1 Friday, 19 April, 2002
2 [Open Session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.16 p.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Case Number IT-98-29-T, the Prosecutor versus
7 Stanislav Galic.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar. Mr. Piletta-Zanin
9 indicated before to us that he was not able to attend today.
10 Ms. Pilipovic, are you ready to resume the cross-examination of
11 the expert?
12 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Usher, will you please then guide the witness
14 into the courtroom.
15 [The witness entered court]
16 WITNESS: ROBERT DONIA [Resumed]
17 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon, Mr. Donia. Please be seated.
18 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Mr. President.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, please proceed.
20 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
21 Cross-examined by Ms. Pilipovic: [Continued]
22 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Donia, good day.
23 A. Good afternoon.
24 Q. Mr. Donia, yesterday, in the course of our cross-examination, we
25 discussed the conclusions arrived at within the framework of your expert
1 report. Today, I would like to start out by asking you a couple of
2 questions about the setting up of the national party, nationalist
3 parties. You said that the three leading such parties won overwhelmingly
4 at the first free elections; is that correct?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Could you tell us whether you have any knowledge as to the
7 sequence of the setting up of those parties in the area of
9 A. They were set up in two stages. They were set up, first of all,
10 as founding committees in the period before the Supreme Court --
11 Constitutional Court decision made such parties legal. I do not know what
12 order those three parties were established or those three committees were
13 established. They were all essentially operating outside the law. The
14 order of the actual founding assemblies which was the formal event, public
15 event, kicking off the formation of the party, began, I believe, with the
16 SDA; second was the HDZ; and third was the SDS.
17 Q. Thank you, Mr. Donia.
18 As to the sequence of the setting up of these national parties,
19 do you think it had any impact? What I mean to say, the fact that the
20 first one to be set up was SDA, did it influence the setting up of the
21 other nationalist parties afterwards?
22 A. I don't believe so, no.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 Can we agree that the leader of the SDA was, and remained for a
25 long time, Alija Izetbegovic?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Isn't it correct that the party -- programme of that party was
3 based on the Islamic declaration drawn up by Alija Izetbegovic?
4 A. No.
5 Q. Have you had the opportunity to read the Islamic declaration?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Isn't it correct that the Islamic declaration is based on the
8 conclusion about the fact that the Islam and Islamic [as interpreted]
9 Institutions are irreconcilable [Realtime transcript read in error
11 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I don't know whether it is a
12 translation problem, but the question as it presently framed does not make
13 any sense.
14 THE INTERPRETER: It was irreconcilable, not "reconcilable" as we
15 can see in the transcript. Thank you.
16 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Mr. Donia, if I tell you that one of the statements of the Islamic
18 declaration -- well, I am going to try to interpret it and you can tell me
19 whether I am correct or not, that the first and most important conclusion
20 of each conclusion concerning the irreconcilability of Islam and
21 non-Islamic institutions means that there can't be any peace or
22 reconciliation between Islamic faith and non-Islamic institutions. Can
23 you agree with this interpretation of the main idea of the Islamic
25 JUDGE ORIE: May I just interrupt. Does not mean that not only
1 the word irreconcilable, but also Islamic and non-Islamic institution was
2 in your first question because, as it reads now it says, that the Islam
3 and Islamic institutions are reconcilable. So there are two corrections
4 to be made. You are talking about the nonreconcilability --
5 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] About the Islam and non-Islamic
6 organisations not being reconcilable.
7 A. Quite the opposite. The Islamic declaration was written in the
8 late 1960s precisely to reconcile the traditional, more fundamentalist
9 positions of Islam at that time, with the modernizing Islamic states of
10 that time represented principally then by the -- by Iran under the Shah.
11 The purpose of that declaration, writing it, was in fact to address
12 relations within Islam and between Islam and non-Islamic institutions and
13 its purpose was clearly to reconcile those positions, not to put them in
14 direct opposition.
15 Q. So that's your interpretation.
16 Mr. Donia, do you know that due to these attitudes, Mr.
17 Alija Izetbegovic, in the course of the unity and brotherhood doctrine,
18 was held responsible for that because his Islamic declaration at the time
19 invited people to destroy the then common Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
20 Are you aware of that?
21 A. That's a false interpretation of both the declaration and the
22 prosecution of Alija Izetbegovic, which took place in 1983, and I would
23 not accept that as an accurate characterisation of what took place.
24 Q. Mr. Donia, have you had the opportunity to read the ruling which
25 condemned Mr. Alija Izetbegovic?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. If, as the Defence counsel of General Galic, I present to you the
3 incriminating evidence, rather, the indictment document leading to the
4 ruling in that case, do you think you could still agree with me that, at
5 that particular time, the attitudes expressed in the Islamic declaration
6 called for the destruction of the common state?
7 A. No. The Islamic declaration made no mention of
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina. The words never appear in the Islamic declaration.
9 The word Yugoslavia never appears in the Islamic declaration. The Islamic
10 declaration was addressed to the political situation everywhere else in
11 the world, outside of Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. So, there was
12 certainly an attempt by the Prosecution and, indeed, a ruling of the court
13 that the ideas contained in the Islamic declaration constituted a danger
14 for the political ideals then predominant in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
15 Yugoslavia. But clearly such was not the case, as was argued quite
16 successfully by the Defence in rejecting the claims of the Prosecution in
17 that case.
18 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the Defence would
19 like to present Mr. Donia with the sentence, and I would like to submit it
20 as proof. We do have the text in English as well. There is a translation
21 into English.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, you may present it to the witness,
23 Ms. Pilipovic.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Let me just ask you that you prenumbered both D99,
25 may I ask you that the English translation is D99.1, Ms. Pilipovic?
1 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, I do apologize.
2 Q. Mr. Donia, can you see in front of you the ruling and, more
3 specifically, page four of that text?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Can you see on page 5 and within the framework of the
6 indictment, that is to say, the allegations that Mr. Alija Izetbegovic and
7 somebody else whose name I wouldn't like to mention - I don't know what
8 the status of that person is - that the Islamic system of the unity of
9 religion and politics?
10 A. I'm sorry, I don't see where -- I am sorry, I don't see where you
11 are -- perhaps we are dealing with the B/C/S, page 5.
12 Q. Mr. Donia, on page 5. Thank you. On page five --
13 JUDGE ORIE: Would you please, Ms. Pilipovic, indicate because of
14 -- since we are using the English version, I see that there are some
15 numbers now and then. So you are taking us to the...
16 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour --
17 JUDGE ORIE: You are taking us to the part which start with "early
19 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. Afterwards on
20 page 5, para 4, there is the indictment. From the declaration,
21 the first and the most important conclusion must be the conclusion about
22 the fact that the non-Islamic institutions and Islam are not
23 reconcilable. That's something we have already presented to Mr. Donia.
24 But then again on page six of the B/C/S version, and that means on page
25 ten of the English version of the text, the last paragraph states: "In
1 the text of the declaration in between the period of time between 1974 and
2 1983, with the aim of the counter-revolutionary threat to the social
3 system of Yugoslavia and with the aim to set up the group of like-minded
4 people within the country to pursue counter-revolutionary activities to
5 destroy the social system," and so on and so forth.
6 Q. Mr. Donia, it is on page 10, the last paragraph in the English
8 THE INTERPRETER: And it might be a good idea for the interpreters
9 to see the text as well.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Are there any texts available for the interpreters as
11 well, Ms. Pilipovic?
12 Mr. Usher, could you please assist Ms. Pilipovic.
13 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
14 Q. Mr. Donia, have you found the part of the text where it says that,
15 "between 1973 and 1983." It is on page 10 of the English text.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Can you agree with me that in that particular period between 1974
18 and 1983, in view of the multi-ethnic composition of the population of
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, this declaration, any such message in fact, could have
20 been characterised as a crime against the social system at that time, that
21 is to say, the social system of the Republic of Yugoslavia?
22 A. Under the communist era laws of that time, it was indeed possible
23 to characterise this, the Islamic declaration, or just about any other
24 political writing, as a crime against the state, yes.
25 Q. Can we agree that the setting up of the SDA led by
1 Mr. Alija Izetbegovic in the period of time around 1990 in the area of
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina which still continued to exist as a multi-ethnic
3 community could have, in relation to certain entities in that area, lead
4 to a negative repercussions which were obviously reflected in the setting
5 up of the nationalist parties and thus had an impact on the overall
6 political and social situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
7 A. I would agree with most of that statement, but it is a very long
8 and complicated set of hypotheses and I would not agree with all of them.
9 Q. Thank you, Mr. Donia.
10 Mr. Donia, are you aware of the fact that on the 10th of June,
11 1991, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there was a congress of Muslim intellectuals
12 from all over Yugoslavia that passed a resolution that patriotic league
13 was set up as well?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Can you confirm that the setting up of the patriotic league
16 basically amounted to the setting up of party armed force?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Mr. Donia, can you agree with me that when it comes to the
19 multi-ethnic community, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina used to be at the time,
20 must needs disintegrate, if one party goes down the path of moving towards
21 the dominant nation and when it comes to the defence issue on the basis of
22 our discussions so far, that one entity would be the Muslim side because
23 they were the majority and they had the opportunity to choose that option?
24 A. No.
25 Q. In your report you make a negative statements about the
1 regionalisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, advocated by the SDS party. As a
2 historian and bearing in mind the national composition of
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the setting up of the national party in
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, could you have reached any conclusions as to what
5 could have led the Serb party to opt for a certain approach,
6 regionalisation, that is?
7 A. Well, I reached the conclusion and expressed in the report that
8 this was the product of the SDS's desire to have political control by a
9 single party and one nation, through the strategy of regionalisation.
10 Q. And can you agree with me that it was proceeded by process of
11 Islam-isation of Bosnia-Herzegovina according to the principles referred
12 to in the Islamic declaration of Alija Izetbegovic?
13 MR. IERACE: Mr. President,
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Ierace.
15 MR. IERACE: I object to the question. It follows a number of
16 questions by my learned colleague which probe the history of the politics
17 of Bosnia-Herzegovina going well before 1990. Essentially, it seems
18 probing an explanation of the events which occurred from around 1990
20 Mr. President, as I have indicated on previous occasions, the
21 Prosecution does not seek to present to the Trial Chamber a view as to the
22 lawfulness, or otherwise, of the armed conflict itself or to probe to any
23 depth the contributing factors to that armed conflict. The purpose of
24 this historical overview is to provide the Trial Chamber with the context
25 which barely predates the commencement of the armed conflict itself, that
1 is around 1990. Therefore, these questions raise the issue as to whether
2 it is relevant to delve further back into the history. One could
3 theoretically go back some 600 years. What, then, is the appropriate cut
4 off point? Is it 1990? 1980, 1970 or so on? Mr. President, it seems to
5 me that the guiding principle here is the extent to which the evidence is
6 of assistance to the Bench in determining the specific issues that fall to
7 it for determination and, from that perspective, it is my respectful
8 submission that probing the social forces behind the political movement
9 and the historical forces is of no assistance to the Trial Chamber. It
10 simply isn't relevant. Thank you.
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 JUDGE ORIE: After having conferred with my colleagues in the
13 Chamber, the Chamber has decided that the objection is denied. I think
14 you have perfectly well put the question, Mr. Ierace, that how to find the
15 very moment where to start, would that be 1990 or would it be 1988 or
16 would there have to be September of 1992, that is not easy and therefore
17 the Chamber thinks that it might not help a lot to go through the whole
18 history of ages. Although it might give some explanation as well, but,
19 the last question seemed to be very close to the starting point of the
20 report. I think Ms. Pilipovic was asking the witness whether one of the
21 events described in the report was preceded by another event and that is,
22 in the opinion of the Chamber, is admissible.
23 Please proceed, Ms. Pilipovic.
24 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
25 Q. Mr. Donia, do you know -- I apologise. In spite of the fact that
1 having studied the transcript, I found out that you said that you weren't
2 an expert in constitutional law, but first of all I would like to ask you
3 whether you are familiar with the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina and I
4 am talking about the 1990s, 1991?
5 A. Well, the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in effect in 1990
6 and 1991, dated from 1974. I am generally familiar with its provisions,
7 but would not claim to be a specialist in interpreting it or knowing
8 intimately well.
9 Q. My question is only whether you are familiar with it. Did the
10 constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina provide for the possibility of
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. In your expert report, you stated that regionalisation was carried
14 out according to the plan of the Serbian Democratic Party. Did you have
15 the opportunity of becoming acquainted with this plan and could you tell
16 us what it consisted of.
17 A. Well, it consisted of several stages in different initiatives in
18 different parts of the republic. It began in the Bosnian Krajina region
19 in north-west Bosnia. In January, 1991, just weeks after the multi-party
20 elections with a plan to associate the -- those municipalities in
21 north-western Bosnia into a community of municipalities of the Bosnian
22 Krajina. This plan came to partial fruition in April of 1991, and was
23 subsequently ruled unconstitutional by the constitutional court of
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina. It -- that is regionalisation took different forms in
25 other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was the rationale for the withdraw
1 of the municipality of Polje for the city of Sarajevo in early
2 May of 1991 and was also used by SDS leaders in Herzegovina, and
3 subsequently in other municipalities around Sarajevo, in Semberija -- they
4 were both in western, not extreme western, in central Herzegovina and
5 eastern Herzegovina and the Drina River area.
6 Q. Mr. Donia, so you are telling us that the constitutional court
7 with regard to the provision of Bosnia-Herzegovina which provided for the
8 possibility of regionalisation, this court said it was unconstitutional.
9 Could you tell us when this happened?
10 A. I said that the constitutional court declared unconstitutional,
11 the association of the community of municipalities of the Bosnian Krajina.
12 This happened I believe in the summer of 1991. I don't recall the exact
14 Q. Thank you, Mr. Donia.
15 Mr. Donia, would you agree with me that there were problems
16 between the peoples in the area of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that they were
17 felt the most when the assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina was terminated on
18 the 11th of September, 1991? And you have spoken about this in your
19 report. It is on page five.
20 A. I don't believe I have a copy of my report here.
21 JUDGE ORIE: We are able to provide one to you.
22 A. We may again be looking at a different page where the
23 translation --
24 JUDGE ORIE: I think that Ms. Pilipovic is referring to page 4,
25 approximately in the middle, where something is said on the -- she
1 was referring to 11th of September.
2 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the 15th of October,
3 1991, I apologise. In the B/C/S version, it is paragraph 2, right up at
4 the beginning of page 5, where Mr. Donia spoke about the events of the
5 15th of October, 1991.
6 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]... page three, Mr.
8 THE WITNESS: Yes.
9 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Mr. Donia, in this passage you mentioned a speech by
11 Radovan Karadzic before the Assembly and you told us that he gave a speech
12 saying that the Muslims could disappear as a whole if they declare the
13 secessation of Bosnia-Herzegovina from Yugoslavia; he held this fierce
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Would you agree that this part of his speech was related to the
17 presentation -- was related to what they said could happen if war broke
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Did you have the opportunity to see the minutes from that Assembly
21 or to have a look at a videorecording, and did you provide us with such an
22 answer on the basis of this?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Thank you. Would you agree that at that Assembly because of SDA
25 and HDZ deputies who were -- spoke in an inappropriate way and spoke about
1 the threat to the sovereignty, would you say that it is for this reason
2 that the Assembly had to stop working?
3 A. No.
4 Q. Could you tell us why the Assembly stopped working on that day?
5 A. It stopped working because it adjourned. I am not clear what your
6 premise is here, but the Assembly in fact continued to meet quite
7 regularly after this date well into -- well, throughout early 1992 and, in
8 fact, beyond that. But I think I, as far as that date is concerned,
9 outlined the primary events. It is actually the 14th of November and 15th
10 of November when, following these exchanges, the Assembly was adjourned by
11 its President Momcilo Krajisnik --
12 Q. Yes.
13 A. -- of the SDA and HDZ subsequently reconvened the session and
14 passed the declaration of sovereignty.
15 Q. Thank you, Mr. Donia.
16 I just wanted to ask you to confirm something and to give me this
17 answer, that the delegates of the HDZ and the SDA passed a declaration on
18 sovereignty? Mr. Donia, are you aware that the decisions of the Assembly
19 could be passed only with the participation of all of the three
20 constituent peoples, that is to say, all the three bodies of the Assembly?
21 A. No.
22 Q. Do you think that this decision by the deputies of the HDZ and SDA
23 without the participation of the SDS deputies, do you think that such a
24 decision is a legitimate and constitutional, according to the constitution
25 that was valid at the time?
1 A. I cannot make the judgment on whether this was a constitutionally
2 valid decision or not, either by virtue of the constitution or the rules
3 of the procedure of the Assembly. I only know that the provision for a
4 sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina was already a part of the constitution from
5 amendments passed in February of 1990.
6 JUDGE ORIE: May I just for my better understanding ask one
7 question, Ms. Pilipovic. From the report, I read that, "It was on the
8 15th of October, 1991 that Mr. Karadzic delivered a speech," and then the
9 report continues, "and after the Assembly had adjourned for the day by its
10 SDS President Momcilo Krajisnik and the Bosnian Serb delegation had
11 departed, HDZ and SDS delegates reconvened the session and passed the
12 declaration of sovereignty." When I read it this way, it looks as if it
13 was on the same day, but I see in your testimony now that you are
14 referring to the 14th and the 15th of November for the declaration of
15 sovereignty was made, and I wondered whether this was a mistake or I was
16 not able to read properly what it said. If you look at page 14, line 25.
17 It will soon disappear.
18 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think that it is a
19 mistake. I think that Mr. Donia mentioned those two dates at one point in
20 time but I think that we have agreed after all that we are only speaking
21 about the 15th of October, 1991. Mr. Donia can correct me if I
22 am wrong.
23 THE WITNESS: That is correct, Mr. President, yes.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
25 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 Q. So, Mr. Donia, was leaving the Assembly by -- was the Serbian
2 deputies leaving the Assembly after this unconstitutional declaration of
3 sovereignty, do you consider that this was a legitimate act on their
4 part? Because of the protection of the interest of the Serbian people,
5 was it legitimate to leave this Assembly?
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace.
7 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, the question assumes that the
8 Serbian deputies left the Assembly after the declaration. I am not sure
9 that that is the evidence of this witness. Perhaps that could be
10 clarified first.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. In the English transcript, Ms. Pilipovic, it
12 reads: "Was leaving the Assembly by the Serbian deputies -- leaving the
13 Assembly after this unconstitutional declaration of sovereignty." Was
14 that your question, since the -- at least the report, and as far as I
15 understand the testimony, was that they left and that only afterwards the
16 declaration of sovereignty was proclaimed.
17 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. There was a
18 slight misunderstanding. I shall rephrase the question.
19 Q. Mr. Donia, do you think that -- Mr. Donia, could you confirm that
20 the passing of the declaration of sovereignty was an unconstitutional
22 A. I am not qualified to assess its constitutionality. I don't know.
23 Q. Would you agree, Mr. Donia, that after the adoption, after the
24 passing on the declaration of sovereignty, all ties which were based on
25 national relations were suspended or broken?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. No, that is not the case.
2 Q. And do you think that the decision to form the Assembly of the
3 Serbian People and all other institutions, was this a legitimate decision
4 given the right of the people to determine itself to self-determination?
5 A. I don't know. I am not able to render a judgment on its
7 Q. Do you know anything about the fact that when the Serbian people
8 passed other decisions, do you know whether they took those decisions,
9 passed those decisions with full respect for the rights of the people to
11 A. Well, I don't know what you mean by "Serbian people." And I would
12 ask maybe that you clarify what -- if there is a particular deliberative
13 body that you have in mind or what the "Serbian people" constituted. I am
14 not clear on the import of the question.
15 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. I apologise.
16 Your Honour, the Defence has a decision. These are the records from the
17 Assembly of the Serbian people of the 21st of November, 1991. This is a
18 document which the Defence obtained from the Prosecution. I would like to
19 show part of this record, part of these minutes, but I first would like to
20 ask Mr. Donia a question.
21 Q. Mr. Donia, did you have the opportunity of becoming acquainted
22 with the contents of the minutes of the Assembly of the Serbian people in
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina which were held in Sarajevo on the 21st of November,
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Would you agree with me that this is an assembly which was held
2 after the plebiscite of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina with
3 regard to their declaration on whether they would like to remain within
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina within the context of Yugoslavia?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Did you have the opportunity while you were examining the minutes,
7 did you have the opportunity to become familiar with the speech of the
8 President of the Assembly at that time, Mr. Krajisnik?
9 A. I did, and I could not recite it to you from memory but I became
10 familiar with it in the course of preparing this report, yes.
11 Q. If from the Assembly, if from the minutes of the Assembly of the
12 Serbian People I quote a part of Mr. Krajisnik's statement: "We want to
13 inform all peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina that we want to preserve a
14 unified Bosnia-Herzegovina. Our desire is to live together but in peace
15 -- with love and with peace."
16 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, perhaps, pursuant to the usual
17 agreement, my friend could provide me a copy of that document, ideally
18 before it is read out but in this case --
19 JUDGE ORIE: I see that in footnote 10 of the report reference is
20 made a meeting of the Assembly of the Serbian People of Bosnia-Herzegovina
21 of the 21st of November, 1991. I don't know whether this is a complete
22 shorter note of the meeting, but perhaps you could guide us because it is
23 quite a lot of pages at least. I see --
24 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE ORIE: -- both an English and an B/C/S version of that
1 document which is, I could tell you --
2 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the Defence has
3 prepared a speech -- the speech from page 11 in the B/C/S version, and in
4 the English version, 009301. I have enough -- I have sufficient copies of
5 that part of the record and I am prepared to provide it to my
6 colleagues. I have marked it as number 100, evidence for the Defence. I
7 hope I have a sufficient number of copies for the interpreters, too.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but if it is part of the other meeting, is it
9 any use to have a repetitious -- to have the same document again?
10 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour. I have just --
11 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]... last three
12 digits, but perhaps distributed, perhaps it should not be tendered but we
13 have it available. But could you tell us the last three digits of the
14 English version so that Mr. Ierace and the Chamber are able to follow.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Your Honour, the last three digits of the English
16 version are 301. I think that 3 -- I think in B/C/S those are pages 11,
17 12 and 16.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
19 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
20 Q. Mr. Donia, do you have a copy from the 2nd Assembly -- Session of
21 the Serbian People?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. On the first page of the English version, in the third paragraph,
24 Mr. Krajisnik said that, "The main principle which should be adhered to in
25 our activities -- " I apologise.
1 "The main principal that we should adhere to in our activities is
2 not to impose the will of the Serbian people on other peoples. We should
3 respect the justified will of the Muslim and the Croatian people, but we
4 must not underestimate our advantages too, which expressed in the real
5 relation of political forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina and we must not give
6 up our rights to others."
7 Mr. Donia, from this part that I have just read, can one draw the
8 conclusion that the Serbian people want to carry on living together in a
9 unified Bosnia-Herzegovina, but in Yugoslavia, too?
10 A. Only if one takes this paragraph in isolation from other
11 statements made in resolutions passed at this session.
12 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I am having some difficult locating
13 the relevant passage in the English translation.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Page 301, last three digits. Yes, it is, I would
15 say, the third paragraph of that page, "the basic principle you should
16 observe," and then for the next four or five lines.
17 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.
18 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
19 JUDGE ORIE: Do you have additional copies for the interpreters,
20 Ms. Pilipovic?
21 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have tried to make
22 a sufficient number of copies, but it is obvious that I don't have enough
23 copies. I apologise. I really made an effort in order to be as efficient
24 as possible and to ensure that we could work as fast as possible.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, of course, the Judges could provide the
1 Serbian -- the B/C/S version of the -- I don't know whether that might
2 help some of you. So that we just mark the office's, the B/C/S version.
3 I could provide the B/C/S version as well. I think we can use this
4 document because since it is already part of the filing of the footnotes
5 of Mr. Donia's report. So, I usually would not, I would prefer not to
6 split up documents. It is not of a major problem here, perhaps.
7 Please proceed, Ms. Pilipovic.
8 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
9 Q. Mr. Donia, I think that you agreed with this paragraph we have
10 just read out, but that you made a comment and that you said that you
11 would not agree with it in relation to certain other discussions.
12 As far as you can remember, with reference to this session, were
13 there any significant divisions of use with regards to such viewpoints
14 which the President of the Assembly expressed at the time?
15 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, may I ask you - and you perhaps as
16 well, Mr. Donia - since translation needs some time, to slow down a bit.
17 Then please proceed.
18 A. The Assembly itself was in the process of taking actions which
19 contradicted this statement. I cited this document in the first instance
20 for its confirmation of the establishment of regions dominated by Serbs
21 and by the SDS in the strategy of taking those regions outside of the
22 jurisdiction of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
23 There are other parts of Mr. Krajisnik's speech which suggest, in
24 fact, that this is a highly conditional assurance that is easily
25 abrogated. If we go, for example, to the next page, 0302, I am looking at
1 the English in the formulation that is about halfway down the page, "If we
2 separate in peace, we have a chance to associate again in the future. If
3 we go to war, I don't believe we will ever do that. On our way to
4 achieving the goals of the Serbian people, we accept all friends, we
5 accept everybody, except traitors and opponents."
6 Q. Mr. Donia, is this in contradiction with the statements with
7 reference to the desire and the willingness of the Serb people to continue
8 to live in a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Can you tell us, according to your opinion, why?
11 A. The creation of the Serbian autonomous regions or SAO's was
12 specifically an act of dismembering the authority of the government of
14 Q. Mr. Donia, it does seem to me that we had agreed that it is the
15 legitimate right of every people to have the right to self-determination,
16 if it is guaranteed by all international conventions and charters. Why do
17 you think that the right of the Serb people to self-determination at that
18 particular time and the wish, once again I reiterate, to remain within
19 a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina is unacceptable?
20 MR. IERACE: I object to the question, in particular the first few
21 words. It does seem to me that we had agreed that it is a legitimate
22 right and so on. I don't know what my friend has in mind in relation to
23 that. Perhaps, you could clarify that.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Would you please, before answering the question, Mr.
25 Donia, tell us whether you and Ms. Pilipovic have agreed or would agree
1 that it is the legitimate right of every people to have the right of
2 self-determination, as guaranteed in all international conventions and
3 charters, because that was the assumption of the question.
4 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, more specifically, my learned
5 colleague asked the witness whether he agreed that certain acts done by
6 the SDA party, in particular the declaration of sovereignty, was
7 unconstitutional. She then followed that by asking him whether, in his
8 opinion, certain acts taken by the Serbian party were a legitimate
9 expression of the right to self-determination, as I recollect it. And
10 that is the only reference that I recollect in relation to the right of
11 self-determination. So that's specifically my concern, that this question
12 doesn't seem to rise from the answers given to those questions.
13 JUDGE ORIE: It is an assumption of which the question starts with
14 an assumption.
15 Ms. Pilipovic.
16 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, perhaps Mr. Donia can
17 correct me, but I believe that we did agree when we referred to the
18 legitimate right of self-determination of all peoples. I believe we
19 agreed on that.
20 Q. Do you believe, Mr. Donia, that all peoples have the legitimate
21 right to self-determination? I mean, I can't really --
22 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, we have dealt with two issues. The
23 1st issue is, I think, the constitutional right to self-determination and
24 in your question now, you are referring to the right of self-determination
25 of peoples and the international legal instruments, which might be a
1 different thing. So, would you please first clarify on what issues you
2 and Mr. Donia would agree and on what issues not. Because it seems to
3 cover two different aspects of self-determination of peoples. I mean, are
4 we talking about the Yugoslav peoples, the Narod, or are we talking about
5 peoples in the context of public international law? Please proceed. Or
6 do you have any --
7 MR. IERACE: Yes, I can assist, Mr. President. The question was
8 asked at page 16, line 13 of the English transcript. There was an
9 objection to the question. The question was never answered. Mrs.
10 Pilipovic then said she would rephrase the question and asked something
11 entirely different, that is, the question to whether the leaving of the
12 Assembly by the Serbian deputies was a legitimate act on their part, and I
13 think that's the reference to --
14 JUDGE ORIE: I think it was legitimacy under the constitution
15 rather than under instruments of public international. I think Ms.
16 Pilipovic quite understood where the problems are and she certainly will
17 clarify that question.
18 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Ms. Pilipovic.
20 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
21 Q. Mr. Donia, can you confirm whether according to the constitution
22 at the time the constitutional peoples - and we do know that there were
23 three constitutional people in Bosnia-Herzegovina - so whether, according
24 to the constitution at the time, they had the right to
25 self-determination. Can you answer that question?
1 A. In the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina of 1974, the three
2 constituent nations were accorded the right of self-determination, yes.
3 Q. Thank you. Mr. Donia, we are still discussing the assembly
4 meeting of the Serb Assembly of the 21st of November, 1991. You disagreed
5 with Mr. Krajisnik's statement made at that Assembly, and can you tell us
6 about the decision of the members of that Assembly on that day, the 24th
7 of November, after the referendum?
8 A. To be clear, I didn't disagree with Mr. Krajisnik's statement. I
9 objected to the context or your failure to cite the appropriate context in
10 which that statement was made and the many other statements that
11 contributed it within that same meeting. I don't know what decision you
12 are referring to on the Assembly of 24th of November, 1991. I think there
13 were several decisions reached on that day. But if you could be more
14 specific, perhaps.
15 Q. Mr. Donia, if I tell you that two decisions were made, the first
16 one being to approve the results of the referendum of the Serb people
17 which was held on the 9th of November. I do apologise: Once again, it is
18 on the last page of the minutes of that meeting.
19 Once again, the Assembly meeting of the 21st of November. I
20 believe it must be the last page in the English text as well. The second
21 decision says: "It is confirmed that the decision of the Serbian people of
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina to remain in the common state of Yugoslavia adopted by
23 the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina at its session
24 of the 24th of October, 1991 is hereby upheld by the plebiscite of the
25 Serbian People held on the 9th and the 10th of November, 1991, and that
1 the same has come in to effect."
2 So, Mr. Donia, can you agree with me that the Assembly is made up
3 of delegates of the MPs and that they -- the main point is their reaching
4 the decisions, and decision is something that I referred to when I was
5 talking about the statement made by the President of the Assembly. Can
6 you agree with me?
7 JUDGE ORIE: First, Ms. Pilipovic, you are indicating that we can
8 find this on the last page of the -- that is 311.
9 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. That is para
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please proceed.
12 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Mr. Donia, can we agree that the Parliament or the Assembly is a
14 body where everybody is free, all the delegates are free, to voice their
15 views but the basic opinion of the Assembly as a whole is reflected in the
16 decision and the decision is the one that we just read?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Mr. Donia, can you agree with me that the views of the SDA and HDZ
19 parties at the time when the referendum of the Serb people was being held
20 continued to be the sovereignty and that in that case the Serb people
21 would have become a minority?
22 A. That is two questions as I hear you ask them. Did the SDA and HDZ
23 parties continue to support the position of the sovereignty of
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina? Yes, they did. Would, in that case, the Serb people
25 become a minority? No, it wouldn't change the position of the Serbian --
1 those of Serbian nationality and Bosnia-Herzegovina in any way.
2 Q. And can you agree with me that already at that time Serbs in
3 Bosnia and Herzegovina, and especially in Sarajevo, were not getting equal
4 treatment in all institutions, universities and even hospital?
5 A. No.
6 Q. Mr. Donia, in your footnotes you referred to the minutes of the
7 Serb autonomous region of Romanija of the 18 -- 11th of December, 1991. I
8 am just going to try to find the footnote here. It is footnote number 23,
9 I believe. Have you had the opportunity to actually read through the
10 minutes of that meeting, the Serb Assembly of the autonomous region of
12 A. I don't believe it is footnote 23.
13 Q. I do apologise.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Footnote 23 is a law, Ms. Pilipovic, in Croatia, in
15 the municipality of Rajlovac.
16 THE WITNESS: Might it be 13? 12 or 13?
17 JUDGE ORIE: 13 relates to the --
18 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, 13. Thank you.
19 THE WITNESS: We agree on that, anyway.
20 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the Defence has the
21 minutes of that particular meeting.
22 Q. Mr. Donia, have you had the opportunity to read through the
24 A. Yes. Yes.
25 Q. Do you know that there was statement, a public statement, made at
1 the end of that Assembly on the 11th of December, 1991? I am going to --
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. I can give you a copy and I've got enough copies in both
5 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] May I ask the usher to provide the
6 interpreters with the English texts.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Could you, Ms. Pilipovic, help me in finding -- I
8 will wait until I have a look at the English so that I can find them in my
9 binder of footnotes.
10 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] That is the last page. Your
11 Honour, the footnote is number 13, the minutes of the meeting, and the
12 page is 286 in the English translation and in the B/C/S version it is the
13 last page of the minutes. But I don't see whether it is numbered -- oh,
14 yes it is. 3692.
15 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, if I may assist.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
17 MR. IERACE: As I indicated yesterday, the Prosecution has
18 prepared some binders of the documents as it transpired. Mr. President,
19 you said that it was not necessary but the fact is, they have been done
20 with tabs, which we couldn't have done with the filed version. I wonder
21 whether those long hours could be put to use at some stage.
22 JUDGE ORIE: You didn't tell me that you added tabs, Mr. Ierace,
23 and if I would have known that, the Chamber would have approached the
24 matter totally differently.
25 MR. IERACE: Excuse me, Mr. President.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
2 [Prosecution counsel confer]
3 MR. IERACE: Within five minutes, Mr. President, I anticipate we
4 can have three sets brought down. In the meantime, perhaps I could hand
5 up some indexes for those volumes which are coming. And they will assist
6 in finding the appropriate tab. I will hand up three indexes and we will
7 bring down the set, of course, for my learned colleague, an index for my
8 learned colleague.
9 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 Q. Mr. Donia, can you see the minutes in front of you, the minutes of
11 the autonomous district of Romanija of the 11th of December, 1991?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. To my question as to whether the Serb people would end up being a
14 minority if the referendum was -- were held according to the attitudes as
15 the HDZ, well, you have replied, no, and as to whether they would get an
16 equal treatment, what do you think about that? Do you know anything about
17 whether they would have had any equal treatment within certain
19 A. The first part of your question has mischaracterised my answer to
20 an earlier question. I think we talked about whether the Serbian people
21 would become a minority in view of the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
22 You instead suggested that I answered that question in terms of the
23 referendum. The referendum, as you know, at this time had not yet been
24 held or even scheduled.
25 Q. I do apologise. Yes. Thank you.
1 What we are discussing is simply the status of the Serb people.
2 So, your reply is they would not have been treated as a minority?
3 A. No, they would have continued in all likelihood to have been --
4 continued -- treated, to be treated as a constituent nation.
5 Q. And if I tell you that already at that time the Serb people was
6 not being given equal treatment in all institutions, starting from
7 universities and all the way down to hospitals, can you tell me whether
8 you have any knowledge of such an atmosphere and that sort of attitude
9 towards Serbs at that time, of course?
10 A. I have no knowledge of such attitudes or policies, no.
11 Q. Mr. Donia, if I tell you that the Assembly of the Serb Autonomous
12 district of Romanija, on the day of the 11th of December 1991, made a
13 statement where it is said that the Assembly of Romanija at its meeting,
14 amongst other things, reached a decision to tell the public about rough
15 discrimination against Serb patients when they were hospitalised in
16 Sarajevo and that was the behaviour on the part of non-Serb doctors and
17 other staff. The same sort of treatment was admitted at to Serb students
18 at the Sarajevo University on the part of non-Serb professors. That not
19 only went against the ethical principles of those professions but it is a
20 kind of thing that may lead to ethnic tensions.
21 As far as you are concerned, do you believe that such a statement
22 from such a body is acceptable, bearing in mind the events that preceded
23 that period and the conditions under which this Assembly was held?
24 A. It's a typical complaint of extreme nationalists at this time.
25 And I know of no foundation for these complaints or allegations. I see no
1 evidence in these minutes of specific incidents or policies which would
2 validate the allegation contained in this public declaration.
3 Q. Mr. Donia, on what basis can you claim that the members of the
4 Assembly of the Autonomous District of Romanija -- well, you said that
5 this was a decision that could have only been passed by an extremist body.
6 Well, can you tell us on the basis of what you reach that conclusion?
7 A. I said that such grievances were typical of extreme nationalists,
8 and I would add extreme nationalists on all sides, in this time of this
9 kind of abuse at the hands of social or governmental institutions.
10 Q. So you are telling us that you have no knowledge of any such lack
11 of an equal treatment when it same to the Serbs in the various
12 institutions in Sarajevo?
13 A. I said I have no knowledge of anything that would support these
14 particular allegations and I see no specific information or allegations
15 rendered in the minutes of this meeting, in support of these very general
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Ierace.
18 MR. IERACE: Mr. President. I just want to make the point that
19 during the cross-examination of two doctors, one being a Serb from a state
20 hospital, it was not put to either doctor by my learned colleague that
21 there had been such behaviour on the part of doctors towards patients
22 prior to the war. I simply wish to draw to the attention of the Trial
23 Chamber at this stage. Perhaps later I will make it relevant to general
24 submissions under Rule 90. Thank you.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Ms. Pilipovic.
1 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. As far as I
2 know, a witness was heard by this Chamber. I don't know whether it was a
3 protected witness, but it was gentleman who did not say he was a Serb.
4 Maybe his name and family name indicated he might have been a Serb, but we
5 never ever asked any of the witnesses what their nationality was, at least
6 not to the best of my recollection.
7 JUDGE ORIE: I do understand that Mr. Ierace is pointing to --
8 drawing our attention to the fact that when doctors who are treating
9 patients in hospitals were heard that no question, as on the factual basis
10 of the allegations we are dealing with at this moment, no questions were
11 put to them in that respect.
12 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, at that time, we were
13 cross-examining witnesses or, rather, there was the examination-in-chief
14 and that referred to 1992 up until August 1994. The document in the
15 possession of the Defence and that Mr. Donia has referred to, is a
16 document from 1991. So we are discussing the possession or rather the
17 treatment that referred to the period of time prior to the outbreak of the
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 JUDGE ORIE: The objection is denied. There might be given
21 several reason for that, but one of them is that the situation prior to
22 the period that is covered by the indictment is specifically dealt with in
23 the report of Mr. Donia which was not available at that time to the
24 Defence. So, therefore when the issue has been to some extent been
25 introduced by the report, the situation prior to the -- I would say the
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 outbreak of the armed conflict, and therefore you may proceed, Ms.
3 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
4 Q. Mr. Donia, can you agree that at that time by the end of 1991 and
5 the beginning of 1992, the international community came up with a whole
6 range of different solutions to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Well,
7 more specifically, I just like to remind you of a couple of cases, and
8 this actually is my question: Could you clarify the so-called Cutilhiero
9 plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina?
10 A. Well that's much later than this document. We are moving on to
11 1990 -- 1992.
12 Q. Yes, I think it was in February, 1992. Yes, Mr. Donia.
13 A. Yes, the international community became involved in the period
14 over the change of the new year via the Badinter Commission first and
15 subsequently as a part of the international conference on the former
17 Q. Do you believe that the Cutilhiero plan was based on the
18 regionalisation of all three peoples within the BH, within the framework
19 of Yugoslavia? Do you have any knowledge of that?
20 A. Yes, it was effectively a plan for the division of
22 Q. Can you confirm that Mr. Alija Izetbegovic withdrew his initial
23 statement after signing the Cutilhiero plan?
24 A. No.
25 Q. And can you agree with me if I tell you that Mr. Alija Izetbegovic
1 withdrew his signature and that that was the reason why the Cutilhiero
2 plan so to say was never implemented?
3 A. That is partly correct, but there are some events prior to that
4 which essentially doomed the Cutilhiero plan from being implemented.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, if you can find a suitable moment for
6 a break.
7 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] I think this is the appropriate
8 moment, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE ORIE: We will adjourn until quarter past 4.00.
10 --- Recess taken at 3.45 p.m.
11 --- Upon resuming at 4.17 p.m.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, are you ready to proceed?
13 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
14 Q. Mr. Donia, before the break, we were speaking about the essence of
15 Cutilhiero's plan, which appears to have been the best solution for
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina, which unfortunately was not accepted. But in your
17 expert report, on page 6 of that report, footnote number 26, you spoke
18 about a document; you referred to a document of the Serbian democratic
19 party on the organisation or activity of the Serbian people. If it is of
20 any help, the page is 00184274 of the B/C/S version and the English
21 version is 0035993. I have a copy of one of the pages from that
22 document. I don't know that it is necessary now to provide you with these
23 copies since we all have that document, with the exception of Mr. Donia.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Mr. Ierace, do you need a copy of this document
25 also or do you have it?
1 MR. IERACE: I think I have that document. I am locating it now.
2 Mr. President, the ERN number for the English version in the transcript
3 lacks a final number. Perhaps that might be clarified. It reads 0035993.
4 I think there should be one more number.
5 JUDGE ORIE: I think it is -- the document ends with "6," so 936,
6 and due to your tabs, Mr. Ierace, I found it already. It is in the second
7 binder, first tab, 2631.
8 Yes. Please proceed, Ms. Pilipovic.
9 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
10 Q. Mr. Donia, you have a document in front of you. Those are the
11 instructions for the organization and activity of organs of the Serbian
12 people in Bosnia-Herzegovina in extraordinary circumstances?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. As part of this document -- with reference to this document, you
15 spoke about the organisation of the SDS and you spoke about the A and B
16 Variants. In your footnotes 27 and 28, you made reference to this?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Would you agree with me that at that time it was normal to act in
19 a unified way when forming a government?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Is it for that reason that these instructions on the organisation
22 and activity of the Serbian people were passed, that is as is mentioned
23 here, in extraordinary circumstances?
24 A. I am not clear that that is the reference that the document is
25 suggesting. But I would agree that these were extraordinary
1 circumstances, and for that matter, extraordinary times.
2 Q. Thank you. Mr. Donia, under item 8 of this document, on page 5 of
3 the translation, page 2620 or 0035940, that is the ERN number in English,
4 item 8 states: "In following all these measures, take care to ensure that
5 the national and other rights of members of all peoples are respected. At
6 a later time ensure that they are involved in the government bodies that
7 will be set up by the Assembly of the Serbian people in the municipality.
8 Mr. Donia, would you agree with me that these instructions -- now
9 that I have read out item 8 from this document, would you agree that these
10 instructions were in no way detrimental to other peoples?
11 A. No.
12 Q. Could you tell us what you mean by "no?
13 A. This statement that you have read number 8 in the, I believe the
14 second stage, the final set of instructions, is the only statement in this
15 document that even in the broadest sense hints that there will be regard
16 for other peoples. This document is a blueprint, in fact, to prepare for
17 and go to war. It is a blueprint for the establishment and ultimately
18 activation of separate Serbian institutions under SDS control, prepared
19 and carried out in secret, and intended to establish single party one
20 nation control over all institutions in the country.
21 Q. Could you tell us on what basis you have arrived at this
22 conclusion, on the basis of which documents?
23 A. Well, I think if you look at the document as a whole, it is
24 self-evidently a blueprint for a seizure of power.
25 Q. Would you agree with me that when we are dealing with
1 extraordinary circumstances, when this is at stake, in such cases the
2 process of organising the people and the process of operation of the
3 organs of power at the levels of municipalities and of other institutions,
4 would you agree that this is also organised in other parts of
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina? Let me simplify this. Are such instructions, in your
6 opinion, on the organisation in extraordinary circumstances, would this be
7 acceptable if all three entities are at issue in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
8 A. No.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, may I ask you one thing? Very often
10 a question of yours starts with, "Would you agree with me" and then there
11 comes a whole complex of what Mr. Donia would have to answer, whether he
12 would agree or not. Could you please split up, because we have several
13 times heard the answer, "no," and at least we know that he does not agree
14 with all that you said. Sometimes he makes a distinction between
15 partially yes and partially no. But wouldn't it be more efficient if you
16 would split up sometimes and see whether on certain issues he would agree
17 with you, so that the Chamber gets the information the Chamber very much
18 would like to have.
19 Please proceed.
20 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 Q. So, Mr. Donia, you are telling us that the party of Democratic
22 Action and the HDZ when Bosnia-Herzegovina was in extraordinary
23 circumstances, when it found itself in such a situation, these parties did
24 not organise and provide instructions to their people, issue instructions
25 to their people in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
1 A. There, to my knowledge, has never been instructions of this
2 character issued by either of the other two parties, national parties. In
3 the extent of their specificity, the particular steps to be taken, all of
4 which were implemented carefully - in some places with considerable
5 opposition - in the number of municipalities as instructed, no, there is
6 nothing comparable that I know of that has ever been shown to have been
7 characteristic of the other two parties.
8 Q. Could you give us an example --
9 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, General Galic would like to have
10 some contact with you.
11 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, I heard what he
13 JUDGE ORIE: I was just worrying about whether the
14 communication --
15 THE REGISTRAR: Microphone, please
16 JUDGE ORIE: Your microphone is off. We can't hear you, General
17 Galic. The microphone is off. If you want to communicate with Ms.
18 Pilipovic, that is perfect. If you want to address the Chamber, then
19 please put it on.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I said several things but now I
21 will just say thank you.
22 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE ORIE: I take the opportunity to -- General Galic, you are
24 facing to the back of Ms. Pilipovic, so if there is ever a moment where
25 you would like to communicate when she doesn't see it, don't hesitate to
1 put on your microphone and ask for a moment to confer with counsel. Yes.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Your Honour.
3 I have understood you very well and thank you.
4 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Mr. Donia, if in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina at that
6 time there were two parties in operation, the HDZ and the SDA, and they
7 were operating in the coalition and the declaration was passed on the
8 sovereignty, in such a case, is it justified -- is the organisation of the
9 Serbian people justified in such extraordinary circumstances?
10 A. I cannot envision the circumstances under which it would be
11 justified to establish separate governmental institutions, secure secret
12 places for hiding provisions, declaring separate institutions and seizing
13 power from regular governmental institutions in nearly all the local
14 communities of a country. And that is what these instructions are. They
15 are not a simple legislative act or a declaration of principles; they are
16 very specific instructions for preparing to seize power and for seizing
17 power. And it's, as I say, difficult for me to envision the circumstances
18 that would justify such action. Certainly, such circumstances did not
19 exist in Bosnia on 19 December, 1991.
20 Q. Mr. Donia, but in your report on page six when you mentioned the
21 variants and you explained the explanations of the 19th of December, the
22 instructions of the 19th of December, 1991, you told us that the main
23 committees of the SDS are different in the municipalities where the Serbs
24 are in the majority. In this case, is it logical if in one municipality
25 one of the parties got the majority; was it logical for them to organise
1 power there?
2 A. I think those organisational activities that had already taken
3 place in all municipalities and had been carried out in accord with
4 agreement among the three parties that prevailed in the November 1990
5 elections. So this is not a case of organising a municipality. That had
6 already taken place. The legitimate governmental institutions were
7 already well in place. This was a plan to establish parallel institutions
8 and ultimately to overthrow the existing legal governmental institutions
9 as they existed on this date.
10 Q. So, Mr. Donia, you don't accept that the Serbian people had the
11 right to self-determination, according to the constitution of
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina? You do not accept that they had the right to organise
13 their own bodies of power, organs of power.
14 A. Your first proposition is a totally different one than is
15 addressed in this document and which we have been speaking. As to whether
16 they served, representatives had the right to organise their own bodies of
17 power, from a constitutional standpoint, I can't make that judgment. This
18 document makes no effort to argue that it conforms in any way with any
20 Q. That is your opinion?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 Mr. Donia, in footnote 46, 80 and 11, I will read out part of the
24 footnote. On footnote 46, on page 8, where you referred to the shorthand
25 notes of the session of the people of Serbian, in footnote 46 from the
1 record of this Assembly, you came -- on the basis of that record, you came
2 to the conclusion that some Bosnian Serbs fought with the JNA and with the
3 local Serbs in Croatia as well as with as members of the JNA and as
4 volunteers who organised by activists of the SDS and various
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Could you tell us on the basis of which part of the record you
8 came to this conclusion?
9 A. In the -- I believe I gave the ERN number of that Assembly session
10 in which there is what amounts to a bragging contest about how each
11 municipality has contributed troops to the war effort in support of the
12 Serbs in Croatia. I see only the English ERN, but I believe that section
13 is the place where that discussion is held. There is plenty of other
14 evidence concerning the role of Bosnian Serbs as well as volunteers in
15 Croatia. I here have only drawn attention to the quote of Romanija and
16 the appropriate celebration in Han Pijesak simply because those are most
17 relevant to the Sarajevo area.
18 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I think the B/C/S ERN is indicated
19 immediately following the tab which reads "11, 46, 80." The ERN for both
20 English and B/C/S is given on the first page.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I have seen that. But I think the B/C/S
22 indication is to a specific page of that ending 663, if I am correct, line
23 663. So I was just trying to assist Ms. Pilipovic in order to find
24 whether I could trace where line 663 as it should be approximately, I
25 would say, some 15 pages from the -- but that would be more in B/C/S, I
2 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, with regard to
3 this -- these notes, the Defence would appreciate it if Mr. Donia could
4 tell us on the basis of whose speech he came to such a conclusion. And I
5 would like to ask Mr. Donia, within the framework of these notes from the
6 Assembly, was the subject of national interest discussed at all, that it
7 would be in the national interest to leave the state of Yugoslavia?
8 Q. Did you have the opportunity of reading the speech of Mr. Alex
9 Buha and other participants in this assembly?
10 A. That's two questions. The first one is very specific as to -- I
11 am looking at footnote 46. I assume that's the question at issue since I
12 use the word "only one delegate." I would have to look at the --
13 Q. Yes, yes.
14 JUDGE ORIE: It seems to be in the English version on page 27.
15 The name seems to be Tosic who said, "I also want to draw attention of my
16 honourable colleague, Mr. Brdjanin, to the fact that the Serbian
17 people..." And that's what I see in your footnote 46. So, that would be
18 page 27 of the English version and it would be -- now it becomes more
19 difficult. I think it is page 55, but I am not quite sure. Yes, that
20 must be page 55 in the B/C/S version, Ms. Pilipovic, where I see the name
21 Tosic and it starts with as far as I can read "Mr. President," and then
22 the second part at least it is referring to "Kolega Brdjanin". I think
23 that is the part the witness is referring to.
24 A. Mr. President, I am handicapped by not having the documents in
25 front of me.
1 MR. IERACE: I was just about to suggest --
2 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, in order to save
3 time, I shall withdraw this question, so that we don't have to try and
4 find this in the transcript. Because if Mr. Donia can't remember who said
5 that -- but he did state or someone did state that a deputy stated this.
6 I will ask another question with regard to these notes.
7 JUDGE ORIE: If you look at page 55, Ms. Pilipovic, you'll almost
8 certainly find that same words. Yes, it speaks about a Srpski Narod
9 Romanija. That must be the Serbian people.
10 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, I found it.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please proceed, Ms. Pilipovic.
12 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 Q. Mr. Donia, on the basis of what Mr. Tosic, the deputy, said at
14 this Assembly, you came to this conclusion in footnote 46 on this basis.
15 I think that you've actually quoted this part in your footnote; is that
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Mr. Donia, were there any other speakers at that Assembly having
19 views different from those of Mr. Tosic?
20 A. I recall that -- I do recall that there was a suggestion that the
21 Romanija Serbs were under-represented. That was made by, I believe, Mr.
22 Brdjanin, but the suggestion was made by another speaker and that was the
23 comment that elicited this refutation and claimed that, "a good number of
24 our people were involved in some of the critical battles in Croatia."
25 Q. Mr. Donia, have you had the opportunity to read through the
1 minutes referring to the statement by Mr. Buha? It is on page seven.
2 A. I am sorry. I am still not --
3 JUDGE ORIE: If you have binder two in front of you -- no. Let me
4 just sort of --
5 THE WITNESS: I have one, Mr. President.
6 JUDGE ORIE: One is okay. It would then be the -- I think it's
7 the fourth tab which says 11, 46, 80.
8 THE WITNESS: And what page is this --
9 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] It is on page 7. It is the B/C/S
11 JUDGE ORIE: Would that be page 3? Professor Aleksa -- is that
12 the speaker you are referring to, Ms. Pilipovic?
13 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, that's it.
14 THE WITNESS: I have that, Ms. Pilipovic, yes.
15 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Can you agree that Mr. Buha's statement was in contradiction to
17 what certain other speakers have said, you yourself referred to Mr.
18 Tosic? Now, I would like to know whether on page 7, Mr. Buha - it is at
19 the bottom of the page - didn't he say that, "This historical crossroads,
20 the Muslim and the Croat peoples, will have to provide answers to some
21 questions. Have they recognised that leaving the Republic of Yugoslavia
22 is not something that the Serb people is going to be violently opposed to
23 for the sake of the country, but they want to make sure that the territory
24 that they occupy remains in the rump Yugoslavia"?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Can you agree that the substance, the aim and the desire of the
2 Serb people was their right to decide to remain within Yugoslavia?
3 A. That was the critical issue for most Serbs, yes.
4 Q. Have you when analysing this documentation pertaining to the
5 Assembly meetings of the Serb people, been able to conclude that, for the
6 most part, the speakers did not speak out against the wishes of the other
7 two constituent peoples to act in line with their right of
8 self-determination, but they just wanted the same right to apply to them?
9 When I say "them," I mean the Serb people.
10 A. The first -- there's two questions I hear you asking. I think the
11 first is: Did most speakers not speak out against the wishes of the other
12 two constituent peoples? And I would say yes, that is the case. The
13 rights to which the Serbs, Serbian speakers at the Assembly, were
14 referring, however, went far beyond the rights that they would attribute
15 to the other two constituent peoples. So I think the answer to your
16 second part of the question is no, that is really not the case. There
17 was, for example, no suggestion that the other two peoples would receive
18 constituent nation status in the Serbian state. And in fact, never did,
19 and that was never seriously considered until about a year ago.
20 Q. Mr. Donia, can we agree that the March 1992, the Assembly of
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina, proclaimed independence following referendum in
22 February which was organised by Bosnian Muslims, with a certain amount of
23 support from Bosnian Croats?
24 A. Again, you have asked several questions there. Was there --
25 Q. Yes. Let me simplify. I would like to know whether in March 1992
1 there was an Assembly meeting of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Was it held without the presence of the representatives of the
4 Serb people on that occasion, in 1992?
5 A. I agree the representatives of the SDA did not attend the session.
6 Q. Mr. Donia, I am referring to the Assembly of the
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina after the referendum in March 1992.
8 A. I believe that the representatives of the SDA -- I am sorry, the
9 SDS. If I said "SDA," I spoke incorrectly. The representatives of the
10 SDS, that is deputies in the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, did not
11 attend that session.
12 Q. Thank you. Do you have any knowledge about the Assembly of
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina following that referendum proclaiming the independence
14 of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
15 A. Yes. They did so.
16 Q. Is it correct that the referendum was held by the end of February
17 and the beginning of March of that year, 1992, and that it was organised
18 by the Bosnian Muslims with the support of the Bosnian Croats?
19 A. Again, there are two questions there. The referendum was held on
20 the last day of February, which is 29th of February, and the first day of
21 March. It was organised by order of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina
22 and with the endorsement or similar act of the Assembly of
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, at the suggestion of the Badinter Commission of the
24 European community.
25 Q. Mr. Donia, isn't it correct that the right -- that the decision,
1 sorry, about proclaiming the independence was counter to Articles 1 and 2
2 of the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
3 A. I am not a constitutional expert and I am not really prepared or
4 don't feel I am qualified to render that decision or that judgment.
5 Q. Thank you, Mr. Donia. You have told us that the opinion of the
6 Badinter Commission was sought. Have you got any knowledge about the
7 Badinter Commission of the European Community issuing any opinions on the
8 occasion of the referendum and on the occasion of the proclamation of
9 independence? Let me try -- I would like to simplify the question but I
10 am unable to. Do you have any knowledge of that?
11 A. Not on those two occasions, no.
12 Q. And if I tell you that the Badinter Commission did issue an
13 opinion, will you agree with me?
14 A. I don't know.
15 Q. And if I tell you that the opinion was as follows: "Acting
16 according to the will of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina for the
17 socialist republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina being set up as a sovereign and
18 independent state, not being able to be considered as fully well-founded."
19 A. If you are citing a document, I would like to examine the
20 document. It very well may be that that statement was made by the
21 Badinter Commission but I don't have any first-hand knowledge of it and
22 would like to examine any document that made that statement.
23 Q. Unfortunately, I don't have that document at the moment, but I
24 have tried and I did my best to try and quote as best I could the exact
1 Mr. Donia, would you agree that the results of that referendum led
2 to an escalation of nationalist behaviour on the part of the members of
3 nationalist parties on all sides? And I am referring to Sarajevo in
4 particular at the moment.
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Do you think that these events represent the beginning of the
7 conflict which then degenerated into armed conflict in Sarajevo and the
8 rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
9 A. No.
10 Q. Can you tell us why you say no?
11 A. I think it is extremely difficult to identify a single beginning
12 point to the armed conflict. There was armed conflict that began in very
13 early April, April 1. That, to me, is a good starting date but I think
14 there is also good reason to look at April 6th or April 4th as dates that
15 are good starting points for the armed conflict.
16 The events that begin to lead up to it, I think should be dated
17 considerably further back than that, than the date that you have suggested
18 and it is very difficult, I think, to identify a specific point in time
19 which one should say, "This is where it began and nothing previous to
20 this really influenced the development of the conflict." So I have
21 difficulty identifying any date as the beginning of the particular
23 Q. You said in your expertise, in your export report, that there were
24 barricades in Sarajevo. Can you tell us when exactly the first barricades
25 were erected in Sarajevo?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. Within a few hours of the completion of the voting, the first
2 barricades went up in the Pofalici area. That was the -- that was the
3 late night, late evening of 1 March, 1992.
4 Q. Do you have any knowledge about what happened after the vote in
5 favour of the independence on the occasion of that referendum, of the fact
6 that this victory was celebrated in an improper way in some parts of town
7 and in some parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the part of the SDA
9 A. I don't know specifically what you are referring to. There was
10 plenty of celebrating. Some of it was probably excessive, but there were
11 also acts of violence that occurred within hours of this event, which I
12 think are not necessarily related to either the referendum itself or the
13 celebrations that took place.
14 Q. Do you think that the cause of the conflict in the area of the
15 city of Sarajevo, or rather, do you have any knowledge of there having
16 been one person killed on the 1st of March of that year, one Serb person,
18 A. Yes, I believe I referred to that in my report. If I recall,
19 the --
20 Q. Yes.
21 A. -- father of the groom of a wedding that was taking place, that
22 had taken place in the old Serbian Orthodox church in Sarajevo, was killed
23 just after this had taken place, and the post-wedding celebration was
24 going on in Bascarsija and at that point a shot or shots -- there were
25 several shots fired, killing the father of the groom and wounding an
1 Orthodox priest.
2 Q. Mr. Donia, do you believe that as of that day Sarajevo was a
3 divided city, first of all, the barricades and then there was military
4 and the political division? Do you believe that that was one of the
6 A. There are several questions, again. Was Sarajevo a divided city
7 as of that day? No. I think some territorial division was in the process
8 of taking place, but the city was, once the barricades came down, free and
9 open again and really not divided.
10 There was by that time a significant political division, with the
11 SDS having take power in several of the municipalities, as I indicated,
12 around the periphery of the city. The military division of the city was
13 really not yet established. The barricades clearly stopped free movement
14 for a period of about 24 hours to 48 hours, but then it was restored
16 Q. Thank you, Mr. Donia.
17 On page 7 of your paragraph [as interpreted], you refer to
18 military preparations on the part of the nationalist parties in
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina. You say that all nationalist parties started
20 preparing for war. Is that correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. On page 7, you said that the SDA set up two paramilitary units,
23 the Patriotic League and the Green Berets?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Can you tell us who was in command there, who was the commander of
1 those paramilitary units? Do you have any knowledge of that?
2 A. No. I couldn't name you -- I don't know the names of the
4 Q. Do you know when they were set up?
5 A. Well, I really don't know much about the Green Berets unit. The
6 -- I am aware that the Patriotic League had only a skeleton organisation
7 until September/October of 19 -- or September/October of 1991, when some
8 of the command positions were filled by Muslims who had left the JNA in
9 the wake of events in Croatia, which had made the JNA into an increasingly
10 Serbian force in Croatia.
11 That organisation was substantially filled out substantially
12 enough to hold periodic inspections by January of 1992.
13 Q. Mr. Donia, do you know how many members they had, the Patriotic
14 League, I mean, in 1991?
15 A. No.
16 Q. You said you read the book by Mr. Sefer Halilovic, A Smart
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Is it correct that he was the commander of the headquarters of the
20 chief of staff of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1990?
21 A. I believe 1992, was that your statement?
22 Q. 1993?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Mr. Donia, the Defence has a copy of one part of that book by Mr.
25 Sefer Halilovic. On page 120, he talks about how many members the
1 Patriotic League had with reference to 1992.
2 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Ms. Pilipovic, are you going to tender this
4 page or what is your intention? As you know, you should indicate when
5 providing a document to the witness whether you want to do with it.
6 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. The Defence
7 would like for this page to be tendered as proof on behalf of the Defence.
8 I believe I marked with the number of 104, unless I made a
10 JUDGE ORIE: Your numbering, Ms. Pilipovic, all the other
11 documents you have shown to the witness were already part of the document
12 that is tendered by the Prosecution, that is the report of Mr. Donia, and
13 the footnote to it. So, Madam Registrar thinks we are D100 and not D104,
14 I think.
15 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Mrs. Kelly tried to
16 explain it to me so it is a relief.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You are doing your utmost.
18 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Mr. Donia, on page 120, you will see that there is an English
20 version as well, Mr. Sefer Halilovic talks about the spring of 1992 and
21 in para 2 says, "But I must say that at military talks in the village of
22 Mehurici near Travnik when we marked the anniversary, and the current
23 organisers have not invited me, even though I am one of the organisers...
24 They established what -- the Patriotic League had at that time between 60
25 to 70.000 [Real-time transcript read in error: 60 to 7000"] armed members
1 and that number increased day by day because military organisation was
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Mr. Donia, would you agree that the figures referred to by Mr.
5 Sefer Halilovic here as to the number of members of the patriotic league
6 are acceptable?
7 A. I think so. I think the meeting in Mehurici was, if I am not
8 mistaken, in March. So this would be a number in a sense on the probably
9 March, early April period. I think early you had asked me about 1991, and
10 I would think that this number would be way too high for 1991 but would be
11 maybe a little high, but about right for this period.
12 JUDGE ORIE: In order to avoid whatever misunderstanding, for the
13 transcript, page 53, line 13, should read 60 to 70.000 armed members and
14 not to 60 to 7000 armed members.
15 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, now in the transcript, on the new line on page
17 54, line 1, the number has even reduced to 60 to 70, but it is 60 to
18 70.000 armed members. It is a total confusion at this moment because
19 where I said what it was not, it surprisingly gives the number it should
20 be. So for the last and final time, page 53, line 13, should be 60 to
21 70.000 armed members. Yes, that is correct.
22 Please proceed.
23 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
24 Q. Mr. Donia, you told us yesterday that the BH army was set up on
25 the 15th of April, 1992 starting on the basis of the Territorial Defence?
1 A. I believe I told you yesterday or testified yesterday that the
2 unified command of the Territorial Defence forces was established on 15
3 April, 1992 and that organisation subsequently became the army of BH.
4 Q. Do you have any knowledge about the members of the Patriotic
5 League and the members of the Green Berets joining the armed forces of BH?
6 A. Again, my knowledge is more of the Patriotic League and the -- a
7 couple of the commanders of the Patriotic League have written that the
8 organisation came under the command of the unified TO staff on the 15th of
9 April, 1992. I am sorry, I don't know the status of the Green Berets.
10 Q. Mr. Donia, in your report, you claim that the SDS regionalisation
11 made it possible for itself to establish control over the Territorial
12 Defence. Have I phrased this question correctly? That, when carrying out
13 regionalisation, it established control over the Territorial Defence; is
14 that what you claimed?
15 A. I believe I put it a little bit differently. The Territorial
16 Defence units in each municipality came under the political authorities in
17 most situations from -- in those municipalities, which meant that in
18 municipalities with a Serbian majority and SDS control of the municipality
19 Assemblies, those TO organisations, in most instances, came under the SDS
21 In municipalities where the Bosnian Muslims had a majority or
22 where there was a mixed situation, in most of those situations, the TO
23 units came under the Republican TO authorities, and, subsequently, the
24 army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Certainly regionalisation assisted in some
25 municipalities in that SDS control over a TO unit, but probably only in a
1 few municipalities.
2 Q. Could you tell us whether in the territory of the city of Sarajevo
3 in which areas did the SDS establish control over the Territorial Defence?
4 A. I am not sure about each and everything municipality, but
5 certainly Ilidza, Pale, Ilijas -- beyond that, I am not certain.
6 Q. Could you tell us when, and at what time, the SDS established
8 A. I think probably was different for each municipality. Pale
9 certainly was very early. But I can't give you specific dates, so the
10 answer is really, I don't know.
11 Q. Could you tell us which brigade of the Territorial Defence of the
12 regional staff in Sarajevo was controlled by the SDS?
13 A. No, I can't.
14 Q. Would you agree with me that the division of the Territorial
15 Defence took place in municipalities but also at the republican level and
16 that this happened after the division in Sarajevo?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Mr. Donia, do you know whether in June 1991 Alija Izetbegovic,
19 that is to say the leadership of the SDA and those in power in
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time, so we are talking about June 1991, do you
21 know whether they made it impossible for the JNA to be filled up with
22 recruits in reservists who were born in Bosnia-Herzegovina and at that
23 time, the JNA was a legitimate institution still?
24 A. They did not.
25 Q. So you are claiming that no such decision was adopted?
1 A. You asked me whether the SDA leadership made it impossible for the
2 JNA to be filled up with recruits and reservists and the answer to that
3 is, no, they did not make it impossible.
4 Q. When you say, "they did not prevent this, they did not make it
5 impossible," are you telling us that reservists and recruits from the
6 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, so people who were born in the territory
7 of the Bosnia-Herzegovina, went to the JNA? And I am referring to Muslims
8 right now.
9 A. Yes, they did.
10 Q. I would just like to clarify something. I would just like to
11 clarify this issue now. Is it correct to say that from June 1991, the
12 reservists from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina who were of Muslim
13 nationality did not respond to the call-up papers from the JNA? Would it
14 be correct to claim that?
15 A. No, it would not.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 Mr. Donia, in your report you claim that the Yugoslav People's
18 Army became an instrument of the Serbian Democratic Party?
19 A. I don't know if I made that statement appropriate to any period
20 prior to May 12th, 1992. Do you have a citation where I state that?
21 Q. Mr. Donia, I shall try to find that part.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Can I assist you, Ms. Pilipovic. Are you referring
23 to page 8 in the English language where it reads: "In the first five
24 months of 1992, the JNA in Bosnia-Herzegovina was gradually transformed
25 from a Yugoslav force composed of various nationalities into an instrument
1 of SDS policies operating in the name of Serbian national interests." Is
2 that the part that you are referring to?
3 Could you please then answer the question, Mr. Donia.
4 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, thank you, Your Honour.
5 A. Yes, I would, I think, stand by this formulation. A gradual
6 transformation that culminated in the event of May -- or the decision of
7 May 12th, 1992 to actually make the JNA units in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
8 remake them into the Bosnian Serb army. The events of April and early
9 May, 1992 contributed substantially to that process, but it still -- there
10 is considerable evidence of an independent JNA policy, independent of the
11 SDS as late as the first several days of May, 1992.
12 Q. Mr. Donia, on the basis of which documents did you arrive at such
13 a conclusion?
14 A. In part, the deliberations of the Serbian -- Assemblies of the
15 Serbian people, in particular, the addresses of Dr. Karadzic, who back in
16 late 1991 indicated that the JNA was not really at the disposal of the SDS
17 and couldn't be counted upon by the SDS to carry out its policies. By
18 March of 1992, in some of the minutes we have been looking at, he makes a
19 statement - in fact, there are a couple of statements - that the army is
20 no problem and can be counted on, in effect, to support SDS aims. That
21 doesn't mean it was subordinated to the SDS - I think there is an
22 important difference - but rather that the command element of the JNA was
23 working in tandem with the SDS to achieve certain limited aims.
24 Q. Mr. Donia, could you provide us with the name of one JNA commander
25 who was appointed as commander by the SDS? That is to say, was appointed
1 as a commander of the army and of the corps.
2 A. Well, as you see in the statement that I have excerpted from the
3 1995 minutes of the Serbian Assembly, Radovan Karadzic claimed that his
4 nominee, Radic, had been made commander of the second military district,
5 upon his, that is Karadzic's, nomination. On the other hand, it is clear
6 that that designation, the appointment, was not Karadzic's to make and
7 such appointments were not made by the SDS at that time or, for that
8 matter, later in the formal sense; those were not party appointments.
9 Q. Mr. Donia, could you mention a plan or an action by the JNA which
10 was planned by the leadership of the SDS?
11 A. No. I think I have made clear that that would not be something
12 that would have taken place in this period. There probably were some
13 decisions to distribute arms to SDS members or local Serbs that would have
14 been initiated by the SDS and the result of efforts to persuade JNA
15 officers to so distribute arms. But I think that would be the extent of
16 the actual SDS ability to influence JNA decisions. At this point we are
17 talking about prior to May 12th.
18 Q. Mr. Donia, do you know when the JNA left Sarajevo?
19 A. Parts of it left -- concerns fortification in May of 1992. I
20 think parts probably left in late April, but most of the weaponry and a
21 large number of the personnel never left, didn't leave in this time period
23 Q. Are you aware of a document being signed, according to which the
24 JNA was going to withdraw on the 4th of May, 1992?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. In your opinion, would you agree that up until the signature on
2 the 4th of May, up until it signed that document on the 4th of May, 1992,
3 would you agree that the JNA was a legitimate military force in the
4 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, regardless of the fact that on the 6th of
5 April, the European Community recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina?
6 A. No.
7 Q. Could you tell us why not?
8 A. The JNA was asked to depart Bosnia-Herzegovina by the leadership
9 of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was then an independent
10 state. So it would at least call into question whether that was a
11 legitimate military force on the territory of a sovereign state at that
13 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, we are close to the time where we
14 usually have a break.
15 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Could I also ask you how much time you would still
17 need approximately? If we have a break to close to 6.00, how much time
18 would you still need do you think? We are coming to the weekend and you
19 know that I always become a bit nervous towards the weekend how far we
20 have come that week.
21 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think that I will
22 have finished my cross-examination by the end of this hearing, and perhaps
23 even earlier.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace, do you have any idea of how much time you
25 would need to re-examine the witness?
1 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, at this stage, very little time
2 indeed, a matter of minutes.
3 JUDGE ORIE: A matter of minutes. And during the break, I will
4 try to find out what questions from the Bench are still to be expected.
5 We will have a break until 5 minutes to 6.00.
6 --- Recess taken at 5.35 p.m.
7 --- Upon resuming at 5.57 p.m.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Ierace.
9 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, we had a spare set of the tabbed
10 binders so we have given that spare set to the accused. Thank you.
11 THE COURT: Yes. That's good, so that he is better able to follow
12 what happens.
13 Ms. Pilipovic, I just inform you that the Chamber has a few
14 questions, but not many. That means a couple of minutes for Mr. Ierace,
15 not many questions from the Chamber, so if we would -- if we could
16 conclude this Friday, that would be fine.
17 Please proceed.
18 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
19 Q. Mr. Donia, on page 10 of your report you mentioned the
20 demonstrations in front of the Assembly building on the 6th of April. You
21 wrote that six demonstrators lost their lives and the others scattered
22 about and ran way. It is just before the footnote 69, page 10 of the
23 translation; I do apologise, Mr. Donia.
24 You wrote that the BH police, when they got to the site, realised
25 that people who opened fire left the city together with the key leaders of
1 SDS. Footnote 69?
2 MR. IERACE: Yes.
3 THE WITNESS: Yes.
4 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Mr. Donia, did you mean to say that the people who left the city
6 together with the key leaders were the people who opened fire on the
7 citizens? Because you said that the police found that the people who
8 opened fire left the hotel.
9 A. That's most of them had left the hotel, and I think that the
10 reports are that a small number of them were arrested.
11 Q. In the course of your stay in Sarajevo, did you find out who
12 actually shot at the citizens gathering in front of the building?
13 A. The names of those persons, I don't know.
14 Q. Mr. Donia, you told us that you follow the press in Sarajevo. You
15 even referred to Slobodna Bosna magazine; is that correct?
16 A. I gave two citations to Slobodna Bosna in the course of the paper.
17 I would say that following the press in Sarajevo was probably a hopeless
18 task. I try to follow it in the main, but it is certainly not the case
19 that I see everything that comes out.
20 Q. In the course of your stay in Sarajevo, whilst working on the
21 history of that period, did you find out and did you obtain any
22 information as to Juka Prazina might be? Have you ever heard that name?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Mr. Donia, have you in the course of your stay in Sarajevo, more
25 specifically in 2000, did you read an article in Slobodna Bosna written by
1 Mrs. Medina Mladic, and she said, "Juka Prazina told us that our snipers
2 were shooting at the people in front of the Assembly building"? Have you
3 ever seen such an article?
4 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we do have a copy of
5 that article so we can present the witness with the article.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, if he, of course -- perhaps he first answers the
7 question as to whether he has ever seen it.
8 THE WITNESS: No, I have not seen it.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Then the next question is what you could ask the
10 witness about something he has not seen before, but perhaps I will leave
11 it for a while. Ms. Pilipovic, you understand what the concern of the
12 Chamber is.
13 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes.
14 Q. Mr. Donia, do you have any knowledge of and did you ever, in the
15 course of your stay and work in Sarajevo, find out that the people in
16 front of the Assembly building, the citizens gathered there, were shot at
17 by the snipers from the terrorist group under the command of Juka Prazina?
18 A. No.
19 Q. And if I tell you that the Slobodna Bosna magazine published such
20 an article, can you accept that this might be true?
21 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I object to the question. It has no
22 probative value, given the answers by the witness to the last question and
23 similar questions.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Ms. Pilipovic --
25 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, my questions and the
1 submitting of this article were addressed to Mr. Donia for the simple
2 reason that, in his statement, Mr. Donia mentioned that fire was opened in
3 front of the Holiday Inn and that the demonstrators were shot at and that
4 the people responsible were the ones who were together with the leaders
5 of the SDS party, during this stay in Sarajevo and his work in that area
6 of his research in that part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially since Mr.
7 Donia seems to be referring to literature and newspaper articles published
8 in Sarajevo. Amongst other sources, he also mentioned the Slobodna Bosna
9 magazine. I thought that for the sake of check the credibility of Mr.
10 Donia, I would present him with a document that he must have come across
11 as a historian, he must have had the opportunity to read it. However, if
12 Mr. Donia doesn't recognise it, no problem.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, you are mixing up a lot of things. On
14 the other hand, even if you have not seen the newspaper article, if this
15 is just an assumption, if you would know who was responsible, then you
16 could tell that if this newspaper says that someone else is responsible
17 could not be true. But I do not know whether this is the knowledge of Mr.
18 Donia, so -- but I couldn't say that the question has no probative value
19 at all, so therefore the objection is denied. But perhaps you ask the
20 question in such a way that we don't get theoretical answers, but
21 practical answers.
22 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Mr. Donia, do you have any knowledge of the fact that it was the
24 Juka Prazina group that was shooting at the citizens in front of the
25 Assembly building?
1 A. Let me point out that this article refers to 5 April, 1992. My
2 statement in the paper refers to 6 April, 1992. As you know, there were
3 demonstrations on both days and both came under fire. The first day's
4 demonstration was dispersed with not a lot of blood spilt. I don't think
5 there was actually any injuries. The 6th was a much more serious attack.
6 So I would respectfully note that the document that you have given me has
7 no relevance to the statement that I made in the paper.
8 Q. Mr. Donia, you said that the day when Bosnia-Herzegovina was
9 recognised was the 6th of April and that was when there was a lot of
10 shooting in Sarajevo. Do you know anything about whether, on the 5th of
11 April, there were any demonstrations in front of the Assembly?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Do you know anything about there being any shots fired at the
14 demonstrators in front of the building on the 5th of April?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Do you know that on the 5th of April, snipers from the sniper
17 terrorist group under the command of Juka Prazina were the ones shooting
18 at the citizens in front of the building?
19 A. I don't know who did that shooting.
20 Q. Thank you, Mr. Donia.
21 In your report you refer to the 2nd of May, 1992.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Do you know that on that day, the Muslim army, about 500 armed
24 individuals, attacked the centre of the JNA in Sarajevo?
25 A. I don't think that's quite correct statement. The JNA command --
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 well, ask me more. I don't think that statement is correct, no.
2 Q. Do you know anything about one lieutenant and one soldier having
3 been wounded on that day in front of the JNA community centre?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Do you -- I mean, you are referring to the events of the 3rd of
6 May, 1992. Do you know anything about the Territorial Defence of
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina attacking a group of soldiers on that day and they were
8 headed by Alija Izetbegovic?
9 A. Well, there's two questions there. On the 3rd of May, there was
10 an attack by Territorial Defence forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina on a convoy
11 that was moving through the streets of Sarajevo. Alija Izetbegovic was in
12 one of the armoured personnel carriers because he had been taken hostage
13 by the JNA the previous day when he returned to the airport from
14 international negotiations. So, I would say I don't think they were
15 headed by Alija Izetbegovic at that point, since he was actually in one of
16 the armoured personnel carriers of the convoy that was attacked.
17 Q. Mr. Donia, in your report on page 11 of the B/C/S version, after
18 the reply that the Territorial Defence did attack the -- well, could you
19 explain what you meant by the failed offensive [Realtime transcript read
20 in error "defensive"] of the JNA on the 2nd and the 3rd of May? On page
22 A. Let's see. I'm not --
23 Q. Just before strategic goals.
24 A. On the 2nd of May, the JNA brought armoured vehicles across the
25 river and toward the Presidency building from several directions. This
1 battle is recounted in the several memoir accounts and also in the press
2 reporting at the time and the commission of experts report. Those
3 armoured vehicle reached the park directly in front of the city government
4 building where they were stopped by anti-armour weapons in the possession
5 of the Territorial Defence forces and several of those armoured personnel
6 carriers burned until late in the day on that square.
7 That offensive, apparently directed at taking the Presidency
8 building, failed and at the same time, roughly the same time, Izetbegovic
9 was detained at the Sarajevo airport. So by the end of the 2nd of May,
10 there was a situation where the JNA command element, which was in the
11 headquarters component in Bistrik wanted to exit the city and, of course,
12 the Bosnians wanted their presidency -- president back.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Just for the sake of the record, page 66, line 11,
14 should read "offensive," instead of "defensive."
15 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
16 Q. Mr. Donia, you claim that the leaders of SDS formulated their
17 strategic goals by the beginning of May, 1992. I am referring to the
18 minutes of the Assembly meeting of the 12th of May, 1992.
19 A. Yes. I believe my statement was that they formulated their
20 strategic goals in the course of two meetings, one at Graz on the 6th of
21 May and one at Banja Luka on the 12th of May.
22 Q. Mr. Donia, we are talking about five or six strategic goals
23 defined by the Assembly of the Republika Srpska on the 12th of May.
24 A. Or six.
25 Q. Yes. Do you make a distinction between the Assembly and the SDS
1 as a party?
2 A. Formally there was a distinction. In practical reality, the
3 Assembly was consisted of almost exclusively of SDS members. So I think
4 in the day-to-day reality, there really was not much difference.
5 Q. So the Assembly as such, as an constitution is being compared to
6 the SDS as a party by you?
7 A. Well, as I would say there was virtually complete overlap between
8 the two. There were a few members of the Assembly who were not SDS
9 members and there were certainly some SDS members whose did not share in
10 the views and conclusions of the Assembly. But the overlap was very
11 substantial. But I concur that these are two different institutions.
12 Formally, they are two different organisations.
13 Q. Thank you, Mr. Donia.
14 Do you consider it as not legitimate that after the start of the
15 hostilities, the Parliament starts defining the goals of the war? In
16 other words, defining the goals of the war, is it within the area of
17 competence of Parliament?
18 A. I don't have an opinion on that.
19 Q. Can you confirm that the strategic goals as defined by the
20 Assembly on the 12th of May, 1992, for the most part are goals which were
21 accepted at Dayton except the one pertaining to having a part of the
22 coast, that strategic goal?
23 A. No.
24 Q. So we cannot agree that those were the legitimate goals and that
25 they were legitimately chosen and formulated as such?
1 A. I don't really know if they were legitimate or not. They were --
2 they were chosen, they were formulated, and what their level of legitimacy
3 was in the constitutional sense, I really don't know.
4 Q. Thank you. Mr. Donia, can you agree with me that the most
5 authentic minutes are the ones which are the shorthand minutes?
6 A. No.
7 Q. Can you tell us, in your opinion, whenever we are talking about
8 any meeting at all, what is the most authentic document reflecting
9 whatever has been said at a meeting?
10 A. Well, there are minutes and there is a transcript. And in this
11 instance, for example, one deals with transcript derived from a
12 tape-recording made of the session. That should be the most accurate and
13 complete record of the deliberations and conclusion of the Assembly. It
14 is far superior to the shorthand minutes that were taken at many such
15 sessions throughout Bosnia during this time.
16 Q. So you are telling us that the most accurate source of information
17 would be a transcript or a tape-recording?
18 A. Certainly superior to the shorthand minutes.
19 Q. But we can also agree that the shorthand minutes have -- arrive at
20 a certain level of accuracy?
21 A. Often that is the case, yes.
22 Q. Thank you. Mr. Donia, in your report, footnote number 83, you
23 refer to the minutes on the 12th or, rather, on the 14th of May 1992. I
24 think it is the last minutes. It is in the binder 2-2, the last pages of
25 the minutes in the second binder.
1 A. Yes, I have that, Ms. Pilipovic.
2 Q. Mr. Donia, was it a short -- are these shorthand minutes?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Can you tell us on what basis you made this conclusion?
5 A. Well, it is a set of minutes that are typical of shorthand
6 notations made at minutes in this period, often with incomplete sentences
7 and one or two sentences -- sentence summaries of statements that clearly
8 were longer by some of the speakers. I believe we have a signature page
9 at the end of the B/C/S. Probably more than anything else, the absence of
10 the more precise quotations or word-for-word quotations would indicate
11 that these are shorthand rather than -- shorthand minutes, rather than
13 Q. Can you agree with me that these minutes are simply an
14 interpretation of what certain of the speakers present at the meeting
15 said, especially if you look at page two of these minutes, and page three
16 as well?
17 A. Well, the person in this role is tasked with summarising speeches
18 by the individual person. So I characterise them as summaries.
19 Q. Mr. Donia, would you say that this -- these minutes were taken by
20 someone, that this record was made after the meeting was held? Do you
21 think that this record was made after the meeting, someone who was present
22 and who compiled the record and interpreted what was happening at the
23 meeting and, let's say, typed it on a typewriter? Would you admit that
24 this was possible?
25 A. I think that the normal procedure in such a situation was for a
1 person to take shorthand notes and then to type them up on a typewriter at
2 some point, reasonably short in time after the conclusion of the meeting.
3 Typically the same day, but not always.
4 Q. So we agree that these minutes could have been compiled by someone
5 who signed this minutes and it could have been compiled after the meeting
6 was held, but that it was compiled on that same day?
7 A. I think it is safe to conclude that they were typed after the
8 meeting, but probably initially compiled in the course of the meeting.
9 Q. Mr. Donia, in your report you pointed out that that meeting was
10 presided over by Mr. Stanislav Galic. If we have a better look at the
11 minutes, that is to say, that the first page of the minutes, the first
12 page of the minutes where it says, after number 11, "The President of the
13 autonomous region of Kljuc told those present of the objectives of the
14 meeting and allowed Mr. Colonel Galic to speak. On the basis of what the
15 President said of the autonomous region of Kljuc agreed to those who were
16 present would be possible to draw the conclusion that the President
17 presided over the meeting that was held on that day."
18 A. I am not able to put my finger on exactly where I expressed that
19 in the report, but it was clear to me that the person presiding over the
20 meeting was not General Galic, but the president of the -- of Kljuc, who
21 -- of the Serbian Assembly of Kljuc, who then turned over the meeting to
22 him to speak.
23 Q. Thank you, Mr. Donia. So according to your interpretation on page
24 12 in the B/C/S, which starts with paragraph 4, "The appointment of
25 General Mladic, the transfer of the Yugoslav people's army into the army
1 of Republika -- will enable the civil organs -- "
2 THE COURT: Mr. Donia, did you find it? It is in the English
3 version, page 11, the second last paragraph.
4 THE WITNESS: Yes. Well, I would -- that is simply not -- my
5 formulation there is in error. It is very much the case that he was not
6 presiding over the meeting, but he did address it.
7 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Mr. Donia, thank you. So you agree that Colonel Galic was a
9 guest, since he was in command of the unit whose zone of responsibility
10 included the municipalities we have mentioned?
11 A. Yes, a guest and a participant.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 Mr. Donia, we have had the opportunity of becoming familiar with
14 the decision of the Assembly, the decision of the 12th of May, 1992, and
15 also to take cognisance of the strategic objectives. The strategic
16 objective we are interested at the moment is the strategic objective
17 number 5, which states that the objective of dividing Sarajevo into a
18 Serbian and Muslim part, that this is the objective; would you agree that
19 in the formulation of this 5th objective, which is to divide Sarajevo in
20 to a Serbian and Muslim part?
21 A. This was the formulation at the meeting of the 12th of May, yes.
22 Q. In your report on page 12, you told us that at that meeting, Mr.
23 Milan Malidza repeated the six strategic objectives which have been
24 accepted two days earlier on in Banja Luka. However, his formulation of
25 the 5th priority of Sarajevo was more correct than the version that had
1 been officially made known. It was said that Sarajevo had to be either
2 divided or levelled with the ground.
3 A. We may be encountering a problem of translation somewhere, but my
4 original report was that -- stated that this formulation was more specific
5 than the officially published version.
6 Q. Yes, Mr. Donia. You would agree that Mr. Milan Malidza
7 incorrectly interpreted this. He didn't repeat all the six strategic
9 A. I don't know whether he incorrectly interpreted it or not. He
10 stated it differently and may have stated his understanding of it. No one
11 stood up at the meeting and corrected him, according to the minutes, so I
12 don't know the nature of his reformulation of that objective other than to
13 say, it certainly was more specific.
14 Q. Would you agree that it was possible for that to be his
15 interpretation as a deputy. He was present there, was present in the
16 Assembly and I would especially like to underline that the strategic
17 objectives, all six of them and, especially the 5th objective, does not
18 include such a formulation.
19 A. Yes, I think it can be characterised as his interpretation of the
20 six points.
21 Q. Mr. Donia, you said on that same page, it begins with "Colonel
22 Galic proposed, that the six strategic objectives be adopted." Would you
23 agree with me that your interpretation is not correct, your interpretation
24 that Colonel Galic proposed that the six strategic objectives be adopted?
25 A. No.
1 Q. Mr. Donia, in the record, the last page of the minutes on page 4,
2 it says, "At the end of the meeting Colonel Galic suggested the following
3 proposal -- the following conclusions, to have the conclusions
4 implemented, the conclusions from the meeting in Banja Luka," so the word
5 "adopting" -- the word "adopt" cannot be identify with the word
6 "implement". They are not the same words. In the first part of his
7 conclusion, he says the conclusions from the Banja Luka meeting should be
8 implemented but they should also be forwarded to the command of the
10 A. Yes, I think that -- I agree, at least in the English, this is the
11 statement and I am assuming that one of those decisions at the meeting was
12 the adoption of the six strategic objectives.
13 Q. Mr. Donia, would you agree with me that to implement something and
14 to adopt something, these are two different concepts.
15 A. It seems to me the term "implement" is stronger than "adopt" and
16 would encompass the adoption of it. They are two different words, to be
18 Q. Would you agree with me that General Galic suggested that these
19 minutes, that is to they, conclusions should be forwarded to the commands
20 of units and municipalities, so that he was not aware of the actual
21 contents of the minutes, that is to say, the conclusion of the Assembly?
22 A. That question is not -- I don't think is answerable from the
23 document. I am sure he knows, but I don't know that from this statement
24 one could conclude whether he was or was not familiar with the specific
25 decisions of the meeting in Banja Luka. You know, he proposed the, what,
1 seven conclusions that were adopted unanimously by the meeting, and one of
2 those was to clearly implement the decision in Banja Luka. I think, in
3 that sense, the document perhaps best speaks for itself.
4 Q. Is it correct to say that the following conclusion was that the
5 current positions should be held and that they should be held without a
6 conflict. It's the second item?
7 A. Yes, defend them without war.
8 Q. Mr. Donia, on page 13 on the same document, the interpretation of
9 the statement -- you gave an interpretation of the statement of Mr.
10 Malidza and under the strategic objective number 5 that Sarajevo should be
11 either divided or razed with the ground, you came to the conclusion that
12 this was closer to the intentions of many leaders of the SDS and military
13 offices than the more moderate version that was adopted on the 12th of May
14 and which is -- and which only mentions the division of the city. Is this
15 your personal interpretation?
16 A. It is my assessment of the various speeches made by a number of
17 SDS leaders at the meeting of May 12th.
18 Q. Mr. Donia, if we carefully read the minutes of the 12th of May,
19 and carry out an analysis of everything that was said by the deputies,
20 would you agree with me, and I carried out a careful analysis, that none
21 of the deputies said that Sarajevo should be razed to the ground. There
22 were various formulations but nothing of that kind was said at that
23 meeting, that is quite true?
24 A. Yes, there are many different variations of the way Sarajevo
25 should be destroyed at that meeting, but I do not find the one that said
1 "Sarajevo should be razed to the ground."
2 Q. Mr. Donia, would you agree that up until the time General Galic
3 came to the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, came to its head, the political and
4 military -- the political, military and territorial division of Sarajevo
5 had been concluded, and I would like to say that he became the command of
6 the Sarajevo Romanija Corps on the 6th of December, [as interpreted] 1992?
7 A. I would -- yes, I concur but would say that the lines of
8 confrontation were not completely stable from that point on. There were
9 shifts and changes in lines of confrontation after September of 1992. But
10 I think that -- or I think that the date is September of 1992. I see
11 September 1992 -- I see December in the transcript, but I would agree that
12 the division was complete.
13 Q. Mr. Donia, thank you.
14 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] The Defence has concluded its
16 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much, Ms. Pilipovic. Mr. Ierace.
17 MR. IERACE: Perhaps my learned colleague could clarify that she
18 did mean the 6th of September, 1992. I refer to page 75, line 20 of the
19 English transcript.
20 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] That is what I said, but I don't
21 know why it says December in the transcript.
22 MR. IERACE: Thank you.
23 Re-examined by Mr. Ierace:
24 Q. Mr. Donia, you just have been asked some questions about page 11
25 of the English version of your report. Might I clarify whether you said
1 in effect during that questioning that you wanted to change something at
2 the bottom of page 11. Did you intend that or not?
3 A. Well, I think the question was pertained to the -- my statement
4 that on 14 May, 1992, the commander of the 30th Partisan Division, Colonel
5 Stanislav Galic, presided over a meeting. And yes, I would change that to
6 say "participated" in a meeting. It is certainly true that he proposed,
7 according to the minutes, all of the conclusions of the meeting, but
8 formally did not preside in the sense that he did not open the meeting.
9 Q. Does it appear from the minutes that at the outset of the meeting,
10 the president set out the goals of the meeting as he saw them, apparently
11 referred to the present guests, and then it seems straight after that gave
12 the floor to Colonel Galic?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Therefore he was the first speaker of substance, so it seems, and
15 he was the last speaker of substance?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Going to the last page of those minutes, it was pointed out that
18 one of the proposals made by Colonel Galic to be adopted by the meeting
19 was that present positions be held and defended without war; is that
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Thereafter the other proposed measures for adoption included the
23 proposal of the continued growth of the army; is that so?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. The obtaining of further weapons and equipment?
1 A. Yes, that is correct.
2 Q. And the maintenance of the economy on a wartime footing?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. As well as the commendation of soldiers for their combat results
5 achieved so far?
6 A. Yes, that is correct.
7 Q. In relation to this issue of whether there was some
8 misunderstanding about goal five, do the minutes record that the president
9 presented the conclusions to the meeting of the earlier meeting at Banja
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And does it appear thereafter the reference to Sarajevo being
13 either divided or razed to the ground?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. I would like to ask you some other questions about your report
16 while it is in front of you. Earlier, in our session yesterday, you were
17 asked a question by Mr. Piletta-Zanin about the nature of some academic
18 work undertaken by you, in particular, having regard to your curriculum
19 vitae, the nature of a dissertation you undertook in 1976 for your
20 doctorate. And I think you said yesterday that, "The topic of my
21 doctorate thesis was the political and social life of the Muslims of
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1878 until 1908." Would you please look at page
23 31 of your report, that being the last page of your curriculum vitae?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. You have told us yesterday what the topic was. Having regard to
1 the precise title, is there firstly a misprint, in that "1978" should be
3 A. Yes, that is a title and work I would like to forget, actually.
4 But I clearly have not rendered it correctly here.
5 Q. And I take it that "1914" should be "1908."
6 A. No, 1914 is correct. The work was principally prior to 1908 but
7 it did continue to 1914.
8 Q. Staying with your report, you were asked some questions about an
9 incident in, I think it was May 1992, where some members of a wedding
10 party involving individuals from the Serbian community were attacked, and
11 that was in the context of the start of conflict. That is the context of
12 the questions in cross-examination. That appears at the bottom of page 8
13 of the English version of your report.
14 A. That was in March.
15 Q. Yes, March. Having regard to the content of your footnote 63,
16 have you come across some references to the perpetrator being responsible
17 for some earlier offences, including murder and rape, and that individual
18 having received psychiatric attention in the past?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. You were asked some questions today in relation to some
21 instructions issued in December of 1991 entitled: "Instructions for the
22 organisation and activity of organs of the Serbian people in
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina in extraordinary circumstances." That appears at tab
24 26 to 31. Do you have that volume in front of you? The spine should
25 indicate volume 2- 2.
1 A. Yes I do.
2 Q. You were asked some questions about that document. One of
3 those questions appears in the English version of LiveNote at page 40,
4 line 9. You were referred to this report and then asked, "Is it logical
5 if in one municipality one of the parties got the majority, was it logical
6 for them to organise power there?" I think it is fair to say that the
7 suggestion was that the majority ethnic group was surely entitled to
8 organise power in a municipality if they held the majority. Do you
9 remember being asked that question?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And you referred to the legitimate government institutions being
12 already well in place. Did you have in mind the government institutions
13 of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
14 A. Yes. The government institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of
15 each of the 109 municipalities which were part of the governmental
16 structure of the socialist republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
17 Q. As of December 1991, what was the nature of the representative
18 organ of the government, in other words, was it a Parliament or an
19 Assembly or something else?
20 A. The Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina was the representative body
21 that was the legislative organ of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
22 Q. Were the members of that Assembly elected or appointed?
23 A. All were elected.
24 Q. Was the profile of the Assembly in relation to its ethnic
25 composition singular or was there multiple representation?
1 A. There were representatives from all three major nationalities.
2 Q. Having regard to the question and the suggestion in it that the
3 majority group was entitled to engage in, indeed, to organise for itself
4 power, would you now look at the document in front of you, in particular,
5 having regard to the number in the top right-hand corner, page 2624. Do
6 you have that in front of you? That is the title page of the
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. The top left-hand corner is identified as a document of a party,
10 that is a political party?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Being the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Is it also described as being strictly confidential?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Does the document bear instructions for two types of
17 municipalities, firstly, those where the Serb people form a majority,
18 being Variant A; and secondly, those where the Serbian people are in a
19 minority, being Variant B?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Do the instructions require the establishment of assemblies in
22 each of the municipalities?
23 A. The establishment of a Serbian Assembly in each municipality, both
24 Variant A and Variant B.
25 Q. Indeed, in requiring the establishment of a Serbian Assembly, do
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 the instructions specifically require that the only member of the
2 assemblies are to be Serbian?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Do the instructions also require for the taking of control of the
5 various organs of government?
6 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel for the Prosecution please slow
7 down a little.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace, I do understand that you trying to keep
9 your promise that it would take a couple of minutes, but nevertheless the
10 interpreters have to interpret.
11 A. Yes, it does.
12 MR. IERACE:
13 Q. Do the instructions require that all of those organs are to be
14 controlled by either Serbs or persons who have expressed allegiance or
15 support of the aims of the party?
16 A. Yes.
17 MR. IERACE: Nothing further, Mr. President.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Ierace.
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 JUDGE ORIE: Judge El Mahdi has one or two questions for you.
21 Questioned by the Court:
22 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
23 Witness, I would like you to explain to me, if you could, a few
24 details, a few minor details. On page 11 of your report, of your
25 testimony, you quoted the date, you mentioned the date 14th of May, it
1 was, and you spoke about -- and if we then turn to the bottom of the page
2 83, it says, and I am reading it in English -- is that the same Colonel
4 A. Yes, Your Honour, it is.
5 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] But he was the commander of the
6 30th division or was he the commander of the 1st Partisan Brigade?
7 A. I am not certain.
8 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] But I think that in the Serbian
9 version I can see that it says the 30th part division, the 12th of May,
10 so there is after all -- this meeting took place on the 14th or the 12th?
11 A. My understanding, in looking at the document at the time, was that
12 it took place on the 14th. But I see Your Honour's point that this is --
13 the date, that the 12th occurs in my citation of the B/C/S original and I
14 am -- would have to go to the B/C/S --
15 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Very well. Let's move to -- move
16 on to another issue. I am quoting you. You are still speaking about
17 Colonel Galic [In English] "Without further fighting." [Interpretation]
18 And then he suggested a meeting every 15 days with the presidents of
19 civilian municipalities. Did that actually take place? Did they meet?
20 What was the position of General Galic at these meetings as far as you
22 A. Your Honour, I have not encountered any evidence of further
23 meetings of this group together with General Galic. It appeared to me
24 from the minutes that he was turning over to the presidents of the Serbian
25 Assemblies the initiative for convening such meetings, but beyond that, I
1 have no indication or run across any documentation of such further
3 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] So it is possible that there were
4 other meetings?
5 A. Certainly.
6 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Very well, sir. If I ask you one
7 last question with regard to your conclusion. You stated -- you made
8 two claims. You said that there was shelling, and I quote you in English,
9 [In English] "Advantage to shell the city periodically to damage and
10 destroy..." [Interpretation] So you suggested or you advanced the
11 material fact, that is to say the shelling, and you nevertheless assumed
12 that there was an intention which accompanied it and that was the
13 intention, the intention was to damage cultural monuments and religious
14 monuments, and then you say [In English] Electricity..." End of quote.
15 [Interpretation] This intention, did you come to the conclusion that there
16 was such an intention with regard to -- on the basis of the report from
17 the special emissary of the United Nations or was this on the basis of the
18 personal research you carried out, or is it an observation, the subject of
19 your own reflection? I would like to know what your opinion is.
20 A. I would say, principally, the reports of observers on the scene
21 and the pattern of the destruction in -- now, please note that I am
22 speaking of the period before September, 1992, but the destruction of
23 certain cultural monuments, particularly the -- I could name them, but
24 there were several -- appeared to be quite calculated and deliberate in
25 terms of the types of shells that were directed at them and the
1 consistency of the attacks on particular targets. And that observation is
2 shared by the United Nations observers in at least one case, the case of
3 the library. And so I would just perhaps return to the statement that the
4 overwhelming military advantage both permitted this, and in a sense,
5 facilitated this kind of very specific targeting of cultural monuments,
6 particularly cultural monuments that attested to the city's multi-ethnic
7 life. More so than religious institutions, for example, of any particular
9 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Donia, before I could even put a question to you,
11 I first have to ask the interpreters. I have four relatively short
12 questions to Mr. Donia. Could we conclude today, or otherwise we would
13 have to invite Mr. Donia to come back, Monday morning.
14 MR. IERACE: If it assists you, Mr. President, in your decision,
15 Mr. Donia has to come back any way.
16 JUDGE ORIE: I know that he is almost a full resident these times.
17 But, of course, just for a couple of minutes, would the booth agree or
18 strongly object against four more questions.
19 THE INTERPRETER: No objections, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE ORIE: I am listening to the wrong channel. Thank you very
21 much for your kind cooperation, especially for a Friday, late in the
23 Mr. Donia, a couple of questions have been put to you in relation
24 to a -- well, whether or not Muslim reservists or recruits would not
25 respond to being called to the JNA. Do you know anything about it? The
1 questions did not give many information -- the answers to the question
2 didn't give many information, but do you know anything about it and what
3 do you know about it?
4 A. Yes. The SDA came to the conclusion in the summer of 1991 that it
5 was not going to support these mobilisations, which were quite frequent
6 and occurred at the level of various units. And in many individual
7 mobilisations, such as the one in the Bosnian Krajina in late June 1991,
8 the SDA leaders informally urged Muslim recruits not to join, but many of
9 them did in any case. The same situation prevailed in a mobilisation of
10 troops in Prijedor in September 1991, where the local SDS organisation
11 understood that the Sarajevo party was not opposed to the mobilisations,
12 and so essentially took no position.
13 And large numbers of Muslims participated in that mobilisation
14 and, in fact, the first casualty within that unit in Croatia was a Muslim.
15 So, for some time, the SDA general position in opposition to such
16 mobilisations had only modest effect on Muslim participation. However,
17 in -- I think it is September 29, 1991 -- they specifically requested
18 local units to ignore the mobilisations. In other words, they authorised
19 them to stand aside from the process. They never specifically prevented
20 or obstructed the participation in those mobilisations until after the
21 beginning of 1992.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, so I do understand that although you couldn't
23 agree with Ms. Pilipovic, that there was some factual basis in those
25 A. That's correct.
1 JUDGE ORIE: The next question about the 15th of October meeting,
2 it is not quite clear to me. It reads: "After the Assembly had been
3 adjourned for the day by its President and the Bosnian Serb delegates had
4 departed, HDZ and SDA delegates reconvened the session and passed the
5 declaration of sovereignty."
6 It doesn't say anything about the way it was reconvened. Were
7 the -- after the Assembly had been adjourned, were the Bosnian Serb
8 delegates informed about -- leave apart whether this could be done by the
9 HDZ and SDA delegates -- but were they informed about the reconvention of
10 the Assembly?
11 A. Apparently, they were not informed, no. It was a trick by the HDZ
12 and SDA delegates to reconvene.
13 JUDGE ORIE: That is clear. Then I -- have you explained to us,
14 in relation to, as far as I can see, the handwritten part even on the
15 B/C/S version on the meeting of the 14th of May that you said, well, the
16 meeting decided to implement the strategic goals or measures and therefore
17 they adopted them. Now, it might be a matter of language, but my first
18 question is: Do you find any specific reference to adopting the earlier,
19 two days earlier adopted, strategic goals by this meeting?
20 A. Only that they were listed by Mr. Mladic at the same meeting --
21 JUDGE ORIE: It reads that it was presented?
22 A. They were presented, and so I agree this is a matter of language,
23 and perhaps the formulation that's in the minutes is the best one to
24 accept. I find no further evidence than what you have in the document.
25 JUDGE ORIE: You also explain that implementing is even stronger
1 adopting. That was part of your testimony. And there we might come in
2 the field of language. It is my understanding, but please correct me if I
3 am wrong, that implementing a goal or a strategy could be done by a
4 subordinate - I am not talking about whether it's an army or a university
5 body or governmental body - could be implemented even if you would not
6 personally adopt the measures, but since you are under a duty to do so or
7 -- so I have some difficulty in understanding why implementing is even
8 stronger than adopting. But perhaps you could explain what you
9 specifically meant when you testified. Yes.
10 A. I would certainly not argue the point with you at all. To me
11 implementation suggests an immediate action to take steps to advance a
12 particular agenda or set of goals. Now, I think I would just, in general,
13 fall back on the context of the document and point out that it is clear
14 that everyone is in agreement about the basic steps to be taken, moving
15 forward here.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Would that also implicate in your opinion that -- I
17 mean, if you know how to implement a certain measure, does that
18 automatically mean that you would have taken that measure by yourself as
20 A. No, I think it does not. I would agree.
21 JUDGE ORIE: So, we have no difficulty any more as far as the
22 language is concerned. These were my questions.
23 Mr. Donia, it's late. It's Friday evening. You have answered,
24 well, not too many questions of the party who called you, but that is
25 because of the specific procedure under Rule 94 bis. So you had to answer
1 a lot of questions in cross-examination by Ms. Pilipovic. You answered
2 the questions of the Bench. I would like to thank you very much for
3 coming and giving those answers to this Chamber. It needs answers to
4 questions in order to perform its task. Thank you.
5 THE WITNESS: It's an honour, Mr. President
6 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much. We will then adjourn until
7 next Monday morning at 9.00.
8 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at
9 7.15, p.m., to be reconvened
10 on Monday, the 22nd day of April, 2002,
11 at 9.00 a.m.