1 Monday, 17 June 2002
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, could you please call the case.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honours. Good morning. This is case
7 number IT-98-29-T, the Prosecutor versus Stanislav Galic.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
9 After one week of recess, perhaps I should ask the parties
10 whether there is any specific issue they wanted to bring to the attention
11 of the Chamber.
12 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, at the close of last -- two weeks ago,
13 you requested that the Prosecution take all possible steps to ensure that
14 the evidence in the Prosecution case will be completed by the 2nd of
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
17 MR. IERACE: That process took place last week, and I am
18 reasonably confident that we can do that. I note that there are three
19 days set aside for Plenary session in that period and also a day for
20 court maintenance. I have spoken to the senior legal officer in chambers
21 to see if it is possible for at least the court maintenance date to be
22 shifted, and if we have that additional day, I think that would be
23 extremely useful since it falls on the Friday of the second last week of
24 this additional period. I am hopeful that that could be postponed for six
25 trial days so that it takes place during the break.
1 In any event, I anticipate that as soon as I have word back on
2 that, I can then submit a timetable for the entirety of the remaining
3 period and indicate precise dates for some, if not of all, the experts.
4 Thank you, Mr. President.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace, you also mentioned Plenary without
6 attaching any further expectation to that. Well, I noticed that you
7 brought to our attention that it was three days Plenary.
8 Mr. Piletta-Zanin, any specific issue? I see that Ms. Pilipovic
9 is not there. I hope that there is just a practical reason for that.
10 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you for asking that
11 question, Mr. President. It is that the planes are not always -- don't
12 always conveniently arrive on time and Ms. Pilipovic will arrive a little
13 later, perhaps at the end of the hearing. Thank you.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Then, looking at the last schedule, Mr. Ierace, I
15 notice that the next witness the Prosecution will call is Mr. Tucker.
16 MR. IERACE: Yes, Mr. President, and Mr. Waespi will take him.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Of course, the Chamber also noticed that there are
18 still two pending witnesses so we have to see where we can fit them in as
19 soon as possible because interruptions, although not always unavoidable,
20 of course should be limited to the extent necessary.
21 Then, Mr. Waespi, are you ready to call Mr. Tucker?
22 MR. WAESPI: Yes, we are, Mr. President.
23 JUDGE ORIE: May I then ask the usher to escort the witness into
24 the courtroom.
25 [The witness entered court]
1 WITNESS: PYERS WILLIAM TUCKER
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tucker, I presume?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is correct.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tucker, before giving testimony in this court,
5 the Rules of Procedure and Evidence require you to make a solemn
6 declaration that you will speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but
7 the truth. AND the text will be handed out to you now by the usher. May
8 I invite you to make that declaration.
9 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
10 whole truth and nothing but the truth.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please be seated, Mr. Tucker. You will
12 first be examined by counsel for the Prosecution.
13 Mr. Waespi, please proceed.
14 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
15 Examined by Mr. Waespi:
16 Q. Good morning, Mr. Tucker. Could you please state for the record
17 your full name?
18 A. My name is Pyers William Tucker.
19 Q. And perhaps if you could spell your first name.
20 A. It is P-y-e-r-s.
21 Q. And your nationality?
22 A. I am a UK citizen.
23 Q. Perhaps for practical reasons, if you could slow down while you
24 are talking, because we are talking the same language, and also watch the
25 screen in front of you and only answer my questions when you have seen
1 that the transcript has stopped moving.
2 Can you briefly tell us your military education, also
3 specifically mentioning your specialties in military training.
4 A. I am a British Army officer and I was trained at Sandhurst, which
5 is the officer training school, in 1976 and 1977. I was then commissioned
6 into the Royal Artillery and I served as a Royal Artillery officer in
7 Germany, Canada, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, and all around the world in
8 other locations. I underwent artillery training at the Royal School of
9 Artillery in 1997 and 1984 and 1986, and conducted concentrations of
10 artillery fire on exercise in Germany and in Canada and in the United
11 Kingdom. I also served in Northern Ireland in an infantry role when my
12 artillery units underwent three months training in order to serve their
13 infantry role.
14 Q. Thank you, Mr. Tucker. Did you also have experiences as a
16 A. Yes, I was a skilled marksman and I competed at Bisley, which is
17 the top British marksmanship competition.
18 Q. Did you serve in the former Yugoslavia?
19 A. I served in the former Yugoslavia in 1992 and 1993, in 1995 and
20 1996 and 1997.
21 Q. Turning to the first period, 1992, 1993, when exactly were you
22 deployed in the former Yugoslavia?
23 A. I arrived in Belgrade around the middle of October 1992 and then
24 deployed into Sarajevo on the 25th, 26th of October, and I then left
25 Sarajevo on the -- at the very end of March. I think it was about the
1 31st of March, 1993.
2 Q. In what function did you serve in Sarajevo?
3 A. I was appointed as the military assistant to General
4 Philippe Morillon, and that means it was my responsibility to accompany
5 the General to all the meetings that he went to. And those were meetings
6 with the military and political leaders of all three warring factions and
7 the political and military leaders of Serbia, that is, the country with
8 capital Belgrade, and to Croatia, the country with capital Zagreb. At
9 these meetings, it was my responsibility to take the minutes of those
10 meetings and write the -- draft the reports from those meetings for
11 General Morillon to approve and sign and send on to HQ UNPROFOR in Zagreb,
12 to New York, or to other military commands as appropriate.
13 Q. When you say that you accompanied General Morillon to see
14 military leaders, what type of military leaders? What level were these
16 A. General Morillon dealt with the senior military leaders of all
17 three sides, that is, on the Bosnian Serb side, particularly with General
18 Mladic; on the Bosniak side, particularly with General Halilovic; and on
19 the Bosnian Croat side, it was with Brigadier General Patkovic and
20 sometimes with their immediate junior, immediate subordinate officer.
21 Q. In the course of your duties, were you involved in drafting
22 written protests to the Bosnian Serb side?
23 A. I was involved with --
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
25 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. I
1 believe that this is a particular leading question because it would imply
2 that the protests would only be addressed to one party, that is the Serb
3 party. Perhaps one could ask a question to find out whether protests were
4 addressed to all parties.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Would you please first ask in general terms whether
6 any involvement in drafting protests was part of the job of the witness.
7 MR. WAESPI: Yes, I will. Thank you, Mr. President.
8 Q. Mr. Tucker, was part of your duties and responsibilities to draft
9 written protests to all warring factions?
10 A. Yes, it was.
11 Q. Can you give us examples for these written protests.
12 A. General Morillon was only involved with written protests about the
13 most serious of events, of incidents, and the more general day-to-day ones
14 were handled by the headquarters of Sector Sarajevo for events around
15 Sarajevo and by the headquarters of Bosnia-Herzegovina command, for
16 instance, outside Sarajevo. Examples of instances where I drafted
17 protests were when General Morillon's headquarters in Sarajevo were
18 shelled and mortared on the 24th and 25th of December, 1992. And in that
19 instance, after the research and investigation that I carried out, it was
20 our belief that the first of those attacks was carried out by forces
21 within Sarajevo, and on that instance, the protest was addressed to
22 President Izetbegovic. Another example was when some outgoing fire had
23 come from the Kosevo hospital, mortar fire, and the retaliatory Serb
24 artillery fire came in and some of it was landing very close to
25 General Morillon's headquarters, which was about 400 metres from Kosevo
1 hospital, which is why we became aware of this particular shelling.
2 And in that instance, the protest was addressed to General Mladic
3 in Pale.
4 Q. Just one brief clarification on what you said. You mentioned that
5 in relation to the Kosevo hospital, there was some outgoing fire that had
6 come from the Kosevo hospital. Was that within the hospital or within the
7 compounds of the hospital area? Do you know more about where the mortars
8 were located that fired?
9 A. On that particular incident, we had reports of fire coming out of
10 the hospital area. I do not have more specific information. But I do
11 have specific information that there was a unit of Bosniak mortar who went
12 into the middle of Kosevo hospital and fired salvos of mortars out of
13 Kosevo hospital, and this was witnessed by a British Army Royal Engineer
14 sergeant who was delivering diesel fuel to the Kosevo hospital, and he saw
15 these people firing because he arrived earlier than expected at the
17 This was a tactic which was used on a number of occasions in order
18 to invite retaliatory fire by the Serbs, which would then land on the
19 hospital and the area around it.
20 Q. And again, Mr. Tucker, when you say that the mortar went into the
21 middle of Kosevo hospital, was it placed within the building or was it
22 placed outside the building but on the ground within the hospital area?
23 A. It was obviously not in the building, in a building, because it
24 wouldn't be able to fire. The description of the sergeant was that it was
25 a mortar on the back of a truck, which allowed it to be moved quickly from
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 location to location.
2 Q. Now, Mr. Tucker, when you arrived in Sarajevo, how was the
3 situation? Can you tell us your impressions you had?
4 A. When I arrived in Sarajevo at the end of October 1992, I found a
5 city with a population which was in shock. They were very anxious and
6 very afraid. The city was surrounded by hostile forces who prevented food
7 -- they had cut water supplies, electricity supplies, gas supplies.
8 There was a shortage of food. And later, in the winter, with the cold and
9 the lack of heating, the situation was desperate.
10 Life in Sarajevo was very unpleasant for these people. There were
11 daily random shelling of various parts of the city. There was constant
12 sniper fire and there were intense periods of small arms and artillery
13 fire around the perimeter from time to time as attacks by one side or the
14 other continued. It was a horrible situation.
15 Q. You told us about random fire. From which side of the
16 confrontation line and who was responsible for this fire you have
17 described as random?
18 A. When I arrived in Sarajevo, there were two types of incoming
19 fire. There was concentrated fire, in other words, multiple shells
20 landing in a short space of time in a particular area. The second type
21 of fire was single shells landing arbitrarily around the city, to no
22 identifiable purpose.
23 Q. When you talk about no identifiable purpose, can you put that into
24 relation to civilian targets and military targets?
25 A. When I described the concentrated fire, that was usually --
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
2 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone counsel, please. Microphone,
4 JUDGE ORIE: Would you please use your microphone.
5 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes. I need to intervene for
6 the transcript. I thought that I heard in the French booth that there
7 were no local targets, but that is not what the witness said, because the
8 witness was saying that he wasn't seeing a particular target or particular
9 objective of these shellings, of single shelling because there were
10 multiple shellings as well. I think he spoke -- he couldn't see the
11 purpose. I don't think we were talking about the targeting. I think
12 that's -- for the purpose of the French booth.
13 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...listen to the
14 French channel, but I am certain that proper care will be taken that the
15 French transcript is correct in this respect. Thank you for your
17 Please proceed, Mr. Waespi.
18 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
19 Q. I had asked you to clarify what you meant by, and I quote, "no
20 identifiable purpose," whether you could put that into relation to
21 military or civilian targets.
22 A. It was not to any military purpose. These were shells which were
23 just landing somewhere within Sarajevo. In other words, in the built-up
24 areas, civilian areas. They were not fired at during any attacks or to
25 defend. They simply were fired into the city.
1 Q. Let me turn to negotiations you had or you attended with warring
2 parties. Did you have an occasion to meet General Mladic? I think you
3 said initially in the beginning that you in fact accompanied
4 General Morillon to meetings with General Mladic.
5 A. That is correct. I met General Mladic on quite a few occasions.
6 Q. Now, when was it the first time you met with General Mladic?
7 A. I believe it was around the 27th of October, 27th, 28th of October
9 Q. Do you recall what the subject of this meeting was, what was
10 discussed during that meeting?
11 A. That was the first meeting between General Morillon, the newly
12 appointed commander of the UN forces in Bosnia, with General Mladic, the
13 commander of the Bosnian Serb forces, obviously in Bosnia.
14 General Morillon had a number of agenda items. The first was to introduce
15 himself and explain what his objectives were. Secondly, to seek
16 agreement to the deployment of CanBat, that is the 2nd Canadian battalion,
17 into the Banja Luka area. Thirdly, it was to seek a ceasefire
18 throughout Bosnia. Fourthly, it was to seek an improvement to the
19 utilities, that is, gas, water, electricity, into Sarajevo.
20 General Mladic, for his side, made a very strong statement that
21 Republika Srpska was a reality. It existed, had people, customs, forces
22 and authority, and that all communications with them had to be directed to
23 authorities as members of the government of Republika Srpska.
24 Any letters which were not addressed in that manner would be
25 ignored and returned to sender. He also made a strong point, saying that
1 he was only a military commander and that he carried out the instructions
2 of his government and that he did not have the authority, for example, to
3 approve the deployment of CanBat 2.
4 Q. Did General Mladic, at that meeting, also express his thoughts
5 about the military situation in and of Sarajevo?
6 A. Yes, he did. And I have here the notes that I made at the time.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps you should not at the very moment, until
8 being invited to do so, consult any notes, Mr. Tucker. So please wait and
9 see what Mr. Waespi will ask you. If it will be necessary to consult
10 them, then please first ask the Court permission to do so. Yes.
11 MR. WAESPI:
12 Q. Mr. Tucker, if you need to consult them, with leave of the Court,
13 you can do so. If you are able to do that without the notes, that would
14 be preferable or fine as well.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
16 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes. I would like to just use
17 this opportunity: In English transcript, 10.18, it should be mentioned
18 CanBat 2, and that doesn't appear in the transcript
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, it is my recollection that in earlier instances,
20 the witness was referring to CanBat 2.
21 MR. WAESPI: If I could have a minute, Mr. President, to consult
22 with Mr. Ierace, Mr. President.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
24 [Prosecution counsel confer]
25 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
1 Q. If you can do without the notes, that would be preferable,
2 whether you recall the --
3 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I think if --
4 it is all very well to say that if we can do without the notes, that is
5 fine, but not with the notes.
6 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...in order to make
7 clear that you are not consulting your notes, perhaps you better close
8 them. That is what Mr. Piletta-Zanin would like to see done.
9 Please proceed, Mr. Waespi.
10 MR. WAESPI:
11 Q. Yes. Perhaps, Mr. Tucker, have you shown these notes to the
12 Prosecution? Are these notes you gave copies to the Prosecution
14 A. Sorry, I don't understand the question.
15 Q. Sorry, I was not clear enough. Have you given these notes to
16 members of the Office of the Prosecutor previously?
17 A. Yes, that is correct.
18 Q. When was that?
19 A. About a year and a half ago.
20 Q. And do you recall the names of the persons you have given these
22 A. Yes. Caroline Edgerton.
23 Q. Thank you very much. So perhaps, having closed your notes, you
24 can answer my question about the comments General Mladic made about the
25 military situation in Sarajevo, how he saw his policy in relation to
1 Sarajevo, then please answer.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
3 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, just to be
4 clear on these matters, considering that this witness practically already
5 consulted his notes, perhaps we could ask him if he has already seen his
6 answer in the notes. Perhaps he has already consulted his notes.
7 JUDGE ORIE: I don't know whether he consulted his notes. I saw
8 him opening a binder.
9 Please proceed, Mr. Waespi.
10 MR. WAESPI:
11 Q. Yes, Mr. Tucker, can you please answer my question?
12 A. General Mladic made a number of points regarding Sarajevo. He
13 said that there were two solutions to Sarajevo. The first was that
14 Sarajevo was split in two and that the Bosniaks stayed in the old city and
15 that UNPROFOR provided a separation force to keep the two sides apart.
16 The second solution was for the Bosniaks to surrender all their
17 arms and weapons to UNPROFOR and for UNPROFOR to guarantee that no fire,
18 no shooting, would occur against Serbs. And General Mladic then laughed
19 and said, "There is, of course, a third solution and that is for them to
20 surrender, but then I don't think that is what they will do."
21 Q. Did General Mladic use the example of another city to explain what
22 he meant?
23 A. General Mladic, for the splitting of Sarajevo, used the example
24 of Berlin.
25 Q. Now, after this meeting, was there any military operation which
1 followed and which reminded you of this meeting you had?
2 A. About two or three days later, there came a major attack by the
3 Bosnian Serb forces surrounding Sarajevo in which they tried for the last
4 time to capture Sarajevo or, more specifically, to cut it in half. They
5 attacked from the north and the south just to the west of the old city and
6 this was a very fierce and sustained attack, using infantry and heavy
8 But the sustained defence by the Bosniaks prevented them from
9 making much progress.
10 Q. How long did this military operation last for?
11 A. It lasted for two days.
12 Q. And do you recall the date the operation started or how long it
13 was after the meeting you had with General Mladic?
14 A. It was on the 31st of October and I can't recall, without
15 referring to my notes that I made at the time, whether it was the 1st of
16 November or the 30th October as well.
17 Q. Thank you, Mr. Tucker.
18 Were you involved in negotiations about the departure of Serb and
19 Croatian citizens from Sarajevo?
20 A. I was not personally involved in these negotiations but became
21 aware of them, firstly, because of reports from headquarter Sector
22 Sarajevo, which had been involved with these negotiations before
23 General Morillon and I arrived in Sarajevo. And secondly, because Dr.
24 Ganic, a member of the Bosniak Presidency, told General Morillon about
25 these negotiations.
1 Q. Can you be a little bit more specific about the contents of these
3 A. These negotiations were about the evacuation of several thousand
4 Croats from Sarajevo to Split and several thousand Serbs to Belgrade,
5 using buses provided by Sarajevo.
6 Q. At one time, was there an intervention from the Bosnian Serb side?
7 A. We were told by headquarters Sector Sarajevo around the 4th, 5th
8 of November, 1992, that Colonel Zarkovic, a Bosnian Serb colonel, had
9 sent a message saying that if the Serb convoy was not allowed to leave
10 the city by 1300 hours that day, that he would shell the city.
11 General Morillon had a meeting with Dr. Ganic that morning and
12 Dr. Ganic told General Morillon the same thing, in other words, that the
13 Presidency had received a message from Colonel Zarkovic saying what I
14 have just described.
15 Q. Can you tell us who Dr. Ganic was and then who Colonel Zarkovic
17 A. Dr. Ganic was the vice-president of the Presidency in Sarajevo.
18 And Colonel Zarkovic was a senior commander of Bosnian Serb forces
19 surrounding Sarajevo who attended many of the negotiations which General
20 Morillon had with commanders on the Bosnian Serb side.
21 Q. Now you told us that, and I quote you: "He," meaning Colonel
22 Zarkovic, "would shell the city." By "shelling the city," what is meant?
23 A. My understanding was that this was a threat and the execution of
24 the threat implied the firing of artillery shells at random into Sarajevo,
25 in other words, at the civilian population in Sarajevo.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Q. Mr. Tucker, did you have a chance to meet General Galic?
2 A. Yes, I met General Galic on a number of occasions. The first
3 particular occasion was on the 14th of November, 1992, when
4 General Morillon wanted to meet General Mladic, but General Mladic was
5 heavily involved with an emergency in the Trevinje area in south-east
6 where Croatian forces were attacking into Bosnia. So General Mladic
7 requested General Morillon meet General Galic instead.
8 Q. Thank you, Mr. Tucker.
9 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, I would like to show a document to
10 the witness, and since it is a protected document, we should, with your
11 leave, turn into closed session.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If you want to question the witness about it
13 and if it will be shown, then it is preferable to go into closed session.
14 [Closed session]
12 Redacted – Closed Session – Pages 9910-9918
10 [Open session]
11 MR. WAESPI: Mr. --
12 JUDGE ORIE: I see it confirmed on my screen that we are now in
13 open session again. Please proceed.
14 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
15 Q. Mr. Tucker, did you have occasions to attend meetings which
16 included Lord Owen?
17 A. Yes, I did.
18 Q. And when was that?
19 A. General Morillon and I met with Lord Owen at the beginning of
20 December, together with Vance in Split. The second time was for about
21 four or five days, from around the 17th or 18th of December at 1992, when
22 Lord Owen stayed at the residency with General Morillon in Sarajevo.
23 Q. Do you recall what was said between General Mladic -- between
24 General Morillon, Lord Owen, and the parties they talked to?
25 A. There was much which was said between particularly Lord Owen and
1 General Mladic, but the most memorable event was when Lord Owen chastised
2 General Mladic and told him that the shelling of Sarajevo was an absolute
3 disgrace and had to stop. General Mladic went red in the face, stood up
4 and shouted and banged the table. And Lord Owen talked to Mladic in a
5 schoolmasterly fashion, talking to a little boy.
6 It was only when Professor Koljevic intervened and changed the
7 subject that tempers calmed.
8 Q. Do you recall similar exchanges about this subject between General
9 Morillon and General Mladic?
10 A. Yes. General Morillon on many occasions said to General Mladic
11 and to Karadzic that history would judge the Serbs and their actions by
12 the way that he used his artillery and that he had to understand this and
13 that it was in his own interests to stop his artillery from firing into
14 cities and towns and at civilians.
15 This was something which General Morillon said on many occasions
16 and something to which General Mladic usually responded by saying
17 something along the lines of his heavy weapons being equivalent to the
18 Bosniak infantry. His forces had few infantry but many heavy weapons,
19 whereas the Bosniaks had a lot of infantry but few heavy weapons.
20 Q. Just to clarifying three names which you mentioned, what were the
21 positions of Lord Owen, Mr. Vance and Professor Koljevic?
22 A. Lord Owen and Mr. Vance were members of a party seeking to assist
23 the warring factions in the former Yugoslavia find an agreement under
24 which they could live together in peace. Professor Koljevic was a member
25 of the Serb Presidency and an advisor to Dr. Karadzic.
1 Q. Thank you, Mr. Tucker.
2 Was there an attempt by the Bosnian Muslim army to break out of
3 Sarajevo, which you observed?
4 A. Yes. The Bosniaks carried out a major offensive at the beginning
5 of December 1992 to try and break the siege of Sarajevo. They carried
6 out a pincer attack from Otes and Stup from Ilidza and from Butmir
7 from the other side. Simultaneously, they carried out a number of other
8 attacks from inside Sarajevo in order to confuse the Serb -- the Bosnian
9 Serb forces and to prevent them from being able to focus their defence in
10 the area where their main effort was, which was Ilidza.
11 The fighting lasted a couple of weeks and was very intense with
12 vicious house-to-house fighting and the use of many heavy weapons. The
13 attack caught the Bosnian Serb army by surprise and the Bosniaks initially
14 made some progress. Once the Bosnian Serbs was able to bring
15 reinforcements and professional infantry and tanks and heavy weapons to
16 the area, the Bosnian Serbs carried out a sustained series of attacks and
17 captured Otes and part of Stup, pushing the Bosniaks back from where they
18 had originally started.
19 Q. How did they do that, the Bosnian Serb army? What were you able
20 to observe from your sources?
21 A. The Bosnian Serb army used classical housefighting tactics with
22 small groups of well-trained infantry with the support of heavy fire-power
23 provided by tanks, artillery, and mortars, and fought their way, house by
24 house, through Otes and halfway through Stup.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi, we are close to 10.30. If you can find a
1 suitable moment to interrupt.
2 MR. WAESPI: I think that will be one, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE ORIE: We will adjourn until 11.00.
4 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
5 --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Ms. Pilipovic. I am glad to see that
7 you did arrive.
8 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE ORIE: I have been informed already about the practical
10 problems that kept you out of this courtroom.
11 Mr. Waespi, please proceed.
12 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
13 Q. Mr. Tucker, just before we broke for the recess, you talked about
14 the events at Otes the beginning of December and you described that the
15 Bosnian Serbs used infantry but also other weapons such as artillery.
16 Can you describe the role of artillery? Did they support the infantry or
17 also had they a role on their own?
18 A. The artillery was used in two ways. Firstly, it was used in the
19 immediate support of the attacks by the Bosnian Serb infantry, but the
20 artillery was also used firing all over the city at targets which had
21 nothing to do with the actual attack which had been carried out by the
22 Bosniak forces. The impression that we gained was that the purpose of
23 this shelling was in order to intimidate, firstly, the population of
24 Sarajevo in general and to break their will to resist; and secondly, in
25 order to intimidate the Presidency of Alija Izetbegovic and break their
1 will to resist.
2 Q. This observation, did you make it only at the occasion of these
3 events around Otes in early December 1992 or also at other times?
4 A. No, this was a tactic which was used by the Bosnian Serb forces
5 throughout the time that I was in Sarajevo, and it was as follows: A
6 Bosniak infantry attack would commence in a particular area. The attack,
7 if it was successful, would gain some ground because the Bosnian Serb
8 perimeter was not held by nearly as many soldiers as the Bosniaks had.
9 The Bosnian Serb army would use artillery tanks, armoured vehicles, heavy
10 machine-guns, anti-aircraft guns used in the ground fire drill in order to
11 stabilise the situation and then push back the Bosniaks. They would then
12 carry out what we would describe as punitive shelling of the area of the
13 city out of which the infantry attack had been mounted, and this was
14 something we observed time and time again. And the sense that we had
15 about this was that it was, again, to punish the citizens in the area from
16 which the attack had come and to demonstrate how useless it was to resist.
17 Q. On Christmas Eve 1992, were you in Sarajevo?
18 A. Yes, I was.
19 Q. And what did you observe?
20 A. On Christmas Eve, I was standing outside the Residency together
21 with a couple of other staff officers from General Morillon's headquarters
22 and suddenly, at midnight, every single artillery gun, mortar, tank,
23 machine-gun, around Sarajevo started firing in a huge
24 barrage into Sarajevo for about 20 minutes.
25 For example --
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
2 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes. I have to intervene for
3 a question of interpretation. I don't think that what was the -- that
4 there was no barrage fire but it was barrage type of shooting.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I take it that this will be properly reflected
6 now in the transcript.
7 Please proceed.
8 THE WITNESS: This fire was coordinated and all started at one
9 moment, and a huge amount of ammunition was expended. It looked like a
10 fireworks demonstration, there was that much ammunition fired, except that
11 this was a lethal fireworks demonstration. I am an artillery officer and
12 I know how much coordination it takes in order to arrange for so many
13 weapons in so many different locations to be manned at midnight on
14 Christmas Eve, to have the artillery ammunition in place, to have the
15 targets coordinated in order to achieve what was carried out that evening.
16 For example, there was a 40-millimetre Bofors anti-aircraft gun
17 positioned above the Residency, and the gunner of this gun fired,
18 boom-boom, boom-boom-boom, boom-boom. Boom-boom, boom-boom-boom,
19 boom-boom. Each time, a 40-millimetre shell being fired into the city for
20 20 minutes in that rhythm.
21 MR. WAESPI:
22 Q. In your opinion or your observations, did these weapon systems
23 engage any military targets or not?
24 A. There were very few military targets in Sarajevo which could be
25 engaged by heavy weapons. These weapons fired at civilian targets at
1 random across the length and breath of the city.
2 Q. Just to make it clear, which army did these weapons systems belong
3 to which were active on Christmas Eve, 1992?
4 A. These weapons were firing from the mountains and high ground
5 around Sarajevo, and the impacts of the weapons were inside Sarajevo and,
6 therefore, could only have been weapons of the Bosnian Serb army.
7 Q. And also in terms of clarifications, you already touched upon this
8 issue of coordination, but can you pronounce on the role of the commanders
9 to initiate or supervise or coordinate such an action, perhaps discussing
10 commanders at the higher level?
11 A. The usage of such large amounts of ammunition had to have been
12 approved at a fairly high level. To arrange for the gun crews to have
13 all the transport necessary, to arrange for them to be on the gun
14 positions at that unusual time in order to be able to fire this -- I will
15 not use the word "barrage" -- this concentration of fire, can only have
16 been carried out by the order of, and with the approval of, the senior
17 most commanders of the Bosnian Serb army surrounding Sarajevo.
18 The communications required in order to coordinate this can only
19 have passed through the headquarters of the Bosnian Serb forces
20 surrounding Sarajevo.
21 Q. The actual date of this event, you said Christmas Eve. What date
22 is that?
23 A. That is using the Christian calendar. That is the 24th of
24 December, and I am not familiar -- I can't recall the terminology, but it
25 is not the Greek Orthodox calendar that I am using.
1 Q. Did you have a chance to observe a similar event later?
2 A. Yes. A similar event happened on the Christmas Eve according to
3 the Greek Orthodox calendar, which was on the 7th of January of 1993,
4 which was the 24th of December according to the Greek Orthodox calendar.
5 Q. And was it exactly the same 20-minute operation or was it any
6 different in time or manner than what you have described earlier?
7 A. It was a very similar event.
8 Q. Thank you, Mr. Tucker.
9 MR. WAESPI: If the witness can be shown the next exhibit, which
10 is 530, please.
11 Q. Do you recognise this document?
12 A. Yes, I do.
13 Q. Can you tell us what it is about?
14 A. This document was drafted by headquarters Bosnia-Herzegovina
15 command in Kiseljak for the mixed military working group, which was a
16 meeting which occurred regularly at headquarters -- at -- usually at the
17 airport between two or three of the warring factions, with the purpose of
18 trying to bring about a ceasefire around Sarajevo, freedom of movement for
19 civilians and the repair of utilities and the resumption of normal living.
20 This agreement was one of the agreements reached in the mixed military
21 working group and it agreed corridors for the freedom of movement of
22 civilians around Sarajevo and into and out of Sarajevo.
23 Q. Thank you, Mr. Tucker. The date this agreement --
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
25 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, considering the
1 period of the recess that we had, it seems that we did not receive the
2 Serbian translations of this document. It may have happened that we
3 received them in the pigeon hole very recently, but we were not able to
4 check this. So perhaps if the Prosecution could give us these
5 translations so that at least General Galic could try and follow.
6 JUDGE ORIE: This version has been disclosed on the 3rd of June,
7 which would mean a bit more than 10 days ago.
8 MR. WAESPI: Yes, this is correct, Mr. President, on the 3rd of
9 June, before potential exhibits were disclosed in B/C/S. But I am sure we
10 can find a copy.
11 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you in advance.
12 MR. WAESPI: Yes, in fact, I do have a copy which could be handed
13 to the Defence.
14 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, indeed.
15 MR. WAESPI: You are welcome.
16 Q. Mr. Tucker, if you could assist us with the date of this agreement
17 and also the parties who eventually signed the agreement.
18 A. This agreement was signed on the 13th of December, 1992, and the
19 parties who signed it were Colonel Siber on behalf of the Bosniak
20 Presidency, by General Gvero on behalf of the Bosnian Serb forces, and by
21 Dario Kordic on behalf of the HVO, the Bosnian Croatian forces.
22 Q. What was the position of General Gvero?
23 A. General Gvero played a subordinate role to General Mladic and
24 deputised for General Mladic on numerous occasions.
25 Q. Perhaps if you could turn to the second page on that document, it
1 is the number, usual eight-digit number 00095017, and I see that the first
2 two lines talks about the Security Council Resolution 787. How much of a
3 role played these Security Council resolutions in your work?
4 A. The Security Council resolutions were effectively known as that of
5 UNPROFORs' senior orders and instructions and mission statements. And we
6 attempted to carry out the United Nations forces' part of the
7 responsibility to support the implementation of the Security Council
9 Q. Was that a frequent topic among the parties in discussions or
10 negotiations, the existence of Security Council resolutions?
11 A. Yes. Security Council resolutions were always mentioned,
12 particularly when a new Security Council resolution had just been made.
13 Q. So are you saying the parties were aware of the existence of the
14 Security Council resolutions?
15 A. Absolutely. For example, General Mladic made a big play of
16 Security Council resolutions requiring forces outside of Bosnia to be
17 either removed from Bosnia and to play no part in Bosnia in his arguments
18 that the Croatian forces in Bosnia, that is forces of the Republic of
19 Croatia, in the south-east of Bosnia, near Trebinje and in the north of
20 Bosnia by the river Sava, had to be removed from Bosnia, and why was the
21 international community and the Security Council not condemning Croatia
22 for failing to implement those Security Council resolutions
23 JUDGE ORIE: Before we continue, Mr. Waespi, may I ask you for one
24 clarification. The documents P350 consist of five pages. We just heard
25 that this was an agreement between the parties. I find one page with the
1 words "the mixed military working group," at least where it starts with,
2 and another page that is "Agreement: Freedom of movement linked with the
3 safety of the airport." I see both of these pages -- one's signed by what
4 seems to me Dario Kordic. I see both pages signed by Gvero. And then if
5 it comes to Siber Stjepan, I just see one of these pages that is
6 "Agreement of freedom of movement for civilians linked with the safety of
7 the airport." You didn't ask any questions about that.
8 Is that still to come or -- it is a bit of a puzzle to us, at
9 least to me, but perhaps to the other members of the Chamber, why we find
10 two signed pages by two of the parties but only one signed page by the
11 third party.
12 MR. WAESPI:
13 Q. Perhaps, Mr. Tucker, if you could assist --
14 JUDGE ORIE: If am too early but --
15 MR. WAESPI:
16 Q. If you could assist His Honour in clarifying these issues.
17 JUDGE ORIE: You see, the first page seems to be signed by
18 Siber Stjepan, that is the agreement. Then the second page of the
19 document, which is mixed military working group, signed by Gvero, and then
20 the next page is again the agreement, which seems to be the same document
21 as the one signed by Siber Stjepan, also signed by Gvero. And then we
22 have these two documents signed by Kordic. Why is there only one page
23 signed by Siber Stjepan or --
24 THE WITNESS: I have no idea. He signed both and as did the
25 others, and I have no idea why.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Why we only have five pages instead of six. So it
2 is still a puzzle for us.
3 MR. WAESPI:
4 Q. If I may move to another subject, Mr. Tucker, that is the crossing
5 of the people of the airport. Do you have any knowledge about people
6 crossing the airport?
7 A. Yes. The airport was handed over by the Bosnian Serbs to the
8 United Nations during the summer under something that was known as "the
9 Airport Agreement," which stipulated that the airport was only to be used
10 by the United Nations and United Nations' personnel for United Nations
12 Now, the airport was also like the cork in the bottle of the siege
13 around Sarajevo. In other words, if you were a Bosniak and you could get
14 to the airport settlements and you then were able to cross the airport to
15 Butmir, you would not pass through Serb military lines. Now, in the
16 winter, and in particular in January and February when it was coldest,
17 there was no heating, food was short, the shelling was continuing, the
18 snipering was continuing and morale amongst the civilians in Sarajevo was
19 very low, many Bosniaks tried to go to the airport settlement, wait until
20 it was dark, and then tried to run across the airport to Butmir.
21 Now, the French Battalion stationed at the airport had the very
22 unpleasant responsibility of protecting the airport and preventing
23 unauthorised use of the airport, which included preventing the civilians
24 from running across it. About 200 French soldiers, every night, spent all
25 night driving up and down the airport in their vehicles, trying to catch
1 these civilians and taking them back to where they came from, which almost
2 in all cases was back to the airport settlements.
3 Now the French Battalion reported every day how many people they
4 had caught and returned back to the airport settlements, and these figures
5 were a very powerful indicator, barometer, of the state of morale of the
6 city. Another aspect of these civilians trying to run across the airport
7 was that the Bosnian Serbs had set up snipers with nightsights and
8 machine-guns with nightsights and they fired at the civilians trying to
9 run across the airport. And in January and February, every
10 night, between 5 and 20 or 30 civilians were killed or injured by these
11 snipers. And the Serb snipers were not particularly careful about who
12 they fired at and they also killed and injured a number of the French
13 soldiers who were trying to round up the escaping civilians to return
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 line 1 until up to line 8, please.
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please proceed.
4 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Your Honours.
5 Q. Please continue without naming particular individuals.
6 A. I apologise. The second source of information was the daily
7 situation report --
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
9 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I apologise,
10 but this way of intervening with the witness doesn't seem very honest
11 because if the witness has people to name --
12 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...mentioning names
13 as such, there is nothing wrong with that. But if you guide the witness
14 in such a way that if you expect that a name would be mentioned which
15 might be the name of a protected witness, that you then refer the witness
16 not to mention at that specific moment, the name. So if questions are
17 more generally put to the witness, we cannot ask him not to mention any
18 names, but if it comes to a specific source, then you could perhaps guide
19 the witness, Mr. Waespi.
20 MR. WAESPI: Thank you. I do apologise.
21 Q. Please, Mr. Tucker.
22 A. The second source was the daily situation reports completed by
23 headquarters Sector Sarajevo, which reported what had happened at the
24 airport and gave the statistics of how many Bosniaks had been caught and
25 returned because this was a subject of great concern to General Morillon.
1 Q. Thank you, Mr. Tucker. I have a couple of more issues before we
2 conclude. The first one is --
3 MR. WAESPI: I would like the witness to be shown Exhibit number
5 Q. This is a press clipping dated 9th January, 1993, and I would like
6 you, Mr. Tucker, to read out on the last page of this three-page document,
7 the first three paragraphs.
8 A. On page M0009244?
9 Q. Exactly.
10 A. At the top of the page, I read: "Mr. Turajlic was pronounced dead
11 on arrival. All seven bullets had hit his body, three of them in the
12 chest, according to a UN official. General Morillon said he was told
13 that Bosnian Serb authorities arrested the soldier who killed
14 Mr. Turajlic. General Morillon demanded the disciplining of General
15 Stanislav Galic, who commands the Bosnian Serb Lukavica Corps. General
16 Morillon said the size and fire-power of the force at the roadblock
17 indicated General Galic must have sent it."
18 Q. Thank you, Mr. Tucker. Can you in all briefness explain to us
19 what this incident about Mr. Turajlic was about?
20 A. This incident was started by the arrival in Sarajevo airport of a
21 Turkish Air Force C-130 Hercules which carried on board five tonnes of
22 humanitarian aid, and we understand some senior Turkish government
23 officials and some Turkish paratroops. For some reason, the UNHCR air
24 bridge had accepted the offer of this aircraft from the Turkish
25 government in order to deliver humanitarian aid. This was something
1 which had not happened before and the UNHCR had not previously accepted
2 the use of any Turkish aircraft because of the danger of accusations of
3 partiality. Nonetheless, this aircraft arrived. Unbeknown to the United
4 Nations, Mr. Turajlic had climbed on board the shuttle armoured personnel
5 carrier, which carried cleaners from inside the city to Sarajevo airport.
6 Q. If I can stop you just briefly. Who was Mr. Turajlic?
7 A. Mr. Turajlic was the deputy prime minister, I believe, of the
8 Bosniak Presidency in Sarajevo. He was a senior government official.
9 Mr. Turajlic had boarded this bus, an armoured personnel carrier,
10 with cleaners in the morning who were taken to Sarajevo airport and then
11 brought back in the evening. He had not been notified to the United
12 Nations as a senior government official because normally, when they do
13 that, we provide an escort to ensure their safe movements to or from the
15 What happened at the airport was that the Turkish paratroops
16 fanned out and surrounded the Turkish Air Force aircraft, and Mr. Turajlic
17 had a meeting with the Turkish government delegation. I say again, all
18 this was without the knowledge of the United Nations. Mr Turajlic then
19 climbed back aboard the shuttle bus with the cleaners in order to go
20 back into Sarajevo, but by this time, the Bosnian Serb forces around
21 Sarajevo, having seen a Turkish aircraft land, having seen Turkish
22 paratroopers dismount from the aircraft, were clearly very suspicious and
23 they dispatched a strong force to block the road between Sarajevo airport
24 and the city. And they stopped every single UN vehicle coming from the
25 airport and demanded to inspect the inside of the vehicle because they
1 believed that weapons, ammunition, personnel, may have been being smuggled
2 into Sarajevo.
3 Q. If I can just stop you there for one moment. You don't need to go
4 into too much detail about this incident. If the Defence wants to do
5 that, they are welcome. I also would like you not to again mention any
6 specific names.
7 A. The force which carried out the block and which then led
8 subsequently to the tragic killing of Mr. Turajlic inside the back of the
9 UN armoured vehicle, that force was professional Bosnian Serb army
10 soldiers and tanks and was larger than a company, and had to have been
11 commanded at least by a battalion commander, and could not have been
12 deployed, in General Morillon's opinion, without the explicit approval of
13 General Galic. And General Morillon, when he met with General Mladic
14 after the incident, demanded that, firstly, General Galic be disciplined
15 for this event, and secondly, that the Bosnian Serb soldier who had fired
16 the shots which killed Mr. Turajlic also be disciplined and subject to the
17 due processes of law.
18 Q. Have you heard anything back from General Mladic on the
19 fulfillment of the request General Morillon made?
20 A. General Morillon asked General Mladic on a number of occasions of
21 what had happened and what he had done. And regarding General Galic,
22 General Mladic gave no answer. And regarding the soldier who had killed
23 Turajlic, he said that he had taken that soldier into custody and that he
24 was a 19 year-old soldier, both of whose parents had been killed by the
25 other side - in other words, the Bosniaks - and that he was subject to
1 the discipline of the Bosnian Serb army, but he never informed us what
2 the outcome of that discipline was.
3 Q. Thank you, Mr. Tucker.
4 My last point refers to something you said earlier about the
5 incident at Kosevo hospital where Bosnian Muslim troops fired from that
6 compound. Did you have any information that Bosnian Muslim forces shelled
7 their own people?
8 A. I have had many conversations with many people about that. I have
9 not seen any hard evidence or reports to say that. I, however, have seen
10 what I would consider to be strong circumstantial evidence that that
11 happened on a number of occasions and that there were elements within the
12 Bosniak Presidency and the armed forces of the Republic of
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina who would certainly mentally and psychologically be
14 able to do that. An example was the calling of a press conference at the
15 Kosevo hospital, but this mobile mortar detachment fired out from Kosevo
16 hospital half an hour previously, resulting in a Serb counterbombardment,
17 despite knowing that they were shelling a hospital, as the journalists
18 were arriving for the press conference.
19 Q. Just to clarify, Mr. Tucker, you said you have seen -- I quote
20 you, "seen what I would consider to be strong circumstantial evidence."
21 But you said earlier that you have seen no reports. What kind of strong
22 circumstantial evidence was that? Did you ever attend a scene when that
24 A. No, I did not consider any scenes, however, I know that, for
25 example, in the case I have just described, that there was a mobile mortar
1 detachment which frequently fired out of Kosevo hospital, as witnessed by
2 the sergeant who I referred to earlier. And I know that the hospital was
3 usually shelled in response and that usually, whenever the Bosniaks fired
4 out of the city, the Serbs always tried to fire a counterbombardment in
5 order to punish and deter that from happening.
6 Another example which I witnessed myself was when the Bosniaks
7 positioned mortars immediately next to General Morillon's headquarters in
8 Sarajevo and then carried out 20 minutes of rapid fire and then quickly
9 moved away. In fact, that happened for the first time on the very first
10 night that we were in Sarajevo and happened a number of times thereafter.
11 And on each occasion, I immediately made contact with Dr. Ganic to protest
12 and tell him to get his army under control.
13 MR. WAESPI: I have no further questions, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Before giving the opportunity to the Defence to
15 cross-examine the witness, may I ask on one clarification. You have been
16 asked about the BiH military firing at their own people. All the examples
17 you have given were BiH firing soliciting for counterfire. Is that what
18 you said by "firing at your own people"?
19 You have told us this morning already about firing from the Kosevo
20 hospital and then it was under the heading of using hospital grounds to
21 fire from. And now you come with similar examples in response to a
22 question of firing at your own people. Does that mean that there was no
23 direct firing, but it was just a soliciting counterfiring to your own
24 people, or was there any direct fire from the BiH to their own people?
25 THE WITNESS: I do not have any hard evidence of them deliberately
1 firing at their own people. What I have just described is where they
2 carried out an action soliciting, as you say, of counterfire. I have
3 heard of two particular incidents when they actually allegedly fired at
4 their own people. One was at a funeral at -- at the big funeral, the big
5 cemetery north of Kosevo hospital, but that was before I arrived in
6 Sarajevo. And people from headquarters Sector Sarajevo, and I can name
7 them if you need, told me that they had carried out investigations, they
8 had actually had some people on the ground, and that they believed that
9 that fire had come from Bosniak forces. And there was a second incident
10 which was, I believe, called the first marketplace shelling, when a large
11 number of civilians were killed in the marketplace by a shell which came
12 into the marketplace. And, again, I have spoken with a number of people
13 about that, but I have no hard evidence to support that.
14 JUDGE ORIE: And no personal knowledge of that?
15 THE WITNESS: And no personal knowledge.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much for your clarification.
17 Ms. Pilipovic, is it you or will it be Mr. Piletta-Zanin who will
18 cross-examine the witness?
19 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it will be my
20 colleague, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Then please proceed, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
22 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
23 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, could I start
24 by asking the assistance of a technician because my computer which is in
25 front of me, as opposed to the other one, is not functioning and then
1 perhaps I could --
2 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...assist Mr.
3 Piletta-Zanin to have his computers functioning.
4 Please proceed, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
5 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
6 Cross-examined by Mr. Piletta-Zanin:
7 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, witness.
8 A. Good afternoon.
9 Q. I am going to ask you some questions immediately in relation -- in
10 relation to what you have just spoken of. You just said, sir, that you
11 could name people, those people who conducted investigations on one hand,
12 those involving firing on a funeral, and on the other hand, what you
13 called the incident, "the first marketplace incident."
14 A. That is correct.
15 Q. Could you please give me the names of the people who investigated,
16 on one hand, the incident at the funeral?
17 A. That was Major Jackson, a Canadian Army officer who was the
18 operations officer at HQ Sector Sarajevo. And secondly, Colonel
19 Bezkrocenko, who was the Chief of Staff of headquarters Sector Sarajevo.
20 Q. Could you spell the name of Colonel Bezkrocenko, please, so that
21 we can be absolutely certain about his name?
22 A. It is a Ukrainian name. By memory, it's B-e-z-r-o-u-c-h-e-n-k-o.
23 Q. Thank you, sir.
24 Sir, it is possible that I may interrupt you or ask you to stop.
25 That is not that I would want to be rude, that is just trying to gain
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 time. Thank you.
2 Now, could you please tell us the name, if you know, of the
3 people who investigated the second incident?
4 A. Major Itani, who is a Canadian artillery officer.
5 Q. Anyone else?
6 A. He is the only one who I believe was involved. There were
7 others. There were some senior noncommissioned officers from the British
8 Army, but I don't recall their names.
9 Q. Thank you very much. Now, sir, could you tell us the dates of
10 these two events, if you can remember.
11 A. The cemetery incident was before I arrived. I would guess it was
12 about August or September, maybe even earlier. The second event, the
13 marketplace event, was afterwards but I cannot, without referring to my
14 notes, find out when that was, remember when that was.
15 Q. Since you have your notes, I am almost certain that the
16 Prosecution will agree with me, I think the moment has come to use them,
17 with the agreement of the Prosecution.
18 MR. WAESPI: No objection, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, you may consult your notes in respect of the
20 dates -- of the date of the second event you were questioned about.
21 THE WITNESS: I am afraid that I cannot recall the date, and to
22 find it would mean me having to read through my notes. These are
23 handwritten notes.
24 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Sir, I understand the problem, but perhaps -- could you perhaps in
1 the next break try and find the date - that would pose no problem - and
2 after you have done it, maybe you can let us know.
3 Now, could you tell us briefly what happened in the marketplace?
4 First of all, where this happened and then what was the scale of the
5 victims in the marketplace?
6 A. My understanding of what happened is that a mortar bomb or an
7 artillery shell came down near vertically to land in the marketplace and
8 to cause many casualties to the closely packed civilians who were in the
9 marketplace. And, again, I can't remember the exact details but there
10 were 40 dead. It was some horrific number.
11 Q. Now, sir, could I stop you there, please.
12 You said that this shell almost fell almost vertically. But could
13 you perhaps tell us where was the market in question located?
14 A. The marketplace was in the old town in Sarajevo, which had high
15 buildings on all sides around it. And, therefore, for a shell to come
16 into the marketplace, it would have to have come nearly vertical or
17 pretty close to vertical. If that shell had been fired from a long way
18 away, it would have come in at a much flatter trajectory. And again, as
19 an artillery officer, that is an obvious fact.
20 Q. I am listening to your answer at the same time as the French
21 booth. For the French booth, it is an artillery officer, not a military
22 officer, and I believe this is where it is important to underline the
24 That is exactly what you said, sir, isn't it?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Thank you. Now, sir, you spoke of buildings that were relatively
2 high. Now, as far as you know, were these buildings 7, 8-storey
3 buildings? 10-storey buildings?
4 A. I can't recall exactly, but it was at least four storey, maybe
5 even higher. Maybe some higher than four storeys on some sides.
6 Q. Thank you very much. Sir, therefore, and according to your
7 experience, technical experience, that is, you as an artillery officer, if
8 we have a four-storey building as you said --
9 MR. WAESPI: I am sorry, Your Honours. I am not sure whether
10 that is a very -- that it assists you what my learned colleague is doing
11 now. We don't know yet when it happened. We don't know whether the
12 witness was in fact there in that time. Perhaps before he draws on any
13 type of experience or expertise or whatever, I think this should first be
14 clarified, the position of the witness vis-a-vis this incident, and
15 perhaps it could be postponed until the witness knows where he was at the
16 time this incident happened.
17 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, this witness
18 has by himself said, following the questions that were asked by the
19 Prosecution, not by your Chamber, mentioned existence of a marketplace.
20 And I asked him what was the location. He will tell us the location
21 later. And as far as the time frame is concerned, the date that it
22 happened, I would say that this is less important than we may think,
23 since what we are also trying to establish here is the possibility, the
24 probability, of people from Sarajevo firing at themselves.
25 Now, if this witness knows something, then he must say it.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, the witness has testified that he
2 has no personal knowledge of anything, so then at least I think we should
3 find out about what he is talking about. He is talking about the first
4 market. Well, we have heard evidence on markets as well. So I think that
5 Mr. Waespi is right when he says that whatever confusion should be
6 avoided, especially since the witness has no personal knowledge of it,
7 that we identify exactly what we are talking about.
8 So if you would please try to guide the witness.
9 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you,
10 Mr. President.
11 Q. Now, sir, you said that you don't have personal knowledge of
12 this. Now, was this an incident that had taken place before you arrived
13 in Sarajevo or did it take place after you arrived?
14 A. It took place after I arrived, the marketplace one. The cemetery
15 one occurred before I arrived.
16 Q. Very well. And you left -- could you please remind us of the
18 A. It was about the 31st of March, 1993.
19 Q. So the incident, did it happen in the same year, the year that you
20 left or did it happen later?
21 A. It may have happened while I was still there, but it could well
22 have happened after I left. And I came back to that when I was working in
23 the United Kingdom Crisis Management Headquarters when we were
24 reviewing information. That was when I was working as a United Nations --
25 as a United Kingdom officer, not as a United Nations officer.
1 Q. Thank you, sir.
2 Is it true that you spoke of the first marketplace incident?
3 A. That is correct.
4 Q. So would you then speak also of the second, third, and so on?
5 A. I have heard from the media about a second marketplace incident.
6 However, my knowledge of that is only from what I have read in the
8 Q. Sir, this second marketplace incident, would it correspond to the
9 name of Markale? If that means anything to you.
10 A. I have no recollection of that.
11 Q. Very well. Thank you.
12 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, we will see the
13 question of the dates later on, but we can see now that we are probably
14 in the right time frame since the witness said it may have happened while
15 he was there.
16 Q. Now, sir, you spoke of a building, a four-storey building as being
17 a high building. Is that correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. You said that as an artillery officer that it was practically --
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi.
21 MR. WAESPI: Again, Your Honours, I would like to hear first
22 whether the witness was present, what his relation was to this incident.
23 He is not here as an expert, despite the fact that he had some artillery
24 expertise. But this witness is here to talk about facts, perhaps about
25 information he had heard from somebody else, but not about him going or
1 placing him into an incident we don't know where he was at that time and
2 to have him make any assessments of the highness of building and so on.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But, Mr. Waespi, of course you can ask
4 specific questions and if Mr. Piletta-Zanin wants to spend the time as he
5 wants to and leaving aspects of what you consider to be major importance
6 rather vague, then, of course it might be of importance in the evaluation
7 of that evidence, but he is still entitled to ask questions.
8 On the other hand, I do agree that the more we stick to facts, the
9 more useful it will be to hear the evidence for the Chamber.
10 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 Q. Therefore, sir, to come back to the facts, you explained to us
12 earlier about the obstacle that was the high building, as indicating by
13 your hand movement. And my impression was that you wanted to tell us
14 something else. In other words, would it have been technically possible
15 that someone from top of a roof would launch by hand such a shell in order
16 to have it explode further down, that would explode at the foot of the
17 building? Would it be technically feasible?
18 A. I would believe so.
19 Q. You believe so, and in a hypothesis of the first marketplace
20 incident, if you know that, do you know what were the conclusions of the
21 investigation commission?
22 A. They were inconclusive. "Inconclusive" was the word I was
23 looking for.
24 Q. When you say that they were inconclusive, what you are saying
25 is politically inconclusive?
1 A. No. I mean from the evidence gathered by the technical
2 investigation officer, in other words, Major Itani, he was unable to
3 conclude specifically where that explosive device had been fired from. In
4 other words, he was unable to determine whether it had been fired from
5 Serb lines or from within the city.
6 Q. Now, just a -- simply a technical point - we will go to other
7 matters later - now the vertical feature of the angle of the launch, that
8 is an element that in general would allow one to conclude that this was
9 something that was fired from the inside?
10 A. The conclusion that I drew personally is that it had to be fired
11 from fairly close by. Now, whether that "close by" was inside or outside
12 the perimeter Sarajevo, that is something I am not in a position to say.
13 Q. Thank you very much.
14 Now, sir, when you say "close by" could you perhaps, in terms of
15 distance, tell the Chamber on what you can visualise in saying this?
16 A. That would depend on the size of the shell that was fired. In
17 other words, if it was a small mortar, the distance would be shorter, but
18 if it was a big mortar, that distance would be small in comparison with
19 the maximum range of a big mortar. It is unlikely that it could have
20 been an artillery shell, in my opinion, because artillery fires much
21 flatter, whereas mortars fire much higher.
22 Q. So, practically, can we speak of several hundreds of metres,
24 A. Yes, it would be more than several hundreds of metres. It would
25 be depending on the calibre and I can't recall what Major Itani said.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Q. Thank you very much.
2 Now, sir, I am going to ask you a series of questions and I would
3 like you to answer just by "yes" or "no" every time in order to gain time.
4 Do you know in Sarajevo the names or rather the locations, names
5 of places that I am going to give you? I am going to start with Gras,
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Could you tell the Chamber what is Gras and where was this
10 A. I would need to look at a map.
11 Q. Could you tell us what it was?
12 A. I believe it is a hill or something to do with a hill to the
13 north, north-west of Sarajevo.
14 Q. Very well.
15 Could you tell us what is Magros?
16 A. I am not similar with the name.
17 Q. Same question for Pavle Goranin.
18 A. It is not a name that I have heard.
19 Q. Thank you. Same question for Kulin Ban.
20 A. No, not a name I have heard.
21 Q. Thank you.
22 Same question for Petar Dakic.
23 A. No, not a name that I can recall.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 Same question for Kobra?
1 A. Not a name that I --
2 Q. Kobra Fatih?
3 A. Not a name that I particularly connect to anything.
4 Q. Sultan Fatih?
5 A. No, not that I can recall.
6 Q. Ljiljana?
7 A. Not that I can recall.
8 Q. MUP, M-u-p?
9 A. Not that I can recall.
10 Q. The Hero Square?
11 A. Not that I can recall.
12 Q. Thank you. Electrical supply company, Elektropriveda?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Where is it?
15 A. The electrical supply company is outside of Sarajevo on the way to
17 Q. Thank you. Witness, now, were you informed or are you informed of
18 a school in Dobrinja that had -- that was used as a base for BH snipers?
19 A. No, I didn't.
20 Q. Thank you. Sir, could you please tell us the locations, that is,
21 the addresses of all of the brigades that covered of what I sometimes
22 call "the Greater Sarajevo," that is all the municipalities of Sarajevo?
23 A. On which side? By the Bosniak side or the --
24 Q. I am talking about the city of Sarajevo. The city itself and,
25 therefore -- there were two sides, obviously. There was one Croatian
1 brigade and the others were BH brigades. Could you tell us the locations
2 of these brigades?
3 A. I have no knowledge of the locations, and I can tell you now what
4 I do know is that when I was serving in Sarajevo, that I had maps which
5 showed their locations. And with those maps, I would be able to tell you
6 where they were.
7 Q. Sir, did you know where were the command posts of each of the
8 battalions of each of the brigades?
9 A. No, that is not a level of detail that General Morillon dealt with
10 and --
11 Q. Thank you.
12 Sir, do you personally know where the companies, the command and
13 control posts, not of the level of battalions, [In English] the
15 A. Yes. We visited General Halilovic's headquarters. He had two
16 particular locations that we visited frequently.
17 Q. [Interpretation] Thank you. But I was talking about the command
18 post on the level of companies.
19 A. I have no knowledge of those.
20 Q. Thank you very much.
21 Sir, I would now like to come back to the ceasefires. I have to
22 say that we have had testimonies saying that, at the same time when the
23 Serb side wanted to agree to a ceasefire for Sarajevo, that the Bosnian
24 side, the BH side, did not wish it. Were you informed of this and of
25 such situations? Did they occur while you were in Sarajevo?
1 A. Yes, that sort of situation happened frequently.
2 Q. Thank you very much.
3 Sir, I have to tell you that we have also had testimonies that
4 tended to say also in a similar vein to what you have said already, is
5 that when practically ceasefires started operating, the BH army or
6 elements of the BH army would then start firing provocation shots in order
7 to provoke return fire and, therefore, that would cancel out the ceasefire
8 and the agreements. Were you informed of this? Did you know of this
9 during your stay in Sarajevo?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Thank you for your answer, Witness. Yes, I am sorry?
12 A. Yes, I am aware of that sort of thing happening fairly frequently.
13 Q. Thank you very much.
14 Since we are talking about BH shots, sir, did you know about the
15 existence of special units? So these were sniper units on the side of the
16 BH army.
17 A. Yes, I was.
18 Q. Thank you. Sir, do you know if these units were established by
19 elements from the police and those elements were at the time established
20 or known as "special units"? They were created during the Olympic Games
21 in Sarajevo.
22 A. I do not know whether they were police, civilians with special
23 marksmanship skills, or soldiers. The difficulty was that, in Sarajevo,
24 almost any male who had carried out military service could be described as
25 a soldier, and the clothes that they wore, in other words, the uniform,
1 was a very poor indicator of whether someone was a soldier or a civilian
2 or a policeman.
3 Q. Sir, could you perhaps elaborate on this point in terms of what
4 you said? In terms of what you said in effect that the clothes that were
5 worn would not allow for an immediate identification to tell apart a
6 civilian from a soldier from a policeman, that is, you couldn't tell
7 apart the police from a soldier and a civilian? You couldn't tell them
8 apart. Thank you.
9 A. There were certainly situations when that happened. There were
10 other situations when you were on the front line and when people were
11 fully equipped with military uniforms. There were other situations
12 when you were dealing with police and they were wearing obviously police
13 uniforms. But when you are dealing with refugees or dealing with fluid
14 situations, when you were dealing with people fleeing for their lives
15 wearing whatever clothes they had, you need to take into account that most
16 civilians in Bosnia, all had a considerable amount of ex-military
17 clothing. And the military clothing was of higher quality and warmer,
18 particularly in the winter.
19 Q. Sir, you earlier spoke of a "fluid situation." Could you tell us
20 what you meant by that? What is a "fluid situation"?
21 A. By "fluid situation," I mean where events are happening really
22 quickly and it is difficult to establish what exactly is happening. For
23 example, the fall of Jajce in the end of October, beginning of November
24 1992, and, for example, the situation surrounding Srebrenica in February
25 and March 1993.
1 Q. Sir, since we have to focus on Sarajevo, by "fluid situations,"
2 what you mean is, if I understand correctly, these situations that we can
3 really describe as being emergency situations? Is that what you meant?
4 A. Yes, emergency combat situations, heavy fighting.
5 Q. Thank you very much.
6 Sir, were there situations or emergency situations, emergency
7 combat situations - and I believe that your answer would be affirmative -
8 in the areas that were near or neighbouring or in civilian areas? Would
9 you like me to rephrase the question?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. As far as you know, were these emergency situations, emergency
12 combat situations, in areas that were neighbouring to -- neighbouring
13 areas that were inhabited by civilians?
14 A. The fighting always occurred somewhere. When the fighting
15 occurred in built-up areas, then yes, it is possible that there were
16 civilians in that area. I cannot make a generalisation as to whether or
17 not civilians stayed when heavy fighting occurred or not. That is
18 absolutely situation-by-situation dependent.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, looking at the clock --
20 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, I apologise,
21 Mr. President. Should we now have the break at half?
22 JUDGE ORIE: I didn't hear your last words.
23 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Should we have a break now at
24 half past?
25 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...already a couple
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 of minutes late.
2 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] This moment is perfect.
3 Mr. President, could we just ask the witness to check the date
4 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...consult your notes
5 and find the date of the second incident called "the first market."
6 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: Correct.
7 JUDGE ORIE: We will adjourn until 5 minutes to 1.00.
8 --- Recess taken at 12.35 a.m.
9 --- On resuming at 12.58 p.m
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, please proceed.
11 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
12 Q. Let us now go back to what you were talking about a while ago.
13 You told us that you could find the date of this second, which was the
14 first incident, according to what the President told us. Is that
16 A. Yes, that is correct.
17 Q. What is the date?
18 A. The date is after I left Bosnia and I don't have it -- the reason
19 I don't have it in my notes and I couldn't find it is because it was after
20 I left. And the only time it could have been was while I was in
21 Srebrenica. But I now recollect where I found a detail about that and it
22 was in 1995, when I was in the headquarters of the 1st UK Armoured
23 Division in Germany and I met the senior noncommissioned officer who had
24 carried out the investigation, and he knew that I had been in Bosnia and
25 he showed me the report which had been completed. And that is from where
1 I recalled a number of items which I described to you earlier.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 But you haven't found the date of the event?
4 A. No, because I don't have it written in the notes because it was
5 after I left Bosnia in the 31st of March, 1993.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 Witness, have you any other notes where you could perhaps find
8 the date?
9 A. Yes. I would carry out a literary search and find the dates of
10 what is known in the media as the "first marketplace attack."
11 Q. Where do you have those notes? Do you have them with you in
12 The Hague?
13 A. I would have to go and look on my computer, which is in my room in
14 the hotel.
15 Q. Thank you very much.
16 Let us assume that you will be able to come back to the issue
17 tomorrow if you think you can find the date. Thank you in advance.
18 A. I am certain I will be able to do that.
19 MR. WAESPI: Perhaps if it assists Your Honours, and for the
20 anticipated objection, if he has left Sarajevo at that time, if he was
21 not present during the time the incident happened, I am not sure whether
22 it assists even to find the date and to take it further. I am just not
23 sure how much he can be cross-examined on something he had no recollection
24 of, other than from the media.
25 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President, I would
1 like to reply.
2 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...first respond
3 briefly. It was not the answer of this witness that he had only from the
4 media. I think he told us that he saw a report given to him, or at least
5 provided to him so that he could read it. So it is not just the media,
6 Mr. Waespi, and of course one of the puzzling things might be is whether
7 it is a specific date all too well known to many of us so that we can
8 identify more in detail whether we are talking about something which is
9 relatively new or which is relatively well known - perhaps not well
10 enough - but at least is well known to us. And then of course we would
11 have to see what the testimony could add to and on what basis.
12 So, therefore, I think it is too early to decide on such an
13 objection, but since you made it already at this stage, I think the
14 Chamber should give it the view that we cannot yet -- we cannot yet
15 confirm to you that it could not assist the Chamber. Yes.
16 Please proceed, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
17 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President, I will go
18 -- come back to this issue tomorrow.
19 Q. Mr. Witness, and since you have to come back anyway, I would like
20 you to check on the date. I would like to come back to what we have
21 examined at the end of our preceding session. You told us, Witness, that
22 on numerous occasions, the B forces fired from the inside of a
23 hospital called the Kosevo hospital. Is that correct?
24 A. That is correct.
25 Q. Thank you. Witness, to the best of your knowledge, were there any
1 other similar situations involving other hospitals where the same pattern
2 was reproduced?
3 A. The only one that I am aware of is at Kosevo hospital in Sarajevo.
4 Q. Thank you. Witness, you told us on a number of occasions what you
5 meant by that -- by that, did you say, once, twice, three times or a dozen
7 A. I know of two times and I believe, from things which were told to
8 me by other UN personnel, that it happened probably five, six times, but
9 that is not something I can confirm hard and fast.
10 Q. Witness, thank you for your answer.
11 You spoke to us about a mobile mortar mounted on the back of a
12 truck. Now, it was not on the truck, perhaps, it was behind it. The
13 testimony was that it was -- that the principle that it was put on the
14 back of a lorry or a truck, that is right. Was it -- was it an
15 82-millimetre mortar?
16 A. I cannot confirm the calibre of the mortar because I did not
17 personally see the truck with the mortars on it. The journalists who
18 witnessed the firing on the 24th of December, 1992 and the sergeant who
19 delivered the diesel fuel to Kosevo hospital, both saw what I believe was
20 the same type of vehicle, and described it, but they were not artillery
21 people who were able to identify it.
22 Q. Very well.
23 Could you tell us where was the point of departure of the shot
24 that hit General Morillon's residence?
25 A. It was somewhere near the Presidency building in Sarajevo. I
1 would have to look at my notes and the reports which I wrote at the time
2 in order to be able to tell you more precisely.
3 Q. Thank you. Then you could do it at the same time you will check
4 up on the date. Since a report was written, the people who manned the
5 mortar, were they militarily trained in the sense of uniforms that they
6 might have worn?
7 A. That I cannot answer, as I did not personally see them. It was
8 these other people who saw them. What I do believe is that they were part
9 of a special unit of the kind that you described earlier which was based
10 somewhere to the south-west of Tito barracks.
11 Q. You spoke in your testimony of a unit, mortars unit or specialised
12 in mortars, a unit specialised in mortars.
13 Witness, do you know whether there were several specialised units
14 in the area of mortars? And here I have in mind greater Sarajevo, that
15 is, the 10 municipalities composing Sarajevo.
16 A. I only have information around one particular mobile special
17 mortar unit which was under the control of a radical part of the BiH army.
18 I do not have any information whether there were other.
19 Q. Yes. When you spoke -- speak about this, you have to be very
20 precise. We are talking about mobile special mortar units. We are
21 referring to the unit as being mobile. Is that correct?
22 A. Yes. I mean that the units had these trucks and was able to move
23 somewhere, fire quickly, and then move away quickly.
24 Q. Thank you very much, Witness.
25 You told us that in the case that you suspected, there was a shot
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 provoked by the BH forces just before a press conference was held. Can
2 you perhaps be more specific in terms of date and period of time?
3 A. Again, I would have to look back through my notes. It was not
4 something which was particularly important to me at that time. It is
5 something that I know happened, but I would have to think back hard to try
6 and work out what the date would have been.
7 Q. Very well. This was the third note, mental note, you have to
9 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I don't know if the witness
10 can be provided with a slip of paper.
11 THE WITNESS: Could you go through the three items? The first
12 one is the date of the market.
13 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Well, we have the date of the first incident. Now we are
15 referring to the date of the shot on the Kosevo area.
16 And the second I would like to ask for the assistance of the
17 Chambers because --
18 JUDGE ORIE: I think I could help you. You asked the witness to
19 look back at a certain -- yes, on the headquarters of General Morillon.
20 But I didn't want to interrupt you, but I think we do have, as a matter of
21 fact, a document which will be tendered under seal, however.
22 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] If we have it, well and fine.
23 Very good. Thank you.
24 Thank you, Witness.
25 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...well, that became
1 the second now is the date of the press conference. Yes.
2 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] That is right.
3 Q. Now in respect of the date, the date we do not know for the time
4 being, you spoke about a deliberate shot, but what was the reason for it?
5 What was the aim, the objective?
6 A. I cannot say what the objective of the people carrying it out was,
7 although it seemed to me that it was in order to deliberately provoke the
8 shelling of the hospital in order to -- in such a way that the
9 international media would see this event before their eyes and maybe even
10 suffer some of the shelling themselves.
11 Q. You told us, Witness, if I understood you well, that there was a
12 will to provoke reaction at a given point in time with the purpose of
13 manipulating public opinion. Is that correct?
14 A. Whether it was to manipulate public opinion, I cannot say. What I
15 can say is that there were quite a number of actions, by that I mean
16 shooting or attacks, carried out in order to break ceasefires and provoke
17 reactions which would perpetuate the collapse of the ceasefire.
18 Q. When you say that these actions were aimed at perpetuating the
19 collapse of the ceasefire, do you mean by that that the actions were
20 carried out by a particular side?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Is it the BH side?
23 A. That is correct.
24 Q. Thank you. Do you consider that, since you have used the term "to
25 perpetuate," that this was part of a plan, that is, of a political will?
1 A. Whether it was of political will, again, I cannot say. What I can
2 say is that it was our - and by "our" I mean General Morillon and my own
3 and general headquarters - belief that from about December 1992 onwards,
4 the Bosnian Serb side wanted peace. They wanted an overall ceasefire in
5 order to consolidate the territory of which they had taken control of.
6 In that aim, to that aim, the Bosnian Serb side was trying to achieve
7 ceasefires. From the Bosniak side, however, they did not want to submit
8 to a situation which had been enforced upon them and, therefore, they did
9 not want to recognise the status quo, and accepting a ceasefire would have
10 meant accepting the status quo. Now, they could not publicly state
11 that, but their activities on the ground were uniformly aimed at
12 preventing any kind of permanent ceasefire across all of
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina from taking hold in order to perpetuate the fighting,
14 in order to give them the opportunity eventually in order to retake some
15 of the terrain which had been taken control of by the Bosnian Serbs in the
16 period from April 1992 up until December 1992.
17 I was at a meeting with General Mladic, Dr. Karadzic and Professor
18 Koljevic in November 1992, at which they got out a map which showed the
19 ethnic distribution of Bosnia, in colour, and they used this map in order
20 to illustrate to General Morillon how they had only taken control of areas
21 where the Serb population was in 50 per cent majority or greater and that
22 they had not tried to take control over areas where the Serb population
23 was in the minority. And that they had done this in a way which was fair,
24 in the way that they described it, and that the results of this was that
25 the front line was not a front line which was militarily sensible. In
1 other words, the front line was very long; it waved all over the place,
2 and from a tactical or strategic military point of view, it made no sense
4 However, that was the reason why they had chosen to -- over the
5 period of April 1992 to December 1992 taken the military actions that they
6 had, and it is in that context that I made the point earlier that the
7 attack on Sarajevo at the end of October was the last major Bosnian Serb
8 military activity, military offensive. From then on, they basically
9 carried out defensive operations and tried to terrorise the Bosniak
10 population and the Presidency into accepting this status quo.
11 Q. Witness, thank you. I would like to re-read the last element of
12 your reply.
13 Yes. Witness, you have the screen before your eyes. In lines 14
14 and 15, you expressed by using an indefinite pronoun. You say -- when you
15 say and speak about this, "they," whom are you referring to?
16 A. I am sorry, I am not familiar with the -- I can't identify line
17 14 and 15.
18 Q. [In English] Okay. So don't say a single word. Stop here,
19 please. Line 14 in front of you.
20 A. I have a whole series of numbers on the left-hand side and it is
21 not clear to me --
22 Q. 14, the first line.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Line 14 is not the first line any more. Yes the
24 pages and lines are in the gray area to the left. But I think it has
25 disappeared already. If you could please read --
1 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] "That was the reason why they
2 are chosen the period of April 1992 to December 1992 -- " and it is out
4 JUDGE ORIE: It is not line 14. That might be the problem,
5 Mr. Piletta-Zanin. I will read it. Your testimony was that: "In order
6 to perpetuate the fighting, in order to give them the opportunity
7 eventually, in order to retake some of the terrain which had been taken
8 control of by the Bosnian Serbs in the period from April 1992 up until
9 December 1992. I was at a meeting with General Mladic, Dr. Karadzic -- "
10 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I am sorry, I
11 have to interrupt you. I apologise, but it is line 14 of the page 48. I
12 am sorry. What the witness said was the following --
13 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...so I don't know
14 what --
15 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, because that was the
16 problem with my computer.
17 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...couple of pages.
18 So then please just read it. And that created to the confusion, I think.
19 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I apologise. What I have
20 before my eyes, however, [In English] "Why they had chosen the period of
21 April 1992 to December 1992," [Interpretation] et cetera.
22 Q. Who do you mean by saying, "they"?
23 A. I mean that Bosnian Serb leadership, in other words, Dr. Karadzic,
24 et cetera, had during the period April 1992 to December 1992 taken control
25 of a portion of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the explanation for taking those
1 parts was what they were explaining to General Morillon with this map.
2 Does that answer your question?
3 Q. Very well. Thank you.
4 Sir, now in relation to what you said, and I apologise because my
5 computer doesn't have the exactly -- my transcript doesn't have exactly
6 the same numbering, but in relation to what you said, could we consider
7 that in the period that you are talking about, that is the period when
8 there were ceasefire negotiations, on the Serb side in Sarajevo, there was
9 a military and political will not to continue attacking the city, not to
10 be the aggressor on the city.
11 For the English booth, not "not to continue," but not to egress,
12 in order to obtain a ceasefire.
13 Is that true?
14 A. It is partially true. It was the results of our own headquarters
15 analysis that from about December 1992 onwards, the Bosnian Serb side
16 wanted a global ceasefire. What they did not want was local ceasefires.
17 What the Bosniak side wanted was local ceasefires. But to come back to
18 Sarajevo, yes, I believe that there were probably no major attempts to
19 capture Sarajevo, as I described, but there was nonstop shelling of the
20 citizens of Sarajevo, and the siege of Sarajevo and the prevention of food
21 aid and the repair of utilities continued throughout. And that we
22 interpreted as being a continuation of the terrorism of the population of
23 Sarajevo in order to make them accept the status quo.
24 Q. Very well. Thank you, sir.
25 I would like to, after your lengthy answer, to go back to the
1 elements of mobile mortars. These elements, it is true that you
2 yourself never saw them?
3 A. That is correct.
4 Q. Did you, sir, however, see even smaller elements that would
5 correspond to private personal vehicles, of a passenger vehicle like
6 Golf, for instance, where there would be mortars mounted on top of them?
7 They would have been placed inside vehicles and with which small units
8 could move around that shoot for a while and then move, then withdraw.
9 Do you know anything about this?
10 A. Yes, I know that that happened. I did not see it myself, but I
11 read reports from our intelligence people who had had reports from
12 soldiers on the ground who had seen such vehicles and such people.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 Sir, you said that you had two kinds of information. One was the
15 intelligence, intelligence information, and the other kind would have been
16 from soldiers on the ground themselves. Is that correct?
17 A. That is correct.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 Now, sir, are we here talking about multiple elements, that is,
20 of a number of these vehicles that would have been used for this purpose?
21 A. It was our impression that the Bosniaks were using any kind of
22 vehicle that they had inside Sarajevo for military purposes. It was only
23 for those vehicles that they made fuel available because there was a
24 shortage, a very strict shortage of fuel in Sarajevo, and the Armija
25 largely controlled, together with the black market, the availability of
1 fuel for cars in Sarajevo.
2 Q. Thank you for your answer, sir.
3 JUDGE ORIE: May I just ask for a clarification on a question you
4 just put to the witness. The witness testified that he did not see by
5 himself the cars with mortars in it but that he read reports from his
6 intelligence people who had had reports from soldiers on the ground who
7 had seen such vehicles and such people.
8 Your next question was: Sir, you said that you had two kinds of
9 information, where it seems from your answer that you had as a source of
10 information the reports of your intelligence people relating what they
11 heard from soldiers on the ground. So the next question to you is, you
12 said you had two kinds of information: One was the intelligence
13 information and the other kind would have been from soldiers on the
14 ground. But your source of information, was that soldiers on the ground
15 reporting to intelligence and then intelligence reports read by you; or
16 did you have this information from two different sources, that means from
17 the intelligence and from soldiers on the ground?
18 THE WITNESS: From both.
19 JUDGE ORIE: You had from both sources. So your first answer was
20 a bit confusing then for me, that it came only through the intelligence
21 reports. It clarifies the issue.
22 Please proceed, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
23 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
24 Q. Now that we have these two sources of information clear as they
25 are and because you said that the army was using practically all the
1 vehicles that they had at their disposal, do you include in your answer
2 then also the vehicles that we would call "civilian vehicles"?
3 A. That is correct.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 And when you say "civilian vehicles," were these sometimes,
6 occasionally, or all the time, vehicles that were not even marked as being
7 used for military purposes, being military vehicles?
8 A. That is correct.
9 Q. Therefore, there was a situation in Sarajevo whereby, as we hear
10 it from you, sir, is that most of the civilian vehicles were used by the
11 military for military purposes and at the same time when not officially
12 distinguished or marked as such as military vehicles?
13 A. Some vehicles, some civilian vehicles were painted and marked as
14 Armija, but there were others which were not. The situation in Sarajevo
15 was that the Bosniak Presidency forces had virtually no, what I would call
16 proper military vehicles, and that they made use of the only equipment
17 which was available to them, which was predominantly civilian vehicles.
18 Q. Sir, do you know if, in practice, there was a situation of a
19 requisition, de facto requisition?
20 A. I do not know how people came to be in possession of vehicles.
21 What I can say is that most vehicles driving around Sarajevo with the
22 shortage of fuel were being used, to the best of my knowledge, for
23 military purposes of one kind or another.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 I would like to go back to the civilian vehicles that were used
1 for transporting mortars. And I have to say that we have had testimonies
2 saying that they were basically, most of the time, Golf cars, so
3 Volkswagen Golf vehicles. Do you know, perhaps of other vehicles, private
4 vehicles, passenger vehicles, that were used by these mobile mortar units?
5 A. I cannot say specifically Volkswagen Golf. I must be clear, I am
6 talking about two separate activities. One is what I called a mobile
7 mortar unit, and that is the one where the description given to me was of
8 small trucks, something like -- this is my imagination now, putting into
9 words what I was told, something like a Land Rover or a pick-up, yes.
10 Now, a second piece of information is reports picked up by
11 soldiers on the ground reported to the intelligence reports which came to
12 me, and secondly, from my own speaking with the Danish company which
13 shuttled back and forth between General Morillon's headquarters in
14 Sarajevo and the headquarters in Kiseljak, and they were always driving
15 back and forth through Sarajevo. And I spoke with those soldiers every
16 day in order to get a sense of what was happening, what the atmosphere was
17 like. And it is -- those were the soldiers on the ground who I personally
18 spoke with and they told me that they had seen the sort of thing you
20 Q. Very well.
21 But were you told of specific vehicles, for instance, that was a
22 Golf or that was a Bentley for instance, just to give you an example which
23 would not be very ordinary?
24 A. [No audible response]
25 Q. However, now starting from the facts that these vehicles
1 existed, could we then assume that they were quite difficult to locate?
2 A. I am not sure what you mean by "quite difficult to locate."
3 Q. I am going to rephrase my question, in fact.
4 If these vehicles were very mobile, is it then true to say that on
5 one hand they could move around everywhere, and on the other hand, they
6 would then be discreet in their shooting, in their firing, that is, they
7 would fire a few shots and then they would disappear. They would go
8 somewhere else. It would be hard to trace where it came from. Is that
10 A. Yes, but that is correct. But I must also put this in context,
11 which is that the vast majority of vehicles used for what I described as
12 military purposes was simply to transport personnel around Sarajevo.
13 Q. Yes, I don't doubt that. We will come back to that.
14 Sir, I was talking about vehicles that were carrying mortars. So
15 could you perhaps give us your answer again, is that true?
16 A. Yes, such vehicles could have driven anywhere within Sarajevo that
17 the Bosniak authorities allowed them to go.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 Is there any reason why the Bosnian authorities would have banned
20 them from going anywhere?
21 A. Yes. There were a number of different factions in Sarajevo and
22 there were sometimes crackdowns by what I would describe as
23 the "authorised" police against what I would describe as hardline
24 extremists, and sometimes the hardline extremists would try and stop and
25 prevent the movement of what I would call "mainline people." And this
1 varied from time to time, depending on the politics and the power plays
2 that were going on in the Presidency at that particular time.
3 Q. We will probably come back to it later. I think that you may have
4 been referring to a name. Are you familiar with the name of Juka or the
5 first name Juka?
6 A. Yes, I am.
7 Q. Very well. We are talking about the same person so we will speak
8 about it at a later stage.
9 Now, you said that vehicles were used to transport military
10 personnel; do you remember?
11 A. Correct.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 But when we are talking about civilian vehicles, these are mostly
14 vehicles of a family car, a passenger car, for instance, a passenger
15 vehicle which could, perhaps, carry four or five, maybe even six people.
16 Are we talking about this type of vehicle?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 Therefore, such a vehicle, would you then consider it as a
20 military target, if this vehicle is transporting military personnel?
21 A. I would consider it, as a military officer, to be a military
22 target, but I would also have to take into account the risk of my being
23 wrong and it not being a military target before I personally decided to
24 shoot at it.
25 Q. Very well. Indeed. Thank you.
1 JUDGE ORIE: I am trying to listen carefully. I did not want to
2 interrupt you during your questioning, but especially the beginning of
3 page 73, the answer of the witness in relation to your questions were
4 somewhat confusing. So I would like to ask some clarification.
5 Is it your testimony that most of the vehicles within the city,
6 civilian vehicles, were, at the disposition of the military, they would be
7 used so or was there a certain percentage of the civilian vehicles that
8 was used or was at a disposition of the military? It was not quite clear
9 to me what your testimony was in this respect.
10 THE WITNESS: I was not asked for a percentage and would not be
11 able to give one.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Then may I just read one line to you.
13 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President?
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
15 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] May I perhaps continue with
16 another line of questioning and then --
17 JUDGE ORIE: I have to then ask the witness the following. You --
18 one of the questions to you was: "Therefore, there was a situation in
19 Sarajevo whereby, as we hear it from you sir, is that most of the civilian
20 vehicles were used by the military for military purposes?"
21 THE WITNESS: That is correct.
22 JUDGE ORIE: So that is a majority?
23 THE WITNESS: Yes.
24 JUDGE ORIE: So most of the civilian --
25 THE WITNESS: Not all.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that is clear to me.
2 Please proceed, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
3 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 Q. Sir, you said that in your capacity as an artillery officer, you
5 would then consider this as a military target, but that you would then
6 make sure, you would take care in some way, you would think twice in order
7 to find out if there was a risk of making an error. That was the meaning
8 of what you said?
9 A. That is correct.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Waespi.
11 MR. WAESPI: Yes, just one point. I am not sure whether he said
12 in his capacity as an artillery officer that he answered that.
13 JUDGE ORIE: As a witness, and this witness is an artillery
14 officer. So I don't know whether this is of major importance. Let's say
15 "as an officer." Would that be --
16 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] That is exactly the terms of
17 what the witness said as an officer.
18 MR. WAESPI: As an officer is fine. I am just saying that --
19 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: He has said "as an officer." [Interpretation].
20 Q. So I just said artillery officer, because you are an artillery
21 officer. So that was exactly what you said in your testimony, that is how
22 you put it?
23 A. I am an artillery officer, but being in the artillery is
24 irrelevant to my answer to that question.
25 Q. Indeed. Thank you.
1 But my question is the following: If you are an officer, not
2 "you," but if one is an officer, and that one knows, as you just said
3 yourself, that in practice all distribution of fuel is controlled by the
4 army, BH army, isn't it then true to say that, logically speaking, it
5 would be fair to say that such vehicles were therefore at the disposal of
6 the army? They were placed at the disposal of the army?
7 A. That is not completely the case. I said that fuel was controlled
8 by the army or by the black market.
9 Q. Therefore, there are two possibilities here: Either the army or
10 the criminals who are involved in the black market?
11 A. That is correct.
12 Q. Very well. Thank you for your answer, Witness.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin --
14 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] At when are we finishing? At
15 quarter to?
16 JUDGE ORIE: We will soon adjourn until tomorrow morning at 9.00
17 in the same courtroom. May I ask you not to speak with anyone about your
18 testimony until tomorrow, until we resume. That is also valid for the --
19 those who are working in the Office of the Prosecution.
20 May I then ask the usher to escort the witness out of the
22 [The witness withdrew]
23 JUDGE ORIE: I would like to inform the parties that this morning
24 it was mentioned that there would be a Plenary which would take three
25 days. As far as I am informed at this moment, the Plenary is trying to
1 reduce the time necessary for its discussions. That would mean that
2 almost for certain on that Wednesday, which is I think the 14th - but I
3 am not quite sure about that - that we would have an ordinary hearing, and
4 even perhaps, but we still have to consider that, on Friday afternoon.
5 That would mean that we would lose only one day instead of three days
6 during the Plenary. I am just informing you. This is not a final
7 announcement, but in order to make sure that you are not too much
8 surprised at a later stage.
9 Then the last thing I would like to -- Mr. Piletta-Zanin,
10 according to my calculations, there is approximately one hour left for
11 cross-examination. Yes.
12 Then we will adjourn until tomorrow morning, 9.00, same courtroom.
13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at
14 1.50 p.m., to be reconvened on Tuesday,
15 the 18th day of June, 2002, at 9.00 a.m.