Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

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 1                          Monday, 3 December 2001

 2                          [Open session]

 3                          [The accused entered court]

 4                          --- Upon commencing at 2.20 p.m.

 5            JUDGE ORIE:  Could the registrar please call the case.

 6            THE REGISTRAR:  Case number IT-98-29-T, the Prosecutor versus

 7    Stanislav Galic.

 8            JUDGE ORIE:  Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.  May I please

 9    have the appearances for the Prosecution.

10            MR. IERACE:  Good afternoon, Mr. President and Your Honours.  My

11    name is Mark Ierace.  I appear with other members of the trial team,

12    Michael Blaxill, Morris Anyah, Monika Kalra, and my case manager, Edel

13    Guzman.

14            JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Ierace.

15            Could I please have the appearances for the Defence.

16            MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honour.  The

17    Defence of General Galic is represented today by attorney Mara Pilipovic

18    and my colleague, Stephane Piletta-Zanin.  Thank you.

19            JUDGE ORIE:  General Galic, can you hear the proceedings in a

20    language that you understand?

21            THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, I can, in a

22    language I understand.

23            JUDGE ORIE:  I will not ask you this question every day, but as

24    soon as there's a problem as far as the translation is concerned, please

25    do not hesitate to let us know immediately.

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 1            THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

 2            JUDGE ORIE:  Could I ask you about -- please sit down, General

 3    Galic.  Before we start the case, I just wondered whether you have any

 4    health problems at this moment or that you are in good health.  You may

 5    remain seated.  You don't have to stand up all the time, although it's up

 6    to you.

 7            THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you for asking, Your Honour.

 8    I do have some health problems.  I was hoping that they would be treated

 9    by the beginning of trial, but they haven't.  But I do hope that I will be

10    able to follow the proceedings, though these are problems that are

11    worrying me.  I have some problems with my spine and leg.

12            JUDGE ORIE:  Perhaps if you say to us now that you can follow the

13    proceedings for today, we'll pay later on attention to your health in more

14    detail.  That's all right?

15            THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.  Yes, indeed, I

16    can follow the proceedings today, and the days to come, should there be

17    any problems, I will let you know on time.  Thank you.

18            JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you very much, General Galic.

19            By order of the President of the Tribunal dated the 30th of

20    November, this Trial Chamber is composed of three Judges.  Sitting on my

21    right-hand side is the Honourable Judge Amin El Mahdi, sitting on my

22    left-hand side is the Honourable Judge Rafael Nieto-Navio.  My name is

23    Judge Alphons Orie and the Presiding Judge in this case.

24            The Trial Chamber would like to thank the Pre-Trial Judge

25    Rodrigues for his contribution to the administration of this case.  As I

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 1    understand, we'll be sitting in this courtroom from a quarter past 2.00 in

 2    the afternoon until 7.00 throughout this week.  Next week, due to

 3    constraints arising from other proceedings before the Tribunal, we'll be

 4    sitting on Monday only, in the morning, from 9.00 until a quarter to

 5    2.00.  I thank the Registry in advance for informing the parties and

 6    obviously the Judges of any change in venue or time as soon as

 7    practicable.

 8            Mr. Ierace, is the Prosecution ready to proceed with the opening

 9    statement, in accordance with Rule 84?

10            MR. IERACE:  It is, Your Honour.

11            JUDGE ORIE:  And could you please inform us about your timing of

12    your opening statement so that we can organise the breaks as appropriate.

13            MR. IERACE:  Yes, Your Honour.  As best as I can anticipate, it

14    will take approximately an hour and a half.

15            JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  You may proceed, Mr. Ierace.

16            MR. IERACE:  Thank you.

17                          [Prosecution Opening Statement]

18            The siege of Sarajevo, as it came to be popularly known, was an

19    episode of such notoriety in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia that

20    one must go back to World War II to find a parallel in European history.

21    Not since then had a professional army conducted a campaign of unrelenting

22    violence against the inhabitants of a European city so as to reduce them

23    to a state of medieval deprivation in which they were in constant fear of

24    death.  In the period covered in this indictment, there was nowhere safe

25    for a Sarajevan, not at home, at school, in a hospital, from deliberate

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 1    attack.

 2            Why did it happen?  Sarajevo, a city of half a million people, was

 3    the capital of the socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a federal

 4    unit of the former Yugoslavia.  Its main ethnic composition was

 5    approximately 44 per cent Bosniak, and by that term I mean Bosnians of the

 6    Muslim community; 31 per cent Serb, and 17 per cent Croat.  In 1991, first

 7    Slovenia, then Croatia, declared independence and subsided into violent

 8    ethnic conflict.  As Yugoslavia disintegrated the government determined to

 9    follow the lead of Slovenia and Croatia in declaring independence and in

10    March 1992 declared itself to be the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

11            Sarajevo was a thriving multi-ethnic community, proud of a rich

12    cultural heritage and its international status as the 1984 Winter

13    Olympic city.  Many remained convinced that their city was too urban,

14    sophisticated and contentedly multi-ethnic to suffer such a fate.

15            The end of peace came in early April 1992.  Sarajevans had

16    observed forces of the Yugoslav People's Army, or JNA, conducting

17    exercises around Sarajevo, and when on 6 April the European community

18    recognised the Republic, hostilities began.

19            The following day Bosnian Serbs declared themselves to be the

20    Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, better known from August 1992

21    as the Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and claimed the majority of

22    the territory of the Republic.  I will hereafter refer to it as the

23    Republika Srpska.

24            The objective of the Republika Srpska in relation to Sarajevo was

25    clear by May 1992.  On the 12th of May, its National Assembly stated their

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 1    strategic objective to be the "partition of the city of Sarajevo into

 2    Serbian and Muslim parts."  The same day, the assembly voted to create the

 3    Army of the Republika Srpska, or Vojska Republika Srpska, known as the

 4    VRS, effectively transforming remaining JNA units and other forces loyal

 5    to the Republika Srpska into commands of the new VRS.  The particular VRS

 6    corps which was deployed in the Sarajevan theatre was the Sarajevsko

 7    Romanijski Korpus or Sarajevo Romanija Corps, known as the SRK.

 8            The army of the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the

 9    Armija Bosna i Herzegovina, known as the ABiH.

10            So the two principle protagonists were the government of Bosnia

11    and Herzegovina and the break-away Republika Srpska, operating through

12    their respective armies; the ABiH and the SRK.

13            Over the next three and a half years, the people of Sarajevo

14    descended into what some observers described at the time as a medieval

15    hell.  The two armies fought to a position of stalemate, the confrontation

16    lines became static, and reflecting the protracted strangle hold of the

17    SRK, the battle became known as the siege of Sarajevo.  The stand-off came

18    about because, although the ABiH had approximately 75.000 soldiers

19    committed to the battle and the SRK only about 18.000, the SRK had a

20    countervailing territorial and armament advantage.  It held the high

21    ground encircling the city and had far more artillery.  By January 1993,

22    Sarajevo was surrounded by hundreds of pieces of artillery, including

23    tanks, howitzers, anti-aircraft guns and other weapons.  Neither side

24    could deliver the decisive blow.  Nevertheless, the SRK could keep engaged

25    in Sarajevo and therefore, out of the rest of the Bosnian theatre, three

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 1    or four ABiH troops for every one of theirs.  Further, by moderating the

 2    intensity of both legitimate and unlawful attacks on Sarajevo, Republika

 3    Srpska could exert pressure on its opponent at critical times.

 4            For long periods, the residents of this European city were

 5    deprived of water, gas, and electricity.  Without these essential

 6    services, they were regularly forced from the relative safety of their

 7    homes in order to queue at water pumps and scrounge firewood, which they

 8    would burn in ingeniously instructed stoves for cooking and warmth.  For

 9    those in high-rise buildings, periods of no electricity meant no elevators

10    in which to carry up their water, fuel, and other essentials.

11            But there was another, darker, dimension to this armed conflict.

12    It soon became apparent that civilians who chose to remain within

13    Sarajevo, within the confrontation lines, were being deliberately

14    targeted.  Through television and the print media, the world watched in

15    horror as the people of Sarajevo were fired upon at will as they crossed

16    lines of sight from the SRK-held hills and high-rise buildings.

17            Occupation, age, sex, and ethnic background were irrelevant to the

18    sniper.  The indictment has annexed to it some illustrations.  A

19    three-year-old child was shot at the door of her home, a nine-year-old as

20    she played in her garden.  Civilians were shot in their homes as they

21    watched television, drank coffee, or prayed.  They were shot outside their

22    homes as they crossed the street, collected wood, drew water from canals,

23    carried it home, cleared rubbish, chatted and walked with friends, rode in

24    cars, trucks, buses, and trams, on bicycles and buried their dead.

25            It seems no area of human activity was too innocuous, mundane,

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 1    or sacrosanct to escape the sniper's judgement.  Serbs who chose to stay

 2    were unforgiven and shot along with their Muslim fellow Sarajevans.

 3            In order to maintain a semblance of order and thwart attacks, the

 4    dead were buried at night, or during fogs, or simply in odd plots of earth

 5    between buildings.  New tracks and back routes protected by buildings from

 6    known sniper position were used instead of exposed foot paths and roads.

 7    Anti-sniping barriers were erected to the same end.  Shipping containers,

 8    buses, trucks, and other obstacles were placed across intersections which

 9    were vulnerable to the SRK positions.  The snipers responded to this new

10    challenge by making the most of gaps between the barricades, anticipating

11    when victims would be fleetingly vulnerable.

12            Nowhere, however, was safe from the shelling.  The Prosecution

13    will call expert evidence to explain that the artillery which the SRK

14    deployed included both direct fire and indirect-fire weaponry.  Direct

15    fire weapons, such as tanks, howitzers, and large calibre guns, as, for

16    instance, anti-aircraft guns and armoured personnel carrier guns, APCs,

17    usually fire along a direct line of sight.  Mortars, on the other hand,

18    are designed to travel on an inverted U-shaped trajectory so that they

19    fall into areas which cannot be seen by the mortar crew.  Accordingly,

20    they are operated by a crew in radio communication with a forward observer

21    who directs their fire to the target.  A mortar shell is specifically

22    designed to kill and maim people.  It is not usually used to destroy

23    property.  Its casing becomes shrapnel designed to inflict the maximum

24    number of casualties.  What's left at the point of impact, if it's a

25    hard surface such as a road, is usually a small indentation.  By the end

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 1    of the war, the streets, foot paths, and parking lots of Sarajevo were

 2    peppered with the telltale star pattern of mortar impacts known as mortar

 3    roses.

 4            During the period covered by the indictment, mortars were used by

 5    the SRK to a devastating effect against civilians engaged in a variety of

 6    activities where they congregated in the open out of a direct line of

 7    sight with SRK positions.  For instance, a soccer game, waterline cues,

 8    groups of playing children, a crowded secluded marketplace, schools,

 9    hospitals and even funeral processions.  The scheduled shelling incidents

10    demonstrates some of these.  This campaign of deliberate sniping and

11    shelling of civilians is the foundation of the Prosecution case against

12    Major General Galic.

13            It is important to note at this point that the Prosecution case,

14    as set out in its pre-trial brief, is that shelling was used sometimes

15    with the intention of hitting a specific target of civilians and at other

16    times indiscriminately against civilians.  That is, the crew would

17    deliberately fire shells into known civilian areas not necessarily with

18    the intention of hitting a particular target of civilians but rather with

19    the knowledge that wherever it landed, it was likely to endanger

20    civilians.  To place it in its proper legal context, this practice

21    offended the principle of distinction, to which I will later refer.

22            The world watched in disbelief that the perpetrators acted with

23    impunity, day after day, week after week, month after month, year after

24    year.  It so tore at the world's conscience that, in no small measure, it

25    contributed to the establishment of this Tribunal.

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 1            During the three and a half years of the battle of Sarajevo, there

 2    were three principle commanders of the SRK.  The second of those three,

 3    Major General Stanislav Galic, who I will hereafter usually refer to as

 4    the accused, was the commander for the longest period, almost two years,

 5    from around the 10th of September, 1992 to the 10th of August, 1994.

 6            So far I have frequently referred to the battle in terms which

 7    cover its entirety rather than specifically to the indictment period,

 8    which corresponds to the accused's tenure as commander of the SRK.

 9    Indeed, the Chamber will shortly view a collage of video clips which

10    predate the indictment period, as well as portray events during it.  The

11    reasons are three-fold.  Firstly, it is the Prosecution case that the

12    accused inherited a pre-existing strategy of the deliberate sniping and

13    shelling of civilians.  Secondly, the characteristics of the campaign,

14    before, during, and even after his tenure, are essentially identical.

15    Thirdly, I mean to place the accused's actions in their proper historical

16    context.  Naturally, the accused is only accountable for the

17    responsibilities which fell to him as a result of his period as commander.

18            Even in relation to the indictment period, the Prosecution does

19    not say that all wrongdoing was attributable to the accused or indeed that

20    all wrongdoing was perpetrated from the accused's side of the

21    confrontation lines.  There is evidence that civilians on both sides of

22    the confrontation lines were deliberately targeted.  It is trite to

23    observe that unlawful behaviour against civilians by the accused's

24    opponents did not entitle him to do likewise.

25            I will now seek to acquaint the Chamber with the layout of

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 1    Sarajevo.  In so doing, I take the Trial Chamber to a diagram.

 2            THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please, Mr. Ierace.

 3            JUDGE ORIE:  Microphone, please.

 4            MR. IERACE:  I take the Trial Chamber to a map --

 5            JUDGE ORIE:  Is the Defence in a position to look at it or --

 6            MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour, for

 7    raising the issue.  As is usual, the Defence is absolutely not able to

 8    see.

 9            JUDGE ORIE:  Can you see it now on the screen, or have you direct

10    sight on it?

11            MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Your

12    Honour.  Yes, with a little delay.

13            JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

14            MR. IERACE:  Mr. President and Your Honours, the map to which I

15    now point depicts the city of Sarajevo.  You will observe that there are

16    two green lines, one lighter and one darker, which with encircle the

17    city.  The city appears as a developed area on the map.  The two green

18    lines depict the confrontation lines between the SRK and the ABiH.  As

19    I've already observed, those lines remained relatively static throughout

20    the war.  You will note that at some points, those lines came very close

21    together, sometimes as close as 50 metres.  At other points they were much

22    further apart.

23            I also point out that the lines at some points travelled into the

24    urban area of the city.  That applies to this area, which is the Grbavica

25    area, and also to the left on the map in the area of Dobrinja.  Dobrinja

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 1    was the Olympic village for the 1984 Winter Olympics, and following that

 2    event it became a residential apartment block area.  It adjoins the

 3    airport.

 4            The map also depicts the various scheduled sniping incidents, that

 5    is, where they took place, or more particularly, where the victims were at

 6    the time that they were shot.  Those positions are depicted by the red

 7    dots.  Your Honours will note that there is a reference to 27, but number

 8    1 was a "U" beside it, and that is because, Mr. President, your

 9    predecessor descheduled that incident but allowed the Prosecution to

10    continue to call evidence on it.  So its current status is as an

11    unscheduled sniping incident.

12            The blue dots depict the places where the scheduled shelling

13    incidents occurred.  The reference to A, B, C, and so on are references to

14    particular shells.  So, for instance, shelling incident 1, which occurred

15    in Dobrinja, involved two mortar shells, so in close proximity.  Scheduled

16    incident 4, which also occurred in Dobrinja, involved three shells.

17            I also point out on the map a star, which marks the position of

18    the Lukavica barracks.  Those military barracks became the forward command

19    post for the accused, and indeed they were his forward command post

20    throughout the indictment period.  The Trial Chamber will note the

21    proximity of the barracks to the Dobrinja residential area.

22            Your Honours, I appreciate that it is difficult from a map when

23    one is not familiar with what it depicts to gain much from it.  At this

24    stage I simply make the point that the development of Sarajevo can be seen

25    to run in an east/west line and to be relatively narrow.

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 1            I now take Your Honours to some photographs, and before I do that,

 2    I will lay a plastic sheet over the map to demonstrate where the

 3    photographs I'm about to take you to were taken from.

 4            The first photograph was taken from this position, Trebevic, and

 5    the two lines indicate what will be shortly seen in the photograph.  So

 6    firstly, Your Honours will note that the camera was pointing approximately

 7    north, that is, from the southern edge of the city, looking across it, in

 8    a northwards direction, but within the photograph you will be able to see

 9    much of what lay to the west.

10            I now take the Trial Chamber to that photograph.  This is that

11    photograph, and I'll wait until the video camera depicts it.  Perhaps if

12    the camera could zoom back to allow as much of the photograph to be seen

13    at the same time.  At this stage I'm concerned only with the top

14    photograph.  So this is a photograph taken from Trebevic looking across

15    the city, encompassing more or less the developed area furthest to the

16    east, and to the west we can see disappearing down the valley floor the

17    rest of the city.  I point out firstly some obvious geographical

18    features.  One can observe from this photograph that the city lies at the

19    base of a valley floor, and indeed a river runs along it.  One can also

20    observe that towards the west, the valley floor -- indeed, the valley

21    flattens out to a plain.  If you come back to the eastern side of the

22    city, the side to the east is sometimes called the old city, and in terms

23    of the three principal communities of Sarajevo, it is a section associated

24    with the Bosniak community, and indeed it is the oldest part of the city.

25            There is an area towards the centre of the photograph which is

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 1    known to be a focal point for the Croat Sarajevan community, or was before

 2    the war, at least.  To the east, one notices that there are more high-rise

 3    modern buildings, and they were characterised by a more mixed community,

 4    and as such in the more modern area there was a large Bosnian Serb

 5    component amongst the residents.

 6            I now point out in the photograph the two principle hospitals of

 7    Sarajevo which were operating at the time.  I should say that this

 8    photograph was taken last year, in the year 2000, but for my purposes,

 9    nothing much has changed since the indictment period.  I firstly point out

10    the grounds of the Kosevo hospital, which was a little up from the

11    valley floor, towards the north of the city, and that was a large hospital

12    complex.

13            I now point out the second biggest hospital, which was known as

14    the State Hospital, sometimes as the French Hospital.  In the video

15    collage which the Trial Chamber will later view, you will see a portion

16    which shows a sniper's nest which was positioned coincidentally from

17    around the same area as where this photograph was taken from.  And this

18    portion of this photograph can be seen through the hole from the sniper's

19    nest which gave a view of the city, including the State Hospital and the

20    site of one of these scheduled sniping incidents.

21            I now point out the Marsal Tito barracks, will featured

22    prominently in the pre-indictment period, and Your Honours will likely to

23    hear evidence about it only in that context.  Along the valley floor ran

24    arterial roads, one in particular, which was the -- and remains the main

25    communication link for vehicular traffic through the city of Sarajevo.

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 1    That road travels more or less through the centre of the valley at this

 2    modern western end, and then, as it comes to the central part of the

 3    photograph, runs alongside the river, which is where I'm pointing at the

 4    moment.

 5            This photograph also shows the assembly building, another

 6    structure which featured prominently in the pre-indictment period, and as

 7    this photograph shows, at the time it was taken, still shows the signs of

 8    heavy shelling.  The area of Grbavica is in the foreground beneath the

 9    ridge, which is immediately visible in the photograph.  Your Honours, will

10    hear much of Grbavica during the trial.  It was the source of much sniping

11    activity into the city and an area held by the SRK.

12            I also point out, and it may be difficult for the video camera to

13    pick it up - if the video camera could perhaps zoom in - the approximate

14    position in the old city of the Markale market.  That was a scene of the

15    worst civilian devastation by shelling in one particular incident which

16    occurred on the 5th of February, 1994, when one mortar shell, size 120

17    millimetre, killed 66 people who were attending the market at the time.

18    The approximate direction of fire of that shell was from the Markovici

19    area, which is behind a ridge, which probably cannot be easily made out by

20    the video camera at about this point.

21            In front of it, and to the left, is a well-known local position

22    known as sharp stone, translation of sharp stone.  That was a ridge which

23    approximated the position of the confrontation lines at that point, so

24    that the SRK occupied the plateau-like high ground and then beneath the

25    ridge, a short distance away, was the confrontation line separating it

Page 576

 1    from the ABiH.  A number of sniping incidents occurred in that area

 2    beneath sharp stone, sharp stone being the source of fire.

 3            Your Honours, I return to the diagram with the plastic overlay,

 4    and I now point out the position of a second panorama photograph that I'll

 5    take you to.  The lines indicate the position of the camera at the time

 6    this photograph was taken, which was just a few months ago,

 7    September/October 2001.  The view which appears in the photograph

 8    encompasses Lukavica barracks and the area where number 3 scheduled

 9    shelling incidents occurred, as well as three scheduled sniping

10    incidents.  So the direction of the camera is approximately

11    south/south-west.

12            I come now to that photograph, and perhaps the camera in the first

13    instance could zoom back as far as possible to give the viewers a sense of

14    what is depicted overall.  And I notice, Your Honours, that part of the

15    photograph is obstructed by -- that's better.  All right.

16            Now, again it's apparent that this photograph was taken from high

17    ground.  You can see beneath the hill the apartment development of

18    Dobrinja, which I said earlier was the village for the Winter Olympics

19    of 1984, and in the foreground, the runway, or one of the runways, for

20    the airport.

21            Coming to the left of the photograph, you can see the words

22    "Lukavica barracks," and I now point to that complex, which can be seen

23    to be behind what appears in the photograph to be a white road at a

24    T-intersection.  On that T-intersection in particular, if you could zoom

25    in - I'd be grateful if the camera could zoom in to this point where the

Page 577

 1    pointer is - there appears to be a two-storey white building.  That was of

 2    the office of the accused in his forward barracks.  In particular, he was

 3    on the top floor, and in the front corner of the building, to the right.

 4            Moving further along the photograph, one comes to a church, and

 5    further again, one comes to the site of shelling incident 1 and sniping

 6    incident 6.  I come back to the left of the photograph, and I'll shortly

 7    show you a diagram which will show the precise position of the

 8    confrontation lines, which was approximately at this point.

 9            Shelling incident 1 occurred in the forecourt of a U-shaped

10    complex -- apartment complex.  Virtually identical to the complex which

11    can be seen immediately to its left.  That is, three sides facing towards

12    the hill where the camera is positioned.  So that is virtually replicated

13    behind the trees to the right.  On that occasion, a soccer game was being

14    held in a car park, to the right, and the direction of the two mortar

15    shells was from the area of Lukavica.

16            As I've earlier indicated, we can see in this photograph the

17    approximate position of sniping incident 6.

18            Your Honours, the nature of the individual crimes which constitute

19    the crime base for the indictment are such that they are difficult to

20    convey in a courtroom.  In the case of sniping, they involve persons being

21    shot in the open.  In circumstances where the killer is secluded in the

22    case of shelling, the use of indirect fire means that those who were

23    present at the place where the shell landed generally did not see where

24    the shell emanated from.  The Prosecution is aware of the difficulties

25    that these factors present to the Trial Chamber in understanding the

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 1    evidence which the Prosecution shall call.  Traditional means of conveying

 2    a crime scene involve the use of photographs and maps, and indeed they

 3    would go part of the way to placing Your Honours in the position where the

 4    crime scene can be imagined, according to the evidence.  In order to

 5    better assist the Trial Chamber, the Prosecution has prepared a video of

 6    each of the sniping and shelling incidents.  In relation to the sniping

 7    incidents, if the victim survived and is available to give evidence, the

 8    victim was videoed at the scene, pointing out precisely where they were at

 9    the time they were hit.  This exercise was undertaken in the last few

10    months.  If, however, the victim was fatally wounded, an eyewitness to the

11    incident appears on the video, pointing out, to the best of their

12    recollection, where the victim was at precisely the moment that they were

13    shot.

14            A member of the OTP is then seen to place a yellow cross on that

15    precise spot according to the direction of the eyewitness or the surviving

16    victim.  Later, a tripod was erected over those yellow spots and the

17    camera lens fixed at a height approximating the height of the point of

18    entry on the body of the victim of the bullet.  A professional

19    photographer then took photographs depicting a 360-degree view from that

20    position, the position where the bullet entered the body of the victim.

21            These photographs were later joined up, with appropriate software,

22    so that a continuous, 360-degree image can be made available to the Trial

23    Chamber.  It can be played in court, and by the use of the computer mouse,

24    one can navigate in any direction, up and down, zooming in, and zooming

25    out, panning back.  Defence counsel, Ms. Pilipovic, was able to attend the

Page 580

 1    filming of some of these incidents in September of this year.  The

 2    scheduled shelling incidents were videoed in the same fashion.  All of

 3    those who participated in the shooting of the video footage will be made

 4    available by the Prosecution to give evidence and to attest to the truth

 5    of what they are heard to say on the video and what they did on the

 6    video.   In due course, and in that fashion, all of the video of the

 7    incidents will be tendered by the Prosecution.  It will be tendered in

 8    edited form, but I hasten to add that an un-cut version has been disclosed

 9    to the Defence.  The edited form will include a note at the commencement

10    of each segment indicating the date on which it was filmed, the particular

11    scheduled incident to which it relates, the names of all those who were

12    present during the filming and their roles, for instance, investigator,

13    interpreter, name of the witness, camera people, the GPS position of

14    the site, that is, the global satellite positioning system, so that we are

15    with best able to provide an accurate record of where that place was, and

16    in the un-cut footage the GPS machine is held up to the camera lens so

17    that the reading can be recorded.  The direction of the video camera or in

18    some cases video cameras were facing.  When the panoramic photographs were

19    taken, the camera invariably started off pointing north and then took a

20    series of photographs around, so that it's possible to figure out what

21    direction one is looking in as one and a navigates around the photographs.

22            I will take you now to a sample incident using this technology,

23    and the incident is sniping incident 6.  The schedule for that incident

24    reads:  11 July 1993, Munira Zametica a woman aged 48 years was shot dead

25    while collecting water from the Dobrinja River in the area of Dobrinja 2

Page 581

 1    and 3.  The scene of the killing therefore was the Dobrinja River, which

 2    flowed through Dobrinja in a cement-lined canal.  Local residents would

 3    draw water from it, since the water supply to their homes had been cut

 4    off.  The canal ran an approximately east/west direction from the

 5    direction of Lukavica.  At this point I will show the Trial Chamber a

 6    diagram -- or should I say a portion of a larger map which has been blown

 7    up to illustrate the relevant details.

 8            Your Honours, perhaps I could have some assistance in having

 9    the -- that second map mounted higher than it presently is.

10            This is a detail of the first map.  It's electronically based so

11    it's possible to blow up any particular portion of it.  We see at the red

12    dot the position of sniping incident 6, and the Trial Chamber -- I invite

13    the Trial Chamber to note that nearby the two other sniping incidents,

14    being 18 and 22.  One can also see on this map the position of shelling

15    incident 1, which is in this area that I indicate now.

16            The large red circle is the position of the church which appeared

17    on the panorama photograph.  To the left of it can be seen the

18    confrontation lines, light green being the most forward position of the

19    ABiH forces, dark green being the most forward position of the SRK

20    forces.  The significance of the Mahine [phoen] church is that the

21    Prosecution will call evidence that there was a regular pattern of sniping

22    into the Dobrinja area from that building during the indictment period.

23    As well, there was regular sniping from a part of a block of apartments

24    which is marked by the small red dot.  Indeed, it was a particular part of

25    the apartment block that was occupied by the SRK.

Page 582

 1            The evidence will indicate that the distance between the church

 2    and sniping incident 6 was around 900 metres, and between the apartment

 3    block and incident 6 was around 740 metres.  The blue line is the Dobrinja

 4    River, although its appearance is more in the form of the concrete-lined

 5    canal.

 6            The witnesses will give evidence that typically, sniper fire came

 7    down the canal and alongside the canal.  At various positions alongside

 8    it, since it traversed a heavily occupied residential area, were a

 9    collection of foot bridges, such as one immediately alongside incident

10    6, and wider road bridges, such as near incident 18.  Barricades were

11    erected on the bridges at different times.  I point to another bridge

12    behind incident 6.

13            Those who collected water from --

14            THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

15            MR. IERACE:  -- were regularly subjected to fire and many others

16    had been shot previously at around the same place as sniping incident 6.

17    Sometimes the sniping would continue all day and day after day.  This

18    incident occurred beneath the foot bridge which I've earlier indicated.

19    On the 11th of July, 1993, a sunny day, at about 2.00 p.m., the victim and

20    a neighbour, [redacted], approached the bridge in order to draw

21    water from the canal.  They saw several people sheltering against the side

22    of the concrete foundations of the bridge, which afforded them protection

23    from the direction of the SRK positions.  The people who were already

24    there told them they had seen bullets hitting the water.  The group then

25    took turns to quickly venture from their protected position down to the

Page 583

 1    water's edge to quickly fill their containers.  One went, then another,

 2    and then the victim approached to fill her bucket.  As she did so, she was

 3    hit in the chest.  She turned and was hit by a bullet in the neck and

 4    fell.  Her 16-year-old daughter was nearby and was summoned by those

 5    present.  She came and saw her mother lying face down near the water's

 6    edge.  She and the others were prevented from pulling the victim back to

 7    safety by continued gunfire.  Her daughter saw the bullets hitting the

 8    water.  The victim's son arrived and attempts were made to reach her, but

 9    they were always forced back by the continuing gunfire, until another

10    neighbour obtained some rope and tied it around the arm of the victim,

11    which enabled them all to then pull her to a more protected area, by which

12    time she was dead.

13            In the video, which Your Honours are about to view, the victim is

14    a neighbour, (redacted), who accompanied her to the site and was

15    standing alongside the concrete foundations a few metres from the victim

16    at the time she was shot, was asked to indicate where firstly she was

17    located at the time of the shooting and then where the victim was located

18    at the precise moment she was shot.  You will then see another person

19    place a cross on the spot nominated with yellow spray paint, following the

20    directions of the neighbour.  You will hear all words which were spoken in

21    English by the investigator on the video being translated by the neighbour

22    into B/C/S.  And I ask that the video be shown.

23                          [Videotape played]

24                MALE: Can you please indicate your location to the best of

25    your recollection on the day that Mrs. Munira Zametica was shot?

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Page 585

 1            FEMALE:  [No interpretation]

 2            MALE:  Can you please indicate to the best of your recollection

 3    where Mrs. Zametica was located at the time that she was shot?

 4            FEMALE:  [No interpretation]

 5            MALE:  When Mr. Lesic reaches the location -- Mr. Lesic is marking

 6    that location where with yellow spray paint.

 7            MR. IERACE:  As I've already said, following the shooting of the

 8    video, a series of photographs were taken from that yellow cross, and

 9    ultimately there were, via software, made available in computer form,

10    A 360-degree view.  I ask that that photograph be brought up on the

11    screen.  And I ask that the photograph be navigated as it is 360 degrees.

12    One can see at this stage looking approximately east up the canal

13    underneath the bridge, and keep in mind this is taken from the position of

14    the victim, approximate height of the bullet.  We're now looking back up

15    the slope in an approximate southerly direction, to the bank.  And now

16    roughly west, down the canal, away from the Lukavica area, the area of the

17    church.  And presently we're looking approximately north.

18            I ask that the photograph be navigated to the position looking

19    approximately east down the canal and that it now be zoomed in along the

20    canal.

21            The evidence will be that the white building, the white tower,

22    which can be just seen to the right, is the spire of the church which

23    appears in the earlier panoramic photograph.  The building which was

24    occupied by the SRK is to the left, just behind those bushes which have

25    grown since.  Evidence will make this clear in due course.  It will be

Page 586

 1    possible to go, during the trial, to clearer photographs of that view.

 2    Thank you.

 3            JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA:  Mr. Ierace, do we have that photograph?

 4            MR. IERACE:  Yes.  I have that photograph at the bar table in hard

 5    copy form, and I understand Your Honours have a copy of it.  And I think

 6    my friends have a copy.  I understand that they were given a copy, or

 7    copies were provided for them.

 8            One can see more clearly in this photograph the church.  While the

 9    panoramic photograph is still before the Court, I will take Your Honours

10    back to it briefly to make a point.  Your Honours, my point is this:  I

11    indicate the church which has appeared on the panoramic photo on the

12    video, and I indicate again the position of Lukavica barracks in which the

13    accused had his office.  And I make the point that it is a relatively

14    short distance from his office to the source of fire for sniping which was

15    carried out on Dobrinja throughout the indictment period.  I anticipate

16    that evidence will establish these propositions.

17            I turn now to a brief reference to the relevant law.  First I make

18    the point that although the battle was often popularly referred to as a

19    siege, it was not necessarily a siege in the way that term is understood

20    militarily or in international law, and it is irrelevant to the issues in

21    this case to make such a determination.

22            Ultimately, this case is not about why the campaign in Sarajevo

23    was fought.  It is about how it was conducted.  Indeed, this is the first

24    case before this Tribunal with an explicit, indeed exclusive, focus upon

25    the conduct of hostilities, and in particular, the scope of a military

Page 587

 1    commander's obligation to protect civil life during armed combat.

 2            Since the confrontation lines at some points traversed urban

 3    areas, we can assume that there were many legitimate military targets

 4    within the city confines.  Consequently, the Prosecution does not argue

 5    that the overall military campaign in Sarajevo was unlawful or that many

 6    attacks which took place during the indictment period did not comprise

 7    lawful combat activities.

 8            However, alongside and parallel to lawful combat operations, it is

 9    abundantly clear that civilians were unlawfully sniped and shelled on such

10    a temporal and geographic scale as to constitute a deliberate campaign,

11    which was conducted with the intent of striking terror into every civilian

12    in the city.

13            In the course of this trial, Your Honours will be referred to

14    several baseline principles of international humanitarian law that are

15    essential to a conduct of hostilities case but which have perhaps been

16    less pertinent to many other cases previously adjudicated by this

17    Tribunal.

18            The first of these is the principle of distinction.  This

19    principle, the bedrock norm of international humanitarian law, obliges a

20    military commander to differentiate, at all times, between civilian and

21    military objects.  He is obliged, at all times, to direct force only

22    against military objectives.

23            The definition of a military object is not entirely free from

24    dispute.  It is beyond contention, however, that it is only combatants who

25    are lawful targets, and civilians are not.  Similarly, buildings and

Page 588

 1    objects used for military purposes may be targeted, whereas those used

 2    exclusively for civilian purposes may not.

 3            The second fundamental principle is that of proportionality, which

 4    obliges a military commander, when deciding whether to launch an attack

 5    against a legitimate military object, to undertake a particular type of

 6    calculus.  He must evaluate whether the military advantage anticipated

 7    from the attack would be outweighed by the extent of civilian losses

 8    likely to result from it.

 9            A rational assessment of proportionality must be undertaken prior

10    to and during the carrying out of the attacks.  The overriding, governing

11    principle in this regard is that of reasonableness in all the

12    circumstances prevailing at the time.

13            The Prosecution's case is that attacks carried out by forces under

14    the command and control of the accused did not evidence a proportional

15    character when assessed against notions of reasonableness which would be

16    accepted by most responsible military commanders.

17            The Prosecution notes that the present case confronts the Trial

18    Chamber with a virtually unprecedented opportunity to elucidate principles

19    to guide the practical application of these bedrock norms of international

20    humanitarian law within modern armed combat.  Simply stated, the doctrine

21    that will be developed in this case will be of intense interest to, and

22    may well form an operational litmus test for, responsible military forces

23    worldwide.

24            I turn now in particular to the counts.  Six of the seven counts

25    in the indictment against the accused are concerned specifically with the

Page 589

 1    killing and wounding of civilians as a consequence of the campaign.  The

 2    remaining count, which is the first in the indictment, is that the accused

 3    violated the laws or customs of war by inflicting terror and mental

 4    suffering on the civilian population of Sarajevo as a result of this

 5    campaign.  I want to focus on this count.

 6            During the indictment period, the number of civilian casualties

 7    from the campaign ran into the thousands.  However, in contrast to the

 8    other six counts, the victims of this crime were not limited to the

 9    Sarajevans who were killed or wounded but, as well, those who were

10    terrorised as a result of the campaign.

11            Had the accused wished to simply kill as many Sarajevans as

12    possible, this was not the way to do it.  He was equipped with the means

13    to extract higher civilian casualty figures had that been his intention.

14    The city was ringed with hills which contained hundreds of mortars, tanks,

15    howitzers, rockets, and other artillery.

16            It is apparent from the characteristics of the campaign over such

17    a protracted period that the intention was not to kill as many civilians

18    as possible, but rather to inculcate in each citizen the realisation that,

19    so long as he or she remained in Sarajevo, they and their loved ones lived

20    under an inescapable risk of death.  As some witnesses will observe, a

21    morbid fatalism overtook many civilians, expressed in the belief that it

22    was futile to overly seek protection from mortars and the sniper's

23    bullet.  Death was unavoidable and would come regardless of what steps

24    they took to prevent it.  Soldiers expressed a feeling of greater security

25    at the front line than when off-duty in the civilian areas, since at the

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Page 591

 1    front they knew where danger lay, whereas elsewhere in the city, death

 2    could come from anywhere, at any time.

 3            As noted earlier, witnesses will be called to testify as to

 4    examples of the campaign.  The scheduled incidents have been chosen to

 5    illustrate the range of everyday activities that civilians were engaged

 6    in at the time they were targeted.  Beyond these scheduled incidents,

 7    those same witnesses will also testify about other incidents involving

 8    themselves and neighbours and friends and loved ones.  A Sarajevan of this

 9    period typically knew many in his circle who had become victims of the

10    campaign.  In this fashion, a picture will emerge to the Trial Chamber of

11    the pervasiveness of the campaign, its penetration of the fabric of

12    Sarajevan society and the manner in which it delivered a sense of fear and

13    terror far beyond its immediate victims.

14            This unrelenting psychological stress exacted a horrific toll

15    upon the well-being of the civilian populace, as reflected in attendances

16    at psychiatric clinics during and after the conflict.  Expert psychiatric

17    evidence will be tendered to establish that the fear prevalent in Sarajevo

18    during the indictment period was extreme, and far exceeded that which

19    would be the normal and expected threshold of anxiety within armed

20    conflict.

21            This count is not concerned with the fear, and sometimes terror,

22    which is inevitably felt by civilians who are caught up in an armed

23    conflict, and no doubt was experienced by many civilians in Sarajevo.

24    That is quite different in nature and degree from the terror which comes

25    from the sure knowledge that you and your loved ones are in fact the

Page 592

 1    intended target and there is nowhere to hide.

 2            The suffering of civilians was not merely an incidental by-product

 3    of the armed conflict in Sarajevo, but rather the intended consequence,

 4    and the actual effect, of the unlawful attacks perpetrated by the forces

 5    under the command and control of the accused.  The inescapable conclusion

 6    in this regard is that the attacks against the civilians of Sarajevo

 7    during the indictment period were designed principally, even if not

 8    exclusively, to terrorise the civilian population of Sarajevo.

 9            Although it is well recognised that the deliberate and avoidable

10    infliction of terror upon civilians as an objective is contrary to

11    customary international law, this charge has not previously been

12    adjudicated before any international judicial body.  Both protocols

13    additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 prohibit the infliction of

14    terror upon a civilian population in the manner in which the accused did

15    so, through forces under his command and control.

16            Often the infliction of terror will be linked to the specific

17    goals of the perpetrator.  In this case, it meshed closely with the

18    broader aims of the Bosnian Serb leadership.  Clearly, had the terror

19    imparted by the campaign weakened the civilians' morale or the political

20    will of their government to a point that it capitulated, these aims would

21    have been served.  I will now turn my attention more particularly to the

22    accused.  He was born on 12 March 1943 in Golesa village, Banja Luka

23    municipality, in the Republika Srpska Bosnia-Herzegovina.  He was a

24    career soldier in the JNA, ultimately becoming commander of the 30th

25    partisan Division.  When the transition of the JNA into the army of the

Page 593

 1    Republika Srpska, known as the VRS, occurred in May of 1992, he remained

 2    the commander of the Division, renamed the 30th infantry Division, and

 3    took part in a number of military operations within the operational area

 4    of the 1st Krajina Corps, including Jajce.  He was appointed to the

 5    position of commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps by the president of

 6    the Republika Srpska Presidency, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, on the 31st of

 7    August, 1992.  In November of the same year, he was promoted from Colonel

 8    to Major General.  He remained commander until in August 1994 he was

 9    replaced, and shortly afterwards retired from active service by official

10    decree on the 30th of September, 1994.

11            Accordingly, the accused assumed command of the SRK as an

12    experienced, professional soldier, fresh from active duty elsewhere.

13            I turn now to the military doctrine.  The military doctrine of the

14    JNA effectively became that for the VRS, so the accused and his

15    subordinates continued to operate under the doctrine with which he was

16    familiar.

17            The central tenet of that system was that each level of the

18    structure acted under the orders of the superior.  A system of regular

19    briefings and distribution of written documentation carried these orders

20    down the chain, and daily reporting brought back up to the superiors the

21    results of the orders being carried out.  In this manner, the corps acted

22    as one integrated unit which carried out the orders of the supreme

23    commander.

24            According to that doctrine, the designated commander is vested

25    with the authority to command his staff, subordinate units, institutions,

Page 594

 1    and the personnel which comprise those bodies.  It also establishes the

 2    responsibility of a commander, reiterating the concept that while a

 3    commander can delegate authority to subordinate officers, he remains

 4    responsible for the actions of those subordinates.

 5            Shortly following its formation, the Republika Srpska adopted key

 6    instruments of the international law of armed force.  In so doing, it

 7    acknowledged the responsibility of each level of its military structure to

 8    respect international law which governs armed conflicts.

 9            The commander-in-chief of the VRS was the President, Dr. Radovan

10    Karadzic.  Directly subordinate to him was General Ratko Mladic, who was

11    the commander of the main staff of the VRS.  Under the main staff command

12    were the various corps of the VRS, including the SRK.

13            I will now turn to the structure of the SRK.  The Trial Chamber, I

14    anticipate, will be concerned with where the units which conducted sniping

15    and shelling fitted into that structure, and what disciplinary related

16    measures and resources the accused had available to him.

17            In relation to the term "sniping," it is important to understand

18    that its use in this trial by the Prosecution is not confined to its

19    strict military meaning, which is of a professional marksman utilizing a

20    specialised rifle and scope.  Instead, it is used in a broader sense, to

21    include regular troops and the use of such armaments as hunting rifles,

22    machine-guns, and anti-aircraft guns.  In the video collage that you will

23    view shortly, you will see a machine-gun in a sniper's nest overlooking

24    the city, known amongst Sarajevans at the time as the Death Sower for that

25    type of machine-gun, and this one, Your Honours will see, was fitted with

Page 595

 1    a telescopic site, and also there was an anti-aircraft gun.

 2            I take you now to a diagram of the structure of the SRK.  In

 3    taking you through this diagram, I want to highlight the chain of

 4    responsibility and how the artillery unit and sniper assets, as well as

 5    the regular troops and commanders were responsible to the accused.  The

 6    essential structure of the SRK involved four levels of forces under the

 7    command of the accused.  They were the accused's Main Staff at the corps

 8    headquarters, the brigades, the battalions, and the companies.  There were

 9    nine brigades, about 2.000 soldiers in each.  The battalions were at least

10    37 in number, about 200 to 700 soldiers in each, and finally, the

11    companies comprised about 50 soldiers in each.  As noted earlier, the

12    central tenet of the VRS military doctrine was that each level operated

13    under the orders of a superior.  To put it another way, the 18.000 troops

14    of the SRK were all ultimately responsible to the accused and acted on his

15    orders.  It was his job to know what was going on and to control the tempo

16    and direction of combat activities.

17            The accused would provide his operational objectives to say his

18    Main Staff, who would develop a plan to put those objectives into effect.

19    Orders were given to the implementation of the plan, which were then

20    conveyed down the chain of command by daily briefings, and I indicate

21    those lines of communication.  Firstly, from the corps headquarters to the

22    brigade headquarters, that is, the headquarters of the nine brigades.

23    Those nine brigades ringed the city of Sarajevo.  The briefings continued

24    down the line from the brigades to the battalions, and then from the

25    battalions to the companies.

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Page 597

 1            Your Honours, the lines of communication operated in both

 2    directions to carry back up the chain from the lowest rung of the

 3    structure, daily reports as to the implementation of the orders and

 4    other combat activities.

 5            This communication system is typical of that which applies to

 6    modern armed forces.  It is a sensible means of ensuring that the forces,

 7    at even the lowest rung, understand what is required of them, and

 8    similarly, that their commander, in this case the accused, was thoroughly

 9    familiar with the activities of his forces.  In this manner, the corps

10    acted as one integrated formation, which carried out the orders of their

11    overall commander, the accused.

12            The diagram also demonstrates that within the Corps structure

13    under his command, the accused had military police units, had he wanted to

14    involve them in the investigation of allegations of unlawful conduct by

15    his troops, and I indicate those.

16            Firstly, a battalion of military police which was responsible

17    directly under the corps headquarters, and in relation to the battalions,

18    there were also military police companies.  The diagram indicates those

19    companies of which the Prosecution has evidence, the Prosecution

20    anticipates that, in fact, each of the brigades would have had such

21    military police units.

22            Finally, in relation to the diagram, I point out the artillery and

23    sniping units.  The artillery units appear in red at various stages down

24    the structure of the SRK.  I come back to the first group of boxes that I

25    indicated, and I invite the Trial Chamber to note that these artillery

Page 598

 1    units were directly responsible to the accused's Main Staff.  In other

 2    words, his senior subordinates.  At the brigade and battalion level, there

 3    were further artillery units.  The diagram also indicates by the green

 4    boxes where the --

 5            JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ierace, if you would allow me, we have got a copy

 6    in front of us without any colours.  So you're referring to colours which

 7    are very difficult to see on the screen.  Would it be possible to have

 8    perhaps during the break, which I intend to have in a couple of minutes,

 9    to provide us and the Defence with copies with colours, please?

10            MR. IERACE:  Yes, Your Honour, that can be done.

11            JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

12            MR. IERACE:  Would that be a convenient time, Your Honour?

13            JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Of course, it depends -- how much time do you

14    still think you need?

15            MR. IERACE:  Your Honour, in order to complete the opening, I

16    should think about 20 minutes, perhaps 30.

17            JUDGE ORIE:  I think also keeping in mind that the Translation

18    Services need some rest as well.  Perhaps if you can finish this part,

19    let's say, in a couple of minutes and we'll then have a break.  I don't

20    know whether this is a, as you say, at this moment or in two or three

21    minutes.  I don't know what your --

22            MR. IERACE:  Indeed, Your Honour, this would be a convenient time,

23    because at this point I was about to leave the diagram and go to a

24    different aspect of command responsibility.

25            JUDGE ORIE:  So you're finished with the diagram.

Page 599

 1            MR. IERACE:  Yes.

 2            JUDGE ORIE:  And then we'll have a break.  And I have difficulties

 3    in -- because of the reflections to look at the clock, but we'll resume at

 4    4.15.

 5                          --- Recess taken at 3.43 p.m.

 6                          --- On resuming at 4.17 p.m.

 7            JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Ierace, for providing us with a colour

 8    copy of the schedule.  The Defence has got a colour copy as well?  Thank

 9    you.

10            Mr. Ierace, you may proceed.

11            MR. IERACE:  Thank you, Mr. President.

12            Before I leave the chart, I will briefly point out with the ELMO

13    the relevant boxes in relation to artillery and sniping.  It's now

14    possible to see the red boxes which indicate the artillery units, and I'll

15    point to those, and also the position in the structure where the snipers

16    operated, and that is within the companies.

17            The diagram also indicates the reporting and briefing structure,

18    that is, briefings going down all the way to the company level and then

19    reporting coming back up.

20            I now turn to the responsibility of the accused pursuant to

21    Article 7(1) of the Statute.  The Prosecution contends that the unlawful

22    acts set forth in the indictment, and in particular, the schedules to the

23    indictment, and those of similar character, were planned or ordered by the

24    accused.  Armies operate on principles of subordination and control.  Acts

25    which forces carry out in theatre are, over time, those which their

Page 600

 1    commanders have ordered.  When I say "ordered," I do not necessarily mean

 2    that the accused recorded these orders in writing.  Indeed, given the

 3    blatant and serious degree of unlawfulness of the campaign, it would be

 4    surprising if written orders to this effect still exist, or were ever

 5    issued other than orally.  The world was watching.  The same could be said

 6    for the reports back up the structure to the Corps Commander, the

 7    accused.  The temporal and geographic scale of the campaign demonstrates

 8    it to have been a deliberate campaign, which must have been the result

 9    of orders which came down from the highest level of command in the SRK,

10    namely, from the accused.  This campaign could not have continued for 22

11    months, throughout the city, on the other side of the confrontation lines

12    from the accused, with the fire emanating from the SRK side of the

13    confrontation lines, had it not been on the accused's orders.

14            This sustained military operation did not just spontaneously

15    occur.  It was in place before he arrived and, as evidenced by the

16    continued provision of ammunition alone by him to those who were carrying

17    out the campaign, he chose to continue and sustain it.  The fact that he

18    was probably following orders from his superiors, General Mladic and

19    President Karadzic, when issuing his orders to continue the campaign, does

20    not relieve him of responsibility.

21            In relation to Article 7(3) of the Statute, even if, extraordinary

22    as it seems, the accused had not ordered the campaign, customary

23    international law poses clear obligations upon commanders to prevent or

24    punish the unlawful acts of subordinates.  The accused did nothing to

25    prevent the campaign from continuing, and did not punish those who were

Page 601

 1    responsible.  This cements his responsibility.

 2            Although in his pre-trial brief the accused denies it, there can

 3    be no doubt that he knew that unlawful acts were being committed by his

 4    subordinates, given the SRK reporting systems that were designed to inform

 5    him of daily combat activities right down to the lowest ranking

 6    commander.  It is extraordinary to suggest that these attacks were not

 7    communicated up the chain, albeit not necessarily in written form, given

 8    their highly unlawful nature.

 9            Quite apart from the SRK reporting system, the accused and his

10    senior subordinates in his corps headquarters were the frequent recipients

11    of formal complaints about the shelling and sniping of civilians by

12    numerous UN military observers and UN protection force senior officers,

13    who had contact with him and his senior subordinates.

14            And then there was the media.  Journalists from around the world

15    travelled to Sarajevo to report on the war.

16            In his pre-trial brief, which was filed with this Chamber a few

17    weeks ago, the accused claimed that no one in the SRK ever admitted to him

18    that they were deliberately sniping civilians, and that the UN

19    representatives never told him the identity of the perpetrators.  The

20    corollary, it seems, is that he felt it inappropriate to order an

21    investigation until he was told the name of his soldier who pulled the

22    trigger for a specific incident, or at least his specific unit, and

23    therefore he did nothing.

24            At a bare minimum, the accused was at least put on inquiry that

25    crimes may have been committed by his subordinates, which obliged him to

Page 602












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Page 603

 1    investigate further.  Customary international law requires the Prosecution

 2    to prove only that the accused "had reason to know" of the acts of his

 3    subordinates.  In relation to the deliberate sniping and shelling of

 4    civilians, at paragraph 2.47 of the Defence pre-trial brief, he said "he

 5    hadn't any knowledge of such events."  And at paragraph 6.32, that he had

 6    "never received even a single report on any individual incident, and that

 7    he did not undertake an investigation regarding such an incident."

 8            Your Honours, during those two years that he commanded the SRK,

 9    the accused must have been the only person in the world who did not know

10    of credible allegations that the residents of Sarajevo were being

11    deliberately sniped and shelled on a daily basis from the hills

12    surrounding the city.  The hills which he controlled.  All the more

13    strange, when one considers evidence that he had a television in his

14    office in his forward command post at Lukavica barracks.  All he had to do

15    was turn it on.  One witness will tell you that in 1993, not surprisingly,

16    he saw a television running in the office of the accused's liaison

17    officer.  It was tuned to CNN.

18            The powers of a Corps Commander of the Republika Srpska army as to

19    punishment are extensive.  Expert testimony will identify the precise

20    scope and nature of the accused's responsibility in-theatre and will

21    pinpoint exactly what types of measures would have been within his

22    powers.  These included the ability to remove offending persons from

23    front-line positions, to issue orders, to effect improvements with levels

24    of training, to amend Rules the Engagement, and to initiate disciplinary

25    measures.  The accused admits in his pre-trial brief he did not undertake

Page 604

 1    any such or similar measures in relation to any of the incidents detailed

 2    in the schedules to the indictment, or others of a similar character.

 3            Finally, Your Honours, I will show a short collage of video

 4    clips.  It takes approximately 8 minutes and 40 seconds, taken before and

 5    during the indictment period, up to approximately spring of 1993.  I do so

 6    in order to demonstrate more vividly than words could some of the

 7    anticipated evidence I have alluded to during my opening.  On the video,

 8    the state of the foliage and the clothing being worn by people indicates

 9    the seasons and thus whether the footage was taken broadly in the summer

10    months of 1992, or after the accused assumed command of the SRK in early

11    September of that year.  A brief explanatory note prefaces each segment.

12            It starts with footage of civilians attempting to avoid sniper

13    fire as they run across an intersection which was exposed to SRK

14    positions, early in the conflict.  The second clip is of the same

15    intersection during the indictment period, by which time anti-sniping

16    barricades, in the form of shipping containers, had been placed on it.

17    Thereafter follows general footage of civilians attempting it avoid sniper

18    fire, sometimes unsuccessfully, and footage of civilians collecting water

19    and firewood, footage of the after math of three scheduled shelling

20    incidents and the burial of the dead in Dobrinja, in a plot of land

21    adjacent to a car park because do to so in a cemetery was unthinkable

22    given the campaign of shelling of funeral processions.

23            The video illustrates, in particular, the terror that was

24    communicated not just to those who were unable to dodge the sniper's

25    bullet or the shells, but to those who lived and witnesses what happened

Page 605

 1    to their fellow Sarajevans.  It conveys a sense as to how they were the

 2    targets, even though they were not hit, of the intention to inflict

 3    terror.

 4            Thank you.  Perhaps that video might be shown.

 5                          [Videotape played]

 6            JUDGE ORIE:  Do I understand, Mr. Ierace, that by showing us this

 7    video you've concluded your opening statement?

 8            MR. IERACE:  Yes, Mr. President.  That completes my opening.

 9            JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you very much.

10            Ms. Pilipovic, at this stage you're entitled to make your opening

11    statement pursuant to Rule 84, but as you know, you may also defer making

12    this statement until after the Prosecution has presented its case.  What

13    is your wish to do at this moment?

14            MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the Defence relies on

15    Rule 84 and will make its opening statement upon the conclusion of the

16    Prosecution case.

17            JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you very much.  Ms. Pilipovic, does your client

18    wish to make a statement in accordance with Rule 84 bis of the Rules of

19    Procedure and Evidence at this moment?

20            MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour, not at this

21    moment.

22            JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you very much.

23            This means that we could proceed to the case presentation of the

24    Prosecutor to be continued.  Mr. Ierace, are you ready for your first

25    witness?  Although I do understand that we have to make a short break

Page 606

 1    before we should come to that, because, as far as I understand, all these

 2    boards have to be removed.  But would you be ready to -- for your first

 3    witness?

 4            MR. IERACE:  Yes, Mr. President.

 5            JUDGE ORIE:  Then I'll have a break of I think approximately

 6    three, four, or five minutes, in order to have the courtroom prepared for

 7    the first witness.  Thank you.

 8                          --- Break taken at 4.42 p.m.

 9                          --- On resuming at 4.47 p.m.

10            JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ierace, after the Court being prepared, who will

11    you call as your first witness?

12            MR. IERACE:  Mr. President, Mr. Michael Blaxill will appear for

13    the Prosecution in relation to our first witness, Mr. Kupusovic.

14            JUDGE ORIE:  Would the usher, then, please bring in the first

15    witness.

16            MR. BLAXILL:  For the record, Mr. President, Your Honours, good

17    afternoon.  My name is Michael Blaxill.  I shall be taking this witness in

18    chief for the Prosecution.  And the witness's full name is Mr. Tarik

19    Kupusovic.

20            JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Blaxill.

21                          [The witness entered court]

22            JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kupusovic, can you hear me in a language that you

23    understand?

24            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I hear you very well, Your

25    Honour.

Page 607

 1            JUDGE ORIE:  Then I will invite you to make the solemn declaration

 2    of which the text will be handed over to you.

 3                          WITNESS:  TARIK KUPUSOVIC

 4                          [Witness answered through interpreter]

 5            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

 6    the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

 7            JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Kupusovic.

 8            Mr. Blaxill, you may begin the examination of your witness.

 9            MR. BLAXILL:  I'm obliged, Your Honour.  Thank you.

10                          Examined by Mr. Blaxill:

11       Q.   Good afternoon, Mr. Kupusovic.  Would you firstly for the record,

12    please, state your full name for the Court.

13       A.   Good afternoon.  My name is Tarik Kupusovic.

14       Q.   And could you please give us your date of birth.

15       A.   On the 5th of December, 1952.

16       Q.   And where were you born, sir?

17       A.   I was born in Sarajevo.

18       Q.   And could you just give us a brief outline to the Court as to your

19    educational and professional background.

20       A.   I am a civil engineer.  I teach at the civil engineering faculty

21    in Sarajevo, and director of an engineering institute.

22       Q.   And what was your profession back in 1992, let us say the

23    beginning of 1992?

24       A.   By profession, I was professor at the university, but also on an

25    amateur basis I was a member of the Municipal Assembly of Sarajevo.

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Page 609

 1       Q.   Sir, may I ask you at this stage, how long has your family lived

 2    in Sarajevo?

 3       A.   More than 400 years.

 4       Q.   And you've mentioned your involvement in the municipality.  When

 5    did you first have such an involvement?

 6       A.   After the elections in 1990, I was elected to the town council,

 7    and I was a member.

 8       Q.   And what basically were the functions of the town council within

 9    the context of Sarajevo?

10       A.   As in all other towns in the world, it is a body of local

11    self-government which dealt with public utilities and other needs of the

12    town of Sarajevo.

13       Q.   And does the town of Sarajevo have any other authorities, such as

14    local municipalities?

15       A.   Yes.  The town of Sarajevo in those days consisted of ten

16    municipalities in those days.

17       Q.   Could you please be so kind as to name the municipalities, and

18    just indicate whereabouts in Sarajevo, north, east, south, and west,

19    whereabouts they are.

20       A.   Starting from the east, there are the municipalities of Pale,

21    Stari Grad, Centar, Novo Sarajevo, Novi Grad, Hadzici, Ilijas, Trnovo,

22    and Vogosca.

23       Q.   And how many of those municipalities make up the actual urban part

24    of the city of Sarajevo?

25       A.   The urban part consists of four municipalities.

Page 610

 1       Q.   And would you just name which four are those urban municipalities?

 2       A.   Yes.  Stari Grad, Centar, Novo Sarajevo, and Novi Grad.

 3       Q.   Mr. Kupusovic, I'd like you, please, to tell the Judges a little

 4    about Sarajevo in its pre-war condition and the pre-war lifestyle of the

 5    city.  Can you tell us firstly, please, something about the commercial

 6    life of Sarajevo before the 1990s.

 7       A.   Sarajevo, as a town, dates back 500 years, when it was first

 8    established at the crossroads of roads as a commercial centre.  After the

 9    Second World War, and especially after the winter Olympic games in 1984,

10    in addition to being the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it also became a

11    cultural and economic centre of the former Yugoslavia.  Four out of the

12    six largest civil engineering and consulting companies of the former

13    Yugoslavia were based in Sarajevo.  In the music life, cultural life,

14    university life, and in many other aspects, Sarajevo was a prominent

15    centre independent of Belgrade and Zagreb, another of the main centres of

16    the former Yugoslavia, in which all its inhabitants lived in harmony,

17    regardless of their religious or ethnic affiliation.

18       Q.   Thank you.  To move to that, Mr. Kupusovic, how large was the

19    population of Sarajevo by, say, the year 1991 or 1992?

20       A.   Half a million inhabitants.

21       Q.   And can you tell us which or what ethnic groups might have

22    composed that population?

23       A.   About 40 per cent of the population was Muslim, about 32 per cent

24    Serbs, and 8 per cent Croats, and the rest mixed marriages and people who

25    declared themselves as Yugoslavs, people who considered themselves to be

Page 611

 1    citizens of Yugoslavia or members of other ethnic groups constituted the

 2    rest.

 3       Q.   And can you describe in a little more detail the relationships

 4    that there were between the ethnic groups within the city.

 5       A.   I've already said that relationships were harmonious; in fact,

 6    there wasn't any part of town or any institution or any company which was

 7    dominated by members of only one ethnic group.  Simply, citizens

 8    considered themselves fellow citizens, and the small differences that

 9    existed in religious terms were not an obstacle.  They exchanged visits

10    for religious holidays, such as Bajram, family celebrations, and other

11    festivities.  So as a citizen of Sarajevo, I can assert that it was the

12    most cosmopolitan town in the former Yugoslavia.

13       Q.   And what about the relationships between the members of the city

14    council at the political level, say towards the latter part of 1990 and

15    into 1991?

16       A.   In the city council or city parliament, there were 120 elected

17    deputies or members, and they belonged to different parties.  There were

18    seven parties who had won enough votes to be represented in the

19    parliament, and relationships were very good.  As members of the town

20    assembly, we sought to develop a new multiparty spirit.  For instance, the

21    option of social democracy, liberalism, the greens, all the various

22    options, regardless of the three national parties, which also had their

23    representatives in the assembly, but not one of them had a majority.  The

24    party I belonged to had the largest number of deputies, that is, the SDA,

25    which had 30 or 32 per cent of seats.

Page 612

 1       Q.   When you refer to three national parties, what precisely do you

 2    mean?  Does that have any reference to ethnic groups at all?

 3       A.   Yes.  Most of the members, or one could even say almost all the

 4    members of the Serbian Democratic Party were Serbs.  Of the Croatian

 5    Democratic Union were Croats, and also the majority of members of the

 6    Party of Democratic Action were Muslims or Bosniaks.  The other parties

 7    were definitely multi-ethnic.  Not a single ethnic group dominated in

 8    those parties.

 9       Q.   Mr. Kupusovic, were any of these political parties known simply by

10    a set of initials?  And if so, could you tell us which of these parties

11    may have been known just by their initials?

12       A.   Yes.  All the parties had their initials.  The three most

13    important ones were the SDA, that is, the Party of Democratic Action; the

14    HDZ, the Croatian Democratic Union; and the SDS, the Serbian Democratic

15    Party, headed by Radovan Karadzic.

16       Q.   Thank you.  Now, in your political career, did you continue in

17    public office after and throughout the 1990s, up to, say, 1994, 1995?

18       A.   Yes.  I was a member of the town assembly from the elections in

19    1990 up to 1994, when I was elected town mayor of Sarajevo, and I

20    performed those duties until 1996.

21       Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Kupusovic, just as to the pre-war situation in

22    Sarajevo, were there any particular features of the city that aroused

23    particular affection or sentiment amongst its people, anything they were

24    especially proud of?

25       A.   All the inhabitants of Sarajevo were then, and still are, proud in

Page 613

 1    particular of the old town centre, where, in an area of 400 metres you

 2    have the Orthodox church, the Gasi Husref Bey mosque, the largest mosque

 3    in the Balkans, then the Catholic cathedral and the old Jewish synagogue.

 4    In addition, the people of Sarajevo are particularly proud of the

 5    facilities that were built just before the Olympic Games, which

 6    transformed a town that developed in the 1950s and 1960s under socialism

 7    and communism into a

 8    modern European city.  Thanks to those buildings, and also thanks to a new

 9    infrastructure, water supply, electricity, gas supply, the facilities that

10    were built in the 1980s sponsored by the need for the Olympic Games.

11       Q.   You just mentioned as well, what was the system, the public

12    transport system in the city at that time?

13       A.   In those days, in addition to the trams, which date back to the

14    nineteenth century, the first trams, in fact, that were introduced in the

15    Austro-Hungarian monarchy, trolley buses were introduced, and of course

16    there were buses for transport all over town, so that the city transport

17    system functioned extremely well from the Olympics right through until

18    1992.

19       Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Kupusovic, whereabouts were you living in 1992,

20    the beginning of the year?

21       A.   I was living in the district called Dobrinja, which is close to

22    the Sarajevo airport.

23       Q.   Had you always lived in that district?

24       A.   No.  It's a housing settlement built for the needs of the athletes

25    and journalists for the Olympic Games, and I moved into a new apartment

Page 614

 1    there in 1983.

 2       Q.   And so where were you in fact living at the beginning of April of

 3    1992?  In Dobrinja?

 4       A.   Yes, in Dobrinja, very close to Sarajevo's airport.

 5       Q.   Mr. Kupusovic, what effect did any events in the former Yugoslavia

 6    have on the minds and daily life of the people in Sarajevo towards the end

 7    of 1991?

 8       A.   When the crisis started of the break-up of the structures of the

 9    former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, first with Slovenia,

10    followed by Croatia, the vast majority of people in Bosnia-Herzegovina and

11    the very large majority of the people of Sarajevo believed that a peaceful

12    solution would be found after all to that crisis and that the war from

13    Croatia would not spread to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sarajevo itself.  In

14    fact, on January 1st, 1992, a peace agreement was signed in Sarajevo

15    between the rump Yugoslavia and Croatia whereby that stage of the war in

16    Croatia, when Vukovar, Dubrovnik, and other towns were particularly badly

17    damaged, ended.  We believed that nothing like that could ever happen to

18    Bosnia-Herzegovina, and especially not in Sarajevo, in which, before and

19    even after that, the people were absolutely in favour of peace and a

20    peaceful settlement of the crisis rather than what happened.

21       Q.   And faced with that situation, did anything change as regards

22    those amicable relations in the early months of 1992?

23       A.   It didn't change a lot, but nevertheless, after the referendum

24    that took place on the 29th of February and the 1st of March, 1992, at

25    which the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina had to declare whether they

Page 615












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Page 616

 1    wished to remain within the rump Yugoslavia, that is, together with

 2    Serbia, or whether they wanted to have an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina,

 3    some members of the SDS set up the first checkpoints in Sarajevo to

 4    demonstrate their rejection of the results of the referendum which later

 5    on resulted in the recognition and the actual independence of

 6    Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 7            Later, when Bosnia-Herzegovina was officially recognised by the

 8    European union, there were fresh barricades in the night between the 5th

 9    and 6th of April, but our colleague deputies in the town assembly, that

10    is, colleagues, members on behalf of the SDS, claimed that they had

11    nothing to do with it, that they were not involved and that this was being

12    done by groups that were out of control.

13       Q.   Did you manage to ascertain what the purpose of these barricades

14    was?

15       A.   The purpose of the barricades, according to what the president and

16    vice-president of the SDS were saying, was to express their disagreement,

17    that is, the disagreement of the SDS as a party, but at the level of the

18    whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the results of that referendum.  So that

19    as these barricades lasted -- were up for a few hours, that is, a

20    limitation on freedom of movement, there were occasional shootings, but

21    all we could do was guess as to what the purpose was, as a kind of test,

22    an exercise on the part of the people who were prepared to engage in such

23    activities.

24       Q.   And what was the mood of the population at large when these events

25    were going on?

Page 617

 1       A.   The reaction of the population was to organise peaceful actions to

 2    remove the barricades, and that is what happened.  For the first time in

 3    March, and a second time in April, when large crowds of people consisting

 4    of men, women, and children, headed towards those barricades, and the

 5    people who were camouflaged with caps and socks over their faces who were

 6    manning those barricades, were removed.  Similarly, on the 5th of April,

 7    an enormous mass of people from all over Bosnia came to Sarajevo to

 8    demonstrate peacefully against those who had put up those barricades, and

 9    to urge them to remove them, which indeed happened, of course with some

10    sporadic shooting.

11       Q.   Now, Mr. Kupusovic, had there been any form of military stationed

12    in or situated in Sarajevo prior to the war?

13       A.   Before the war in Sarajevo, the Yugoslav People's Army had several

14    barracks in the town itself and several facilities in the environs of the

15    town.  The only military in Sarajevo was the JNA.

16       Q.   And can you say where precisely they were located in Sarajevo?

17       A.   The largest barracks was the Marsal Tito barracks in the very

18    centre of town.  It is a very large compound in area, and in the old part

19    of town and in new districts, there were several smaller barracks and

20    facilities for the training of soldiers.

21       Q.   And generally, what were the activities of the JNA soldiers in the

22    city prior to the war?

23       A.   When the JNA withdrew from Croatia and Slovenia, much of the

24    troops and armaments arrived in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and much of that in

25    Sarajevo.  And the number of patrols increased considerably.  They were

Page 618

 1    passing through town in APCs and in other vehicles, which had an adverse

 2    effect on the citizens, and they saw it as a demonstration of military

 3    might.

 4       Q.   If I could just stop you there at that point.  What were the

 5    activities, then, prior to that sort of period on the part of the JNA.  I

 6    mean, did they -- how much did you see of them in the town and what sort

 7    of activities did they have in peacetime?

 8       A.   Before the 1990s, for instance, the military was in town and

 9    around town, but relations were fine.  There were local, amateur,

10    cultural, and arts societies, together with the soldiers.  The soldiers

11    would go out when they were on leave, to go to coffee shops and various

12    cultural institutions, and relations were quite amicable between the

13    soldiers and the citizens.

14       Q.   And so generally, what indeed was the attitude of the people

15    towards the JNA and the purpose that the JNA were serving?

16       A.   The attitude towards the JNA before the war in Croatia was

17    extremely favourable.  After the war, in Slovenia and Croatia, this

18    attitude became more neutral.  Yes, they are our army, but because of

19    certain actions which did not meet with approval, it had become to

20    Serbianised, as we used to say, because too many Slovenes and Croats had

21    left the army, so that it was no longer the army of all the peoples of

22    Yugoslavia, but still it was considered to be a neutral force which would

23    protect the constitutional order and peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

24       Q.   Thank you.  You mentioned a few minutes ago that you saw, after

25    the events of the trouble in Croatia, that the JNA increased in numbers of

Page 619

 1    men and weapons in the vicinity of Sarajevo.  Could you tell us a little

 2    bit more, please, about what you witnessed as to the return of these JNA

 3    troops into the city.

 4       A.   It was common knowledge that the number of soldiers and that large

 5    numbers of soldiers and weapons were moved from Croatia to Bosnia and

 6    Herzegovina, and in Sarajevo we saw images on television of increased

 7    activity by the JNA around Sarajevo.  JNA commanders said these were

 8    regular activities to protect the town.  Some citizens believed this, but

 9    others expressed fear.  They said, "Who is the JNA protecting us from by

10    setting up guns and other weapons around Sarajevo?"  I myself, because I

11    lived in Dobrinja, and there was a crossroads leading to Trebevic from my

12    house, and I saw that that part of the road was closed off for civilians

13    and that personnel carriers, tanks, and guns had been set up on the

14    Mojmilo tank, which was on the other side of Dobrinja, in the direction

15    of town, so that soldiers were everywhere, and one did not really

16    understand who they were protecting the citizens from.

17       Q.   You made reference to Mojmilo tank.  Can you explain, please, to

18    the Court the place you're actually referring to.  What is Mojmilo tank?

19       A.   The Mojmilo reservoir is the biggest water reservoir in Sarajevo,

20    into which water is pumped and then redistributed to smaller pumping

21    stations for the water supply of the town.  This is on a hill overlooking

22    the airport, the new part of town, and Dobrinja, which is close to the

23    airport.

24       Q.   And when you say that guns had been set up on that location, can

25    you give us a description of what type of guns they appeared to be?

Page 620

 1       A.   No.  I'm not an expert on this.  They were guns with long barrels,

 2    but I can't say anything more about them.

 3       Q.   Thank you.  That's fine.  So you were referring to the other

 4    events that had been occurring around the beginning of April.  Was there

 5    any particularly significant event on the 6th of April of 1992 in

 6    Sarajevo?

 7       A.   Well, the 6th of April is the day of liberation of Sarajevo from

 8    World War II, and it was always celebrated as a holiday in the town.  And

 9    there was to be a ceremonial session of the city assembly, which was not

10    held, because in the night from the 5th to 6th of April, barricades were

11    set up, and only some of the people were able to make their way to the

12    assembly.  I arrived in a taxi at a barricade, then crossed on foot, took

13    another taxi to the next barricade, and that's how I managed to get

14    through to the assembly.  I didn't have any special problems except that I

15    couldn't use my own car or public transport.  The barricades were manned

16    by masked people, and their role was unclear.

17       Q.   You say they were masked people.  Was there any other way that you

18    might have identified who they were or who they represented?

19       A.   No.  They had socks over their heads and they were not wearing

20    military uniforms, so they didn't look like soldiers or policemen.  They

21    were armed and that they were manning the barricade.  But they were not

22    preventing people from passing by the barricade on foot, but you couldn't

23    pass through in a vehicle.  We knew, however, that they were members of

24    the SDS because on television we saw negotiations between President

25    Izetbegovic and Karadzic, the president of the Serbian party, on the

Page 621












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Page 622

 1    removal of the barricades, and the mediator was a representative of the UN

 2    in Sarajevo.  And this is what happened, actually.  On the following day

 3    the barricades were removed and peace was negotiated, and it was said that

 4    barricades would no longer be erected.

 5       Q.   So after that incident and the barricades were removed, what was

 6    the position in the city?  What was the situation?

 7       A.   Throughout April, the situation was tense.  At a high level in the

 8    police, efforts were needed find a solution, but there was sporadic

 9    shooting in town.  There were incidents which instilled fear and made

10    people afraid.  However, everything continued to function.  Public

11    transport, utilities, people went to work.  And our slogan was that by

12    working, we were fighting for peace, because this was the way to prevent a

13    possible war.

14       Q.   You have referred to a number of incidents and shootings.  Can you

15    give the Chamber any facts relating to any of these incidents?

16       A.   When the peace rally was held, in front of the assembly of the

17    socialist Republic, or rather, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as

18    it was already called, and the Executive Council, that is, the government

19    of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the rally was broken up by shots coming from the

20    Holiday Inn, a nearby hotel, and several people were wounded.  Later on,

21    when the peace demonstrators set out towards the police school, that was

22    where the first civilian casualty occurred, on the bridge on the other

23    side of the assembly, leading to the part of town where the police school

24    is.  Throughout the month there were a few peaceful days, followed by days

25    when there was sporadic shooting from the smaller barracks around town,

Page 623

 1    and the shooting was actually done by people who were unknown to us.

 2       Q.   Now, that first instance of the first civilian casualty shot on a

 3    bridge, can you give us any more details about that?  Do you know anything

 4    about the identity of that person?

 5       A.   Yes.  It was a female student in Sarajevo who came from

 6    Dubrovnik.  She was studying in Sarajevo.  Her name was Suada Omerovic,

 7    she was the first victim of the war in Sarajevo, so the bridge is today

 8    named after her.

 9       Q.   So did that event therefore have a strong significance in the mind

10    of the people at that time?

11       A.   It did.  She was a young girl studying in Sarajevo who wanted

12    peace, and in a way, people felt obliged by her death.  They saw that more

13    such casualties could happen if people did not leave off weapons and try

14    to find peaceful solutions for the misunderstandings in the former

15    Yugoslavia.

16       Q.   And did anyone ascertain or find out how she came to be shot,

17    where the shot came from or who did the shooting?

18       A.   The police established that the shots were fired by the bodyguards

19    of Radovan Karadzic.  That's what was published in the newspapers.  I of

20    course have no personal knowledge of this.

21       Q.   Of course.  Did you have any knowledge as to the whereabouts of

22    those bodyguards of Dr. Karadzic at the time of the shooting?  Where were

23    they?  Did you know that?

24       A.   They were on two floors of the Holiday Inn hotel, and in other

25    nearby buildings.  But this is where the SDS headquarters was.  After the

Page 624

 1    rallies and after this event, they moved to Pale.

 2       Q.   And so after that particular event on the 6th of April, how did

 3    things progress in the city in terms of the atmosphere and the general air

 4    of whether it was calm or tensions rising?

 5       A.   The tensions mounted because many more soldiers were moving in and

 6    around town, and the citizens tried to carry on with their normal lives

 7    and to oppose the militarisation of the town and the military activities

 8    in this way.  They felt that all this was pointless and that it only

 9    increased the danger of new incidents.  There were incidents throughout

10    April: Shootings, woundings, and other events where people were killed.

11       Q.   And what were the JNA troops in the city of Sarajevo doing while

12    these incidents were going on?  In fact, were they involved in any of

13    them?

14       A.   The JNA forces played the role of a neutral mediator, separating,

15    as they said, the opposing sides.  But there were no opposing sides.  In

16    fact, there was only the SDS, the guards, the lads who were the SDS

17    militia, and then there were the JNA soldiers.  There were also groups of

18    young men in Sarajevo, citizens patrolling the streets without any

19    weapons, patrolling the streets and the entrances to residential

20    buildings, to watch out for crime, for drunken soldiers, and reserve

21    soldiers who committed crimes around town.  So tensions mounted, and at a

22    higher political level, they kept changing ideas about how to preserve

23    Yugoslavia peacefully or else how to make a new political agreement in

24    order for the whole territory of the former Yugoslavia to develop into a

25    peaceful community of federal states or confederation.

Page 625

 1            JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Blaxill, I'm intending to have a short break of

 2    approximately 20 minutes.  Would this be a proper moment to start this

 3    break, or --

 4            MR. BLAXILL:  As convenient as any, Your Honour.  Yes, indeed.

 5            JUDGE ORIE:  Then we'll have a short break and we'll resume at 10

 6    minutes to 6.00.

 7                          --- Recess taken at 5.31 p.m.

 8                          --- On resuming at 5.52 p.m.

 9            JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Blaxill, could you please proceed.  First, of

10    course, we need the witness to be brought into the courtroom.

11            MR. BLAXILL:  Indeed, Your Honour, yes.  As soon as he's in court,

12    I will of course proceed.

13            JUDGE ORIE:  Could the usher please -- is he there or ...

14                          [The witness entered court]

15            MR. BLAXILL:

16       Q.   Mr. Kupusovic, just before the break we were talking a little

17    about the activities of the JNA at that time, at the beginning of April,

18    but can you tell us something about events in and around Sarajevo airport

19    that might have occurred shortly before then?

20       A.   The Yugoslav People's Army took over control of the airport from

21    the civil administration of the airport, and already in March and April it

22    had full control of the airport and all the air traffic at the airport.

23       Q.   Did the air traffic at the airport include still civil traffic or

24    was it exclusively military at that time?

25       A.   There was a very pronounced military traffic.  As I lived nearby,

Page 626

 1    I saw planes landing and taking off.  But there were also civilian

 2    airplanes landing.

 3       Q.   So as we progress through the month of April after these

 4    particular events, particularly around the 6th, can you tell us sort of

 5    how events went in the city as that month went on?

 6       A.   I don't know what exactly you mean.  I have already spoken about

 7    the heightening tensions and the efforts of citizens to maintain normalcy

 8    of life in town.

 9       Q.   Probably my fault.  I don't think it was a very precise question.

10    I'll ask you something more precise and more on the point.  Was there any

11    time after that that the JNA became more militarily involved with any

12    groups or other people with some sort of conflict in the city during

13    April?

14       A.   There were quite a number of what the JNA commanders called

15    exercises by the JNA, in town and around town, which provoked fear among

16    the population and an increase in tension.

17       Q.   Was there any time at which the JNA became involved in actual

18    shooting incidents with anybody?

19       A.   There were shooting incidents, as I have already mentioned, but I

20    did not know, nor did other people know, who was doing the shooting.  I,

21    for instance, remember a statement by General Kukanjac, who was commander

22    of the garrison, or the area of Sarajevo, that when citizens were saying

23    that it was the JNA that were shooting, he said that the JNA was a force

24    that would not trample on an ant, that it would maintain the peace.  But

25    there were constant exercises and movements by the military and a

Page 627












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Page 628

 1    heightening of tensions.

 2       Q.   Was there ever a time at which there was an open confrontation

 3    between people in the vicinity of the Tito barracks during the month of

 4    April?

 5       A.   There were some incidents.  From the barracks outside, but it

 6    could not really be called a confrontation.  It was simply a mirroring of

 7    events that took place in Capljina and Mostar, where there were even more

 8    troops than in Sarajevo, relatively speaking.

 9       Q.   And at that time, how had relations developed between the

10    delegates within your city assembly?  Was it still as harmoniously

11    conducted, as you have previously described, or was there a change?

12       A.   There were no particular changes.  We would meet.  In those days I

13    was already president of the deputy club of my party, and those presidents

14    met in an effort to ease tension and to preserve the functions of the

15    city.  And the president of the SDS deputy club also took part in those

16    meetings.  His name was Bozo Popara, and of course the president of the

17    SDS was Karadzic, but Popara was president of the SDS for the town of

18    Sarajevo.

19       Q.   Now, in terms of -- you've described obviously how tensions had

20    heightened and there were problems.  Had there been any kind of shift or

21    change in the population or any movement of population by this point, in

22    April?

23       A.   Yes.  A part of the population, maybe a couple of thousand, in

24    March and April, left on JNA planes and in other they left the town.

25    These were mostly family members of JNA officers who were serving in town,

Page 629

 1    who were living in town, but also other citizens.

 2       Q.   And was there any particular ethnic group that saw more of its

 3    citizens leaving Sarajevo than others?

 4       A.   Maybe, as the officers were mostly Serbs, so maybe there were more

 5    Serbs who were leaving the town, but others were leaving too, Croats and

 6    Muslims.  They were sending their wives and small children.  Some were

 7    either to the Adriatic coast or to some other destination, believing they

 8    would stay there for a month or two, until the situation calmed down.

 9    That was what everyone told me who had sent their families either to the

10    Adriatic, to Croatia, or to Germany.  That's what they said.

11       Q.   Now, at about that time, let us say mid-April, was there any

12    particular action that was taken by the city assembly perhaps on or about

13    the 19th of April?

14       A.   As the assembly could not meet on the 6th of April because of the

15    barricades, which we have discussed, then a limited number of people, the

16    leaders of the parties who had deputies in the city assembly, met in an

17    effort to find a solution for the city itself to ensure peace and further

18    development.  On the 17th of April, a statement was signed which was made

19    public in the local newspapers by the presidents of the deputy clubs, to

20    the effect that we wished to preserve the assets of Sarajevo.

21       Q.   May I just interrupt you there, sir?  I apologise.  I do have a

22    document I would like to have shown to this witness at this stage?

23            MR. BLAXILL:  Does the usher have the document to present to him?

24            JUDGE ORIE:  This gives me opportunity, Mr. Blaxill, perhaps to

25    make a proposal as far as tendering of exhibits in evidence is concerned.

Page 630

 1            MR. BLAXILL:  I'm sorry to interrupt, Your Honour, but I don't

 2    propose to tender this as an exhibit.  The reality is that this is a

 3    document of a very brief nature and is germane really to the main text of

 4    the witness's evidence.  I was proposing to invite him to read it into the

 5    record of the transcript and not, in fact, tender the document.  That

 6    being said, it has been prepared as an aid to Your Honours and to my

 7    learned friends, and indeed has been translated into both English and

 8    French to assist in that purpose.

 9            JUDGE ORIE:  You have received a copy, Ms. Pilipovic or

10    Mr. Piletta-Zanin?

11            MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I think that we haven't

12    received that document, Mr. President, but I think last time we wanted to

13    focus in particular on translation problems.  And I would like to take

14    advantage of this opportunity to say that when the witness said "a little

15    more," and I didn't see that reflected in the transcript.  So we're going

16    to have these problems, and how should we react when a statement made in

17    one language doesn't appear in an exact translation in another language?

18    I'm not quite sure what we are referring to, so I can't say regarding this

19    document.

20            JUDGE ORIE:  I would concentrate rather than on this document at

21    this moment, and perhaps if there are any problems as far as corrections

22    to the translations are concerned, we'll deal with that at a later stage

23    and to find a way to solve that problem as far as we can.  But as regards

24    this document, I do understand that we haven't had a copy, the Defence

25    hasn't had a copy, but we get it now.

Page 631

 1            MR. BLAXILL:  In point of fact, Your Honour, that is not quite

 2    so.  We have copies for distribution that were tendered this morning, and

 3    my learned friend in fact received it on the 26th of November.  It was

 4    handed to Madam Pilipovic by a colleague of mine, as I understand.

 5            JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Blaxill, I have to apologise.  Shortly before

 6    this Court hearing started, I was provided with a copy, and you've got a

 7    copy as well?  I see it's a document which says in English "statement made

 8    by a representative."  That's the document you're referring to.

 9            MR. BLAXILL:  That's precisely so, Your Honour.

10            JUDGE ORIE:  Defence has got a copy as well?  Okay.

11            MR. BLAXILL:  Sorry, Your Honour.  Just as an observation, Your

12    Honour, I think you'll find any comments about translation will be

13    resolved, because as you read it into the record, our interpreters here

14    will be translating formally to the Court in both French and English.

15            Could the document be handed to the witness.

16       Q.   Mr. Kupusovic, could you look at that document, and do you

17    recognise it?  Can you say what it is?

18       A.   Yes, that is the document that was published in the local

19    newspapers, a statement by representatives of parliamentary parties in the

20    city assembly of Sarajevo.

21       Q.   Could you read the contents of that document into the Court,

22    please.

23       A.   Of course, the document is headed "The town is indivisible."

24            [As interpreted] "At a meeting in the assembly of the town of

25    Sarajevo held on the 19th of April, 1992, in the work of which

Page 632

 1    representatives of all parliamentary parties whose deputies constitute the

 2    town assembly participated, and it was chaired by the president of the

 3    City Assembly, Muhamed Kresevljakovic, a joint statement was adopted and

 4    signed:

 5            "On behalf of the citizens of Sarajevo, no one from the town or

 6    the Republic," and the implication is to Bosnia and Herzegovina, "or

 7    Europe has the right to negotiate any divisions of Sarajevo.

 8            "The town of Sarajevo, with a history of more than 500 years long

 9    of joint life as a multicultural, multi-confessional and multi-ethnic

10    community, is indivisible.

11            "In the town of Sarajevo, we are defended a modern European civil

12    concept of life.

13            "Sarajevo is the capital of the Republic of Bosnia and

14    Herzegovina, and all human rights and freedoms are respected in it, due to

15    which we hereby state that no one has the right to jeopardise the lives of

16    people, peace, and the material property of citizens and the cultural and

17    historical and natural heritage of Sarajevo."

18            The signatories are Miodrag Jankovic, the Alliance of Reformist

19    Forces, a party; Bozidar Popara, the Serbian Democratic Party; Tarik

20    Kupusovic, the Party of Democratic Action, or the SDA; Anto Zelic, the

21    Croatian Democratic Union, the HDZ; Slobodan Primorac, the SDP, the

22    Socialist Democratic Party; Esad Afgan, the MBO, the Muslim Bosniak

23    Organisation; Nijaz Nurkovic, Liberals; Ibrahim Spahic, DSS, the

24    Democratic Party of Socialists; and Muhamed Kresevljakovic, the town mayor

25    of Sarajevo.

Page 633












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Page 634

 1            So all the presidents of the urban part of the party signed,

 2    including the SDS, Bozidar Popara, and I who at the time was the president

 3    of the SDA club of deputies.

 4            MR. BLAXILL:   There is just one issue of translation at this

 5    point, Your Honours, although it's probably of little significance, but

 6    the Alliance of Reformist Forces has been referred to as the party of

 7    Miodrag Jankovic, but I had a translation of the Serbian Radical Party.

 8    Would that be the same thing or is that an error?

 9       A.   The Alliance of Reformist Forces, a party that came into effect a

10    year or 18 months before this time we are referring to.

11       Q.   In which alphabet is that notice prepared, and in which alphabet

12    was it published, Mr. Kupusovic?

13       A.   In Cyrillic script.

14       Q.   Is there any significance to your having had it published in

15    Cyrillic script?

16       A.   No.  The newspapers would be published one day in Cyrillic and one

17    day in Latin script, or some newspapers in Latin, some in Cyrillic.  So we

18    had the technical facilities to publish in both scripts, and the emphasis

19    was on the equality of scripts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, so that both scripts

20    were in use, both the Cyrillic and the Latin.  So just it happens to be a

21    coincidence that it was published in Cyrillic.

22       Q.   Now, we've talked about the incidents and incidents of violence

23    that occurred in April.  Was there a time when that changed and the

24    situation became rather predominantly more violent, there were greater

25    incidents and shooting?

Page 635

 1       A.   In April, the situation was under constant tension, and on the 2nd

 2    of May, of course, the situation exploded.

 3       Q.   Can you tell us, please, what actually happened to explain what

 4    you mean by "the situation exploded."

 5       A.   A column of APCs and tanks was heading towards the Presidency of

 6    Bosnia-Herzegovina.  At the same time, the army centre in downtown

 7    Sarajevo, close to the Presidency building, was being evacuated, and there

 8    was shooting, an explosion, as I said, which provoked setting light to

 9    trams, killings, and it was then, in fact, that the war really started in

10    Sarajevo, this lengthy apathy of life in town under those circumstances.

11       Q.   Can you tell us, please, Mr. Kupusovic, whose column of APCs and

12    tanks were these?  Who was using them?

13       A.   The Yugoslav People's Army.

14       Q.   And they were heading, you say, for the Presidency.  Where did

15    they actually end up?

16       A.   They were stopped at the bridge in front of the town assembly,

17    which is right close to the Presidency building, and they were stopped, in

18    fact, by the guards of the Presidency and the town assembly, that is,

19    units of the regular police, so that fighting occurred.  The assumption

20    was, of course, since negotiations were underway at the same time in

21    Lisbon on the implementation of the results of the referendum, that that

22    was in fact an attempted coup d'etat.

23       Q.   And after these APCs were stopped, what happened?  Did they remain

24    there?  Did they withdraw?  What happened to that armoured column?

25       A.   Several were destroyed, and the others withdrew.  But at the same

Page 636

 1    time several trams were set on fire, several cars and shooting occurred in

 2    town and that marked the beginning of the war conflict in Sarajevo.

 3       Q.   And can you say, sir, who were the other people involved in these

 4    incidents you refer to as unrest and riots?  Were there any particular

 5    groups involved?

 6       A.   Apart from police units and units of the reserve police units who

 7    were actually protecting the Presidency building as a symbol of the

 8    sovereignty of Bosnia and Hercegovina, there were several groups of

 9    self-organised young men who were assisting them.  These groups called

10    themselves Bosna.

11       Q.   And could you -- you say there were groups calling themselves

12    Bosna, did they represent any particular political party or any particular

13    ethnic group?

14       A.   No they were young men from Sarajevo who felt that there was

15    impending trouble and there were several hundred of them, several groups

16    who were assisting the police in maintaining the law and order and

17    civility in Sarajevo in March and April, but they were in civilian

18    clothes.  They were just citizens acting together with the reserve police.

19       Q.   So what happened after those particular incidents?  What then

20    happened in the city?

21       A.   After that the town was exposed to very heavy shelling.  A couple

22    of days later the Bascarsija was set alight, the national and university

23    libraries, the railway station, the post office and many key buildings in

24    town were heavily shelled and destroyed.

25       Q.   Do you know the date or the approximate date that that shelling

Page 637

 1    began?

 2       A.   This started already on the 2nd or 3rd of May and went on for

 3    several weeks, with interruptions, of course, went every day or every

 4    other day we experienced shocks.  Zetar [phoen] was destroyed, the Olympic

 5    Sports Hall, that the railway station had gone, that many apartments

 6    buildings had burned or several floors of those buildings and several

 7    apartments, and this went on during the following weeks and months.

 8       Q.   I'd like to ask you just a little more closely about that.  When

 9    the first shells landed upon the city, can you say the areas in which they

10    landed?  Were they specific areas, or what was the situation?

11       A.   The buildings that I mentioned are scattered all over town, so one

12    could not identify a particular part of town being targeted, except for

13    the buildings themselves, that were symbols of the town and were essential

14    for its functioning, like the post office, the railway stations, the Zetar

15    sports hall, and similar such facilities.

16       Q.   To your recollection, at that time, were those buildings the only

17    ones that received shell hits, or were there others?

18       A.   In those days, several apartment buildings were destroyed, many

19    high-rises had apartments burning.  The part of town where I had lived

20    until then, Dobrinja, right close to the airport, where the JNA was, half

21    of those apartments were set alight at the very beginning, and I found

22    that out from a neighbour who happened to be there.  Whereas when these

23    things were happening on the 2nd of May, I happened to be in the centre of

24    town, staying at my wife's parents' house.  Twenty days later, the

25    telephone lines were cut because the post office was set alight, so you

Page 638

 1    could not use the phone any more.

 2       Q.   You said, Mr. Kupusovic, that you lived in Dobrinja at that time.

 3    Were you able to make a return to your home?

 4       A.   No.  About a quarter past 11.00, when this fighting around the

 5    Presidency started, I happened to be in the street, and when I heard the

 6    shooting, I was with my children, so I went back to my in-laws' place, and

 7    in instead of going to -- by tram to Dobrinja, where we were planning to

 8    go, the tram stopped and we spent the following two and a half months in

 9    that apartment with my in-laws, because we couldn't go to Dobrinja any

10    more.  And when we called up our next-door neighbour in Dobrinja, we

11    learnt from her that we had nowhere to go, because the apartment had been

12    set on fire, and there was also no transportation.  Everything was under

13    blockade.  It was not possible to move around town.  And from the Marsal

14    Tito barracks, which was on the way, there was shooting going from the

15    barracks in all directions.

16       Q.   Who was occupying the Marsal Tito barracks at that time?

17       A.   The Yugoslav People's Army.

18       Q.   And when you refer to shooting, can you tell the kind of shooting

19    it was in terms of the weapons?  Was this small firearms or was it big

20    guns type shooting from the barracks?

21       A.   From the barracks there was side arms, rifle fire, and also the

22    so-called Zolja, the hand-held rocket launchers for armoured vehicles, but

23    they were also used to destroy apartments.

24       Q.   And can you say the kind of areas that came under fire from the

25    Tito barracks when that shooting started?

Page 639












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Page 640

 1       A.   All parts of town were targeted, which could be reached from the

 2    barracks.  So there was shooting in all four directions.

 3       Q.   What effects did this shooting from the Tito barracks have upon

 4    the ability of the civilian population to function within Sarajevo?

 5       A.   As I said, the barracks is in the centre of town.  It is a large

 6    compound.  And due to this fire coming from the barracks, these two parts

 7    of town -- there was no communication between the two parts of town on

 8    each side of the barracks.

 9       Q.   When you say "on each side of the barracks," are you talking of

10    north to south or east to west?

11       A.   All four sides: East/west and north/south.  Because the two main

12    roads are on each side of the barracks.  They couldn't be used.  And also,

13    north south, the north/south direction could not be used because of the

14    shooting coming from the barracks.

15       Q.   Were there any people hit by that shooting that was coming from

16    the barracks?

17       A.   Yes.  The television was still operational.  There was

18    electricity, and we repeatedly saw images or news reports about killings

19    or wounding of children, women, or men who happened to be in the line of

20    fire of people, I suppose, soldiers, in the barracks who were doing the

21    shooting.

22       Q.   And can you say again:  How long did it go on that there was this

23    shooting from Tito barracks out into the streets of Sarajevo?

24       A.   This went on for several weeks, until the point in time when it

25    was agreed at the negotiations that the JNA should move to Serbia, that

Page 641

 1    is, what was left of Yugoslavia, when the barracks was evacuated.  So that

 2    would be about a month and a half later.

 3       Q.   Was there any form or group of people who were actually opposing

 4    the JNA, fighting with them at that time?

 5       A.   In the former republics, the socialist republics of the former

 6    Yugoslavia, there was the Territorial Defence as a local organisation,

 7    that is, of the Republic, and already at the beginning of May, I think

 8    officially in mid-May, it was mobilised.  And together with the reserve

 9    police force and the police force and the self-organised groups of young

10    men, who all later became the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, members of that

11    army, those were in fact the force that opposed and that sought to

12    preserve the town and protect the citizens from these attacks.

13       Q.   And during that time, while the JNA was in those barracks and this

14    fighting was going on, what about the shelling of the city?  Was that

15    continuing?

16       A.   Throughout that time, the city was shelled, mostly from positions

17    around Sarajevo, but also from these barracks which were still under JNA

18    control in the city itself.

19       Q.   And did any -- to your recollection, did any shells hit the JNA

20    barracks while they were there, at that time?

21       A.   I don't know that any shell hit the barracks, but those young men

22    in the police didn't have the weapons with which to shell.  There were no

23    heavy weapons on their side.

24       Q.   Do you recall whether any of the shells coming in from the outside

25    of the city hit the Tito barracks at that time while the JNA were there?

Page 642

 1       A.   That was the same army, both outside town and in the barracks.

 2       Q.   Did you in fact personally see the Tito barracks buildings during

 3    this period, or did you not go near that particular area?

 4       A.   I didn't go to the immediate vicinity of the barracks because it

 5    was impossible to reach it, but the apartment which was behind the Holiday

 6    Inn hotel, we could see the walls of the barracks, compound.  It can be

 7    seen virtually from any part of town, because it is a very large compound

 8    of buildings, a complex of buildings.

 9       Q.   And so from those observations that you were able to make at the

10    time, if you just think back, Mr. Kupusovic, do you recall seeing any

11    noticeable damage to those barracks during that period, while the JNA were

12    there in May?

13       A.   No, I didn't see anything.

14       Q.   Now, what had happened at this time to your city assembly, now

15    that you had these conditions in which to try and function?

16       A.   The city assembly had been unable to meet since April, so we did

17    not have a quorum and were unable to make decisions.  Under the

18    legislation that was then in force, the Presidency of the town took over

19    the functions of the city assembly, and it is these signatures here that

20    it consisted of: The mayor, the deputy mayor, and the commander of the

21    civil defence, and the chief of the town police.  It started operating in

22    June, because in May it was still not possible to move around.  The

23    situation was totally unsafe.  And from early June until January or

24    February 1994, the Presidency of the town took on the functions of the

25    town assembly as the highest authority of civilian government in the town.

Page 643

 1       Q.   Yes.  I will at some future point be asking you a bit more about

 2    that, Mr. Kupusovic, but at the moment:  Were you in fact a member of that

 3    body, the Presidency?

 4       A.   Yes, I was.

 5       Q.   Thank you.  So after we have this change in civilian

 6    administration, you have made reference, I believe, to a time when the JNA

 7    left the Tito barracks.  Could you just describe briefly the circumstances

 8    that led to that and where they went?

 9       A.   When Bosnia and Herzegovina became a member of the UN as a

10    sovereign state, negotiations were held by people at higher political

11    levels, and it was agreed that the JNA should move out of Bosnia and

12    Herzegovina and thus from Sarajevo and the Marsal Tito barracks.  They

13    moved out, and this was monitored by the UN.  They were to leave behind

14    their heavy weapons for the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to take

15    with them only their personal weapons.  When they were moving out, some of

16    them stayed in Grbavica, which is a part of town on the other side of the

17    river.  And as I said, we still had TV broadcasts, and of course we

18    watched both Belgrade and Zagreb TV.  And young men who had been doing

19    their military service in the JNA really did go back to their homes and

20    their families, but evidently the largest part of the JNA - officers,

21    soldiers, and weapons - stayed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, around Sarajevo, and

22    they were simply transformed into the army of Karadzic's Serbs, or later

23    on, the army of Republika Srpska.

24       Q.   And so at that time, were any areas established or locations in

25    the city established where we could refer to them, say, as front lines,

Page 644

 1    occupied by soldiers?

 2       A.   In April, May, early July, no lines had yet been established.  We

 3    couldn't call those lines.  The urban areas where people lived were

 4    patrolled by reserve policemen and the units of the Territorial Defence

 5    and volunteers from the houses and flats where people lived.  I don't

 6    remember the exact date when a state of war was declared and the army of

 7    Bosnia and Herzegovina was formally established and general mobilisation

 8    was announced.  In Sarajevo, this meant setting up an army to defend the

 9    town.  It was only in September or October that one could speak of lines

10    being established when trenches began to be dug by the town, which was

11    under siege from all sides, and these trenches were the defence lines.

12       Q.   Right.  Thank you.  So in May, the situation you've described

13    clearly did not lead to any settled confrontation.  You have referred to

14    mobilisations.  What in fact happened, and when was that initiated, to try

15    and mobilise a defence force?

16       A.   The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina issued a call for

17    mobilisation, saying that able-bodied young men were to report to the

18    municipal mobilisation bodies, and that is how the organisation of the

19    army began.  Its first commander was the commander of the Territorial

20    Defence, who, during the former Yugoslavia and during the time of the JNA,

21    when they controlled the town, had been the Territorial Defence

22    commander.  He expressed loyalty to the government of sovereign Bosnia and

23    Herzegovina.

24            Later on, of course, there were changes, and the mobilisation was

25    carried out according to city districts and municipalities, and people

Page 645

 1    responded, but there were no weapons or uniforms, or there were very small

 2    amounts.  And there was a big depot containing weapons and equipment for

 3    the Territorial Defence on the edge of the town, and this was moved

 4    overnight by the JNA.  It was moved to another location, where it could

 5    not be used to arm and equip the regular army of the state of Bosnia and

 6    Herzegovina, and this was in Faletici, where this depot used to be.

 7       Q.   And did your city Presidency have any role in the military aspect

 8    of the defence of the city?

 9       A.   [No interpretation]

10       Q.   Now, you have described that during this period -- we have had a

11    description of shelling of the city.  Can you say whether these shellings

12    resulted in human casualties?

13            MR. BLAXILL:  Your Honours, we appear to have an indication there

14    was no interpretation of my last question.

15            JUDGE ORIE:  I think it was the answer to the question, as far as

16    I can see, it's "A. No interpretation."  I didn't hear any answer

17    pronounced by the witness.

18            MR. BLAXILL:  I thought he said "no."

19            JUDGE ORIE:  Perhaps a very short answer.

20            MR. BLAXILL:  May I ask the question again for clarity on the

21    record?

22            JUDGE ORIE:  Please do, Mr. Blaxill.

23            MR. BLAXILL:

24       Q.   Mr. Kupusovic, did your presidency have any role in the military

25    aspect of the defence of city of Sarajevo?  Could you answer that question

Page 646

 1    again, please, sir, for our records here.

 2       A.   No.  It had no role in the military aspect.

 3       Q.   Thank you very much.  Just before that, Mr. Kupusovic, I had asked

 4    you whether there had been any human casualties as a result of the

 5    shelling of the city that had commenced then and been going for a little

 6    while during May of 1992.  Can you tell me if you know that?

 7       A.   Yes.  There were numerous casualties.  We could hear ambulances,

 8    the sirens of ambulances driving the wounded to hospital.  There were ten

 9    or fifteen casualties every day.

10       Q.   Do you recall or do you know whether these casualties were

11    civilian casualties or were people who were engaged in some kind of active

12    hostilities?

13       A.   Civilians.  Also, there were some policemen or members of these

14    groups defending the town.

15       Q.   Are you aware, Mr. Kupusovic, of any kind of proportion between

16    the two as to which civilian or these other groups had the greater

17    casualties at that time?

18       A.   95 per cent of the victims were civilians, and only a few per cent

19    were reserve policemen and other members of the city defence.

20       Q.   Now, of those casualties, were they only casualties of the

21    shelling of the city, or were there any other ways in which they were

22    being killed?

23       A.   There was a lot of shooting from infantry weapons, and citizens

24    started calling these sniper shots, people at crossroads or in the streets

25    were wounded or killed in this way.

Page 647












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13   English transcripts.













Page 648

 1       Q.   So what initially did the citizens do to try and protect

 2    themselves, say, when they were at crossroads or at other places in the

 3    city as regards this shooting that they refer to as sniping?

 4       A.   At the very beginning after the 2nd of May, most citizens stayed

 5    in their basements.  They were afraid to go out.  They had to go out,

 6    however, in order to get bread or to run an errand or see a friend or

 7    visit someone who was wounded, and they either had to make detours through

 8    narrow streets where there was less danger from the sniping, or they had

 9    to run across these places, risking being shot, because there was no other

10    way of crossing from one part of the street, one side of the street to

11    another.

12       Q.   I'd like to explore just a little more about the actual style of

13    this shooting.  I mean, was this a situation of people who were very close

14    to some kind of actual military group, or were these shots of a different

15    type, at longer range or unseen?

16       A.   People crossing the streets or moving around, these people were

17    all civilians.  The shooting was from Mount Trebevic, overlooking

18    Sarajevo, from the wood, or in other parts of town, from wooded areas

19    around the town.  In mid-May, I personally waited for half an hour with my

20    daughter to cross the street.  I kept thinking whether I should go back or

21    cross.  And when I thought that the shooting had stopped, we ran across,

22    and on our way back we looked for a way around, a detour, in order to go

23    back.  And then, of course, my wife was very angry because I had risked my

24    own life and my daughter's life.  However, later on, she did the same

25    thing herself, because there was no other way.  You couldn't keep on

Page 649

 1    sitting in the basement waiting for the situation to end.  You had to

 2    organise your family, your life, under these risky conditions, among all

 3    the sniping and shelling.

 4       Q.   So Mr. Kupusovic, was this, therefore, a regular occurrence that

 5    there was sniping of this nature?

 6       A.   It was unforeseeable.  There would be a lull of a few hours, then

 7    it would start again, and then it would stop.  There was no pattern.

 8    There was no reason we could discern why it started or stopped.

 9       Q.   You've just given us one of your own personal experiences of

10    sniper shot.  Can you tell us, please, where that was that you and your

11    daughter had to take the risky crossing?

12       A.   It was at the crossing between the hygienic institute and

13    Skenderija, in the very centre of town, which lies open towards

14    Trebevic.

15       Q.   And could you tell us whether you were able to tell where the shot

16    was coming from or where the shooting was coming from, from that place?

17       A.   It was obvious, because there were a few big trees there and you

18    could see the bullet flying through the leaves and hitting the asphalt or

19    person, if it hit someone.  And it was obviously coming from the hill,

20    from the mountain, a few hundred metres behind Skenderija.

21       Q.   And you have mentioned, I believe, that there were obviously other

22    areas, other places where this happened.  What kind of features indicated

23     -- made for the places where the sniping took place?  In other words, is

24    there some particular feature about an area that made it more vulnerable

25    to it being sniped upon?

Page 650

 1       A.   The centre of town, where the streets are wider and where the

 2    streets run at a right angle to the long axis of the town, this is where

 3    there was most sniping, and these streets were very dangerous to cross.

 4    People made detours to avoid them.  And also the streets on both banks of

 5    the river Miljacka, where there were open spaces without buildings, this

 6    was also exposed to this kind of fire.  The narrower streets, or the parts

 7    where the buildings are taller, these were safer, so that for the first

 8    few weeks the townspeople learned which streets and crossings were

 9    dangerous and which were less dangerous, and this applied to every part of

10    town, but I have simply described the centre, around the assembly, the

11    Holiday Inn hotel, the barracks, where the army had moved out, but this

12    was all exposed, because the army of Karadzic's Serbs and their snipers

13    were on the other side.

14       Q.   Did the city Presidency have any responsibility for the sort of

15    public safety in the sense of the infrastructure and trying to arrange

16    safety measures for the population of Sarajevo in those conditions?

17       A.   As regards public utilities, the Presidency had exclusive

18    responsibility for this.  But as regards security, protection from sniping

19    and shelling, the Presidency had no responsibility for this, but it did

20    look after the security of citizens by taking care that communications

21    were established and that people could move around under these conditions

22    that prevailed.

23       Q.   So did the Presidency, of which you were part, have any role in

24    contacting others about protection for the citizens in respect of this

25    sniping?

Page 651

 1       A.   Yes.  The civilian defence of the town of Sarajevo, according to

 2    its establishment, was under the republican staff, so that the

 3    commander came from the republican staff, but the town civil defence, its

 4    commander was a member of the city Presidency, and it obeyed the

 5    instructions of the Presidency of the town in connection with helping to

 6    maintain the infrastructure of the city.

 7       Q.   And to your recollection, did the civilian protection do anything

 8    to try and assist protecting civilians from sniper fire?

 9       A.   Yes.  In the beginning, the local organisations of the civilian

10    protection set up trash containers or buses or trucks that had been burnt,

11    where there had been fires, they put them there on their own initiative,

12    to make movements safer.  Later on, the city Presidency organised and the

13    civilian protection carried out the setting up of large containers from

14    railcars that were found at the railway station in Sarajevo, and these

15    provided better protection from the sniper shots and from the infantry

16    weapons.  Of course, machinery had to be used to move these containers.

17    It couldn't be done by hand.  So that cranes from companies that had that

18    were recruited to move these containers by night.

19       Q.   Can you say when those measures started to be taken in Sarajevo,

20    to put up the barriers against sniping?

21       A.   This started in May.  I'm referring to setting up protection on

22    people's own initiative.  Later on it was organised by the Presidency of

23    the city and the civilian protection and companies that were able to

24    provide the service of moving and setting up these large containers.

25       Q.   You've used the expression "people's own initiative."  What do you

Page 652

 1    mean by that?  Was that just local community action, local residents, as

 2    it were?

 3       A.   Yes.  Sarajevo was organised into 120 local communes.  These were

 4    local organisations of municipal self-government.  There would be several

 5    streets or several buildings, and the inhabitants of these constituted a

 6    local commune.  They would have a small administrative centre and one

 7    employee, a secretary, and the people there got together and they would

 8    put several trash containers at the end of a street to make it less

 9    exposed to sniping.  So this was self-organisation without any sort of

10    command or special organisation.  So on a local level, the population

11    tried to protect themselves.

12       Q.   And later you say that the, as it were, the authorities became

13    involved.  And can you tell us what sort of criteria were applied in

14    choosing where to put up the barricades in order?  There must have been

15    many demands, but how did you select which places to put up the

16    barricades?

17       A.   When the city Presidency started functioning in early June, and

18    until then the mayor's office which functioned the whole time, had been

19    receiving reports as to where people had been wounded or killed by sniping

20    and who these people were.  So that along with general knowledge of which

21    places were risky, there was also precise information, and if several

22    people had been killed or wounded at a certain crossroads, this crossroads

23    was given priority to set up this sort of passive anti-sniping

24    protection.  It took a great deal of effort to set this up, to find

25    trucks, containers, to make a certain part of town passable in relation to

Page 653

 1    snipers.

 2            One of the first crossings was the one where I had my personal

 3    experience, and containers -- two containers high, a wall two containers

 4    high was set up, because a lot of people had been wounded there, and in

 5    the centre of town, where there were more people, that was given priority.

 6       Q.   And can you tell us any other significant locations where in the

 7    earlier stages some of the barricades were erected, other than the

 8    junction where you had your incident?

 9       A.   There were anti-sniper barricades in front of the Energoinvest

10    building, where there was a wide street.  Then little by little, actually,

11    in all the streets that were exposed and that were close to these lines

12    outside the town from which shots were fired at the town.  In Novi Grad, a

13    lot were set up on the main road leading toward Ilidza, also on the old

14    town on Bascarsija, which is the old centre of town.  There's a big square

15    there, where there were several rows of anti-sniper barricades.

16            JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Blaxill, would this be a suitable moment to

17    stop?  Because we have to stop at 7.00.  Unless you have one short

18    question left, but otherwise --

19            MR. BLAXILL:  In fact, that's why my learned friend and I were in

20    brief conversation.

21            JUDGE ORIE:  That's what I thought, as a matter of fact.

22            MR. BLAXILL:  I have more to say on the subject, but it's a good

23    place to break, so indeed, Your Honour.

24            JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you very much, Mr. Blaxill.  It is the

25    attention of the Trial Chamber that once this witness will be excused, so

Page 654

 1    after examination-in-chief, of course, cross-examination, and if necessary

 2    re-examination, that we'll have a short Status Conference and see what

 3    problems still have to be solved.  So I don't know whether this will be

 4    during tomorrow, already tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, but the Court

 5    stays in recess until a quarter past 2.00 p.m. tomorrow.

 6                          --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.59 p.m.,

 7                          to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 4th day of December

 8                          2001, at 2.15 a.m.