1 Monday, 25 March 2002
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.34 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone in this courtroom.
6 Madam Registrar, could you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Case Number
8 IT-98-29-T, the Prosecutor versus Stanislav Galic.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
10 Ms. Pilipovic, I see Mr. Piletta-Zanin is not there. He will have
11 a delay in travelling, do you expect, or...?
12 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, due to his
13 commitments in Geneva, my colleague is not going to be present today.
14 However, as of tomorrow, he will be here with me again.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much.
16 I think before we continue with the witnesses, we still have to
17 deal with the admission into evidence of the documents tendered during the
18 testimony of Mr. Kundo and Witness AE.
19 Madam Registrar, could you please guide me through the documents.
20 Yes, Mr. Ierace.
21 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, good morning. Before that happens, on
22 Friday morning, Mr. Piletta-Zanin made some submissions in relation to the
23 medical documentation in respect of Mr. Kundo.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
25 MR. IERACE: I am ready to respond to that. If you wish it, Mr.
1 President, if you think it is necessary, I would give a brief explanation
2 as to why the documents -- why there were two or more versions of the
3 medical reports.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Translations. Of the originals.
5 MR. IERACE: Yes. The differences in the translation are clearly
6 on the face of the documents explained by different or varying qualities
7 of legibility. So the issue then becomes why is there more than one
8 version of the document? And the explanation for that I think is
9 apparent when one looks more carefully at the ERN numbers and reflects on
10 the evidence that was given on Friday. If you wish, I could briefly give
11 that explanation.
12 JUDGE ORIE: If you would do it briefly.
13 MR. IERACE: On the exhibit list, the Prosecution has placed two
14 versions of the medical report. They are Exhibit Numbers P1800 and P1809.
15 During the evidence of Mrs. Kundo, she was taken to -- by the Defence, she
16 was taken to an investigative report done by the Bosnian authorities at
17 the time. You may recall that she was asked questions about a statement
18 given by her husband.
19 THE INTERPRETER: Could you slow down, please, Mr. Ierace.
20 MR. IERACE: I will slow down in deference to the interpreters. I
22 That report, of course, had been disclosed by the Prosecution to
23 the Defence. The ERN numbers for that report range from 0028-4041 through
24 to 49. In other words, when the report was received by the Tribunal, it
25 was stamped with those numbers. The report included the letter of
1 discharge, and therefore, not surprisingly, that's where it picked up the
2 first ERN number, which ends in 47.
3 And that, in turn, when one looks at the two translations
4 attached, the translation attached to each of the exhibits, one sees down
5 at the bottom of one of those translations that the document is based on a
6 medical report within that same range, that is, 47.
7 One then goes to, in time, the statement taken by the
8 investigator, an investigator of the OTP, of Mrs. Kundo. And you may
9 recall that during the testimony of Mrs. Kundo, I took her to a part of
10 one of her statements which referred to a medical report which was stated
11 to be attached to her statement. One sees in the statement, having regard
12 to the ERN numbers, that at that point, the medical document picks up its
13 second ERN number. We then see -- so that explains one of the exhibits on
14 the exhibit list in relation to the medical report, Exhibit 18 -- one of
15 the versions on Exhibit 1800.
16 There then came into the possession of the OTP a copy of the
17 document from a different source, and inquiries reveal that that source
18 was a Dr. Kulenovic, who was the head of the relevant clinical centre.
19 But in relation to the other exhibit, one sees that on the face of the
20 document, there are a number of additional signatures. That is explained
21 by the fact that 1809, in particular, the first version of that report, is
22 attached to the 92 bis statement authenticated by Kapetanovic, first name
23 Faris, in relation to hospital records from Kosevo Hospital. So when one
24 looks closely at the various stamps and signatures on the
25 face of that document, it becomes readily apparent that one of those
1 signatures is in relation to that person completing their 92 bis
2 statement. And there should be, behind it, an earlier version of the same
3 record which lacks that 92 bis attestation.
4 So Mr. President, that's the explanation for the various copies of
5 the document. The reason that we have tendered two of them is that one is
6 more legible than the other in various parts. And that is, of course, why
7 each of the two translations has differences.
8 Again, the basic proposition is simply whether there is evidence
9 of the injury, the wounding, consistent with the history of the wounding.
10 That comes primarily from the witness. One then goes to the
11 documentation, if there is any available, for corroboration. Thank you,
12 Mr. President.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. May I ask you one question: Of course,
14 the Chamber noticed the double ERN numbers, what the explanation is,
15 that's not difficult to understand. The Defence has also pointed at some
16 inconsistencies in the translations, and not just legibility. And I think
17 there are also sometimes it seems that the translation of stamps is not
18 always clearly distinguished from the translation of text. So what about
19 the inconsistencies?
20 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, many of the parts of the translations
21 marked by Mr. Piletta-Zanin in ink are, in fact, explained by the lack of
22 legibility. To give an example, under the box dated "Admission" in the
23 copy marked in blue, we simply see "2 November." When one looks at the
24 original of that translation, one can see "2.11." and the year is not
25 apparent. When one looks at the original for the other translation, and
1 that translation shows "2 November 1993," one can clearly see the
2 original -- the date, rather, on the face of the document. I note in
3 relation to that that there appears to be a handwritten entry under date
4 of admission. That is, on P1809. It therefore appears that someone at a
5 later point has written in the date. I note the date is the same as on
6 the earlier version, and one can only speculate that perhaps the date on
7 the copy of the document retained by the hospital was not legible or fully
8 legible, so it has been corrected. But there is no inconsistency.
9 As to any inconsistencies on the face of the translations, that is
10 really a matter for the translation unit. In other words, the OTP puts in
11 a request for the translation and whatever we receive, we then attach to
12 the document that we tender. Mr. President, I do not note any significant
13 difference between the translations.
14 One of the issues that I recall that Mr. Piletta-Zanin drew our
15 attention to was the signature of the doctor as translated and marked by
16 him in pink. And essentially, he defied anyone to read from the original
17 that name. Mr. President, I do note that at the bottom of that same
18 original, one sees the stamp of the same name. One can barely make out
19 the surname in the box "Head of clinic signed" halfway down the form on
20 the right-hand side. I can certainly make out the last four letters,
21 and the first capital letter, first capital letter being "K," last four
22 letters being "O-V-I-C." When one looks at the Stamp at the bottom of the
23 page towards the middle, one sees that it is a stamp for Dr. Faruk
24 Kulenovic. And it may well be - it's a matter of speculation - that the
25 translator assumed that was the same person and took the information from
1 that stamp.
2 The issue is really whether there is, firstly, any challenge by
3 the Defence on the material in the medical report; and if so, whether the
4 authenticity becomes an issue. The witness has given evidence of the
5 document, so there is evidence before the Tribunal already, before we get
6 to the 92 bis statement, to the effect that the original, that is, the
7 photocopies from which the translations were done, are in fact the
8 relevant medical report.
9 Thank you, Mr. President.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, would you like to respond?
11 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
12 Your Honours, the Defence has pointed to the problem of
13 illegibility of the medical documentation several times. The problem was
14 often raised at the meetings with my colleagues from the Prosecution. The
15 same problem arose this time, and it involved the problems of translation
16 of certain documents. The Defence declared its objection to the
17 authenticity of the entire medical documentation.
18 We were -- we have been able to see the document in respect of Ms.
19 Kundo, which was illegible, and we believe that it is possible that there
20 are several such documents in the Serbian language, and that that was the
21 reason for differences in translation. Because of the contents of each
22 medical document where it is stated that the patient was hit by a sniper
23 bullet, which information was not entered as part of the case history but
24 the conclusion of the physician, we object to the document itself, because
25 such a conclusion can only be made by a pathologist, by a forensic expert.
1 We have pointed out the problems of the documents, and the reason
2 for our objection is impossibility for the Defence to study these
3 documents. We have requested access to original documents several times.
4 I think that Ramiza Kundo told us that she had the original of this
5 document. If such a document exists in its original form, I don't see any
6 reason why should we continue to waste any more time in order to establish
7 the authenticity of the documents which are obviously illegible.
8 We maintain our request for access to the originals because we
9 believe that it would be possible for us, by doing so, to assess the
10 veracity of the documents which are provided to the Defence and the
11 Chamber. And of course, it will be up to the Chamber to judge the value
12 of the documents. Therefore, it is our conclusion and our motion that the
13 original documents should be made accessible so that we can establish its
14 authenticity. And I believe we have stated often times the reason why we
15 challenge the authenticity of the documents.
16 [Trial Chamber confers]
17 JUDGE ORIE: We'll give a decision on the specific matter after
18 the break. That just concerns, I would, say the medical documentation of
19 Ramiza Kundo.
20 Madam Registrar, what other documents do we have to decide upon?
21 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, according to the list I have, it's
22 Prosecution Exhibit P3280V, P3279V, P1800, P1800.1, P1811, P1811A, P3673
23 and P3674. That's what I have. Apart from the documents that were
24 discussed earlier.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but you're repeating, I think, part of the
1 documents, because we discussed 1800. Well, let's just start at the
2 beginning. The video and the second number you mentioned, that was the
3 360-degree photograph, they are admitted.
4 Then 1800 and translations, we'll give a decision on that after
5 the break.
6 Then you said 1811, that was -- could you perhaps --
7 THE REGISTRAR: A colour copy of a photograph.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Coloured copy of the photograph.
9 THE REGISTRAR: And P1811A is the black and white copy.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that was the double-sided copy, as far as I
11 remember. The major importance was that the photocopy, the testimony was
12 that it was signed but the signature was not visible on the photocopy. So
13 1811, a coloured photograph with markings on it, is admitted into
14 evidence. And also 1811.A, which is the same photograph in black and
15 white, and at the back of the photograph, some handwritten information.
16 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, 1811 is the coloured version. Thank
17 you. And 1811A is the black and white.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's what I intended to say, at least.
19 Then we have 36 -- I first had 72 as a name sheet of Witness AE,
20 which is --
21 THE REGISTRAR: Sorry. I thought we would deal with these
22 witnesses separately.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, first Mrs. Kundo.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Yes.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Then 3673, could you please assist me. That is --
1 THE REGISTRAR: That is the witness statement.
2 JUDGE ORIE: That is the witness statement, but -- yes, the
3 witness statement is admitted in evidence, but since the attachment to the
4 statement is not translated and this translation concerns similar aspects
5 as the translation of Document 1800, the attachment is not yet admitted.
6 We'll decide upon that after the break as well.
7 And then we have 3674. You said that's the --
8 THE REGISTRAR: That's another witness statement.
9 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Another witness statement of the month of October,
11 30 October, 3674.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's admitted as well.
13 Then we come to the next witness, that was Witness AE.
14 THE REGISTRAR: The following exhibits are P3363, medical record;
15 and P3672, that's an under seal document.
16 JUDGE ORIE: 3672 is a name sheet.
17 Yes, Mr. Ierace.
18 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I'm told that 3365 is the medical
20 JUDGE ORIE: Let me just have a look and check it.
21 It's 3365, yes, that's what I have here as well. The name sheet
22 is not a problem. That's 3672. That's admitted under seal.
23 The medical record is also admitted under the specific
24 circumstances of this document itself. The translation covers all parts
25 the Prosecution relies upon. The small part of the document not
1 translated seems to reflect the treatment and the medication of the
2 patient, and the Defence has been confronted with this and has not given
3 any specific reasons why it was material to the Defence that this part
4 also would be translated, apart from the fact that the Defence has
5 knowledge of the B/C/S language and could read it by itself, it
6 nevertheless insisted upon translation of the document as a matter of
7 principle, and that objection is denied.
8 It also has to be admitted under seal, Madam Registrar, because it
9 contains the name of the protected witness. I think, having dealt with
10 the documents, we could now continue.
11 Mr. Ierace, we received a new order of witnesses. Would you
12 please call your first witness.
13 MR. IERACE: Yes, Mr. President. The next witness will be taken
14 by Chester Stamp. Might I be excused?
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
16 MR. IERACE: Thank you.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stamp, am I well informed that Mr. Hamill will be
18 the next witness?
19 MR. STAMP: Yes, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Would you please call him.
21 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stamp, am I well informed that the witness did
23 not arrive yet?
24 MR. STAMP: The witness was here last week.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
1 MR. STAMP: He came from early last week, and he indicated that he
2 would like to go and return. He's from Ireland, and I think he wanted to
3 go somewhere, which did not present an inconvenience. And my last
4 knowledge of the matter that I instructed that he had to be here for this
5 morning, which meant that he would have to return here yesterday.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, or at least this morning, early.
7 Have you any information, any additional information --
8 MR. STAMP: I'm just learning now that he's not here. I was
9 assured that he would be here for this morning.
10 THE REGISTRAR: If you permit me, Your Honour, I can contact the
11 Victims and Witnesses Section and see how long it will take before the
12 witness is here.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. At least, if they are aware of where the
14 witness is, of course.
15 THE REGISTRAR: What I heard from the usher, they are aware, and
16 he must be here within 10 minutes. That's the latest information.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stamp, what would you suggest? If it's just a
18 matter of 10 minutes, it might be more convenient for you to -- not to
19 start with another witness. But if you could change your order, I don't
20 know whether this would...
21 MR. STAMP: I am not quite sure if I could change the order. I
22 don't know if the other witnesses would be here for this morning.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I can imagine, yes.
24 MR. STAMP: That witness we had expected to take at least today.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I see that.
1 Well, I think the only thing we could do is to have a short break
2 and urge you to inform the Chamber as soon as possible when there's any
3 information about when we could expect the witness. And I'd like to hear
4 from whoever is responsible for the presence of the witnesses why this
5 could happen. Because one thing was for sure from last Friday, it was
6 clear that we would start this morning with Mr. Hamill.
7 Yes. We'll have a break. Could perhaps, since it has been
8 indicated that it might be take no more than 10 minutes, could everyone
9 stay nearby so that we could immediately resume when the witness is there.
10 Thank you.
11 --- Break taken at 10.04 a.m.
12 [The witness entered court]
13 --- On resuming at 10.12 a.m.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stamp.
15 MR. STAMP: If it please you, Mr. President, Your Honours, I have
16 been made to understand that there was a misunderstanding between the OTP
17 and the Victims and Witnesses Unit. The victim was here in the building,
18 however at some stage a member of the OTP had indicated to him that
19 perhaps the order had changed. Not -- that perhaps the order had changed.
20 I am told by the Victims and Witnesses Unit that they had been led to
21 believe that the order had changed. That is the explanation for the
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, let's all try to prevent misunderstandings for
24 the future.
25 Mr. Hamill, I don't think I have to ask you whether you hear me in
1 a language you understand.
2 THE WITNESS: Yes.
3 JUDGE ORIE: You speak English. Before giving your testimony in
4 this Court, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence require you to make a
5 solemn declaration. The text of the declaration will be handed out to you
6 now by the usher. May I invite you to make that solemn declaration.
7 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
8 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much, Mr. Hamill. Please be seated.
10 WITNESS: JOHN GERARD BRENDAN HAMILL
11 JUDGE ORIE: You'll first be examined by counsel for the
12 Prosecution, then by counsel for the Defence, and if there are any
13 questions by the Judges, you'll hear them.
14 Mr. Stamp, please proceed.
15 MR. STAMP: I am grateful, Mr. President.
16 Examined by Mr. Stamp:
17 Q. Could you please state your name and rank.
18 A. My name is John Gerard Brendan Hamill. I am a commandant, which
19 is the equivalent of a major.
20 Q. Which army is that?
21 A. The Irish Army, the Irish Defence Forces.
22 Q. How long have you been a member of the Defence Forces?
23 A. I have been 30 years in the Defence Forces.
24 Q. Have you worked in any particular field in the Irish Defence
25 Forces in those 30 years?
1 A. I am an artillery officer and have been since September 1974. I
2 have served overseas with United Nations forces on six occasions, and I
3 have served with the European Community Monitoring Mission also for a
4 period in the Balkans.
5 Q. Now, in between May 1993 and July 1994, can you tell us where you
6 served, if anywhere?
7 A. At that time, I was a military observer with United Nations in the
8 United Nations Protection Force. I spent three months in the vicinity of
9 Sarajevo, followed by one month in Daruvar, followed by ten months in
10 Zagreb, where I was the deputy chief operations officer for the first four
11 months, and then acting chief operations officer of the UNMO organisation.
12 Q. Where exactly is Daruvar?
13 A. Daruvar is in sector west in -- the former sector west in
15 Q. Now, what period of time did you spend as a member of UNPROFOR in
16 Sarajevo or in the vicinity of Sarajevo?
17 A. I was posted there in May 1993, and my posting terminated in
18 August 1993. So apart from two leave periods, I spent from May until the
19 beginning of August in Sarajevo and its vicinity.
20 Q. What was your first posting in Sarajevo?
21 A. In Sarajevo, I was posted first to the Lima 5 team, and the
22 following day, to the Lima 8 team. "Lima" indicated Lukavica, that is,
23 the military observers which were operating on the Serb side of the front
24 line. So I was there from day 2 as the team leader of Lima 8, based in
25 Gornji Kotorac. Following a period there, I was taken into the
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 headquarters of the UNMO organisation in Lukavica, and I lived in Lukavica
2 barracks for most of the remainder of my period in Sarajevo.
3 Q. Where is Gornji Kotorac?
4 A. Gornji Kotorac is just to the south of Lukavica. It's a hill or
5 its on a hill called Ilinaca, which is overlooking the airport. It also
6 looks over Vojkovici, Hrasnica, Igman, as far as Stup and Mojmilo.
7 Q. While you were an UNMO at Gornji Kotorac, what was the nature of
8 your task?
9 A. The nature of the task was to, in that particular area, to visit
10 the Serb weapon positions within my area, and to ensure that they were not
11 being fired. And if they were being fired, to elicit information as to
12 why they were being fired, to attempt to negotiate cease-fires where
13 necessary, and to report on all that I found to my higher headquarters.
14 Q. Gornji Kotorac is to the south of the city you said, did you?
15 A. It is. It's to the southeast of the city.
16 Q. Were you ever posted in any of the northern parts of the city?
17 A. I was posted to the northern part of the city from around
18 mid-July. I was posted first of all to Vogosca, where we had the
19 headquarters of the UNMOs to the north of the city. And from there, I
20 covered from Radava as far as Igman as the commander of the UNMOs in that
21 area. However, due to a problem we had, we moved to Blazuj, which is just
22 beyond Ilidza, on the road towards Mostar and Kiseljak.
23 Q. Now, in those postings towards the north of the city and the south
24 of the city, you indicated that part of your task was to make
25 observations. Did the UNMOs at the time you were there have sufficient
1 personnel and material to make comprehensive observations of all the Serb
3 A. It is my opinion that they did not have sufficient resources
4 available. Large parts of the area were extremely difficult to get at,
5 particularly in the north and east of the city. The furthest east we had
6 in the south was the Lima 5 position in Kasindol. Then you had --
7 Q. That is to what part of the city?
8 A. It's east. Southeast. It's east of Lukavica. So from there, as
9 far as Sombolovac there was no team in situ, and the area was very
10 inaccessible. Also, it was inaccessible as the Bosnian Serb army did not
11 wish us to travel throughout the area.
12 Q. How about the area towards the north of the city? Was that
13 accessible or inaccessible?
14 A. It was partly accessible, partly inaccessible. The terrain was
15 difficult particularly to the northeast, in the area of Radava, and from
16 there eastwards.
17 In the west, the travelling was good, however there were
18 artificial obstacles put in our way on many occasions. There was a group
19 of so-called Chetniks led by a man called Vasilije Vidovic, known as
20 Vasko, who regularly impeded the UNMO teams in that area.
21 Q. And in the northeast area, what was your ability to observe?
22 A. Similarly in the northeast, it was difficult, again because of the
23 fact that the access to the area was controlled by the same so-called
25 Q. Now, while you were posted in those areas, did you make any
1 observations of the Bosnian Serb army artillery and mortar positions?
2 A. Yes, I did.
3 Q. Could you briefly, if you could in a sentence or two, tell us how
4 mortars and artillery are sited or positioned in the standard military
6 A. In the standard military use, each type of weapon has its own job.
7 Thus, for example, guns would be used for long-range firing at distant
8 targets, very distant targets. They would be sited, depending on the
9 tactical circumstances, either well to the forward or well to the rear.
10 To the rear, in Defence; and forward, in attack.
11 Mortars would be a lot closer to the front line due to the shorter
12 range. Again, Howitzers and mortars can fire from behind high cover, so
13 they would be used in circumstances of difficult terrain.
14 And the job of the artillery is always to support the combat
15 troops, that is, the infantry. That is, in conventional circumstances.
16 Q. In conventional circumstances, in respect to mortars, are they
17 normally sited in one position for a long time?
18 A. No, no. Mortars, because of their high visibility, the slow rate
19 of fire, the ease of detection, are normally used in what we would
20 describe as "shoot and scoot."
21 Q. Could you explain.
22 A. That is, that they fire a number of rounds very quickly and move
23 to another position, perhaps hundreds of metres, perhaps kilometres
24 distant. That is to prevent what we call "counter battery fire," which is
25 fire directed by artillery at artillery. Again, this is in conventional
2 Q. Did you make any particular observation in respect to how mortar
3 positions were sited by the BSA army around Sarajevo while you were there?
4 A. Yes, I was very surprised at the positioning of both mortars and
5 guns. They were not used in the conventional way that I have just
6 described. What they did was they sited any weapon they had, whether
7 mortar or gun, in a particular area and left it there. For example, in
8 the Lima 8 position where I had responsibility for monitoring two troops
9 of mortars --
10 Q. Where is Lima 8 position, before you go on?
11 A. Sorry, Gornji Kotorac. There were two troops of mortars, there
12 was a troop of anti-aircraft guns, and a troop of tanks. And all were
13 used in effectively the same way despite their different tactical
14 characteristics. They were placed in position to plug a gap and where they
15 could fire at targets of opportunity. In other words, they were left in
16 place, and it was clear that the mortars, when I arrived in May 1993, had
17 been in situ for a considerable period. And they were still there when I
18 left in August.
19 Q. When you say "in situ," could you just explain what you mean. Did
20 they move from one spot to another spot in the same vicinity or were they
21 on the same immediate spot?
22 A. Base plates had not moved. When a mortar is fired, because of the
23 angle of firing, the base plate - that is, the platform on which the
24 barrel sits - is pushed into the ground, and the more rounds that are
25 fired, the further it is pushed into the ground. It was clear that these
1 mortars had been in exactly the same position for a considerable period.
2 This was most unusual.
3 Q. The crews that operated these mortar batches, from your
4 observation of them, is there anything you can say about their general
5 quality and training?
6 A. It was -- we tend -- all professionals tend to make a mystery of
7 their own profession. However, there is nothing particularly mysterious
8 about firing mortars and the skills can be learned relatively quickly.
9 And it seemed to me that the people of the troops in question had the
10 requisite skills.
11 Q. Now, you said that for a period of time, you were posted at the
12 Lukavica barracks.
13 A. That is correct. I was there as liaison officer.
14 Q. What was your function as liaison officer in those barracks?
15 A. My first job was to deputise for the commander of the UNMOs in the
16 Lima area. But following on from that, part of the task was to liaise
17 with the headquarters staff of the Sarajevo Romanija corps of the Bosnian
18 Serb army in order to pass on information to them and receive information
19 from them regarding war activities in the area, and also to negotiate,
20 where required, cease-fires and to monitor cease-fires.
21 Q. Now, did you pass on any particular type of information to them in
22 respect to the circumstances that civilians were undergoing in Sarajevo?
23 A. Yes, we did. On occasion, we would receive information from our
24 headquarters inside the city that a particular area was being sniped or
25 being shelled. And we would then go to the liaison office which was
1 directly across the hallway from our living and working accommodation, and
2 we would discuss the issue with the liaison officers of the corps, and we
3 would request a cease-fire or request cessation of shelling, as the case
4 may be.
5 Q. Were -- what was the result of these requests that you made?
6 A. In many cases, directly the liaison officer would ring the brigade
7 in question and would request them to cease firing. On other occasions,
8 they would explain that an attack had been launched against a Bosnian Serb
9 position by the Armija, and that they were merely responding to such
10 aggression. So sometimes the request was successful and sometimes it was
11 not, but there was always an explanation as to why it would not be
13 Q. Now, you said many times they would contact the brigades and ask
14 them to stop firing. How did you become aware of this? At this time, did
15 you speak --
16 A. The liaison office was in two separate rooms directly across the
17 hall, as I said. Both were obviously in -- had telephone systems.
18 Occasionally, the liaison officer would go into the other room and make
19 the request by telephone, but sometimes he would make the call in front of
20 me. He would actually ring the brigade in front of me or request the
21 person on the switchboard to ring the brigade and speak to somebody in the
23 Q. Did you understand B/C/S? By that time, did you understand the --
24 A. Not a lot, no, but enough to know they were doing what they said
25 they were doing. "Brigada" and "brigade," you know, very similar.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 Now, who were the liaison officers that you made these reports to
3 about the sniping and shelling of civilians?
4 A. The chief of the team was Colonel Zarkovic. Colonel Zarkovic, and
5 his two main assistants were Major Misa Indic, and Captain Brane
7 Q. These -- I beg your pardon. Who, at that time, was the commander
8 of the Sarajevo Romanija corps?
9 A. The corps commander at the time was General Stanislav Galic.
10 Q. And do you see him in this Court today?
11 A. I do.
12 Q. Did you ever personally make any protest or report to him about
13 the sniping or shelling of civilians?
14 A. No, I did not. Not personally to the general. We dealt through
15 the liaison team.
16 Q. I'd like you to describe for us the physical circumstances in
17 which the UNMOs lived at Lukavica barracks. You said you had your
18 accommodation across from the liaison office.
19 A. That is correct. We were on the ground floor of the main corps
20 headquarters building, or what seemed to me to be the main corps
21 headquarters building, just directly inside the gates of the barracks.
22 And when one went in the main door and turned to the left, there was the
23 press and information office, and beyond that was the UNMO accommodation
24 and offices which comprised a working area, a sleeping area, and a small
25 kitchen. We shared the bathrooms of the remainder of the people living in
1 the corps headquarters, and similarly, we could eat with them. Beside us
2 was a conference room, and directly across the hall, as I said, were the
3 liaison offices. Upstairs, then, seemed to be the office of the corps
4 commander and his senior staff.
5 Q. Now, did you ever see Major General Galic at Lukavica barracks
6 while you were posted there?
7 A. Yes, I did.
8 Q. About how often would you see him there?
9 A. Frequently. Frequently.
10 Q. Frequently meaning? Could you approximate what you mean by
12 A. Whenever he would be coming in or out of the building I would see
13 him. Travelling places. On the stairs, in the hallway. Perhaps not
14 daily, but certainly numerous times in a week.
15 Q. Did you observe how, if in any way, he related to his liaison
16 officers to whom you made your reports about the sniping and shelling of
18 A. He spoke to them as a commander would.
19 Q. Briefly, what do you mean by "as a commander would"?
20 A. Generally, a commander relies upon his staff for particular jobs
21 to be done. He can't, obviously, do them all himself. So he would have
22 persons responsible for security, for personnel matters, for logistics,
23 and in this particular case, because of the nature of the operation,
24 liaison. So I saw him speak to Colonel Zarkovic, for example.
25 Q. Thank you. Now, you said you have been in the army for over 30
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And you made observations of the weapons in Yugoslavia while you
4 were there.
5 A. Yes, I did.
6 Q. And you observed them while they were in use?
7 A. Yes, I did.
8 MR. STAMP: With your leave, Mr. President, Your Honours, I would
9 like to hand to the witness Document P3675.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Stamp.
11 MR. STAMP: Before I proceed, may I inquire of the Court: The
12 document, of course, has been translated into B/C/S but since the working
13 languages of the Tribunal are English and French, I don't know if we need
14 to, at a later stage, tender the documents in both languages. I imagine
15 we only need to tender them in one of the working languages.
16 [Trial Chamber confers]
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stamp, the Chamber deems it not necessary that a
18 B/C/S translation is tendered. On the other hand, if there would be any
19 problem with the translation disclosed to the Defence, then, of course,
20 it's up to the Defence to do whatever they think would be necessary in
21 order to object against a document disclosed to them. But for the work of
22 the Chamber, it's not necessary at this very moment. And if, for example,
23 there would be differences between the translation and the original, then
24 of course, it might become necessary. But at this very moment, the
25 Chamber does not insist on having a B/C/S version tendered. And we do
1 understand that a B/C/S version has been provided to the Defence.
2 MR. STAMP: Indeed, Mr. President.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
4 MR. STAMP:
5 Q. Could you tell us what this document is.
6 A. This document is a document called "Weaponry in the former
7 Yugoslavia" and effectively it's a bit of a dissertation on artillery in
8 general and in its use in the wars in the former Yugoslavia, complete with
10 Q. And does it deal with, to some degree, with small arms?
11 A. It does, yes. It does.
12 Q. And we could say, I think, that it is a brief description of some
13 of the weapons that were used in the former Yugoslavia while you were
15 A. Some of the weapons, certainly.
16 Q. You -- do you agree with everything that you see -- well, may I
17 just put the question this way: Have you seen the document before this
19 A. I have seen the document before, and you will note that I have
20 initialled every page of it. And I have handwritten certain comments
21 which I felt would not necessarily disagree completely with what was said
22 but perhaps clarify some of the items in it.
23 Q. Perhaps we can just have a quick look at these clarifications.
24 You made some clarifications on page 3 of the document?
25 A. I did.
1 Q. Could you explain what you mean by the first one. If I made read
2 it: "Larger mortars may have a less sophisticated system than guns."
3 A. Point 4 there: "Mortars do not have a recoil system or a heavy
4 barrel tube to absorb the force of the propellant charge, thus limiting
5 the size of a propelling charge and --"
6 THE INTERPRETER: Is it possible to read more slowly, please?
7 Thank you.
8 A. Certainly, yes. It says: "Mortars do not have a recoil system or
9 a heavy barrel tube to absorb the force of the propellant charge, thus
10 limiting the size of the propelling charge and hence its range and pay
11 load." That is not strictly accurate. Larger mortars in particular do
12 have a recoil system, however, it is a less sophisticated system than guns
13 or Howitzers, hence my written comment.
14 Q. The next comment you made, could you explain it? I'll read
15 it: "True in offence only. Only one third of range in enemy territory in
16 a defensive role."
17 A. This refers to the sentence: "Their siting also endeavours to
18 have 60 to 80 per cent of their maximum range reaching into enemy
19 territory." Generally, in conventional teaching, mortars are sited
20 forward in offence. That is, they would be approximately one third of
21 their effective range behind the forward edge of the battle area, the
22 front line, if you will. So that for a mortar with a range, a planning
23 range, of say 6.000 metres, it should be planted about 2.000 metres behind
24 the FEBA in offence.
25 Q. What is a FEBA?
1 A. Forward Edge of the Battle Area. However, in a defensive
2 situation, the mortars are deployed much further back, with two thirds of
3 the range, the planning range being between them and the forward edge of
4 the battle area, so that same mortar would be 4.000 metres behind the
5 front line, in defence. Hence my comment.
6 Q. You also commented that, if I may read: "Can be fired from a
7 normal truck, but reinforcement is desirable." Could you just briefly
8 explain what that clarification is about.
9 A. Light mortars - 60 mortars - medium mortars - 81 and 82 millimetre
10 mortars - can be fired from vehicles. Now, a truck can be used as a
11 firing platform for these weapons, providing sandbagging, for example -
12 bags filled with sand - are placed under the base plate to give a
13 cushioning effect. The recoil is not great, but without some protection,
14 it would damage a vehicle.
15 Q. And the last comment you made, is that in respect to heavy
16 mortars, "they need to be dismounted from the wheels when they are
18 A. The comment made is that heavy mortars are towed by a vehicle or
19 prime mover and dismounted from their bogie wheels for firing. That is
20 not the case. It is not necessary to dismount them. In actual fact, it
21 is counterproductive to dismount them because it prevents quick -- because
22 it prevents quick removal of the weapon from the area after it has fired.
23 Q. Now, I take it that, apart from those clarifications, you agree
24 with the contents of the document as a basic description of the weapons
25 that were used in the former Yugoslavia while you were there?
1 A. Yes, I do.
2 Q. Thank you very much, Commandant.
3 Now, can you tell the Court briefly, if maybe you could enumerate
4 what are the methods that can used to determine from where a mortar has
5 been fired?
6 A. The detection of a mortar is actually quite easy because it has a
7 very loud signature, that is, it makes a very loud noise when it is
8 fired. Even at low charge - charge 0, charge 1 - it is still a very, very
9 loud weapon. It can be detected by a sound ranging system, accordingly.
10 That is, by a series of microphones placed in a line across a large
11 distance and connected to a central processing unit.
12 Q. May I --
13 A. It can -- yes.
14 Q. May I just go on. You said notwithstanding that it might be on a
15 low charge, it could be detected. Could you just briefly, if you could,
16 explain what you mean by "low charge" as opposed to a high or medium
18 A. Okay. A mortar projectile is a fixed bomb. However, it requires
19 additional charges to give it further range. So a standard mortar could
20 be fired between, say, charge 0 and charge 6, each number referring to an
21 additional increment of propellant which comes by way of either a satchel
22 or a horseshoe which fits on the base of the round. So that a mortar
23 firing on a low charge would have a short range. As each increment is
24 added for a given angle of elevation, the round goes further, generally,
25 as I say, up to about seven charges. Is that clear?
1 Q. Yes, it is.
2 A. Okay.
3 Q. Now, you said one of the ways the place where a mortar is fired
4 from could be detected is by sound. Are there any other ways?
5 A. It can also be detected by radar. They are radars in existence
6 since the 1960s which will detect the exact location of a mortar which has
7 fired just one round.
8 Another way, of course, is if the observer can see the mortar
9 firing. And that, obviously, is the most accurate of them all.
10 Q. When a mortar impacts at a target, does it normally leave any
11 particular markings?
12 A. It depends very much on the ground on which the mortar lands. A
13 mortar which lands on concrete or asphalt leaves a very clear signature.
14 A mortar which lands on soft ground or earth leaves a much more
15 indeterminate crater, but there is always a crater of one type or another.
16 Q. Now, is there a method -- or I think I could just take you
17 straight there. Have you any experience in crater analysis and could you
18 explain to us what that is about?
19 A. Crater analysis is the examination of a crater, generally a fresh
20 one, which has been caused by a projectile and which -- from which one may
21 determine the direction from which the projectile has come and, in certain
22 circumstances, the range from which it is fired, in general terms.
23 Q. Now, you said that after your posting in Sarajevo, you were posted
24 in Zagreb. Were you so posted in February 1994?
25 A. I was. I was, at that time, acting chief operations officer in
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 the UNMO organisation in Zagreb.
2 Q. Now, on or about the 11th of February, 1994, did you receive any
3 particular mission?
4 A. I did. Subsequent to the Markale incident of the 5th of February,
5 the chief military observer was directed to put together a team of experts
6 to investigate the Markale bombing. I was appointed by him to form part
7 of that team due to my background as an artillery officer with extensive
8 artillery experience both in Ireland and in the Middle East, and the fact
9 that I was an instructor in gunnery in our own artillery school.
10 Q. Did you have any particular title in that team of experts?
11 A. For political reasons, after arriving in Sarajevo, I was
12 designated as the technical advisor.
13 Q. Now, did the team receive terms of reference or guidance,
14 instructing them as to how they should perform the investigation?
15 A. Yes, it did.
16 Q. And did you so abide by the terms of reference and perform the
17 investigation as a team?
18 A. To the best of our ability, we did.
19 Q. Can you remember when you arrived in Sarajevo?
20 A. We arrived, if I remember, on the night of the 10th or early in
21 the morning of the 11th. I think it was the 11th.
22 Q. And when was the report due to be presented?
23 A. It had to be presented, if memory serves me, by the 15th, which
24 was four days later.
25 Q. Did you go to the scene of the Markale?
1 A. We certainly went to the scene on the morning of the 11th. We
2 also went to the scene on the 12th, interviewed witnesses and other
3 persons with a direct interest in the case, and produced our report by the
5 Q. Did you contribute to the preparation of the report?
6 A. I wrote the report.
7 Q. And did the report include annexures?
8 A. It did.
9 MR. STAMP: With your leave, Mr. President, I process to tender to
10 the witness a copy of the report that he spoke of. However, I should
11 advise the Court that there are some problems with legibility in some
12 parts of the report. We have done everything I know possible to obtain
13 completely legible copies. The parts which are not legible are -- do not
14 amount to the bulk of the report, and I would submit that the sense of the
15 report can still be ascertained. We have asked for searches to be
16 conducted in Geneva and in New York to see if we could obtain a better
17 copy of the report and we have conducted quite a few searches in the OTP
18 itself since last year to see if there might have been here a better copy
19 of the report. We have not been able to locate a better copy. However,
20 we have located a document which is identical to the summary of the report
21 which is at the front of the report which I would later seek your leave to
22 tender to the Court.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, perhaps I should give you the
24 opportunity to respond to these observations while Mr. Stamp is tendering.
25 MR. STAMP: The first -- if it please you, Mr. President.
1 JUDGE ORIE: I gave the opportunity to Ms. Pilipovic, but I didn't
2 hear from her, so I was about to take it that...
3 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, since the witness
4 stated that he had written the report, if I understood him correctly,
5 maybe it would be useful for us to get some clarification from the witness
6 in respect of the illegible portions of the text. So if we can perhaps
7 have the assistance of the witness with these illegible parts of the text,
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So there are no objections. There's, rather, a
10 suggestion how to clarify the issue, Mr. Stamp. This will certainly be of
11 assistance to you, I take it. And please proceed.
12 MR. STAMP: Thank you very much, Mr. President.
13 Q. The document you have in front of you, marked P2261, is that a
14 copy of the report with the annexures?
15 A. It is.
16 Q. At the back of that document, do you see a document with these
17 numbers on it? I should say the third-to-last page of that document,
18 0026-4146 and it goes on to 48.
19 A. Yes, I do.
20 Q. If you would look at what is marked Appendix 2 to Annex C of the
21 report, and I -- and that is the part numbered 0026-4146.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Is that Document numbered 0026-4106 a cover page to the UNPROFOR
24 report in respect Markale incident?
25 A. From sector HQ Sarajevo, yes, it is.
1 Q. And this was a report of one Captain Verdy, who had done an
2 analysis of the marketplace?
3 A. It is.
4 Q. And the front page of that report is annexed to the report of the
5 United Nations team of experts?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Those last three pages, is it correct to say, the last three pages
8 of the document you have in front of you, from 0026-4126 to 41 -- to
9 0026-4148, would be the UNPROFOR report with the front page plus the other
10 two pages?
11 A. What I would say is that it is a very specific report from one
12 individual from sector HQ Sarajevo, with which I disagreed fundamentally.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 MR. STAMP: I would ask, for the sake of convenience, if for the
15 next couple minutes, Mr. President, Your Honours, I could just deal with
16 matters of organising the documents for ease of reference by the Court.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We had a short break in between. It is 11.00
18 now. If you could do it quickly, please proceed. Otherwise, we would
19 have the break now.
20 MR. STAMP: Very well. I wonder, and I'm in the Court's hands, if
21 the explanation of the witness is sufficient or if it will be necessary to
22 separately mark those last three pages. He has explained that these last
23 three pages are -- or they include the report plus the other two pages of
24 the report is annexed in the body of the UNPROFOR team of experts report.
25 [Trial Chamber confers]
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The Chamber for the moment feels that it's
2 sufficient, Mr. Stamp.
3 MR. STAMP: Thank you very much.
4 For the benefit of the Chamber, may I draw the Chamber's attention
5 to that part of the report numbered 0026-4112 to 0026-4113. Those two
6 pages were written in the French language, which is one of the languages
7 of the Tribunal, however, we have an English translation, which I would
8 designate as P2261.2.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. As you might have noticed, all members of the
10 Chamber both read and speak French as well, so for the Chamber it's not
11 necessary. I do understand that the Defence, Mr. Piletta-Zanin, is also
12 speaking French. So I think for the time being, I'm just wondering, but I
13 have to give it some more thought on if this case would ever go on appeal,
14 whether perhaps then a translation should be prepared. But you say it's
15 there already, but this Chamber at this moment can do with the French
17 I see the French -- the English version is the -- yes. I see it
18 is there. Yes.
19 MR. STAMP: Yes. The English version is done or was done because
20 the witness might be asked questions about that part of the report.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If you request the witness on this part of the
22 report, do the interpreters' booth have the English versions available to
24 MR. STAMP: They do.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
1 MR. STAMP:
2 Q. Now, on the document numbered -- or the pages marked 0026-4093 to
3 0026-4095, is that a summary of the report --
4 A. Yes, it is.
5 Q. -- those pages? And from the --
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stamp, could you please repeat the numbers
7 because they do not appear in the --
8 MR. STAMP:
9 Q. Commandant, I'm referring to 0026-4093 to 0026-4095.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Now, I'd like to hand to the witness a document marked P2261A.
12 Could you have a quick look at that document, and when you're
13 ready, could you tell us if this document, P2261A, is substantially the
14 same as the first three pages of the report which you said is a summary?
15 A. It is substantially the same. It is, in fact. It was prepared
16 for the press.
17 MR. STAMP: That document, Mr. President, is a document which we
18 located which could assist the Court in respect to the legibility issues
19 in respect to the summary.
20 JUDGE ORIE: I do understand.
21 MR. STAMP: Thank you very much, Mr. President.
22 Q. Now, could you have a look at the page of the report. At the top,
23 it is 6 of 46, and it is Annex A, and the number at the bottom is
24 0026-4097. Can you say who were the members of the team, having a look
25 at that?
1 A. Yes, it is quite clear that the team leader was Colonel Michel
2 Gauthier, from Canada; team members were Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay
3 Rumyantsev, from Russia; Major Sahaiser Khan, from Pakistan; Captain Jose
4 Grande, from Spain; Captain Lavarde, from France; and technical advisors
5 John Hamill, that is myself; and Sergeant Chef Dubant, from France.
6 MR. STAMP: I don't know if this would be a convenient time.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, if it's convenient to you, it's convenient to
8 the Chamber at this moment as well.
9 We will adjourn until a quarter to 12.00.
10 MR. STAMP: Thank you very much, Mr. President.
11 --- Recess taken at 11.10 a.m.
12 --- On resuming at 11.46 a.m.
13 JUDGE ORIE: I indicated that I would give a decision about the
14 documents used during the examination of the witness of last Friday after
15 the break. If you do not mind, I'd rather do it after we have finished
16 the examination of this witness, and I also then will give a decision on
17 the documents tendered by the Defence, Ms. Pilipovic, which had not yet
18 been done. So perhaps now, Mr. Stamp, please proceed.
19 MR. STAMP: Thank you very much, Mr. President.
20 Q. Could you have a look at Document P2261A. Item number 2 on that
21 document, does that describe the scope of the investigation or the terms
22 of reference which confined the scope of your investigation?
23 A. Yes, it does.
24 Q. And is it correct that the investigation mandated was to
25 complement earlier investigations conducted by the United Nations, and
1 that the investigation should be confined to the crater analysis and the
2 related technical aspects of the explosion?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And you are confined to include all relevant physical information
5 concerning the explosion, technical analysis, and also, if you could, any
6 relevant findings in respect to culpability?
7 A. Yes, as so stated.
8 Q. And your investigation was on the basis of this terms of
10 A. That is correct.
11 Q. Now, on page 3 of that document, item 17, there is a finding in
12 respect to culpability. The last three lines read: "There is
13 insufficient physical evidence to prove that one party or the other fired
14 the mortar bomb. The mortar bomb in question could have been fired from
15 either side."
16 Was that your findings?
17 A. That was our findings. That is an accurate assessment.
18 Q. And that was based on the investigations that you conducted?
19 A. Yes, it was.
20 Q. As confined by the terms of reference?
21 A. Correct.
22 Q. Was it possible, on the basis of those terms of reference -- if I
23 may ask you this question: Was it possible with those terms of reference
24 to make any finding in respect of culpability in the circumstances of the
25 investigation, the physical investigation in Sarajevo?
1 A. What I would say is that the findings that we produced were the
2 most comprehensive possible, given the limitations of the methods and the
3 events surrounding the incident, that given also the technical nature of
4 the mortar bomb and its use, there was no possibility whatsoever of
5 determining culpability in the case of this particular explosion due to
6 the distance between it and the front lines of the warring parties.
7 Q. Thank you. Also, you started the investigation on the 11th of
9 A. That is correct.
10 Q. And you completed your investigations, or you wrote your report
11 when, can you say?
12 A. We finished the report at approximately 3.30 on the morning of the
13 15th of February, 1994. That is, four days later.
14 Q. And that investigation included interview of UNMO personnel,
15 discussions with both parties, as well as various analyses of the physical
16 evidence in the market?
17 A. That is correct. We interviewed persons from sector Sarajevo who
18 had been in the area at the time. We interviewed both UNMO and sector
19 Sarajevo personnel. We spoke also to members of the Armija and also to
20 members -- to a specific member of the Bosnian Serb army during that
21 period who had been designated by their respective authorities to assist
22 us in our investigation.
23 Q. What was the deadline for you to produce your report?
24 A. The 15th of February.
25 Q. Now, the team did a variety of crater analyses.
1 A. That is correct.
2 Q. And your findings, that would be on page 3, was that the explosion
3 was caused by a conventional factory-produced 120 millimetre high
4 explosive mortar bomb which detonated upon impact with the ground.
5 A. That is correct. That was very, very specifically written to
6 exclude the possibility that the mortar detonated on contact with a stall
7 approximately one metre above the ground, which was the initial report
8 given by a so-called crater analysis team.
9 Q. The cause of the explosion in that paragraph is that the bomb
10 appears to have been launched in a conventional manner from a
11 120-millimetre heavy mortar tube.
12 A. That is correct. That was stated because one of the parties had
13 reported to the investigating team that they believed that the bomb had
14 been launched by a pneumatic device from a specified address within the
15 city of Sarajevo, not far from the location of the market. The team
16 discounted that explanation.
17 Q. From the team's technical and physical examination of the site,
18 was it possible that the traces you saw there could have been caused by a
19 statically-exploded bomb?
20 A. Definitely not. As stated, the explosion was caused by
21 conventional factory-produced 120 millimetre high explosive mortar bomb.
22 No other explanation possible.
23 Q. Did you personally conduct crater analyses at the scene?
24 A. I did.
25 Q. How many did you conduct?
1 A. I conducted two; one on the morning of the 11th and one on the
2 morning of the 12th. We had a change in our team leadership between the
3 two periods, between the morning of the 11th and the morning of the 12th,
4 and the new team leader decided that he wanted it done again so we went
5 and did it again.
6 Q. How many methods of crater analysis did you use?
7 A. Personally, I used two.
8 Q. Could you briefly describe the first method of analysis that you
10 A. I have to look at my own notes again, I'm afraid.
11 Q. You made a written report in respect to your crater analysis and
13 A. I did. Oh, yes. A very specific type of mark --
14 Q. One moment. May I direct you to Annex 4 to Annex C. That is
15 written in the top right-hand corner, page 18 of 46, or 0026-4109 in the
16 bottom right of the page.
17 A. Yes. Yeah.
18 Q. Is that a copy of your report?
19 A. That is a copy of my report, 26-4109, yeah. Now, the first method
20 was called a fuse tunnel method. When a mortar bomb hits the ground, the
21 force of it hitting the ground -- the force of its traverse through the
22 air causes it to continue into the ground for a short distance. And
23 because of the makeup of the bomb, there is a piece at the end, the tail,
24 which is nonexplosive. The head is explosive; the tail is not. So the
25 tail continues and follows the direction that the fuse took when it
1 was -- when it hit the ground, it follows the same direction. So the fuse
2 makes a tunnel into the ground, and the tail follows behind. Meanwhile,
3 the body has exploded into every direction.
4 So what I did was I got a stick and I placed it in the fuse tunnel
5 as excavated. Now, this was not as accurate as it might have been because
6 it had been one week since the explosion, or near enough one week since
7 the explosion.
8 Q. I'm sorry. Before you continue with your explanation, we'll get
9 back to that.
10 A. Okay.
11 Q. When you did your examinations, when you arrived there first, had
12 the site been secured by the local police?
13 A. It was secured by the local police, yes.
14 Q. You said you did the fuse tunnel method. Can you continue.
15 A. So what you do is you place the stick into the ground, into the
16 fuse tunnel, and this gives a direction. And by taking a bearing, a
17 bearing with a compass, you determine the direction from which the round
18 had come, from which the bomb had arrived. So in this particular case,
19 the direction given was something in the region of 0300, 0330 to 0360
21 Q. I'm going to ask you to explain that briefly. The figure which
22 you just gave us --
23 A. It's mils. There are 6.400 mils in a circle. So a direction of
24 around 0360 would mean generally north-northeast. That is, between north
25 and northeast. It would have come in from that direction.
1 Q. I'm just going to go briefly into that. We sometimes measure
2 directions in terms of degrees, and you have mentioned mils. Can you
3 just explain briefly the relationship of mils to degrees.
4 A. There is approximately 17.78 mils in one degree, so a mil is an
5 inherently more accurate method of determining exact direction. As I
6 said, there are 6.400 mils in a standard circle. So a quarter circle
7 would be 1600, and 400 would be a quarter of a quarter, as it were. So
8 you're looking at a quarter of a quarter from north.
9 Q. And 6.400 mils would correspond to a complete circle in the same
10 way that --
11 A. 360.
12 Q. -- degrees would correspond to a complete circle?
13 A. 360.
14 Q. Very well. Now, your finding of approximately 300 to 330 to 360
15 mils, was that in respect to mils from magnetic north, true north, or
16 geographic --
17 A. Grid north. Grid north. Geographic north.
18 Q. Now, could you please explain to the Court the distinction between
19 grid north and magnetic north, and could you explain it having regard to
20 the method you used with your compass.
21 A. All right. Firstly, magnetic north is not fixed. It is a
22 location generally in the north of Canada which varies because the axis of
23 the earth actually varies. So magnetic north is not a fixed point. To
24 compensate for that, geographers place a grid of squares on a map, working
25 from west to east and from south to north, to get northings and
1 eastings. And every location on the earth can be determined by means of
2 the grid. So grid north is preferable to use than magnetic north, which
3 is not stable.
4 So what I did with my compass, because magnetic north is all that
5 a compass can measure or can point to, and there is a variation, one must
6 determine the variation. And the way I determined the variation with that
7 specific compass - because again, all compasses are different - was I took
8 two known points, I stood in one, I measured the grid bearing to the
9 other. In this particular case, if memory serves me, I used a junction at
10 the airport and the hill of Ilinaca, which is a prominent feature to the
11 east of the airport, determined the grid bearing, measured the bearing
12 with my compass, and found that there was a variation between the two,
13 naturally. And then --
14 Q. That is, a variation between the grid bearing and magnetic north.
15 A. Yes, in this case of about 60 mils. There was about a 60 mil
16 difference. So what I had to do whenever I measured any other bearing
17 with my compass was to add 60 mils to get the true grid bearing in the
18 Sarajevo area.
19 Q. You said approximately 60 mils.
20 A. Yes, approximately 60 mills.
21 Q. So I take it then that in February 1994, magnetic north was
22 approximately 60 mils away from grid north.
23 A. It was.
24 Q. Thank you. And your findings are in terms of the figures you gave
25 us in mils, is it in respect to magnetic north or grid north?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. Grid north. Always, always grid north.
2 Q. Other members of the team did examinations and made findings.
3 A. That is correct.
4 Q. Were their findings in respect to grid north or magnetic north?
5 A. Also grid north. All professionals would use grid north.
6 Q. You said you used another method of crater analysis.
7 A. That is correct. I used a method of two poles aligned on the
8 centre of the splash pattern. There are a number of ways of so doing. A
9 splash pattern is very, very distinctive, and one can, for example, align
10 two poles on the wings of the splash pattern, and the -- angled between
11 them, the centre of the angle between them is the direction away from
12 which the round -- the direction towards which the round came.
13 Q. Now, this splash pattern is caused by what?
14 A. The splash pattern is caused by splinters when the round explodes
15 on the ground. What happens is the round explodes into numerous small
16 pieces of hot metal which gouge out a pattern on the concrete or asphalt,
17 or indeed on earth or mud, and in the case of concrete or asphalt,
18 especially concrete, they are quite distinctive and they form two long
19 wings, in the case of a mortar, away from the location of the explosion,
20 back towards where the round came from, but at an angle, at a wide angle.
21 Q. Did you make any finding as to whether or not the mortar round was
22 fired in a normal manner?
23 A. It was my opinion from the physical evidence that was produced to
24 us that it was fired in a normal manner in that we were given the tail of
25 a mortar, the markings of which corresponded to markings which had been
1 noted by the first UN team on the scene on the 5th of February and which
2 had been taken down by them when the round was still in the crater. So
3 the same number was stamped on the fuse -- sorry, not on the fuse but on
4 the propellant charge that there was on the mortar. The primary
5 cartridge, which looks like a shotgun cartridge, was struck on the bottom
6 by a firing pin, thus indicating that the round had been launched from a
7 normal mortar and not by other means. It wouldn't be safe to be playing
8 around with a round which had the primary cartridge struck.
9 Q. Now, you said that there was a technical analysis. Could you have
10 a look at the second page. That is a page marked 346, 0026-4094.
11 A. Sorry, can you give me that number again?
12 Q. 0026-4094.
13 A. Okay.
14 Q. And a detailed and technical analysis based on the physical
15 evidence in the market and surrounding area was conducted. And further,
16 I'd like you to have a look at the page marked 846 in the top right-hand
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. On that page, under the heading "Physical Evidence," at item F,
20 there is a reference to fragments found in the crater and in the
21 surrounding area. If I may read from the beginning: "The team's
22 technical analysis was conducted based on the following evidence: The
23 crater found in the marketplace, the tail-fin assembly of a mortar bomb
24 extracted from the crater, the markings on the ground surrounding the
25 crater, the damage to the stalls --"
1 THE INTERPRETER: Can you please slow down, please.
2 MR. STAMP: I'm so sorry.
3 Q. The last item, item D I mentioned, was, "...the damage to the
4 stalls surrounding the crater, the dimensions of the marketplace including
5 the buildings surrounding it, and fragments found in the crater and in the
6 surrounding area." Were fragments found in the crater and in the
7 surrounding area?
8 A. They were fragments found in the area but they were very, very
9 small pieces and of no benefit to the analysis.
10 Q. Were the fragments that were found in any way inconsistent with
11 the explosion being caused by a 120-millimetre mortar?
12 A. I would say they were neither consistent nor inconsistent. They
13 were just fragments of steel.
14 Q. Could you have a look at page 45 of 46. That is a page numbered
15 at the bottom 0026-4136. And could you have a look at the fourth
16 paragraph of that page, in particular.
17 A. Yes, I see that.
18 Q. Did the team meet with one Mr. Jamakovic from the Bosnian
20 A. Two members of the team met with him. I did not.
21 Q. From the report, were -- was an offer made to provide the team
22 with fragments --
23 A. Yes, it was.
24 Q. And that offer was refused?
25 A. According to the report, yes.
1 Q. The report indicates that there was no way of proving that these
2 fragments actually resulted from the 5th of February explosion.
3 A. That is correct. There was no chain of evidence.
4 Q. So from the report, you did not -- the team did not take
5 possession of any fragments presented?
6 A. At this stage, I do not recollect.
7 Q. Very well.
8 A. I seem to remember examining fragments when the two
9 representatives had come back, but memory is not as good as it should be
11 Q. Now, apart from your crater analysis, other members of your team
12 conducted crater analyses.
13 A. That is correct.
14 Q. Could you have a look at the page numbered 10/46 to the top
15 right-hand corner, or 0026-4101.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Is that a summary of the findings as --
18 A. It is, but there was one typographical error on it.
19 Q. Yes.
20 A. In the last, Sergeant Dubant, 13th of February, that should not be
21 0420 mils, it should in fact, if I remember right, be about 0360 mils --
22 or 0355 mils, if I remember right. It is a typographical error.
23 Q. Did Sergeant Chef Dubant draft a report?
24 A. He did.
25 Q. Could you look at the pages again, 22 of 46, or 0026-4113.
1 A. Yes, I see it.
2 Q. Do you see a reference there in respect to the direction from
3 which the projectile came?
4 A. I do. It is on the third last line, and it reads: "Direction, 355
5 mils." So as I say, 0420 is in fact a typographical error.
6 Q. Thank you. Now, were -- I should put it this way: If you have a
7 look at the page I showed you just now, page 10 of 46.
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. The first three results there are from FreBat 4, Captain Verdy
10 and Major Russell.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And these results are inconsistent with the -- or generally
13 inconsistent with the results of the team of experts?
14 A. They certainly are. I have no knowledge of Major Russell's
15 methods; however, we questioned FreBat 4 team and Captain Verdy as to
16 their methodology and simple arithmetic and found them to be somewhat
18 Q. Could you have a look at the page designated 9/46, or, at the
19 bottom, 0026-410.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. I'd like you to look at the penultimate sentence of the first
22 paragraph of that page. Was it your finding that the method used by the
23 FreBat 4 team was suspect?
24 A. It was very suspect. It was very unconventional, very loose, and
25 it effectively amounted to guesswork.
1 Q. Have a look at the second paragraph of that page. Did you find
2 that the figures used by Captain Verdy were unsound and, therefore, his
3 results were flawed?
4 A. I found his results were totally flawed, totally flawed, totally
5 inaccurate, completely wrong.
6 Q. Did you find that the methodology he used was flawed or not?
7 A. His initial methodology appeared to be relatively good; however,
8 his use of the methodology and his simple arithmetic turned out to be very
9 flawed. In a word, wrong.
10 Q. And you also found that he used tables in respect to the wrong
12 A. I couldn't believe what I read in his report and what he
13 explained. He used Howitzer tables. Howitzers are a completely different
14 weapon from mortars, for a start, as I explained earlier. But further
15 than that, each individual weapon, of whatever type, has its own specific
16 tables and cannot be used for any other weapon, because they are the
17 result of an arduous scientific process which determines exactly what
18 range is arrived at on any elevation on any specific charge. So using any
19 other weapon, even if it was a mortar - and it wasn't in this case - is
20 completely and totally wrong.
21 Q. So you said using another weapon; you mean using the range tables
22 for any other weapon.
23 A. Yes. Simply cannot be done.
24 Q. Was this your finding or was this a consistent finding of all of
25 the team of experts who went there on the 11th?
1 A. Nobody on the team could believe what had been done. So yes, it
2 was consistent across the team which came from Zagreb.
3 Q. Now, I'd like you to have a look at a particular document. It is
4 Exhibit 2309A.
5 MR. STAMP: Just for the record, Mr. President, Your Honours, that
6 document has already been tendered in Court. It is a recall of a
7 document. It is a report by the witness Mirza Sabljica. We have copies.
8 I'm not sure if... And copies for the Court. I'm not sure if...
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If you please, Mr. Usher, could...
10 MR. STAMP: Could I have one.
11 Q. I'd like you, Commandant, to have a look at that part of the
12 document in English which is P2309.1A.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Have you, in the past, had an opportunity of reading and examining
15 the contents of this document?
16 A. Yes, I have had.
17 Q. And could you advise the Court or indicate to the Court what is
18 your view on the quality of the methodology used in the examination as
19 represented in that document?
20 A. As represented in this document, it seems that very good -- a very
21 good analysis was made, and it was done using recognised methodology. It
22 was thorough. It was convincing.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 The finding that it came -- that the projectile that impacted and
25 exploded at Markale market on the 5th of February, 1994, came from the
1 north-northeast direction, or 18 degrees from north, can you comment on
2 its consistency or inconsistency with respect to the finding of your team
3 of experts?
4 A. It is consistent with our findings. 18 degrees is more or less in
5 the region of 350 mils, more or less. So it was consistent with our
6 findings. And you will note that they mention a plus or minus 5 degree
7 tolerance added to the angle of difference value. This brings it in line
8 with Major Russell's finding also, if it was plus 5 degrees. So it is
9 consistent with our findings on that point.
10 Q. The finding that the shell was activated at the moment of its
11 contact with the asphalt surface - and I'm referring to the penultimate
12 sentence of his report - was that consistent with the finding of the team
13 of experts?
14 A. It certainly was.
15 Q. Now, the finding of 18 degrees from north, if made from magnetic
16 north, if that finding is made from magnetic north, would the margin of
17 error compensate for the difference between magnetic north and grid north?
18 A. It would. I mean, we're looking here at 60 mils of a magnetic
19 variation, which is just slightly over 3 degrees. You will note in the
20 final line that it mentions 18 degrees plus or minus 5 degrees, so that is
21 well within the margin of error. And I should say that 100 mils left or
22 right is not a major variation; we're talking about a very, very small
23 angle. I would say that this report was completely consistent with the
24 report of the team which came from Zagreb.
25 Q. Did the member of the team from Zagreb, Sergeant Chef Dubant, do
1 drawings of the scene?
2 A. He did.
3 Q. Were you present when he did so?
4 A. I must have been because we were there together. However, we were
5 working independently in the market area, doing our own analysis, not to
6 influence the other members of the team.
7 Q. Now, could you have a look at Exhibit P2261, at the drawings on
8 page 23/46 to the upper right, or to the bottom right, 0026-4114.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. I would like you to compare that drawing to -- and perhaps the
11 usher could assist the witness -- to the drawing at page 0026-8360 in
12 Exhibit P2309A.
13 Can you comment on the consistency or inconsistency, if any, in
14 respect to these two drawings done by Sergeant Chef Dubant and that in
15 this Exhibit Number P2309A?
16 A. I would say they are more or less the same and there appears to be
17 a slight difference as regards the building marked number 5 in the
18 "suplisnic," the P2309A, and on the other hand, page 23 of 46, but in
19 essence, it is in fact the same drawing, showing the same scene.
20 Q. If you look at the drawing of Sergeant Chef Dubant, there is a
21 bottom drawing with a line going over a structure. Can you explain that
22 drawing to the Court?
23 A. I can. The structure on the right is a very tall building. The
24 line represents the possible trajectory or the likely trajectory of the
25 incoming mortar bomb. And where it strikes on the left is obviously the
1 point of explosion, the point of impact.
2 Q. And is that trajectory, that incoming trajectory over that
3 building, inconsistent with the standard or normal trajectory of mortar
5 A. It is not inconsistent. A mortar bomb comes in at a steep angle.
6 Because of the nature of the weapon, it fires at a steep angle, and the
7 round accordingly drops at a steep angle, unlike a gun, which comes
8 in flat. So that mortars are used to fire from behind high buildings or
9 other cover, and similarly can attack targets behind high buildings or
11 Q. In the same document, those of drawings by Sergeant Chef Dubant,
12 could you have a look at the document at page -- or drawing at page 25/46,
13 to the bottom right it is 0026-4116.
14 A. I see it.
15 Q. This is a drawing in which the buildings or the measurements of
16 the buildings are shown?
17 A. Correct. That is correct. And it shows the minimum angle which
18 the round could have impacted had it cleared that building, which is 865
19 mils, in other words, just slightly over 45 degrees. And again, it proves
20 conclusively that a mortar round could clear the building because of its
21 steeper than 865 mils angle of descent. We found, those of us who
22 measured it, that the mortar round impacted almost certainly at an angle
23 of between 950 and 1100 mils. This was the angle of the fuse tunnel, as
25 Q. And the results in respect of those which you mentioned, or who
1 measured the angle of incidents to the ground, that is the angle in which
2 it impacted the ground, would also be on page 10/46 of the report?
3 A. Yes. Yes. As I mentioned earlier, Captain Verdy's findings can
4 all be discounted. The other three measurements, Major Russell, Major
5 Khan, and my own show somewhere between 950 and 1300. And even allowing
6 for major differences there, I would say that they are obviously all
7 greater than 846 mils.
8 Q. If you look at Sergeant Chef Dubant's drawing at 25/46 --
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. -- he has the height of the building --
11 A. He has.
12 Q. -- at 18.5 metres.
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. And could you have a look, for the final time, at the Exhibit
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Perhaps the usher could assist us. There had been a more legible
18 copy of the legend.
19 A. Mm-hmm.
20 Q. That building, number 5, do you see how high it is on the legend?
21 A. It is written as grada, and 18450 millimetres.
22 Q. And I take it you'll agree with me that is substantially --
23 A. It is the same building, and it accords almost exactly with
24 Sergeant Chef Dubant's drawing.
25 Q. Measurements. Thank you very much.
1 A. You're welcome.
2 Q. Back to the UNPROFOR report. Could you have a look at the first
3 page. I beg your pardon, the second page of the report. That is 3/46 to
4 the top right, or 0026-4094.
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. In the third paragraph, that is paragraph 9, it is indicated here
7 that an exhaustive investigation of the casualties was considered beyond
8 the scope of your investigation.
9 A. That is correct.
10 Q. However, did you speak with witnesses?
11 A. We did.
12 Q. From your investigation, the first UNMO on the scene, I take it
13 could be Captain Audhuy. And I would like you to have a look at - I
14 should have asked you before - 29/46, or 0024.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Did he confirm that the time of the blast was sometime between
17 12.00 and 12.15?
18 A. He did.
19 Q. And did he give an estimate of 100 and 150 dead and wounded?
20 A. He did.
21 Q. And he indicated that before the explosion, when he had passed it,
22 there were 300 to 500 people present in the market?
23 A. So he estimated.
24 Q. You also spoke with a Lieutenant Steeves.
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And he indicated to you that he estimated the number of casualties
2 at roughly 25 to 30 dead and 60 to 70 wounded?
3 A. He did.
4 Q. And also that he observed that many of the injured that he saw had
5 received wounds to their limbs as a result of fragments.
6 A. That is correct.
7 Q. Were you personally able to ascertain at what stage after the
8 explosion or how long after the explosion Lieutenant Steeves arrived on
9 the scene?
10 A. He indicated that he arrived on the scene approximately 15 minutes
11 after the explosion.
12 Q. And his estimate would have been based on what he saw when he
14 A. Correct.
15 Q. The team also spoke to a Colonel Ambrosi. And in regard, I would
16 like you to have a look at page 32 of 46 of Document P2261.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Now, could you explain to us what the initials "SMEDLO" means?
19 A. I imagine it's Senior Medical Liaison Officer or possibly Sector
20 Medical Liaison Officer.
21 Q. And from his information, you recorded an estimate of observed
22 casualties as 52 dead and 119 wounded?
23 A. 65 dead, he said. He said there was a quoted figure, the figure
24 quoted to him by the BiH authorities, medical authorities, were 65 dead
25 and 119 wounded. And he said that that was unreasonable, but of course
1 that's hearsay.
2 Q. Did he say that that was unreasonable or that was not
4 A. He said it was not unreasonable, based on his observation of
6 Q. He also indicated that many of the seriously wounded were turned
7 back from the hospital, that is, the Kosevo Hospital, without treatment.
8 A. So he said, yes.
9 Q. And further, that the majority of the casualties treated by the
10 United Nations medical personnel were casualties caused by shrapnel
12 A. Yes. As one would expect.
13 Q. There was, in the two days that you had to do this report, an
14 effort to analyse the circumstances of the two competing armies in the
15 direction of fire, was there?
16 A. There was. There was.
17 Q. If I could direct your attention to the document marked 2261A,
18 which is a little bit more legible. You interviewed UNPROFOR military
20 A. Sorry, just one second, please. 2261A.
21 Q. 2261A, the second page thereof.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Firstly, from the information you had, were United Nations
24 military observers allowed free access to the northeast area of Sarajevo
25 beyond the confrontation line?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. They were not. It was extremely difficult for United Nations
2 military observers to work in the area between Vogosca and Sombolovac.
3 Q. Sombolovac is --
4 A. Is well to the east. It's very far to the east of the city.
5 Q. So the United Nations, the information you had, and I take it also
6 from your personal experience while you had been in Sarajevo, the United
7 Nations military observers were unable to do observation of Bosnian Serb
8 army guns in that area of the city?
9 A. I would say they had very limited access, but there was some
10 access at times. Some teams operated better than other teams.
11 Q. The UNMOs that you spoke with in February 1994 indicated that they
12 had been denied freedom of movement by the Bosnian Serb army in the
13 northeast quadrant of Sarajevo since last October, which would be October
14 of 1993?
15 A. That is correct.
16 Q. So what they told you about their denial of access to that area
17 would have occurred after you left Sarajevo?
18 A. I had not been in Sarajevo serving during the period October to
20 Q. Thank you.
21 Among the persons interviewed or spoken with by the team, they
22 were members of the Bosnian government and army.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Were the team shown any Bosnian Army gun positions?
25 A. No.
1 Q. Could I ask you to have a look at the -- at page 34/46 or, to the
2 bottom right, 0026-4125.
3 A. Mm-hmm, yes.
4 Q. In the paragraph marked 3, it is indicated that members of your
5 team were shown two 120-millimetre mortar positions of the Bosnian Army.
6 A. No, it says actually that on the 9th of February, 1994, which was
7 before the team arrived in Sarajevo, Colonel Pardon, deputy chief of staff
8 sector Sarajevo visited two mortar positions, not a member of the team.
9 Q. Thank you very much for that correction. And your information
10 from Colonel Pardon was that both positions were outside the estimated
11 direction of fire?
12 A. Well, what you've got to remember is that the direction of fire
13 which sector Sarajevo was working on was inaccurate. They were working
14 off false data given to them by the FreBat 4 team and by Colonel -- or
15 Captain Verdy. So firstly, they were looking in the wrong area.
16 Secondly, if it had been fired by BiH troops, there is no possibility
17 whatsoever that anyone from the UN would have been brought to the firing
19 Q. Now, I take it from your answer you are saying that you would not
20 know whether or not there were any BiH mortars along the direction of
22 A. That is correct.
23 Q. You --
24 A. Again, could I remind you that mortars are highly mobile weapons,
25 and were used in that way by Armija troops. They were brought into an
1 area; they fired often from, for example, outside the UN building or from
2 Kosevo Hospital, and then they were moved immediately. So that they are
3 mobile. They can be moved and can be easily moved.
4 Q. Indeed.
5 Did you speak with any member of the Bosnian Serb army?
6 A. I did. I spoke to Colonel Cvetkovic, who was the commanding
7 officer of the Bosnian Serb army artillery regiment based in Mrkovici. We
8 interviewed him in connection with this incident because he was designated
9 by Republika Srpska authorities to deal with us.
10 Q. In respect to the presence or absence of 120-millimetre mortar
11 weapons in the vicinity of an area known as Mrkovici, did he say anything?
12 A. He confirmed that there were a number of 120-millimetre mortars in
13 Mrkovici, which is to the north-northeast of Markale and along the
14 direction line that we estimated the round came from.
15 Q. Did he say anything in respect to the firing of mortars into
16 Sarajevo by the Bosnian Serb army or by his area of responsibility in the
17 Bosnian Serb army?
18 A. He did. He said specifically that they had not fired that
19 particular round; however, he also said that in the previous year, they
20 had fired 30 to 40.000 rounds into the city and why were we so concerned
21 about one round when they had fired so many.
22 Q. On the basis of your evaluation, technical evaluation that you
23 made, though you could not come to a conclusive determination, did you
24 come to any conclusion as to the likelihood as to the source of fire?
25 A. I did. Because of what you might describe as the footprint of the
1 round on the ground, we came up with six possible firing locations in a
2 line along 0330 mils grid. Two of those locations were on the Armija
3 side of the line, and four of them were on the BSA side of the line.
4 While it wasn't possible to definitely conclude which firing position had
5 been used of the six because it simply just isn't possible to do that
6 regardless of what technical evidence you have unless you have seen them
7 firing or used sound-ranging or radar, nonetheless, four likely firing
8 positions were on -- four positions from which the round could have been
9 fired were on the BSA side, and two were on the Armija side.
10 MR. STAMP: May I have just one moment before I go to the next
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please.
13 MR. STAMP: Thank you very much, Mr. President.
14 Q. Just for the record, the mortar tail-fin which you were shown, did
15 you confirm with the FreBat team that it was the same tail-fin which had
16 been extracted from Markale?
17 A. Yes, we did.
18 Q. Did you confirm for the benefit of your investigation that the
19 site had not been interfered with up until the time when the FreBat team
20 arrived, or the crater had not been interfered with up until the time that
21 the FreBat team had arrived? And maybe I could refer you to page 31 of
22 46 -- or 30/46. And the -- in paragraph 6, in particular --
23 A. Yes, Captain Segada from FreBat 4 said that the crater, upon their
24 arrival -- he described the crater upon their arrival as appearing to be
25 fully intact and showing no signs of tampering. He watched as the FreBat
1 4 analysts scraped away soil from the mouth of the crater, excavating, and
2 extracted the tail-fins. When shown the tail-fins held by the
3 investigation team, he confirmed with some certainty that this was the
4 same tail-fin extracted from the crater.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 Now, if we may move on to something else for the time being, could
7 I take your mind to the 18th of September last year. That day, did you --
8 were you in Sarajevo?
9 A. I was.
10 Q. Did you go to any particular place in Sarajevo?
11 A. I went to Dobrinja.
12 Q. And did you examine two craters in Dobrinja?
13 A. I examined two craters in Dobrinja, one of which was remarkably
14 intact considering the period it had been there, and the other was less
15 clear. But one was very, very clear.
16 Q. Now, were these two craters that you examined pointed out to you
17 by someone?
18 A. They were. They were pointed out to me by a local man who had
19 been present, he said, when the craters were produced.
20 Q. Can you recall the name of this local man?
21 A. No. I would have to read my statement again, I'm afraid.
22 MR. STAMP: With your leave, Mr. President, Your Honours, may I
23 not tender something in evidence, just for the purposes of him refreshing
24 his memory, ask him to have a look at a document that he wrote.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please do so.
1 MR. STAMP:
2 Q. Did you write, for the OTP, a report in respect to that
4 A. I did.
5 MR. STAMP: I'm afraid, Mr. President, Your Honours, we are not in
6 possession of copies. I'm wondering if, as it is that I only would ask
7 him to refresh his memory in respect to one item, if I could hand the
8 document -- my friend has the document in both English and B/C/S --
9 JUDGE ORIE: Let's first check if Ms. Pilipovic is in possession
10 of the document. Do you have an ERN number or could you have it shown to
11 her so that --
12 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. I think I do
13 have the document. But it is the time for the break so I think, in the
14 meantime, I could find the document. I could locate it.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. It depends, Mr. Stamp. How much time do you
16 think you'd still need? I mean because we have the long break now.
17 MR. STAMP: Yes, perhaps 20 minutes at the most.
18 JUDGE ORIE: 20 minutes, yes. But that would be too much to
19 continue. I mean, if it was just 10 minutes, we might consider to finish
20 the examination-in-chief this morning. But with 20 minutes, that would be
21 too much, I think, unless you give me a new estimate. You say 20 minutes
22 is what you need, approximately.
23 MR. STAMP: At the most. I wouldn't want to underestimate and
24 find myself going beyond.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Perhaps it's wise that we'll have the break
1 now. Both parties are able to look at the document. If it would be
2 copied this afternoon for the Bench, that would be good, I think.
3 We'll adjourn until 2.30.
4 --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.00 p.m.
1 --- On resuming at 2.31 p.m.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Stamp, I see that the copies were
3 distributed of the... Would you please resume your examination-in-chief
4 of the witness.
5 MR. STAMP: Thank you very much, Mr. President.
6 Q. The document that you have been given, Commandant, numbered
7 0213-1820, is that a copy of the report that you wrote?
8 A. It is.
9 Q. And having looked at the document, can you recall who it was who
10 identified to you the two craters that you examined?
11 A. Mr. Barry Hogan of the Tribunal introduced me to Mr. Ismet Fazlic
12 in Dobrinja on the day and date in question.
13 Q. And did Mr. Fazlic point out to you the two craters that you
15 A. He did. He pointed out to the entire team the two craters.
16 Q. Were those two craters in any way marked?
17 A. They were marked with a red plastic-like substance which had the
18 effect of preserving the craters. The holes of the craters were actually
19 filled with the substance.
20 Q. Having examined those two craters, did you form any conclusions in
21 respect of what caused them?
22 A. It was my opinion that they were formed by explosions caused by
23 artillery shells of a field calibre, that is, somewhere between 100 and
24 130 millimetres, which had been fired from an approximate direction of
25 2.200 mils, that is, generally east-southeast.
1 Q. Having regard to the condition of those two craters when you saw
2 them that day, could you say if it was possible that they might have been
3 caused by some other weapon?
4 A. They could have been caused by a medium mortar, that is, an 81 or
5 an 82 millimetre mortar, which has a higher explosive effect than a
6 similar calibre artillery weapon.
7 Q. Did you come to a conclusion as to where the projectiles had been
8 fired from?
9 A. It is my belief that the projectiles were fired from an area
10 called Toplik, to the east of Sarajevo city, an area which I knew
11 contained artillery weapons of that nature and which was monitored at that
12 period by military observers of UNPROFOR.
13 Q. That area was in control of the which of the warring parties while
14 you were stationed in Sarajevo?
15 A. Bosnian Serb army.
16 Q. Would that area have been in control of the Bosnian Serb army in
17 June of 1993?
18 A. It was under control of the Bosnian Serb army throughout my
19 period, which was May to August, and certainly well after that, and indeed
20 still forms part of Republika Srpska.
21 Q. You described to us earlier the arrangement of your office and
22 living accommodations at Lukavica barracks. Could you tell the Court
23 briefly, where was the office of the accused, Major General Galic, in
24 respect to the liaison office of the Bosnian Serb army members?
25 A. Building had two storeys only. The liaison office was on the
1 bottom floor and General Galic's office, as we were given to understand as
2 I was never personally in it but was on the first floor. So it was
3 generally above the liaison office.
4 Q. Where in respect to Dobrinja would the general's office be, as far
5 as you understand?
6 A. Lukavica barracks is not far from Dobrinja. You can see the area
7 generally, one from the other. They are more or less on the same level.
8 The distance between them would only be a couple of kilometres, maybe 2
9 kilometres. Dobrinja is a suburb, so obviously extends.
10 Q. So in relation to Dobrinja, where was the general's office
11 situated in Lukavica?
12 A. Not far from it.
13 Q. Was it situated, in relation to Dobrinja, on the opposite side of
14 the barracks, on the same side?
15 A. Sorry, I see what you mean. The building where the general had
16 his office was the nearest point of the military complex to Dobrinja.
17 Q. Thank you very much.
18 Now, you said in respect to the analysis that you did on the 18th
19 of June last year -- 18th of September last year, I beg your pardon --
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. -- the craters you saw were probably from a gun.
22 A. Yes. A Howitzer.
23 Q. And also possibly from a medium-calibre mortar?
24 A. That is a possibility, yes. You must bear in mind that the
25 craters had been filled with this red plastic substance, so it was not
1 possible to determine exactly the condition they were in when they were
3 Q. But having regard to the craters you saw as they were filled, do
4 you think that that would impact in any significant degree on the accuracy
5 of your findings as to the direction of fire?
6 A. I'm fully convinced that the direction of fire that I mentioned in
7 the report was accurate.
8 Q. And would it have been accurate had it been a mortar?
9 A. Yes, it would. I performed the analysis on the basis that it
10 could have been either a gun or a mortar and used the appropriate methods
11 for both and came up with equal findings. There was no difference in the
13 Q. Thank you very much.
14 MR. STAMP: I think Mr. President, Your Honours, that that
15 concludes the examination-in-chief of this witness. But could I have one
16 minute to review my notes?
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please take one minute.
18 MR. STAMP: Thank you very much, Mr. President. That concludes
19 the examination-in-chief.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, is the Defence ready to cross-examine
21 the witness?
22 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Then please proceed.
24 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 Cross-examined by Ms. Pilipovic:
1 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Hamill. Can you confirm for
2 us that on the 13th, 14th, and 15th of December of 1995, you gave a
3 statement to the OTP investigators?
4 A. I believe so.
5 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the Defence can
6 produce the statement in English, and we can give it to Mr. Hamill to look
7 at it and to confirm whether this is his signature or not because I don't
8 think he has it with him.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Is your hesitation about the date or about whether
10 you were interviewed --
11 THE WITNESS: Mr. President, I certainly was interviewed, and I
12 was interviewed at some stage in December 1995, but I cannot recall the
13 specific dates.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please proceed, Ms. Pilipovic.
15 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Does the witness need them or we should take them
17 back, Ms. Pilipovic? I don't know -- if you leave them with the witness,
18 then --
19 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] It can stay, Your Honour. It can
20 stay there. Perhaps I will direct him to some parts of the statement, so
21 the witness will be able to look at it and confirm what it says in his
23 Q. Thank you, Mr. Hamill. Now I'd like to ask you about the
24 interviews that between 1995 to this day, to the day of your testimony,
25 I'd like you to confirm to us whether you talked with the OTP
1 investigators in relation to the incident that you were examined now, that
2 is, on the 18th of September, 2001 - and you confirmed it for us - then on
3 the 4th of February, 2002, and the 21st of March, 2002.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Thank you. Mr. Hamill, the Defence understands that you came to
6 Sarajevo as an experienced military expert, that you were there from
7 between May and August of 1993. You also told us that you were the head
8 of the UNMO team. I'll use the acronym so as not to have to develop the
9 name of the team, that is, this was a team of UN observers. Wasn't it?
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stamp.
11 MR. STAMP: A small correction, if perhaps the translation is
12 correct. I'm not quite sure if he said he was the head of the UNMO team.
13 JUDGE ORIE: I would have to look it up, but perhaps, Mr. Hamill,
14 if you could just --
15 THE WITNESS: Mr. President, madam, the UNMO group within Sarajevo
16 consisted of the headquarters and two subsectors. Each subsector for
17 either the Papa side, that is Presidency side, or the Lima side, Lukavica
18 side, within each of those there were again smaller teams. So that on the
19 Lima side, there was a sector north comprising approximately five teams at
20 any one time, and on the south side, about three or four teams at any one
22 So initially, I started off with one of those teams. The
23 following day, I became head of that team, but it was only a small team.
24 Following on that, I went into the headquarters on the Lima side,
25 that is the Bosnian Serb army side, as a liaison officer, and occasionally
1 took over from the head of the entire Lima area when he was on leave.
2 Following on from that --
3 JUDGE ORIE: Let me just see whether, Ms. Pilipovic, because this
4 is to some extent what you told us before. It was just an objection of
6 Are you interested to hear more about this, Ms. Pilipovic? Then
7 please, put the next question to the witness.
8 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
9 Q. Witness, can you please tell us, how long did you head that team?
10 You told us that for a while, you were a deputy commander of the
12 A. That is correct. And as liaison officer, I am deputy head to a
13 Norwegian UNMO but I started off on the 19th of May as head of what was
14 called the Lima 8 team. After a number of weeks there, about two weeks
15 there, I went into Lukavica barracks. I was there until the end of June
16 in that capacity, and I was appointed at that stage as commander of all
17 the teams on the northern side of the city. And while I was commander of
18 the teams on the northern side of the city, I deputised for the commander
19 of all the teams while he was on leave or otherwise absent.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 Can you tell us -- can you explain, what was the task -- what was
22 the mission of the UN monitors, or rather, the team which you headed?
23 A. The small groups, the Lima 5, Lima 2 and so on, had a task of
24 liaising with the local brigade and battalions of the Bosnian Serb army in
25 order to determine where their weapons were, to what use they were being
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 put, and to report back to -- through their headquarters to inform the
2 headquarters of the locations and the uses.
3 Also, there was a responsibility to endeavour to prevent the
4 weapons from being fired by use of diplomacy. Obviously, as unarmed
5 observers, we had no power but we had a certain moral authority because we
6 worked for the United Nations.
7 Inside in Lukavica, the responsibility was to liaise with the
8 headquarters of the corps and to monitor, to effectively -- to negotiate
9 cease-fires first, and then to monitor the fact that they were holding,
10 that there was no firing going on. So, for example, after a major
11 incident when a cease-fire was negotiated between the two sides, we would
12 go out and patrol. I remember one in particular after a particular battle
13 in the beginning of June, we spent a long time patrolling the front lines
14 on Zlatiste, the road between Lukavica and Pale. It was a matter of
15 meeting with the commanders and gaining information from them and passing
16 that information on through our headquarters.
17 Q. Thank you. Could you tell us, in relation to the UN team, rather,
18 the monitoring team which you headed, can you explain to us what was their
19 role in relation to sectors and subsectors, or more specifically, I'm
20 asking you about that particular sector where you headed the team. Was
21 it a sector and which one, or was it a subsector with regard to the
22 reporting chronology?
23 A. Okay. I started off, as I said, as head of the Lima 8 team which
24 was based in Gornji Kotorac, and we had liaison with a number of Bosnian
25 Serb army fire units in our area. There was a troop of Pragas which we
1 designated as Lima 8 Alpha, there was a troop of 81-millimetre mortars,
2 which we designated as Lima 8 Bravo, a troop of four tanks above Kasindol
3 which we designated Lima 8 Charlie, and a troop of 120-millimetre mortars,
4 again above Kasindol, which we designated Lima 8 Delta. We also visited
5 the local brigade headquarters in Vojkovici commanded by Colonel Cehovac
6 [phoen], and we spoke with him on numerous occasions at length. We also
7 dealt, to a certain extent, with the local civilian authorities during
8 that period in that they had problems which they were looking for our
9 assistance to overcome, such as a lack of fuel, for example. So it was
10 dealing with these groupings that I personally was involved initially.
11 Afterwards, when I went into the headquarters --
12 Q. Thank you, thank you. Thank you.
13 Can you tell us, during that period of time, whilst you were in
14 Sarajevo, how strong was your team?
15 A. The teams were actually quite weak, as I mentioned earlier on.
16 That particular team had two to three members plus an interpreter at that
17 time. There were, as I said, about five teams in the north of the city
18 each comprising somewhere in the region of two to four observers plus an
19 interpreter or two. And on the south of the city, we had a team, that
20 particular one we had Lima 5, in Toplik, we had Lima 6 which we
21 established during my period there in Grbavica, and we had a team in the
22 east of the city near Sombolovac, which was Lima 7. So small, a very
23 small group. Checking my war diaries there, I found that at one stage on
24 the south side of the city, during a critical period, we were down to only
25 five observers.
1 Q. Witness, when you tell us that in your view, the teams were just
2 too small and that they could not cover the whole area properly, are you
3 also confirming that there were difficulties after your departure, that
4 there was a shortage of personnel of the United Nations, that is, military
6 A. In my view, there was a constant shortage of personnel to cover
7 the entire Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, and Macedonia.
8 Q. Witness, can you confirm for us that the activities, yours and
9 your teams', were regulated by regulations, or rather, were you duty-bound
10 to act in alliance with the instructions of standard conduct prescribed
11 for the United Nations monitors?
12 A. Military observers have certain standards, and they are required
13 to be officers with a minimum of six years' service. I had over 20, many
14 other monitors had more. We are of a certain rank; minimum captain but
15 generally majors and upwards. And we are required to use our own
16 initiative to assist in the implementation of orders given to us by higher
17 headquarters. But initiative is valued in military observers in a way
18 that it is not generally amongst normal armed forces. So we were required
19 to be flexible in the implementation of our duties and to exercise
20 flexibility and initiative, where required, to get the job done.
21 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us -- you told us that you were
22 accommodated in Lukavica. Does that mean that your team was -- the whole
23 team was put up in that building? Whether all the members of your team
24 were accommodated in the same building?
25 A. No. The -- that building contained the headquarters of the
1 observer group on the Lima side. It comprised the subsector commander,
2 myself, and one other officer on an irregular basis. So there were a
3 maximum of three persons accommodated there at any one time. The
4 remainder of the group were accommodated in various places, in Toplik, in
5 Gornji Kotorac, Sombolovac, Blazuj, Rajlovac, Vogosca, Radava.
6 Q. Witness, I stand to be corrected in this: When you tell us where
7 the members of your team were accommodated, am I to understand that those
8 were the observer points where members of your team were, in all those
9 places that you've just mentioned?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Thank you. Mr. Hamill, the system of organisation which you have
12 just explained to us and which operated on the side of the army of
13 Republika Srpska, was the same system of work and organisation applied on
14 the side of the Presidency? Can you only tell us if those were the Papa
16 A. The Papa positions comprised five in number. Because of the
17 fact that the Papa side was a much smaller area to be covered, it was
18 easier to cover it with a smaller number of teams. Similarly, the
19 teams were organised as small groups based on the Presidency, based in
20 Brijesca Brdo, somewhere around Vasin Han and Sedrenik. These were the
21 general areas. But normally, there were five positions during this
23 Q. Mr. Hamill, thank you.
24 Can you confirm for us that the members of your team, specifically
25 I am referring to the positions which you have at the VRS side, were both
1 stationery in terms of their work and patrolling the area?
2 A. Yes, that is correct, both stationery and patrolling. There was a
3 requirement to patrol between the different positions. As I explained,
4 for one particular team, the Lima 8, we had four separate positions which
5 contained weapons; and there were other locations within the team area
6 which also had to be visited, such as the municipality, for example, such
7 as the brigade headquarters, and lower than that, then the battalion
8 headquarters. So it was a case of both mobility and operating from fixed
10 Q. Did you maintain a constant communication with all specific
11 locations and all patrols? And can you explain to us the system of
12 communications and the system of reporting and informing between you, as
13 the head of the team, and members of the team, and the system of
14 communication amongst the members of the team, in particular in cases of
16 A. Certainly. The UNMO organisation operated on a specific radio
17 channel from 0700 hours in the morning until 2300 hours at night. At that
18 stage, they changed over on to another radio channel which was the general
19 sector Sarajevo radio frequency. But between 0700 and 2300, each vehicle
20 and each location in which there was a fixed patrol point had radio
21 communications with the centre, Lima 9er, as it was referred to, 9er being
22 the standard military jargon for commander. And Lima 9er then had
23 communications with what we call uniform, that is, the headquarters of the
24 whole UNMO operation in Sarajevo who controlled both the Presidency side
25 and the VRS side.
1 So we had constant communications by radio. And also, because of
2 the fact that people were mobile, there was face-to-face contact.
3 Lukavica was a centre where teams would regularly come in on a daily basis
4 or more often to exchange information, to get instructions, and so on.
5 Q. Mr. Hamill, am I correct in understanding you then as regards the
6 system of information and reporting with respect to the work of your
7 teams, that you were always in a position to obtain very swift information
8 in cases of incidents in a particular area of the town, that is, that you
9 would immediately have been informed of a shelling or a sniping incident?
10 A. Again, as I mentioned, we had teams throughout the area, but it
11 wasn't always the case that a team would be on hand where an incident
12 occurred. So, for example, the traffic between ourselves and the liaison
13 office was two-way, it wasn't one-way. We would have members of the
14 liaison office - Major Indic or Captain Luledzija - coming in to us to
15 complain about shelling or sniping going on in Serb-controlled areas, and
16 we would then pass that information on to the headquarters to attempt to
17 get something done about it from our Papa teams. So it was a two-way
19 But if a team was in a location, they could have instantaneous
20 communication with us and report the incident. We had two types of
21 reports of that nature. One was a shootrep, where there was a shooting
22 report, which was outgoing from our area, or for the Papa people, it would
23 be outgoing from their area. Then we had an increp, or incident report,
24 which designated incoming fire or incoming incidents. This was passed
25 immediately to the headquarters.
1 Q. Mr. Hamill, am I correct in understanding you that you received
2 information both by radio communication and through reports about
3 incidents, that is, written reports about incidents?
4 A. That is correct. Yes. We had a written report on a daily basis
5 from each team, which we then collated and sent on as our daily report to
6 the headquarters.
7 Q. Did your observers in your area of responsibility submit their
8 reports to you as the head of the team?
9 A. They did, when I was head of the team. But generally, because of
10 the fact that I was a native English speaker, I got them anyway in order
11 to tidy them up, shall we say, before sending them on to the higher
13 Q. That would have been my next question. Did you yourself compile
14 your report on the basis of other observers' reports, or did you simply
15 forward their report further on without any intervention?
16 A. Their report was transmitted direct to the entire organisation. I
17 used their reports partly to compile my own report, but also included what
18 I had personally witnessed or heard during the period myself. So it was a
19 compilation of two types; other peoples' plus my own direct observations.
20 Q. As regards the reports that you received from your team members, I
21 should like to know whether these written reports were subject to any
22 corrections or shortening compared to the initial, original report made by
23 the patrol or the person in the field.
24 A. The original report was widely available in that it was sent
25 generally by radio. If it wasn't possible to send it by hand, it was sent
1 by radio, so it was open to everybody to hear, including the factions on
2 each side, if they wished to listen into it.
3 You must remember that the United Nations, particularly the
4 military observers, operated on a very open basis, on the basis that we
5 were not there as a warring faction; we were there to monitor and report.
6 And it was my own firm policy that we had no secrets as such so that
7 anything which came through from the teams was available to go ahead to
8 the headquarters. In certain circumstances, it might be the case that we
9 would query reports coming in, query the accuracy or the validity if we
10 had any doubts as to what was written or what came across the air.
11 And again, because of the fact that the reports were always in
12 English, not every military observer had the same standard of English.
13 And it was up to me often to interpret what I was reading and to turn it
14 into a better form of English, shall we say, so the only corrections would
15 be done on the grammar and syntax, or the basis of corrected facts, but
16 corrected by the team, not by the headquarters.
17 Q. Mr. Hamill, with respect to military regulations, what was the
18 level of command of the VRS that you had contact with? On what level was
19 this contact possible?
20 A. Corps headquarters.
21 Q. With the corps headquarters, is that what I understood?
22 Mr. Hamill, you told us that in May, June, and July 1993, you were
23 in the area, if I understood you correctly, of the Vojkovici Brigade, and
24 that you monitored that brigade. You also told us that you had an
25 observation point in Vogosca and in Toplik as well.
1 If I were to show you a map of Sarajevo, do you think you would be
2 able to mark on the map the positions of your OPs?
3 A. Certainly.
4 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, at this point, the
5 Defence would like to show to the witness map number 3644P, that is, the
6 map that we agreed we would use in the examination of witnesses.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And then I think it gets the addition H, but do
8 we have H already? The initials of the witness usually are added to it.
9 Two questions: First --
10 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE ORIE: -- the map as it was initially introduced, of course,
12 had the P number so we know what map we are talking about. But if you
13 want to tender it, of course we need copies, and we need to give it a D
14 number now since it's the Defence who would then tender the map with the
15 markings of this witness on it. If you would like it to be marked.
16 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. I think the
17 number is 77D.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Have you copies for us?
19 THE REGISTRAR: D76.
20 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] My apologies.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Do you have copies?
22 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I think that my
23 colleague has the copies.
24 MR. STAMP: We would be quite happy to --
25 JUDGE ORIE: If you have them. Yes, please. As always, a set
1 available in case of emergency.
2 MR. STAMP: However, it is marked P3644. Perhaps that could be
3 altered to suit the circumstances.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll...
5 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Mr. Hamill --
7 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, would you please check on whether we
8 do not have already another Exhibit D76, because it might be a mistake
9 since one map was not used, but I have a premarked document D76, which is
10 a statement of Hilmo Kundo, a handwritten statement, but it may be
11 re-numbered. But the number, finally, will follow.
12 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour.
13 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
14 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] That is why I said 77.
15 JUDGE ORIE: We'll check the bookkeeping during the next break.
16 Let's have it D77 for the time being.
17 Mr. Usher, in order to be able to follow whatever markings are
18 made, I think the ELMO is -- after the witness has oriented himself, it
19 would be the better place to work with it.
20 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Mr. Hamill, if you could please put the map on the ELMO.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Hamill, we have to take care that you do not go
23 too far away from the microphones. So the ELMO can be turned in your
24 direction if you sit down.
25 Mr. Usher, would you please assist.
1 THE WITNESS: Right. Do you wish me to physically mark the map?
2 JUDGE ORIE: If you'll follow the request and instructions of
3 Ms. Pilipovic.
4 THE WITNESS: Okay.
5 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Mr. Hamill, can you please mark for us on this map the area of
7 responsibility that you were in charge of, that is, the part of the town
8 which was under the VRS control and where your positions were.
9 A. Okay.
10 Q. While you're marking the map, will you please say for the record
11 what it is that you're marking as a position.
12 A. Okay.
13 Q. If you have that knowledge.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Does the witness have a blue or a black marker?
15 THE WITNESS: Blue.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Would you please use a black marker since black is
17 the colour we always use when --
18 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] The black one, please. Yes.
19 JUDGE ORIE: -- Defence. Perhaps you have a thicker one. Yes.
20 Please proceed.
21 THE WITNESS: When I came out initially to the Lima side, I was
22 posted to a team called Lima 5 Alpha, which was based approximately here.
23 Lima 5, sorry. The address was Toplika Cesta 57R.
24 This was responsible for a group of guns in this area here. Then
25 I moved, as I said --
1 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Witness, you told us that that part of your team was responsible
3 for this area. Can you also tell us what military formation was deployed
4 in the area and how many guns there were? Also, with respect to the area
5 that you just marked, can you also indicate where Toplik is.
6 A. This is Toplik, this area here. And this --
7 Q. Mr. Hamill, sorry to interrupt you, can you please encircle the
8 area of Toplik, that is, the word "Toplik," and if you can mark it with a
9 letter T, please.
10 A. [Marks]
11 Q. For the record, the witness has marked with a square and the
12 letter T the area of Toplik.
13 A. Now, this area is Toplika Cesta, which means Toplik Road, and
14 this was the area in which there were four 120-millimetre guns. When I
15 moved the following day over here to Gornji Kotorac, and the team was
16 located in Gornji Kotorac 42.
17 Q. Mr. Hamill, just for the record, the witness has marked with a
18 rectangle and the letter G the area of Gornji Kotorac where observation
19 point Lima 8 was located, if I understood you correctly. Thank you.
20 A. That is correct. On top of the hill Ilinaca there were
21 anti-aircraft weapons, four Pragas, that is truck-mounted 30-millimetre
22 twin guns. Roughly here, we had three 82-millimetre mortars. Now, I
23 cannot be exact, but up in the hilltop, around Gornji Maridza [phoen], we
24 had four tanks and four 120-millimetre mortars. These were the areas
25 known as Alpha --
1 Q. Sir --
2 A. -- Bravo, Charlie, and Delta.
3 Q. Mr. Hamill, it is necessary for the record to indicate that you
4 marked Donji Ladici [phoen] with number 4. And can you please tell us
5 whether you had an observation point there? Did it have a number or was
6 it part of the area which was observed from observation point number 8?
7 A. Lima 8 was our base from which we patrolled. And on a daily basis
8 we went to these weapon positions which were designated as Lima 8 Alpha,
9 Lima 8 Bravo, Lima 8 Charlie, and Lima 8 Delta. Now, we went and visited
10 those positions on a daily basis to liaise with the commander and the
11 troops who were based there.
12 Similarly, we went into --
13 Q. Mr. Hamill, at this point, can you please tell us which military
14 formation was located in the area under your control and where your
15 observation posts were. And also, who were the commanders that you
17 A. At that time --
18 Q. If you have that knowledge, please.
19 A. The commander of the tanks, if memory serves me, was a Major
20 Milutinovic. The commander of the Pragas was a Lieutenant Finisa
21 Antelovic [phoen]. The commander of the 82-millimetre mortars was
22 Lieutenant Pappas [phoen]. And I cannot remember offhand the name of the
23 commander of the 120-millimetre mortars. The name Nenad comes to me, but
24 I think he was just one of the foot soldiers, as you might say. All of
25 those were responsible to the headquarters in Lukavica.
1 Now, further than that, also in our area was a brigade
2 headquarters in Vojkovici, which I have marked with a V. Vojkovici. And
3 this was on the front line almost versus Hrasnica, and the commander there
4 was a man who was introduced to us as Colonel Cetovac [phoen].
5 Q. Mr. Hamill, for the record, let me clarify that the rectangle
6 marked with the letter V stands for the Lima observation point which
7 monitored the Vojkovici brigade which was deployed at the front line.
8 Now, Mr. Hamill --
9 A. No, sorry. That is not accurate. That was the location of the
10 brigade headquarters. It was not an UNMO post, but it was a place which
11 was visited on a regular basis by the UNMO team in order to liaise with
12 the brigade commander and his staff. It was not, strictly speaking, an
13 UNMO location.
14 Q. Thank you, Mr. Hamill, for this clarification.
15 As regards this part of the area where your observers were
16 deployed, I should like to ask you a few questions. What was the
17 cooperation of the members of your team with the commanders of the
18 specifically Vojkovici Brigade and the persons that you just named and who
19 were deployed in this portion of the area which was under the Lima 8 --
20 A. It was my view that --
21 Q. -- control?
22 A. -- we had a very good working relationship with all persons of the
23 Bosnian Serb army in that area that we came into contact with.
24 Specifically, the teams, the team when it went to the weapons' positions
25 were always welcomed, were shown the weapons, were shown the ammunition.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 If there were any changes, they were explained to us. For example, on one
2 occasion, we went to Lima 8 Charlie, a tank position, and found tanks were
3 no longer there. It was explained that they were in Lukavica for
4 servicing and we would be informed when they would be brought back.
5 Similarly, from my experience of Lima 5, I found the cooperation
6 there between the troops deployed on the ground and the UNMO team to be
7 excellent, to the extent that the gun commander, before he fired a fire
8 mission, would come down to the observation post and inform the UNMOs that
9 he was about to fire, and ask if they wish to be present for the firing.
10 So cooperation was very good at that level.
11 Q. Thank you for your answer, Mr. Hamill. In May, June, July 1993,
12 did you personally eyewitness - and I'm talking about the area under Lima
13 8 and Lima 5 jurisdiction so to speak - did you witness any intentional
14 attack on civilian targets coming from the area which you just indicated
15 for us on the map?
16 A. No, I did not.
17 Q. Whilst you were on duty, that is, during your tour of duty, and in
18 view of what you told us about the Vojkovici Brigade, that it was deployed
19 on the front line facing Hrasnica, were there any -- was there any armed
20 activity in this part of the town between the two armies?
21 A. Yes, there was considerable firing during the period. This would
22 have been one of the quieter sectors in Sarajevo during that time but
23 there was still a considerable quantity of fire going in both directions.
24 I was personally stuck in the headquarters for a considerable period of
25 time while it was being shelled from Hrasnica, for example. Similarly, in
1 Lukavica, I was under fire from inside the city. And also, we constantly
2 were reporting outgoing shootings as well. So it was both ways; in and
4 Q. Mr. Hamill, you just told us that there was shooting coming from
5 both sides in this area. Can you tell us how often it was? Was it on a
6 daily basis, once a week? How frequent were these shootings?
7 A. Not a day passed without a shooting or a shelling. Occasionally
8 it would be very, very heavy, such as, for example, I remember on one day
9 we recorded 3.610 rounds in a 12-hour period, outgoing from our side.
10 Similarly, we had incoming into our side from the Presidency side on a
11 regular basis, although not to the same extent. But on a daily basis,
12 there was shooting and shelling both ways. Shooting by small arms,
13 machine-guns; shelling by artillery weapons.
14 Q. Thank you, Mr. Hamill. Now that you told us that your team
15 members counted impacts or rounds, can you tell us what was the procedure
16 used to count these incidents?
17 A. We would hear them or see them, as the case may be. We only
18 counted rounds that we ourselves saw or heard. We did not count rounds
19 that were reported to us by either of the warring parties.
20 Q. Mr. Hamill, since you were in a position to, as you tell us, be
21 almost daily witnesses to combat operations between the two parties to the
22 conflict in the part of the city which your observers covered, were you
23 duty-bound to conduct operational investigations in those areas where, as
24 you say, there was shelling and sniping?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Can you explain it to us, or rather, clarify for us, how did you
2 conduct your, if I may call it, your investigations?
3 A. I can give you examples. For example, shortly after I arrived, we
4 went into Grbavica to examine a location where a mortar shell had hit a
5 block of flats. And we examined the wreckage and reported that indeed it
6 was a fresh mortar hit, and that Grbavica had been fired on from inside
7 the city, for example. Similarly, we conducted patrols on a regular basis
8 in Grbavica, listening for snipers, driving around with our windows open
9 so we could hear them, and reported what we heard back to the
11 Where shelling was going on from a particular area, we would visit
12 the guns in question and question them as to what their targets were and
13 why they were shelling. We would inform higher headquarters of the
14 results of those. We would, when we found information when I was in
15 Lukavica, we would go to the liaison office and question the liaison
16 officer who was on duty as to what was happening and why there was
17 shelling outgoing. Similarly, as I said, we would be informed by the
18 liaison team of shelling which was incoming and we would be asked to get
19 on to our counterparts to have that stopped.
20 However, on a number of occasions, we were informed by the VRS
21 headquarters staff that attacks had occurred north of Sokolac, for
22 example, or in Han Pijesak, places like that. And we requested permission
23 to go and examine the areas and confirm that an attack had taken place,
24 but we were refused permission because they were quite paranoid about
25 allowing us to visit areas which had been shelled, for whatever reasons
1 best known to themselves.
2 So they protested to us but wouldn't allow us to investigate,
3 generally. On occasions when we were there when the shelling was
4 occurring, then of course we would investigate.
5 Q. Mr. Hamill, you told us that you had received information about
6 shellings. You mentioned specifically Grbavica. Did you establish --
7 from which positions was Grbavica shelled, from which part of
8 the city, and was the target or was the facility hit a residential or a
9 military facility? Did you try to establish such facts when you went out
10 to the scenes?
11 A. In the specific case I mentioned, which happened to be my first
12 investigation there, the shell landed on the roof of a block of flats and
13 came through into the top floor. It was a residential area, they were
14 residences lived in by people, and it was not possible to do any sort of
15 analysis on it but it was quite clear that it had come from, generally,
16 the north, in other words, from inside the city.
17 Q. You say north, from the north, from the northern part of the city.
18 Could you then determine from where exactly? Because northern part of the
19 city is rather broader.
20 A. No.
21 Q. Mr. Hamill, during your tour of duty, 1993, May, June, July, were
22 you present or did you see how, from the area of Lukavica, and Gornji
23 Kotorac, whether the city was shelled from there? That is, did you see it
24 with your own eyes and did you have any information that the -- that
25 Dobrinja and Alipasino Polje were shelled from those two locations?
1 A. I was actually in Gornji Kotorac, not Donji Kotorac, and the
2 difference is that Gornji Kotorac is on a hill so we could see very
3 clearly over Dobrinja. It was one of the reasons why we were based there,
4 and we could see on occasion shells landing in there, particularly at
5 night. And also, you had Mojmilo hill, Mojmilo in between ourselves and
6 the airport on the one side and the city on the other. But it was quite
7 clear at times that shelling was going on because the smoke would arise.
8 Now, also, there was a location which I found very useful. It was
9 a historical monument up near Hrabac [phoen], I think, on the way to
10 Zlatiste, a memorial to Comrade Tito, if I remember right again, and we
11 used to go up there and look over the city, and we would see the shells
12 landing in the city, yes. We would see the shells landing in the city.
13 Q. Mr. Hamill, can you tell us this: Did you receive any information
14 in writing? A moment ago you spoke about shelling. Did you receive such
15 information in writing as to which parts of the city had been shelled?
16 A. Yes, in the sense that every shootrep and every intrep was
17 reported. The information was very comprehensive, and the location where
18 the round fell, were known, was mentioned. So yes, we certainly had
19 specific information on specific locations on a daily basis.
20 MR. STAMP: Just a matter for the records, I am wondering if the
21 answer is the information was very comprehensive and the location where
22 the round fell "where known" was mentioned or is it "were known"? I think
23 I heard the witness say "where known."
24 THE WITNESS: Where.
25 MR. STAMP: So I think, for the record, the transcript should read
1 "where known," and not "were known."
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, if this reflects your answer better, Mr. Hamill.
3 THE WITNESS: Mr. President, I don't have the transcript on my --
4 JUDGE ORIE: I'm just wondering, because I have the word "were,"
5 and --
6 THE WITNESS: It should be where known.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Could you please, Mr. Hamill, read your answer on
8 page 87, line 9.
9 THE WITNESS: "Yes, in the sense that every shootrep and every
10 increp --" i-n-c-r-e-p -- "was reported. The information was very
11 comprehensive and the location where the round fell, where known, was
13 JUDGE ORIE: Where known, that's w-h-e-r-e.
14 THE WITNESS: Yes, Mr. President.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's because in the --
16 THE WITNESS: It was not always the --
17 JUDGE ORIE: -- previous line there's also the word "where." It's
18 two times where, with w-h-e-r-e. Thank you for the clarification.
19 THE WITNESS: It was not always the case that the location where
20 the round fell was known because it was heard but not seen.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you for your clarification.
22 Please proceed, Ms. Pilipovic.
23 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 Q. Mr. Hamill, as you were giving us your answer, you mentioned the
25 hill of Mojmilo. Will you agree with me that during your tour of duty,
1 the hill of Mojmilo was under the control of the BH army?
2 A. It certainly was, and indeed they sniped from there into Lukavica
3 and sometimes at military observers, too. Mm-hmm.
4 Q. And you are telling us, therefore, that the troops of the BH army
5 were controlling the Mojmilo hill and --
6 A. That is correct.
7 Q. -- and that they opened sniping fire from there, aiming at
8 Lukavica. In that part of the city, was there any fighting between the
9 troops of the army of BH holding the positions on Mojmilo and the army of
10 Republika Srpska whose positions were, we've just said Donja Kotorac and
11 Lukavica? Can you tell us if in that part of the city there was any
12 fighting between the two armies?
13 A. It was a very quiet part of the city. There was very little by
14 way of combat activity. As I mentioned, there was sniping from Mojmilo
15 towards Lukavica, towards the Serb-held part of Dobrinja, for example.
16 But it was generally quiet.
17 Q. In other words, Mr. Hamill, you are speaking about the sniping
18 activities from both the positions of the troops of the army of BH. Can
19 you tell us, how frequent were such sniping activities?
20 A. Sniping in that area was infrequent. Sniping in the area of
21 Grbavica was quite frequent.
22 Q. When you say that in the area of Grbavica, there was very frequent
23 fire, did you, during your stay, get any information as to from which
24 parts of the city was the sniping fire opened against Grbavica? Did you
25 establish which were the facilities, the structures, from which sniping
1 fire was aimed at Grbavica?
2 A. It seemed to me that the fire was coming from the area around --
3 generally around the Hotel Bristol, that general area. From Hrasno.
4 Q. When you say from Hrasno, do you have any information if Hrasno
5 was controlled by the army of Republika Srpska or the BH? And can you
6 specify the positions with regard to Hrasno.
7 A. Hrasno was the front line, more or less, between the Armija and
8 the VRS. And on one side of the stadium -- in general terms, on one side
9 of the stadium you had the VRS; on the other side, you had army of BiH.
10 And the sniping was coming into Grbavica from the Armija side.
11 Q. When you say the army, you mean the BH army, do you?
12 A. Army of BH, yes. Mm-hmm.
13 Q. Mr. Hamill, during your tour of duty and activity at your post,
14 did you have any information as to the type of armament of the BH army?
15 Did you receive the information from your team members observing the part
16 of the city controlled by the BH? What kind of weapons did they use?
17 A. They were quite lightly armed, generally. They had mortars. We
18 were aware they had mortars. We knew they had some tanks. They had some
19 artillery guns but very, very few. Generally, it was rifles,
20 machine-guns, standard infantry-type weapons, RPGs, that is,
21 rocket-propelled grenades.
22 Q. During your stay in the area of Sarajevo, were you ever present at
23 the fighting which took place in some parts of the city between the troops
24 of the army of BH and the army of Republika Srpska? Or more specifically,
25 did you eyewitness one of -- some attack of the BH army? Can you confirm
1 for us that the troops of the army of BH also conducted some actions in
2 which it participated as an attack?
3 A. Yes, I can confirm that. I was present in Vogosca in early July
4 during one particular attack when the Armija, Armija BiH, attacked VRS
5 lines and were responded to by first small arms and then fairly heavy
6 artillery fire.
7 Q. Did you receive any information about BH army attacks on the road
8 to Pale? Do you have any information if there was any fighting in that
9 part of the city between the two armies?
10 A. There was certainly one major attack at the end of May in which
11 the army of BiH attacked uphill towards Zlatiste. It was an infantry
12 attack without any proprietary fires, and it was repulsed by the BSA with
13 very small losses on their part. But my understanding from my colleagues
14 on the Papa side was that there were very large Armija BiH casualties,
15 well in excess of 100.
16 It was directly after that that we monitored that particular area,
17 driving up and down the road, looking at positions, inspecting positions,
18 seeing what could be seen and just generally implementing the cease-fire.
19 Q. Mr. Hamill, since you communicated both with the representatives
20 of the army of Republika Srpska and the BH army, can you tell us what did
21 the soldiers of the army of Republika Srpska wear, that is, whether they
22 had any uniforms and what kind of, and the same question goes to the
23 members -- regarding the members of the BH army?
24 A. It was policy amongst the military observers that we did not mix
25 with combat personnel of the side which we were not monitoring. So I had
1 no contact with members of the Armija BiH at that time. I only had
2 contact with members of the VRS. They were generally armed -- they were
3 generally clothed in a type of camouflage combat uniform, dark brown.
4 Some of them who appeared to be more militia than Armija, as it were, more
5 gendarmerie/militia type, wore a kind of blue-grey camouflage uniform.
6 But generally, the soldiers wore a greeny-olive camouflage uniform. Not
7 everybody had the full uniform. Some more some civilian clothing with
8 bits of uniform because, of course, it wasn't a regular army in that
9 sense. It was an army of people who perhaps by day were farmers and by
10 night were soldiers, or vice versa.
11 Q. So, Mr. Hamill, you are confirming that in the part of the city
12 controlled by the army of Republika Srpska, that members of the army of
13 Republika Srpska were in residence of the parts of the city which was
14 controlled by the army of Republika Srpska. That is, that the residents
15 of this part of the city were also members of the army of Republika
17 A. Practically every person that I met on the VRS was a native either
18 of the outskirts of Sarajevo or had lived perhaps in Hrasnica, perhaps in
19 Centar, perhaps in Bascarsija, and had come out to the outside around
20 April, May, June of 1992. So most of them, but not all, most of them were
21 Sarajevans. There were others. There were people from Crnokar [phoen],
22 for example, there were people from Herzegovina. But generally, the
23 people -- certainly 95-plus per cent of personnel there were locals.
24 Q. Mr. Hamill, thank you for your answer.
25 Today during your examination-in-chief, explained that you heard
1 protests, that you received various protests from your associates who were
2 controlling and observing the part of the city in the hands of the BH
4 Can you tell us, what was the form of these protests that you
5 received and that you, as you told us, forwarded and informed Mr. Indic
6 about? Is that correct?
7 A. If Major Indic was there, we would speak to him. If he wasn't, it
8 would be Captain Lucia [phoen] or perhaps one of the other staff who were
9 present. There were a number of others. We would receive information
10 that shelling was going on in a particular area, perhaps an area monitored
11 by Papa 5 or Papa 3 or whoever. And we would go to the office and say,
12 there is shelling going on in this area. What's happening? It must be
13 stopped. And at that stage, they would not -- they would often know
14 already that IT was happening, naturally, because they were the corps
15 headquarters. Or if they didn't know, it was because they had, perhaps
16 you might say it was an independent activity going on. But generally,
17 they were aware of what was going on and had a prepared answer, if you
18 will, if they didn't wish to stop the shelling or shooting. Or sometimes,
19 they did anyway, they stopped it or they caused it to be stopped.
20 Q. Mr. Hamill, can you tell us the following: Would the shelling in
21 the part of the city controlled by the BH army, after you had received
22 such a protest, can you tell us if it is -- what kind of information did
23 you receive? What unit was involved, and what was targeted, or to make
24 myself clear, can you tell us precisely during that period of time from
25 which area and when and from whom did you receive information as to the
1 part of the city under shelling?
2 A. We received that information specifically from UNMO teams working
3 in the area.
4 Q. When you say that you receive information from other teams working
5 in the area, can you be more precise? Can you tell us, this information,
6 if it was oral information, did you also receive such information in
7 writing? And did such written information include the exact name of the
8 formation and the part of the city shelling and whether there were any
9 combat activities in that area?
10 A. When we received the information, it was by radio, because
11 obviously doing it by letter or by hand would take too long. It took --
12 it could take two hours to reach Lukavica from the centre even if it were
13 possible to go through, which it wasn't always. So there was no sense in
14 sending written information that a shelling was going on. Our job was to
15 cause the shelling to stop. That had to happen instantly. There was no
16 point in having it go on for two, three hours before going into the
17 liaison office and saying "stop it". So the question isn't really
18 relevant. It came by radio from the teams.
19 Now, obviously they wouldn't say to us, "It's the 105th Brigade
20 headquarters that's being shelled." They would say "There is shelling
21 going on in Papa 4's area. It's in this particular grid square." It was
22 not up to us to question the Papa teams on their information in that
24 Q. Do you have any knowledge as to when the Papa team would inform
25 that shelling was underway? Specifically you mentioned the case of the
1 105th, and I suppose you mean the 105th Brigade of the BH army. Now, when
2 you get such a report that a certain part of the city is under shelling,
3 would you know -- if teams of UNMOs would go to the site straight away,
4 would they draw up a record of it? Would they inform you about it as a
5 member of Lima on the other side, and was such information or was such
6 record then forwarded on in the form of protests?
7 A. What happened was as soon as a shelling occurred, incoming or
8 outgoing, it was reported by the appropriate team. If it was outgoing
9 from their area, it went out as a Shootrep, a shooting report. If it was
10 incoming into their side, in other words, if their area was being shelled,
11 it was reported immediately in the form of an incident report, an INCREP
12 I-N-C-R-E-P. So that this was an instant response, and we were made aware
13 instantly of what was happening because we could hear it going over on our
14 radio set. We had the radio set on 24 hours a day. From 7.00 in the
15 morning until 11.00 at night, we had our own channel specifically for the
16 UNMOs. We heard everything that was happening with every team.
17 The reports were comprehensive insofar as it was possible to make
18 them. One paragraph was kept for the written form. It wasn't kept or it
19 wasn't sent over the radio. And that was the type of target. But it was
20 a written report at the end of the day, and every day's reports were filed
21 and kept. So it's quite possible to go back and look at any specific day
22 and see what was being shelled at that time. Generally, when we went into
23 protest, it was because a normal civilian area with no apparent military
24 value was being attacked. This was the information that we were given by
25 our people on the Papa side.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, would this be a suitable moment for
2 you to interrupt your cross-examination.
3 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. Yes. Thank
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Hamill, our Court schedule tells us that at
6 4.00 we stop, in the afternoon. We'll continue tomorrow morning at 9.00,
7 not 9.30, 9.00.
8 Mr. Usher, could you please escort Mr. Hamill out of the courtroom
9 so that we can deal with one or two technicalities.
10 Would you please follow the usher, Mr. Hamill.
11 THE WITNESS: Your Honours.
12 [The witness stands down]
13 JUDGE ORIE: I think we still have to deal with two issues. First
14 of all, I still owe you the decision on the medical records we discussed
15 this morning. These are the -- it's the medical records especially
16 of -- I don't want to make any mistakes. It's about the medical records
17 of Ramiza Kundo.
18 Mr. Stamp, the Chamber has decided that the evidence as it is
19 presented now cannot be admitted. On the other hand, that it would be
20 admissible if there would be a -- if it would be the best legible copy
21 with a translation without any unclarity and if a proper explanation is
22 given why elements of the document which are not well visible in the text
23 itself. And you might remember that we discussed, for example, the first
24 name of a doctor where we only see his initial. If you could -- if the
25 Prosecution could give us a proper explanation of what has happened during
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 the various translations made of these documents, especially in this
2 respect where we find translation elements which are not there in the
3 original copy of the document -- I wouldn't say the original document, but
4 the original copy of the document.
5 And finally, I inform the parties that the Chamber thinks that on
6 the basis of the objections made until now, and given the authentication
7 of the document as given by the witness itself, there's no need on this
8 basis for any additional authentication for this moment. And as I told
9 you, it's on the basis of the objections made until now. Of course, if
10 there's anything else, we'll hear about it. That's the decision on the
11 medical records of the Witness Kundo.
12 Then we still had to decide, Ms. Pilipovic, on two documents the
13 Defence tendered. One is an official note. That is the Exhibit D75,
14 which is an official note drawn up by Mr. Jusufbegovic. The second one is
15 a handwritten statement of Hilmo Kundo. Since I've heard no objections,
16 not on Friday, not today, they are both admitted into evidence.
17 We'll adjourn until tomorrow morning, 9.00, same courtroom.
18 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at
19 4.03 p.m., to be reconvened on
20 Tuesday, the 26th day of March, 2002,
21 at 9.00 a.m.