Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 9980

1 Tuesday, 18 June 2000

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone.

6 Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is Case Number

8 IT-98-29-T, the Prosecutor versus Stanislav Galic.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.

10 Mr. Piletta-Zanin, is the Defence ready to continue the

11 cross-examination of the witness?

12 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, we are, indeed,

13 Mr. President.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Please escort the witness into the courtroom.

15 [The witness entered court]

16 WITNESS: PYERS TUCKER [Resumed]

17 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Tucker. Please be seated.

18 Mr. Tucker, may I remind you that you are still bound by the

19 solemn declaration that you gave at the beginning of the your testimony.

20 THE WITNESS: Yes.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

22 Cross-examined by Mr. Piletta-Zanin: [Continued]

23 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Witness.

24 A. Good morning.

25 Q. We are perhaps going to go to an area where we stopped yesterday,

Page 9981

1 but before that, I would like you to give us some answers as to the dates

2 that you were supposed to look up in your notebook. Could you please do

3 that?

4 A. Yes. The date of the attack on the marketplace that we were

5 discussing yesterday was around the 6th of February of 1994. The 6th of

6 February, 1994.

7 Q. Thank you very much.

8 A. The second date was the date of the news conference, press

9 conference, called at Kosevo hospital, which was then fired upon, and that

10 date was around the 9th of December, 1992. And the reason I am not

11 specific about the date is that I only heard about it about 14 days later.

12 Q. Thank you very much, sir.

13 Now, have you had any knowledge in the same vein as to what you

14 have told us earlier? Did you have any knowledge about the facts that the

15 Sarajevo forces, that is, BH forces, would have fired a little bit

16 earlier, a little bit before the arrival of a diplomatic convoy to

17 Sarajevo, and which was escorted by one of the negotiators?

18 Now, that was "escorting."

19 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter apologises. Escorting one of the

20 negotiators.

21 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Would you like me to rephrase the question?

23 A. Yes, please.

24 Q. Do you have any knowledge, sir, of a situation where Sarajevo

25 forces fired not at a convoy but just before a convoy arrived in

Page 9982

1 Sarajevo. This was in Sarajevo. This was escorting one of the

2 negotiators in relation to the peace plan.

3 A. Not specifically.

4 Q. Thank you. Sir, you spoke yesterday of ceasefires; do you

5 remember?

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. Thank you. Sir, is it true that General Galic, who is here today,

8 was himself involved in these negotiations in order to obtain a ceasefire?

9 A. That is correct.

10 Q. Thank you, Witness.

11 Sir, do you know the abbreviation "TEZ" mean, please?

12 A. Total Exclusion Zone.

13 Q. Is that not perhaps a Total Exclusion Zone?

14 A. Total Exclusion Zone.

15 A. Very well. Do you know, sir, in relation to this Total Exclusion

16 Zone, and we are talking about heavy weapons, General Galic was also in

17 charge of these negotiations or he took an active part in the

18 negotiations?

19 A. I am aware that General Galic was involved with negotiations at

20 the mixed military working group, and those negotiations were on a daily

21 basis, the business of Brigadier General Cordy-Simpson, who was General

22 Morillon's Chief of Staff. It was only when they came to the signing and

23 final conclusions that General Morillon became involved.

24 Q. Thank you. But General Galic was quite active on the level of

25 these discussions; is that correct?

Page 9983

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 Sir, is it true to say that one of the negotiations, one of the

4 objectives of these negotiations, was to either withdraw completely or

5 have the heavy weapons, as many heavy weapons as possible, to have them

6 removed to the peripheric areas of Sarajevo on one hand, and on the other

7 hand, to place them under UN control?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. Thank you. Thank you for your answer, sir.

10 Now, sir, we spoke of a ceasefire plan and a plan of withdrawing

11 heavy weapons from Sarajevo. Could we consider that at the time that you

12 have known the plan of the Main Staff, if there was one, if there was a

13 plan, consisted, in fact, of whatever the reasons to look for, to look to

14 find a ceasefire and to promote peace?

15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. Thank you, sir.

17 Now, I would like us to examine some slightly more technical

18 questions. You know, no doubt, of the existence of an ad hoc military

19 commission. First of all, is it true that there was commissions, there

20 were mixed or joint commissions in Sarajevo at the time of your stay in

21 Sarajevo?

22 A. That is correct. The commission I am talking about is called the

23 mixed military working group.

24 Q. Thank you. Could you tell us from which period, from what time,

25 were these groups established?

Page 9984

1 A. The mixed military working group was started by headquarters

2 Sector Sarajevo before the arrival of General Morillon. It was then

3 actively picked up by General Morillon and particularly by General

4 Cordy-Simpson and it carried on its work throughout the time that I was

5 in Bosnia. And I do not know what happened specifically to that, to the

6 mixed military working group, after the 31st of March, 1993, when I left

7 Bosnia.

8 Q. Sir, would you be able to tell us briefly what were the duties or

9 the functions of the -- of this commission, the general outlines?

10 A. The first point is to understand why the mixed military working

11 group was started and that was because, at the highest level, when

12 politicians were involved, it seemed to be impossible to make any

13 progress. Therefore, the decision was made by the United Nations, Sector

14 Sarajevo, to speak with the military commanders one step down from the

15 political leaders, hence, mixed military working group.

16 The tasks of the mixed military working group were, firstly, to

17 try and achieve a ceasefire around Sarajevo; secondly, to try and achieve

18 a ceasefire across all of Bosnia; thirdly, to try and achieve a freedom of

19 movement into and out of the city; and lastly, to achieve the removal of

20 weapons - you referred to heavy weapons - from around Sarajevo. And sir,

21 there is one more thing: It was also to repair and improve the utilities,

22 in other words, water, gas, electricity, supply into the city and to the

23 surrounding areas, in order to make the life of the citizens more

24 bearable.

25 Q. Just a clarification. Sir, first of all, thank you for your

Page 9985

1 answer. You said that one of the tasks, and last but not least task, was

2 to withdraw the heavy weapons from around Sarajevo. Could you tell us in

3 and around Sarajevo, withdraw heavy weapons in and around Sarajevo, so you

4 were saying inside Sarajevo and from outside Sarajevo?

5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. Thank you, sir. Now sir, this commission, was it also tasked of

7 missions of more technical nature, for instance, conducting expert

8 investigations, for instance, in mortar firing?

9 A. It was not responsible for the actual conduct of the

10 investigations. In a more general sense, it was responsible for

11 investigating occasions where the ceasefire was broken and in order to

12 try and resolve how and why the ceasefire was broken, in order to assist

13 both sides with maintaining the discipline necessary in order to ensure

14 that ceasefires were adhered to.

15 Q. Thank you, sir.

16 Do you know, sir, who was specifically informed when there was an

17 incident? When an incident occurred like the one that you mentioned, who

18 was informed?

19 A. The source of the information could be varied. One source was

20 the group of United Nations military observers who were positioned on

21 strategic points of view --

22 Q. No, no, sir. I am sorry. I apologise. I am not asking the

23 question about the source of information. What I was saying is that when

24 an investigation is launched, who would be informed, for instance, on the

25 Serb side, on the Bosnian side, and so on?

Page 9986

1 A. The participants in the mixed military working group would be

2 informed.

3 Q. Was that always the case?

4 A. To my knowledge, it was always the case. And the way that

5 information was passed when people were not actually at the mixed military

6 working group, that I cannot speak about.

7 Q. Thank you. Sir, I would like us to come back to some other

8 elements. Does the name of operation code name "Oxygen" mean anything to

9 you?

10 A. It is something that I recall. I am not entirely sure what it

11 relates to.

12 Q. If I tell you sir, that there were oxygen bottles that were

13 allegedly filled with oxygen and they were delivered to hospitals, does

14 that ring any bells?

15 A. Yes. That does ring a bell, and there were complaints by the

16 Bosnian Serb side that that had happened, and I would have to look in my

17 notes to remember more.

18 Q. Very well. Sir, as far as you can recall, is it true that in fact

19 what happened is that gunpowder was delivered, was hidden in oxygen

20 bottles? Is that what we are talking about?

21 A. I don't believe it was gunpowder. The information that I had was

22 that it was explosives for making mortar bombs with.

23 Q. Well, you are the expert in artillery so I will take your word.

24 But, in any case, it was explosives, we agree on that?

25 A. Correct.

Page 9987

1 Q. Thank you. Do you know if these complaints achieved anything, was

2 there any particular procedure?

3 A. I was not at the forum where these complaints were made. What I

4 do know is that General Cordy-Simpson took some steps in order to try and

5 ensure that the next load of oxygen bottles, when they came in, were

6 inspected by United Nations personnel before they were shipped and

7 brought into Sarajevo.

8 Q. Thank you. Do you know, sir, of an operation code

9 name "Container"?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Not containers that were positioned in order to protect people

12 from fire.

13 A. No, I don't recall such a name.

14 Q. Thank you.

15 Sir, do you know of an operation code name "Korat"?

16 A. No, it is not a name I am familiar with.

17 Q. Thank you.

18 Sir, yesterday, you said in relation to two journalists who were

19 present when mortar mobiles fired, that they were told to leave the city

20 without delay, and I think that you added something like "for their

21 safety." Do you remember that you said that?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. Thank you, sir.

24 What did you mean by saying these three words, "for their

25 safety"?

Page 9988

1 A. At that time in December 1992, there was a struggle for power

2 going on inside Sarajevo. There were some very radical elements and who

3 had been responsible for considerable difficulties, both to the

4 ceasefires, both to the United Nations, to the authorities in Sarajevo.

5 And the difficulties they had been causing was black market. They were

6 terrorising some of the civilians in certain areas and they had been

7 carrying out attacks in various areas. The authorities were trying to

8 clamp down on them and there were -- there was a period of roadblocks by

9 the police all around the inside of the city in order to try and clamp

10 down on these irregulars. And the advice that I gave to these two

11 journalists was on the basis that, inside the city, there was not what I

12 would describe as the due situation of law and order and that with these

13 hardliners about, they could be at risk if hardliners came to hear that

14 they had given hard evidence about something which was very sensitive.

15 Q. Thank you for your answer, sir.

16 You said that they could be at risk. Should I understand that

17 could they have been killed?

18 A. That is what I believed possible.

19 Q. Should I understand, sir, that it wasn't really in their capacity

20 as witnesses that they were at risk, but they were particularly at risk

21 because they were witnesses who were journalists?

22 A. No. I believe that they were at risk because of the specific

23 incident that they had witnessed, not because they were just journalists

24 in general.

25 Q. Very well. I would like us to continue along this line of

Page 9989

1 questioning. We spoke at length about the crime and the power struggle.

2 Yesterday you told us about somebody called "Juka," and do you remember

3 that, sir?

4 A. That is correct.

5 Q. Could you tell us the full name of that person?

6 A. I believe it is Juka Boje [phoen]. I can't -- phonetically, I am

7 probably incorrect, but that is what I --

8 Q. Does the name of Juka Prazina mean anything to you?

9 A. Prazina does not mean anything to me.

10 Q. Could you please tell us who was this Juka that we are talking

11 about?

12 A. The Juka that I am talking about is -- rather, was a -- a criminal

13 who General Mladic complained to General Morillon about, saying that

14 UNPROFOR had helped move this person into and out of Sarajevo. And

15 General Morillon declared to General Mladic that, yes, he was aware who

16 this Juka was, that he was a criminal, and that as far as General

17 Morillon was aware, that Juka was in gaol.

18 After the meeting, because I was not aware before the meeting of

19 who Juka was, General Morillon told me that Juka was a petty gangster in

20 Sarajevo before the war, and when the fighting started, he had used his

21 gangster connections and had organised amongst a section of the population

22 resistance against the Bosnian Serb force attacks, and in so doing, had

23 achieved a sort of hero status. That had initially been of use to the

24 nascent authorities in Sarajevo who had no organised military force with

25 which to resist the attacks from the Bosnian Serb forces.

Page 9990

1 However, once the Sarajevo force or authorities began to exercise

2 power, Juka insisted on carrying on independently and not subjecting

3 himself to the discipline and authority of the Sarajevo authorities. He

4 then became more of a liability than an asset, and he was captured by the

5 Sarajevo authorities and deported from Sarajevo. And when

6 General Morillon and General Mladic had their conversation, which was the

7 first meeting that General Morillon and Mladic had, General Morillon said

8 that he believed that he was in gaol somewhere in the -- somewhere in the

9 south-west of Bosnia. I can't recall the name of the city.

10 Q. Thank you, sir.

11 Since this Juka was a warlord, do you know where his headquarters

12 was?

13 A. No, I do not.

14 Q. Sir, do you know if this warlord who had organised a private

15 militia, or at least of a private type, had several areas in the town,

16 had several headquarters in the town?

17 A. What I am aware of is that there were several areas within the

18 city which were dominated by particular gangsters at the early days of the

19 siege of Sarajevo. Which particular areas they were, the headquarters

20 Sector Sarajevo was aware of, but it was not something which I involved

21 myself.

22 Q. Thank you, sir.

23 Now, sir, I am going to come back to the question of the explosive

24 that was delivered and the information that you gave us of the control or

25 the checking that was imposed by the UN on the oxygen bottles that were

Page 9991

1 brought into the town. It is true that the bottle or bottles that were

2 found containing gunpowder were supposed to go to a hospital outside of

3 Sarajevo. Is that correct?

4 A. My understanding was that they were -- that the explosives were

5 inside oxygen bottles which were being brought from outside Sarajevo into

6 Sarajevo, to hospital inside Sarajevo.

7 Q. Thank you, sir.

8 Now, sir, if we bring explosive into Sarajevo, we assume that

9 this is for the reason that it is to be used?

10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. Thank you.

12 Sir, in your capacity as a -- practically an expert, an artillery

13 officer, how would it be possible to have a workshop or a factory to

14 manufacture projectiles, projectiles that would be used for mortar? Would

15 it be possible?

16 A. It would absolutely be possible. If you gave me a garage

17 workshop, I would be able to do it myself.

18 Q. Sir, you are saying to me that a very small building, say a

19 garage, with some tools, could be sufficient to have manufacturing of

20 this kind of projectiles. Is that correct?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. Sir, should I also conclude from your answer that at the end of

23 the day, if we have all the elements, if we have the powder, if we have

24 the location, if we have the tools, then it would be possible to

25 manufacture almost anywhere such ammunition? So, my question: It would

Page 9992

1 be possible to manufacture such units which would be able to manufacture

2 ammunition?

3 A. Providing you had the know-how and the steel as well, that is

4 correct.

5 Q. Very well.

6 Now, as far as the know-how is concerned, is it true that an

7 artillery officer who has your competence would be able to give the

8 necessary instructions for making such a factory?

9 A. I would not call it a factory. I would call it a DIY assembly of

10 mortars.

11 Q. Very well. But your answer is yes?

12 A. Correct.

13 Q. Thank you, sir.

14 Now sir, do you know if at a given time there were such

15 workshops, in order not to call them factories, near or inside the PTT

16 building?

17 A. That, I have no knowledge of.

18 Q. Sir, do you have any knowledge of any sites that would have been

19 manufacturing such products in and around Sarajevo? In Sarajevo.

20 THE INTERPRETER: In Sarajevo. Interpreter apologises.

21 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation]

22 Q. In Sarajevo.

23 A. I know that that activity carried on inside Sarajevo, as well as

24 collecting unexploded Serb shells, which were sawn open. The explosive

25 inside was melted and poured out in order to be used for home-made mortar

Page 9993

1 bombs.

2 Q. Witness, if I understand you well, there was a para-industrial

3 structure in Sarajevo which made it possible to remelt metals to be used

4 for cartridges?

5 A. It was not to remelt metals, it was to liquefy the explosives

6 inside Serb shells so you could then pour the explosive out, because it

7 was otherwise dangerous to take out. That is the technique that you use.

8 Q. Very well. In practice, there was a structure to recuperate, to

9 renew armaments, BH armaments, in Sarajevo?

10 A. That is correct, because they were surrounded and they were being

11 attacked and they had no other way of defending themselves.

12 Q. I am taking note of this, what you have just said, and thank you,

13 Witness.

14 Now, I would like to come back to another one of your statements

15 about an attack which took place at 400 metres, more or less, from the

16 residence. Do you remember it, yesterday, on page 2 -- page 7, line 2,

17 you spoke of a distance of 400 metres which made it possible for you to

18 see it?

19 A. [No audible response]

20 Q. Point of clarification, Witness, and I must say that we have

21 testimonies that go in that direction. Is it technically correct to say

22 that an armament such as a mortar is not as precise, as accurate, as an

23 arm of direct fire and that, consequently, the use of a mortar involves

24 necessarily a margin of error in regards to targets and that one which is

25 greater than in the case of direct fire?

Page 9994

1 A. That is absolutely correct.

2 Q. Thank you. Is --

3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi.

4 MR. WAESPI: Just to indicate that in the transcript it says, "no

5 audible response" to the previous questions about the 400 metres.

6 Perhaps that could be reflected what the witness was --

7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, it was the question whether the witness

8 remembered that he spoke of a distance of 400 metres which made it

9 possible for you to see it. Your answer was in the affirmative, as far as

10 I remember.

11 THE WITNESS: Yes.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

13 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you.

14 Q. Witness, now I would like to come back to this margin of error.

15 Some witnesses told us that with a mortar, we speak of a zone of error

16 which can amount to 400 metres on targets to the extent to which there may

17 be a long fire, a short fire, and then a shot to the target. Would you

18 say that this is, in principle, correct?

19 A. It is possible. The function of the accuracy of a mortar relates

20 to whether it is a heavy mortar or a light mortar and over the range at

21 which it is fired. But, yes, a 400 metre error is certainly possible.

22 Q. Thank you very much.

23 Witness, now I would like to submit to you a document which

24 relates to your -- to your statement.

25 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I don't know what the number

Page 9995

1 is. Can we please verify the number.

2 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...tell us where we

3 are in the numbering of the Defence exhibits.

4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, we are at D131.

5 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: 31 is the last one?

6 JUDGE ORIE: Is it the next one to come or is it the last one

7 used? The next one to come.

8 THE REGISTRAR: The next one to come is D132.

9 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation]

10 Q. I shall give it to you, Witness. I shall give you a certain

11 number of documents. We will begin by Exhibit D132, and I would like to

12 ask you if you could certify if you recognise this type of document.

13 Witness, do you recognise that type of document?

14 A. The structure of the document is fairly similar to the form of the

15 daily sit-reps from HQ Sector Sarajevo and the headquarters, BH Command,

16 but --

17 Q. Witness, I am interrupting you because you are in the -- saying

18 the right thing. It is a report of that kind. Could you please read out

19 the date which is in the middle of the document under item 7.

20 A. Thursday, 7 January, 1993.

21 Q. Thank you very much.

22 Witness, do we agree that this is the date that you mentioned

23 which corresponds to the Orthodox Christmas?

24 A. Yes, that is correct.

25 Q. Thank you, Witness. Could you please read the first line of item

Page 9996

1 A?

2 A. "Combat and shelling activity not specified."

3 Q. Thank you very much, Witness.

4 Now, we assume that what we have above corresponds to January 6th.

5 Would you please read the first line or the second line, even the second

6 line of point 1446.

7 A. "The city had been quiet as Serbs began preparing to celebrate

8 the Serb Orthodox Christmas. Sarajevo radio said heavy guns opened fire

9 during the night around the Parliament building south-west of the city

10 centre -- "

11 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please read more slowly.

12 A. "The city had been quiet as Serbs began preparing to celebrate the

13 Serb Orthodox Christmas. Sarajevo radio said heavy guns opened fire

14 during the night around the Parliament building south-west of the city

15 centre and that there was sporadic small-arm fire in the same area."

16 Q. Thank you, Witness.

17 Witness, now with the assistance of Madam Usher, I would like to

18 submit to you a document carrying the number 133. I would like to ask

19 you, now that you have it in front of you, to read the first line of

20 point A.

21 A. Is that point A for the 5th of January --

22 Q. [In English] No, for the 6th.

23 A. "Military active combat and shelling activity. The city was

24 reported quiet in the early hours as Serbs began preparing for the

25 Orthodox Christmas."

Page 9997

1 Q. [Interpretation] Excellent. Thank you.

2 Now I would like to give you --

3 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I don't know if Mr. Waespi --

4 numbers 134 and 135. Could the usher kindly give those documents to the

5 witness. We will do it together.

6 Q. Very quickly, Witness, could you please look at, in respect of

7 document 134, what the text says under "A," combat and shelling activity?

8 A. This is for the 24th of December, 1992: "Military activity,

9 combat and shelling activity. UN officers estimated that about 400

10 artillery, tank and mortar shells exploded in the city."

11 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness read more slowly, please.

12 THE WITNESS: "UN officers estimated that about 400 artillery,

13 tank, and mortar shells exploded in the city."

14 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Thank you, Witness.

16 I would like you to do the same in relation to the next document,

17 which has to do with December 22nd -- 25th, 1992.

18 A. Section A: "Combat and shelling activity. Shelling was

19 reportedly reduced on Christmas Day, but several large explosions hit the

20 centre of Sarajevo in the morning."

21 Q. Thank you, Witness.

22 Witness, now let us focus on other points. You mentioned in your

23 testimony of yesterday that the Serb forces fired during the night at

24 people who were crossing the airport runway and that they caused, on a

25 daily basis, between 5, 20 or 30 victims. This is what you mentioned

Page 9998

1 yesterday, if you remember.

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. Thank you. You mentioned that you were certain of what you said

4 because you possessed such information from the very mouth of the colonel

5 who was then in charge of the French Battalion at the airport, [redacted]

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Page 9999

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11 A. In the residency.

12 Q. Can you tell me when?

13 A. I think it would have been around the end of January, beginning of

14 February, I think, 1993.

15 Q. And this figure of 5 to 30 victims, casualties, on a daily basis,

16 was this -- was the colonel that we were discussing, the person who told

17 you this?

18 A. Yes. It was mentioned in the context of the casualty rate which

19 the colonel's battalion was also suffering.

20 Q. I apologise. What language did the colonel speak in?

21 A. French.

22 Q. Witness, I apologise, but could you please answer my question in

23 French, now.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tucker, you are requested to answer in French.

25 Of course, you only have to do so if you speak the French language in such

Page 10001

1 a way that you think that you could answer in French.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, it is possible, I can speak

3 French, yes. I am completely capable of speaking in French and I

4 understood almost everything that you said in French.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Go on.

6 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: Certainly, and definitely. Thanks.

7 Q. [Interpretation] I am going to repeat my question, Witness. And

8 considering that I know that you speak French, are you absolutely certain,

9 do you categorically say, that this colonel mentioned these figures to you

10 which doesn't marry with his testimony?

11 A. He said those figures to General Morillon in my presence, in

12 French, and it was during the heaviest period of the people trying to run

13 across the airport.

14 Q. Very well. I can just take note of what you said.

15 Do you know, Witness, if you knew him who was a certain name

16 called Caco?

17 A. No, I am not -- I don't recall the name.

18 Q. Thank you.

19 I am going to have you look at a document numbered 136, with the

20 assistance of Madam Usher.

21 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22 MR. WAESPI: One point, Mr. President.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr Waespi.

24 MR. WAESPI: As a matter of courtesy, before the witness is

25 asked, I guess even shown a potential exhibit, and even more before he

Page 10002

1 starts to read, let me please have a copy of the proposed exhibit.

2 JUDGE ORIE: I think they are provided to you, but it is just the

3 logistics in the courtroom that cause the problem at this very moment.

4 But it have been solved as far as I see.

5 THE WITNESS: Mr. President, there is some advice I would like to

6 ask you.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Would you -- is it of such a nature that you can do

8 it in public or is there anything specific that --

9 THE WITNESS: There is some information regarding the last

10 exhibits of which were given to me and which I read out, which I believe

11 are pertinent to the interpretation of those exhibits.

12 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. I don't

13 know whether we can come back to that, but considering the time and that

14 I would like to keep to the time, I suggest that we go on to other

15 matters and then possibly later we can come back to this.

16 JUDGE ORIE: I think the witness asked advice at this very

17 moment. Of course, we will take that into account and measuring your

18 time which, as you indicated, is not very much any more. So we can do it

19 in public. What would you like to -- what advice would you like to ask

20 us?

21 THE WITNESS: I would like to ask you whether I may say something

22 about the way that the reports were compiled which I read out just now.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If you think that these are sit-reps, I think

24 whatever clarification you would like to give, we will listen to it, but

25 these are not sit-reps, although they may be based on sit-reps. So if it

Page 10003

1 is of any relevance, please tell us. But these are not sit-reps you just

2 read out.

3 THE WITNESS: Yes. I believe I know where those documents came

4 from, and they are compiled based on the UN sit-reps. The UN sit-reps are

5 largely compiled from the reports by the United Nations military observers

6 who were stationed around the city. And when those observers are resting

7 and not expecting any particular activity, they do not catch the activity

8 and do not report the activity. And I know that in a number of occasions,

9 like, for example, the attack on the 31st of October, 1992, the observers

10 did not catch the majority of the events. And if you were to conduct an

11 analysis of the reports of -- by the observers, you would not get an

12 accurate reflection of the combat activity that went on in and around

13 Sarajevo. You would have an indication but it would not be a totally

14 accurate one.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for your clarification.

16 Please proceed, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

17 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

18 Q. Witness, at the end of this document, 136, we have a page which

19 has a number, 161, and I would like you to have a look at this very last

20 page of the document. Did you find that page?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Is it true that what it says here under column "gas" corresponds

23 to, in your memory, to the reality which is that the fact that the

24 infrastructures of gas distribution were not destroyed but were in

25 operational conditions, in a state of working relatively normally?

Page 10004

1 A. My understanding was that the gas supplies were turned off,

2 either inside Bosnian Serb-held territory or in Serbia itself. There was

3 some damage to the actual distribution system inside Sarajevo and

4 immediately around it. But the pressure of the gas was so low, basically

5 because it had been turned off, that very little gas came through.

6 Sometimes the gas was opened and then higher pressure built up, but it was

7 never for more than a couple of days at a time.

8 Q. Thank you. Sir, this document says that about 5.000 apartments

9 were connected to the gas network without authorisation. Did you know

10 about this?

11 A. No, I have no information of that.

12 Q. Very well.

13 Now, could you please read the very last sentence of the first

14 paragraph under "standard of living."

15 A. "Pumps at -- "

16 Q. [In English] No, no, no. "Standard of living." At the top of

17 the page, please.

18 A. "UNHCR can however"?

19 Q. No.

20 A. "There is no starvation among the population."

21 Q. Yes. [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you.

22 I would like to go to another subject in the few minutes that we

23 have left.

24 Sir, you said that you were present when there were shots --

25 there were indiscriminate shots fired. Do you remember that?

Page 10005

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Very well.

3 Sir, could you tell us a location, for instance, a specific

4 location where such firing occurred?

5 A. It happened in many occasions along the routes from the residency

6 to headquarters Sector Sarajevo and between headquarters Sector Sarajevo

7 and the airport.

8 Q. Thank you. Sir, you are talking about a route. Is it true --

9 A. I mean --

10 Q. Just a moment, please. Thank you.

11 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

12 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Sir, you were talking about a route. Is it true that in military

14 technique, communication route, an act of communication, a route could be

15 considered a military -- legitimate military target in times of war?

16 A. It is not the route which is the military target, it is that

17 which uses the route.

18 Q. Are you saying that a bridge would not be a military target?

19 A. A bridge would be a military target if logistics were being

20 carried across it.

21 Q. Very well. And so a bridge being part of a route, of a road, so

22 if we say that the road, if it has military purpose, would then be a

23 military target, right?

24 A. The circumstances would depend.

25 Q. Very well. I am talking about the principle.

Page 10006

1 A. In general, yes.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 Sir, could you please give us an example in a city, in one

4 location where you were present when there was a shelling that could be

5 described as indiscriminate shelling?

6 A. Yes. When I was at the residency, on many days, I could hear

7 shells landing within 300, 400 metres of the residency and we sometimes

8 had to take cover inside the residency because shells were landing close

9 enough to make us take cover.

10 Q. Very well.

11 But, could you please tell me a location, an address, a precise

12 address?

13 A. No, I cannot tell you an address because, if I could, then I would

14 not be here today because the shell would have landed on me.

15 Q. Sir, you could have passed by the location the following day, you

16 could have seen the traces of the shell and we still would have had the

17 pleasure of seeing you here today.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

19 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Just three more minutes,

20 Mr. President.

21 JUDGE ORIE: I said I would strictly keep you to it.

22 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation]

23 Q. So, sir, simply, could you, before this Chamber, categorically

24 exclude that there was no mobile military target at that location, nor

25 possibly one of these HQs that you did not know of, that you did not know

Page 10007

1 of their existence?

2 A. What I can say is --

3 Q. No. My question, I am sorry, is very simple: Could you exclude

4 the possibility, categorically exclude, yes or no?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Thank you very much.

7 Sir, I would, in the same line of questioning, I would like to ask

8 you to tell me if you know the person called Lars-Eric Wahlgren?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Do you know if this person said in Sarajevo there were the

11 following: [In English] "A large number of military installation and

12 therefore it would have been very difficult to have made it a

13 demilitarised zone."

14 A. I have no knowledge of that.

15 Q. [Interpretation] Thank you very much. Very last question. Sir,

16 in relation to the incident of Prime Minister Mr. Turajlic who arrived at

17 the airport, first of all, we have testimony of high-rank officers that it

18 was not always possible to have surveillance and control of all the

19 members of an army. Is that what you could confirm?

20 A. That seems an obvious statement to me.

21 Q. Yes, to the Defence as well, and I thank you for it. Thank you

22 very much.

23 Now, as far as the incident is concerned, do you know that the

24 man who fired these shots was a man who was, in fact, mentally disturbed?

25 A. No, I did not know that. That is not what General Mladic told

Page 10008

1 General Morillon.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, your time is over. You said your

3 very last question.

4 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Indeed. Indeed, it is this

5 one.

6 Q. But you yourself, sir, were you there at that time and did you

7 attend this event?

8 A. Do you mean when General Mladic told General Morillon --

9 Q. No. I mean the actual incident at the airport.

10 A. No, I was not. I was at the residency at the time.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That was your last question.

12 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Is there any need to re-examine the witness,

14 Mr. Waespi?

15 MR. WAESPI: Yes, Mr. President, very briefly and with your leave,

16 my colleague, Mark Ierace, would add a couple of questions if that would

17 be allowed.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We allowed that several times to the Defence.

19 It is the first time you asked for it. Please proceed.

20 MR. WAESPI: Thank you very much, Mr. President.

21 Re-examined by Mr. Waespi:

22 Q. Mr. Tucker, I just want to ask you to keep on reading of a small

23 number of statements you had to read out by the Defence. The first one

24 was the potential Defence exhibit - I think it was the last one which was

25 shown to you - the cover page carries the UN symbol, and if you can go to

Page 10009

1 the last page, it started, "standard of living." And you were asked to

2 read out the first sentence, "There is no -- " I quote: "There is no

3 starvation among the population." So could you please keep on reading.

4 A. I continue: "They survive on what the human relief organisations

5 give them and on what they grow themselves in gardens and even balconies."

6 Q. Yes, thank you, Mr. Tucker. Perhaps it is of assistance if you

7 can go to the bottom of the page and try to read out perhaps the author

8 and the dates of the reference.

9 A. The author is Captain Timerman, a United Nations military

10 observer from headquarters Sarajevo, on the 11th of September, 1993.

11 Q. The next page I would like you to refer to is potential Defence

12 Exhibit 132. If the witness could be provided, in fact, with all the

13 exhibits that the Defence had given him. The first one would be number

14 132. You have been asked, I think, about the top narrative of events

15 number 1446. I would like you to read out the next paragraph, which is

16 1447.

17 A. I read 1447: "Sarajevo radio reported intense shelling of the

18 Novi Grad district. Over 50 shells were reported to have fallen on

19 Stari Grad late in the afternoon and in the evening. It said that the

20 Hrasno district was shelled by mortars, tanks and anti-aircraft fire.

21 Street fighting was also reported in the Dobrinja and Vojnicko Polje

22 districts."

23 Q. Thank you, Mr. Tucker. And then on the same page you were asked

24 about the 7th of January, 1993, and you read out about combat --

25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

Page 10010

1 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I just have to interrupt

2 because it did not appear in the French translation, that Vojnicko Polje,

3 the army field district.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I do understand that is corrected now.

5 Please proceed, Mr. Waespi.

6 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.

7 Q. You were asked about the part, I quote: "combat and shelling

8 activity," and then you read out "not specified." Can I ask you to read

9 out what it says a few lines further down about casualties.

10 A. "Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that two

11 people were killed and 25 wounded on this day."

12 Q. Thank you.

13 I would like you to go to the next page that is the potential

14 Exhibit number 135. You were asked here to talk about military activity.

15 If you go down further that page to number 1395, it starts with, I

16 quote, "several large explosions." If you could read this part out,

17 please.

18 A. I read 1395: "Several large explosions rocked the centre of the

19 Sarajevo in the morning. Sarajevo radio said Serb-fired shells landed in

20 the compound of the Kosevo hospital near Morillon's residence."

21 MR. WAESPI: Thank you very much, Mr. President. Now Mr. Ierace

22 has a few questions.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Ierace.

24 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.

25 Re-examined by Mr. Ierace:

Page 10011

1 Q. Mr. Tucker, you told us this morning that you consulted some

2 notes in order to determine the date of the incident that you discussed

3 with Mr. Itani. Could you tell us, firstly, what notes you consulted in

4 order to determine that date?

5 A. I consulted some notes at the back of a diary which I held when I

6 was in Srebrenica.

7 Q. When were you in Srebrenica, between what dates?

8 A. I was in Srebrenica from around the 6th of -- 5th of 6th of March,

9 1992 through to the end of March 1992, the 30th or the 31st of March.

10 Sorry, 1993. The 31st of March, 1993.

11 Q. All right. Do you have that note with you in court today?

12 A. No, I do not.

13 Q. Is it back at your hotel?

14 A. It is.

15 Q. If I could just summarise what you have told us. As I understand

16 it, you consulted some notes at the back of a diary which you held when

17 you were in Srebrenica, and you were in Srebrenica from the 5th or 6th of

18 March, 1993 until the 30th or 31st of March, 1993; is that correct?

19 A. That is correct.

20 Q. Do you believe that you made that entry that you consulted while

21 you were in Srebrenica?

22 A. No, I do not.

23 Q. Was there any indication with the note as to when, that is, the

24 date, that you made the entry?

25 A. No, I don't believe so.

Page 10012

1 Q. When you say that the person you had the conversation with was

2 Mr. Itani, was that --

3 A. It was not with Major Itani that I had the conversation. The

4 conversation was with a British Army sergeant major who had been

5 involved with the investigation together with Major Itani, and it was

6 this British sergeant Major who I met in headquarters 1st UK Armoured

7 Division in Germany in, I think, late 1994/1995.

8 Q. What was the name of the British Army sergeant major?

9 A. I can't remember his name. He was the -- he was an artillery

10 intelligence sergeant major who had been deployed with one of the

11 Cymbeline [phoen] mortar located radars in Sarajevo and he was an expert

12 in the technique of examining shell craters in order to identify from

13 where a shell had been fired, in order that counterbattery bombardment

14 could be carried out.

15 Q. All right. Are you saying then that this British Army sergeant

16 major told you that Major Itani, the Canadian artillery officer, had

17 carried out an investigation?

18 A. He said that -- the British Army sergeant major showed me a

19 report, a copy of this report, from that event, and my recollection is

20 that he had carried out that, he, the British Army sergeant major, had

21 carried out an investigation together with Major Itani.

22 Q. Did you meet Major Itani when you were in Sarajevo?

23 A. Yes, I did.

24 Q. And was he at one stage a member of General Morillon's staff?

25 A. That is correct.

Page 10013

1 Q. And when was it, if you know it, that Major Itani left Sarajevo?

2 A. I don't know. He was in Sarajevo when I left.

3 Q. You said that this British officer showed you a copy of a report,

4 and I think you said a report that the British Army officer had been

5 involved in, in terms of the investigation. Is that correct?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. Do you remember anything as to the nature of the report, in

8 particular, whether it was prepared by, or for, any particular agency?

9 A. I believe it was prepared for the UN.

10 Q. And what particular agency of the UN?

11 A. A military agency. It was not a civilian agency.

12 Q. To your knowledge, I think you have referred to two UN military

13 agencies in your evidence so far, being UNPROFOR and another agency which

14 perhaps is also a part of UNPROFOR, that is the UNMOs. Is that correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Are you aware of any other UN military agency that was operating

17 in Sarajevo at any stage of the conflict?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Does it therefore follow that the agency involved in the report

20 had to have been UNPROFOR?

21 A. That would be my assumption.

22 Q. All right.

23 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I note the time. I wish to obtain a

24 document to show the witness in re-examination. Would that be

25 convenient?

Page 10014

1 JUDGE ORIE: I think we would first have the break and see

2 whether there are any additional questions by the Bench. But after the

3 break, you could start to show a document to the witness. Of course, we

4 do not know what document it is, but you have an opportunity to find it

5 over the next half hour. We will adjourn until 11.00.

6 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

7 --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m

8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace -- Mr. Piletta-Zanin, yes?

9 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, very quickly.

10 You will have noted a few moments ago that we had not spoke about the

11 second incident or the first incident, depending on how you look at it,

12 regarding the market in our examination of the witness. Now, if the

13 Prosecution wishes ask new questions of the witness in relation to this,

14 the Defence reserves the right to respond.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Within certain time limits, if new evidence

16 comes up, then you will have an opportunity to respond.

17 Mr. Ierace.

18 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, in relation to that, it is my

19 submission that indeed the Defence did cross-examine about that issue,

20 but in any event, I will continue, Mr. President.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

22 MR. IERACE: I ask that the witness be shown Exhibit P2261. That

23 is the document which has already been tendered into evidence. In fact,

24 I think it is P2261A. That is the English version, and B is the

25 translation into B/C/S.

Page 10015

1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

2 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, the extent --

3 we don't hear the counsel. We didn't hear what the counsel said. He

4 hadn't his microphone switched on.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Could you please put the document on the ELMO, since

6 we have no copies at this very moment.

7 MR. IERACE:

8 Q. Mr. Tucker, I think part of the document is on the ELMO at the

9 moment. If you require an opportunity to leaf through the document in

10 order to answer my question, please say so.

11 My question is: Do you recognise this document?

12 A. I recognise neither of the documents which have been placed in

13 front of me.

14 Q. Do you have two documents in front of you?

15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. All right. In any event, in relation to the British officer that

17 you met and whose name you don't recall, can you assist us with any

18 further recollection you may have as to his identity?

19 A. Yes. I believe that this is not the event which I was talking

20 about. I do not see his name anywhere on this and this does not look

21 familiar. It must have been the marketplace attack in, I believe it was

22 August 1995 that I am referring to -- that I referred to.

23 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I ask that the document be returned.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Would you please assist.

25 MR. IERACE:

Page 10016

1 Q. Yesterday, you were asked this question and gave this answer in

2 cross-examination:

3 Question: "Did you, sir, however, see even smaller

4 elements that would correspond to private personal vehicles, are they

5 passenger vehicle like Golf, for instance, where there would be mortars

6 mounted on top of them? They would have been placed inside vehicles and

7 with which small units could move around that shoot for a while and then

8 move, then withdraw. Do you know anything about this?"

9 "Answer: Yes, I know that that happened. I did not see it myself,

10 but I read reports from our intelligence people who had had reports from

11 soldiers on the ground who had seen such vehicles and such people."

12 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. I would

13 like to ask to give us the quotation, precise quotation, and the line.

14 Because you will remember yesterday we had asked for a rectification.

15 JUDGE ORIE: I was wondering what question would come, so if it

16 would relate to that correction then. But it is as Mr. Ierace reads it.

17 That is how it was in the transcript yesterday. I have that very clear in

18 my mind.

19 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I will then ask you to rectify

20 it correct, please.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace, I think the intervention of

22 Mr. Piletta-Zanin relates to a -- well, some difficulties in the

23 translation yesterday which do not appear clearly in the transcript. So I

24 will wait until you have put your question to the witness, and if it is in

25 relation to that problem, I might intervene, but I will first let you go.

Page 10017

1 MR. IERACE: Certainly.

2 Q. Mr. Tucker, at a later point, there was some clarification

3 elicited from you as to your source or sources of information. My

4 question does not relate to that.

5 In the question you were asked, there were a number of separate

6 propositions and your answer did not deal with those separate

7 propositions. So --

8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace, if I may intervene. If you are pointing

9 at the difference between mortars mounted on a lorry or a small truck or

10 inside a car, "inside the car" was a rectification for a wrong

11 translation. So the question and the testimony of the witness was about

12 mortar in a personal vehicle. I don't know whether you are --

13 MR. IERACE: I won't take it any further, Mr. President, if that

14 has been clarified.

15 JUDGE ORIE: That was the issue that I think Mr. Piletta-Zanin --

16 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Exactly what I had thought and

17 I am at the -- always at the disposal of the Prosecution.

18 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...of the question

19 which was made after Mr. Piletta-Zanin asked for a better translation. So

20 inside a personal vehicle, and not mounted on the back of a small truck.

21 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President. One remaining issue.

22 Q. Mr. Tucker, you gave evidence in cross-examination as to the area

23 of accuracy of mortars, and the figure of 400 metres was mentioned. What

24 are the relevant aspects of the firing of mortars to the accuracy of

25 mortars?

Page 10018

1 A. There are a number of factors. If I start first with positioning

2 a mortar rigidly in one position so it is aimed at one spot and then fire

3 a whole series of shells from that same mortar aimed at one spot, those

4 shells will land in a long ellipse in the line that the mortar is

5 pointing. The length of the ellipse will be about eight times the width

6 of the ellipse, and the length of that ellipse depends upon the range at

7 which the mortar is firing. And roughly speaking, if you take the ratio

8 of the range together with the size of the mortar, in other words, a light

9 mortar, a 60-millimetre mortar, fired at the maximum range which is about

10 500, 600 metres, you will have quite a wide spread. Whereas a heavy

11 mortar fired at what is a much closer range will have a much smaller

12 ellipse. It will be more accurate.

13 The second aspect is how accurate your aim is. The first aspect

14 is a technical aspect. The second aspect is how accurate your aim is.

15 The difficulty with mortars, as for artillery, is obviously that from the

16 position you are firing, you can rarely actually see the targets. So you

17 have to carry out calculations about where to point the mortar or the

18 artillery gun. And your accuracy in selecting that can vary tremendously,

19 and that is the biggest cause of inaccuracy of mortars and artillery guns.

20 Now, a mortar, the sight system on the mortar is much more coarse

21 than the sight system on an artillery gun, which is much more precise.

22 And when the gun fires, it comes back into the same position much more

23 reliably. So it is the sighting of the weapon which can cause errors. I

24 have seen errors in training of two kilometres. That's not because it's a

25 mortar, a poor gun. That is simply because it was aimed at the wrong

Page 10019

1 direction.

2 If you add in the third factor, which is weather, because the

3 winds -- and the mortar fire is very high, unlike an artillery shell which

4 is much flatter, they are subject to the winds, and again to give you an

5 example, on training, I have seen shells moved just by the wind about 600,

6 700 metres from where they were meant to land.

7 Q. Thank you for that.

8 A. They are very inaccurate.

9 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Ierace.

11 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] No further intervention from

12 my side.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Some one or more questions will be put to you by

14 Judge Nieto-Navia.

15 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: Thank you, Mr. President.

16 Questioned by the Court:

17 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: Yesterday, you mentioned as part of the

18 tactics of the BSA the house-to-house fighting. Could you elaborate a

19 little bit on that?

20 A. The house-to-house fighting tactics, the BSA used in the Otes and

21 Stup areas, were carried out by regular, that is, professional,

22 well-trained infantry. House-to-house fighting is a very difficult

23 activity to carry out competently. It is much easier to defend, with

24 little training, than it is to attack. To attack successfully, you have

25 to do a lot of training. I have done this myself. The technique is where

Page 10020

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Page 10021

1 you have to identify which the next house is that you want to attack. You

2 need to bring it under fire from several other points so that you have

3 got covering fire. You then bring people under the covering fire to the

4 outside of the building. You then enter the building, preferably through

5 a wall because you don't want to come in through the window or the door,

6 and I am now talking about the training that undergo in the British Army.

7 You then enter the building and clear it room by room, and it

8 takes a lot of ammunition, a lot of discipline, a lot of communication and

9 a lot of training. And the reports which came to us from the

10 United Nations military observers and from headquarters Sector Sarajevo

11 indicated that these were the tactics which were being employed by the BSA

12 in the attacks around Stup-Otes.

13 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: How can the civilian population be affected

14 by that?

15 A. Very badly. Anybody living, it would be virtually impossible to

16 live as a civilian in an area where that kind of fighting is going on.

17 You would not survive.

18 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: Yesterday, we saw the agreement between the

19 military command creating some corridors for freedom of movement. I would

20 like to know if those corridors are the same so-called "blue routes."

21 A. No, those are different. The blue roads are routes from way down

22 to the south -- to the south and south-west of Sarajevo, leading up to

23 Sarajevo and into Sarajevo. By memory, it was roughly, 20, 30, 40

24 kilometres long. Whereas the corridors that I am talking about which the

25 mixed military working group was dealing with in early December 1992, were

Page 10022

1 much smaller corridors around Sarajevo airport. I can give you more

2 detail. I can sketch roughly what those corridors were, if you like.

3 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: No, I don't think that is necessary. Thank

4 you.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Judge El Mahdi also has one or more questions to you.

6 JUDGE EL MAHDI: Thank you, Mr. President.

7 [Interpretation] In relation to what you have told us about firing

8 coming from the surroundings of the Kosevo hospital, you told us that you

9 received information from two sources. Firstly, from a sergeant, a

10 British sergeant, and then from journalists. Was it a single incident or

11 was it something which was reproduced covering firing involving against

12 the hospital from the surroundings?

13 A. It is -- it was a complex situation. The sergeant told me about

14 one specific incident that he saw with his own eyes. The sergeant also

15 told me that he believed that that activity was carrying on from Kosevo

16 hospital, in other words, that firing out of the grounds of Kosevo

17 hospital was taking place. Because on a number of occasions -- because he

18 delivered fuel twice a week to Kosevo hospital. On a number of occasions,

19 he was halted by Bosniaks a short distance away from the hospital and

20 told to wait, and then he heard firing. And then he was allowed to

21 proceed to the hospital, and there was nothing there. It was that

22 sergeant's supposition that firing from out of the hospital had taken

23 place.

24 The press told me about an incident when shelling had happened of

25 Kosevo hospital which they witnessed from close hand, and my sergeant said

Page 10023

1 that he believed that firing from Kosevo hospital had happened shortly

2 before that.

3 It is not something that I witnessed first-hand. It is my belief

4 and supposition from these various sources that firing by mobile Bosniak

5 mortars from within the grounds of Kosevo hospital was something that

6 happened a lot more than once. Whether it happened daily or once a week

7 or -- that, I cannot say. The only other thing that I can say is that we,

8 that General Morillon, tackled the head of Kosevo hospital, asking him,

9 "Why do you allow this to happen? Why do you not protest to the

10 Presidency or to the ABiH?" And he denied any knowledge of that

11 happening.

12 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Yes. When you say, "from out of

13 the hospital," you don't mean from the hospital itself, but from the

14 surroundings of the hospital? It is not from the hospital. The shooting

15 did not come from the hospital itself or from vehicles that may have been

16 parked in the area of the hospital, the surrounding area of the hospital?

17 A. Kosevo hospital is not one single building. It is a whole

18 complex of buildings, and between those buildings there are parking areas,

19 grass areas. And when I say the firing was from Kosevo hospital, I mean

20 it was from those areas between the buildings of Kosevo hospital.

21 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Was it the only hospital in

22 Sarajevo or were there other hospitals in Sarajevo, too?

23 A. There were other hospitals in Sarajevo as well.

24 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] As far as you know, were the

25 other hospitals also used in the same manner, that is to say, the

Page 10024

1 surrounded -- that firing would come from the surrounding area of those

2 hospitals or was it only the case of the surrounding area of the Kosevo

3 hospital that firing was carried out in the other hospitals, too?

4 A. I must answer in several steps. The first step is to say that I

5 have no knowledge of such firing from the proximity of other hospitals in

6 Sarajevo. Secondly, the other hospitals in Sarajevo were very different

7 types of building. Kosevo hospital was the only hospital which was spread

8 out over quite a large area. The other hospitals were solid, single

9 buildings, with a small building next to it, maybe. So they did

10 not lend themselves to the kind of tactic. The third thing is that the

11 head of Kosevo hospital was known to us as a radical hardliner and was

12 someone who we believed would have certainly supported this kind of tactic

13 in the greater interest, as he saw it, of supporting the Bosniak cause,

14 whereas the directors of the other hospitals were, in our view,

15 much more medically focused and refused to have anything to do with the

16 kind of action that the director of Kosevo hospital, in our view,

17 participated in.

18 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] And the other hospitals, as far

19 as you know, were they also the object of firing, or were they spared?

20 A. I have no specific knowledge that they were either targeted or

21 spared. What I do know is that in reports of firing, it was always Kosevo

22 hospital which came up, never the other hospitals.

23 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] You said that there were factions

24 that were not necessarily subject to a hierarchy, subjected to a

25 hierarchy, and that is why you advised the journalists to leave the

Page 10025

1 premises, the city, in fact. I wouldn't say "to your knowledge," but

2 according to your assumptions, the shooting that came from the surrounding

3 area of the hospital, that came out of the hospital, was -- did it come

4 from those that were not subordinated to the hierarchy, as one would say?

5 A. I cannot confirm that but it is very plausible and it would be

6 my belief that that was likely.

7 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Your Honour. Microphone, please.

8 Could you please switch on your microphone.

9 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] My question relates to the gas

10 bottle incident, that is, bottles filled with powder or material which

11 could be used to military ends. Was this the object of an investigation

12 by your services? Have there been any traces, any documents that would

13 confirm that the incidents took place and who was responsible for it?

14 A. We heard about the incident at a meeting with the directors of

15 the hospitals of Sarajevo. When they complained or they stated to us

16 that they were very anxious about the lack of oxygen, when we asked them,

17 "Why is there a shortage of oxygen," they then said to us, "It is because

18 the humanitarian aid agency which brings in the bottles of oxygen is

19 being prevented from doing that by the Serbs."

20 We then asked: "Why are the Serbs preventing bringing in bottles

21 of oxygen?" And we were told that it is because they found a bottle of

22 oxygen to contain explosives, not oxygen. That is when we became

23 involved, and we did not carry out any investigation to this incident

24 because it had already happened and we had not been notified about it at

25 the time. What we did instigate was to require the humanitarian aid

Page 10026

1 agency which brought in those oxygen bottles, because it was a specialised

2 medical humanitarian agency of some kind, we requested UNHCR to ensure

3 that we, UNPROFOR forces, were able to inspect oxygen bottles before they

4 were brought in. We then spoke with General Mladic, to tell him that we

5 had taken that step and would he please allow the supply of oxygen bottles

6 into Sarajevo to be continued and not to be interrupted.

7 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Did this result in a lifting of

8 the restrictions in regard to oxygen supplies to the city?

9 A. To my knowledge, it did, because we didn't hear any more requests

10 from the directors of the hospitals for oxygen. And we, therefore,

11 assumed that it must have been addressed and resolved.

12 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Thank you, sir.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tucker, I have a few questions for you as well.

14 Yesterday, you testified about firing of mortars from the Kosevo

15 hospital grounds and you used the expression on a number of occasions and

16 you clarified that. You also testified about shelling your own people,

17 you remember that BiH, and you also used the expression, that you "had

18 strong circumstantial evidence that on a number of occasions this would

19 have happened."

20 May I ask you to clarify whether "on a number of occasions" is

21 the same number, or what is "a number of occasions" in this respect?

22 A. In this respect, it was two occasions: One was the cemetery

23 attack which happened before I arrived in Sarajevo and the second one

24 was the marketplace event at which we spoke earlier.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So it was on two occasions.

Page 10027

1 THE WITNESS: Two occasions, yes.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much.

3 Yesterday, you told us that General Morillon asked General Mladic

4 to stop his artillery from firing into cities and towns and at civilians.

5 And your answer continued that "General Morillon said on many occasions --

6 said this on many occasions and that General Mladic usually responded by

7 saying something along the lines of his heavy weapons being equivalent to

8 the Bosniak infantry. His forces had few infantry but many

9 heavy weapons, whereas the Bosniaks had a lot of infantry, but few heavy

10 weapons."

11 The remarks of General Morillon were about attacks on towns and

12 civilians. The response is, if I understand your answer well, is not

13 specifically limited to attacks on civilians but just describes a -- well,

14 could describe a combat situation as well. I mean, if you say, we have

15 more heavy weaponry, it doesn't mean you use it to fire on civilians.

16 Could you elaborate a bit more on the relation between the answer? Was it

17 an evasive answer, in your view, or was it an answer responding to attacks

18 on civilians, so that we have to understand the answer in the sense that

19 he would use heavy weaponry against civilians?

20 It is not quite clear to me. Could you elaborate on that a bit

21 more?

22 A. The answer is multi-layered [Realtime transcript read in

23 error "multi-led"]. I believe that General Mladic's response to General

24 Morillon was at a number of levels. At the first level, Mladic was

25 expressing his anxiety about his weakness in lack of infantry. Secondly,

Page 10028

1 General Mladic was expressing frustration that the

2 international media and international condemnation was coming for the

3 highly-visible attacks by artillery, whereas the media were never present

4 or never noticed when the Bosniaks carried out infantry attacks, which he

5 then had to defend using his heavy artillery because he didn't have the

6 infantry.

7 At the third level, General Mladic was being -- was avoiding the

8 question because there were two levels of activity. The first level is

9 what I would describe as, "legitimate military activity." And

10 by "legitimate," I mean that it is acceptable to understand two military

11 forces fighting against each other. I am not by that implying that the

12 fighting in Bosnia was legitimate. That is a different issue and not one

13 that I am able to judge on.

14 But there is a second issue which was never discussed, and that is

15 that analysis of the targets that were used, that were fired against,

16 indicates very strongly that the heavy artillery was not being used

17 principally against military targets, but was being used in order to

18 terrorise the civilian population in order to apply pressure against the

19 local civil authorities supposed to be looking after those civilians, and

20 to apply pressure against the Bosniak authorities.

21 And the reason that I say that is that it is entirely

22 illegitimate, in my view, to be using artillery or mortars which have the

23 inaccuracies which have been described just now in order to try and attack

24 so-called military targets consisting of one building or one vehicle or

25 somewhere when the ability of artillery or mortar, mortars, to hit that

Page 10029

1 target are negligible and the chances of that artillery or mortars of

2 hitting the surrounding civilian houses is 99.9 per cent.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for your answer. So you say as far as the

4 question was specifically related to the attacks on civilians, the answer

5 was evasive. That was that part of the question.

6 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I apologise for interrupting. Before

7 you move on to the next question, the transcript at page 47, line 12, has

8 the witness saying that his answer was "multi-led." I think that should

9 be multi-layered, "l-a-y-e-r-e-d" ending. Thank you.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that is how I understood it. But I didn't look

11 at the transcript.

12 The last question is you have told us about one of the tasks

13 performed was to discuss issues of restoring utilities: gas, water

14 supply, electricity. Could you tell us whether the parties were

15 cooperative if it came to restoring these utilities, whether both parties

16 behaved similarly or differently? Could you elaborate a bit more on

17 that?

18 A. Utilities were something which General Morillon considered very

19 important, and at the meetings at which utility repair was discussed, both

20 sides were entirely cooperative. These meetings were very complex because

21 you needed to bring to one place, at one time, both technicians who had

22 the right knowledge and a ceasefire that was agreed by both sides,

23 and the technicians needed to know a safe route through the minefields in

24 order to reach the area that they needed to carry out repairs.

25 When we looked at what happened on the ground, the cooperation

Page 10030

1 which we received from the Bosnian Serb authorities was generally of a

2 high order. The cooperation we received from the Bosniak local

3 commanders varied considerably, and it was our belief that in some areas

4 where the Presidency authorities had high control, things generally went

5 well. But there were other areas where the local commanders were radical,

6 and from the perspective of general discipline and obedience, were

7 unreliable, that all sorts of tricks were used in order to prevent the

8 repairs from taking place.

9 JUDGE ORIE: I am trying to understand this. The supplies of

10 water, electricity and gas, also served their own population. What was

11 the specific reason why they would play tricks which would result in not

12 restoring the supplies when their own population would suffer from it?

13 Do you have any explanation about that?

14 A. I do have an explanation and it is as follows: There were

15 elements within the Bosnian leadership who believed that the only way to

16 take back that which had been taken from them by the Bosnian Serbs, that

17 could only happen by either international intervention in Bosnia or by

18 the provision of arms and ammunition to Bosnia, which was not possible at

19 that time because of the arms embargo. Those people believed that the

20 only way to secure such international assistance was to depict the

21 situation in Sarajevo to be so severe that the international community

22 would be -- would be willing to intervene. Therefore, it was not in their

23 interest to see any improvement in the situation in Sarajevo. It was not

24 in their interest to see any -- to see the lot of the civilian population

25 improve. To put it bluntly, the more suffering, the better because that

Page 10031

1 played to the television cameras and would ultimately lead to the pressure

2 that they wanted in order to achieve international intervention.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Would that be, in three words, exploitation of

4 misery?

5 A. Could you say that again, sir?

6 JUDGE ORIE: Would that be, in three words, exploitation of

7 misery?

8 A. Absolutely, sir.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for your answer.

10 Mr. Tucker, this concludes your testimony in this court, unless

11 Mr. Piletta-Zanin asks permission to put additional questions to you.

12 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, the tradition says that I

13 should ask your leave, Mr. President.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Is it a subject touched upon by the Bench?

15 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, I believe so,

16 Mr. President.

17 JUDGE ORIE: We will listen to your questions. Please proceed.

18 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

19 Further cross-examination by Mr. Piletta-Zanin:

20 Q. [Interpretation] Very briefly, sir, you said earlier in page 48,

21 line 6 and 7, that the artillery of the Serb forces was not used in

22 principal on military targets. Do you remember that?

23 A. Yes, I do.

24 Q. I would like to ask you a question which is the following, in

25 three parts: Isn't it true to say that the destruction of -- most

Page 10032

1 important material damage that was caused of property happened in areas

2 like Otes. Is that a yes or a no?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. Thank you. Then in areas like Dobrinja, would you say yes or no?

5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. Thank you. And in, generally speaking, in areas along

7 confrontation lines like, for instance, the area that we mentioned earlier

8 which is called Vojnicko Polje or military field, is that also true?

9 A. That is also true.

10 Q. Thank you. Now, Witness, is it true to say that these

11 destructions occurred due to artillery fire, as a principal, principally

12 speaking?

13 A. I would not be able to answer that. Specifically, I would say

14 that it would be a combination of artillery fire and what I call direct

15 fire. To explain my language, artillery fire is indirect fire. It fires

16 over. You do not see the target you are firing at. Whereas direct fire

17 fires in a straight line and you can see the target you are firing at. So

18 a tank would be direct fire, whereas artillery is indirect.

19 Q. Very well. So when you are talking -- when you said earlier about

20 artillery fire, artillery shots, you were only talking about indirect

21 fire?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. Very well. Now, isn't it true, however, to say that as far as you

24 know that, in Sarajevo, indirect firing or direct firing, the most

25 substantial damage was produced in areas near or around the lines of

Page 10033

1 confrontation?

2 A. In general, you are correct. However, there are some areas inside

3 Sarajevo which experienced very concentrated fire and --

4 Q. Indeed. Indeed. But I believe that you answered my question.

5 The very last question in relation to the exploitation of misery: You

6 confirmed earlier that there was exploitation of misery; do you remember

7 that?

8 A. Yes, I do.

9 Q. Do you think that this exploitation of misery became a political

10 calculation?

11 A. I believe it had to have been.

12 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] No further questions,

13 Mr. President.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Piletta-Zanin. As I said before, this

15 will conclude your testimony in this court. I thank you very much for

16 having come and having answered all the questions of both the parties and

17 the Bench, and I would like to ask the usher to escort you out of the

18 courtroom.

19 [The witness withdrew]

20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace.

21 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, we seek to tender the four documents

22 which are on the exhibit list.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Two under seal, as far as I see.

24 Madam Registrar, would you please guide us through the documents

25 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. The first document which was

Page 10034

1 tendered the 17th of June, 2002, is Prosecutor's Exhibit 397, under seal,

2 and it is a reported dated 15 November, 1992. We have the second document

3 tendered 17 June, 2002, as Prosecutor's Exhibit 577, under seal, and that

4 is a communications from BH Command dated 24, 25th December, 1992.

5 Prosecutor's Exhibit 530 is an agreement of 13th December, 1992.

6 Prosecutor's Exhibit 653 is a newspaper article of 9 January,

7 1993.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could you please continue with the Defence

9 exhibits as well? I think it starts with D132.

10 THE REGISTRAR: Correct, Your Honour. Defence Exhibit 132 is

11 S1994/674, annex 6, and it is page 415.

12 Defence Exhibit 133 is S/1994/674, annex 6, page 414.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I think the next two, 134 and 135, have the same

14 description but are different pages, that is page 404 and page 405.

15 THE REGISTRAR: Correct, Your Honour. And the last exhibit, D136,

16 is an UNMO briefing dated 16 November, 1993.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Since there are no objections, they are

18 all admitted into evidence; 397 and 577 under seal.

19 Mr. Ierace, are you ready to call your next witness? And if -- I

20 can imagine that you would also like to inform the Court, perhaps not

21 today but perhaps at a later stage, about the new scheduling, I don't know

22 whether you prepared it in writing or not, which is usually more

23 efficient in the courtroom. If you would like to present that, I would

24 rather do that at the end of today, let's say the last 10 minutes of

25 today's hearing, and perhaps if you are then still examining the next

Page 10035

1 witness, that you would stop in time in order to have some remaining time

2 to inform the Chamber.

3 MR. IERACE: I will do that Mr. President. I will have copies

4 available. Firstly, I seek the Court's indulgence. Mr. Waespi had a

5 plane to catch and that is why he left earlier. I have present with me

6 Kirsten Cresswell from the OTP, who will assist me with the next witness.

7 Before I --

8 JUDGE ORIE: Welcome in the courtroom, Miss Cresswell.

9 MR. IERACE: Before I come to the next witness, Mr. President, I

10 understand that the Defence are in some difficulties in relation to their

11 expert attending on Friday to hear the evidence of Mr. Zecevic. I

12 understand further that the difficulty involves him obtaining a visa. I

13 wonder whether the good officers of the Registry may be able to assist in

14 that so as to ensure there is no disruption of the evidence of the

15 witness.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, the visa is the problem?

17 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. I thank

18 the Prosecution for coming to Defence's assistance.

19 JUDGE ORIE: You asked already the intervention of the Registry

20 in order to obtain --

21 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, not yet. I

22 spoke to the Victims and Witness Service and also with the OLAD service

23 and I have spoken to Mr. Ierace, and I wanted to see if worse came to

24 worse, if the witness could be moved to another day. It may happen that

25 it would be possible to obtain a visa for other expert, which I will know

Page 10036

1 either this evening or tomorrow morning. I haven't spoken to the Registry

2 yet, but if that can speed matters up, that we are actively involved in

3 doing this.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Could you ask OLAD to inform, perhaps through the

5 intermediary of the senior legal officer, the Chamber this afternoon on

6 how things are so that we can keep a close eye on it and that we don't

7 waste time on technicalities.

8 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I will do that at the next

9 break.

10 MR. IERACE: I call Francis Briquemont.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, could you please escort the witness into the

12 courtroom.

13 Yes, Ms. Pilipovic.

14 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would like to avail

15 myself of this opportunity, if that is -- if you would allow me.

16 When we are talking about experts -- I am sorry, the microphone isn't

17 working quite well.

18 Your Honour, I will leave it for the end of our day, after the

19 scheduling. Thank you.

20 [The witness entered court]

21 WITNESS: FRANCIS BRIQUEMENT

22 [Witness answered through interpreter]

23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Briquemont, I presume?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Briquemont, before giving testimony in this

Page 10037

1 court, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence require you to make a solemn

2 declaration that you will speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing

3 but the truth. May I invite you to make that declaration. The text will

4 be handed out to you by the usher.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

6 speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

7 JUDGE ORIE: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. You may sit

8 down.

9 [In English] Mr. Ierace, please proceed.

10 You will first be examined by counsel for the Prosecution.

11 Examined by Mr. Ierace:

12 Q. Mr. Briquemont, are you a retired general from the Belgian Army?

13 A. Yes, I am.

14 Q. In relation to the latter part of your -- firstly, did you serve

15 for in excess of 40 years in the Belgian Army before retiring?

16 A. That is right, yes.

17 Q. In relation to the latter part of your military career, were you

18 promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General on the 26th of March, 1993?

19 A. That is right, yes.

20 Q. Were you appointed Commander of the Belgian Intervention Force

21 and Commander-in-Chief of the Belgian forces in Germany on the 29th of

22 June, 1993?

23 A. Yes, I was.

24 Q. On 12 July, 1993, did you take up the position of Commander of the

25 forces of the United Nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

Page 10038

1 A. Yes, I did.

2 Q. Did you remain in that position until the 24th of January, 1994?

3 A. Yes, I did.

4 Q. In taking up that position, did you take over from General

5 Morillon?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And were you succeeded by General Sir Michael Rose?

8 A. Yes, it was General Rose who was my successor.

9 Q. During your tenure as commander, were you based at the forward

10 headquarters in Sarajevo?

11 A. I was mainly based in the headquarters in Sarajevo and also in

12 part in Kiseljak where the Main Staff was.

13 Q. Was your force Commander General Cot from France, and was he based

14 at Zagreb?

15 A. Yes, that is right.

16 Q. In relation to your man --

17 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I apologise.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

19 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] No, I withdraw that. Thank

20 you.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace.

22 MR. IERACE:

23 Q. In relation to your mandate, General, please accept that we have

24 heard evidence already as to the mandate of UNPROFOR at other times. Was

25 there a resolution passed by -- adopted by the Security Council on the 4th

Page 10039

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Page 10040

1 of June, 1993, being Resolution 836, which related to your mandate from

2 the time of the beginning of your tenure?

3 A. Yes. I know Resolution 836 very well, which became very

4 inapplicable for the simple reason that it was a very ambiguous

5 resolution, and on the other hand, what was promised, the means promised

6 by the Security Council, the mission that was designed in Resolution 836,

7 that never arrived to me. So if Mr. President will allow me, I can refer

8 to what I say of the Resolution 836 in the book which I wrote five years

9 ago.

10 Q. All right. Before you do that, can I ask you this: Did the

11 resolution refer to certain safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

12 A. Safe areas as defined by the resolution, which I do not have

13 before me, but these were zones of Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Zepa, Tuzla and

14 Gorazde.

15 Q. Did the resolution, as you understood it, authorise the use of

16 force in self-defence by United Nations military forces on the ground?

17 A. Resolution 836 authorised only use of force in legitimate defence,

18 only hypothetically and not only for the safe zones, safe areas.

19 Q. All right. Did you come to the view during your time in Sarajevo

20 in that position that you lacked the necessary military forces to protect

21 United Nations safe areas, including Sarajevo?

22 A. If I remember correctly, the Resolution 836 designed a kind of a

23 light version, and I never understood that as a General. They said it

24 would be 6.000 men. The only battalion which arrived in the beginning of

25 my mandate was the French Battalion, the 2nd French Battalion, which was

Page 10041

1 deployed in Sarajevo, and much later, parts of a battalion who was called

2 a Nordic battalion, Nordic-Bat. So what we believed or estimated, that

3 only to defend a safe area like Srebrenica, we would need at least a

4 brigade of 3.000 men. So, Mr. Ierace, a lack of resources or forces are

5 flagrant and I never received any reinforcements.

6 Q. Now, in your dealings with the political and military leadership

7 of the warring parties, did you stratify your command so that certain

8 persons in your command dealt with the same level on both sides or on all

9 sides of the warring parties?

10 A. That is right, Mr. Ierace. As soon as I arrived in Sarajevo, I

11 wanted to be the only interlocutor for the three political leaders and for

12 the three military commanders, for the simple reason that I wanted that we

13 always speak the same language, the same person would be speaking

14 to those who were responsible in political authority. My Chief of Staff

15 did the same with the Chief of Staff of the Serbs, that is

16 General Milovanovic.

17 As far as Sarajevo was concerned, the interlocutory of

18 General Soubirou, or at least from the time of his arrival in Sarajevo in

19 October, was General Galic.

20 And the battalions and battalion commanders were able to have a

21 relationship with local commanders, whether they were Bosnian Serbs -- if

22 you allow me to say Serb, Croat or Muslim, that will be a lot simpler. So

23 with local commanders of the three sides in order to attempt to calm the

24 situation on the ground.

25 Does that answer your question, Mr. Ierace?

Page 10042

1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

2 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. This is

3 just a translation point. On page 59, line 17, the text said, "all sides

4 of the warring parties" or something like that, and that is not -- cannot

5 be interpreted "on both sides of the line." The General spoke of the

6 three chiefs, the three sides, so that would have to be a distinction.

7 Yes, but I have to make this point.

8 JUDGE ORIE: I see, Mr. Briquemont, that you are having

9 difficulties in keeping your earphones on. If you just put them a bit

10 different, it will save you a lot of trouble.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Ierace.

13 MR. IERACE:

14 Q. Sir, who were your chiefs of staff during your time in Sarajevo

15 and therefore the officers who dealt with General Milovanovic?

16 A. I had two chiefs of staff. The first one from July to the end of

17 September, beginning of October, was British Brigadier Vere-Hayes, and the

18 second one until the end of my mandate was Brigadier Ramsey.

19 Q. Given your level of interaction, did you deal with

20 President Karadzic and General Mladic?

21 A. Yes, I did. And being the only one in Sarajevo, there was a

22 complete absence of political authority. I had to speak to the political

23 leaders and the military leaders. But, yes, that is correct.

24 Q. I will firstly ask you some questions about your dealings with

25 President Karadzic. How often did you meet with him?

Page 10043

1 A. It is difficult to answer your question very precisely. I had

2 many meetings with him: the end of July, the beginning of August, when we

3 signed several agreements, and the 30th of July and the 6th of August. In

4 any case, in early August, we signed two others as well. I saw him again

5 at the end of September, when everyone was hoping that the three sides

6 would accept the peace agreement of gentleman Lord Owen and

7 Mr. Stoltenberg, and I saw him again particularly in November and December

8 when the situation was deteriorating again in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And

9 particularly in the -- around Sarajevo, and this was also in relation to

10 the relations that we were trying to establish between the European

11 Community and the Serbs, which were nonexistent until then. And also due

12 to the arrival of Mr. Akashi, who was supposed to take over at the

13 beginning of JNA from Mr. Stoltenberg.

14 Does that answer your question?

15 Q. It more than answers the question. During the period that you

16 were in that position, can you tell us just briefly what were the

17 significant --

18 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President, so that

19 things are clear for the transcript, we do not have question-answer, so

20 perhaps it should be noticed so things are clear

21 JUDGE ORIE: That would have been something for the small yellow

22 papers, Mr. Piletta-Zanin. But please proceed.

23 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.

24 Q. During the period of your office, can you tell us briefly what

25 were the significant developments, if any, in relation to international

Page 10044

1 attempts to resolve the crisis?

2 A. When I arrived in Sarajevo, the situation was very tense, and

3 General Morillon at the time was trying to establish the limits of the

4 secure areas, areas of security. And during the month of July, I met all

5 of the military and political figures of authority in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

6 and from the 30th of July, in agreement with Mr. Stoltenberg, we tried to

7 calm the situation down on the ground. At the moment when we signed the

8 first agreement at the end of the July, the Serbs had launched a very

9 intense offensive to encircle Mount Igman. It was at that time that

10 Mr. Stoltenberg, who wanted very much to prepare a new agreement, a new

11 peace agreement, asked me to go and negotiate with Mr. Karadzic and Mr.

12 Mladic in order to stop the offensive on Mount Igman, open certain routes

13 and make it so, so that the UN forces can come between the Serbs and the

14 Muslims on Mount Igman.

15 Mr. Stoltenberg asked me at the same time to prepare the military

16 part of the peace agreement that he was hoping to sign as soon as

17 possible. The agreement on Mount Igman was carried out by both parties,

18 including the Serb troops under the command of General Galic. And then we

19 tried throughout August and September to make it so that the operations

20 are stopped on the ground. I can say that in the period in August and in

21 September, we had very high hopes to see this agreement finally signed.

22 The Serbs and the Croats accepted Mr. Stoltenberg and Mr. Owen's

23 agreement, and Mr. Izetbegovic - and I believe that is important that I

24 point this out - before accepting it, asked me to assemble all the

25 leaders, all the Muslim leaders, in Sarajevo. I took the risk because it

Page 10045

1 was a considerable risk to carry out this operation. And it was a great

2 success on the level of security because there were no incidents, but it

3 was a complete defeat because, after this period, Mr. Izetbegovic had the

4 impression that he was able to reconquer, recapture by force, certain

5 territories that were occupied by the Serbs. And if I can summarise my

6 thought, to gain, to win war on the ground, which didn't seem very

7 reasonable.

8 From October, if you allow me to read a few lines written by

9 a journalist from Sarajevo at that moment --

10 Q. I will stop you at that point. You have mentioned some names.

11 Mr. Izetbegovic, his position, what was that?

12 A. Mr. Izetbegovic was the head of the government or, actually, the

13 authority, the Muslim authority. And afterwards was a prime minister.

14 Mr. --

15 Q. I will stop you there. You mentioned also Lord Owen and

16 Mr. Stoltenberg and their efforts to negotiate with the parties. On whose

17 behalf did they carry out those negotiations?

18 A. Mr. Stoltenberg who was the representative of Mr. Boutros-Ghali,

19 who was the United Nations Secretary General, and Lord Owen was the

20 European Union representative. And so they were in charge of the

21 negotiations on behalf of the negotiations and the United Nations and the

22 European Union.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Just to intervene, you explained to us that to gain

24 on the ground, which was the wish of Mr. Izetbegovic, it is my

25 recollection that you said that it was practically impossible. But the

Page 10046

1 translation says that it was, which didn't seem very reasonable. It might

2 be that I have wrongly understood you. But did you say that it was not

3 reasonable or it was not possible, in your view?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think in French I said that it

5 wasn't possible. I couldn't see how one party could have the military

6 victory on the ground.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Ierace.

8 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.

9 Q. In relation to events outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, were there any

10 attempts to bring the parties together in Geneva during that period?

11 A. Mr. Izetbegovic, in the beginning of August, had declared that he

12 would not resume negotiations in Geneva unless an agreement on Mount Igman

13 was signed. I know that before the end of September, that meeting of the

14 three parties on the British Ship, the Invincible, took place, and I know

15 that Mr. Izetbegovic one day went to Geneva, but I don't remember the

16 details of all those meetings, the meetings between Mr. Stoltenberg and

17 Lord Owen and the other parties.

18 Q. All right. Now, you said that Mr. Izetbegovic in the beginning of

19 August declared that he would not resume negotiations in Geneva. When had

20 negotiations occurred in Geneva previous to August?

21 A. I arrived in early July. The only thing that I can remember here

22 is that in May there was the failure of the negotiations on the Vance-Owen

23 Plan. Mr. Vance left and Mr. Stoltenberg replaced him. But the first

24 objective of Mr. Stoltenberg, and it seemed logical to me, was to try to

25 get a new peace agreement together, which is exactly what happened between

Page 10047

1 Mr. Stoltenberg and Mr. Izetbegovic in May and June. That is what I do

2 not know.

3 Q. All right. Now, I bring you back to the topic of President

4 Karadzic, Mr. Karadzic. You have told us that you frequently met with

5 him. During those meetings, during, in fact, any of those meetings, did

6 he express to you his objective in relation to Sarajevo?

7 A. I think that I could say that Mr. Karadzic did not accept the

8 idea that Sarajevo would be a city totally under the domination of the

9 Muslim community. Mr. Karadzic wanted the three communities, that is the

10 Serbs, the Croats and the Muslims, have their say in the management of

11 Sarajevo. And that I could even tell you that at some point there was a

12 mention of dividing Sarajevo in three zones like the way Berlin was.

13 Mr. Karadzic's idea was certainly never to give up Sarajevo only to the

14 Muslims. He wanted the Serbs to have -- he wanted them to have their word

15 to say over what was happening in the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

16 Q. Did he ever express to you --

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

18 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I think I have

19 got to intervene for the transcript. On page 65, line 4, I had the

20 impression that what reads on the line is not exactly what the witness

21 said. There is a problem. Maybe it should be repeated here.

22 JUDGE ORIE: I have no clear recollection of that part, but I am

23 certain that overnight, specific attention will then be paid to this,

24 although the original is in French.

25 Could you please read, Mr. Briquemont --

Page 10048

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is line 4 on page 65. "The first

2 objective of Mr. Stoltenberg."

3 JUDGE ORIE: I think it is the previous point. I think it is the

4 previous point, but it disappeared from your screen, I take it.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What I had said before that was that

6 the objective of Mr. Stoltenberg was to recreate the situation that a new

7 peace agreement could be entered into. I don't know if that is exactly

8 what I said, exact words, but that was the idea.

9 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...in mind.

10 Mr. Piletta-Zanin, was it this part of the transcript that was bothering

11 you --

12 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] No, no. It was right after

13 that. We can re-check it during the -- I don't want the Prosecution to

14 waste time. I thought I was being helpful.

15 MR. IERACE:

16 Q. Did Mr. Karadzic express any view as to whether there would be a

17 controlling influence or force on the partitioned or divided Sarajevo?

18 A. I am familiar with the idea of Lord Owen and Mr. Stoltenberg, that

19 is, that the peace agreement of September, and I probably responded to the

20 wishes of the Serb side, they intended to put the city of Sarajevo under

21 UN control, United Nations control, and the city of Mostar under the

22 control of the European Union. That is all that I can tell you about

23 that. However, that was agreed by the two parties, that is in September,

24 by the Serbs and the Croats.

25 Q. Did you ever raise with Dr. Karadzic the issue of the use of

Page 10049

1 artillery by Bosnian Serb forces in Sarajevo?

2 A. Mr. Ierace, I can tell you that as --

3 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, this is a point

4 I've got to come in on the English transcript. On page 67, line 7, I read

5 that it was agreed by the two parties. It said that it was accepted.

6 "Agreed" and "accepted" is not the same thing.

7 JUDGE ORIE: The witness said it was accepted by the Serbs and

8 the Croats.

9 Please proceed, Mr. Ierace.

10 MR. IERACE:

11 Q. Please continue.

12 A. I could answer your question. I have it in front of me. There

13 was not a single meeting with Mr. Karadzic or Mr. -- General Mladic. I

14 didn't speak about the problem of using artillery in Sarajevo. My

15 purpose, and the purpose of my entire staff moreover, was also to limit or

16 to try to convince them that the shelling of Sarajevo, especially if the

17 shelling took place in nonmilitary areas, that is civilian areas, then

18 that didn't contribute anything to the Serb cause, but on the contrary,

19 gave them a very, very poor image in the international community. And so

20 I repeat, Mr. Ierace, that constantly throughout the month I was in

21 command, I did not stop raising that problem, but I can tell you that in

22 August and September, we succeeded in limiting as much as possible all

23 that kind of activity on the city of Sarajevo.

24 Q. Was there any occasion upon which you complained to either

25 Dr. Karadzic or General Mladic about ongoing shelling of civilian areas of

Page 10050

1 Sarajevo when there was any apparent response on the ground to your

2 complaints?

3 A. I think that I said a few minutes ago that when I arrived in

4 Sarajevo, there was great deal of tension, and at the end of July, the

5 25th of July, or maybe it was the 24th of July, if I remember correctly,

6 even the UN troops were concerned by Serb firing, supposedly an exchange

7 of fire between the Serbs and Muslims, for which Dr. Karadzic apologised

8 in the beginning of August. And so I believe that after September,

9 certain firing began again. If you like, I can explain this type of

10 permanent tension and this constant resumption of activities between Serbs

11 and Muslims in Sarajevo, but I prefer to wait until you ask a question.

12 Q. What I am asking you about -- I am sorry.

13 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Sorry, but I've got to come

14 in, Mr. President. Page 68 on line 9, there is a mistake, great mistake

15 in the French booth. We can see that it has to be looked at.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I did not follow the French booth. I was

17 reading English.

18 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I am doing that for you,

19 Mr. President.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace, it is approximately time for a break.

21 May I ask, Mr. Piletta-Zanin, I am not complaining about the necessity of

22 your interventions, but if you could try to do it in such a way that it

23 is interrupting as little as possible because it is -- sometimes it is

24 necessary, I feel that, but sometimes the way of doing it can make it

25 more easier for Mr. Ierace to continue.

Page 10051

1 We will have a break until five minutes to 1.00.

2 --- Recess taken at 12.33 p.m.

3 --- On resuming at 12.56 p.m.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace, please proceed.

5 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.

6 Q. Sir, did you ever complain to General Mladic or Dr. Karadzic

7 about shelling of civilian areas while that shelling was still going on,

8 and if so, was there any change in the shelling?

9 A. I can assure you that there were changes in the shelling,

10 certainly during the time August-September --

11 Q. If I can interrupt you there. I am not asking about changing

12 over a period of months, but changes over a period of minutes or hours

13 following a complaint by you.

14 A. That is correct, Mr. Ierace. When we would intervene, frequently

15 noted that the shelling of Sarajevo would diminish or even stop.

16 Q. All right.

17 A. It was a constant intervention on our part. I have already said

18 that.

19 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I ask that the witness be shown

20 Exhibit P371.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Please do so. Could the usher assist.

22 Mr. Ierace, it seems as if the Registry has some problems, but ...

23 MR. IERACE: May I continue, Mr. President?

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please do so.

25 MR. IERACE:

Page 10052

1 Q. All right. Now, if you could please answer "yes or no". Do you

2 recognise this document?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Did someone hand you this document?

5 A. Yes, it was given to me at the end of the -- my command period.

6 If I remember correctly, it was by the French medical service in Sarajevo

7 which was in constant contact with the city's hospitals.

8 Q. Whereabouts was the French medical service based at that stage,

9 in what building?

10 A. The French medical service basically was deployed at the Sarajevo

11 airport where, each night, there would be casualties and that required an

12 intervention of the French medical teams. And they would -- on a level of

13 the staff, they were at the PTT building, I think it was.

14 Q. Were the casualties that arose each night at the airport civilian

15 casualties or military casualties or both?

16 A. The casualties at the airport essentially were civilian

17 casualties. In fact, they were civilians who were trying to flee from

18 Sarajevo, crossing the airport, but since they were not able to go through

19 the tunnel that went underneath the runway. So it is a very clear answer

20 in respect of the victims; they were essentially civilians.

21 Q. What was the source of fire, if you know it, which resulted in

22 the civilian casualties?

23 A. On the Sarajevo airport, there was no question that it was the

24 Serbs who were firing into the access of the runway because they did not

25 accept that the airport could be used by civilians in order to escape from

Page 10053

1 Sarajevo and they would say that that was a neutral zone. So it was an

2 extremely difficult mission for the French Battalion, but the Serbs would

3 fire onto the access of the runway in order to prevent the people --

4 prevent people from fleeing Sarajevo.

5 Q. Do you know whether at the places and at the times that the

6 civilians were wounded, there was any source of light?

7 A. The Sarajevo airport was controlled by the French, where they had

8 deployed an infrared camera where they could -- which would enable to spot

9 any movement of civilians. The French were trying, and most of the time

10 they succeeded, they tried to detect this movement of civilians before

11 they would get across the airport fence. And at that point, the person

12 responsible for the airport would set out an alert, set off an alert,

13 which meant that they would go with vehicles to get back -- pick up those

14 civilians and to give them back or to bring them, rather, to the other

15 side of the fence of the airport.

16 Q. All right. Now, can you tell us something of the numbers of

17 civilians who were wounded each night whilst trying to cross the airport?

18 I should say wounded or killed.

19 A. I cannot answer you out of memory but I know that I spent a

20 whole -- I worked with the French for a whole night, and there were two

21 people killed and three or four seriously wounded all through that night.

22 But that is information that you can get, surely, from the French

23 Battalion that was at the airport.

24 Q. On the night that you witnessed this, what were -- what was the

25 type of weaponry used by the Serb forces, in other words, was it rifles,

Page 10054

1 machine-guns, anti-aircraft fire, mortar shells or what?

2 A. Generally, they were bursts of automatic guns or firing,

3 individual shots fired from rifles. I was even fired on by French snipers

4 -- by Serb snipers that evening.

5 Q. Now, as given your position, did you, from time to time, see

6 documentation of numbers of civilian casualties from the -- as a result of

7 civilians crossing the airport at night?

8 A. I myself didn't see those documents.

9 Q. In terms of your observations, did the civilian casualties from

10 that exercise include children?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. I bring you now back to the graph in front of you. Having regard

13 to the words on it, did you understand it to be a graphic depiction of

14 the numbers of wounded who were treated at the State Hospital in Sarajevo

15 from January 1993 until December 1993?

16 A. It was shown to me as being that. So that indicates the number

17 of wounded people treated at the hospital between January and December.

18 Q. Did you have any reason to doubt the reliability of the figures

19 indicated at the bottom of the page?

20 A. I had no doubts about it.

21 Q. Some words in French appear to be handwritten on the graph. Do

22 you know who wrote those words on the graph?

23 A. I did.

24 Q. If I read them correctly, the words at the bottom of the dip

25 which corresponds to approximately March appear to be shorthand for

Page 10055

1 "conference in Geneva." Is that correct?

2 A. Yes, that is correct.

3 Q. Would you please read the other words which appear on the graph,

4 corresponding to early August, 1993?

5 A. The two words are "espoir Geneve."

6 MR. IERACE: Perhaps the translation booth can assist.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That we were hoping, all of us were

8 hoping, all of us in Geneva, that we would be able to sign the peace

9 agreement by Lord Owen and Mr. Stoltenberg.

10 Mr. Ierace, I have to tell you that in Sarajevo I was asked to

11 prepare a room for that agreement to be signed. There was really hope.

12 It was the hope in Geneva as we experienced it then.

13 MR. IERACE:

14 Q. Now, were you informed whether the numbers in this graph represent

15 civilian wounded or military wounded, or both?

16 A. I myself always believed that they were both, because when they

17 were wounded, people in the neighbourhoods of Sarajevo where there were --

18 wounded among the Muslim troops, they were sent to the two city

19 hospitals. And, therefore, in my opinion, that included the civilian and

20 military wounded. That is my opinion.

21 Q. If I understand you correctly, and please correct me if I am

22 wrong, you are inferring that, you were not told specifically, but you

23 have made a conclusion about the nature of the patients?

24 A. Do you mean that they were civilian and military people? Is that

25 what you mean, Mr. Ierace?

Page 10056

1 Q. No. I am simply asking if you were, in fact, told, one way or the

2 other, or whether you assume, for the reasons you have indicated, that the

3 figures represent a combination of both?

4 A. It was a personal conclusion.

5 Q. All right. Now, having regard to the two events during the year,

6 one might conclude that there is a clear relationship between those two

7 events and the degree or rate of casualties in Sarajevo.

8 Are there any observations that you would make about that

9 apparent link or connection?

10 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. Ierace.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

12 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, the French

13 booth is telling me that it didn't understand and would ask Mr. Ierace to

14 repeat the question. I am not sure exactly what was not understood.

15 Perhaps the whole question could be asked again, Mr. Ierace.

16 MR. IERACE: I will be happy to do that, Mr. President.

17 Q. Is there any -- I withdraw that.

18 Do you believe there to be any correlation between the frequency

19 of casualties in that year and the conference in Geneva in March and the

20 expectations by the parties in August?

21 A. Mr. Ierace, for me, there is no question that the Geneva

22 conference was in May. If you look at the graph, the meeting took place

23 in May in respect of the Vance-Owen Plan, and for me there is no doubt

24 that the lessening of tension was very significant in Sarajevo in August

25 and September before the proposed peace agreement of Lord Owen and

Page 10057

1 Mr. Stoltenberg. So personally, I connect the two elements.

2 Q. All right. Now, we heard from you earlier in relation to UN

3 Resolution 836. Did you take any steps by the use of force to limit the

4 use by both sides of snipers where the snipers were deployed against

5 civilians, as you understood it?

6 A. That is right, Mr. Ierace. Especially in October and November, I

7 found it increasingly intolerable to see that the snipers were firing,

8 maybe even just to have fun with the civilians or with the UN people who

9 were crossing the city, or the nongovernmental organisations. The French

10 Battalion, which was deployed in the centre of Sarajevo, in Skanderija,

11 looked for the sniper positions, whether Muslim or Serb. The French

12 Battalion was able to establish or to draw up a map of those positions.

13 We informed the -- Generals Mladic and Delic about that situation which I

14 considered intolerable, and then we carried out some action, and at least

15 in one case, we eliminated a sniper.

16 Q. From which side -- I rephrase that.

17 On which territory, in terms of the warring parties, was the

18 sniper who was eliminated?

19 A. The sniper was eliminated in the area which was under the control

20 of the Serbs. My objective was at least to send a very clear symbol in

21 order to try to limit the activity of those snipers, and I never had any

22 illusions about the fact that we'd be able to put an end to that activity

23 once and for all simply because not one single political leader, whether

24 Serb, Croat or Muslim, ever came out against that sniper activity in

25 public.

Page 10058

1 Q. Did you take any steps to inform General Mladic of the elimination

2 of that Serb sniper or sniper from the Serb territory?

3 A. I don't remember having done that myself. I would simply say the

4 following: That is General Mladic said to me one day, "If one fires on UN

5 people, you can respond to that. That is your right." I don't know

6 whether he was informed, if he was informed by somebody in my staff, but

7 in any case, that was known in Sarajevo and that was the essential thing.

8 Q. Was it your understanding that the sniper position that was fired

9 upon was one from which civilians were shot or United Nations personnel,

10 or both?

11 A. I think that I could say, yes, to your question.

12 Q. Yes, that it was a position from which --

13 A. That they were positions from which they could fire either on

14 civilians crossing the city, or UN people, or people from NGOs that were

15 working in the city as well.

16 Q. Thank you for that.

17 Now, did you ever complain to anyone on the -- either the Bosnian

18 government side or the Bosnian army about them sniping against United

19 Nations personnel?

20 A. Yes, Mr. Ierace. We often complained, but we had no illusions as

21 to the results of the complaints that we were making.

22 Q. Did you ever specifically complain to General Delic about an

23 incident where your car was apparently fired at?

24 A. Yes, I did. I did complain, Mr. Ierace. I bitterly complained to

25 General Delic because it was certainly the General with whom it was

Page 10059

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2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Page 10060

1 easiest to get in touch with, and because it was a Muslim sniper who fired

2 at my car, this unsettled me deeply. Disappointed me.

3 Q. Was General Delic at that stage the head of the Bosnian

4 government army?

5 A. Yes. General Delic was certainly the head of the Bosnian army and

6 I would say that he even became -- as time went on, I believe that he had

7 a considerable problem with what we would call mujahedin who came from

8 other countries. They were certainly not Bosniaks. But General Delic was

9 incontestably head of the Muslim army, particularly, specifically when we

10 speak about the end of the year.

11 Q. Did you form -- withdraw that.

12 Was General Delic someone you met with frequently or

13 infrequently?

14 A. I met General Delic very, very frequently indeed, because his HQ

15 was about 500 metres away from mine in Sarajevo.

16 Q. In your dealings with Generals Delic and Mladic, was it important

17 for you or not to assess the degree of reliability that you could place on

18 their word, in other words, whether you could trust them to do what they

19 said they would do?

20 A. Mr. Ierace, I will tell you that with General Delic, I had

21 confidence in what he said, but to start with, at least, he had some

22 difficulties. His subordinates were not carrying out his orders because

23 his armies was constituted a little bit like resistance during the Second

24 World War. For instance, there were no ranks. They were all calling

25 themselves commanders. So General Delic had some problems in terms of

Page 10061

1 establishing a structure of the army. I am speaking professionally.

2 General Mladic, I can tell you that it was very difficult to trust

3 him. But on the contrary, when he gave an order, I could be almost

4 certain that that order would be carried out. And when General Mladic

5 told me in late September, "General, you can assemble your Muslim leaders

6 in Sarajevo," I took the risk. And General Morillon already told me that

7 when Mladic gave an order, then that order was carried out by all of his

8 subordinates.

9 Q. All right. Now, did you ever ask General Delic to take steps to

10 ensure that Bosnian government snipers, or snipers operating from

11 territory held by the Bosnian government, did not target UN personnel or

12 civilians?

13 A. Yes I did. I did take these steps. But I always had doubts as

14 to the nature of snipers. I sometimes wondered, but it is just a

15 personal impression, if there were no completely uncontrolled elements,

16 that if you allow me to use this expression, were "playing" at snipers. I

17 was -- admitted that, as far as the commanders were concerned, in a

18 conflict of this type, it was extremely difficult to control the

19 deployment of snipers, moreover, whether this was wanted or not. I told

20 you that already. No political official ever came out in public to stop

21 this activity.

22 Q. Now, do you believe or what is your belief as to whether

23 General Delic did what he could to stop that sniping that we have referred

24 to, that is, the sniping of civilians and UN personnel?

25 A. I think that as far as he was concerned, he did make this effort

Page 10062

1 because I have to admit, although I do not have any documents that would

2 allow me to declare this, but it does seem to me, however, that in the

3 last few months, there was always the problem of artillery. But sniping

4 activity did diminish in the end. But that is just a personal impression.

5 Q. All right. Now, in relation to General Mladic, from time to time

6 you have told us some things about him, including your belief that his

7 commands were followed. Could you tell us something of his personality in

8 terms of his attitude towards conducting the hostilities against the

9 Bosnian government forces, based on your meetings with him.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

11 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President, if I

12 understand the question correctly by Mr. Ierace, it is about a very

13 subjective element linked to a person which is not the accused. And I

14 believe that this kind of consideration which is about a personality of a

15 third person should not be asked as a question in these proceedings.

16 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, the relevance of the question is that

17 the Prosecution contends that the accused, General Galic, was subject to

18 the orders of his immediate superior, and that was General Mladic. And

19 given that relationship, questions which go to establishing the intent of

20 General Mladic in relation to the targeting of civilians is directly

21 relevant to the actions of the accused. To spell it out, if

22 General Mladic gave an order that civilians were to be targeted, then the

23 Prosecution case is that General Galic conveyed those orders to his

24 subordinates.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but you are asking about personality.

Page 10063

1 MR. IERACE: Yes. I am asking about his attitude towards the

2 waging of war and armed conflict, more broadly, against the Bosnian

3 government forces, and that is relevant for the same reason.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but personality is the first part of your

5 question. Do you think that the witness could give us -- I do understand

6 that you can ask a witness to say something about the attitude, as far as

7 he could learn from this attitude in the way another person expressed

8 himself, and I think you added that to the question.

9 MR. IERACE: I did, yes, based on your meetings.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Personality is another thing.

11 MR. IERACE: I take your point, Mr. President. I will amend the

12 question to take that into account. Although I think I did say, "his

13 personality in relation to his attitude." Page 80, line 1.

14 JUDGE ORIE: It is gone.

15 MR. IERACE: I think the relevant words were: "His personality

16 in terms of his attitude."

17 JUDGE ORIE: In the transcript it reads: "Could you tell us

18 something of his personality in terms of his attitude."

19 I don't know whether an attitude reflects a personality. But if

20 you could rephrase that.

21 MR. IERACE: I will, Mr. President.

22 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. It

23 happens that by explaining, at length, his position, Mr. Ierace has

24 already given the element of the answer that he would like to hear from

25 this witness. So the next time, if Mr. Ierace is going to do this, then

Page 10064

1 the witness should not be listening to this. Because now the witness

2 knows what the answer he should give, and that is not really acceptable.

3 JUDGE ORIE: You may proceed, Mr. Ierace.

4 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.

5 JUDGE ORIE: And try to keep the questions as factual as

6 possible.

7 MR. IERACE: Yes.

8 Q. Did General Mladic ever say anything to you which conveyed to you

9 any impression as to his view or attitude towards his enemy or enemies

10 and secondly, the way in which he would conduct hostilities against them?

11 A. I will try and answer in a -- as simply as I can. General Mladic

12 was a professional, a professional of war. He was making war. He wanted

13 to win it. He was incontestably the head of the Serb army. And I never

14 imagined that a Serb officer could either refuse or modify or contest one

15 of his orders. Does that answer your question, Mr. Ierace?

16 Q. Yes, thank you for that. Now, just before I move on to a

17 different topic, in relation to the civilian casualties at the airport,

18 did that daily occurrence of civilian casualties apply to the entirety of

19 the time that you held your command or only a part or parts of that period

20 of command?

21 A. I can say that as for the problem of Sarajevo airport, lasted

22 throughout my period of command. It was the civilians who were trying to

23 flee Sarajevo. This had nothing to do with the military problems.

24 Q. My question is whether -- you have told us that civilians were

25 killed or wounded on a nightly basis. Was that daily occurrence -- did

Page 10065

1 that daily occurrence happen throughout your period of command or not?

2 A. To say this was a daily occurrence, that would be perhaps

3 exaggerating a little. Throughout my mandate, certainly, and very, very

4 frequently. But I repeat, to have a very precise answer, from

5 Colonel de Richouttz, who was a French officer throughout my period of

6 command.

7 Q. Thank you for that.

8 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I note the time, and would that be

9 convenient?

10 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I am not sure

11 that the name of the Colonel was well pronounced and well transcribed, so

12 perhaps we may need it later. Could the witness repeat the name of his

13 deputy?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is Colonel de Richouttz and it

15 is written Romeo -- R-i-c-h-o-u-t-t-z. It is very complicated.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Briquemont, since we will have to deal with a

17 few procedural issues for a couple of minutes and since we have to

18 adjourn at a quarter to 2.00, I will ask the usher to escort you out of

19 the courtroom and ask you to come back tomorrow morning 9.00, same

20 courtroom, and not to speak with anyone about the testimony you have

21 given in this court and about the testimony that is still to come.

22 So I hope to see you again tomorrow morning.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

24 [The witness stands down]

25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace, may I then invite you to ...

Page 10066

1 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I have seven copies of the timetable

2 for distribution.

3 Mr. President, when everyone has had an opportunity to briefly

4 look at that, I will make a few observations.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Please do so.

6 MR. IERACE: Thank you.

7 As it presently reads, Ewa Tabeau is to be called on Thursday, the

8 1st of August and Friday the 2nd of August. If indeed the Trial Chamber

9 does sit on Wednesday, the 10th of July, and perhaps also Friday, the 12th

10 of July, I will move her to those two dates. That will relieve the

11 pressure of the last two weeks, in particular, the last week. Leaving to

12 one side for the moment the issue of 92 bis witnesses, I am confident that

13 with the additional two days from the Plenary, should that happen, that we

14 will finish by Friday, the 2nd of August. I intend to do everything in my

15 power to ensure that witnesses are completed by the dates indicated in the

16 chart. They are the only observations I would make.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you. Of course, the Chamber is quite

18 happy that you managed to make us keen. That fits into the expectations

19 of the Chamber. And I still expect that we could sit on the 10th of July,

20 and if possible, also on the 12th of July, but it is not sure yet.

21 Perhaps we first sleep it over and keep under very strict control that we

22 use not more time than indicated because I wouldn't say that we had a very

23 bad start this week, but we had a start which was not entirely in

24 conformity with the expectations. It started already that the Prosecution

25 took some more time in the examination-in-chief.

Page 10067

1 If the Prosecution sometimes encounters the difficulty of keeping

2 a witness, well, within certain boundaries, as far as time is concerned,

3 of course the Chamber will assist, if requested to do so, by explaining

4 to the witness that we had already a lot of testimony and that if they

5 stick strictly to the answers, that this would be to the benefit of

6 Chamber, the parties, and the witness himself. So if you would need any

7 assistance in this respect, please ask us.

8 MR. IERACE: I will, Mr. President. And in relation to the 92

9 bis application, the Prosecution is assisted by the recent Appeals Chamber

10 judgment in respect to two deceased witnesses Sofi and Kabecic, and in the

11 application of those principals, we have decided to withdraw one of the

12 witnesses and we will shortly file some written submissions in relation to

13 the balance which may be of assistance.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Is there at this moment any observation to be

15 made?

16 Yes, Ms. Pilipovic.

17 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the Prosecution

18 proposal is for Mr. Zecevic, who is scheduled for Friday, for the 21st

19 of June. Of course, if this is possible, if his appearance can be moved

20 to the 29th or the 30th of July, the same time when Mr. Kovac and Mr.

21 Higgs are being moved, being heard at that week. We are proposing this

22 for practical reasons and to save time because in that week when Mr.

23 Zecevic Kovac and Higgs and could be heard, then also the Defence's expert

24 could be present. That would enable our expert, Mr. Milicic [phoen], who

25 is supposed to come on Thursday, then he could hear Mr. Berko and that

Page 10068

1 would help the Prosecution and the Defence. It would help us in a

2 practical way if he could be there starting in the week starting 29th of

3 July.

4 If -- I don't know whether this is possible for the Prosecution to

5 make sure that Mr. Berko comes at the last week of July.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps you discuss this with the Prosecution. I

7 understood this morning that it was mainly a matter of visa for your

8 expert to come. And now there seems to be another problem as well. But I

9 do not know whether the witness or after the witness or expert witness

10 that -- I try to find neutral wordings, whether he did arrive already?

11 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, he hasn't arrived already. However,

12 I would be extremely reluctant to change the timetable. There have

13 been a lot of arrangements put in place, and this is precisely the issue

14 which is causing considerable consternation with the witness unit. Thank

15 you.

16 Mr. President, might I also add that the Defence was first

17 informed that we intended to call Berko Zecevic on this date on the 7th of

18 June.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, Ms. Pilipovic, we will have to take a

20 decision if the parties could not agree. But I understood this morning

21 that it was a mainly a matter of visa for next Friday and not the

22 availability of the expert.

23 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour. The expert of

24 the Defence, Mr. Milicic, who is going to be present here when Mr. Berko

25 is being heard, has got a visa and the Defence informed the Registry about

Page 10069

1 this. The only problem would be the arrival of Mr. Milicic because of the

2 Registry organisations in terms of his travel. I don't know whether there

3 are possibilities to alter this. We have submitted our request

4 for travel authorisation, but I don't know whether travel can be

5 authorised for him. The visa doesn't seem to be a problem. The visa is a

6 problem for the expert who is going to be heard for the 24th and 25th of

7 July, but I expect that by that time the Registry will be able to make

8 sure that he gets a visa

9 JUDGE ORIE: I take it since we are leaving now on Tuesday that

10 perhaps some extra effort, that travel arrangements should be possible.

11 If you would need the assistance of the Chamber for that after you failed

12 to get it organised, then, please, even just address the matter to the

13 senior legal officer and we will see what we can do.

14 Then I have one minor issue I would like to discuss in closed

15 session and I think two minutes would be enough.

16 [Closed session]

17 [redacted]

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Page 10071

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10 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

11 1.48 p.m., to be reconvened on Wednesday,

12 the 19th day of June, 2002, at 9.00 a.m.

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