Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 8103

1 Thursday, 12 July 2007

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

6 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] The hearing is open. Good morning,

7 ladies and gentlemen.

8 Good morning to the Office of the Prosecutor.

9 Good morning to the Defence.

10 Good morning to the witness and to all the staff members assisting

11 the Court. The Court is going to sit in compliance with Article 15 bis of

12 the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, so we're going to proceed with the

13 cross-examination which was started yesterday by Ms. Edgerton.

14 So, Ms. Edgerton, you have the floor.

15 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, Your Honour.


17 [Witness answered through interpreter]

18 Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton: [Continued]

19 Q. Good morning, Mr. Tusevljak. Did you rest well overnight?

20 A. Good morning. Yes, thank you for asking.

21 Q. I'd like to go back largely today to matters that were discussed

22 in both your testimony in chief and when we were speaking yesterday. To

23 begin with, at pages 8043 and 8044 of your testimony yesterday, you were

24 asked whether you were able to deal with the civilian victims of the war

25 in the part of Sarajevo which was under the control of the Bosnian army,

Page 8104

1 and you said: "No, because the security services centre of Serb Sarajevo

2 did not cover that territory."

3 Do you recall that?

4 A. Yes, I do.

5 Q. Now, you also said: "If there had been an incident, we were often

6 willing and ready to intervene through UNPROFOR and other international

7 organisations that were active in the area. We were willing to extend our

8 assistance to the other side, but the other side was never interested."

9 Do you recall that?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Now, can I take from this that you're saying you actually did

12 extend offers of assistance?

13 A. Yes. Through international organisations, mainly UNPROFOR.

14 Q. Do you recall any occasions where you did that, when they took

15 place, what they related to?

16 A. I believe that this was at the Markale II when this happened.

17 Q. Do you recall at any other time from 1992 right through to 1995,

18 when you made that offer?

19 A. In 1992, on the occasion of the murder of the vice prime minister

20 of the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we investigated that crime.

21 Q. That was actually in 1993, I think, wasn't it?

22 A. Yes, 1993.

23 Q. You're talking about the killing of Hakija Turajlic?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Apart from these two occasions, can you recall any other times at

Page 8105

1 which you offered your assistance to the other side in the investigation

2 of shelling or sniping incidents?

3 A. The other side never approached us for assistance. I can't

4 remember.

5 Q. So to the best of your recollection there were two occasions and

6 only two over the course of 44 months where you offered assistance to the

7 other side?

8 A. I personally, yes, but maybe there were others. I was not the

9 only person involved in these tasks in the territory of eastern Sarajevo,

10 the Serbian Sarajevo.

11 Q. Now, then, yesterday do you recall when I asked you whether you

12 knew about the fact that civilians in the city were falling victim to

13 various types of gun-fire, you said you had no knowledge of that. But now

14 based on your answer and your reference to Markale II, it sounds like you

15 did have knowledge that there was some shelling and sniping of civilians

16 in Sarajevo. Is that correct?

17 A. I repeat, there were victims on both sides. There were victims in

18 the territory under the control of the VRS as well as in the territory

19 under the control of the BH army. However, I personally, as I've already

20 told you, I'm not familiar with the sniping victims in Sarajevo because we

21 were not in a position to check and control whether this was happening.

22 It is only to be assumed that there were victims on both sides. There

23 were victims on our sides and there must have been victims on the other as

24 well. It was wartime.

25 JUDGE HARHOFF: Ms. Edgerton, my question was if at the two

Page 8106

1 occasions which the witness mentioned, was there ever any investigation

2 done from your side on these two incidents. I understand that you offered

3 your assistance to the other side, but did you do anything else than just

4 offering your assistance? Was any steps taken -- were any steps taken to

5 -- to actually investigate these two incidents from your side?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In 1993 we carried out an

7 investigation independently, that was in the first case; and in the second

8 case, we were not in a position to investigate because we did not have an

9 insight into the investigation material and everything else that was found

10 at Markale II. What we could see in the media and what was presented from

11 Sarajevo drew us to conclude - and I'm speaking from the experience

12 because I often attended sites where shells were falling and people were

13 being killed - it was impossible that one 120-millimetre shell resulted in

14 so many victims. In 1992 I was in a position to see a shell falling some

15 15 metres away from me. I was in a car with a colleague who was in the

16 other car. Two colleagues were next to the car. One colleague died from

17 that shelling, and those of us who were in the vehicles, we didn't even

18 suffer a scratch. We just suffered consequences of detonation. We were

19 listening to what UNPROFOR was saying. We wanted to go to the site of the

20 incident but --

21 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you. Was any information on what had

22 happened on the other side offered to you through UNPROFOR? In other

23 words, did UNPROFOR provide you with information that would have enabled

24 you to investigate those incidents?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Not to me personally. I don't know

Page 8107

1 whether any of the representatives of the VRS were given such information.

2 I don't know.

3 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you very much.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The civilian police did not receive

5 any such information.

6 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.


8 Q. Now, just to follow-up on the answer you gave to Judge Harhoff, I

9 note that you said with respect to Markale II, what you could see in the

10 media and what was presented from Sarajevo drew you to make some

11 conclusions. But, sir, yesterday when I asked you about the siege of the

12 centre of Sarajevo, you said you could only talk about what you saw with

13 your own eyes and the investigations you participated in or in the

14 investigations that your personnel conducted.

15 So the assertion that you've just made about the shell that fell

16 on Markale II is actually something that you didn't see with your own eyes

17 and was not investigated by any of your team. Isn't that right?

18 A. I did not see the shell falling with my own eyes, but I had an

19 occasion to follow the media and media conveyed the image from the site on

20 the first day, and I also have other experience, not only the experience

21 from 1992 or 1995. I had my own police experience from 2006 and 2007 when

22 my team got hold of some more material relative to the

23 event in Markale. So I had an occasion to more attentively observe all

24 the video material that was accessible to me at the time. When I was

25 watching that video material, I could spot some illogical things. That's

Page 8108

1 one thing. And second of all, we got hold of some expert analysis

2 provided by medical forensic experts, ballistic experts, analysed the

3 case, and based on what I perused, I have given you my opinion. So my

4 opinion is not based only on what I knew in 1995, but also on the

5 experience that I have gathered in the meantime.

6 Q. But, sir, yesterday you said you found the media and media

7 coverage unreliable when I asked you about what it portrayed about the

8 siege. So why now today are you saying you placed some measure of faith

9 in what the media was reporting?

10 A. I did not say that I trusted media. I said that I trusted the

11 image. The camera that recorded things on the spot. I don't trust the

12 comments, but I trust the facts, the pictures that you can see, the images

13 that you can see if you look and watch carefully the video footage that

14 was taken at Markale.

15 Q. With respect, sir, that's not what you said yesterday. Would you

16 agree with me?

17 JUDGE MINDUA: [No interpretation].

18 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, with all due

19 respect, this is not what you said yesterday," said my learned friend. I

20 believe that she should be more specific and say what she was referring

21 to. My learned friend, with all due respect, this is not what you said

22 yesterday. Could my learned friend be more specific and tell the witness

23 what is it that she is specifically referring to in order to avoid

24 confusing the witness.

25 JUDGE MINDUA: [No interpretation]

Page 8109

1 MS. EDGERTON: I will, Your Honour.

2 Q. At page 8085, Witness, you said: "I know that the media covered

3 the events in a very biased manner, even including the incidents I myself

4 investigated. So, really as a professional, I could not credit the

5 reports that were published in the media at all."

6 Sir, would you agree with me that's what you said yesterday?

7 A. Yes, this is what I did say yesterday, but today I am not talking

8 about media reports. I'm talking about the images that I had an occasion

9 to see, and the analysis that were provided by forensic experts on

10 medicine, ballistics, and explosives. I am not talking about what the

11 journalists said. I'm talking about what the experts had to say.

12 Q. Are you -- do you have any kind of forensic expertise, sir? Are

13 you a ballistics expert?

14 A. I completed police academy, and one of my courses was crime

15 prevention, crime tactics, crime methodology, crime operations. I

16 completed courses for crime technician, for operative. I completed

17 ICITAP school and I am an instructor for investigations.

18 Q. So you have no ballistics expertise? You're not a ballistician,

19 are you, sir?

20 A. No, I never said that today, although I have some basic knowledge

21 in ballistics that are applied in the crime prevention technology.

22 Q. So with respect to some aspects of the siege of Sarajevo, even

23 though you weren't there and you didn't receive reports on those incidents

24 from any members of your team and you have no expertise, it seems as

25 though, sir --

Page 8110

1 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Mr. Tapuskovic.

2 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this is a complex

3 question. First of all, the witness has never mentioned "siege." This is

4 happening for the third time. I did not react before. The question

5 contains the issue of the siege. Neither in the information in chief nor

6 in the cross did the witness mention the word "siege." The Prosecutor may

7 follow that course, but first he has to ask the witness to provide his

8 explanation of this notion. This is a very important word and very

9 important for the entire case. Not for a single moment has the witness

10 mentioned the word "siege" in his testimony.

11 [Trial Chamber confers]

12 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Ms. Edgerton, the Defence is

13 raising the issue of the siege of Sarajevo, which had not been covered in

14 the examination-in-chief. Now, what have you got to say about this?

15 MS. EDGERTON: With respect, Your Honours, I would suggest that

16 the siege of Sarajevo is at the heart of the Prosecution's case and I'm

17 entitled to put my case to the witness in cross-examination.

18 [Trial Chamber confers]

19 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Well, the Court authorises you to

20 put your question.

21 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

22 Q. So, sir, with respect to some aspects of the siege of Sarajevo,

23 even though you weren't there on site, you didn't receive reports on those

24 incidents from any members of your team, and you have no expertise --

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic.

Page 8111

1 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, can the witness

2 please first be asked to explain the notion of "siege" before any other

3 questions are asked. You are right. This question should be permitted,

4 but let's start from the notion of "siege." Why isn't the witness asked

5 to explain his idea of that notion, and everything else can follow from

6 there. The -- my learned friend cannot just go straight into the word

7 "siege" and put her questions from that.

8 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Tapuskovic, I suggest you raise this issue in

9 your re-examination if you wish to put questions to the witness about the

10 siege. And I must also say that it would be good if we could proceed with

11 the examination and the cross-examination and the re-examination without

12 too many interruptions because it's better if we can get a good flow of

13 the proceedings here. So you should put your questions about the siege to

14 the witness when you have the chance to re-examine.

15 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Judge Harhoff, I

16 don't intend to put any questions about the siege. In my opinion, there

17 was no siege during the time of the indictment and it has never been my

18 intention to put any questions to the witness about the siege.

19 JUDGE HARHOFF: Please proceed.

20 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] All right. Now we're going to

21 listen to the Prosecutor. She's going to put her question and the witness

22 will answer.

23 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, Your Honours. I'll try again slightly

24 differently.

25 Q. Sir, with respect to some aspects of the continued shelling and

Page 8112

1 sniping of Bosnian-held Sarajevo over the course of 44 months, from 1992

2 to 1995, even though you weren't there, you didn't receive reports on

3 those incidents from any members of your team, and you have no ballistic

4 expertise, it seems as though you are prepared to offer opinions. Isn't

5 that correct?

6 A. I don't agree with you. I don't agree that during that period

7 between 1992 and 1995, like you are trying to put it to me and you are

8 trying to make me say it, there was no systematic shelling and sniping in

9 Sarajevo, especially when we're talking about the period between 1994, the

10 second half of 1994, and the beginning of the Muslim offensive in the

11 territory that was inhabited by the Serbs, which is also part of the town

12 of Sarajevo. It's not somewhere on the hills or in the mountains because

13 Grbavica, Dobrinja, Hadzici, Vogosca, Rajlovac, Trnovo, all those were

14 Sarajevo municipalities --

15 Q. Thank you, thank you, Mr. Tusevljak. With respect, that wasn't

16 the answer to the question I put to you at all, but I'm going to move on.

17 Yesterday when we were talking about whether your service ever

18 referred allegations of war crimes against civilians perpetrated by a

19 member of the SRK to the military Prosecutor's office and to the military

20 investigating judge, you talked at page 8098 and 8099 about what

21 effectively was a cooperative arrangement between your service and the

22 SRK.

23 For example, you stated, in addition to yourself as head of the

24 service, there were also departments, each of which had a head that could

25 have had cooperation with these organs of the SRK. You said any one of

Page 8113

1 your associates could have handed over an investigation into an SRK war

2 crimes perpetrator without it having to reach you. Do you remember that?

3 A. Yes. When I'm testifying, I'm not only talking about war crimes,

4 but about all crimes because there were crimes pertaining to the area of

5 general crimes --

6 Q. Sir --

7 A. -- Which were most grievous and which means that a member of

8 the --

9 Q. Sir, I'm talking about war crimes and I think I've made that clear

10 both yesterday and today. You just indicated you recalled that, so I'd

11 like to ask you this: In light of this cooperative relationship, were you

12 ever asked by the SRK to provide assistance in any of their police

13 investigations?

14 A. Some parts of my crime technology were put at the disposal of the

15 military prosecutors and investigating judges of the Romanija-Sarajevo

16 Corps. I'm talking about equipment, not personnel.

17 Q. Was that for the investigation of allegations of war crimes

18 against members of the SRK?

19 A. No.

20 Q. Sir, do you recall between 1992 and 1995, one single instance in

21 which you came upon or undertook an investigation of war crimes against a

22 member of the SRK that you had to refer to the military prosecutor?

23 A. No. As far as war crimes go, no.

24 Q. I'd like to move on now to two of the incidents you testified

25 about yesterday, three in fact. The first one being with respect to

Page 8114

1 shelling in the Ilidza area in which two young boys were killed --

2 MS. EDGERTON: And perhaps in that regard, I could ask for D299 to

3 be brought up on the screen.

4 Q. Now, sir, this document which you talked about yesterday, if I'm

5 not mistaken, is an official report into a shelling that occurred in

6 Rakovica area in Ilidza around the 18th of June, 1995, and I'd like to

7 direct you to what I think is the second page of this report in B/C/S,

8 also the second page of the English translation.

9 The bottom of the first paragraph of this second page which

10 says --

11 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Could you speak closer to the

12 microphone, Mr. Witness, otherwise the interpreters find it difficult to

13 hear you.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] [Previous translation continues]...

15 On the page --


17 Q. See the page on the screen in front of you, please look at the

18 bottom of the first paragraph where it says, that this incident related to

19 an exploding artillery shell of undetermined calibre fired by members of

20 the so-called BH army from the direction of Godusa village, Visoko

21 municipality. Do you see that?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. How far is Visoko from Sarajevo and in what direction?

24 A. Visoko is about 30 kilometres away from Sarajevo. However, from

25 this location, Ilidza municipality borders on Visoko municipality.

Page 8115

1 Q. So this shell, according to reports of your service, did not

2 originate from the centre of Sarajevo at all, did it?

3 A. No. It came from the area of Visoko, or rather, from the area of

4 Visoko municipality, as stated here, from the direction of village Godusa

5 in Visoko municipality.

6 Q. How was that determination made? How was it determined that the

7 shell came from Godusa village in Visoko municipality?

8 A. Most likely we received that information from the SRK since their

9 scouts who were on the lines probably knew what direction the firing came

10 from.

11 Q. When you say "most likely," that's because you actually had no

12 involvement in this investigation at all, did you?

13 A. No. I participated personally because Dusko Obradovic is my crime

14 investigator as well as the other men mentioned here. They were members

15 of my team, I was their immediate superior and I sent them to the scene.

16 I waited for them when they returned, and I was sent their report the very

17 same day.

18 Q. If you participated personally, why isn't your name on any of the

19 reports? Is that because you only acted in a supervisory capacity and

20 weren't directly involved in the investigations?

21 A. Apart from being their superior, I also often took part in on-site

22 investigations. This on-site investigation record is an essential part of

23 the overall crime report that was submitted to the prosecutor. My

24 signature must be underneath the conclusions of the entire file, and I

25 repeat, this record is a part of that file.

Page 8116

1 Q. Sir, how was it determined that this shell was fired by members of

2 the so-called BH army?

3 A. I would have to read it again. It is clear that it could have

4 only come from the BH side and fired by members of the BH army, not from

5 the Serb side. This is the shell who -- which killed the two boys. It

6 wasn't the only shell that landed that day in that area.

7 Q. Why do you feel you're able to say that this shell doesn't come

8 from the Serb side? What conclusive evidence have you got?

9 A. As I said, this was not the only shell to land in that area that

10 day. Many more fell. I think this was on the 17th, the second or the

11 third day into the offensive, when the artillery activity on these areas

12 was of such intensity that basically you couldn't even peek out. That's

13 why the on-site investigation was not conducted the first day when the

14 event took place, but rather on the 17th -- no, the event was on the 17th,

15 and we carried out the investigation the next day, once the shelling had

16 stopped. As you can see, the date says that it was drafted on the 18th,

17 whereas it mentions the event of the 17th. We waited for one whole day

18 because of the shelling. We couldn't have conducted the investigation any

19 sooner than that.

20 Q. So because of the circumstances, by the time you got to the

21 scene -- between the time of the incident and the time you got to the

22 scene, the scene wasn't actually secured, was it, because of the

23 circumstances?

24 A. It is absolutely clear that there was no interference, that no one

25 tried to move the bodies. Since even if you arrive on the scene late, one

Page 8117

1 of the basic questions to be put is to ask the witness who found the

2 bodies whether he moved anything or changed anything. This is also easily

3 confirmed by the investigation itself to see whether bodies were moved or

4 not. If there were, there would be blood traces on the ground and the

5 scene would be contaminated.

6 Q. Sir, you're saying all this without even having gone to the scene

7 in this case, aren't you?

8 A. Yes, but I have the report of my operatives who were on the scene.

9 MS. EDGERTON: Let's move on, please, to D300.

10 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Ms. Edgerton, based on the

11 registry's calculation, you have used an hour and a 20 minutes for this

12 cross-examination, which was supposed to last for an hour and a half. So

13 you have about ten minutes left. So please do try to do your best.

14 MS. EDGERTON: I will, Your Honour, and I suspect I will run a

15 risk of outlasting my ten minutes probably by an additional ten minutes,

16 with Your Honour's leave. But I will be as expeditious as I possibly

17 can. In any case.

18 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes, please do proceed.


20 Q. D300 is now on the screen. Sir, you weren't involved in this

21 investigation either, were you?

22 A. Not on the scene; however, I participated in the forwarding of the

23 report. The on-site investigation was headed by an investigating judge,

24 in this case Vladimir Jankovic. My operatives assisted him during the

25 investigation, as you can see from the composition of the investigative

Page 8118

1 team. All the people enumerated here, the inspectors and technicians, are

2 my operatives, my technicians, who I sent to the scene. The event

3 itself --

4 Q. Thank you. What's the basis of the determination in this case

5 that the fire came from ABiH forces?

6 A. I think that in addition to the official report there are

7 photographs explaining it, and could you please show them to me.

8 MS. EDGERTON: I think they were admitted as parted of this

9 exhibit, if we could scroll through.

10 Q. So you're unable to answer the question as to the determination of

11 the origin of fire without referring to photographs?

12 A. I can do it even without photographs, but it would be far easier

13 if we could have a look at the photographs, since it's been 12 years since

14 the event.

15 Q. Do you see the photograph on the top of the -- in the centre of

16 your screen?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Perhaps you could answer the question now.

19 A. This is the entrance to the sports hall. The boy was hit on the

20 stairs. Can we go on? What is shown here is the exact location where the

21 boy had been hit and blood traces.

22 Q. How does that --

23 A. Perhaps we can move on.

24 Q. How does that go to establish origin of fire?

25 A. There will be the last photograph at which you will see the origin

Page 8119

1 of fire or its direction. The boy was seated at the staircase. This is

2 another image of the scene. You can go on. What you can see here is the

3 direction from which the bullet had come.

4 Q. And ...?

5 A. As can be seen, this is the most likely location from which the

6 enemy sniper fired.

7 If you move on, you will see --

8 Q. Sorry, sorry, let me ask you a question now, sir. What's the

9 basis of the determination that the fire came from BiH forces then?

10 A. Based on the entry wound.

11 Q. I think I'm going to leave that and move on. Let's go, sir, to

12 the shooting of the two girls which you talked about at page 8071 of your

13 testimony. You seem to have some familiarity with that investigation, and

14 I'd like to ask you a couple of questions about it. You wouldn't know,

15 would you, sir, that the day after the incident on 12 March 1995, Bosnian

16 authorities stated to UN officials that their government had formed a

17 commission to investigate the incident?

18 A. No.

19 Q. You wouldn't know that shortly after --

20 MS. EDGERTON: And for the record, that evidence is found in P24.

21 Q. You wouldn't know that shortly after the shooting the General

22 Staff of the Bosnian army confirmed that a Muslim sniper was responsible

23 and stated that the soldier who had killed the girls had been arrested and

24 would stand trial?

25 A. Since a lot of time has passed between 1995 and today, perhaps we

Page 8120

1 could see the judgement issued in that case. If they knew who the person

2 was who had killed the girls, until now the judgement must have been

3 rendered but I know of no such case in Sarajevo.

4 MS. EDGERTON: And the source of that information, Your Honours,

5 is P26.

6 Q. You wouldn't know that General Milosevic himself was aware that

7 the Bosnian authorities had said they were taking measures with the

8 perpetrator of the incident, would you?

9 A. I don't know. General Milosevic was in no way my superior at that

10 time. We had no such communication. We were under no obligation to

11 inform each other of anything.

12 Q. You wouldn't -- you asked for the record of conviction, so then I

13 take it from that you wouldn't know that the perpetrator, one

14 Senad Piskic, was prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced to a term of

15 imprisonment for the event doctor for the incident?

16 A. I never saw the document and this is the first time I hear of it

17 and the first time that I've heard of Senad Piskic.

18 MS. EDGERTON: Could I have ter number 03419 brought up on the

19 screen, please, and I should say page -- I've seen these yesterday in

20 e-court, so I know they exist in e-court. And page 2 of this same

21 document, Mr. Registrar, should be the B/C/S version.

22 Q. Sir, do you see on the screen in front of you a letter from the

23 acting minister of defence -- a letter from the acting minister of defence

24 of Bosnia and Herzegovina referring to a military card for one

25 Senad Piskic, and noting that the person in question was prosecuted and

Page 8121

1 sentenced to a year's-long imprisonment?

2 A. I'm sorry, but I think this document you received is incomplete.

3 What is lacking -- well, it says based on the information available we can

4 inform you the person was prosecuted and sentenced to year's-long

5 imprisonment. First of all, they should have forwarded the exact file

6 number of the case and they should have specified what was the term of

7 imprisonment. When we forward such documents, we always specify the exact

8 reference number, we specify the imprisonment term, and according to my

9 knowledge, because I also deal with such issues today, I don't think he

10 was ever sentenced and sent to jail. I know of many others graver crimes

11 committed by members of the ABiH --

12 Q. Sir, thank you --

13 A. -- And those persons were not prosecuted for war crimes but for

14 general crimes --

15 Q. Thank you, thank you. I take it from the first part of your

16 answer that you're disputing the veracity of the information contained in

17 this document. You're saying that this document forwarded by the acting

18 minister of defence is untrue. Is that correct?

19 A. I am not stating that. Based on what they forwarded to you, one

20 cannot see whether this person was indeed sent to prison and for how long.

21 There's no reference file number. They only sent his card and the daily

22 combat report of the command, and that's it. And my apologies, but I also

23 wanted to say that the documentation on the -- these proceedings might

24 exist in the archives of the military court, which means that this lady --

25 Q. Sir --

Page 8122

1 A. -- Had no access so it --

2 Q. Sir --

3 A. -- She only said there may be documentation. The question is

4 whether there is any.

5 Q. -- My question to you required a yes or no answer. Are you

6 agreeing or disagreeing with the veracity of the document?

7 A. It is my opinion that it is incorrect.

8 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence for a moment, Your Honours.

9 [Prosecution counsel confer]

10 MS. EDGERTON: Could I have this document tendered as a

11 Prosecution exhibit, please?

12 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] The document is admitted.

13 Mr. Tapuskovic.

14 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I object the tendering of this

15 document and its being admitted as a Prosecution exhibit. It doesn't

16 contain even the basic elements necessary to establish whether there was a

17 proceedings conducted against anyone. If it contains no judgement,

18 perhaps they could have at least mentioned the number of the file of the

19 proceedings and the prison term imposed, and then it might be a relatively

20 reliable document. As such, this document contains nothing that would

21 confirm to us that this person, indeed, was held responsible, that he

22 stood trial, and was issued with a judgement, and no one can check that

23 either.

24 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Tapuskovic, I believe that the test for

25 admitting a document into evidence through a witness is not whether the

Page 8123

1 information in it is correct or incorrect. The test is rather whether

2 there is any bearable relation between the document and the witness. And

3 I must admit that it is perhaps difficult to establish the relation

4 between the witness and this document because he says that he has no

5 knowledge of it and he cannot confirm or otherwise have any opinion about

6 the contents. So I don't know.

7 What do you say, Ms. Edgerton?

8 MS. EDGERTON: I tendered it because it goes to the witness's

9 credibility, Your Honours.

10 [Trial Chamber confers]

11 JUDGE HARHOFF: The document has been admitted and we accept your

12 reason.

13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, excuse me for the interruption, that

14 will go in as P813.

15 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] [Previous translation continues]...

16 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours.

17 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Mr. Tapuskovic, do not talk to us,

18 please, about the document. The document is already admitted into

19 evidence.

20 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Then there's nothing for me to

21 say. I cannot understand how this has anything to do with the reliability

22 and credibility of this witness, and it has nothing to do with him since

23 he said that he knows nothing of this and he pointed out the lacking

24 information. How can that go to the credibility of this witness?

25 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] The Chamber heard your comments,

Page 8124

1 and we will deliberate on it.

2 Ms. Edgerton, I believe that you have two more minutes.

3 MS. EDGERTON: Then I'll ask, with your permission, one more

4 question, Your Honours.

5 Q. Mr. Tusevljak, do you recall speaking to a reporter from the New

6 York Times during the time of the re-integration in 1996 --

7 MS. EDGERTON: Pardon me, Your Honours, it will be three more

8 brief questions related to the same topic.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do.


11 Q. Do you recall during the discussion with that reporter about

12 aspects of the re-integration saying to him: "My loyalty is to the

13 Serbian leadership in Pale. The Muslims have no interest in professional

14 police work. They only want to create an Islamic state. They can't

15 expect us to help them do that"?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Did you know at the time you made this statement that Radovan

18 Karadzic, the head of the Serbian leadership in Pale, had been indicted by

19 this Tribunal for genocide?

20 A. Radovan Karadzic is not the only representative of the Serb

21 people, and he wasn't the only person in the Serbian leadership. When I

22 said this, I did not want to say that he was my boss. What I had in mind

23 was completely different. I had no Radovan Karadzic in mind when saying

24 that. He's not the only person who can represent or speak on behalf of

25 the Serb people.

Page 8125

1 Q. Did you know at the time you made this statement that he had been

2 indicted for genocide?

3 A. I think I did, but when I uttered these words I did not have

4 Radovan Karadzic in mind.

5 Q. You said you recalled saying: "The Muslims have no interest in

6 professional police work. They only want to create an Islamic state."

7 Do you also recall referring to those Muslims in -- as fanatics

8 during the course of that interview?

9 A. Muslims as fanatics, well I have 40 videotapes --

10 Q. Sir --

11 A. -- with three hours of material each about the --

12 Q. Sir, that was a yes or no question.

13 A. I don't think so.

14 MS. EDGERTON: Could we have 03407 brought up on the screen,

15 please.

16 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours.

17 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.

18 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Before the document is brought up

19 on the screen and before the witness, I have to say that my learned friend

20 is incorrectly quoting the contents of the article. He said -- actually,

21 the journalist wrote that Mr. Tusevljak was sitting under the large photo

22 of Radovan Karadzic, but he himself never mentioned Radovan Karadzic. The

23 journalist himself mentioned that the interviewee was sitting under

24 Radovan Karadzic's photograph during the interview, whereas the

25 interviewee himself never mentioned Radovan Karadzic.

Page 8126

1 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] It's very strange. I was under the

2 impression that the witness was saying yes to the question put by the

3 Prosecutor, but the Prosecutor may always put the question again just to

4 make sure that we're talking about the same thing. Would you like the

5 witness to be asked the same question again?

6 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I understand -- I

7 would understand that the witness would have been able to answer if he had

8 the document in front of him while he was answering the question. Maybe

9 the witness can say something about this now. The journalist wrote that

10 while he spoke to him, he was sitting under Radovan Karadzic's photo. He,

11 himself, never mentioned Radovan Karadzic's name in the interview.

12 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Ms. Edgerton, would you be able to

13 clarify this point with the witness, please.

14 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, with respect -- with respect, if we go

15 back to page 22, line 19, you will see that I quoted the article almost

16 verbatim, and when quoting the article I did not refer to Radovan

17 Karadzic. My question at line 25 was: "Did you know at the time you made

18 this statement that Radovan Karadzic, the head of the Serb leadership in

19 Pale, had been indicted by this Tribunal for genocide?"

20 With respect, Your Honours, my question was absolutely not a

21 mis-characterization or a misquoting of the article. I -- my question was

22 simply whether he knew that at the time he made that statement, Karadzic

23 had been indicted for genocide. I didn't even mention that he was sitting

24 under a picture of Karadzic at the time; my friend brought that up in

25 evidence.

Page 8127

1 If I may, Your Honours, I'd like to continue so that I can finish

2 up.

3 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Very well.

4 Mr. Tapuskovic, while Ms. Edgerton was talking we were able to

5 check what was said, and it seems to me that what you were mentioning was

6 not said here. The text on the transcript is different from what you are

7 saying to us.

8 So you may continue, please, Ms. Edgerton.

9 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

10 Q. Now, sir, do you see the translation of this article in your

11 language on the screen in front of you?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And the first paragraph, would you agree with me, says: "Simo

14 Tusevljak, the chief of the criminal division for the Serbian police in

15 this suburb of Sarajevo, is required to uphold the laws and constitution

16 of what he calls 'those Muslim fanatics' in his more diplomatic moments."

17 Does that refresh your memory as to what you said during the

18 course of the interview?

19 A. I'm standing by these words. Muslims are not interested in the

20 professional police work. They only want their Islamic state and they

21 can't expect us to help them with that. Everything above that are the

22 journalists comments rather than my words. Also, as far as I can

23 remember, I did not receive this journalist in my own office, so I don't

24 know what was on the wall of that office at the time. As for what the

25 journalist wrote, I don't know; I only know what I stated. He came to me

Page 8128

1 and said that there was a plan for the time-period to be extended, the 45

2 [as interpreted] time-period, but as far as I know, there was never such a

3 plan in place. Nobody ever offered us to stay on in the police on the

4 Bosnian side. And you know only too well that over 120.000 Serbs --

5 Q. Sir --

6 A. -- were moved from that area during that time.

7 Q. [Microphone not activated] --

8 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.


10 Q. My question was: "Does that refresh your memory of what you said

11 during the course of that interview?" And your answer was: "I'm standing

12 by these words," being the following: "Muslims are not interested in

13 professional police work, they only want their Islamic state, and they

14 can't expect us to help them with that." Those are the words you're

15 standing by?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Thank you.

18 MS. EDGERTON: I have no further questions.

19 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Ms. Edgerton.

20 MS. EDGERTON: I've forgotten to tender this newspaper article,

21 please, Your Honours. My apologies.

22 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Very well. It is admitted.

23 Mr. Registrar.

24 THE REGISTRAR: As P814, Your Honours.

25 JUDGE HARHOFF: Ms. Edgerton, please refresh my --

Page 8129

1 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

2 JUDGE HARHOFF: -- my memory about where was this published. I

3 can't see it.

4 MS. EDGERTON: The New York Times, Your Honour, and it was

5 recovered from the internet.

6 JUDGE HARHOFF: On the 5th of February, 1996. Thank you very

7 much. Thanks.

8 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Mr. Tapuskovic, do you have any

9 re-direct?

10 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I did have a few questions, but

11 due to the time constraints I will have to reduce their number. But since

12 we're talking about the document that is still on the screen and in front

13 of the witness -- or maybe not.

14 Re-examination by Mr. Tapuskovic:

15 Q. [Interpretation] In the first paragraph of this document it is

16 stated this, only two words under the quotation mark as having been

17 uttered by Witness Simo Tusevljak, "Muslim fanatics," nothing else has

18 been added and nor can one see in what context were these words uttered,

19 if he uttered them at all. He has just started explaining what kind of

20 documentation he has, but I would like to ask him what was the context in

21 which these words were uttered.

22 Do you remember, did you ever reflect on these words? Did you

23 ever utter the words "Muslim fanatics" --

24 MS. EDGERTON: Before the witness answers --

25 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Ms. Edgerton --

Page 8130

1 MS. EDGERTON: -- Your Honour, that's an incredibly leading

2 question, I would submit, and ask that it be rephrased.

3 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Mr. Tapuskovic, please rephrase

4 your question.

5 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have absolutely

6 not been leading the witness. In the first paragraph there are two words

7 between the quotation marks, and those are "the Muslim fanatics," and I'm

8 only asking the witness to try and remember. I'm not leading the witness.

9 I'm only asking him to try and remember what the context was when the

10 "Muslim fanatics" were mentioned. This is a document that was put to the

11 witness by the Prosecution, and if the Prosecutor insisted on these two

12 words, I suppose that the witness should be allowed to explain what he

13 meant by these two words, because taken out of the context these two words

14 don't mean a thing, do they?

15 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Witness, please answer the

16 question.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I believe that this was taken out of

18 the context. I suppose that we must have been talking about the

19 Mujahedin, which were actively involved in the war in Bosnia and

20 Herzegovina and whose number was huge at the time.

21 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Mr. Tapuskovic.

22 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I have

23 no further questions for this witness.

24 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Mr.

25 Tapuskovic.

Page 8131

1 Witness, this concludes your testimony. On behalf of this Trial

2 Chamber, I would like to thank you for coming to The Hague to bring your

3 contribution to international justice with your testimony. On my behalf

4 and on behalf of all the people who were present here in this courtroom, I

5 would like to wish you a safe trip. Thank you very much. You may leave

6 now.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

8 [The witness withdrew]

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic, we still have 15 minutes, and we

10 better make good use of them. Who is the next witness and is it a

11 protected witness or not?

12 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the following

13 witness is not protected. This is T-35, Mr. Ljuban Mrkovic --

14 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: T-38 is the witness's

15 number.

16 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Mr. Usher, could you please bring

17 the witness.

18 [The witness entered court]

19 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Ljuban Mrkovic.

20 On behalf of this Trial Chamber I would like to thank you for coming to

21 The Hague, and I just want to make sure that you understand me in your own

22 language. If you do, please say you do.

23 THE WITNESS: [No interpretation]

24 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Very well. You will now make a

25 solemn declaration. The usher will give you the text of the solemn

Page 8132

1 declaration.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

3 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

4 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Witness. You

5 may be seated.

6 According to the procedure and to the practice of this Trial

7 Chamber, I will ask the Defence counsel to identify you by asking you some

8 usual questions, after which he will start his examination-in-chief.

9 Mr. Tapuskovic, you have the floor.

10 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.


12 [Witness answered through interpreter]

13 Examination by Mr. Tapuskovic:

14 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Mrkovic. You know that I

15 represent Dragomir Milosevic. We have talked at length these days. I'm

16 going to try and be as efficient as possible, and I'm going to try and

17 bring the examination-in-chief to a speedy end because I understand you

18 have to be back home in Serbia because of your previous commitments.

19 Therefore, I'll try and be as efficient as possible.

20 Sir, can you tell us your name for the Judges.

21 A. Ljuban Mrkovic.

22 Q. You were born on the 28th of December, 1953?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. In Ljubinje in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

25 A. Yes.

Page 8133

1 Q. You completed elementary school in Ljubinje?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. You completed the high school for officers in Rajlovac, in

4 Sarajevo?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. You completed military academy in Sarajevo?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. The command staff academy that you completed was in Belgrade?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Before the outbreak of the conflict, you worked at military

11 academy as an officer and a teacher?

12 A. Yes, that was in Rajlovac, in the aeronautical academy.

13 Q. Before the conflict you were captain first class?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Can you tell the Judges what you did on the 19th of May, 1992?

16 A. On the 19th of May, 1992, pursuant to a decision of the Supreme

17 Command, together with the former JNA, I withdrew from territory of Bosnia

18 and Herzegovina and went to Belgrade.

19 Q. I am duty-bound to draw your attention to the transcript. Please

20 make a pause after my question and try to speak slowly, so as every word

21 you say can be recorded.

22 After you did what you did on the 19th of May, 1992, and since you

23 were in Sarajevo, can you tell us what was happening in Sarajevo and in

24 Rajlovac where you were before the JNA withdrew from Bosnia and

25 Herzegovina?

Page 8134

1 A. While the JNA was functioning in the territory of Bosnia and

2 Herzegovina, which means up to the 19th of May, 1992, the army was engaged

3 in its business. One could feel ethnic tensions among the members of the

4 army. We in Rajlovac, on our strength had Serbs, Muslims, and Croats.

5 Life was normal, the way it had always been, but a moment came when some

6 of the Muslim officers went to the BiH army side. The others remained

7 with us. The same happened to the Croats. Some of them stayed with us.

8 There were constant attacks on Rajlovac, where I worked, from the place

9 called Sokolje.

10 Q. Sir, Witness, can we take these things slowly. When the problems

11 arose, what was your engagement before you left Sarajevo? What was

12 connected to your rank? What did you do at the time? What was your duty?

13 A. I was engaged at the airport of Butmir, and I was working on the

14 evacuation of the population of Sarajevo. I organised flights at the

15 airport of Butmir, from which the largest number of the population was

16 evacuated from the town of Sarajevo.

17 Q. Can you tell the Judges briefly how many people were evacuated and

18 what was the situation like during those times. Can you give us an

19 approximate number of the people who left Sarajevo with your assistance?

20 A. I can say that we organised daily take-offs of some ten transport

21 aeroplanes AN-26 that could hold up to 35 people, and the aeroplane known

22 as Kikas, Boeing 737, which flew the Belgrade-Sarajevo route almost every

23 day and could hold up to 400 people. On average, nearly 1.000 citizens of

24 Sarajevo were evacuated every day from that airport. I would like to

25 emphasise that at that airport nobody paid attention to the ethnicity.

Page 8135

1 Whoever presented themselves at the airport would be flown to Belgrade and

2 elsewhere. I wasn't in Belgrade. I was in Sarajevo, but I can vouch for

3 the fact that nobody paid any attention to the ethnicity. Everybody was

4 transported, whoever wanted to be evacuated from Sarajevo.

5 Q. Can you give us an approximate duration of the time when you were

6 doing that?

7 A. I was doing this from April to June.

8 Q. Can you please wait. Can you repeat?

9 A. This lasted from the first take-off, which was on the 9th of

10 April. I can remember this very well. It was a passenger plane by Air

11 Bosna. We asked for this plane to be removed for security reasons, and it

12 lasted up to the end of April.

13 Q. You said that on the 19th of May you withdrew pursuant to an

14 order, just like every other soldier did. Did you ever return to Sarajevo

15 after that?

16 A. Yes. I arrived in Belgrade. I spent some ten days there, and

17 then I wanted to go back to Sarajevo, to the place where I had resided, to

18 where my family was, to the place where I was born. It was my decision to

19 go back and to stay there. I thought this was the right thing to do, to

20 go back to the place where I had lived all my life.

21 Q. Can you tell the honourable Judges, in the place where you were,

22 were there any other professional career officers who had returned?

23 A. Very few. At that moment, the moment when I returned to Rajlovac

24 and in the territory of the Sarajevo region, there were very few career

25 officers who had returned immediately after the outbreak of conflict.

Page 8136

1 Within the ten next days, maybe two or three officers returned to the

2 territory of Sarajevo after me.

3 Q. Were there any foot soldiers of the JNA who did not hail from

4 Sarajevo who remained in the territory after the withdrawal of the JNA?

5 A. What do you mean by foot soldiers? I didn't quite understand your

6 question.

7 Q. When the JNA withdrew on the 19th of May, not only officers

8 withdrew.

9 A. The active troops left.

10 Q. Where did they go?

11 A. In the direction of Serbia.

12 Q. When you returned, as you say you did, who did you join?

13 A. I joined the units that had already been organised, the

14 Territorial Defence of the Serbian people who had organised those units.

15 Q. Who were the combatants in that army that you joined at that

16 moment?

17 A. This was people, volunteers, who volunteered to make the troops.

18 The reserve officers of the former Territorial Defence which automatically

19 became active-duty officers.

20 Q. Tell me, please, what happened to the heavy weaponry of the JNA

21 that had been in the territory where you were before you withdrew?

22 A. Some of the weaponry that could be pulled out within such a short

23 deadline and was transported towards Serbia, more specifically, the unit

24 that I was attached to which was the air force academy, we pulled out some

25 of the weaponry, some of the arms that we thought might be necessary in

Page 8137

1 some other location for the training of our students. And some of the

2 equipment and weapons remained in Rajlovac because we had not been in a

3 position to transport them to wherever we were going. It was impossible

4 for us to do that, to transport everything.

5 Q. Can you please tell us, if you remember, what pieces remained in

6 Rajlovac.

7 A. I eye-witnessed the moment when we were withdrawing from Rajlovac;

8 I'm talking about the organised, regular army. As soon as we left

9 Rajlovac, different formations broke into the barracks in Rajlovac, either

10 Serbs or Muslims, and they were taking whatever they deemed necessary. A

11 lot of food was left behind, a lot of ammunition. There was very little

12 weapons anyway because this was a training centre, a school. They also

13 took some mock weapons that we used in training, but this could not be

14 used in combat. Those were just training, teaching aids.

15 Q. Thank you. Okay so this was in Rajlovac, the place where you

16 worked with students. However, did you notice that the army that you

17 joined subsequently did have a certain quantity of heavy weaponry in the

18 place where you served?

19 A. Yes, they did have. In any case, they did have maybe not heavy

20 weaponry, but they had infantry weaponry. In Rajlovac, we had never had

21 heavy weaponry, and the situation continued. During the war after I

22 returned from Serbia, we never had any heavy weaponry in Rajlovac.

23 Q. I understand your answer, but I'm asking you not only about

24 Rajlovac because Ilidza is close by and so is Hadzici. Did you notice in

25 these areas that there was heavy weaponry there?

Page 8138

1 A. Yes, there was some heavy weaponry there. There were, I believe,

2 two tanks, T-55 tanks and there were a few howitzers, as far as I can

3 remember. The Republika Srpska army in the territory did have some heavy

4 weaponry, and also there was some heavy weaponry on the side of the BiH

5 army. Those weapons had been taken away from the Marsal Tito barracks,

6 and there was a lot more of them because what could be taken from Rajlovac

7 was just teaching aids, whereas in the barracks there had been a lot more

8 weaponry and that's why they had a lot more than we did.

9 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I believe this is a

10 good time for our first break.

11 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes, you're perfectly right. So

12 we're going to take the break now, and we're going to resume in 20

13 minutes' time. The hearing is closed.

14 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.

15 --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

16 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Mr. Tapuskovic.

17 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

18 Q. Let us continue, Mr. Mrkovic. In order for us to keep discussing

19 the topic further, I wanted to show you a map. It is 2829, from the 65

20 ter list, and perhaps we can indicate a few things on it for the Judges.

21 Can you see the map?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Can you find the place you returned to, the place where you had

24 been before the withdrawal of the JNA?

25 A. This map is quite small, but I think Rajlovac is here.

Page 8139

1 Q. Please put a circle there.

2 A. Here it is.

3 Q. First, you have to be given a pen.

4 A. This is the part.

5 Q. Thank you. Mark it with an R.

6 A. [Marks]

7 Q. Do you know what the yellow and red lines represent?

8 A. The two lines represent the lines of separation between the

9 territory held by the VRS and the Army of BiH.

10 Q. Until when were you at that place?

11 A. After I returned from Belgrade until the Dayton Peace Accords in

12 January 1996 -- no, December 1995.

13 Q. Please tell Their Honours what exactly was there.

14 A. I returned to the aeronautical institute ORAO, next to the

15 barracks in Rajlovac.

16 Q. Thank you. Put a circle where the barracks was.

17 A. It is difficult to have it located. This is where the barracks

18 was, and next to it there was the institute, adjacent to the barracks.

19 That's where the ORAO facility was.

20 Q. Can you tell us something about its geographical location

21 concerning the environs of the buildings?

22 A. The aeronautical institute ORAO and the Rajlovac barracks were at

23 the foot of Sokolje and Zuc, which was constantly under the control of the

24 ABiH. ORAO itself, and the place where I slept at the time, was perhaps

25 800 metres away from the trenches controlled by the ABiH throughout the

Page 8140

1 conflict. The situation was such, the lines of separation did not move.

2 They were established in 1992, and preserved until the end of the war.

3 Q. Thank you. Tell Their Honours what was done within the institute

4 called ORAO at the time. Was it in operation?

5 A. Yes. Throughout the conflict it kept repairing jet engines; jet

6 engines, not aeroplane engines. These engines were intended for Serbia

7 and Banja Luka and also for export. We worked for other clients, those

8 who wanted their jet engines maintained or fixed.

9 Q. The production of those jet engines survived throughout the war.

10 You had a production line, did you not?

11 A. Yes. Should I add another thing about the institute. The

12 institute was at the foot of Zuc and Sokolje. In my unit where I was the

13 head of security, 24 members of the aeronautical institute were killed and

14 70 wounded.

15 Q. Let us discuss something else before that.

16 A. Very well.

17 Q. Since you're already on the topic, tell me this: During the

18 combat activities was the institute itself in any danger, as such?

19 A. I can tell you that it was attacked from infantry weapons, but

20 never from artillery. The reason for this was that it was very valuable

21 and profitable. The equipment that was there was of great value, both

22 sides considered it a great achievement to have it under its control. We

23 had security information showing that the ABiH kept insisting in its

24 orders not to target the institute with heavy weaponry because it had

25 nothing to do with the combat readiness of the VRS. These were merely jet

Page 8141

1 engines for planes sent to various Arab countries and all over the world.

2 Q. What was the reason for such behaviour of the ABiH to try and keep

3 the institute safe?

4 A. The reason was clear. They were hoping that one day they were

5 going to be there.

6 Q. Which weapons did they use then? Please wait for my question to

7 be complete. Which weapons did they use?

8 A. Solely from infantry weapons and snipers, because then in that

9 case there was no damage to the institute itself.

10 Q. And now, please continue what you began saying. Were there any

11 casualties of such firing?

12 A. Facts are that we had 24 killed and around 70 wounded in the

13 institute during the war.

14 Q. Were these people soldiers or the workers of the institute?

15 A. These were our workers from the institute.

16 Q. While we are still on the map and to conclude with it, I wanted to

17 ask you if you know something about certain elevations dominating in the

18 area of Sarajevo. Do you know who -- whose forces were at those

19 locations?

20 A. In the area of Rajlovac and its environs, as well as in Ilidza and

21 Vogosca, the main elevations that were there were controlled by the ABiH,

22 starting with Zuc, Sokolje, Rajlovac, and the Rajlovac barracks. They had

23 all those in the palm of their hand. Hum was another important elevation

24 for the city of Sarajevo and it was also controlled by the forces of the

25 ABiH. Igman as well, Trebevic or parts of Trebevic. We only had the

Page 8142

1 territory up to the road, and it was very difficult to move about there.

2 And moving from Vogosca and Rajlovac to Pale was difficult. We always

3 moved along the separation line, and we sustained many losses en route,

4 many people killed or wounded.

5 Q. Thank you. Please tell Their Honours something about when you

6 returned to Rajlovac. Besides working in the factory, as you said, what

7 other jobs did you have in terms of military events?

8 A. Since the aeronautical institute was part of the former JNA and

9 then the VRS, I was engaged in security and intelligence efforts in the

10 area of the institute and in the territory around it, including Rajlovac

11 and it environs. I was the security organ chief.

12 Q. Did you belong to any particular brigade?

13 A. No. Territorially speaking, we were within the AOR of the command

14 of the SRK. We were not attached to any brigades. We were one of the

15 units of the General Staff of the VRS.

16 Q. What was your job as a security officer?

17 A. My job as the security officer in the institute was to protect,

18 preserve, the property and personnel of the institute itself, gathering

19 intelligence information and forwarding those up the chain of command and

20 control so that they could make their decisions properly. There was

21 another aspect of activity aimed at preserving the documentation that

22 existed in the aeronautical institute concerning the maintenance of such

23 engines.

24 Q. What was the work of your service? What did it look like, if you

25 can explain?

Page 8143

1 A. The service worked like any other service. We were organised as

2 part of the security service of the VRS, and for a while I personally was

3 subordinated to the command along the expert line of the SRK.

4 Q. Thank you. Thank you. I just wanted to know about the actual

5 work. When you say intelligence security work, what does that mean?

6 A. I don't know what you mean.

7 Q. For example, tell us about your service.

8 A. You would have to take all possible measures, all available

9 measures, in order to protect the aeronautical institute.

10 Q. What is the characteristic of the intelligence work?

11 A. Well, the gist of it was that we could not permit the other side

12 to have its people within the institute and to get their hands on

13 information or data of the aeronautical institute.

14 Q. Thank you. I wanted to ask you if you knew if any other

15 intelligence services were operating there?

16 A. The Sarajevo area was very interesting for all intelligence

17 services, the Croatian one, the intelligence service of the B&H army, and

18 the majority of other intelligence services in that area were interested

19 and were present in that area.

20 Q. Do you know when General Dragomir Milosevic assumed the duty of

21 commander of the SRK?

22 A. In 1994.

23 Q. You said that at the beginning of the conflict there were heavy

24 weapons left behind by the JNA. Do you know what happened to these heavy

25 weapons in 1994?

Page 8144

1 A. In 1994, all the heavy weapons from the Sarajevo area were

2 withdrawn in accordance to an agreement out of an exclusion zone around

3 Sarajevo of some 20 kilometres. I know all the heavy weapons were pulled

4 out and placed under the control of UNPROFOR.

5 Q. And can you please say something about that, since you were there

6 in the area from 1992 until 1995. Can you tell us whether during that

7 time-period there were periods when it was easier to live, when the

8 intensity of the combat was lower?

9 A. I can say that the summer, starting from May 1994 until the summer

10 May 1995, in the Sarajevo theatre, was very quiet in terms of armed

11 clashes. This was a period that was characteristic by very, very few

12 combat actions.

13 Q. And what about after May 1995?

14 A. Since we did a lot of intelligence work in that area in order to

15 protect ourselves and preserve ourselves, the people, the property, we had

16 information that in that period, forces under the control of Army of

17 Bosnia and Herzegovina carried out intensive training and preparations,

18 and all of this indicated to us that one day there will be a major

19 offensive in the Sarajevo area.

20 Q. Thank you. I would now like to ask you this: Did you receive

21 information about things that were happening in that part of Sarajevo that

22 was under the control of the B&H army relating to combat actions?

23 A. Yes, we received information in various ways with the departure of

24 a certain number of the population from Sarajevo, areas that were under

25 the control of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We received

Page 8145

1 information that the communications -- from communications also of the

2 Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. So we were quite, quite aware of the

3 situation in the town itself. Also, the other side was aware of what we

4 were doing.

5 Q. I wasn't just thinking of that. Were you able to receive

6 information through the media or in some other way about the consequences

7 of the combat actions in Sarajevo that was under the control of the Army

8 of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the area that was under the control of

9 the -- and where the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina was situated? Were

10 there any consequences in that area as a result of combat between the two

11 sides, as a result of mutual firing?

12 A. We had regular analysis about what was going on and what the

13 effects were in the town itself. This was an activity that was carried

14 out routinely, and the media propaganda had a lot to do with everything.

15 I, myself, frequently heard on the media already in the papers, which we

16 got in different ways, that such and such a person was killed on their way

17 out of Sarajevo, whereas in that location not even a shell fell nor was

18 there any firing.

19 Q. Thank you. You as the security service or anyone from the Army of

20 Republika Srpska, did you do anything to check these reports, to find out

21 what happened, to investigate? Was this possible?

22 A. We received instructions many times about how to behave in a

23 situation like that. We reported to the Main Staff of the Army of

24 Republika Srpska several times that the shells that were dropping in the

25 Sarajevo area, we would ask them to form joint commissions to check if

Page 8146

1 they fell where they fell and so on, but this was never granted.

2 Q. Thank you. Witness, I'm going to show you document DD002492.

3 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Before that, can we just save

4 this map as an exhibit, please.

5 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] You want to tender this or you want

6 to save it on the registrar list?

7 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] We would like to have that

8 admitted as an exhibit, Your Honour, please.

9 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] It is being tendered.

10 Mr. Registrar.

11 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this becomes D302.

12 MR. WAESPI: Maybe I'm missing something --

13 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] I see that the Prosecutor is on his

14 feet. What's going on?

15 MR. WAESPI: It says here: "I'm going to show you a document --"

16 I see, I see, the admission refers to the previous admission of map. I'm

17 sorry, I have no objection, of course, to that.

18 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] All right. Fine. Thank you.

19 Please proceed, Mr. Tapuskovic.

20 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I didn't hear that the exhibit

21 was given a number, but it doesn't matter. If it wasn't given a number,

22 I'm not going to insist on this in order not to burden the Court anymore.

23 Q. Now we have the document. Mr. Mrkovic, could you please read the

24 heading, the date of the document, and read up until the actual text

25 begins, and then I'm going to tell you what you need to pay attention to.

Page 8147

1 A. It's a bit hard for me to see, but the top I can see better.

2 "The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, General Staff of the

3 Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kakanj, strictly confidential number

4 01-1/17-1, dated January 1st, 1995."

5 "Agreement on the cessation of hostilities with guide-lines, to:"

6 Q. Thank you. Can you now look at paragraph 2, please, the third

7 passage of that section.

8 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this is very hard

9 to see. Some things have been crossed out, but perhaps we can place a

10 cleaner page on the ELMO, and then the witness would be able to read what

11 it says. And perhaps we could zoom in a little bit on the text.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's something like: I forbid ...

13 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Where it begins: "I forbid ..."

15 Please read from there.

16 A. "I forbid, and UNPROFOR is to be informed of this, Chetnik

17 officers -- Chetnik liaison officers to be located in UNPROFOR barracks on

18 our territory."

19 Q. And at the end of paragraph 2, the very last passage, where it

20 says: "There can be no backing away ... "

21 And then further down.

22 A. You cannot see very well.

23 "There can be no backing down and talk," I guess.

24 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, can I please read

25 this to the witness and I am able to read this. There is a translation in

Page 8148

1 English. The interpreters are unable to see that on the screen.

2 Q. All right. So after the first part that you read it says: "There

3 can be no backing away from that -- there may be no departure from this

4 because I do not want UNPROFOR to legalise in that way the stay of Chetnik

5 liaison officers on our territory, and thereby also their intelligence

6 activities."

7 Well, I have shown you this, you can see that for yourself. Did

8 that have anything to do with your attempts to do something in order to

9 find out about the matters that you spoke about?

10 A. Yes. In any case, we did know that the Army of Bosnia and

11 Herzegovina did not want us to come and to investigate anything or to see

12 anything.

13 Q. And now I'm asking you to look at page 2, and to see who issued

14 this order.

15 A. This order was issued by commander army general Rasim Delic.

16 Q. And now that we're speaking about the document, can you please

17 look at the paragraph just above the signature and can you please read it,

18 I think that you can read it, it's possible. It's on page 2 right above

19 the -- or right below where it says, "commander army general Rasim Delic."

20 A. "Corps commander will continue to maintain the full level of

21 combat-readiness and they must not permit any surprises."

22 Q. And continue, please.

23 A. "If the agreement is respected, use the time to train troops,

24 units, and commands to transform the army, and to prepare to continue

25 combat actions."

Page 8149

1 Q. Thank you. So this is what you talked about earlier. Is that

2 right?

3 A. Yes.

4 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, can this document

5 DD002492 be tendered as an exhibit?

6 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] This being admitted.

7 Mr. Registrar.

8 THE REGISTRAR: As D303, Your Honours.

9 JUDGE MINDUA: [No interpretation]

10 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Witness, could you now please tell me if you knew anything about

12 there being a tunnel beneath the Butmir airport; and if you do, can you

13 please tell me what you know about that?

14 A. I don't have the translation here, so I don't see -- oh, all

15 right, very well. When the tunnel began -- well, when the excavations for

16 the tunnel began, we knew about it. We knew when that was completed and

17 when the tunnel began to be used. It was used for regrouping of the Army

18 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, also it was used as an exit from the area that

19 was under the control of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was also

20 used for food and the supply of other items. It was very much used. We

21 were informed that it operated continuously 24 hours a day.

22 Q. Did you have information that had to do with the tunnel and

23 weapons?

24 A. Yes, according to the data we had, there was specific times when

25 civilians were able to use the tunnel, that was for a very short period of

Page 8150

1 time, and the rest of the time was for the needs of the military. The

2 tunnel was used to bring in and take out troops, so troops came in and

3 left Sarajevo via the tunnel. And weapons in any case --

4 Q. My question was not written down. I didn't turn my microphone on.

5 What about the weapons?

6 A. Weapons, too. Yes, the tunnel was definitely used for the traffic

7 of weapons.

8 Q. I'm going to show you document DD002743, and when you have the

9 document in front of you can you please look at the heading of the

10 document and then further down. And can you please then give me an answer

11 to a question. I believe this is more legible. Please read out the

12 heading.

13 A. "Command of the 102nd Brigade, strictly confidential number

14 16/1-52, 27 April, 1995.

15 "Relief of units in the zone of responsibility of the 16th Land

16 Army Division order.

17 "On the basis of the planned use of the units in the area of

18 responsibility of the 16th DKOV and the order for the relief of units

19 issued by the command of the 12th division, strictly confidential number

20 02/2-11-20, dated 25 April 1995, and in order to prepare the units in due

21 course for carrying out combat tasks outside the Sarajevo theatre, I

22 order:

23 "Prepare forces out of the 3rd bb, the strength of a battalion

24 (400 soldiers and officers) to relieve the 1/102nd bbr in the area of

25 responsibility of the 16th Division and take the position and its area of

Page 8151

1 defence. Relieve the units on the 3rd of May 1995 by 1600 hours.

2 "Out of the 3rd bb, use: 280 soldiers, including three squads for

3 the 60-millimetre MB and one squad for the 82-millimetre MB" --

4 Q. Thank you. Is this something you had information on? Did you

5 refer to it a while ago?

6 A. Yes, this was a regular activity which often took place. I

7 specified how the tunnel was designated primarily for military purposes

8 and there was only a short window for the movement of civilians.

9 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would kindly ask

10 that DD002743 be admitted into evidence.

11 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] It's being admitted into evidence.

12 Mr. Registrar.

13 THE REGISTRAR: As D304, Your Honours.

14 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you, registrar.

15 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Mr. Mrkovic, you mentioned the weapons transported through the

17 tunnel. What was your information on the arming of the BiH?

18 A. The Army of BiH had large quantities of weapons left behind by the

19 former JNA, primarily those from the Marsal Tito barracks in the area

20 where I was. Then there was another large warehouse at Busovaca, then

21 from Zenica, Busovaca, and so on and so forth. During the war we had

22 information that the Army of BiH through various channels got its supplies

23 from abroad, from various Arab countries, and that weapons were being

24 brought in on planes, as well as in humanitarian convoys which made their

25 way through to Sarajevo.

Page 8152

1 MR. TAPUSKOVIC; [Intepretation] Let us show DD003643 to the

2 witness, please. It reflects a session of the Presidency of the Republic

3 Bosnia and Herzegovina, chaired by Alija Izetbegovic on the 10th of

4 August, 1995; i.e., in the period pertaining to the indictment. The

5 document is DD003643. Your Honours, I had a portion of these minutes

6 translated, and I wanted to show the witness parts of it. Once it is on

7 the screen, I would ask the witness to read out the heading and the time

8 when -- and date when the session began.

9 Q. Please try and make the effort.

10 A. "Session of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and

11 Herzegovina held on 10 August 1995."

12 "The session commenced at 1200 hours."

13 "The session was chaired by President of the Presidency of the

14 RBH, Alija Izetbegovic."

15 Q. Thank you.

16 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Let us go to page 6 of the B/C/S

17 and page 5 of the English, please. That has been translated. The

18 paragraph beginning with the words: "You see ..."

19 Q. I would kindly ask you to start reading from the bottom of the

20 page, saying: "In the last 15 days, we ..."

21 A. Let me find it.

22 Q. At the bottom of the page, almost the last sentence.

23 A. "In the past 15 days, we brought in 26 aircraft-loads of weapons."

24 I transferred them. "Does anyone know who brought them in? Do the people

25 know who did that? These are completely unknown people. 26

Page 8153

1 aircraft-loads of weapons. The man who came was in Germany, the wounded

2 one, he was wounded for two years."

3 Q. Thank you.

4 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Let us move on to the next page.

5 It is page 7 in the B/C/S and still page 5 in the English.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This thing beginning with Catic?

7 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Yes.

9 A. "Catic, he saw the army in 1992. He's now back and says: You can

10 no longer recognise this army, this one is a real army, the one before was

11 not. Those were just groups of unarmed men. Now it is a well-armed and

12 trained army. We did it all. This was not done by the government. A

13 part of it was done by the government, but a lot ..."

14 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Let us go back to page 5. Let's

15 see who the person who said this is.

16 Q. What does it say at the top?

17 A. "President."

18 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Let us go to page 10, and in the

19 English it is page 7.

20 Q. The first paragraph towards the bottom. It says: "Bace" [phoen]

21 in B/C/S?

22 A. "There is a mention of 26 planes which arrived in the last few

23 days if it has to do with 10.000 VBR rockets, 10.000 AR rockets," I don't

24 know what it means, "800 air-bombs, et cetera, then I can say" --

25 Q. Thank you. Let us go back to page 9 to see whose words these are.

Page 8154

1 Towards the bottom, do you see it?

2 A. It says "President."

3 Q. And then after that?

4 A. Can we zoom in, please?

5 Q. The last paragraph.

6 A. "Silajdzic."

7 Q. Thank you.

8 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Now, to make things complete, let

9 us go to page 11, which is page 8 in the English, the words uttered by

10 Silajdzic, the beginning of that portion. Page 11 in the B/C/S.

11 Q. The words of Silajdzic: "If the ratio ..."

12 A. "If the ratio is 90:10, it means that we have received a billion

13 and a half or 2 billion weapons. Then I don't know. If this is the

14 ratio. Because I can openly say that I initiated and asked for it at a

15 time when you reproached me for it, asked me why I needed these weapons,

16 when they were transported to Turkey on my request, if you remember. And

17 we both said: We might need weapons. Including this. I can safely say

18 between $70 and $80 million. Later on this was sent here from Turkey."

19 Q. Thank you. And another thing on page 13, beginning with

20 Silajdzic's words.

21 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] It is page 9 in the English.

22 Q. Can you read out loud Silajdzic's words, please.

23 A. From the beginning?

24 Q. Yes.

25 A. "Let us say who the people are who work and believe me, they

Page 8155

1 aren't, either" -- I'm having difficulty reading this.

2 Q. Do your best, please.

3 A. "I know more or less who these people are. More power to them. I

4 know these men and you don't. I can tell you about men who didn't sleep

5 for nights on end, loading cargo on ships in far-away countries. Their

6 names will never be known. They were both our citizens and so on, and

7 when you talk about the 26 latest planes, with those 26 planes, if you

8 please" --

9 Q. That is good enough, since you are having some difficulty reading.

10 Is this the information that reached you during the war as well?

11 A. Yes.

12 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I wish to --

13 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Mr. Waespi.

14 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. I've no objection to this

15 document coming in because we have had so many documents with the same

16 very, very tiny foundation linked to this witness. All he did was reading

17 out large portions of what other people said in other meetings he didn't

18 attend, and at the end the normal question: Does that correspond to what

19 you have seen? What I'd love to see was this gentleman's analysis,

20 perhaps, an intelligence report of that time which would confirm his

21 intrinsic knowledge, I'm sure, he had of the ABiH. But anyway, that's the

22 way it is. I've no objection to the document being admitted.

23 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Mr. Tapuskovic.

24 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, as any intelligence

25 person, he knew of this. I know of no intelligence service in the world

Page 8156

1 that would have within its system the possibility of putting all the

2 information they receive on paper and reporting on it all. They only do

3 it in a most delicate, subtle way, as explained by the witness. He can

4 explain to us how an intelligence service works. He explained about this,

5 and he mentioned these facts discussed by the Presidency of the -- of

6 Bosnia-Herzegovina, by the president, by Silajdzic, and by the supreme

7 commander of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic. I did

8 not want to bother you with Delic's statements in this document as well as

9 the statements of others. But from that you would be able to see the

10 pride they were taking in their well-armed army by that time. After all

11 the intelligence information this witness has gathered, I see no reason to

12 refuse the tendering of this document because he had all that information

13 at his disposal at the time.

14 [Trial Chamber confers]

15 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] The Chamber will admit the

16 document.

17 THE REGISTRAR: As D305, Your Honours.

18 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

19 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. I have to rush, Witness, and I wanted to ask you this: Concerning

21 combat activities of both parties, of course you can tell us about things

22 happening on both sides, but I'm interested in knowing whether you as

23 intelligence people had some information on the weaknesses or poor state

24 of -- or the poor state of maintenance of weaponry on the ABiH side?

25 A. There were on both sides, since the Army of BiH as well as the VRS

Page 8157

1 will organise the way they were because of the lack of training on both

2 sides. There were often occurrences in which people inflicted wounds on

3 themselves because they were poorly trained and then ordnance would

4 explode, and then sometimes there was friendly fire.

5 Q. I wanted to show you a document, this being DD002659, it is a very

6 short document. I'd like to ask you to read out the whole thing and then

7 provide an answer to a question of mine.

8 Can you read what it says here so that I can ask you questions

9 about what you have just mentioned.

10 A. "B&H army, 12th Division command, logistics section.

11 "Strictly confidential 07/24-3-605.

12 "Sarajevo, 17th of June 1995," and it's being sent to the command

13 of the 1st Corps technical service.

14 "Pursuant to the document of the 101st Mountain Brigade command

15 number 5138, dated 16th of June 1995, two 120-millimetre shells marked

16 UP 01/94 7SF09 were fired. The firing was executed in 1140 and 1540

17 hours. Immediately after being fired from the mortar barrel, the shell

18 dropped in front on the ground some 4 to 5 metres away and did not

19 explode. They have another nine shells with the same marking. Besides

20 these, they also have some 120-millimetre mortar shells marked 95-03-4

21 whose charges are damp.

22 "Please take the necessary measures to repair them at the

23 authorised Pretis workshop.

24 "Commander Fikret Prevljak."

25 Q. Is this what you said earlier about how you found out about these

Page 8158

1 things, about mines dropping on one's own positions?

2 A. Yes, that is correct. Whether because of the human factor or some

3 technical glitches, but this did used to happen.

4 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Can I please tender this

5 document, DD002659 as a Defence exhibit, please.

6 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] The document is admitted.

7 Mr. Registrar, please.

8 THE REGISTRAR: As D306, Your Honours.

9 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

10 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Your security intelligence services, did they sometimes find out

12 perhaps even more sensitive and unpleasant information that would be

13 facing the Army of Republika Srpska?

14 A. I didn't understand the question very well.

15 Q. You know that in Sarajevo - when I say "Sarajevo," I also mean the

16 areas held both by the Army of Republika Srpska and the Army of Bosnia and

17 Herzegovina, and we're talking about Sarajevo and there were different

18 happenings there. Primarily, I'm thinking about some things that were

19 covered by the media. Did you have any information in that sense in

20 relation to those media events which were particularly emphasised by the

21 media?

22 A. I said before that the media very frequently published items about

23 shells falling and killing people, whereas later we would find out through

24 the intelligence sources we had within town that none of that had

25 happened.

Page 8159

1 Q. Were any events announced sometimes?

2 A. Yes, yes, they were. Frequently, they would announce their

3 attacks to us. I can openly say that in 90 per cent of the cases we knew

4 about all the offensives and attacks that were going to be carried out by

5 the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo. Unfortunately, they also

6 knew about ours, but that's how the system functioned.

7 Q. And now I would like you to pay particular attention to the

8 following document: DD001825. And can you carefully read again here the

9 heading and a good part of the text on that page, and then I could draw

10 your attention to a few sentences. This is in quite large letters. If

11 you are able to, can you, please, carefully read everything that is on

12 this page.

13 A. "General Staff of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina --

14 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, General Staff of the army headquarters

15 of the army number 1-1/1120-1, Kakanj, the 26th of August, 1995.

16 "Special information to the command of the 1st Corps.

17 "We are forwarding herewith a document of the office of security

18 services with new data on the intentions of the command of the

19 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. In regard to the above, take immediate measures,

20 all measures that are required, operations and procedures in regard to

21 command number 1/1116-1, dated 25th of August, 1995.

22 "Chief of Staff, General Enver Hadzihasanovic."

23 And then below it says: "Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

24 Ministry of Internal Affairs, office of security services, Sarajevo,

25 special information, number 95, dated 25th of August, 1995.

Page 8160

1 "Official secret, strictly confidential, copy number 2.

2 "Command of the so-called Sarajevo-Romanija Corps has issued a

3 command on full combat-readiness and the undertaking of planned counter

4 measures in the next two days for the purpose of breaking the blockade by

5 the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina." I don't know if it says

6 here -- "to break the blockade of Sarajevo," exactly.

7 Q. Now I would like you to look at page 2. We don't need to read

8 everything; there is no time for that.

9 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 2, please,

10 this part beginning with: "In connection with that ..."

11 Q. Can you please read that.

12 A. Can you please help me where that is because I do not see it.

13 Q. It's the second sentence, Mr. Mrkovic.

14 A. "In connection with the stated command relating also to the use of

15 artillery weapons according to the already-marked and pre-determined

16 points in the depth because when it is put in place it will stop, based on

17 which we have established that in the coming two days the Chetniks intend

18 to shell civilian buildings in Sarajevo."

19 Q. Thank you. Can you now look at the last sentence of that text on

20 that part of the page. No, no, the last sentence, Mr. Mrkovic, begins

21 with: "Based on ..."

22 Is it possible that you cannot see it?

23 A. I cannot see it. It's very hard for me to find it.

24 Q. It's the last sentence, begins with: "Based on these and

25 previous ..."

Page 8161

1 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Perhaps we can zoom in on that.

2 This is very important for the Defence.

3 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, I have no problem if the Defence would

4 like to read the sentence out.

5 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if you permit me.

6 Had I known that you don't see to such an extent, Mr. Mrkovic, I would

7 have provided some glasses for you. I'm going to read --

8 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] [Previous translation continues]...

9 Mr. Tapuskovic, that's better.

10 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] "Based on these and prior

11 information, we believe that the Serb terrorists will over the next few

12 days fire from artillery projectiles of major destructive power at the

13 town of Sarajevo."

14 Q. You said that this was the 25th of August when this document was

15 drafted. At the time, did you have any indications that anything was

16 being prepared and were you more cautious because of that?

17 A. At the beginning of my testimony I said that this was a period of

18 truce, but that throughout the time the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina was

19 conducting preparations, training to continue combat actions. We received

20 much, much information from the town of Sarajevo, how and in which way

21 this training was being conducted.

22 Q. Again, I'm saying this is the 25th of August, 1995. What happened

23 on the 26th of August, 1995, and what happened on the 28th of August,

24 1995, Witness?

25 A. Markale.

Page 8162

1 Q. And was that what was being indicated here?

2 A. All this information indicated that something along those lines

3 would happen to us.

4 Q. Who signed this?

5 A. This was signed by Nedzad Ugljen, and it was dispatched to the

6 president, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic; the command of the Main Staff,

7 Mr. Rasim Delic; and to the minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs,

8 Mr. Bakir Alispahic.

9 Q. Did you find out over that time over those few days if

10 Alija Izetbegovic was in Sarajevo?

11 A. We found out from the media that Alija -- or we were receiving

12 information that Alija was going to leave Sarajevo. And I can say that

13 care was always taken care. Igman was never fired at because that's where

14 they passed, and that is when Alija appeared, according to all

15 indications, in Mostar, some two or three days before Markale. The

16 president was in Mostar two or three days before Markale.

17 Q. Thank you. And did this concern you a bit?

18 A. Just like any analysts, we did carry out a lot of analyses about

19 the events, events in Sarajevo. Something terrible would always happen

20 when the leadership was not in Sarajevo. Large attacks would take place

21 when the leadership was not in Sarajevo.

22 Q. All right. Thank you. Could you please look and tell us who

23 signed this.

24 A. Nedzad Ugljen.

25 Q. Do you know who Nedzad Ugljen is?

Page 8163

1 A. He was the chief of State Security in Sarajevo.

2 Q. And do you know to which units he belonged to? Was there a

3 special unit that he belonged to?

4 A. He was in the State Security Service of the Republic of Bosnia and

5 Herzegovina. This was a document that the army took from the State

6 Security Service.

7 Q. Is he still alive?

8 A. I couldn't really say.

9 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have this document

10 tendered as a Defence exhibit, Your Honours.

11 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Very well. The document is

12 admitted.

13 Mr. Registrar.

14 THE REGISTRAR: As D307, Your Honours.

15 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

16 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I don't know how

17 much time I have in order to be able to keep track. I'm not really

18 keeping control here.

19 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] We have 15 minutes before the

20 break.

21 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22 Q. Your intelligence service, did it have information about any

23 irregular actions undertaken by the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina at any

24 point?

25 A. Just like any service, sometimes we would receive accurate and

Page 8164

1 sometimes we would receive false information. Extraordinary situations

2 were happening all the time. Practically every situation for us was an

3 extraordinary situation.

4 Q. And were there any unusual actions in such conditions? I'm not

5 permitted to suggest anything.

6 A. Yes. Very frequently it would happen that various shells were

7 fired at our positions, shells of contents unknown to us that dropped on

8 our positions. I don't know exactly which part to mention, for example,

9 which section.

10 Q. Well, if you didn't understand my question, I'm not permitted to

11 suggest anything to you.

12 A. No.

13 Q. At the time, you said that there was a year of -- there was a lull

14 for a year.

15 A. From May 1994 to May 1995.

16 Q. And so what started to happen in May 1995? Do you know of any

17 events, incidents in May 1995? Was any combat conducted then that you can

18 recollect?

19 A. Specifically in the area where I was there were many provocations

20 that already started from May 1995. All the information indicated that

21 the forces of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina were preparing to lift

22 the blockade of the town, that they were preparing to attack along all the

23 lines of the front, and we were also preparing for that throughout the

24 summer of 1995.

25 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] The witness said "the so-called

Page 8165

1 lifting of the siege," and it was not registered like that in the

2 transcript.

3 Q. And do you remember that anything happened in May around a

4 barracks?

5 A. There was an attack on the Bosut barracks, I think, up there on

6 Trebevic. Many, many shells landed on that barracks then. There were a

7 number of our soldiers killed and wounded. I know that that barracks was

8 often attacked and particularly fiercely so in May.

9 Q. I want to show you another document now, which is DD002681.

10 Please have a look at the document. Have a look at the date, and after

11 some cursory reading I want to ask you if what is mentioned here is the

12 same thing you were referring to.

13 A. Very well. Yes, this is the amount of ammunition spent, fired at

14 Bosut on Trebevic.

15 Q. What was the date?

16 A. The 24th of May.

17 Q. Concerning the amount of ammunition spent, can you have a look at

18 the last three items?

19 A. Mine 60-millimetre, 516 pieces; 82-millimetre shells, 507;

20 120-millimetre shells, 74 pieces.

21 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I wish to tender

22 this document as well.

23 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Could you please explain to us why

24 you would like this document to be admitted. What are you trying to

25 establish by this?

Page 8166

1 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we have discussed

2 this on many occasions before, and you have admitted similar documents.

3 The intensity of combat activities on the part of the ABiH is the very

4 reason for the mutual actions at that time. I already explained my

5 arguments. I can do it yet again, but until now we have admitted at least

6 ten such documents which have never been disputed. This is a document

7 reflecting the beginning of that offensive with the intensive activities

8 on the ABiH side. The number of casualties following such activities is a

9 good indication of the intensity of combat actions by the ABiH.

10 Therefore, one cannot speak of a campaign or terror that was supposed to

11 have result; rather, it was an unavoidable answer to combat activities in

12 the course of fighting.

13 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] [Previous translation continues]...

14 Is in the transcript and the Chamber will admit this document.

15 Mr. Registrar.

16 THE REGISTRAR: As D308, Your Honours.

17 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

18 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I intended to use

19 another few documents, but I don't want to repeat myself. I wish to thank

20 you for the time allotted to me, and I have no further questions for this

21 witness. I would like to thank Mr. Mrkovic and Their Honours.

22 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Mr.

23 Tapuskovic. You finished before the break. According to my calculations,

24 you had 20 more minutes, so I congratulate you.

25 And in order not to waste any more time, Mr. Waespi has the floor.

Page 8167

1 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President, and if the Defence agrees,

2 I will take their 20 minutes and add them to my time.

3 JUDGE HARHOFF: [Microphone not activated]

4 MR. WAESPI: No, I'm sorry, I tried to be funny. I will try to be

5 as brief as I can.

6 Cross-examination by Mr. Waespi:

7 Q. Good morning, Witness. I'm still not quite sure what your

8 association was within the chain of command of either the SRK or the VRS.

9 I believe at one time you said you were for a period of time within the

10 professional chain of command of the SRK security, and at other times you

11 told us that you were working for the VRS Main Staff. So please tell us,

12 for the period of time you came back to Belgrade -- to Rajlovac from

13 Belgrade, which I take it is somewhere end of May 1992, to the end of the

14 war, November 1995, who was your superior at any time? Can you please let

15 us know in as much detail as you can.

16 A. Upon my return to the aeronautical institute at Rajlovac, my

17 direct superior in all matters was the general manager of the institute.

18 I was his security assistant in terms of the institute. The aeronautical

19 institute ORAO was a unit of the VRS subordinated to the Main Staff of the

20 VRS, directly under it. However, since we were within the AOR of the SRK,

21 in terms of professional subordination concerning logistics and support,

22 we relied on the SRK. That is what the system was like in the VRS at the

23 time. I believe I was as clear in my first explanation as now -- as I am

24 now.

25 Q. Do you know who Marko Lugonja is?

Page 8168

1 A. Yes, I do, chief of security of the SRK.

2 Q. Were you working with him during the relevant period, 1992, 1993,

3 1994, 1995?

4 A. Yes, I did. I worked with him on issues of security at the

5 institute and in Rajlovac, and most of the information I forwarded was

6 through or to Marko Lugonja. That was because, as I mentioned, we were

7 within the AOR where he was chief of security.

8 Q. But I understand you correctly, you were not formally subordinated

9 to Marko Lugonja or the SRK?

10 A. No, no.

11 Q. But you exchanged information with him in a professional sense,

12 like intelligence --

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. -- And other relevant information for the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps

15 and the VRS Main Staff?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Thank you, Witness. Now, let's very briefly talk about 1992. I

18 guess we disagree forever who started the war in -- around Sarajevo, and

19 there were experts -- there will be experts from the Defence side on this

20 issue. But the reason why civilians, the population, part of the

21 population, left Sarajevo in April, May, June 1992, and you explained how

22 you helped organising that, was the relentless bombardment of the city of

23 Sarajevo by JNA and, indeed, the VRS once a transformation has been

24 executed. Could we agree on that?

25 A. We cannot. I don't think that the bombardment was so relentless.

Page 8169

1 In April 1992, there was infantry combat, and as far as I know and as far

2 as I could hear in 1992, there was no use of heavy weaponry. To be

3 specific, in Rajlovac and at the airport where we were, what was there was

4 infantry weapons. As for any heavy weapons in April 1992, I don't think

5 there were any -- at least I don't know of any.

6 Q. In May, mid-May 1992, 14th of May, the situation was so bad inside

7 the city that UNHCR had to pull out of the city. Do you remember that?

8 A. At that time, I was at the Butmir airport. We were trying to pull

9 out the planes from there. I don't know whether it was so indeed. We

10 heard of people leaving Sarajevo, of some panic, firing. Well, everyone

11 tried to flee; that is the truth. As for any shelling, I cannot say there

12 was none but I cannot say there was either. I wasn't the person who

13 observed it or headed the whole thing, but I think the shelling was -- was

14 made to sound too important than it actually was.

15 Q. It was certainly important enough and painful enough, the

16 shelling, that Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade was telling French UNPROFOR

17 General Morillon that the bombardment of Sarajevo was, and I quote him:

18 "Bloody common criminal" and that there was no "justification for the

19 continued bombardment of the civilian population of Sarajevo." That was

20 the 30th of May, 1992. Do you think that's an accurate description of

21 what was happening in Sarajevo at that time?

22 A. As a professional soldier, I would call any shelling of anyone a

23 crime. I would be very much against it. But by that time the front lines

24 had been established. We were all trying to save our hides. I was always

25 against illegal use of fire-power, and we always insisted on not

Page 8170

1 responding too strongly. However, there is a fact that needs to be

2 recognised, and I'm trying to cut things short since I have many

3 obligations to attend to in Belgrade. Both the VRS and the Army of the

4 Federation were very untrained. The only army that knew anything

5 about waging wars had withdrawn by that time. The Muslim officers did not

6 want to go to the front. I knew some of the colleagues of mine, we would

7 hug and kiss and he would go back to Sarajevo and I went to Belgrade

8 crying. We were all fleeing the same war, but once there we realised that

9 there was nowhere to go, that we had to go back. Both those in the Army

10 of Bosnia and Herzegovina and we in the VRS were poorly trained for such

11 events. And it caused certain results on both sides. In any case, I

12 condemn any shelling.

13 As an air force officer, I was in charge of organising the

14 withdrawal of people from Sarajevo. At no moment did we pay any heed to

15 who was what, Muslims, Serbs, or Croat, we were pulling them out as they

16 came. People used to give them their cars just so they would be able to

17 flee, and everyone fled. That is a fact.

18 Q. Yes. My question was whether the description of General Morillon

19 and, indeed, President Milosevic, when they condemned the bombardment, the

20 continued bombardment of the civilian population of Sarajevo in May 1992,

21 whether that was correct or whether you disagree that there was heavy

22 bombardment of the civilian population in Sarajevo from Serb forces around

23 Sarajevo, whether you disagree with that or whether you accept that

24 description. I'm happy to show you the document which records very

25 briefly the conversation between General Morillon and Slobodan Milosevic.

Page 8171

1 A. If you're asking me to say that there was shelling, I don't

2 know --

3 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Mr. Tapuskovic, yes.

4 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, whoever this has to

5 do with, I'm not trying to exaggerate on anyone's importance, but this

6 witness cannot speak on anything someone else said, be it Milosevic or

7 Morillon. I think it would only be fair to ask the witness what he knows,

8 what he saw, what he experienced. It is far more important than any of

9 Milosevic's statements or anyone else.

10 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Mr. Waespi.

11 MR. WAESPI: Yes. The witness is an intelligence officer and he

12 was there at that time, and he is -- I'm --

13 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours --

14 JUDGE MINDUA: [No interpretation]

15 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] As I said, Slobodan Milosevic,

16 who is now in Belgrade --

17 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Who was in Belgrade.

18 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] He was not in Sarajevo. This

19 gentleman, however, was.

20 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] I would like it to be written in

21 the transcript verbatim as the Defence counsel just mentioned it. Very

22 well.

23 I notice that it is time to take a break. We will stop now, and

24 we'll take a 20-minute break. A 20-minute break. The hearing is

25 suspended.

Page 8172

1 --- Recess taken at 12.28 p.m.

2 --- On resuming at 12.50 p.m.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may be surprised to see me, but -- but why

4 should a little cold and flu keep me away from -- from company and the

5 setting that I find so agreeable.

6 Mr. Waespi.

7 MR. WAESPI: Yes.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: I understand you're cross-examining, and there

9 was to be a ruling on an objection.

10 MR. WAESPI: Yes. I was referring to a conversation between

11 Slobodan Milosevic and General Morillon.


13 MR. WAESPI: The UNPROFOR general where they talk about the

14 bombardment of the city of Sarajevo in May 1992, and this was in response

15 to the witness's answer who said he can neither confirm nor deny that

16 there was bombardment in Sarajevo. And my learned friend Tapuskovic said

17 how can this witness, you know, talk about something -- a meeting in

18 Belgrade. But my point is because the witness gave his answer not

19 responsive about the situation in Sarajevo and he was in Sarajevo and he

20 talked about the situation. I should be entitled to put my case to the

21 witness, famous paragraph 7, where we talk about bombardment of the city

22 in 1992. And this document, I'm sure, assists Your Honours and perhaps

23 might refresh the witness's recollection of what was happening in Sarajevo

24 in 1992.

25 [Trial Chamber confers]

Page 8173

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Waespi, what are you seeking from this

2 witness? What is this witness to do or to say in relation to the

3 conversation between Mr. Milosevic and the other person about the

4 bombardment of Sarajevo?

5 MR. WAESPI: The witness was asked in chief about his involvement

6 of getting the civilian population out of Sarajevo, and I asked the

7 witness why. And he didn't really give an answer, so I was putting to him

8 that one of the reasons why the civilian population was fleeing Sarajevo

9 was because of the shelling by the VRS, JNA, before they pulled out of

10 Sarajevo. And then the witness gave the answer: "I cannot say there was

11 none and I cannot say there was either."

12 So in order to, number one, refresh his recollection of what was

13 happening before his eyes in Sarajevo; and number two, about his

14 credibility. I would like to show him this brief document which is very,

15 very straight to the point.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, what does the document say?

17 MR. WAESPI: It says -- in fact, you see it in front of you. It

18 says that General Morillon complained to General Milosevic about the

19 shelling of Sarajevo and said he should use his influence with General

20 Mladic to stop the bombardment of Sarajevo. And then he said, Milosevic

21 said, while he could: "... understand fighting in self-defence, there was

22 no justification for the continued bombardment of the civilian population

23 of Sarajevo. This was, moreover, not in the interests of Yugoslavia nor

24 the Bosnian Serbs."

25 This is Milosevic saying that. So that shows that not only the

Page 8174

1 leading UNPROFOR general in Sarajevo says there was a bombardment of

2 civilian population in May 1992, but also Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade.

3 The witness was there and I would like to know whether he accepts that

4 there was bombardment of civilian population in Sarajevo or not. That's

5 my question to the witness.

6 [Trial Chamber confers]

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I be allowed to answer?

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll admit it.

9 MR. WAESPI: Yes, Mr. President, that's almost a step ahead

10 because I haven't shown the document yet to the witness.

11 Q. But, Witness, if you could read the second paragraph of this

12 document which you see on your screen. The Serbian version is on the

13 right side. You see it's a communication from UNPROFOR General Nambiar to

14 New York, and he talks about a meeting held on the 30th May 1992, between

15 President Slobodan Milosevic and, among others, Generals Morillon,

16 MacKenzie, and Auger. And the second part, the second paragraph, talks

17 about, and I've quoted that two or three times, about the "continued

18 bombardment of civilian population of Sarajevo."

19 And later in paragraph 3, it talks -- it's an assessment of

20 Slobodan Milosevic and he calls it a "bloody, criminal bombardment."

21 So my question to you, Witness, is: Do you accept that there was

22 shelling of the civilian population in Sarajevo by forces under General

23 Mladic? If you can answer, yes or no, please.

24 A. Mr. Prosecutor, before this Trial Chamber I have made a solemn

25 declaration to speak the truth and nothing but the truth. I'm saying that

Page 8175

1 there was no shelling in Butmir and Rajlovac airports where I was. War

2 was going on within the town and in other locations. I can only

3 speculate. What I'm saying here is only the truth; where I was, there was

4 no shelling. Whatever else I might say, if I said there was or wasn't,

5 this would be very arbitrary on my part. I did not command any units. I

6 did not issue any orders. Please do not ask me whether there was any

7 shelling elsewhere because I was not involved. My wife was in Sarajevo as

8 well as my children in the town --

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you --

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- And I know that --

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. We have heard. Your answer is that

12 you can speak to Butmir and Rajlovac and you can say there was no shelling

13 in those areas in the airports.


15 Q. But you told us you were involved in helping civilians from the

16 city of Sarajevo boarding aeroplanes. Didn't these people tell you what

17 they endured in the city of Sarajevo?

18 A. If all hundred civilians pass by you and they all look disturbed

19 and if your task is to organise their exit from Sarajevo, to organise

20 planes to put them on, then you don't have the time to talk to them. I

21 was in a very difficult position, but you could see on their faces that

22 something was going on and that is a fact, I admit.

23 Q. Very well.

24 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. If the document could be

25 admitted now.

Page 8176

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we'll admit it.

2 THE REGISTRAR: As P815, Your Honours.


4 Q. Witness, do you know who Biljana Plavsic is?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And do you know that even she was complaining that there was

7 shelling of civilian areas in Sarajevo in May 1992. Would that surprise

8 you?

9 A. This is what -- something said and nothing surprises me. Why

10 should it surprise me? What I am saying is that I am telling you about

11 the things I know. As for what Biljana said, what Milosevic said, that's

12 an entirely different matter. Maybe they were privy to some other

13 information. I really wouldn't know.

14 Q. Thank you for your answer. Let's move away from 1992, in a few

15 other areas you discussed. If we could pull up Defence Exhibit 303,

16 please. I'm sure you recall the -- I think the first document you were --

17 or one of the first documents you were shown. This was a document

18 generated by the BH General Staff, and it dates of the 1st of January,

19 1995, and that's a copy which was not very well legible. So let me read

20 just a part you were asked about by Defence. For your convenience it

21 said, and this is on the first point -- on the first page in the middle:

22 "I forbid, and UNPROFOR is to be informed of this, Chetnik liaison

23 officers to be located in UNPROFOR bases on our territory."

24 And it goes on to say: "Let UNPROFOR deploy on their territories

25 or send its liaison officers to both us and them."

Page 8177

1 For whatever reason, you seem to link it to a joint commission to

2 investigate incidents. Nowhere in this document does it say anything

3 about investigation of some incidents. It talks about liaison officers.

4 Is that correct?

5 A. I understand this document as a ban on the part of the command of

6 the BiH army, on the presence of any officers in the area, which is

7 corroborated by the document. I've also said that we never shied away

8 from any investigation of any shells, where they came from, how they came

9 from, but throughout the war we were not in a position to investigate.

10 And let me tell you this: The other side was not really keen on proving

11 what was going on in the territory under the control of the Army of

12 Republika Srpska. We had just one case that was Markale where we had a

13 joint commission. Two of our officers escorted by UNPROFOR went there,

14 and they returned within two hours. What could they see in two hours? I

15 leave it to you to be the judge of that. So that was just one joint

16 mission and a very short-lived one.

17 Q. Two points. The first one, the document does not talk about

18 offering investigative resources; it talks about the presence of liaison

19 officers on the ABiH territory. Is that correct?

20 A. Our liaison officers were never there as far as I know. They were

21 not allowed to go there.

22 Q. Yes, but my question was: It talks about liaison officers. It

23 does not talk about any investigative steps being carried out. Is that

24 correct?

25 A. Our liaison officers were not in the territory of BiH army, not

Page 8178

1 that I know of. They were not.

2 Q. Very well. Don't answer this question. Let's move on to these

3 investigative commissions then. Give me, apart from Markale, an example,

4 if you can recall, that a joint --

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a minute. Mr. Tapuskovic is on his feet.

6 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, let us just be

7 clear what Markale we are talking about. Was it Markale I or Markale II?

8 When was it allowed for the officers to go there and inspect?

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Waespi.

10 MR. WAESPI: Yes, that's a fair point. Thanks, Mr. Tapuskovic.

11 Q. We'll come to this Markale I and II in a moment. But apart from

12 those Markale incidents, can you give me an example, if you recall, an

13 example you know first-hand that you offered to UNPROFOR or the ABiH to

14 investigate any incident. Do you remember any such example?

15 A. I gave you the -- that one example, and I don't know which Markale

16 was in question. I only know that I often received information about a

17 shell that killed civilians, that a request was made that this should be

18 investigated through UNPROFOR, through liaison officers, but it was simply

19 not possible. They were not allowed to do that. I am sure of that

20 because that's the information that I received. Why was this not allowed?

21 Because very many times the number of victims was exaggerated. For

22 example, news would say a shell fell at Bascarsija, a number of victims

23 was given, and it turned out eventually there was none. I don't know of

24 any cases save for Markale. Maybe one or two more cases were in which our

25 officers went there. I know that requests were made quite often through

Page 8179

1 our liaison officers; that I know for sure.

2 Q. Yes, and it's important for me to know at least of one example of

3 these many occasions that you received information about a shell that

4 killed civilians, to quote you. Can you give me, aside from these two

5 Markale incidents, an example when somebody asked you that an incident

6 should be investigated. If you can tell me who the person was that asked

7 you, or somebody else from your office, when it was in relation to what

8 incident.

9 A. I personally never requested that in the territory of Rajlovac

10 because there were very few shells that fell over there. We were such

11 units that did not have any artillery pieces, and I can't tell you who it

12 was who requested that. But I know for sure through conversations,

13 through information that I received, that the liaison officers did ask for

14 the truth to be established. But I'm sure that the liaison officers who

15 was a member of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps could tell you more about

16 that. He was the one who communicated directly with UNPROFOR and with the

17 command of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

18 Q. And that was Major Indjic?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. But you don't know more -- you don't know anything more about this

21 subject. You suggest that we should --

22 A. No.

23 Q. Thank you.

24 A. It was not within my purview.

25 Q. Another issue you talked about was in relation to Defence

Page 8180

1 Exhibit D306, and you were asked about friendly fire. And I think you

2 volunteered the word that friendly fire occurred on, if I quote you

3 directly, on the ABiH side and on the SRK side. Is that correct?

4 A. Are you referring to the shells being fired as a result of the

5 lack of training or bad ammunition, and for example, people intended to

6 target something and instead of targeting that, they would fire at their

7 own side. That was a very common occurrence, both in our army and in the

8 Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to the information that we had.

9 Q. Yes. That was what I was referring to, friendly fire at their own

10 people. Can you give me an example, since you say that it happened on

11 both sides, one example each for the SRK and one example for the ABiH?

12 A. Very specifically, in my unit during the war at least five people

13 were wounded from fire-arms because of a lack of training. Some shells

14 that fell in the vicinity of our ORAO, those incidents were investigated.

15 They happened in 1994, and they came from our positions. Those shells

16 were fired from our positions and our soldiers were wounded.

17 Q. So these incidents were investigated; that's what you're saying?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Can you enlighten us a little bit how this -- if you have any

20 knowledge about that, how such an investigation would look like?

21 A. The matter of fact was that we would investigate the origin of

22 every shell that fell. We would look at their serial numbers and if we

23 realised that those were our serial numbers and they fell on our

24 positions, that would mean that they had been fired from our positions.

25 This is what happened in our army, but this happened on the other side as

Page 8181

1 well. All the shells are registered under serial numbers. For example,

2 in the BiH army and in the Serbian army, this happened very often because

3 there was a clear lack of training on both sides. People were not very

4 well trained in using those weapons.

5 Q. And then you would go and find out where the artillery or mortar

6 piece was, who the gunners were, identify these people, talk to them,

7 interrogate them, offer more training, these kind of steps would normally

8 be initiated. Is that correct?

9 A. Yes, that is correct and this was done regularly.

10 Q. You said also that you have recently received information, and I

11 think your source of information was publication in the media. And you

12 say that you had then your intelligence sources within the city who would

13 say that none of it has really happened. Do you remember saying that?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Can you give us an example of such an incident that occurred,

16 perhaps a date, perhaps a casualty alleged in the media, and so we can

17 have a detailed picture of your evidence, please?

18 A. A concrete example. In 1994, it was published in the media that

19 some ten people were killed in front of a tunnel, including some children.

20 Five days later, a person came with the assistance of UNPROFOR who

21 resided nearby, in the building nearby, who didn't know anything about

22 that. He said that nothing of that sort had happened. This was just

23 propaganda. We did want to know what was going on. We wanted to have

24 accurate information. Not a single professional officer who was there

25 could find justification in anybody firing a shell at civilians. All of

Page 8182

1 us who were there who were professional soldiers would never have ordered

2 that. None of us did, and we would do everything in our power to make

3 sure that such things did not happen. At the end of the day, the

4 international humanitarian war was binding upon us, and all of us officers

5 had to comply with it. Unfortunately, both in the ABiH army and in the

6 Army of Republika Srpska there were very, very few educated officers. And

7 one of the problems in both cases was the fact there were few educated

8 officers.

9 Q. Now, let's go back to that example, and I would really like to

10 insist in you giving more details, if you can. I know it's a long time

11 ago, but I would like to back up your information with some substance.

12 This incident that you referred to about the killing of some ten people in

13 front of the tunnel, including children, can you tell us the date and also

14 a little bit more about the person, the person who came to you and said:

15 This all didn't happen. Are you able to tell us more about that?

16 A. I can't give you the date, but quite a few people confirmed that

17 from the area of Dobrinja, from the vicinity of that tunnel. But I've

18 told you that this was not an isolated case. There were many such cases

19 that we stopped paying attention to. We just put it down to propaganda,

20 and it was proven, subsequently, that this was all down to the propaganda.

21 That is not forbidden, mind you.

22 Q. And that's what I'm interested in proving. It's not helpful at

23 least for me, I don't know how other people in this courtroom look at it,

24 that you say it happened often. I would like to focus on this one

25 incident in Butmir where people are killed, including children, a very,

Page 8183

1 very seriously allegation. So you can't really help us more about that

2 incident?

3 A. No, no.

4 Q. Was that perhaps the incident where NATO later threatened

5 air-strikes?

6 A. I can't remember any such thing.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic.

8 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, my learned friend

9 has put a question which contains a reference to the incident where

10 children were killed, and the witness said that, subsequently, it was

11 established that nobody had been killed. In other words, my learned

12 friend is saying something that the witness did not confirm. The witness

13 said that the first piece of information was that children had been

14 killed, and that later, subsequently, it had been proven that they were

15 able to establish through some channels of theirs that nobody had been

16 killed.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, thank you for that lesson in logic, but

18 counsel is allowed to probe a little. And for my part, I don't see

19 anything improper in the question.


21 Q. Witness, you talked about a lull in what was happening in May 1994

22 to 1995. Do you remember saying that?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. But that only relates to combat activities. There was lots going

25 on at that time. There was hostage-taking, there was shelling and

Page 8184

1 sniping, there was cutting electricity of the population, there was lots

2 of suffering happening by the civilian population during that lull, as you

3 call it, in combat activity. Is that correct?

4 A. Mr. Prosecutor, again you're asking me to tell you something

5 without any documents, something that I did not eye-witness. If you are

6 saying that civilians suffered, I'm sure that they did because every war

7 brings suffering. However, when it comes to the army and the period of

8 lull that I mentioned, for us that was a good period. After the fighting,

9 the fierce combat, after many dead and wounded, all of a sudden there is a

10 period of lull where nothing is going on. I can't talk about the

11 electricity, water, and things like that because I was not involved in

12 that. We did have information that the other side was getting ready for

13 defence, and we did the same. When you mention suffering, I agree with

14 you, there was a lot of suffering but it's not up to me to talk about the

15 suffering and the causes of the suffering. I'm not competent to talk

16 about that. What I'm competent to say is that during that period we did

17 an overhaul of 25 aeroplanes, which cost a lot of money. I was involved

18 heavily in that. I collected information that helped me do that part of

19 job as best as I could.

20 Q. Yes, I accept that. I just want to make sure that I understand

21 you. When you say that the period was good for you, you don't exclude the

22 possibility that for the civilians inside the city, trapped - and that's

23 the word I use, Defence might disagree - the life was not that good as it

24 was for you in Rajlovac?

25 A. There is very little difference, to be honest. In order for me to

Page 8185

1 go from Rajlovac to Pale to buy some food, I had to walk 11 kilometres by

2 the fire -- firing line, and I could be killed at any moment from a stray

3 bullet. We did not have any other route. I don't know how familiar you

4 are with the map - in order to leave Sarajevo we could only go through

5 Mrkonjic and Poljine on a market road and we were always at their side.

6 Whenever we did that, we would go during the night. We dimmed our lights,

7 we drove in the dark. We also suffered -- I'm not saying the people in

8 Sarajevo did not suffer, but we also suffered at the same time. It was

9 war -- wartime. We all suffered.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just the as a matter of interest, how often did

11 you have to do that walk of 11 kilometres?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not see my wife and children

13 for three and a half months because I didn't dare take that road. I was

14 afraid I might get killed. Every time we wanted to go from Sarajevo to

15 Pale, we took a great risk. And if you're referring to how long it took

16 by car, it took more than an hour to negotiate the 11 kilometres of that

17 road.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Waespi.

19 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.

20 Q. Do you accept that the VRS leadership, the leadership of the

21 Republika Srpska, used utilities or threatened to use utilities as a means

22 of war? Do you have any information about that, cutting off electricity,

23 gas, water, as a means of war?

24 A. I am not aware of the leadership of Republika Srpska doing that.

25 I don't remember. I only know that we did not have electricity in

Page 8186

1 Rajlovac. So, when the town had electricity, we had it as well. And as

2 for water, I don't know whether a tap could be turned off somewhere.

3 Electricity outages were common on both sides; that's a fact.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Waespi, does the indictment make that

5 allegation, that utilities were used as a means of war?

6 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, that's part of the Prosecution's case,

7 that part of the terror count was that it was within the ability of the

8 VRS and the SRK and, indeed, the political leadership to stop humanitarian

9 aid into the city by firing at UNHCR/UNPROFOR convoys to cut utilities

10 whenever they wanted. That's part of the Prosecution's case.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: I was asking whether it was in the indictment, or

12 is it just something that you're eliciting through evidence?

13 MR. WAESPI: Exactly. The indictment is fairly short on that.


15 MR. WAESPI: But it's clearly within the terror count.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, I'm not seeking to prevent you. I just want

17 to be clear about it.

18 Mr. Tapuskovic.

19 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Just briefly, if I may be heard,

20 Your Honours. This is not worded expressly anywhere as a count in the

21 indictment.

22 MR. WAESPI: Paragraph 18, Mr. President, of the indictment, and I

23 read it out: "Because of the shelling and sniping against civilians, the

24 life of virtually every Sarajevo inhabitant became a daily struggle to

25 survive. Without gas, electricity, or running water, people were forced

Page 8187

1 to venture outside to find basic living necessities, often risking death."

2 And it goes on. So that's a clear indication, Mr. President, that

3 because electricity, gas, water was often cut-off, people had to venture

4 outside their homes, thus risking their lives.

5 [Trial Chamber confers]

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Waespi.

7 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. If Exhibit 03420 could be

8 brought up, please.

9 Q. And this, Witness, is a communication from Viktor Andreev, a UN

10 representative in Sarajevo, to Sergio de Mello who was in Zagreb, and he

11 talks about a meeting between General Rose and the Serb leadership in --

12 on 20th September 1994. That's during the time you talked about there was

13 a lull in activities. And if I can direct you to the third paragraph

14 which is in the English version right at the end of the page. I can read

15 it slowly for you, perhaps you could follow it also on the B/C/S version,

16 if that could be pulled down a little bit.

17 It says here, and he talks about Karadzic saying something. I

18 quote: "In his words, if the international community treats us like a

19 beast, then we will behave like a beast. He specifically mentioned in

20 this regard, the use of utilities as a means of war. As the afternoon

21 progressed, he mellowed somewhat, indicating that he might consider

22 restoring electricity, water, and gas to Sarajevo if these were done in

23 the context of repairs to utilities in Bosnia as a whole."

24 Now, that suggests that, indeed, the VRS leadership -- the RS

25 leadership was capable of influencing the utilities in Sarajevo. Do you

Page 8188

1 accept that?

2 A. I wasn't in charge of the electricity. I wouldn't know how to

3 turn it on and off, so I'm not familiar with the decisions governing that

4 aspect of everything. All I know is that when we had electricity, parts

5 of Sarajevo or Sarajevo also had electricity. But I'm unable to comment

6 on what Karadzic discussed with somebody, whether electricity could be

7 cut-off or switched on and the water is something I don't know anything

8 about.

9 Q. But you would accept that because of what we see here, what we

10 read here, the civilian population who had no utilities at times because

11 of action of the Republika Srpska, VRS, was suffering, despite the lull

12 described by you in the conflict between May 1994 and 1995. Do you accept

13 that?

14 A. I can agree to the extent that the population in Ilidza, Vogosca,

15 and Sarajevo suffered the same thing. I was not in any better position

16 than the soldier at Zuc. We were in the same position, except he had a

17 way out through the tunnel and I had a way out 12 kilometres along the

18 sniper line of fire. I cannot confirm that somebody had an intention to

19 do that, to cut-off electricity. I don't know about that. But that I had

20 a hard time without water, that is true. Every man in town without water

21 had the same difficulties anywhere. As for if this was done or not, I

22 don't know. For a while there was talk that the Russians were cutting off

23 the gas, but sometimes there was gas and sometimes there wasn't gas. So

24 if we happened to have gas -- Sarajevo also had gas. I think that gas

25 began to arrive in Sarajevo in 1991 or 1992.

Page 8189

1 Excuse me. Just one thing. I agree in one thing. All of us

2 together in the Sarajevo valley suffered, the civilian population, one

3 army, and the other army. We suffered in this way or that way, depends,

4 but we all suffered. I was on the side of the Army of Republika Srpska.

5 I very infrequently went out to Pale or went anywhere, afraid that I would

6 get killed, moving around was difficult --

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you --

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- And I also acknowledge that it

9 was very difficult for everyone else.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Witness.

11 Mr. Waespi, please move on.

12 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.

13 Q. Now, you said that you cannot confirm that somebody had an

14 intention to do that, "cut-off electricity."

15 But this document says that Karadzic, indeed, had the intention to

16 use electricity, utilities, as a means of war --

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Waespi, I intended that you should move on to

18 another point.

19 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Move away from that document. The witness has

21 already said he can't comment on the basis of that document.

22 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. If it could be admitted,

23 please.


25 THE REGISTRAR: As 816, Your Honours -- P816.

Page 8190


2 Q. Another point you mentioned in answer to my question. You said

3 that the people inside Sarajevo could have left Sarajevo through the

4 tunnel. But earlier in answering a question from Defence, you said that

5 mostly the tunnel was used by the military and there was only a small

6 window for civilians. You're not suggesting that every person, every

7 civilian in Sarajevo could have easily moved out of Sarajevo?

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: You mean that every civilian could have easily

9 moved out of Sarajevo through the tunnel?

10 MR. WAESPI: Yes, Mr. President.


12 What do you say to that, Witness?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I stand by my previous statement.

14 The exact schedule of when the military could go through and when the

15 civilians could go through. They waited in line to -- for their turn to

16 go out or to come back. It took -- these were two-hour blocks, two hours

17 to go out of Sarajevo, two hours to come in to Sarajevo. And it was a

18 question of what had to be done, priorities, and so on and so forth. And

19 now it's a question of whether everybody wanted to leave Sarajevo.

20 Probably those who wanted to leave were able to leave. Now when I meet

21 with those who were in town, and we were in the Serbian part of Sarajevo,

22 they would say left, went in and out, five or ten times. So it was

23 possible to do that often, and those who wished to leave were able to do

24 that.


Page 8191

1 Q. And what's your basis for information that everybody who wanted to

2 leave Sarajevo through the tunnel could leave the tunnel?

3 A. I'm providing the information on the basis of data we received

4 from Sarajevo, and at the end of the war when it all stopped. And many,

5 many our colleagues who had remained in Sarajevo talked about how they

6 went out, about the routes they took to come out. So I don't see any

7 reason that this would be information that was not accurate. It's

8 accurate because there's a whole bunch of people, and from conversations

9 even recently, I have information that, for example, there was frequently

10 water at a specific location and so on.

11 Q. So now you're able to talk about Sarajevo. Previously, you kind

12 of confined your experience to Rajlovac. But why didn't --

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness comment on that, Mr. Waespi.

14 MR. WAESPI: Mm-hmm. Very well.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Counsel is saying that apparently you are now

16 able to talk about Sarajevo, whereas previously you had confined yourself

17 to Rajlovac. What do you say to that?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Prosecutor asked me about the

19 tunnel. After the end of the war, after my meetings with a bunch of

20 people from Sarajevo, I am hearing stories about how they went out through

21 the tunnel. I'm talking about the tunnel, not about Sarajevo, that people

22 were leaving Sarajevo through the tunnel --

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well, tanks --

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- I'm --

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thanks. It was only right that you should be

Page 8192

1 able to answer that comment from counsel.

2 Yes, Mr. Waespi, move on.

3 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.

4 Q. Just the last point of that. Why, if you have any information to

5 that extent, did the civilians inside Sarajevo not leave through the

6 tunnel if they were free to do? Why did they stay inside the city,

7 suffering, trapped inside the city? Do you have any comment, any

8 explanation about that? If it was so easy to leave, why didn't they

9 leave?

10 A. It's very difficult to say why someone did not leave. I can give

11 you my own example. My mother-in-law - I don't know how you will

12 interpret that - left Sarajevo in 1994. She probably could have left

13 earlier. People were coming in and people were going out. And I can say

14 how many people were brought to us to Ilidza via UNPROFOR from Sarajevo

15 and went out through Kiseljak. And then probably they returned again.

16 There was some police reports referring to these things, and it was said

17 that this was something that was done quite frequently.

18 Q. Okay. Let's now move on a couple of weeks further in the period

19 you describe as a lull. Are you aware that in December of 1994, UNPROFOR

20 assessed the situation that the Serbs made it almost impossible to have

21 pushed UNPROFOR to the brink of withdrawal; for instance, by not allowing

22 any humanitarian convoys into the city, again almost no gas in the city,

23 and the Serbs firing small guided missiles and anti-tank rockets into

24 the --

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm sorry, Mr. Waespi, I'm sorry. The

Page 8193

1 explanation that the witness gave is not in the transcript at all, but

2 when I allowed him to offer an explanation in relation to the question you

3 asked as to why he was now able to speak about Sarajevo. So I hope it

4 will be put in the transcript when the transcript is corrected.

5 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.

6 Q. Going back to my next point, the next set of facts relating to the

7 period that you described as a lull, is an assessment by UNPROFOR --

8 MR. WAESPI: Contained, Mr. President, Your Honours, in Exhibit

9 P10, Prosecution Exhibit 10 --

10 Q. -- Where it says the Serbs made the UNPROFOR task almost

11 impossible: "Having pushed UNPROFOR to the brink of withdrawal by not

12 allowing any humanitarian convoys into the city, again almost no gas in

13 the city, and the Serbs firing small guided missiles and anti-tank rockets

14 into the down-town area causing a number of civilian casualties."

15 That's on page 1 and 6 of Prosecution Exhibit 10.

16 Is that something you would also have information about, you're an

17 intelligence officer, you were stationed in Rajlovac, occasionally in

18 Butmir, was that also the assessment you made about the situation in

19 December 1994, a couple of months into the tenure of the accused?

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: After the witness answers, we'll take the

21 adjournment.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All I can say is that UNPROFOR did

23 not really move around a lot through Rajlovac. UNPROFOR mostly moved

24 through Kiseljak, Blazuj, Ilidza, and Sarajevo. Those were the routes

25 they used. UNPROFOR would go, there would be humanitarian aid, I cannot

Page 8194

1 recall the date when either the military or civilian police stopped a

2 convoy and found some bullet-proof jackets. We received information that

3 there was some weapons there. Also I don't know if that was the reason, I

4 do not remember, but I remember that that caused tension in relations

5 between the VRS and UNPROFOR. And I know through information we received

6 later whether the bullet-proof vests were returned or not. Perhaps they

7 were kept at Ilidza. I don't know if it was intended for the Army of

8 Bosnia and Herzegovina or to UNPROFOR. I don't know about that, but it

9 does say there that it was stopped at Ilidza. There was also a convoy of

10 humanitarian aid that was moving from Kiseljak towards Sarajevo. I know

11 that things like that did happen, yes.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. On that note we'll take the adjournment

13 until tomorrow.

14 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.,

15 to be reconvened on Friday, the 13th day of

16 July, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.