb. It was based on OBAD-500 bomb equipped with four

19 rocket motors of the GRAD system.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: So the conflict in Sarajevo would not have been

21 the first time that these bombs were modified so that they could be

22 launched from the ground.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can only speak to Sarajevo,

24 Mr. President, and the information I had then, in 1994 and 1995. I was

25 under siege in that town, and I had no other information. I can only

Page 4825

1 speak about Sarajevo, and I can speak about the things that can be found

2 in reports of the Red Cross, Helsinki Watch, and other NGOs that were

3 wrote about the events in Chechnya.

4 There are no photographs of remnants found in Chechnya. There

5 were only photographs of Soviet rocket-propelled bombs found in Sarajevo,

6 and such examples can be found elsewhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina and a part

7 in the Netherlands, because the Dutch army transferred some of the

8 non-operative rocket-propelled systems to the Netherlands.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Judge Harhoff.

10 JUDGE HARHOFF: Can I just follow-up on the President's question.

11 Professor, do you know how the people at the Pretis factory

12 developed the technique of modifying air bombs so as to be able to launch

13 them from the ground. I guess what was under lying the President's

14 question was really, did the people at Pretis were they inspired by the

15 Russians? Did they get the idea from Russia, or were they somehow

16 assisted by the Russians in developing this new technique?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would like to draw your attention

18 to the fact that the Pretis factory just before the war in 1990, 1991, and

19 1992 was developing the fuel-air bomb. So the process of development had

20 already started at the time. It's just that fuel-air bomb was not

21 supposed to be launched by rockets. It was supposed to be dropped from an

22 aircraft.

23 In the 1970s, work was done on developing a fuel-air mine or shell

24 that was to have been deployed on possible axis of attack by the Soviet

25 Union, because Yugoslavia was under the pressure of this possibility of

Page 4826

1 being attacked by rocket air-strikes from the Soviet Union. I know a

2 professor from the Rocket Institute who studied in America, and he had

3 occasion to get acquainted with rocket explosives used by Americans in

4 Vietnam.

5 He with his research department, and in cooperation with the

6 Pretis factory, participated in the development of this fuel-air bomb.

7 The whole project was transferred to Belgrade later, and Pretis stopped

8 working on it.

9 As more modification, it is my deep conviction that people,

10 engineers from Pretis, accepted the idea and the concept that they had

11 seen on Russian systems, and they tried to apply that concept in their

12 project. The Russian system was very complex and very sophisticated in

13 terms of design, and it was very time-consuming and very costly. In

14 Pretis, people did not have such resources, but they have very capable.

15 And within their possibilities at the time, within the energy and

16 resources they had, they tried to achieve a certain improvement over what

17 existed before. And there is, of course, a huge difference in quality

18 between the two bombs.

19 [Trial Chamber confers]

20 JUDGE HARHOFF: Professor, thank you for your clarification.

21 I understand you to say that the people at Pretis were inspired by

22 what they saw in Russia; namely, of developing a technique to launch an

23 air bomb from the ground; but because of the way the Russians had

24 developed their project, the Pretis people could not do that because they

25 did not have the same resources. So they developed -- they just worked

Page 4827

1 further on the idea and developed it further and found a simpler solution

2 by attaching rockets to it. Is that a correct understanding? Because the

3 Chamber needs to know how was the thing developed in Pretis.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: I attach some importance, Mr. Whiting, to the

5 issue of the history of the development of the modified air bomb, because

6 in my view it can have an impact on the question of intent. If the

7 technique was initiated by the Bosnian Serbs or whether they borrowed the

8 technique from elsewhere, and that's why I asked the question which I did,

9 which was been followed up by Judge Harhoff.

10 MR. WHITING: I can certainly pursue that with further questions,

11 Your Honour.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. If the witness can help us to the extent

13 that he can, but if he can't take us any further than he has already

14 testified, then so be it for the time being.

15 But do you have anything more to say on that matter?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Let me try to answer the Honourable

17 Judge.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, please go ahead.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Russian system, KREMA, also has

20 rocket motors. The modified projectile, FAB-250, has rocket motors, so

21 they have very similar in concept. But the rocket system on FAB-250, on

22 the aircraft bomb FAB-250, is simpler. It doesn't have close range fuel.

23 It doesn't have secondary fuses. It has no parachute brakes because

24 there were no resources and no time to perfectly copy or to copy to

25 perfection the Russian concept. That's at least how I see it.

Page 4828

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Whiting.

2 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honours.

3 Q. Just to follow-up to some extent on these questions. When you

4 left the Pretis factory in 1992, was there any work or any thought being

5 given to modifying aircraft bombs in this way; that is, attaching rockets

6 so that they could be launched from the ground?

7 A. No. There was no idea of that kind at the time. We, at that

8 time, were only working on a particular bomb for neutralising air fields,

9 air strips. We were copying the French bomb, Durendal, a penetration

10 bomb. There were no mention of avio bombs.

11 Q. And you gave your answer with respect to Pretis. In your position

12 at Pretis, did you become aware of any work being down to modify aircraft

13 bombs anywhere else in the former Yugoslavia, so that they could be

14 launched with rockets from the ground.

15 A. Up to 1992, there was a clear division of labour as to who did

16 what. Pretis was in charge of developing air systems and guidance systems

17 and air bombs. Licki Osik, which was within Unis, did its own work. So

18 the answer to your question is no.

19 Q. And just to be clear, I'm going to try to state one more time what

20 I think your answer is. It's your view that when in late 1993 or early

21 1994, development began on modifying these aircraft bombs so they could be

22 launched from the ground, and that the people who did that at Pretis were

23 following the Russian example, were trying to copy what the Russians had

24 done. Is that a fair characterisation of your testimony?

25 A. [No Interpretation]

Page 4829

1 MR. WHITING: I am sorry. I didn't hear.

2 A. Quite. Quite. It's quite correct.

3 Q. Now, you --

4 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.

6 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I think that in

7 this case my learned friend Mr. Whiting directly led the witness in terms

8 of what the expert was supposed to say as his own expert opinion, whereas

9 Mr. Whiting directly put the response to him.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: No. I can't agree with you, because we have been

11 discussing this matter with the witness for the past ten minutes and he

12 has already said that. So Mr. Whiting merely asked him to confirm whether

13 that was his testimony.

14 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour.

15 Q. Professor, you -- excuse me. You stated earlier that the FAB-100

16 air bomb was modified with a single rocket and the FAB-250 was modified

17 with three rockets. Now, just drawing your attention to page 68 of your

18 report in the B/C/S. It's page 73 in the English. Could you just tell us

19 what types of rockets were used to modify the FAB-250?

20 A. It can be noticed that there were few types of rocket motors that

21 were used for propelling the FAB-250. The GRAD 122-millimetre was used

22 the most and then the M70 Oganj and 127-millimetre K13, which is from a

23 guided rocket, or rather, missile.

24 So there were three types of rocket motors that were primarily

25 used to propel the FAB-250 bomb. Every one of these rocket boosters had

Page 4830

1 different performance, so this significantly affected the performance of

2 the bombs so there were no uniform characteristics. That is what I wish

3 to say. I'm speaking in terms of range and dispersion.

4 Q. Now, when you say that the 127-millimetre K13 is a guided rocket

5 or missile, what do you mean by that? In what way was it guided?

6 A. Well, these were Russian missiles that were a copy of US missiles;

7 and since they had become obsolete, they were supposed to be destroyed

8 before the war. However, as the situation developed in Yugoslavia as the

9 war started, these rocket motors were used to propel this air bomb. So

10 just the rocket motor -- the rocket booster was without a guidance system.

11 Q. Okay. Now, you touched on this a little bit in some of your

12 earlier answers, but could you tell us, based on your analysis and your

13 expertise, can you comment on the professional standards that were

14 achieved in the modifications of these aircraft bombs so that they could

15 be launched from the ground?

16 And this is -- just for everyone's, benefit, this is touched on

17 page 74 of the report in English, page 68 in B/C/S. What professional

18 standards -- what kind of professionalism was achieved in modifying these

19 air bombs; the FAB-100 and the FAB-250.

20 A. Unfortunately, I have to say that a professional -- or rather, the

21 professional level attained in this production did not equal that of the

22 Russian system. There are many inconsistencies involved. Therefore, its

23 performance is of lesser quality and, therefore, it cannot be propelled to

24 the targets where it is supposed to be propelled. So its accuracy is at a

25 lower level.

Page 4831

1 If we look at this study, you can see that there are enormous

2 differences in systems of centering of rocket motors. There are enormous

3 differences in terms of placing stabilisers on projectiles --

4 Q. I'm just going to interrupt you for a second, because I see that

5 you are on page 69 of your version of the report where there are some

6 pictures. On page 69 -- I think it's the next page, and that's page 75 in

7 the English and the figure 98?

8 A. [In English] Okay.

9 Q. The picture on the left is the FAB-250, and on the right is the

10 Russian system the OBAD-500. Can you just very briefly give specific

11 differences in terms of quality between these two systems. In what way --

12 what specific ways do you say that the FAB-250 was of a lesser quality.

13 A. [Interpretation] There are two basic objections to be raised

14 here. One is in terms of centering the rocket motors, because the rocket

15 motor creates a force that propels the projectile. At the moment, when

16 rocket motors are not properly centred, then the projectile deviates.

17 In the Russian system, there is a direct link among adjacent

18 rocket motors, which makes it is able to compensate for pressure. In this

19 way, there is a uniform force involved; whereas, in the modified Pretis

20 system, there is it no interconnection between the rocket motors. So

21 every rocket motor had a different type of pressure, which could affect

22 its stability.

23 Furthermore, the centering of rocket motors of the Russian system

24 was carried out through certain surfaces that were the basis for the whole

25 system; whereas, as far this other system in Pretis was concerned, it was

Page 4832

1 done through a simple triangular system among the rocket motors, and then

2 further on the stabiliser that are the basic - how should I put this? -

3 the basic point that makes it is possible for the projectile to reach the

4 place it is supposed to reach.

5 It was not done with great accuracy at Pretis, and it could even

6 be moved while it was being launched. So there were many incomplete

7 things in the design of the system, things that should have been worked on

8 in order to improve the system. I'm surprised at that, because in Pretis

9 there were a great many qualified engineers, qualified workers, and there

10 was proper equipment. The only justification for this can be time to have

11 a system developed as fast as possible, not looking at the possible

12 effects in terms of this system being unreliable, in terms of its

13 launching, that is.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Or might it have been done deliberately?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't think so. I cannot imagine

16 that. I cannot imagine professionals doing that kind of thing.

17 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour.



20 Q. Professor, just to follow-up on what you just said about time.

21 Based on your long experience and expertise, can you tell the Trial

22 Chamber how long does it typically take to develop a new weapon system?

23 A. This kind of system? Not less than five to seven years of

24 intensive work, with all available resources, with a great many tests that

25 were to be carried out on hundreds of such projectiles or even a thousand

Page 4833

1 such projectiles, so that it could be certified for use in a modern army.

2 Q. Now, Professor, even to achieve the substandard level of quality

3 that you have described, with respect to the FAB-250 and the FAB-100, can

4 you tell us was it technically easy to construction these weapons or

5 technically difficult? Give us some sense of the difficulty from a

6 technical point of view of making this modification to an aircraft bomb.

7 A. If you look at the dimensions, it's three metres. That's the

8 length of the rocket. 360 kilograms is its mass. It is an enormous

9 object, if I can call it that. Is it extremely complex to manipulate

10 something like that. Modification is not an easy job in this sense. It

11 calls for manpower, energy, know-how.

12 Pretis could produce the body but not the fuel. So fuel had to be

13 imported. Fuel could not be obtained in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It had to be

14 imported to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Fuses are complex. So it should also be

15 noted that the Bugojno factory was under control of the HOV. So in order

16 to use multiple fuses, they had to be imported from elsewhere or

17 constructed there, but it could not be done in Pretis; and then also the

18 metal tin that could not be produce in the Bosnia-Herzegovina. It had to

19 be imported into Bosnia-Herzegovina.

20 This required a broad-based effort of the entire military

21 industry, which was under the control of the army of Republika Srpska at

22 the time.

23 Q. Now, moving to another topic, and we're moving to chapter 14 of

24 your report, which is page 97 in the English and 88 in the B/C/S. Can you

25 describe for us briefly how these modified air bombs were launched?

Page 4834

1 A. From available video material that I had occasion to see, and from

2 what was seen at the exhibition in 2001 in Belgrade, one can see that this

3 was a launcher that was made on the TAM-100 truck that had a system which

4 made it possible to direct the barrels horizontally and vertically. So an

5 appropriate launching angle could be obtained, and also it was possible to

6 adjust the azimuth.

7 Every one of these systems can be seen on the photographs. You

8 can see the FAB-100 rocket-assisted bombs had four guide-rail for

9 launching them, and also you can see the FAB-250 rocket-assisted bombs.

10 They were launched with two guide-rail. So it's a relatively simple

11 launcher, not very accurate, because it doesn't have a stabilising system

12 in terms of the horizontal position.

13 However, if we look at its performances, it is quite satisfactory

14 for this kind of guiding. I must say that six metres is the length of the

15 barrel of the launcher because that was required in order to attain

16 appropriate stability for the projectile.

17 Q. What methods would you have with this launcher to aim the

18 direction of the modified aircraft bomb? You referred to

19 horizontal/vertical and to the azimuth. Can you just explain that very

20 briefly again?

21 A. The azimuth makes it is possible for us to direct ourselves to the

22 objective. If I'm supposed to target that door, I'm going to have my

23 launching system face that door, taking into account rotation, whether it

24 is going to be left or right. If I want to be accurate in hitting the

25 area around the door, I have to lift the elevation; that is to say, to

Page 4835

1 lift the guide-rail under a certain angle, and the tables have to define

2 that.

3 So once I have got that right, the azimuth and the elevation; and

4 then if I also take into account atmospheric data, because these rockets

5 are say are very sensitive to temperature, air humidity, then I think that

6 I can get the target I want. That would be it in the briefest possible

7 terms.

8 Q. We'll talk more about that later getting the target that you want.

9 I want to stay for one moment on the launching system. You made a

10 reference to video. The photographs that you have in chapter 14 of your

11 report, do they have any relationship to a video.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And have you seen that video?

14 A. Yes.

15 MR. WHITING: Your Honours, I would like to play the video for you

16 at this time. I think if we watch it on e-court and if we switch to

17 Sanction, hopefully this will work. It's about one minute long. It has a

18 brief speaking, but the English translation will appear on the bottom of

19 the screen.

20 We're not getting sound.

21 Q. Professor, while we're getting the sound, can you just tell us

22 what it is that is depicted in this video.

23 A. This video footage depicts the placing of an air bomb, FAB-100, on

24 the launching system. First, an elevation was taken, then the air bomb;

25 that is to say, without the rocket motors, was placed on the guide-rail;

Page 4836

1 and then at the bottom of the air bomb, the rocket motor was attached;

2 then the azimuth was taken, which is necessary procedure, and then the air

3 bomb was launched.

4 Q. Okay.

5 MR. WHITING: We'll try it again.

6 [Prosecution counsel confer]

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.

8 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Already at this moment I would

9 have to object. This can only be used as an illustration. The Prosecutor

10 had to tell us at least where this had been used. This was used somewhere

11 in Krajina. Does it have anything to do with the Sarajevo front?

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, yes, tell us about the provenance of this.

13 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, the provenance is actually from the

14 witness. The witness relied upon this in his report as a source for

15 showing how these air bombs were launched. I'm not suggesting for a

16 moment that this depicts an air bomb being launched in Sarajevo or

17 anywhere near Sarajevo. That is not the purpose at all. It is simply for

18 the technical purposes of seeing how these operate, and that is all.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Where is it in the report?

20 MR. WHITING: It's in chapter 14. You will see that the

21 photographs in the chapter 14 are stills from this video.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well. Yes, let's proceed.

23 MR. WHITING: Do we have sound? We're getting assistance for the

24 sound, I think.

25 I think what we will they're working on this I will move on to my

Page 4837

1 next set.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, please do.

3 MR. WHITING: We'll get back to this and hopefully have an

4 opportunity to see the launching of an air bomb. And I will move to the

5 second area of question, and that is to talk about some of the specific

6 characteristics of the air bomb which is relevant to our case.

7 Q. First of all, the range -- okay.

8 MR. WHITING: Of course, once I get halfway through my next

9 question -- it's working. Let's give it a try.

10 That was premature. I'll go back to my question.

11 Q. Can you tell us, Professor, what the range was of the FAB-100 and

12 the FAB-250, and this is at page 83 of your report in English and page 75

13 to 76 in the B/C/S.

14 A. The range of the FAB-100 was about 5.560 metres; whereas, the

15 range of the FAB-250 was about 7.680 metres. I'm talking about maximum

16 range. There is a logical caution that has to be made. Often, other

17 rocket motors were used. These performances could slightly vary. So in

18 this case, I oriented myself towards the GRAD 122-millimetres, and I took

19 their values in nominal terms; the ones I had, that is.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Whiting, since you are familiar with miles,

21 what is 5.560 metres in miles?

22 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, I'm familiar with miles but not so much

23 with metres.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: All right. We'll have somebody work that out.

25 MR. WHITING: I'll do the math.

Page 4838

1 A. Five miles, roughly a, bit less. That is the FAB-250. And three

2 point something, about three and a half miles is the FAB-100.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you very much.

4 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Professor. Your expertise has, once

5 again, come into assistance.

6 Okay. Now, the case manager promises me that it is working. So I

7 will interrupt this line of questioning, which we will come back to, so

8 that we could watch this video.

9 [Videotape played]

10 MR. WHITING: I'm just going to interrupt for a moment there.

11 Q. Here the men in the video appear to be screwing something in. Can

12 you tell us what they're doing here?

13 A. I didn't hear anything.

14 Q. Okay. The men appear in the video to be screwing something in.

15 Can you tell us what they're doing? Are you getting a translation?

16 A. Yes, it's fine now.

17 These four men are trying to place the rocket motor into the back

18 part of the FAB-100, in order to create a link between the rocket motor

19 and the body of the bomb.

20 Q. Okay. Thank you.

21 MR. WHITING: We'll continue now with the video.

22 [Videotape played]

23 MR. WHITING: Your Honours, could that video clip be admitted into

24 evidence, please.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, let's hear first from Mr. Tapuskovic.

Page 4839

1 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I think my learned

2 friend Mr. Whiting should explain why this is important. Why is this

3 relevant? When did we ever discuss that five seconds is necessary to

4 fire a certain number of rockets. Eighteen rockets in five seconds, what

5 is the relevance to our case? Is this technique an appropriate subject

6 with this expert that is supposed to deal with specific situations?

7 It was never discussed that this power was used on the Sarajevo

8 front line where 18 rockets should be fired in five seconds. I think the

9 expert should concentrate on his own subject; the modified air bomb that

10 was fired one at a time perhaps. This may be with an educational

11 experience, but it certainly does not help us with the specific cases in

12 the indictment.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Whiting.

14 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, the reference to 18 rockets being fired

15 fire seconds has really no bearing. That is not the purpose for which I

16 offer the video clip. I don't think there is any dispute that the

17 incidents in the indictment were essentially single-shot incidents. The

18 video clip is relevant because, number one, it shows the mechanism and how

19 these rockets were operated, how they were launched, how they were put

20 together, how they were constructed, how they looked, which is the subject

21 or one of the subjects of this report. This was relied upon and it is

22 contained in the report.

23 And then, secondly, it is obviously directly relevant because you

24 see a launching of one of these rockets, which is also an issue in our

25 indictment. So I think it is certainly sufficiently relevant so that it

Page 4840

1 can be admitted into evidence.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we agree. We admit it.

3 MR. WHITING: Thank you.

4 THE REGISTRAR: As P587, Your Honours.


6 Q. Now, Professor that was a launching of a -- well, let me ask you

7 this: The launching that we see there is that a single rocket or is that

8 multiple rockets being launched.

9 A. This was a launching of only one rocket, although we see on the

10 launcher that there are four rockets placed. What we saw was the

11 launching of only one rocket; whereas, there are four placed on the

12 launcher.

13 Q. Can you compare for us in terms of the -- the sound and the smoke

14 and the fire of the launching. Would a launching of a FAB-250 have more

15 or less sound, smoke, and fire at the time of launching?

16 A. I have to specify this. When you fire a large range rocket, 150

17 kilometres, the effects are much more powerful when you fire several than

18 when you fire one. However, the launching of FAB-250 creates noise. It's

19 possible that it creates even smoke, but that depends on the temperature

20 of the air, the humidity, the presence of trees around, the presence of

21 structures.

22 If there are any structures around, the intensity of noise created

23 by launching is muffled. We hear a high-pitched noise as the rocket moves

24 while the rocket booster is active, and the part along which the rocket

25 booster is active is around 450 metres. If the maximum range is 6.2

Page 4841

1 kilometres, the rocket booster only works for 400 metres, which means that

2 in some cases launching is audible; whereas, in other cases there is

3 almost no noise.

4 Q. Professor, my question is actually more simple than that. If you

5 compare the launching of a single FAB-100 and the launching of a single

6 FAB-250, under the same conditions from the same spot, how would they

7 compare in terms -- just at the moment of launch, in terms of sound,

8 smoke, fire. Would one have more of that than the other, or would they be

9 the same?

10 A. It's possible the noise could be more intensive because three

11 rocket boosters were used in FAB-250 and only one in FAB-100. The time of

12 activity of the rocket booster also differs between the two bombs. The

13 noise would be more intensive and the flames.

14 Q. Okay. Now, let's go back to talk about the range of the FAB-100

15 and the FAB-250, and I'm going to draw your attention to page 84 of the

16 English and page 76 of the B/C/S.

17 And here you say that the maximum range, as you have already

18 testified, of the FAB-250 is 7.680 metres; and then you go on to say that

19 it's effective range is 5.820 metres to 7.680 metres.

20 Can you explain for us, please, what do you mean by "effective

21 range"?

22 A. I understand effective range to mean one characteristic of rocket

23 propelled projectiles. With smaller angles, there would be ricochet,

24 which means that when the projectile impacts on the ground, if angle of

25 descent is small, the projectile does not get buried in the ground. It

Page 4842

1 ricochets and the fuse is not activated, for the reason that the fuse

2 placed on those aircraft bombs was small in length.

3 So before impacting on a flat surface, and I emphasise flat

4 surface, the body hits the ground before the fuse gets in contact with the

5 ground, which is the reason for the ricochet. Through geometrical

6 analysis, I determined that ricochet become possible at angle of 25

7 degrees, and that' why I said the limit was 5.820.

8 But if the bomb hits in a pit or a vertical wall, it will be

9 effective, even with a smaller angle of descent. So the range could be

10 4.000 metres, 4.500 metres. So when we say "effective range," we mean on

11 a flat surface, not in an urban area, not a bumpy surface. So in town,

12 since you have a lot of structures, range could have been smaller.

13 Q. Are you --

14 A. When we use "effective range," in our terminology, we mean on a

15 flat surface.

16 Q. Okay. Are you able to give an effective -- an estimation of the

17 effective range for the FAB-250 if you're using it in an urban setting

18 where, as you say, you have either a bumpy surface or buildings. You said

19 it would be less than 5.820 on the lower end. Are you able to give an

20 estimate of the effective range?

21 A. Incontestably. I just want to draw your attention to this. When

22 a projectile moves through the air --

23 Q. I'm sorry --

24 A. -- the range could be on the order of 4.000 metres. It can be

25 3.000 metres. There is no reason why not, if it's going to hit a vertical

Page 4843

1 target.

2 Q. Okay. Did the launching system of the modified aircraft bombs put

3 any limitations on the angle that they could be launched from? And here

4 I'm looking at page 99 of your report in English and 90 in B/C/S.

5 A. Well, certainly, it is on the characteristics of the launcher that

6 both the minimal and maximum angle depend. We see on these photos that

7 the angle is -- depends on the size of the truck and the height of the

8 carrying platform. So every launcher has its own performances in terms of

9 adjusting elevation and adjusting the azimuth.

10 Q. Now, at page 99 in the English and page 90 of the B/C/S, you --

11 you say that the range of possible adjustment for elevation was between 20

12 degrees and 50 degrees.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. How does that effect the effective range of the FAB-250; that is,

15 what would be the range, approximate range at 20 degrees, and what would

16 the approximate range fired at 50 degrees, If you are able to answer that

17 question?

18 A. If the launcher would take an elevation of 50 degrees, the range

19 would be less than the said 7680. It would be shorter, say, 7.000. But

20 if the elevation is 20 degrees, then the range would be slightly less than

21 5.000 metres, with an elevation of 20 degrees.

22 Q. Just so we're clear on this: At what elevation do you achieve the

23 maximum change?

24 A. We usually take 45 degrees to be the one enabling the greatest

25 range.

Page 4844

1 Q. Okay. Let's talk now about accuracy. In your report - it's in

2 chapter 4 - you describe different ways of measuring the accuracy of a

3 weapon. And I don't want to go into too much detail about this because it

4 is set out at length in your report, but could you just briefly tell the

5 Trial Chamber what is meant by "circular error probability," sometimes

6 referred to as CEP? What does that mean, in just two sentences?

7 A. In military use of weapon systems, you usually have to focus to

8 where the launch projectiles would fall, and that's how you calculate how

9 many projectiles need to be fired to fit the target. And in keeping with

10 that, we use the term "circular error probability," which determines that

11 if 50 per cent of projectiles fired fall into that area with a certain

12 radius, let's say, R, then we say that the projectile has a dispersion

13 defined by the circular error probability.

14 It doesn't mean that all projectiles launched will necessarily

15 fall in that area. It means that only 50 per cent will; whereas, the

16 other 50 percent will disperse across a much boarder area. So if we say

17 that the radius is 100 metres, then 50 per cent of the projectiles will

18 fall within their radius of 100 metres and the others will fall outside.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. That's an estimate of the dispersion of the projectiles.

21 Q. Now, let's go back to talking specifically about the FAB-100 and

22 FAB-250, and if you would turn, please, to page 73 of the report in B/C/S,

23 page 79 to 80 in the English.

24 Now, you say -- you say that with a FAB-100, it is only possible

25 to target a surface area measuring 500 metres by 200 metre. That's at

Page 4845

1 page 79 of the English, page 73 of the B/C/S.

2 And then turning to the next page in English, and staying on the

3 same page in B/C/S, you say with the FAB-250, it is only possible to

4 target a surface area measuring 600 metres by 250 metres.

5 Now explain for us, bearing in mind the terminology that you have

6 just explained, what is meant by that. What do you mean it is possible to

7 target a surface area of those dimensions?

8 A. When unguided missiles are used, such as artillery, mortar,

9 rockets, you can never fire at a single target. That's what guided

10 missiles are for. If you wanted to, as I said before, hit a certain

11 target in Sarajevo, it is extremely improbable, except by accident, that a

12 single individual missile will hit that target.

13 That's why I put in my report "by using a volley of fire. " It

14 was necessary, in other words, to fire a number of rockets that would fall

15 around the target and possibly, with the assistance of the warhead,

16 destroy the target. The chance to hit the target directly is minimal.

17 It's common knowledge.

18 Q. Let's focus a little more on the specific area that you give. For

19 example, with the FAB-250, you say it's possible to target a surface area

20 measuring 600 metres by 250 metres.

21 Are you able to tell us if the FAB-250 is fired from its effective

22 range, how many of the projectile would say you expect to fall within that

23 area of 600 metres by 250 metres, and how many would you expect to fall

24 outside of that area? Are you able to give us that information?

25 A. It would be frivolous on my part to venture such an estimate,

Page 4846

1 because there are no reference performances that would enable conclusions.

2 I made certain assumptions that are usual in making estimates, and I said

3 that with a certain mass the effective range is 350 metres. If you change

4 the mass, by 12.5 kilograms, then possible deflection from the target is

5 350 metres if you change the propelling force of the rocket booster.

6 And every rocket booster is different. It has to be strictly

7 controlled, and you have no which particular rocket boosters are built in

8 the system. And that is something that we didn't know, because we bought

9 them from abroad. They were old, ten to 15-years-old. And if there is

10 just a small change of impulse and a small change in air temperature, just

11 ten degrees, then the point of impact is changed by 90 metres.

12 Those are just certainly parameters used to illustrate how

13 sensitive the firing system of this projectile is. And based on these

14 parameters, I said that with a range of 600 metres, possible deflection is

15 250 metres. That means that a certain rocket can fall 600 metres ahead of

16 the target or 600 metres short. The possible range of error is 1.200

17 metres, and 50 per cent of the rockets would have to fall into an area of

18 600 metres by 250 meters; whereas, in actual fact in practice, the

19 situation was much more complex.

20 Nobody had time to measure air temperature, the force of the wind,

21 whether the launcher was positioned exactly at the angle necessary or not,

22 et cetera. The parameters in my report serve a different purpose.

23 Q. That was a long and somewhat technical answer. Let me see if I

24 understood it correctly, and tell me please if I have understood it

25 correctly.

Page 4847

1 Are you saying that your estimate, which was not based on actual

2 performances but was based on assumptions, was that the circular error

3 probability of the FAB-250 is 600 metres by 250 metres. But you qualify

4 that by saying that in reality with all of the different conditions, it is

5 very hard to tell whether that is even an accurate assumption. Is that a

6 fair characterisation of your answer that you have given us?

7 A. Just a small correction. CEP is the circular area; whereas, we

8 are here dealing with the right angle. But the area where the rockets

9 would fall is approximately equivalent.

10 Q. Now, in your report, you also give very specific data regarding

11 the accuracy of unguided rockets and artillery weapons. Can you compare,

12 just in a sentence or two, would a FAB-250 modified air bomb be more or

13 less accurate than an unguided rocket fired on its own or an artillery

14 weapon fired on its own?

15 A. FAB-250, the way it was conceived and designed and defined here,

16 certainly has a greater dispersion than an unguided rocket that was highly

17 professionally manufactured.

18 Q. And how about an artillery weapon, would it have a greater or

19 lesser dispersion than an artillery weapon?

20 A. Well, the artillery splash would have a greater dispersion. I

21 showed that in my report, the data used from a study done in the United

22 States.

23 Q. So an artillery weapon would have a greater dispersion than a

24 FAB-250 modified aircraft bomb?

25 A. Artillery weapons would have a smaller dispersion than these

Page 4848

1 systems. These systems are more precise, more accurate than FAB-250.

2 Q. Finally, can you compare for us please to a mortar weapon. Is a

3 mortar weapon more or less accurate than these other weapons we have

4 talked about; artillery weapon, unguided rocket, FAB-250?

5 A. Mortars are more precise than these systems, significantly more

6 precise.

7 Q. Okay. Now, just to wrap up this topic, you say at page 77 of the

8 English and 71 of the B/C/S, that based on your analysis and expertise,

9 modified air bombs are effective only against what you call area targets.

10 What do you mean by that, "area targets"?

11 A. I'll try to say this again.

12 In wartime conditions, when using artillery to target a small dot,

13 a small target, or you use it at a small range, 100 metres, 200 metres,

14 that can cover a certain area, a small area, that's when you say that you

15 performed your technical assignment, your tactical assignment when you hit

16 it. Other targets are fired at with hand-held rocket launchers, tank

17 shells, or rockets.

18 Q. But could you give us an example -- some examples of what are area

19 targets? What do you have in mind when you say -- what is it, for

20 example, on the battlefield or in a war, what is an area target,

21 concretely?

22 A. We can look at this Russian system, TOS1. It is a modern rocket

23 system using fuel-air explosive that is an improvement on the KREMA-4

24 system. It has 30 barrels, and it targets an area 200 to 400 metres --

25 sorry 200 by 400 metres at a range of 3.500 metres. It can destroy

Page 4849

1 targets on that area. That's what it means.

2 Q. That rocket system - it is at page 89 of the English and page 80

3 of the B/C/S - where you talk about that particular rocket system. But

4 I'm -- again, I think I'm asking a similar question. What kind of target

5 is that in real life? What kind of target occupies an area like that?

6 What are you thinking of? Can you give us a specific example what kind of

7 target you would aim such a weapon at?

8 A. Well, a football pitch is 50 by 100 metres. So four times four,

9 this would be 16 football pitches. Just to help you imagine how large the

10 area is. At a distance of 3.500 metres, you can target 16 football

11 pitches taken together; but you cannot hit the locker room, if you wanted

12 to. It is impossible with this kind of system. It is possible with

13 guided missiles, tank shells, et cetera.

14 Q. Thank you.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Before you move on, in the first part of your

16 testimony, you compared the system used in Sarajevo, Sarajevo with the

17 Russian system, and you indicated that the system used in Sarajevo was

18 less sophisticated and therefore more inaccurate.

19 Now, in the testimony that you have just been giving more

20 recently, I understand that modified air bombs have a level of inaccuracy,

21 which one might describe as inherent.

22 So would it be correct, then, to say that the modified air bombs

23 that we're dealing with here, at one level there is inaccuracy which

24 resulted from less professionalism; but at another level, there is an

25 inaccuracy which is inherent in a modified air bomb?

Page 4850

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You're completely right. There are

2 two different incident influences; the influence of design and development

3 and the very concept of an unguided missile, which is implies the

4 impossibility of hitting a specific individual target. If you use two

5 systems together, that provides for greater dispersion and imprecision of

6 these systems.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Whiting.

8 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour.

9 Q. I want to ask very briefly about another topic, and that is angle

10 of descent.

11 Are you able -- from the way an air bomb strikes a target, are

12 able to determine anything about the angle of descent; that is, the angle

13 that it came down at?

14 A. It is a very important approach in determining the range of the

15 projectile that hit the target, depending on the situation on the ground.

16 You have to take in the whole situation on the site of the event, to

17 identify the effects on site at the target and identify the points where

18 the projectile first hit the target and where the explosion occurred.

19 In a number of cases, where the projectile hit a building, one can

20 notice the point of impact of the projectile on the building; and then

21 inside the building, you can identify the place where the explosion

22 occurred, because usually in that place you would find remnants of the

23 rocket boosters; then using usual trigonometry equations, you could

24 determine the angle of descent. That was one system.

25 Another system applied if the projectile impacted on flat surface;

Page 4851

1 then you would usually find remnants of rocket boosters embedded in ground

2 or sand, and you could estimate, assess the angle of descent.

3 Another factor was very important; namely, if the projectile took

4 its effect within a neighbourhood in town, then by analysing the place of

5 detonation and the height of the buildings over which the projectile

6 descended, you would be able to determine the minimal angle of descent at

7 the time of impact.

8 Q. I think we're another the break, if I could have one --

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, unless you're famished, we could go on for

10 another five more minutes.

11 MR. WHITING: Oh, fine. Good. That's perfect, because I just

12 have last -- one or two last questions that I had planned before the break

13 and then some more after.

14 Q. Based on your expert analysis of the aircraft bomb, and your

15 experience, are you able to offer an opinion about whether the ABiH within

16 Sarajevo had such a weapon during the war?

17 A. The army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the basis of what I know, did

18 not have similar systems because it was impossible to import rocket motors

19 into Bosnia-Herzegovina, because they would have to go through Croatia

20 first and then through HOV.

21 Also, in order to have an air bomb, one had to have an explosive

22 and the body itself. Bearing in mind how Sarajevo was being supplied

23 through the tunnel in 1994 and 1995, then an air bomb would have to be

24 brought down Mount Igman, and an effort would have to be made to push it

25 through the tunnel and also manufacture other components, and that was

Page 4852

1 very difficult. There was no electricity, no proper machinery; then a

2 launching system would have to have been made. That's not simple.

3 You see, you'd have to have trucks, guide-rails, a mechanism for

4 azimuth, a mechanism for elevation, and so on and so forth. I am firmly

5 convinced that there are no prerequisites for the existence of such a

6 system within Sarajevo.

7 Q. You made a reference in that answer -- that rather complete answer

8 about machinery. Can you elaborate a little bit on that, that there was

9 no machinery to accomplish this. What did you mean by that?

10 A. Well, you see, in order to make an air bomb, it is necessary to

11 have 12-millimetre steel sheets. So it has to be of high quality. You

12 have to cut the steel, and that is done through melting; then you have to

13 have all the right machinery for treating this steel, and then you have to

14 have these big machines that can actually deal with an air bomb, which is

15 of such great size and which is 325 millimetres.

16 And we all know that in Sarajevo, there were constant power cuts

17 at the time, and you need electricity. Also, to fill an air bomb with

18 explosive, you need to have TNT. Every air bomb had 150 kilogrammes and

19 more of TNT, or you have to have fuel air. People did not know about fuel

20 air explosives in Sarajevo at the time. It was only the Vinca Institute

21 that knew about that, the institute for atomic energy in Vinca. In order

22 to deal with it, then you also would have to have a foundry which was in

23 Jelsingrad; then that was under the control of the government of Republika

24 Srpska.

25 In order to have stabilisers, you had to have the right metal

Page 4853

1 sheeting and then you had to have machines for treating stabilisers. In

2 order to make a machine that is six metres long there -- has to be very

3 accurate. You would have to have very big-sized machinery. That did not

4 exist in Sarajevo. Sarajevo only had small makeshift machinery with very

5 limited capacity of making a 120-millimetre projectile, nothing more than

6 that.

7 Q. Last very brief question before the break. You made a reference

8 to Vinca. Where is that, please?

9 A. Vinca is near Belgrade.

10 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour. I think that's a convenient

11 time.

12 [Trial Chamber confers]

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll break for an hour.

14 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.34 p.m.

15 --- On resuming at 1.32 p.m.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Whiting.

17 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honours.

18 Q. I'm now going to move to the third area of my questioning, which

19 is to review your analysis in chapter 17 of the specific incidents.

20 I was going to go through all of them; but given the time, I think

21 I'm just going to do a selection. Before I start speaking specifically or

22 asking specifically about the incidents, I want to ask you some questions

23 about your analysis of all of the incidents.

24 With respect to all of the incidents that you analysed in chapter

25 17, were you able to reach a conclusion based on the evidence that you

Page 4854

1 analysed and your expertise on what kind of weapon was used?

2 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. The interpreters cannot

3 here the witness. Interpreter's note: The witness should start again.

4 MR. WHITING: I'm sorry.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a minute. Please restart.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] On the basis of the analysis of

7 photographs and investigator reports on individual cases, and using the

8 information I had and the personal insights I had with regard to

9 individual incidents, it can be established beyond doubt that these were

10 rocketised air bombs. And in this case, it was FAB-250s with rocket

11 motors.

12 Further on, in all cases, what is missing is the intensive effect

13 of fragments at the surrounding vertical surfaces and the structure where

14 the air bomb impacted, which shows the TNT explosive will not been used.

15 Q. What kind of explosive was used then, in your determination?

16 A. The consequences that could be seen show how intensive the effect

17 was, which beyond doubt shows that it was fuel-air explosive that was

18 used.

19 Q. In the cases that you analysed, were you able to determine the

20 direction of fire and/or the origin of fire of the air bomb?

21 A. In most cases, one could assess the direction from which the

22 projectile came and the approximate angle of descent of the projectile,

23 and a ballistic analysis could establish the minimal range from which the

24 objective had been targeted. In a few cases, it was necessary to compare

25 similar cases in the area in order to reach a proper conclusion.

Page 4855

1 Q. In the 11 cases that you analysed, that are scheduled in our

2 indictment and that are analysed in chapter 17 of your report, can you

3 give an opinion based on your analysis and your expertise as to whether

4 the air bomb was fired from territory controlled by the Bosnian Serb army

5 or territory controlled by the ABiH?

6 A. It has been established beyond doubt that the potential launching

7 places were in the territory that was controlled by the army of Republika

8 Srpska in all cases.

9 Q. I'm going to go through some of the incidents with you. And with

10 respect to each one, I'm essentially going to ask you three questions: I

11 want to found out what you concluded regarding the direction of fire, the

12 angle of descent of the air bomb, and what you then were able to conclude

13 or approximate regarding the origin of fire.

14 Now, if we could turn to the first one I want to ask you about,

15 it's what we know as shelling incident number 8. It's page 117 of the

16 English; 104 of the B/C/S. An incident that occurred on the 24th of May,

17 1995. Do you see that, sir? Are you on that page?

18 A. Yes, yes.

19 Q. You say, on page 119 of the English and 106 of the B/C/S, that the

20 angle was determined to be an azimuth of 155 degrees plus/minus five

21 degrees. Who made that determination?

22 A. This conclusion was defined by the investigators. They made a

23 sketch of the terrain, and that is where they determined the direction

24 from where it came. That was the north. And on that basis, the incoming

25 angle was determined, the anticipated angle.

Page 4856

1 Q. Now, there is an angle of 20 degree, angle of descent, which is

2 included in your report, and you conclude that the launch site was

3 probably at a distance of 5.800 metres or more. Can you explain how that

4 was determined in this case. What evidence did you rely on to come to

5 that conclusion?

6 A. I had a few approaches in defining this angle. First of all, in

7 the photographs, it can seen clearly that the rocket motors or part of the

8 rocket motors remained in the ground. That is already an indication of

9 the approximate value of the angle of descent.

10 Furthermore, in terms of the launch site, there is a hill that you

11 can see here on this photograph, that is perhaps 400 metres away. And its

12 altitude is a couple of hundred of metres. The altitude of that hill --

13 Q. I need to interrupt you for a moment. Are you able to tell us

14 which photograph, by referring to the page number, which photograph did

15 you just refer to there?

16 A. Page 107. 107, the lower photograph.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Is there is a number? We're on page 118?

18 MR. WHITING: That is on the B/C/S, and it doesn't actually have a

19 number. But it is the photograph that appears on the top of the page on

20 121 of the English.

21 Q. I am sorry I interrupted you, Professor. What were you saying

22 about the hill?

23 A. This hill is of a certainly altitude, and there is a certain

24 distance to the incident site. Ballistic analysis shows that the height

25 of the trajectory at the point should be higher than the height or the

Page 4857

1 altitude of the hills, so that the projectile could reach the incident

2 site; and that is why, on the basis of this analysis, I said that an angle

3 of 20 degrees of launching would be the minimum one for the projectile to

4 be able to fly over the hill.

5 However, now, if we look at the broader area of this minimal

6 distance, I suggested that it was more likely that the launching angle is

7 about 5.000 metres or more, because it would be more desirable for the

8 launching site to be outside the urban area, which was then under the

9 control of the army of Republika Srpska.

10 These are quite clear criteria that the -- if the angle were less

11 than 20 degree, it is would not fly over the hill and it could not land in

12 the street of the Safeta Zajke. So the minimum range is 4.800 metres.

13 The probable launch range is 5.800 metres or even more. In both case, the

14 launch site is under the control of the army of Republika Srpska.

15 Q. If you are -- once you are able to determine an angle of descent

16 based offer pieces of evidence, from that are you able to determine a

17 minimum or maximum range? Is there any connection between those two

18 things?

19 A. The minimal range can be established, and the maximum rage is

20 defined by the performance of the rocket system. So the approximate or

21 probable area where the launcher was can be established.

22 Q. Let's look at the next incident. It's incident number 9 for us,

23 and it's on page 122 of the English and 109 of the B/C/S.

24 With respect to this incident, were you able to come to any

25 conclusions regarding the direction of fire and the range.

Page 4858

1 A. In the investigators' reports, the direction was defined. It was

2 not possible to establish the incoming angle of the projectile.

3 However, when one looks at the distance in the previous case and

4 in this case, and if we take as a point of departure that both incidents

5 occurred the same day within four hours or so, then, bearing in mind the

6 fact that this same hill is behind the incident site, it is only logical

7 that the launching sites in both cases are similar; and then it was

8 possible to proceed from the assumption that the direction was identical

9 as in the previous case, and also the incoming angle would have to be at a

10 minimum 20 degrees in order to be able to hit this particular site.

11 So, the location for the launcher in this case has to be at a

12 minimum range of 4.800 metres; that is to say, that the distance from this

13 incident, and that site would then be within the broader area of Lukavica.

14 Q. If we could look now at incident number 12, which is at page 132

15 of the English and 118 of the B/C/S. On page 133 of the English, and I'm

16 not sure which page of the B/C/S, if it's 118 or 119, you say that the

17 azimuth angle of 285 degrees was determined. Can you tell us how that was

18 determined, and if you able in this incident to determine a range of how

19 far away it was fired from?

20 A. You see that what I said here was that this analysis was possible

21 only after a detailed analysis of other locations where buildings had been

22 hit the area of Novo Sarajevo; that is to say, in the immediate

23 neighbourhood. The projectile fell on a small flat area behind an

24 apartment building. So, in order to have the projectile hit that area, it

25 had to go by that apartment building, which is an eight story building of

Page 4859

1 20-odd metre. So the difference is, say, about 20 metres between the

2 point of impact and the top of the building.

3 And if we look at the distance from the site of this incident and

4 the vertical surface of the building, it is possible to establish what the

5 minimal angle was. And if we were to compare this to similar incidents

6 that occurred in the area, it was possible to establish the area from

7 where the -- it had been launched; 75 degrees to the west, or rather, 285

8 degrees azimuth.

9 On my photograph on page 119, it is the next one, the next

10 photograph, the next page of this particular incident. And you can see

11 there these red and white dots.

12 Q. Okay. So the photograph you're referring to is on our page 134 at

13 the top. When I say "our page," I mean the English.

14 Were you able, based on your calculation of the angle of descent,

15 to determine the -- an approximate range from which this was fired?

16 A. Around 5.8 kilometres. That is the broader area of Butile.

17 However, I have to say that the position depends on the roads there. A

18 launcher is mounted on a truck so probably it had to take a proper road to

19 that particular site. It is not possible for that truck to go through

20 inaccessible areas; that is to say, communication has to be possible when

21 one looks at the launching. You see many red and white dots here showing

22 the grouping of hits in the narrow area of the city of Sarajevo. That is

23 how I established what the possible position was, a bit more accurately.

24 Q. Now you -- I think you've already said that with respect range you

25 would come up with an approximation, a -- a minimum and a maximum, for

Page 4860

1 example. With respect to direction of fire, based on your analysis, was

2 it possible to come up with a precise determination or an approximate

3 determination of the direction of fire?

4 A. In most cases it was possible to have a relative degree of

5 accuracy, plus/minus five per cent, to assess what the azimuth was. It

6 was impossible to assess it to a single degree. That is impossible, but

7 it was possible to establish what the -- or, rather, assess the corridor

8 that the projectile could have taken in order to get there.

9 Q. I understand. Can we look now at shelling incident 13, which is

10 at page 135 of the English; page 121 of the B/C/S. And here you describe

11 how the reports from the investigators have a conflict in terms of the

12 direction of fire. Some of the reports say north-west and there's -- I

13 believe one report that says north-east. Were you able to come to a

14 conclusion based on your analysis of what the direction of fire was for

15 this incident?

16 A. I carried out a full analysis of the area of the incident, not

17 only relying on the photographs in the investigator reports but by

18 carrying out an on-site visit and analysing the entire region in 3D form

19 in order to be able to assess it. That was my foundation for establishing

20 the minimum angle of descent. I defined the point of impact, where the

21 projectile impacted the building. Then, across -- or, rather opposite

22 that building there is an apartment building that is about 12 metres

23 higher than the point of impact and the distance is about 25 metres, and

24 in that way it was possible to establish the minimal angle of descent.

25 The projectile would have hit that building had the angle been

Page 4861

1 smaller. Once I determined this minimum angle of descent on the basis of

2 a ballistic analysis proceeding from the original data of the

3 investigators, I saw that it was impossible to launch the projectile from

4 the north or some other direction because at a distance of 5200 metres,

5 that is the distance involved and determined by the angle of launching, it

6 is possible to establish that this area is very hilly. So in order to be

7 able to fly over these hills, its trajectory would have to be considerably

8 higher than the 5800 that I referred to.

9 Since I'm familiar with the area, it is in the area of the Pretis

10 factory where I worked for about 20 years. The only broader location

11 where it was -- from where it was possible to carry out the launching and

12 to have a clear area of several hundred metres in front of the launching

13 pad without hitting an obstacle was the interior area of the Pretis

14 factory or, rather, the area right next to the entrance into the Pretis

15 factory. Anything else would have made the launching of the projectile

16 impossible. So that was the reason that made it possible for me to assess

17 the azimuth.

18 Q. Let's move now to shelling incident 15. It's at page 140 of the

19 English and 125 of the B/C/S.

20 MR. WHITING: And this is the incident involving the TV tower.

21 Q. Now you testified early that you participated in the investigation

22 of this incident at the time. What was your role?

23 A. I did not take part in the investigation. I carried out - how

24 should I put this? - an independent case, independently of the judge,

25 Judge Bazdarevic, together with two of my colleagues who are ballistics

Page 4862

1 men. One is a ballistics expert and the other one is an explosives

2 expert. We analysed this incident, and since, on the same day, several

3 incidents occurred in the immediate vicinity of the TV tower we carried

4 out an analysis and we compiled our own report that we handed over to the

5 judge.

6 So, in a way, we were an independent commission apart from the

7 police, that is. Separate from the police.

8 Q. Did you do -- did you undertake this investigation on your own or

9 were you asked by somebody to do it?

10 A. No. Right after the firing of this projectile at the TV tower,

11 the judge telephoned me and asked me to come and carry out an analysis. I

12 have his decision on the investigation too.

13 Q. Did you go to the scene on that day. On the day that it occurred,

14 did you go to the TV tower?

15 A. Very quickly. Perhaps within an hour or an hour and a half after

16 the impact, I was on site.

17 Q. And so if it occurred -- you have it occurring at 9.22. You

18 believe you were there by 10.30 or 11.00?

19 A. Something like that, yes.

20 Q. Do you --

21 [Trial Chamber confers]

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Whiting, there is a matter that has been

23 troubling me. The witness --

24 [Trial Chamber confers]

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Isn't this witness testifying as an expert?

Page 4863

1 MR. WHITING: Yes, Your Honour. Yes. But this -- he was, I would

2 submit, asked as an expert to analyse this incident, and so his analysis

3 of the incident that occurred at the time figures into his expert analysis

4 today in his report about the incident. So that is why --

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Where is his expertise in this area set out?

6 MR. WHITING: In -- I'm sorry, in which area? In terms of

7 investigating incidents?

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: No. Investigating --

9 JUDGE HARHOFF: The use of modified aircraft bombs.

10 MR. WHITING: Well, Your Honour, his expertise is set out in -- in

11 the first chapter. His experience in dealing with --

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's on page 1, is it?

13 MR. WHITING: Hang on. Yes, page 1. And I'm happy to elaborate

14 on it further. I thought this was not a matter of dispute. That based on

15 his experience at the Pretis factory plus teaching experience plus his

16 experience during the war, he has developed an expertise in -- in

17 artillery rocket launching and this kind of weaponry. And this experience

18 extends -- his primary field of work was rocket motors and warheads,

19 developing rocket projectiles. He has experience both in terms of

20 developing the weapons and understanding and knowing the characteristics

21 of the weapons, but also understanding how they impact on targets.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: But you have not demonstrated how he acquired

23 that experience. And, indeed, on page 1, which is headed "Personal

24 Qualifications and Professional Experience," it is more devoted to

25 professional experience than his qualifications. You have described him

Page 4864

1 as a professor, but we don't know how he reached that level.

2 MR. WHITING: Well, I certainly have to ask some more questions

3 about that. I thought I had done sufficient on this, but obviously I

4 haven't.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: No. I don't think you have. I don't think

6 whether the Defence had intended to take it up, but what is here doesn't

7 really establish his expertise, in my view. Although, it is clear from

8 the evidence that he has been giving that he does have a fairly deep

9 knowledge of the area.

10 MR. WHITING: Okay.

11 Q. Professor, you've, I think, heard the intervention of the Trial

12 Chamber. Could you assist us please, and I'll put the question generally

13 first and then may ask some detailed follow-up. Could you assist in

14 explaining to us what expertise you have, based both on -- and you can

15 rely both on your learning and your teaching, your practical experience,

16 working at the Pretis factory, and also practical experience during the

17 war in two subjects: First, the characteristics and qualities of aircraft

18 bombs and modified aircraft bombs with rockets. And, number two,

19 assessing or analysing impact of those bombs and making analysis, such as

20 you have, about what type of bomb, what type of weapon, where it came

21 from.

22 What qualifications do you have to do those two tasks which you do

23 in your report.

24 A. In 1975, I completed -- I graduated from the Faculty of Mechanical

25 Engineering. The topic of my diploma paper was design of 128-millimetre

Page 4865

1 descent rockets. That same year I got employment in Pretis in the

2 development department, and I worked on the development of that rocket,

3 which over a period of years was further developed and became part of the

4 weaponry of the JNA, and it came to be known as 128-millimetre M87. So I

5 developed a new rocket motor, a new warhead, complete analysis of external

6 and internal design. I tested more than 2.000 rockets in flight and more

7 than 700 rocket motors during the testing stage.

8 At the same time, I taught at the Mechanical Engineering Faculty

9 in the department for me are mechanics, first; and then when the

10 department for defence was formed at the university, I taught in that

11 department. So from 1984, I'm -- I teach in the department for

12 ammunitions, rocket motors, testing of those. I later got a diploma in

13 Zagreb in the area of pyrotechnology, internal ballistics of rocket

14 motors, which fly at very high speeds, to simplify things.

15 In 1999, I took a Ph.D. At the Mechanical Engineering Faculty in

16 Sarajevo. My thesis was on the combustion of rocket fuel in the area of

17 high angle velocity, which is a topic directly linked to these rockets.

18 By working in Pretis, I also worked on the 128-millimetre rockets

19 and artillery projectiles of 122-millimetres mortar shells of 120

20 millimetres. Just before the war, I developed the improved rocket of

21 122-millimetres with a range of 27 kilometres and one of 36 kilometres for

22 the needs of the Egyptian military industry.

23 I developed the rocket of 50-millimetres as a test rocket for

24 testing large rocket -- armoured rocket systems. I developed the

25 90-millimetre rockets for combat in case of assault. And during the war,

Page 4866

1 in 1992 and 1993, we tried to find alternative ways of manufacturing

2 ammunitions within available resources.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Thank you. You are a professor?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am a head of the department for

5 defensive weapons at the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering. I have four

6 assistants.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Whiting.

8 MR. WHITING: I'm just going to follow-up with a few questions.

9 In your capacity as a professor, have you published any articles.

10 A. I couldn't be appointed to the post of professor if I hadn't

11 published such articles. I have published and participated in a large

12 number of international congress and symposia. In 1980, I was awarded,

13 together with a colleague, Nenad Fisher, in Tokyo as the best paper on the

14 combustion of fuel.

15 Q. Could you tell us, in addition to that paper, just briefly, some

16 of the other topics that have you published on that might be relevant to

17 your analysis in this case.

18 A. I published articles in the areas of the combustion of rocket

19 motors, their design and fragmentation of warheads, definition of the zone

20 of lethal affect, when a projectile contacts the target; then also I

21 published some papers on uranium. I published the effect of the shelling

22 of the old bridge in Mostar. I was president of the commission for

23 establishing the position of the launcher for Markale 1. I did an

24 analysis of that incident.

25 Q. Just to follow-up on that particular point, have you ever

Page 4867

1 testified as an expert before at the Tribunal?

2 A. [No audible response]

3 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness repeat his answer please.

4 MR. WHITING: I am sorry. The interpreters didn't hear that.

5 Could please you repeat that answer please.

6 A. Yes. I did testify I think I did testify in the Galic case as an

7 expert.

8 Q. That was on what issue, if you can recall? What did you testify

9 about in the Galic case?

10 A. I testified in evaluating the possible positions from which the

11 120-millimetre mortar shell was launched.

12 Q. Which mortar shell? Was it in respect to a particular incident?

13 A. 120-millimetre in the Markale incident, Markale 1.

14 Q. And then the final question, not to overdo this but just to be

15 complete. You testified about having participated in or been involved in

16 many tests of weapons. I think, you said 2.000, but some large numbers of

17 tests of weapons of rockets. Did those tests include in addition to the

18 flight of the weapon, the impact of the weapon? In other words, have you

19 studied that, the impact ever weapons, such as rockets on targets?

20 A. Fully. I designed a rocket system as a whole. For it to be

21 included in the weaponry of the JNA, it had to be fully tested; the rocket

22 motors, the warheads, the ballistics, the reliability, the fragmentation

23 tables of the targeting, and a whole series of other things. I worked in

24 this area continuously for a period of ten years.

25 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, I thank you for allowing me to develop

Page 4868

1 the record on this point.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, please proceed.

3 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour.

4 Q. If we could go back to shelling incident 15, page 140 of the

5 English, 125 of the B/C/S, and you were testifying that you went to the

6 scene at -- I think you said 10.30 or 11.00 that day. When you arrived at

7 the scene, were other -- were there other investigators already at the

8 scene, or were you the first to arrive at the scene?

9 A. No. I wasn't the first to arrive. There were the police officers

10 who were there, and they were to assist me in taking photographs, and they

11 went to this area together with me, so I wasn't alone. There was a

12 three-man team working on this analysis, and we reached the original place

13 of contact of the projectile with the TV building and then we analysed the

14 other elements and examined how such a destructive effect could have been

15 achieved.

16 Q. As part of your analysis in this case, have you reviewed

17 photographs of the destruction caused by the air bomb on that day, on the

18 TV tower?

19 A. I toured all the different parts of the building, every part that

20 was damaged. And during the analysis in preparing this report, I did

21 review those photographs and they fully correspond to what I personally

22 saw with my own eyes.

23 Q. You anticipated my question. Thank you. Did you -- oh, by the

24 way, did you -- do you recall if you saw any UNMOs present at the scene

25 when you were there?

Page 4869

1 A. I did not notice any just then, because just after I arrived and

2 made the first tour of the area, another projectile hit close to the TV

3 and then I went to examine that and then there was another incident in the

4 Geteova Street. So I went to tour all these sites to have a fuller

5 insight and it's quite possible, while I was absent, that some of them or

6 one of them may have arrived, but I don't remember. I don't remember

7 meeting them.

8 Q. How long were you at the TV tower site, after you arrived?

9 A. In the late afternoon about 5.00 p.m., I received a photograph of

10 the launcher --

11 Q. No, I'm sorry.

12 A. -- published by the journal, Europa.

13 Q. I'm sorry, I think you misunderstood. You testified that you went

14 to the site at approximately 10.30 or 11.00. How long did you remain

15 there? How long were you there, at the TV tower, before you left?

16 A. When I had visited these different locations, this may have taken

17 15 or 20 minutes, I spent the rest of the time, until 5.00 p.m., there at

18 the TV tower.

19 Q. I understand.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.

21 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] The witness said in answer to

22 Mr. Whiting's question that on that day he saw a photograph in the

23 magazine Europa, and this was not included in the transcript. It just

24 says "magazine," but what the witness said is not included in the

25 transcript.

Page 4870

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, it is now.

2 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] That he saw the photograph in the

3 magazine, Europa?

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, your intervention has included it.

5 MR. WHITING: Thank you.

6 Q. Did you write a report on the basis of your investigation?

7 A. Yes. After about seven or ten days.

8 Q. Did you reach a conclusion about what type of bomb was used in

9 that incident?

10 A. Yes, my conclusion was that it was an aerosol bomb.

11 Q. Was your report, your conclusion, accepted?

12 A. No, it was not accepted.

13 Q. Do you know why not, did you learn why not?

14 A. Just before handing in my report, a meeting was organised in the

15 Defence Ministry because one of the members of the commission was a member

16 of the Defence Ministry in the section for the military industry and his

17 boss asked us to come to a meeting and two officers were present there

18 from the Security Service of the Main Staff. At the time they insisted

19 that we change our conclusion to the effect that it was not an aerosol

20 bomb but a different bomb, a bomb with TNT.

21 I rejected this initiative and it was a bit unpleasant.

22 Q. Let me just ask you a few questions about this. First of all, who

23 insisted that you change your conclusion?

24 A. Two men who introduced themselves as being from the intelligence

25 or counter-intelligence service of the Main Staff.

Page 4871

1 Q. Did they tell you or did you learn why it was they wanted you to

2 change your conclusion -- that it was -- and change it from being --

3 A. Asked them, because their impression was that it would be more

4 effective if it was stated that the explosive used was TNT. I think that

5 they weren't sufficiently informed about the effects of fuel-air bombs.

6 Q. When you say that your impression was that it would be more

7 effective, what do you mean by that? More effective in what way? What

8 does that mean?

9 A. I really don't know how to explain it. Probably in their minds,

10 they felt that if it said an air bomb with TNT, then possible consequences

11 of destruction are greater than if it is stated that it was a fuel air

12 bomb. It was not so frequently used, in daily use.

13 Q. You said that it became unpleasant. In what way did it become

14 unpleasant? Can you be more specific about that?

15 A. At a point in time, they started threatening me that they would

16 send me to prison if I did not change my conclusion. However, as this was

17 not the first instance from my opinion to differ from the opinion of

18 military leaders at the time or members of the Defence Ministry, I did not

19 agree to their suggestion, and I stood by my position. The other two

20 members of the commission, I must point out, supported me.

21 Q. So you did not change your report?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Does this episode that you experienced cause you to doubt any of

24 the police or investigator reports that you have reviewed in connection

25 with the incidents that you have analysed in your report?

Page 4872

1 A. No. The reports are very correct.

2 Q. Now, let's go back to the incident that you analysed. You

3 determined that the incoming direction was 280 degrees, that the angle of

4 descent was 25 degrees, and therefore the minimum distance was 5.800

5 metres for the launch. Could you very briefly, because we're short on

6 time, explain to us what it was that caused you to reach this conclusion.

7 What did you base that conclusion on?

8 A. The most important proof are the prints of the impact of the bomb

9 on the roof of this tower. One can clearly see an elongated imprint with

10 deep deformations of the ground, and one can also see that the damage is a

11 couple of metres long and the depth about 200 millimetres, on the basis of

12 classical systems of the evaluation of effects of targets, which is

13 defined by American rules. Also, on projectiles, it was possible with

14 precision of plus/minus ten to determine the direction of fire.

15 As the prints were very intensive, it meant that the penetration

16 angle was about 25 degrees, the ricochet angle. And this could be clearly

17 be seen, the bomb hit the roof, it ricochetted, and fell into this area

18 between the studio. And that is it where destruction of the -- part of

19 the casing occurred, the activation of the explosive, the activation of

20 secondary fuses, and the destruction that is it evidenced on these

21 photographs.

22 As I knew the direction --

23 Q. I'm going interrupt you, I'm sorry, because I think you have

24 answered the question. But one more question on this incident. Based on

25 the evidence that you reviewed and that you have just described, is it

Page 4873

1 possible that the air bomb -- this air bomb was fired from a distance of

2 less than 1.000 metres away? Is that possible, given the physical

3 evidence that you reviewed?

4 A. I shall explain that very simply.

5 Q. First answer, and then can you briefly explain?

6 A. No, it is not possible. It is not possible.

7 Q. Now briefly explain, please.

8 A. You see, an air bomb is supplied with three rocket motors. Their

9 time is between 1.6 to 2 seconds, so the maximum speed is about 250 metres

10 per second at the end of the work of the rocket motor. So a rocket

11 projectile has an active period. The trajectory, while the motor is

12 functioning, is 400 metres. There is no possibility of that rocket, once

13 the motor stops working, being able to change its course and have an angle

14 of 25 degrees.

15 It is simple. The system has its own inertia. You must not

16 forget that 250 metres per second is in the range of 800 kilometres per

17 hour or 500 miles per hour. This is a very high speed, and the mass is

18 about 300 kilograms. That is the mass weight of the bomb, so it is

19 impossible to guide such a system to make sudden turns.

20 Q. Thank you. Now, finally, I'm just going to ask you to look

21 quickly at one last incident. It's what we call shelling incident 19, and

22 it's at page 150 of the English and 135 of the B/C/S.

23 JUDGE HARHOFF: Counsel, before you move on to that, I must admit

24 that I'm not sure I fully understand the explanation that the witness just

25 gave to the reason why the TV bomb could not have been fired from a

Page 4874

1 distance less than 1.000 metres.

2 If I look at the transcript, the witness, Professor, you said that

3 the time is between 1.6 to 2 seconds, so that the maximum speed is about

4 250 metres per second.

5 What time are you talking about?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The time that the rocket motor is

7 working, while the fuel is burning. Once there is no further burning of

8 feel, the projectile continues along its route by inertia. It doesn't

9 have its own inertia, so a great force is required to turn it around.

10 So the Prosecutor was asking me whether it was possible to hit the

11 TV tower from a distance of 1.000 metres. I'm saying, at this position,

12 if you're targeting from a distance of one kilometre, the traces would not

13 be what they were here. There is no possibility of the rocket changing

14 its course and ricochetting on the roof of the building.

15 JUDGE HARHOFF: What I understand you to say is that if the angle

16 of descent was about 20 degrees, then it must have been fired from a

17 longer distance, provided, I understand, provided that the rockets were

18 functioning all the time. But a natural question would be: What happens

19 if the rocket motor suddenly fails so that the bomb is just launched and

20 then after one or two or three seconds, there is no more propulsion so

21 then it drops. Would that be a possibility? Could that have happened?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is possible for the rocket motor

23 to fail. It is possible, but then the rocket will not continue to fly in

24 that direction. It will move to the right, to the left, upwards or

25 downwards. It cannot continue its flight in the direction it started in,

Page 4875

1 because there is destabilisation.

2 There are three rocket motors and the vector of propulsion must be

3 parallel. Should one rocket motor fail, then there is destabilisation,

4 and it will fall towards the ground after 100 metres. There is to dilemma

5 in that regard. This is a well-known fact.

6 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.

7 [Trial Chamber confers]

8 JUDGE HARHOFF: Can I just follow-up with a question here.

9 So if the bomb were to keep its trajectory under a failure of the

10 rockets, then that would require that all three rockets stopped at exactly

11 the same time. Is that correct? Which, in my view, would be unlikely,

12 but that could be a possibility.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The motors cannot fail. They can

14 only explode. The whole system is so designed. For a rocket to leave the

15 launcher, it must have a minimum speed of 50 metres per second. So in the

16 first stage, the rocket motors must be working properly or the projectile

17 will not leave the launcher.

18 If the velocity is reduced business because the motors are not

19 producing the necessary propulsion, then the rocket is no longer stable,

20 because we designed the size of the stabiliser of the rocket according to

21 the maximum speed indicated by the motor.

22 If the speed is lower in the launching stage, then the stabiliser

23 surface has to be larger. That is a principle of dynamics and ballistics.

24 If the propulsion by three motors were inadequate, it couldn't fly in a

25 stable manner. It would fall again. It would drop. It cannot fly

Page 4876

1 regularly.

2 It is very simple for people in this field of aerodynamics and

3 ballistics.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Can't the failure occur at 1.000 metres in the

5 same way it could occur at 100?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It cannot at 1.000 metres because a

7 rocket motor works for only 1.6 to 2 seconds. It is working for the first

8 400 metres only; after that, the rocket motors are not working any longer

9 and so any failure has no effect after that. It has already acquired its

10 velocity, stability, and inertia. And the system works notice same way as

11 if you were to throw a stone from your shoulder. It's unguidable.

12 JUDGE HARHOFF: Just to clarify again, the time that mentioned in

13 your first intervention, 1.6 to 2 seconds, that is the time when the

14 rockets are ignited and working?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

16 JUDGE HARHOFF: And during those 1.6 to 2 seconds, the bomb would

17 have moved approximately, was it, 400 metres; and from there on, the rest

18 of the trajectory is ballistic?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Right. Freely. Free flight.

20 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.

21 MR. WHITING: I will just ask one follow-up question on this

22 topic.

23 Q. If the air bomb -- you said that if it had been launched from a

24 closer distance, say, under 100 metre, it is would have resulted in

25 different traces on the building. Can you -- how would they have been

Page 4877

1 different? What way would it be different, the trace on the building, if

2 it had been launched from a closer distance, say, under 1.000 metres?

3 A. In that case, the bomb would graze -- in order to reach -- if it

4 were to reach the roof at smaller angles, it would graze the flat surface

5 of the roof, and there would be no such intense deformations as created at

6 an angle of 25 degrees. From an analysis of vector of inertia forces and

7 analysis of the reaction, we can establish that. At smaller angles,

8 therefore, there would be just mild traces on the surface of the roof.

9 There would be no damage up to 200 millimetres deep into the roof, and

10 there would be no such trail. 200 millimetres is written, not 2.000.

11 Q. Okay. I think you did say 200 millimetres. Right.

12 If we could move on to shelling incident number 19, the last one I

13 will ask you about. Again, it's at page 150 of the English and 135 of the

14 B/C/S.

15 Now, in this case, the investigators concluded that there was one

16 air bomb that ricochetted and hit two locations; however, you have come to

17 a different conclusion. Can you just explain why it was that you came to

18 a different conclusion with respect to this incident, and what your

19 conclusion was?

20 A. My conclusion was there existed two air bombs that within a

21 relatively short space of time hit two spots that were close to each

22 other. In the first case, with regard to Aleksa Santic 50 building, the

23 bomb hit the corner of the building, penetrated and caused extensive

24 damage, hit the ground in the yard; and inside, deep in the ground,

25 remnants of the rocket booster were found.

Page 4878

1 From analysing the point of impact on the building and the spot

2 where the remnants of the rocket motor were found, it was possible to

3 calculate both the direction of descent and the angle of descent. In the

4 case of the second building, at Bunicki Potok 233, where there was an

5 explosion causing extensive damage due to the blastwave, I placed both

6 these incidents on the map.

7 I located them on the map, and I concluded that these were two

8 separate cases and that the report saying that the rocket, after hitting

9 the ground, deviated by 90 degrees and hit Bunicki Potok is absolutely not

10 authenticate. First, because it's impossible to manipulate an unguided

11 projectile go, and second, the degree was too high. The radius in such

12 cases has to be several hundred metres. That's one thing.

13 And the second [as interpreted] thing, it is the bomb that

14 contacts first, that impacts first, and only then rocket motors. It isn't

15 logical that rocket motors are grounded and the warhead which has a larger

16 mass should be found ahead of it.

17 The following is a rough draft which should be proofed. I

18 interviewed witnesses in both these cases, once I noticed this

19 inconsistency, and with the witness who lives just across the street I --

20 speaking to this lady, I heard that the bomb hit the man-hole of the

21 water-supply system that some sort of grey fog dispersed after impact, and

22 that is difficult for fuel-air explosive. Plus, and we can see this on

23 photographs, the whole area was soaked in water, and the effect of the

24 fuel-air explosive was compromised, because the fuel-air mixed with water.

25 That was the first case.

Page 4879

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can I ask you a question?

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: There's a technical problem?

3 MR. WHITING: Yeah, there seems to be a technical problem. I

4 don't know if we can continue --

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: No transcript or no LiveNote?

6 The technicians are on their way.

7 Well, let's give them a couple of minutes. We'll stay here.

8 [Technical difficulty]


10 Q. We're just having a problem with the transcript, Professor.

11 --- Break taken at 2.36 p.m.

12 --- On resuming at 2.49 p.m.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, please continue.

14 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour, Mr. President.

15 Q. Professor, just staying with this incident number 19 and the

16 two -- what you found to be two air bombs, were you able, based on the

17 evidence, to determine the direction of fire of the two air bombs?

18 A. The direction of descent and the angle of descent I could

19 determine with great precision and I -- you can see that from the

20 photographs attached.

21 Q. Okay. That's the -- okay. So the -- when you say the direction

22 of descent, is that the direction of fire?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Okay. So you were able to determine both the direction of fire

25 and the angle of descent. Was the direction of fire that you determined

Page 4880

1 consistent with the direction of fire that was found by the investigators

2 who investigated this incident and who found that there was one air bomb?

3 A. In principle, yes. One should bear in mind that the incident

4 occurred late at night and the investigators arrived on the next day. It

5 was said the projectile had come from the direction of Ilidza.

6 Q. Now, based on the information that you analysed and your

7 determination of the angle of descent, were you able to determine an

8 approximate range from which it was fired from?

9 A. That can be very easily seen. That angle is around 25 degrees and

10 the distance is 5.000 metres, or thereabouts. 5800 was the distance

11 normally at a degree of 25 --

12 Q. Okay. With respect to the other incidents that I did not ask you

13 about, that we did not look at in detail, did you rely on similar factors

14 in reaching your conclusions about angle of descent, direction of fire,

15 and the range from which the weapon was fired. That is, the topography,

16 the photographs, the information about the damage?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Thank you, Professor.

19 MR. WHITING: Your Honours, thank you, I have no further

20 questions.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

22 Mr. Tapuskovic.

23 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

24 Cross-examination by Mr. Tapuskovic:

25 Q. Mr. Zecevic, I'm Defence counsel for Mr. Dragomir Milosevic, and I

Page 4881

1 have quite a few questions concerning your expertise and your report. But

2 just so I don't forget, since you were just talking about an angle of 25

3 degrees and the distances you established on that basis, if I'm not

4 mistaken you always proceeded from that angle, 25 degrees, and you

5 determined always the greatest distances for the firing of these rockets.

6 Is that correct?

7 A. No. If you -- you might have noticed that I also spoke about an

8 angle of 20 degrees as well as an angle of 25 degrees. Concerning certain

9 matters I said that the angle can be 30 or more degrees if you look at

10 individual incidents. For each of these angles I gave a mathematical

11 interpretation to explain how I determined that angle, so I cannot give

12 you a general answer unless you ask me about a specific incident and ask

13 if I had a different approach in determining the angle of descent.

14 Q. I will have to come back to that later but I wanted to pick it up

15 immediately and emphasise it.

16 We are talking here about an imperfect system, and my question is,

17 if that system is so imperfect, how come that we are dealing with these

18 approximate values, 20, 25 degrees, and it always turns out, according to

19 your calculations, that it was fired from four to five kilometres away.

20 A. If you listen carefully, I never said that the distance from which

21 the projectile was fired was 5.000. I said always the minimum distance

22 was, and then it could be 800, 1.000 metres, and so on. I also spoke

23 about the dispersion -- impact deviation, and how it can be affected by

24 changes in temperature by change of pressure impulse and other influences.

25 If you launch a similar projectile while changing the temperature

Page 4882

1 or the rocket booster, the mass, or if there is a wind, there can be

2 differences in range of 500 to 600 metes. You need to know this. I would

3 be deluding you if I said, as a serious person, that the distance was

4 5.800 metres. I was always talking about minimum and maximum.

5 Q. I understood that. You did speak of these things in responding to

6 the questions of the Prosecutor. I am ask you something different. This

7 is deviation possible with every projectile, both guided and unguided.

8 This deviation is always the limit of maximum range, isn't it?

9 A. I didn't quite understand you. Impact deviation is possible at

10 any distance from the place of launching. The character of deviation

11 depends on the angle of launching. That is strictly controlled, because

12 we are talking about differences in metres when we speak of guided

13 missiles. And with unguided missiles, the differences are measured in

14 dozens of metres.

15 Q. Let me come to page 184 of the English version of your report,

16 where you said that the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not have or use

17 this type of modified aircraft bomb anywhere during the war and certainly

18 not in Sarajevo.

19 Could you tell me, first, before I ask you anything else - and

20 that's also contained in your report - you had at your disposal

21 information that this weapon had been used both in 1994 and in 1995

22 throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

23 A. Could you just define when I had that information? Now, when I

24 made my analysis, or during the war?

25 Q. We'll come back to that. For the time being, I'm on this page of

Page 4883

1 your report, and it would take me time to move to another passage.

2 You have that report in front of you. Could you please look to

3 the end of that page. You say that the BH army did not have or use this

4 type of modified aircraft bomb anywhere during the war. Now I'm speaking

5 primarily, and only in fact, about the BH army, that it didn't have this

6 weapon, right?

7 A. According to my information, and this is my opinion.

8 Q. You also said here something that you repeated in answering the

9 questions of the Prosecutor, that you could not make that weapon because

10 you lacked the sheets, you lacked the fuses, you lacked the conditions for

11 manufacturing this weapon. Correct?

12 A. You're talking to me as if I was the one manufacturing it. I had

13 no opportunity to be involved in manufacturing this. If you are

14 identifying me with the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I think you're

15 wrong.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: I did hear that, and don't personalise the

17 questions in that way. There is no basis for it.

18 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

19 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Well, Your Honours, then I will

20 have to proceed slowly and start putting to the witness certain evidence

21 that I have in approximate my hands, and I will start with the document

22 DD00-1985. That's the statement given by Mr. Berko Zecevic on the 26th

23 and 27th February, 1996 to the OTP investigators.

24 Q. Do you see that statement? Is it your statement?

25 A. Probably. I can't see my signature.

Page 4884

1 Q. Very well. Look at page 2. To avoid as personalising anything

2 here - and I usually try to avoid that - on page 2, in paragraph 2, you

3 said: "As a member of the expert team, at the beginning of the war, I

4 organised the production and development of weapons in Sarajevo."

5 Is this correct?

6 A. Absolutely.

7 Q. So why would it be impossible for to you have been involved in the

8 production of air bombs?

9 A. Well, you could hear and read it that when the war began, I was a

10 legal citizen of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and as a legal

11 citizen, I placed my services in the defence of the country called Bosnia

12 and Herzegovina when the war began, and I gave all I could. Before that,

13 I worked for 20 years in the production of weapons until 1993; and on 14th

14 February, 1993, I was demobilised as an unsuitable person from the army of

15 Bosnia and Herzegovina.

16 Q. And you worked on the production of these weapons in cooperation

17 with the staff of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

18 A. I was head of the department for development. And as head of

19 department, I was deputy commander for the centre of production, and that

20 was directly under the control of the staff of the Main Staff of the army

21 of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

22 Q. I'll have to go back to that at some point, but I now I would like

23 to move on to --

24 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Actually, first of all, could

25 this document be admitted into evidence as a Defence exhibit.

Page 4885

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Whiting.

2 MR. WHITING: Well, this is an interview that is nine pages long,

3 and counsel has just put to him one sentence which he did not dispute and

4 was actually something that he talked about in the direct. I'm not sure

5 why the whole document then suddenly comes into evidence. On what basis?

6 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have to explain

7 this. If I have enough time, from that document, I will use all of three

8 pages, in excerpts, very important things related to the this witness.

9 I'm not going to stick to that only. I have to link it up with

10 yet another statement, and two other statements. All of them are his

11 statements, that is why I am cross-examining. That is what I'm entitled

12 to ask on cross-examination. The Prosecutor cannot tell me how I am going

13 to cross-examine.

14 [Trial Chamber confers]

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll admit it.

16 THE REGISTRAR: As D170, Your Honours.

17 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Now I would like us to have a look at this other statement. This

19 is a conversation that Mr. Berko Zecevic had with Prosecutor Chester Stamp

20 on the 21st and 22nd of June 2001. The document is DD00-2035.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Whiting.

22 MR. WHITING: Yes. Just a little technical matter, which may or

23 may not be important. This is not a statement, as we normally use that

24 term in, in the sense that it was not signed and adopted by the witness.

25 It is notes of an interview. With that clarification, I certainly have no

Page 4886

1 objection to counsel using it in cross-examination.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, he said statement, first, and then he said

3 a conversation. So let us proceed.

4 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Mr. Zecevic, first of all, I'm interested in the fourth

6 paragraph. In English, it is page -- or rather, the last paragraph.

7 "When you're talking about the manufacturing of shells, the

8 shells produced in Sarajevo were not made of raw steel but from pieces of

9 steel or cast steel." Is that right?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Not to dwell on this much longer, in the last paragraph on that

12 page, page 2, paragraph 3 in English. The shells --

13 MR. WHITING: I'm sorry to interrupt but I don't believe the

14 witness has -- I think the witness is the only one in the courtroom who

15 does not have a copy of this in front of him. I may be mistaken, but what

16 is on the screen is not this.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: All right. Well, let the witness have a copy.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. It's on the screen, yes.

19 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes. The witness has it on the

20 screen, and I have it in my hands, yes.

21 Q. So since we've dealt with that, in the last paragraph: "Shells in

22 Sarajevo were made in the Alipasino Polje foundry. They were mostly

23 82-millimetres for the most part."

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Yes, for the most part. But a moment ago, you said that shells of

Page 4887

1 120-millimetre were made, too?

2 A. In addition to the mortar shells, yes, 120 millimetres, yes.

3 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Now, I would like to tender this

4 document as well. I would like to have it admitted into evidence as a

5 Defence exhibit.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But not at Livnica, in Alipasino

7 Polje.

8 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. It is your statement. It is what you said in this interview.

10 A. What was said in my interview was that at Alipasino Polje, which

11 is a broad area, there is a factory called Livnica. In this Livnica

12 foundry, there were cast components that were made. And I said that

13 morning that the maximum calibre that could have been made within Sarajevo

14 was 120 millimetres, right?

15 I am very specific when I talk. And also if you look at this

16 here, you will see that certain projectiles were made with a full profile.

17 It says here made with pieces of steel; and then a complex technology

18 makes it possible to make projectiles of 120 millimetres.

19 But all this requires energy, electricity, tools, machinery, and

20 so on and so forth, and you must admit that things were very complex in

21 Sarajevo.

22 Q. Well, even if was complex, you manufactured that.

23 A. I did not. Please. We are not two different sides. Bosnia and

24 Herzegovina is one state. That is the only state that exists. Within

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina, there is not a we, you, and us. Please. I want my

Page 4888

1 integrity to be protected. You keep repeating this.

2 Sorry. I'm a professional. And very professionally, I treated

3 everyone here whenever I came here very professionally. I was not engaged

4 there ethnic divisions, and I do not allow for that kind of thing. I am

5 an anti-ethnic person. I am an a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and I

6 approach every human being as a human being.

7 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, what I have done?

8 What is it that I have done?

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: I don't won't any overlapping, and the witness

10 should compose himself and we'll proceed.

11 MR. WHITING: Yes. Though, Your Honour, I would object that

12 counsel did, once again, say "you" were manufacturing shells at that

13 location, and counsel has been warned about that. That is, in my

14 submission, what provoked the witness, so I don't think that particularly

15 is fair.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. I warned you about that. I don't see any

17 basis for putting to the witness questions beginning, "you," as though he

18 is the alter ego of either the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina or the ABiH

19 army.

20 So just reformulate your questions, and let us avoid that.

21 MR. WHITING: I also, Your Honour, it got a little lost. I make

22 the same objection with respect to the admission of this report, just for

23 the purposes of this record. Counsel offered it into evidence. I make

24 the same objection.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: I don't understand your objection. It is an

Page 4889

1 interview in which he was involved, and he has not denied it. He has

2 offered a clarification in respect of part of its contents.

3 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, in my submission, there are rules about

4 when prior interviews of a witness come into evidence. They -- it is

5 either under 92 bis or 92 ter or under -- because in cross-examination, it

6 contains something that contradicts what the witness has said. None of

7 those requirements have been met here.

8 It doesn't seem to me that there is a basis in the rules, and

9 certainly there is no basis in my common law background for -- for prior

10 interviews to just come in wholesale like this. He reads one sentence of

11 it, and then the whole interview comes in.

12 So that is the basis of my objection.

13 [Trial Chamber confers]

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll admit it.

15 We'll take the break now. But before we do, I am to say that the

16 Chamber orders that the photographs taken during the site visit to

17 Sarajevo, 19th March to the 22nd, be admitted into evidence.

18 We'll break. 20 minutes.

19 --- Recess taken at 3.15 p.m.

20 --- On resuming at 3.38 p.m.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic.

22 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I'm compelled to

23 repeat what I had asked the witness first, as I put his statement to him.

24 That is why I used the word "you." The witness confirmed that, as a

25 member of the expert team at the beginning of the war in Sarajevo, he

Page 4890

1 organised the production and development of weaponry, and that he did that

2 in cooperation with the staff of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3 So when I said "you" to him, Your Honours, I didn't really say

4 anything else but what he himself had confirmed. He wasn't working for

5 himself. He was working for the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, I think in that situation, in that context,

7 it is permissible because he is referring to your statement.

8 So please answer the question.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I answered the question, that I

10 organised the process of production in 1992 and 1993 for the needs of the

11 army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo. I have already given a clear

12 answer to that. That was yes.

13 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. That is why I am saying "you" in my question.

15 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I'm forced to hurry

16 with these documents, and I will now just go back to one of them in

17 greater detail.

18 Now, again, I would like to see another document, DD00-2001.

19 Again, this is an interview that Mr. Berko Zecevic had with a

20 representative of the OTP, John Tate-Harris, a very important thing

21 attachment. Could we please look at page 1.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: We're waiting on that.

23 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Here it is. Look at the third

24 paragraph.

25 Q. You say here that you worked on experiments regarding the

Page 4891

1 120-millimetre shell; and then under 3, you say: "With regard to the

2 whistling sound made by mortars," the witness stated that he was aware of

3 it before the war, but took little notice of it, as is it did not form a

4 relative part of his scientific war.

5 During the war, Zecevic paid great attention to the noise a mortar

6 makes. As he stated, it gave one enough time to run for cover. To listen

7 to the noise could save one's life. Is that the characteristic of the

8 120-millimetre mortar shell? Yes or no.

9 A. The characteristic of all rotating projectiles that move through

10 the air. So it doesn't have anything to do with the 120-millimetre

11 mortar. That is the characteristic. It depends on a great many factors,

12 the intensity of sound. So whether you hear it or not, depends on where

13 you are, whether there is a building in front of you or not. So this is a

14 question of principle, and I gave an answer of principle.

15 As for specific answers, we can talk about that because there are

16 pros and cons involved. Sorry. That is why it says here that it is

17 possible for some to hear it. I'm not saying that everyone can hear it.

18 I'm just saying that there is a chance of a person saving his or her life.

19 Q. However, can we say that such a sound cannot be -- or rather, the

20 most precise apparatus and equipment for registering sound cannot miss it?

21 A. What equipment?

22 Q. The Cymbelline, for instance.

23 A. It's radar based, and that is quite different.

24 Q. I don't want to insist on this any longer. You have given your

25 answer, and what I am interested in is contained in your statement.

Page 4892

1 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] So could this document please be

2 admitted into evidence as a Defence exhibit.


4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we will admit this as D172. Also,

5 the previous document, DD00-0235, will go in as D171.

6 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Finally, I would like to go back to the first document too, the

8 witness statement that he gave on the 20th and 21st of July, 1992, and

9 that is document DD00-1960.

10 Is that it?

11 A. I can't see it on my screen yet.

12 Q. You signed it?

13 A. My signature can be seen here, yes.

14 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] It is such that I would like to

15 look at a big paragraph from page 10 in, B/C/S, and in the English version

16 it is page 10 as well, paragraph 5.

17 Q. This is what you say here, the paragraph that says: "From

18 April/May 1993."

19 Do you see that?

20 A. I still cannot see it. Where does it say April/May? On the

21 right-hand side, I cannot see it.

22 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] It's the third paragraph. It has

23 to be lowered a bit.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Fine. I see it now.

25 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation].

Page 4893

1 Q. "From April/May 1993, mortar shells and projectiles fired on

2 Sarajevo by the Serbian forces were manufactured in Serbia."

3 Is that right?

4 A. That is what is written here.

5 Q. It's your statement.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. "I know that as from August 1992, I introduced a practice of

8 collecting," - that is to say, you did - "unexploded ordnances, mines,

9 projectiles to use explosives extracted from them for the BiH government

10 forces."

11 Is that right?

12 A. That's right.

13 Q. "I would ask volunteers to go around Sarajevo and collect these

14 unexploded ordnances."

15 Is that right?

16 A. Yes, that's right.

17 Q. "This is a practice that in normal situations should not be under

18 taken; but as the government forces were seriously short of weapons, there

19 was no alternative."

20 Is that right?

21 A. That's right.

22 Q. "From each kilogram of explosives I could extract from the

23 ordnance, one could manufacture ten rifle grenades."

24 Is that right?

25 A. Yes, that's right.

Page 4894

1 Q. "As was the usual practice in Yugoslavia, the ordnances people

2 brought into me had the year and place of manufacture."

3 Is that right?

4 A. That's right.

5 Q. So you made not only rifle grenades - I have to say "you" because

6 you organised the making of these rifle grenades, as you said a few

7 moments ago - also of shells of 82-millimetre calibre and 120-millimetre

8 calibre?

9 A. Not correct. Because I was head of the R&D department; the

10 research and development department of military products, that is. This

11 was a unit that was attached to the Main Staff. At the same time, there

12 was the Pretis factory, a parallel factory without the machinery, as

13 opposed to the one in Vogosca.

14 They worked on the production of projectiles for mortars. So the

15 unit that was in, in 1992, had the primary task of creating prerequisites

16 for normalising the process of producing ammunitions, which was taken over

17 by Pretis, that I had no contact with. So my unit, up to the moment when

18 it was disbanded in June 1993, primarily did -- manufactured ammunitions

19 for rifle grenades. These were projectiles fired off a rifle, and hand

20 grenades, too.

21 We did not make mortar shells of 82 millimetres; that is to say,

22 where I personally participated.

23 Q. But others did?

24 A. Correct.

25 Q. Could you tell me where the Pretis factory was that was

Page 4895

1 manufacturing these shells?

2 A. This was, as you know, the government of the Republika Srpska and

3 the government of the HOV and the government of the Republic of

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, once the war started, created a brother factories.

5 There was a Pretis in Vogosca, a Pretis in Sarajevo, and Pretis in

6 Sarajevo [as interpreted].

7 So you had a series of other companies, and each side expected

8 that it would take control, because the Pretis company had a great deal of

9 debts from Iraq measured in hundreds of millions of dollars, and that is

10 why everyone wanted to the keep the name Pretis, in order to be able to

11 collect those dues. It is very complicated but that is how it was.

12 Therefore, Pretis was a fictitious name, which used the facilities

13 of other companies, or event the facilities of private individuals, for

14 the manufacture of various ammunitions. It didn't have its own plants or

15 facilities.

16 Q. When talking about unexploded ordnance or shells that were found

17 and that had markings on them as being manufactured in Serbia, you

18 endeavoured, when making rifle grenades, to retain those markings as if

19 they had been manufactured in Serbia?

20 A. No, no. There is no possibility of launching with a piece of

21 artillery, any artillery projectile that had already been fired from

22 another weapon. What I wrote here means that I was responsible for

23 establishing the process of production under impossible conditions.

24 As there was a shortage of explosives, I demanded that all

25 artillery and mortar shells that are unexploded be brought to me, and then

Page 4896

1 I organised the extraction of the explosives. And you will see that for

2 every kilogram of explosive taken from such a weapon, we could manufacture

3 ten rifle grenades.

4 So try and compare it. If somebody hit at you with a projectile

5 and it doesn't explode, and my men find them and they extract the

6 explosive from it, 2.6 kilograms of explosives, at risk of life, and the

7 Howitzer projectiles, for instance, can have a range of ten to 15

8 kilometres, my response is up to 300 metres. So let us not mislead each

9 other by making a comparison. This was just an attempt to obtain

10 explosives.

11 Collecting artillery projectiles was designed simply to extract

12 explosives from it. There was no other element involved.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you very much.

14 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Could the document 1960 be

15 admitted into evidence, please.


17 THE REGISTRAR: As D173, Your Honours.

18 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Mr. Zecevic, you said that these air bombs could not be

20 manufactured - not that you couldn't manufactured them. I apologise - but

21 that they couldn't be manufactured because there was a shortage of steel.

22 And among other reasons, there is was no fuses. That is what it says in

23 your statement here.

24 A. A fuses, sheets for stabilisers, electricity, machinery that can

25 cover such a large size bomb, launchers, launching pads, and tracts of six

Page 4897

1 metres length. This was -- this could not be made in Sarajevo so there

2 were a series of reasons. I could give you an endless list of such

3 reasons.

4 Q. As I heard a moment ago from you, when answering questions from

5 the Prosecution, that the fuse factory was in Bugojno?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And that was under the control of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina

8 in Croatia. So fuses were available?

9 A. What is the point of a fuse if you don't have a projectile.

10 Q. And you're categorical in stating that no one else at the

11 beginning of the conflict had these air bombs except the army of Republika

12 Srpska?

13 A. No. The HOV had them, too, in Busovaca.

14 Q. Wasn't it possible, then, at a certain period of time, especially

15 in 1995 when the HOV was together with the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina

16 creating one army, such air bombs, or even rocket bombs or launchers,

17 could be obtained from the army belonging to the HOV?

18 A. How are you going to transport a launcher through the tunnel?

19 Q. We have been listening about this, but I can ask you directly.

20 Through the tunnel everything could be transported through the tunnel that

21 could be divided into parts and then assembled again?

22 A. Colleague Tapuskovic, hypothetically, everything is possible. The

23 Americans could have provided rockets and everything in Sarajevo. They

24 could have targeted those targets, instead of the army of Republika

25 Srpska. If we're talking hypothetically, everything is possible. What

Page 4898

1 I'm saying is the concept.

2 If you have a rocket and you have a launcher, you have to have ten

3 charts; and to be able to hit a target, you have to do some testing. As

4 we are talking about air fuel, I told you earlier on in my earlier

5 testimony that -- that only our colleagues from Vinca had fuel air, and

6 they got them from the Americans in the mid-1980s.

7 In Pretis, only the body was manufactured. In 1992, further

8 development of aerosol fuel-air bombs was discontinued, and the

9 manufacture transferred to Belgrade. And even if have you a bomb and you

10 have rockets which you can purchase from the Serbia and Croats, as you

11 say, and if you a launcher that somehow got to Sarajevo, you don't have

12 the air fuel, the fuel air. You can't make it up, if you understand what

13 I'm saying.

14 And let me also say that the directions of fire show if you take a

15 vehicle, which is quite large and can be seen on a flat area, if it is

16 close to the line of conflict, that vehicle will be destroyed very

17 quickly. And if we look at the structure of the soil where the incidents

18 occurred and where that vehicle may have been deployed, it always had to

19 be at least one kilometre away from the confrontation line and sheltered

20 behind a building, so as not to be noticed or destroyed by mortar fire or

21 heavy artillery.

22 So the system is highly complex. If you look at Sarajevo, the

23 configuration of the land, it is very elongated. Therefore, if a vehicle

24 were to move through Sarajevo of such large size with a rocket that was

25 not noticed by military observers or the citizens or the

Page 4899

1 counter-intelligence, the counter-intelligence and the intelligence

2 service never said that it had identified such weapons during 1992. And

3 everything could be seen because Sarajevo is in a valley, and the

4 observation forces were on a higher altitude.

5 Therefore, I cannot accept this thesis.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Shorter answers in future.

7 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Even at night-time?

9 A. In all these incidents, there were only two incidents that took

10 place at night.

11 Q. I was thinking -- I wasn't thinking of the time of the incident,

12 but the time when one had to pass unnoticed through Sarajevo.

13 A. You can't launch anything unnoticed in Sarajevo.

14 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, could the witness

15 be shown document DD00-1724, and there's a translation by the translation

16 service of the Tribunal.

17 Q. Do you see this order, please? As you were working with

18 explosives, when there is reference made to the 3rd of November, 1994, to

19 all the corps, an order is issued.

20 "Recently commands in units in depots and in work areas, there

21 have been lapses in the protection and handling of lethal weapons, of

22 ordnance with the gravest consequence, loss of life."

23 And then comes the order: "Immediately approach the storing and

24 protection of UBS, in the spirit of the instructions and prescribed

25 technical norms and criteria, and give thorough training to personnel who

Page 4900

1 handle these materials, especially UBS filled with D1 explosives guarded

2 in secure places."

3 As you were working with explosives, which you collected in the

4 way that you have just explained, is it right to say that the army Bosnia

5 and Herzegovina, independently of that, had explosives that it used for

6 the manufacture of weapons that is referred to here?

7 A. Let me say immediately that I was active in 1992/1993. This

8 document is dated from the end of 1994. Explosive D1 is an explosive

9 manufactured in Tuzla, a surrogate of a real explosive, if I may describe

10 it in that way, and which had a lot of negative characteristics when it

11 came to handling, sensitivity to external parameters. That is why this

12 order was issued.

13 Its effectiveness was poor; two or three times poorer than TNT.

14 This was an attempt because in 1994 there was still problems with the

15 supply of explosives to reach the territory under the army's control, and

16 this was an attempt to find some alternative source.

17 If I may explain what this is about.

18 Q. So you can confirm that such explosives were available?

19 A. Yes.

20 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Could this document be admitted

21 into evidence as a Defence exhibit, please.


23 THE REGISTRAR: As D174, Your Honours.

24 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Talking about air bombs, you spoke about their shortcomings, the

Page 4901

1 risks. You know that a number of these bombs that we are talking about

2 here were unexploded?

3 A. [No audible response]

4 Q. If there were any such unexploded bombs, could they have also been

5 used to produce an air bomb within Sarajevo?

6 A. I'm telling you, in order to melt the explosive, you would have to

7 heat the whole projectile. For me to be able to bring a 200-kilometre [as

8 interpreted] bomb, I would have to have a furnace with steam, a cauldron

9 of a very large size. I would need to have a crane to raise the bomb, to

10 separate the fuse, and then to try and melt the explosive in that cauldron

11 in order to be able to reuse it. So this is an impossible mission.

12 Q. Thank you. But do come back to your expert report. Can we say

13 that before that, in view of everything that we have heard, because of

14 these activities you were involved with the manufacture weapons, because

15 of your activities in manufacturing weapons in cooperation with the

16 government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that you are not an uninterested

17 party, that you are directly interested in the problems that existed

18 during the conflict, and therefore you are not totally impartial?

19 A. No. I don't agree. If I had been partial, I would be a general

20 in the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or I would be in the Ministry of

21 Defence and not at the Mechanical Engineering Faculty.

22 If I look at my biography, you will see that I had very firms

23 principles, and you can consult your colleagues in Belgrade or Sarajevo or

24 anywhere. I am a man of integrity. And what I believe, I say. You must

25 admit that that is something that is not desirable in the Balkans, and you

Page 4902

1 see, in 1993, I was replaced.

2 I was dismissed because I didn't agree to certain things. After

3 that, I never obtained any kind of position. I am working as a university

4 teacher at the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering.

5 Q. As you said, some of these air bombs that are mentioned here, and

6 that you are specialising in, fell close to your house, and you were

7 directly in jeopardy. You could have been a victim?

8 A. I was a victim for four years, so it's rather ridiculous to focus

9 on one particular day. I was interested in the phenomenon of what is

10 being used, how it was being used. As for me, my family, my wife and

11 children, we were exposed on a daily basis. Sometimes we were lucky that

12 there was no shooting.

13 Q. I understand that, but that is why I think as an expert you cannot

14 be impartial.

15 A. No, on the contrary. I think I can be impartial to a greater

16 degree than most, because rarely will you come upon a situation that a man

17 is four years exposed to artillery and mortar and rocket systems, that

18 this same man worked on the production of such ammunition, and at the same

19 time this person is trying to be a researcher. For me, this was a perfect

20 experience to see the vast differences between theoretical approaches to

21 certain ammunition, the tactics of their use, and their actual after

22 effects.

23 So I am a highly qualified person, and you will in not a single of

24 my reports do -- do I provide my comments only, but I refer to British and

25 American experts. So every conclusion or statement that I make is

Page 4903

1 corroborated with physical and mathematics interpretations of incidents,

2 not my subjective experience of them.

3 Q. But not only that, Mr. Zecevic, you visited almost each of those

4 sites - and I will come back to that later - when these things happened,

5 and you spoke to witnesses, as you yourself say.

6 A. Not every event, but only a certain number of incidents that I was

7 aware of and which I could reach.

8 Q. Doesn't that also, in a certain sense, prevent you from being

9 absolutely objective and professional in observing all these things that

10 were happening? I think this prevents you from being an objective

11 observer of the facts.

12 A. I think you are wrong. Can you imagine a person who would now, 12

13 years later after the events, and who was not in Sarajevo and who was not

14 working in the military industry, who did not rely only on investigators'

15 reports. I had the possibility of monitoring the situation in 1994 and

16 1995, of motivating myself to investigate what was being done in the area

17 in the world.

18 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we now look at the 22nd

19 paragraph of your report; page 159 of the B/C/S and in English 180, page

20 180. The general context for the use of air bombs in Sarajevo.

21 Q. That's the paragraph that tell us when exactly such bombs began to

22 be used, who used them, and where the weapons were procured. In this

23 first chapter, you say that the first incident you ever heard of was on

24 the 29th of January, 1994 at 0945 hours. Is that correct?

25 A. Yes.

Page 4904

1 Q. Very well. In paragraph 3, you say that you heard in a television

2 programme a statement of Karadzic's when he spoke of a "secret weapon"

3 that had been supplied to his army, and you say that it was supposed to be

4 a weapon that would turn around the whole war. It's not written here

5 exactly but --

6 A. Don't put that sentence in my mouth.

7 Q. I read it somewhere. I'll find it later.

8 At any rate, can we say that it was a weapon that could, indeed,

9 have turned the war around, in view of all its characteristics?

10 A. The results of a conflict are based on manpower, technology

11 superiority, and psychological effects. If panic occurs, then these

12 weapons become questionable, and that's why that weapon had an extreme

13 effect on people, such as disorganisation.

14 Can you imagine a person sitting in their apartment when a

15 projectile hits and just blows off the -- the top three floors of a

16 building of a sky-scraper? It's intimidating. Can you imagine that

17 situation when the sky-scraper was hit. From their psychological point of

18 view, it was indeed a formidable effect.

19 Q. Would it have been possible for the BH army to achieve that effect

20 by pursuing such propaganda?

21 A. Well, the main task of the propaganda was to diminish the panic,

22 not to cause it, not to spread it. My answer to the question would be

23 negative, because the purpose of every army is to mobilise its people, its

24 troops, and to raise the morale, rather than destroy their own population

25 because panic and disorganisation can only result from that. Everybody

Page 4905

1 starts avoiding the army. I don't think that argument holds water.

2 Q. I don't think you understood me. You were talking about the

3 psychological effect of such a thing on the population of Sarajevo and the

4 troops in Sarajevo, the troops that were in the city. I'm asking you

5 precisely about that.

6 If the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina had been able to resort to

7 such activities, especially in those cases where there were no victims, no

8 casualties, and there were just a few such cases, just to achieve the

9 psychological effect while blaming the Serbs?

10 A. Let me remind you, again. The specifications of modified bombs,

11 such as FAB-250 that had to be launch from a vehicle, from a distance of

12 several kilometres, are uncontrollable. So you cannot reckon with hitting

13 a particular building without causing casualties.

14 We have already discussed this. There is no army that can control

15 the flight of such a projectile and have it hit a particular building,

16 unless it is a guided missile; therefore, that was not possible. It

17 couldn't happen.

18 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have one

19 document, and I must say that I'm in two minds, whether to present it or

20 not, or whether to produce it now or later. It's DD00-1830. I will

21 produce it now. A translation is supplied. It's by a court-sworn

22 translator from Belgrade.

23 And when this document is shown to the witness, we'll see that

24 it's a signed document. Let's move to page 3. We see that it's signed

25 army General Rasim Delic.

Page 4906

1 If the Court decides to admit this document, the Trial Chamber

2 will have occasion to read it but also the witness. You will see that the

3 document speaks of possible panic that may result, and also the document

4 does not state there was a single human victim.

5 Q. But what I want to put to you, Witness, is this. In the order,

6 that we can see on page 2, it reads under paragraph 1. The order is dated

7 4th July, 1995, six days after that hit on the television building. And

8 it says in paragraph 1: "I hereby order the intelligence administration,

9 in cooperation with the President of the state committee for cooperation

10 with UNPROFOR, shall take required activities with UNPROFOR regarding

11 acquainting the international community with the mass and non-selective

12 use of these devices."

13 And in the last paragraph, before the signature, we read: "The

14 commands of the units, whereever the lay of the land allows, shall select

15 locations at Mojmilo, Igman, Vojkavica, Sokolje, and others for a similar

16 response.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: What is the question? What is the question?

18 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Well, the first question is:

19 Q. Did the witness know anything about this at the time when this

20 order existed, because it was the time when he was investigating the

21 incident of the 28th of August, following orders of the investigating

22 judge, as he said himself.

23 A. I'm sorry. I must have this document before me, because I don't

24 see anything on the screen, in order to be able to -- to understand the

25 gist of this document.

Page 4907

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Why is not on the screen? It was on our screen

2 in English.

3 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] In English, yes.

4 Yes. Now, we can see this order quite clearly.

5 MR. WHITING: I'm sorry. I think the witness wants to see it in

6 his language. I'm a little confused. And maybe if he could be directed

7 to a particular part of the document.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's there now in B/C/S.

9 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Do you see the order and item 1?

11 A. Yes. The intelligence administration.

12 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we now see the last page?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm waiting for the question.

14 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. I can't put this question otherwise than, did you know about this

16 order?

17 A. No. I was employed at the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering of

18 the university, and I was engaged by a judge, who is a civilian person, to

19 investigate the incident that occurred in the television building. This

20 is an order from the commander of the army.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Thank you.

22 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] In that case, I cannot deal with

23 this document any longer.

24 Q. But I would like to continue where we left off regarding the

25 general context and your findings, paragraph 22. You see, after the

Page 4908

1 reference to Karadzic's statement, you say: "I contacted the BH army Main

2 Staff and following a discussion with General Arif Pasalic," which means

3 right then on the 29th of January, 1994, "I sent him a brief report, and

4 then set about drafting a paper on the characteristics of the fuel-air

5 weapon. On completion, I sent it to the BH army Main Staff."

6 So, again, in fact, this time you offered your own services to do

7 this?

8 A. I didn't. It's that I realised after seeing the remnants of the

9 bomb that exploded close to my house on the 29th of January, I realised

10 that it was a dangerous weapon; that is, of particular danger to the urban

11 areas of Sarajevo. I wanted to acquaint the army, because in the BH army

12 nobody knew anything about it, except me, perhaps, and two of my

13 colleagues who are worked earlier in Pretis. I was a citizen of my

14 country, and I thought that was what I should do.

15 Q. Well, I don't know how else to put this, but doesn't that really

16 discredit you as an expert witness, because from the word go you were

17 directly interested. You were an interested party. You were partial.

18 You were doing what you were doing in the interests of the BH army.

19 A. No, no. I was working in the best interests of the citizens of

20 Sarajevo.

21 Q. You have to wait for my question to finish.

22 A. Thank you. I would put this way: If you saw a fire in your

23 neighbourhood, your first logical step, as a loyal citizen, was to pick up

24 the receiver and call the fire brigade. I was a citizen of Sarajevo, a

25 citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and I noted something that was of

Page 4909

1 interest to anyone and everyone who was living in Sarajevo.

2 My job, as a university lecturer, was to provide a intellectual

3 contribution. I wrote a paper about it. If it is forbidden to think, and

4 if it is forbidden to pass on any information that is available and that

5 could help reduce the number of victims and casualties, then so be it.

6 But I thought it was my right and duty as a human being.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

8 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. I did proceed from agreeing with you that it is a proper

10 attitude. But while fulfilling your obligation as a human being towards

11 the citizens and the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I still think that

12 you brought yourself in a situation where you cannot speak here as an

13 expert.

14 MR. WHITING: I think this question has now been asked an

15 answered.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, I agree. I think you're now arguing with

17 the witness, Mr. Tapuskovic. The point has been made, and it's for the

18 Chamber to make of it what we will.

19 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] It is always up to the Trial

20 Chamber to decide.

21 Q. Witness, then you were invited by Judge Ismet Bazdarevic - and

22 that is a passage just below the one that I read - and you invited, in

23 your, turn two of your colleagues. Within ten days after the 28th of

24 June, you made your paper as experts.

25 A. What are you trying to say?

Page 4910

1 Q. Were you engaged in this work only from the moment when the

2 explosion occurred, the one that caused damage?

3 A. I have said this two or three times before. Yes, the judge

4 summoned me and issued a formal decision engaging me as an expert.

5 Q. Let us now go back to your statement given on the 26th of

6 February, 1996, DD00-1 --

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a minute, Mr. Tapuskovic. Was the import of

8 your question that the witness produced his report in a period of ten

9 days?

10 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] It says that within ten days, we

11 collected a certain amount of information and compiled our expert report

12 that we sent to -- submitted to Judge Bazdarevic. Is that correct?

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Is that correct?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, it's correct, and it is written

15 in the report.

16 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. While we're discussing this, why isn't that report attached? Why

18 hasn't it been submit the together with your report.

19 A. I don't see why I should have been the one to submit it. I made

20 it for the court. The court did not accept it. In that report -- in

21 fact, I gave a copy of that report to the Prosecution in 1996. This time,

22 I received specific questions from the OTP and I answered those

23 questions. You may have noticed in the incident regarding the television

24 building, I provided the results, the findings, of my investigations, and

25 I built that into my comments. In every case, I distinguished between

Page 4911

1 what the investigators said and what I was stating.

2 Q. It's symptomatic, and I think requires explanation why that report

3 is missing, the one that you submitted to the investigating judge, like

4 the reports that others provided to you are provided?

5 A. I did my expert report for this occasion, and there are no

6 deviations, no discrepancies, expect perhaps concerning minor details

7 regarding the specifications of projectiles. It's not my responsibility

8 whether the investigating judge will accept my report and whether she will

9 send it on to The Hague or not.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Let us move on. Let's move on.

11 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have a document

12 here that I got from Alex Whiting, my learned friend of the Prosecution,

13 an interview with the witness on the 19th of April, and it ends by saying,

14 in relation to the interview that Mr. Whiting already mentioned here:

15 "The Assistant Minister of Defence heard and did not react to those

16 threats addressed by the MUP."

17 A. Not the MUP, but the intelligence and counterintelligence officers

18 from the Main Staff. Not the MUP, the not the MUP. I never had any

19 problems with the MUP.

20 Q. And then you say: "Professor Zecevic explained that a bomb with

21 rocket motors actually has more destructive capacity than a TNT one, but

22 that did not stop the pressure. He did not change his report, and then

23 his report was not sent to The Hague with the others."

24 A. That is my impression. Why my report was not included in the

25 official government reports. I really don't know who sends these reports

Page 4912

1 to The Hague.

2 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please be asked to speak into

3 the microphone. Thank you.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Witness, please speak into the microphone,

5 perhaps come a little closer.

6 MR. WHITING: I would just note that counsel, perhaps by

7 misspeaking, misquoted the document that he is reading. It doesn't say

8 that a bomb with rockets has more destructive capacity. It says that a

9 fuel-air bomb has more destructive capacity than a TNT bomb.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

11 Let's continue.

12 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Let us now move on to the statement that you made on the 26th and

14 27th. Here is page 1. Is that the statement that you gave? A few

15 moments ago, you said yes.

16 A. I believe it is, yes.

17 Q. Let us look at page 4. In English it is page 4, paragraph 6, and

18 you say here, as far as air bombs are concerned, you talk about them. You

19 say: "I made my own conclusions about air bombs," and then you say who

20 used them.

21 You mention the Russians and the Vietnamese and -- the U.S. in

22 Vietnam, rather; by the Russians in Afghanistan, by the Israelis in the

23 near East; so not only the Russians. These bombs that are mentioned here

24 were used by the Americans, Russians in Afghanistan, and the Israelis in

25 the near East, as you put it here.

Page 4913

1 A. Look, air bombs, not modified rocketised bombs. That is the only

2 difference. It was only the Russians who had would carried out this

3 modification of an air bomb with rocket motors. Americans dropped fuel

4 air bombs from planes, and the Israelis created a special rocket system

5 that launched the projectiles with fuel-air explosives, but it was not a

6 modification. A completely new system was developed.

7 Q. You just made one distinction here, if we go on reading this.

8 These projectiles have a blast effect. These projectiles that you're

9 talking about; Russians, American, Israelis; whereas, modified air bombs

10 also cause a fragmentation effect. That is the only different that you

11 say. You did not mention rocket propelled.

12 A. We are talking about effects here. Effects. I was interested in

13 the effects.

14 Q. In the next paragraph, you say: "On the 27th of January 1994, at

15 about 2:00, I heard a terrible explosion." Can you explain this? You

16 say that it was on the 27th of January at 9:45, and now here you say here

17 that the time when you gave this statement is closer to the actual time

18 when this happened in February, 1996, I mean. So you say that it was on

19 the 27th of January and around 2.00. What is correct?

20 A. To tell you the truth at that time, in 1994, my computer said

21 9:45; whereas, this is an interview I had with the Prosecutor two years

22 later. And, quite simply, that's what I told him, around 1400 hours.

23 This absolutely plays no role. Whether it's 9.00 or 2.00, it is a matter

24 of virtual time that one feels in moments like that.

25 Q. I agree.

Page 4914

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Observe a pause between question and answer in

2 the interests of the interpretation.

3 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Since your report is not in the electronic system, you have it in

5 front of you, don't you?

6 A. Yes .

7 Q. Please look at paragraph 22.

8 A. Could you please give me a page reference.

9 Q. The page is 180 in English and 159 in B/C/S. "In the spring of

10 1995, people in the Novi Grad and Novo Sarajevo informed me that very

11 powerful and high impact projectiles were being used.

12 Is that right?

13 A. That's right.

14 Q. Now please look at your statement on page 5, B/C/S, and, in

15 English, it is page 5, paragraph 2, in the middle. A sentence starts by

16 the words: "In June 1995."

17 A. And so, does that really change anything? I stand by my

18 statements. I'm telling you yet again. I have documents where I recorded

19 this. I have my own diary, my own agenda. This is a statement that I

20 made two years after the actual event. There is no difference in

21 content. It's just a matter of whether it was in April or June. It

22 really has no effect on the importance of my claims.

23 Q. We have to leave that to the Court, I believe, the difference is

24 considerable. But at any rate there is a difference, right?

25 A. Well, look. When does summer start? May I ask you that.

Page 4915

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: No. You may not. It is for counsel to ask

2 questions.

3 Now let us move on, Mr. Tapuskovic.

4 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, please look at what

5 it says after that, that in June six or seven projectiles were fired from

6 Lukavica, Vojkovici from the area called Pavlovac. None of these

7 projectiles hit the TV building. All of them landed in front or behind

8 the building.

9 Q. So is it correct that at that time, in June, even six projectiles

10 were fired at the TV building?

11 A. No. I don't know whether that was the intention, to fire at the

12 TV building. I only identified on the map the sites of impact and, when

13 you look at these places, then it is rather indicative, if can I put it

14 that way. But perhaps the target of these attacks was to actually hit the

15 TV building. That is perhaps the context that you should look at this.

16 Page 130, take a look. Red and white little circles.

17 Q. These are six or seven projectiles that are referred to here. But

18 in the next paragraph, and that's why I'm asking all of this, starts with

19 the following words in the second sentence: "I investigated these impacts

20 unofficially." And then you visited the wire factory and then some other

21 buildings; that is to say, before the TV building was hit, yet again you

22 unofficially investigated all these impacts that occurred before the 28th.

23 Is that right?

24 A. Where does this -- where -- where does it say that,

25 "unofficially."

Page 4916

1 Q. In the second paragraph -- rather, in the same paragraph, in the

2 second sentence. The beginning of the third paragraph, B/C/S, and in

3 English, the fifth paragraph -- or rather, in English.

4 MR. WHITING: If I can be of assistance I think the witness is

5 looking at his report whereas counsel is talking about his statement.

6 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Oh, I beg your pardon. Not your

7 report. Your statement. Please take a look at your statement, and it

8 says here: "Rumours were that there -- these were modified air bombs."

9 You see that.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And then you go on to say I investigated these impacts

12 unofficially, and then you visited the wire factory and all these other

13 places. You describe all of that. So before the investigative judge

14 asked you to do so, you actually carried out your own investigation.

15 A. Well, no, I didn't say investigation. I looked into it. I

16 already said two or three times that I wanted to understand the

17 phenomenology of what was going on. I wanted to be familiarised with

18 this. I did not carry out an investigation. I just went to the actual

19 site to see what had happened. I did not have an objective that is

20 required by an investigation. I just needed to have this information.

21 What happened. Whether it could jeopardise my safety, the safety of my

22 family, of other people, things like that.

23 Q. Would you now please look at page 7. Page 7. Not your expert

24 report; the statement. In English it is page 7, paragraph 5, and then the

25 end of this long paragraph the sentence reads as follows: "It is the

Page 4917

1 first time that --" we're talking about these bombs. "They were first

2 used in June 1993 when they hit objects in town. One motor had a marking,

3 one --" so on and so forth. This last part meant that the motor was

4 produced in 1993.

5 They obviously were not able to apply a parachute to the

6 projectile so they adapted a Russian projectile to their own launch

7 system. The motors were not properly attached to the body and the

8 stabilisers were fixed in an amateur way, so it was obvious that they did

9 not care where it would fall.

10 You see? You say this was first used in the month of June 1993

11 when they hit objects in town?

12 A. I don't think that you have read this right. What I said here was

13 this was the first time that rocket motors of 122-millimetres were used in

14 Sarajevo, that were modified in Sarajevo, so there was this ring that was

15 put on the projectile. The external diameter was 122 millimetres --

16 128 millimetres and the internal one was 122 for it to be able to be

17 launched from Oganj, which is of 128-millimetre calibre. That's what it

18 says here.

19 So we can conclude these were Russian motors that were imported by

20 Serbia, and in Serbia they had external rings of 128 millimetres so they

21 could be launched from the launchers that the army of Republika Srpska had

22 and that on them there was this marking.

23 I'm sorry. I mean, yes, well, I agree I am speaking too fast and

24 I'm really sorry about that. I will try to slow down.

25 122 is what it says here, and then 128. M 91, 9301. And that

Page 4918

1 shows that this rocket motor had been adapt in the year of 1993, in the

2 first month of the year of 1993. And that in 1993 it was the motor not

3 the fuel-air bomb was -- just read on.

4 Q. All right. Let it be.

5 Now I'd like to go back to your expert report, page 71 in English

6 and 66 in B/C/S, where you speak of rocketised FAB-100 bombs.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. So it pertains to the bombs that were referred to here. There is

9 no doubt about that. And what it says here is: "On the basis of reports

10 that came in during 1994 and 1995, it was observed that rocket-assisted

11 FAB-100 and FAB-250 aircraft bombs were being used heavily both on the

12 city of Sarajevo and on other parts of the front, Olovo, Bihac, Gorazde,

13 Postalina, Doboj, Tesanj, Tuzla, et cetera.

14 So can we say that these FAB-100 and FAB-250 bombs were used

15 throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina and that it was not the first time that

16 they -- well, sort of fell and -- fell in Sarajevo, hit Sarajevo in June

17 1995?

18 A. I just mentioned here that there was this piece of information,

19 and this information came through the information media, the mass media,

20 and I said so very clearly. On the basis of information coming in, but,

21 no, no, no doubt that this existed in other fronts. And I also quoted the

22 army of Republika Srpska here in my analysis, and you can see that the

23 Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska, and there are copies of

24 telexes in the Slobodan Milosevic case where an order of the Main Staff is

25 being referred to addressed to the director of the Pretis factory, stating

Page 4919

1 how many rocket launchers should be placed, where and how many bombs and

2 where these bombs should be sent, and in these documents of the Main Staff

3 of the army Republika Srpska, there is mention of Doboj, Teslic and

4 Sarajevo and a few other locations. So there this is other document, SHS

5 and SBS, and in English ...

6 Q. About that as it may, whoever was firing those projectiles one may

7 say with certainty that they did not appear for the first time in the

8 spring of 1995 but that this was something that was present in those

9 conflicts throughout and in the way you have just described?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Let me finally go back once again to your statement of the 26th

12 and 27th of February, DD00-1985 -- 87. Of the B/C/S, and of the English

13 the last paragraph of that page.

14 [Trial Chamber confers]

15 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. But before that -- or shall we deal with this first.

17 Just look at the last paragraph in the B/C/S and in the English.

18 You say, and I quote: "Technically this projectile was not perfect. In

19 my opinion, it was made by people not fully familiar with adapting

20 weapons, but it was a good idea from the military point of view."

21 In what sense? Could you explain that to the Judges, please.

22 A. That's very simple. These weapons, if they were to be used

23 according to certain established principles where troops are concentrated

24 as you were able to see in the order of General Delic when he speaks about

25 the attack by tank units from Lukavica as a possibility, if such

Page 4920

1 projectiles were to be used, it can cause a drop in morale of the troops.

2 So in 1994, January, the first projectile that was launched was directed

3 towards the front lines and not the built-up parts of the town.

4 Later on, this changed. And I'm saying that if two or three such

5 rockets or two or three launchers, or two launchers with two rockets each,

6 if they had been launched towards a point where there was a concentration

7 of the resistance on the part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, those peoples'

8 morale would have dropped very quickly, and the army of Republika Srpska

9 would have made a breakthrough very quickly.

10 Why they didn't use this, I don't know. Weapons were irrationally

11 used in Sarajevo from the military standpoint, not to kill civilians but

12 from the military standpoint.

13 Q. We'll come back to that when we study each of your reports about

14 individual incidents.

15 The last sentence says: "Our authorities did not" -- this is the

16 last sentence of this statement. "... did not appreciate that these

17 weapons are unsuited for use against military targets and are only

18 effective as indiscriminate weapons against civilian population."

19 In other words, is this true, too, your assessment that this

20 shouldn't be used, but does that mean that the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina

21 had such weapons but they didn't want to use them?

22 A. No, you didn't get the point. What I said here was that

23 technically this projectile was not perfect and because in Sarajevo one by

24 one projectile was launched not in a burst of fire, but several

25 projectiles within a small period of time, and this -- the effect of such

Page 4921

1 projectiles was not very great from the military standpoint.

2 However, its effect on built-up areas of Sarajevo, individual

3 effect, led to disorientation of the population, led to panic.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: I believe the point which Mr. Tapuskovic is

5 making is that the words "our authorities" would appear to refer to the

6 authorities both of the -- the RSA and the ABiH. And that is why he wants

7 to know whether, in suggesting that the ABiH authorities did not

8 appreciate that the weapons could be used indiscriminately, you're not

9 implying that they also had those weapons.

10 So I think it's the words "our authorities" which require some

11 clarification.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At that point in time, for me, there

13 was only one authority, and that was the authority of the Republic of

14 Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it was only at the end of 1996 that the

15 present concept was constituted as a result of the application of the

16 Dayton Accords. And I was -- I pointed this out when making the

17 statement, I was referring to the period up to 1995, not after 1995,

18 because it was no longer important. Fighting stopped. Peace was

19 re-established and so on.

20 When I say "our authorities," I'm implying the government of the

21 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period from 1994/1995, from

22 1992, 1994, 1995. I'm quite precise in that respect. Because, if I may

23 have noticed, my expert report about air fuel bombs for the Court was not

24 adopted. I had some unpleasantness with officers of the Main Staff who

25 came to persuade me to change it, instead of putting air fuel that I

Page 4922

1 should put TNT. I didn't agree to that, because they didn't understand.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

3 Mr. Tapuskovic.

4 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Mr. Zecevic, a moment ago you mentioned the name of Slobodan

6 Milosevic. In the Milosevic case, you were a witness?

7 A. To tell you the honest truth, I don't remember. I testified four

8 or five times so far.

9 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness approach the microphone.

10 A. Yes, I was a witness.

11 THE INTERPRETER: Says the witness.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please come closer to the microphone.

13 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. As you are an expert in this case, I would like to show you the

15 last paragraph of your interview with Mr. Chester Stamp, DD00-2035. Last

16 page; English page 6, paragraph 3.

17 We see the end of this statement, rather, of this conversation:

18 "Professor Zecevic handed the team a photocopied report by a Serbian

19 mortar expert scientist, Miroljub Vukasinovic, concerning his findings

20 about the mortar attack of Markale market in August 1995. Professor

21 Zecevic stated that whilst of course the incidents are separate, the

22 information contained within the report is of relevance to the February

23 the 5th, 1994 incident."

24 Do you remember that?

25 A. Yes.

Page 4923

1 Q. Do you remember that that report which you received and handed at

2 the time to the investigators of the OTP relates to the event of the 28th

3 of August, 1995?

4 A. That is what is said here.

5 Q. I should now like to show you that document.

6 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] DD00-2007. There's an English

7 translation at the end of that document, DD-2007. DD00-2007. And before

8 the bibliography that the Professor relies on. We have it.

9 Q. "Conclusion: On the basis of the analysis of the crater and

10 geometry of stabiliser, as well as numerical simulations of the explosion

11 of the projectile on the target, it can be claimed that the shell

12 explosion was most probably carried out in static conditions at an angle

13 between 50 and 60 degrees. For these values of the angle of descent, if

14 the shell had been fired from Serbian positions, it would have definitely

15 activated on the roof of the building."

16 Do you remember this?

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Whiting.

18 MR. WHITING: I'm going to -- I'm going to object because I

19 don't -- this is -- this is a report -- this is an article written by

20 somebody else about an incident that the witness has not testified about.

21 So I'm not sure what the relevance is -- I'm not sure how he could

22 possibly comment on this, on somebody else's report, on something that he

23 has not himself testified about. It seems like a strange time to bring

24 this into the examination. I just don't see how he -- how this witness

25 can comment on it.

Page 4924

1 [Trial Chamber confers]

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, we are past the time to -- for the break.

3 In my view, the witness should be allowed to answer the question: Do you

4 remember this? And then we'll see whether he knows anything about the

5 contents of the document.

6 But we're going to break now and please note where we're at. It's

7 5.00. It's five past 5.00. I see you are looking puzzled. We break at

8 5.00 on Friday. Do you wish to work until 7.00, Mr. Tapuskovic? Because

9 in that event, perhaps separate arrangements can be made for you.

10 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I believe that you

11 don't have to do anything special for me. Allow me only to examine the

12 witness for as long as you have ruled I would have. I have hardly used

13 half of that time. Maybe it is a little late.

14 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Your Honour.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: We're breaking for the -- for the weekend and we

16 resume. You will resume your cross-examination Monday morning at 9.00.

17 So we stand adjourned.

18 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 5.05 p.m.,

19 to be reconvened on Monday, the 23rd day of

20 April, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.