1 Wednesday, 12 February 2003

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 2.20 p.m.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon to everyone in the courtroom.

6 Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Case number IT-98-29-T, the Prosecutor versus

8 Stanislav Galic.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.

10 Before I invite the Defence to call its next witness, I'd like to

11 deal with a few procedural issues as well. It will presumably not take

12 much time.

13 The first issue is the expert report of the expert Radovanovic

14 that has been presented later than the other expert reports. The

15 Prosecution usually has a certain period of time in order to express

16 itself on whether it accepts the report or not. That time has not yet

17 elapsed. Could the Prosecution inform the Chamber whether they would be

18 in a position to express themselves on the acceptance or non-acceptance of

19 that report in an earlier stage than provided by the Rules.

20 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, we could do that on Monday, if that's

21 convenient.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The Chamber would also appreciate if the

23 Prosecution could by then indicate how much time they would need to

24 prepare for cross-examination, if they would not accept the report. Of

25 course this all independent yet from whether the report will be admitted

1 into evidence as not. But the Chamber has found no reasons at this moment

2 to decide that it would not admit the report into evidence.

3 Then another issue is a request from the Defence to reconsider a

4 decision taken by the Chamber. The -- in the situation in which the

5 Defence expressed that it had not made up its mind yet as to whether it

6 would call the accused to testify, the Chamber gave an order in respect of

7 some procedural aspects in case the Defence would decide to call the

8 accused. These aspects, for example, were the chronological order,

9 including a possible re-call of the witness and disclosure in order to

10 provide the Prosecution with information they would need to prepare for

11 cross-examination. The Defence sought a certificate for an appeal against

12 this order. The Chamber has denied this request. And the Defence has

13 subsequently requested the Chamber to reconsider its order.

14 Where the Defence has neither indicated that the position of the

15 Defence differs from the situation in which the order was given nor has

16 based its present request on newly adduced legal arguments, the Chamber

17 considers that in these circumstances there's no need to decide on the

18 matter.

19 These were the procedural issues the Chamber needed to address.

20 Mr. Ierace.

21 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, before the Defence calls the next

22 witness, I think we are still to tender -- we have still to tender the

23 exhibits from the last witness.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Yes, from the last witness. And as far as I'm

25 aware of, we have one document that should be marked for identification, I

1 think. That's the list -- the witness has provided the list with the

2 names on it.

3 Madam Usher -- Madam Registrar.

4 MR. IERACE: Mr. President.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

6 MR. IERACE: I'd seek to tender that document.

7 JUDGE ORIE: You'd seek to tender that document.

8 MR. IERACE: Yes.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Since there are no objections, the document is

10 admitted into evidence.

11 Then we have as a remaining -- we have still to give it a number,

12 yes.

13 Mr. Ierace, admitting a document into evidence without a P number

14 could create confusion. Could you provide us with a number.

15 MR. IERACE: Excuse me, Mr. President.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Well, you may think it over what number you'd think

17 suitable, and we'll hear from you then.

18 Meanwhile, I do understand that there is some confusion as --

19 Yes, Mr. Ierace.

20 MR. IERACE: P3784, Mr. President.

21 JUDGE ORIE: P3784 is then admitted into evidence.

22 We have some problems in respect -- with respect to the videotapes

23 being played. They do bear a P number, as far as I understand, but the

24 Chamber, assisted by the registrar, had some difficulties in finding the

25 moment where this video had been played before, at what moment.

1 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

2 JUDGE ORIE: I see that Madam Registrar has solved our problem.

3 THE REGISTRAR: The three videotapes that were played were P3280Q,

4 under seal; P3280P; and P3280S.

5 JUDGE ORIE: And I do understand that they were all admitted

6 already in evidence.

7 Just for the record that these were the videos that have been

8 played.

9 If there's no other issue to be dealt with at this very moment,

10 I'd like to ...

11 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes. Perhaps a problem.

12 Mr. President, we still don't know whether a number has to be given to the

13 expert report or not, since it has been provided as an expert report. I

14 don't know where we stand with regard to this matter. Thank you.

15 JUDGE ORIE: I'll inform you as soon as -- we have to reconsider

16 it. The issue has been brought to our attention. It's not urgent at this

17 moment. We can proceed without an immediate decision. So we'll give it

18 in due course.

19 Then, Ms. Pilipovic, is the Defence ready to call its next

20 witness? And that would be, as far as I understand, Elena Guskova?

21 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Usher, would you please escort the witness into

23 the courtroom.

24 [The witness entered court]

25 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon. Madam Guskova, I presume.

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good afternoon.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Can you hear me in a language you understand?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can hear you very well.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Before giving evidence in this court, the Rules

5 of Procedure and Evidence require you to make a solemn declaration that

6 you'll speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. I am

7 informed that you would be willing to make that solemn declaration in the

8 English language. There's nothing against it. But if you would prefer to

9 do it in your own language, I'll ask the interpreters to translate it for

10 you. So I'll leave it up to you whether you make the declaration in, as

11 far as I understand, Russian, your native language, or in English, just as

12 you prefer.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If you have the English text, then I

14 can do it in English.

15 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous interpretation continues] ... It's being

16 handed out to you now by the usher. May I then invite you to make the

17 solemn declaration.

18 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

19 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

20 WITNESS: ELENA GUSKOVA

21 [Witness answered through interpreter]

22 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much. Please be seated. I have to

23 warn you. If you don't put the headphone really on your head, it will

24 fall off again and again according to our experience, so...

25 Ms. Pilipovic.

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

3 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

4 Examined by Ms. Pilipovic:

5 Q. [Interpretation] Mrs. Guskova, good day.

6 A. Good afternoon.

7 Q. Before I start asking you questions, could you please tell us what

8 your full name is and could you tell us where you work and what your

9 profession is.

10 A. My last name is Guskova. The first name, Elena. My father's name

11 is Yuri. So in Russian it is Elena Yuryevna.

12 I am a specialist in the history of Yugoslav peoples. In 1971, I

13 graduated from the history of south and west Slavs at the Moscow State

14 University, and my specialty is the history of Yugoslavia. As of 1973, in

15 the academy of sciences I have been studying the modern Yugoslavia, that

16 is, after -- post 1945, even though my doctoral dissertation covered the

17 nineteenth century.

18 When crisis broke out in Yugoslavia, the academy of sciences, that

19 is, the Centre for Slavonic Studies, a centre was set up to study the

20 modern Yugoslav crisis and I have been the head of the department for the

21 past ten years. It is the only centre in the world which engages in

22 scientific research of developments in the Balkans. We approach the

23 subject in very strict scientific terms. So I continued to investigate

24 these matters. In 1994, I worked as a scientific expert with the blue

25 helmets headquarters.

1 Q. Thank you. Mrs. Guskova, since you told us that you worked as the

2 director of the centre for researching the contemporary crisis in the

3 Balkans at the Russian Academy of Science, can you tell us whether you

4 have been involved in other matters as well, and what is your profession

5 in relation to your scientific work and your research work?

6 A. I'm a doctor of history. I also teach, and I teach history of the

7 Balkan crisis at the faculty of history and at the academy for diplomats.

8 Q. Thank you. Professor Guskova, you provided us with a statement in

9 response to the Defence request, and you dealt with the crisis period in

10 Yugoslavia, and you focussed in particular on Sarajevo, that is to say, on

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the light of international factors, was that the

12 subject of your statement?

13 A. Yes. And my expert opinion covered the beginning of the crisis

14 and the part that the international factor played in that crisis.

15 Q. Thank you. Mrs. Guskova, you have told us that in 1994, as far as

16 I have understood you, you were present as a UN official. Can you be more

17 precise and tell us how you were engaged and which areas were you present

18 in from 1994 as a UN official.

19 A. In 1994, I was invited -- I received an invitation from Washington

20 to participate in the group of experts in Mr. Akashi's office as a Balkan

21 specialist. The fact is that when Yasushi Akashi was assigned to the high

22 office of the personal representative of the Secretary-General, he was the

23 only one who realised that in his cabinet there were no Balkanologists.

24 There were diplomats. There were military, vast numbers of journalists,

25 but very few specialists. And that was why an expert group was set up.

1 And this group of experts was made practically of three individuals:

2 Susan Woodward from the United States was its head. And apart from me,

3 there was yet another young colleague from Italy. They found me on the

4 basis of my published papers. By now I have published over 230 papers on

5 the subject.

6 In answer to a question, being at such a high office, as a deputy

7 head of the experts, I had the opportunity to indeed use all the possible

8 resources in order to acquaint myself with the situation in the Balkans.

9 We had at our disposal, helicopters, cars, and also we had the possibility

10 to visit all possible areas, including the hot spots. I was there from

11 April to October 1994.

12 Q. Thank you, Professor Guskova. But I think that I didn't quite

13 understand something. You said "in the Balkans." I didn't quite

14 understand where your headquarters were located and where you were as a

15 member of that group.

16 A. We were in Zagreb, at the headquarters of the UNPROFOR, on the

17 same floor but different wing from Mr. Yasushi Akashi's cabinet. Our task

18 was to prepare expert opinions for the negotiations that were to take

19 place or the developments that were taking place. Another task of our

20 group was to brief the arriving officers, diplomats, members of the

21 mission in the ex-Yugoslav territory about the situation, about the

22 history, that is, and the current situation in the Balkans. And I can

23 tell you one interesting fact in this regard. Throughout --

24 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel please wait for the witness to

25 finish her answer.

1 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. I apologise. Please finish your answer and then I'll put a

3 question to you.

4 A. Only one man arrived who wanted to know what was going on in the

5 Balkans, and he was a military officer from Africa.

6 Q. Thank you. Professor Guskova, bearing in mind the report that you

7 compiled at the Defence's request, could you tell us - and you have

8 already told us where you worked. You said that you worked in an

9 institute - could you tell us what sources you used when writing your

10 report. What did you base your report on?

11 A. I wrote my analysis many years -- after many years of my

12 scientific research and researches conducted my theme [as interpreted] in

13 the centre for the study of the Yugoslav crisis, and we had a large

14 collection of documents about these developments. We've already published

15 six volumes of documents relative to these developments, including some

16 international documents, so that my expertise was based on the documents

17 of international organisations. Apart from that, all the possible

18 available literature that we had we also studied. And yet another type of

19 sources which has begun to emerge of late, and that is the memories of

20 people who served in the Balkans and now have been relieved of their

21 duties and are therefore able to publicise -- to reveal their personal

22 perception of the developments.

23 I also had the opportunity to meet a number of political leaders

24 of parties to the conflict, their military representatives, and also rank

25 and file people whom I interviewed. I have the recordings of these

1 interviews, though not all, unfortunately, because some people would not

2 authorise these interviews.

3 Q. Thank you. You have now told us which documents you used. Can

4 you tell us, in your opinion what are the main reasons for the crisis in

5 the territory of the former Yugoslavia? But since time is restricted, I

6 would like to ask you to tell us about these reasons that led to the

7 crisis very briefly.

8 A. As a rule, the error made by those who studied the crisis in the

9 Balkans now is that they do not go into the whole set of the causes of the

10 crisis. But there is no time for me to go into that, so I shall give you

11 the basic conclusion of my studies. It seems that the chief reason is the

12 relationship between the internal and the external factor in the emergence

13 of the crisis, its escalation, and the break-up of Yugoslavia. The

14 internal factors were an important condition. But the external factor

15 became the fundamental in the disintegration of the Federation and the

16 escalation of the crisis. If we talk about internal factors, then no

17 doubt the chief engine, the chief driving force of the process --

18 Q. Professor Guskova, in order to be clearer, my question is: In

19 your opinion, what are the internal causes of the conflict? Could you

20 tell us about the internal causes very briefly, and then I will ask you

21 about the external ones.

22 A. With regard to the internal reasons, a major role was played by

23 the historical -- by historical factors. And I really realised that the

24 parties who tried to resolve the matter did not take it into mind. The

25 economic, sociological, ideological and all the other factors, they are

1 all very important. But the driving force behind all these processes was

2 the aspiration of the countries to independence, first Slovenia and

3 Croatia followed by Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia.

4 Q. Thank you. You said the desire to secede, the desire of the

5 republics and the territory of the former Yugoslavia to secede -- and you

6 also included Bosnia and Herzegovina in this. In your opinion, what was

7 the reason for the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

8 A. Every historical events have causes which are more removed or

9 immediate causes. The immediate cause was perhaps the sequence of events.

10 If we take every event separately, every one of these events, of these

11 incidents is important. However, we're interested in the consequences of

12 these events.

13 For instance, in February 1991, at that time the negotiations

14 amongst the six leaders of the republics were just beginning about the

15 future of the Federation, and at that time already the parliament of

16 Bosnia-Herzegovina already had on its agenda the declaration of

17 independence. At that time the -- well, it was not adopted, but those who

18 knew what was going on were already quite clear what it meant.

19 In April 1991, there were still negotiations underway about the

20 future of Yugoslavia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina there were already

21 preparations underway for the establishment of armed formations, notably

22 the Patriotic League, Green Berets, and the Muslim Youth. And this was in

23 April.

24 Then further events unfolded, so that Bosnia-Herzegovina proposed

25 its own -- made its proposal regarding the future Yugoslavia. It became

1 quite clear that it did not -- it was not particularly keen on remaining

2 Yugoslavia any longer.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Would you please slow down a bit because the

4 interpreters have to interpret every single word you say so that we can

5 take full knowledge of your testimony. And they have some difficulties

6 with your speed. Please proceed.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Then in June --

8 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Professor Guskova, please just speak slowly.

10 A. I shall be happy to do that.

11 In June 1991, whilst the negotiations among the leaders of the six

12 republics were not yet finished, nevertheless Alija Izetbegovic set up his

13 National Defence Council, the tasks which were to prepare the defence of

14 the republic. All these factors naturally played a major role and

15 contributed to an atmosphere of uncertainty, at least in Bosnia and

16 Herzegovina -- although in Bosnia and Herzegovina, although, the majority

17 of people in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not believe that the situation in

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina could deteriorate.

19 Then if we continue considering the events of 1991, there were

20 still no serious signs that the conflict was afoot, but it is very

21 also -- the very important date for us is the 12th October 1991, which is

22 the well-known assembly -- the well-known session of the parliament of

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina which adopted the memorandum on independence in the

24 absence of the representatives of one of the peoples.

25 And then, as early as January 1992, the Assembly of Bosnia and

1 Herzegovina put on the agenda the organisation of a referendum on

2 independence. And then it became quite clear that the positions were

3 already taken and that Bosnia-Herzegovina would aspire to achieve its

4 independence. It was very important then to solve the question concerning

5 the future of that republic.

6 I haven't mentioned some very important dates, and those were the

7 proclamation of independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the recognition by

8 international organisations. This is a very interesting moment -- it is

9 interesting how they publicised independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina and

10 then the mobilisation of the 4th of April. All these events added

11 momentum to the crisis.

12 Q. Thank you, Professor Guskova. You say that all these events made

13 the crisis worse in that area. Can you tell us what the outcome of that

14 crisis was.

15 A. The outcome of the crisis was armed conflict. That was the final

16 upshot. I'm not talking about different stages of it.

17 Q. Thank you. You say that it was an armed conflict. Can you tell

18 us which parties were involved in that armed conflict.

19 A. In Bosnia-Herzegovina - and I believe you know that - there were

20 three sides which had part in it. But I suppose the most important thing

21 is to see what was the -- what were the objectives of the belligerents or

22 parties to the conflict because they pursued different objectives and had

23 different tasks ahead. They also strived to solve them in different ways.

24 So Muslims - and I call them Muslims, meaning an ethnic

25 group - and I apologise, but that is how it happens in the history of

1 Yugoslavia. In 1961, then in 1971 in Bosnia-Herzegovina the Muslims

2 wrote, "Ethnicity: Muslim faith". This is just by way of clarification.

3 So the Muslims were trying to keep an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina as an

4 independent republic, as an independent state, indispensable, which would

5 not be part of Yugoslavia any longer.

6 The other side - and I'd say that this is perhaps the most

7 interesting question which often puzzles those who study the situation in

8 the former Yugoslavia - and that is the question what was the Serbs'

9 objective. The Serbs originally did not want to leave Yugoslavia. That

10 sentiment and that desire to stay in Yugoslavia, to keep Yugoslavia in one

11 piece, was something that all Serbs professed, be they in Croatia, in

12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Kosovo, or Macedonia. And therefore, the primary

13 task of the Serbs was to try to stay within Yugoslavia. And only later on

14 the objectives began to change when it became clear that the conflict

15 would break out with regard to the future of the Federation and the future

16 of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

17 Then the task set was to try to protect and keep the territories

18 of the Serb population, and in that form, if possible, to then join

19 Yugoslavia.

20 However, even later, when it became clear that Yugoslavia was not

21 supporting the unification of the Serb lands...

22 Q. [Previous interpretation continues] ... Thank you. Mrs. Guskova,

23 I would now like to ask you, given the fact that you have already told us

24 which were the sides to that conflict. Now, can you tell us how did that

25 conflict reflect to your mind in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in more specific

1 terms in Sarajevo?

2 A. Do you want me to finish with all the three parties?

3 Q. Yes. Yes. But I believe that you have already told

4 us -- actually, you mentioned two sides. Can you please tell us which was

5 the third side and then answer my previous question.

6 A. Two parties, yes. Yes, of course.

7 Well, the Serb objectives changed because then they said that they

8 wanted their own territories at least within Bosnia-Herzegovina, if

9 Yugoslavia would not take them in.

10 The third party were Croats, who vacillated in that situation

11 because they were incapable of conducting an independent policy concerning

12 Bosnia-Herzegovina and within Bosnia-Herzegovina and were coordinating

13 fully their plans with the Republic of Croatia. So this would be briefly

14 in answer to your previous question.

15 As to the developments, how the -- what kind of developments took

16 place in Sarajevo, well, it was pretty turbulent. Things were unfolding

17 rather fast. After March and especially after April 1992, this city was

18 partitioned along the ethnic lines, and this then gave rise -- this was

19 the cause of what happened directly in the city of Sarajevo and about

20 which we are only now beginning to get more or less reliable information.

21 Q. Mrs. Guskova, you have told us that Sarajevo was divided on ethnic

22 principles, and you have also told us that already in March there was a

23 conflict in that area. Can you also tell us whether there was an attempt

24 to stop that conflict, both internally as well as externally. And who was

25 it who tried to stop this conflict internally and who was it who tried to

1 stop it externally? But again, if I could ask you to give us a short

2 answer. I know that it is very difficult for you to give us short

3 answers. These are complex questions. But let's try and be as concise as

4 possible.

5 A. I apologise if I'm not brief enough, but this is the subject of my

6 scientific research and I always feel the need to explain in-depth what I

7 know. My course of lectures includes 50 hours, and I find it very

8 difficult to restrict myself, confine it. Will you please remind me of

9 the question.

10 Q. Were there any attempts to stop the conflict, both internal

11 attempts and external attempts? So can you please tell us who was it

12 internally who tried to stop the conflict, to your mind, that is.

13 A. First of all, internally speaking it was the citizens who were

14 making these attempts. There were many layers, or rather, many attempts

15 at various layers of society to stop the conflict. In mid-May we had

16 peaceful demonstrations when the entire city was out in the streets trying

17 to stop the already obvious wave of the conflict. In April, after

18 mobilisation was called, all the citizens turned off the lights in their

19 apartments as a sign of protests. That was the way they expressed their

20 attitude towards the conflict. There was also an attempt by the people

21 who were opposed to Alija Izetbegovic, I mean among the Muslims. They

22 also attempted to stop the oncoming conflict. That was the historical

23 agreement suggested by Zulfikarpasic to Alija Izetbegovic.

24 Externally speaking, without any doubt, the intervention of

25 international organisations was another attempt to stop this conflict. It

1 was also a many-layered, multi-fold intervention and had many expressions,

2 was expressed in different terms and used different methods.

3 Q. Mrs. Guskova, you have now told us that as far as the attempts to

4 stop the conflict are concerned that there was a rally of citizens in

5 Sarajevo. And you have also told us that there were attempts by the

6 people in the leadership of Alija Izetbegovic to stop that conflict. Were

7 there any other internal elements who tried to stop the conflicts? If you

8 have any knowledge of that, if you have any information on that.

9 A. Do you mean internally? I have already spoken about that.

10 Q. Yes, internally.

11 A. Those were attempts to reach an agreement - I wish to underline

12 this again - among the parties.

13 Q. When you mention the interparty agreement, can you please tell us

14 which was the other party that tried to reach some sort of an agreement.

15 A. Well, if I understand your question correctly, the Serb side for

16 its part tried to stop the conflict as well, but that was already linked

17 to the activity of international organisations. Serbs have done a great

18 deal to prevent the conflict, at least in the region of Sarajevo and the

19 Sarajevo airport. But that was already within the framework of the

20 negotiation process headed by international organisations and the Security

21 Council.

22 Q. I will come back to international organisations and the Security

23 Council. But now I have a question for you. When you were studying all

24 these documents and preparing the report on the conflict in Bosnia and

25 Herzegovina, can you please tell us what was the role of the

1 Yugoslav People's Army during that period? And the period that I have in

2 mind is during the year 1992 in Sarajevo.

3 A. Well, as far as the role of the Yugoslav People's Army is

4 concerned, I believe we should be speaking primarily about year 1992,

5 because it was -- because preceding from the experience of the JNA in

6 Croatia, based on that experience the JNA was reluctant to get involved in

7 the conflict. After the first barricades put up in the streets, after the

8 1st of March, 1992, and after the agreement reached between

9 Alija Izetbegovic, Radovan Karadzic, and the Croat representatives on

10 taking down these barricades, the JNA took part in this agreement and it

11 attempted to make a buffer zone and tried not to get involved in what was

12 going on in the streets of Sarajevo, because the consequences were going

13 to be very serious and the leadership of the JNA was aware of this.

14 Within the JNA, serious movements were already going on towards

15 changing the internal structure because all the soldiers and officers who

16 were ethnic Muslims were already leaving the army in 1992. This process

17 had begun already in spring 1991.

18 Q. Thank you. Professor Guskova, in your reply you have also

19 mentioned the role of international organisations and the Security Council

20 in the attempt to resolve the conflict in the area of Sarajevo. Can you

21 please tell us, how did international organisations try to solve this

22 problem and what international organisations those were?

23 A. Allow me at the outset to make one conclusion that we reached

24 while studying the entire process of finding a settlement in the Balkans;

25 that is the following: Stopping the crisis was possible at each stage of

1 its development, beginning with 1991. However, this was not done and all

2 attempts failed. And one of the reasons is that in the Balkans we saw an

3 intersection of various interests, a clash of various interests and

4 various methods of resolving the crisis. First of all, there was the

5 European Union, which developed its own system for reaching a settlement.

6 This system included the headquarters of blue helmets, which also took

7 part in the process of negotiations. Then there were foreign ministers of

8 many countries who were promoting the interests of their own countries and

9 kept commuting between Belgrade, Sarajevo, and Zagreb, also taking part in

10 negotiations. Then another segment was made up of the Security Council

11 itself. This body took it upon itself to play the legislator and create a

12 legislative basis for resolving the crisis.

13 Q. When you say that the Security Council tried to resolve the

14 situation, can you also tell us how the Security Council tried to do that.

15 A. The principal lever or tool of the Security Council were

16 discussions, deliberations, preparation for debates on certain issues and

17 adoption of resolutions on the Yugoslav crisis. There were several

18 hundred resolutions on the Yugoslav crisis adopted in total by the

19 Security Council, beginning with 1992 -- 1991 to date.

20 Q. Thank you. You say that there were hundreds of resolutions, but

21 can you tell us with regard to the year 1992 -- or from 1991 and in 1992,

22 in your opinion what were the important resolutions in the Sarajevo area

23 which were adopted and how were they implemented -- in the area of the

24 city of Sarajevo?

25 A. It is easy to enumerate resolutions. It is more difficult to

1 explain how they were put in practice, because those who adopted the

2 resolutions were inspired by the feeling of striving for justice and

3 finding a solution. However, if we analyse the resolutions themselves, we

4 see that as a result of actions based on these resolutions, there are two

5 components of these actions, two interesting aspects. One, not all

6 resolutions were possible to implement. At least the intent underlying

7 the resolutions was not possible to achieve in practice. And secondly,

8 the approach to the parties to the conflict was not always objective. If

9 we cite now at least a couple of examples of resolutions that were

10 impossible to implement, we will easily see that.

11 Q. Yes. My question in relation to Sarajevo would be: Why was it

12 not possible to implement those resolutions? What was the reason for

13 this? To be more precise, can you tell us which resolution was concerned

14 in 1992 in the area of Sarajevo and what was the result of this resolution

15 and the attempt to implement it in the territory of the city of Sarajevo?

16 A. One could quote several examples. For instance, resolution 752,

17 relative to -- and this is May 1992. If I am correct, it was the 15th of

18 May, when it was adopted. And it dealt with the substance of the conflict

19 and attempt to get out of the territory of Sarajevo the armed forces and

20 from Bosnia-Herzegovina the armed forces which were illegally formed, the

21 Yugoslav People's Army, and the Croatian army.

22 The next resolution, 757, which mostly dealt with the sanctions.

23 But it once again emphasised that the pulling out of the Yugoslav People's

24 Army had started but not the Croatian army, and the Croatian army was

25 never pulled out from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, first of all

1 because according to the calculations, about 40 to 50 thousand of military

2 men from Croatia supported their Croat brethren in the territory of

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

4 Q. Professor Guskova, bearing in mind the two resolutions, 752 and

5 757, that you have mentioned, what was the position with regard to these

6 resolutions on the part of the Serbian side? So what was the attitude of

7 the Serbian side and the JNA with regard to these two resolutions and the

8 attempt to implement them?

9 A. The resolution 757, apart from the decision to enforce sanctions

10 and pull out units also addressed the question of the Sarajevo airport,

11 which the peacekeeping forces had asked to place under their control. And

12 the leadership of the Army of Republika Srpska, which was being

13 formed - that was May 1992 - was about to turn over the Sarajevo airport

14 for peacekeeping tasks to the peacekeeping forces who would then control

15 it and use it for the humanitarian relief. Moreover, on the 5th June, the

16 Croats, Serbs, and Muslims - the military men, I mean - signed an

17 understanding, an agreement on the Sarajevo airport stating that all the

18 heavy weapons would be removed from the area of the Sarajevo airport and

19 removed to a distance which would be beyond the reach of the projectiles.

20 That was the 5th of June. But shortly after that Boutros Boutros-Ghali's

21 report was submitted to the General Assembly, and in it he said that to

22 their enormous regret the Serbs had handed over the airport but the two

23 other parties had seized that opportunity to launch military operations

24 against the Serb side. And Boutros Boutros-Ghali pointed out that

25 something should be done to redress that situation.

1 However, the demilitarisation, or the institution of the

2 demilitarised zone in the area of the Sarajevo airport and the city its

3 never took place.

4 There are very many interesting moments which have to do with the

5 Security Council resolutions.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, my colleague shall

8 continue with the examination.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

10 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11 Examined by Mr. Piletta-Zanin:

12 Q. [Interpretation] Good day, Professor.

13 A. Good afternoon.

14 Q. We have often heard about the term "aggression" or about an

15 aggressor in this conflict. What could you tell us very briefly about

16 this subject, the subject of aggression and the subject of aggressors.

17 A. When the question is put as to how should one define the nature of

18 the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is precisely then that one comes

19 across the die that we often come across in the general -- in the press,

20 in the media, and in the political parlance. The problem is that the

21 definition of the nature of the conflict that took place in

22 Bosnia-Herzegovina - am I too loud? - the nature of the conflict can be

23 easily defined. But for that one has to see which driving forces were

24 involved in that conflict. Serbs, just like Croats, just like Muslims,

25 are the inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the term "aggression"

1 cannot be applied to them. The Yugoslav People's Army was pulled out from

2 the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in May 1992, and therefore

3 the -- only the Croatian army was an external - if I may call it

4 that - factor. And that perhaps could be the reason to call this an

5 international conflict. That is not a sufficient reason, because the

6 things that happened there were internal, civil matters.

7 Q. Witness, thank you for having slowed down, but as time is

8 restricted and if this is not a problem for the interpreters, I think you

9 can speak a little more rapidly but without going as fast as you were

10 going earlier on.

11 First of all, Professor, could you turn back to what you were

12 talking about a minute ago, the absence of objectivity. Can you tell us

13 very briefly, very rapidly what happened after the Clinton administration

14 had been set up in relation to the Yugoslav problem, or to be more

15 specific in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

16 A. Could you be more precise, please. Are you talking about

17 non-objectivity or the role of the United States of America? Because

18 these are two different matters.

19 Q. Very well. Let's then discuss the role of the USA, and if such

20 was the case, the change in the position of the administration.

21 A. When I referred to the negotiations in the territory of Yugoslavia

22 in which many parties and many protagonists of international law took

23 part, I also referred to different and diverse interests of different

24 countries in that process. However, it seems to me that the most

25 characteristic example of interference - and I would even call an

1 aggressive interference, purely American interference - and that is the

2 role of the United States of America in the negotiations. And it was

3 precisely when a new administration came into place in January 1993 that a

4 turbulent -- that the United States of America very loudly entered the

5 stage of the negotiations regarding the -- Yugoslavia. It was at that

6 time that the Vance-Owen plan was on the table. And as Lord Owen writes

7 in his book, with the advent of that administration he immediately felt

8 that America would develop its own idea of the settlement of matters in

9 the Balkans. And since the Vance -- and accused Serbs that the -- the

10 Serbs that the Vance-Owen plan was not adopted. But Lord Owen writes

11 about two factors in that: A, the role of the United States of America;

12 and secondly, the escalating conflict between the Muslims and the Croats

13 in Central Bosnia; also, the United States of America also played a

14 negative role in the activities and actions of the contact group.

15 Q. Thank you. Professor, insofar as it is possible - I know it is

16 difficult - but I would be grateful if you could be as brief as possible.

17 We are going to continue examining these problems at an international

18 level. And can you tell us how many international plans there were in

19 regard -- with regard to peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, attempts to

20 establish such plans.

21 A. Well, let's count. There was Carrington plan --

22 Q. Wait. Will you first tell us how many, without counting them all.

23 A. Six.

24 Q. Thank you, Professor. How many of these plans were refused by

25 the -- were rejected by the Muslims? I'm referring to the Muslim side.

1 A. The Muslim side rejected two plans fully.

2 Q. Thank you. I'd now like to examine a plan which is what we call

3 the contact group plan. With regard to the psychological aspect of the

4 presentation of this plan to the sides involved in the conflict, what can

5 you tell us about this?

6 A. Generally speaking, the establishment of the contact group in 1994

7 marked the beginning of a completely new stage in the approach to the

8 Balkan crisis, an absolutely new stage, new in terms of the methods it

9 used, in terms of its participants, and the results. I do not know

10 whether the Court is aware that the contact group is generally speaking a

11 completely unlawful body which was not set up either by the Security

12 Council or by any other international organisation, which engaged in

13 solving the crisis. Nevertheless, the contact group was set up based on

14 the decision of five countries, and the European Union opposed the

15 establishment of that group very vehemently. And the headquarters of the

16 blue helmets was completely unaware of the establishment of this contact

17 group. I already worked there and we were caught by surprise when we

18 heard about it. Nonetheless, the contact group very actively and very

19 resolutely took certain positions and started to dictate conditions to the

20 negotiating parties.

21 Q. Thank you, Professor. We'll go back to that. But I would now

22 appreciate it if you could tell us with regard to the psychological

23 aspect -- what can you tell on the basis of your own experience? What can

24 you tell us about the way certain plans, perhaps certain maps, were put

25 forward, were suggested to the parties to the conflict? And what were the

1 comments made at the time in Zagreb and Sarajevo?

2 A. The contact group developed a completely new methodology of

3 communication with the parties to the negotiations. To begin with, they

4 proposed a set of maps which were to be adopted by yes or no. There were

5 no -- there was no possibility to either add anything to those -- to the

6 map. Moreover, I have to tell you - and this is my personal impression

7 and the result of my personal research - many people at the blue helmet

8 headquarters in Zagreb were confident that the map of the contact -- the

9 maps of the contact group were drawn in such a way as to make them

10 completely unacceptable to the Serbs, and it was then that in the contact

11 group, and while the parties were discussed whether to accept those maps

12 or not, the contact group meanwhile was developing a method of pressure to

13 be brought on the parties, on several of them, Serbs in Bosnia and

14 Herzegovina, Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belgrade, Mr. Milosevic,

15 and Pale -- that is, Karadzic. But if we -- if you look carefully, what

16 measures were being envisaged to either encourage or punish, you will see

17 how uneven they are in relation to these different parties. The Serbs

18 were being threatened with sanctions, with the fact that resolution 713 on

19 the ban to deliver weapons to the Muslims would be abolished, and also

20 that another resolution, the resolution on the limitation -- on the

21 limitation on the weapons that could be imported into the country would

22 also be withdrawn, and so on and so forth.

23 Q. Thank you. Professor, in the six plans that you have mentioned,

24 the contact group plan, which one was it? Which number? Which order did

25 it appear in?

1 A. The plan of the contact group was, I guess, the fifth plan.

2 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel please wait for the answer to

3 end.

4 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation]

5 Q. As far as the four preceding plans are concerned, what can you

6 very briefly tell us about the Serbs' will to achieve an agreement, as far

7 as you know? But could you be as brief as possible, please.

8 A. Yes. The previous plan was very interesting to my mind, and it

9 could have been quite beneficial. It is called in different ways. In

10 literature they usually refer to it as the Stoltenberg plan. The

11 Stoltenberg plan pursued the settlement and involving in the solution of

12 the matters directly the Serb, the Croat, and the Muslim sides. It was

13 characteristic that almost all the views had already been harmonised, that

14 the Serbs had come along and the Croats and Muslims. Unfortunately Alija

15 Izetbegovic himself did not come to Geneva when this plan was discussed.

16 And nonetheless, there was daily communication with him by telephone, and

17 he agreed with the plan in principle, and the plan was interesting because

18 the territory which was divided into ethnic communities had been agreed

19 that Bosnia-Herzegovina was given an outlet to the sea. There were no

20 problems concerning the enclaves in Gorazde and Zepa because they were

21 being granted large corridors, and to my knowledge the Serbs and the

22 Croats had made a huge number of concessions to the Muslim side. As a

23 result, the result of this plan, Alija Izetbegovic refused to sign it.

24 Q. Thank you. Professor, why, if you know anything about this -- why

25 didn't Mr. Izetbegovic and/or his counsellors want to go to the

1 negotiations in Geneva? Very briefly.

2 A. Alija Izetbegovic writes in his book that the thing he was afraid

3 most of all was to find himself subjugated to Belgrade. He wanted an

4 independent, autonomous, integral Bosnia and Herzegovina, and he

5 called -- and even what he signed, he signed under pressure.

6 Q. Thank you. We'll move on to another subject now. I'd like you to

7 answer the following question. But yet again, as briefly as possible. It

8 has to do with the demilitarisation of Sarajevo. Do you know whether the

9 so-called Muslim side wanted such demilitarisation to be implemented? Do

10 you know whether the Serbian side was in favour of it as well? What can

11 you tell us about this matter?

12 A. Your question is closely related to the question of safety zones,

13 safe havens that was set up by international organisations. But Sarajevo

14 is the case apart, because safe havens were defined by a resolution

15 somewhat later than the resolution 757. I think they were set up by

16 resolution 758 and 839. Sarajevo, however, is mentioned in earlier

17 resolutions. At the time when the protected zones were not yet talked

18 about, apart from the Sarajevo airport, it was then that the plan was

19 conceived that these areas around Sarajevo should become protected areas,

20 and there was an agreement reached by all three parties on it. The Muslim

21 side and the Croat side did not comply with this agreement. As for the

22 safe havens, the five towns -- the five areas that are mentioned, even

23 those were not provided in full, even in Boutros Boutros-Ghali's report

24 and in some of the statements of the commanders, for Briquemont, for

25 instance, it is said in these towns the resolution of the Security Council

1 was not carried out and that concerned in particular Sarajevo, Brcko, and

2 Tuzla.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, we are close to the time where

4 we'd have a break.

5 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I just wanted to point out --

6 to mention the name of Mr. Briquemont. It isn't in the transcript,

7 Mr. President. I wanted to mention this before we had the break.

8 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous interpretation continues] ... Before we

9 adjourn, I'd like to inform the parties that the Chamber intends to sit

10 more tomorrow than scheduled. That would mean that we could sit during

11 the normal hours, that is, from 9.00 until quarter to 2.00, and then after

12 a break until 3.00 we could sit for another half -- one hour and a half,

13 until half past 4.00. If there are any serious objections from the

14 parties, I'd like to know that immediately. Of course, Judge El Mahdi

15 reminds me and of course that was included -- the parties also includes

16 you, General Galic. If there would be -- because the Chamber is fully

17 aware of what it asks from you, in terms of -- of problems with your back.

18 But if there would be any serious objections, we'd like to know that as

19 soon as possible after the break.

20 As the parties are aware of, we'll not sit on Friday because

21 that's court maintenance.

22 General Galic.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours. Thank

24 you for asking me, but I cannot really say anything because I do not know

25 how I will feel tomorrow. It varies. On some days, I'm fine; on other

1 days, not really. So I don't know -- so I really don't know how I will

2 feel tomorrow. I'm trying to be honest. Thank you.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I fully understand. Perhaps we could follow

4 the procedure we followed before, that as soon as you feel that you're not

5 able to attend any more, when you feel that it would be too much, that you

6 immediately indicate it to me. And that means that, like many things in

7 life, this -- the final result will remain uncertain until we are there.

8 Thank you for your observation.

9 And if any of the parties for other reasons would not be in a

10 position to sit for --

11 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] We often discuss the subject

12 of airports, Mr. President, and that is one of my problems. But it

13 concerns the Schiphol airport, not the one at Dobrinja. I'll see what our

14 plan, our schedule is, but my response would be affirmative.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If there would be any objection from the

16 Prosecution side, I would like to hear that as soon as possible. You

17 don't need to give an immediate answer. You can do it after the break.

18 MS. MAHINDARATNE: Yes, Mr. President. I will enquire with

19 Mr. Ierace and we'll inform the Chamber later on.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Yes. We'll then adjourn until quarter past

21 4.00.

22 --- Recess taken at 3.47 p.m.

23 --- On resuming at 4.20 p.m.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Usher, would you please --

25 Yes, Mr. Ierace.

1 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President. Just in relation to the

2 observation that you made before the break as to the timetable. I don't

3 expect that would be a problem. If I could briefly explain. We were

4 notified by the Defence this morning that there is a change to the order

5 of witnesses after Dr. Kuljic. Instead of a UN witness, the next witness

6 after Dr. Kuljic will now be Professor Dunjic. If we get to

7 Professor Dunjic tomorrow afternoon, we won't be ready to cross-examine

8 him tomorrow afternoon having previously up until this morning expected

9 that he wouldn't be entering the box until late next week. But looking at

10 the estimated times, I think that's most unlikely to happen. It seem that

11 is we will finish Dr. Guskova and Dr. Kuljic, and we're not likely to get

12 beyond or perhaps into examination-in-chief of Dr. Dunjic.

13 So, Mr. President, in summary, should we unexpectedly complete

14 cross-examination of Dr. Dunjic tomorrow afternoon, we will then seek an

15 adjournment before cross-examination.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

17 Ms. Pilipovic.

18 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I believe that

19 according to the schedule, Professor Dunjic is expected on Monday. The UN

20 member is flying in on Saturday morning. And due to his long trip and

21 fatigue involved in it, we changed the schedule and informed our

22 colleagues that Professor Dunjic would be testifying on Monday.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

24 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. I think

25 it's in the interest of the Prosecution as well to be reminded on this.

1 We said that we will have documents that we will provide as soon as

2 possible to the Prosecution. And it's also in their interest to be able

3 to examine these documents, to see them. If we assume that this UN

4 witness will only be able to come on Monday, obviously the Prosecution

5 will be at a disadvantage and Defence counsel really does not wish this to

6 be the case. We need more time for this witness. Thank you.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Although the Chamber has sometimes some

8 difficulty in following the quick change of the order of appearance of

9 witnesses, we try to cope with it. And I do understand that as such

10 there's no major objection against sitting also for one hour and a half

11 tomorrow in the afternoon.

12 Having read the exchange of correspondence and also having read

13 the -- what the Defence expects from the UN witnesses, I may take it that

14 on the basis of the reciprocal disclosure, that as soon as whatever

15 documents have arrived, that the Defence is under an obligation to provide

16 copies to the Prosecution and not first to inspect them thoroughly and

17 discuss them thoroughly, but right in the beginning to provide copies to

18 the -- yes.

19 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. The

20 problem is that we have noticed that on several occasions -- we intervened

21 on Sunday. We tried to contact someone from this Tribunal. But the door

22 was closed. We weren't able to find out where these people were. This

23 witness will be arriving on Saturday. We could do this on Sunday, but I

24 don't know whether I can bother people at home on a Sunday. So this is a

25 problem of organisation that I don't have under control.

1 JUDGE ORIE: I take it, Mr. Ierace, that the Prosecution, apart

2 from what it will say at a later stage and whether these documents have

3 been timely disclosed or not, but the Prosecution might be interested to

4 receive copies as soon as they are available. Since it seems that this

5 witness usually speaks English, they might be in English. I've got no

6 idea. But there's a chance that they are in English. So I take it that

7 the parties will be able to communicate even during the weekend. And if

8 they need any assistance, I'm available because I'm in the Netherlands

9 during the weekend. I'm willing to receive as a post box if necessary or

10 to take care that there is a post box.

11 Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

12 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. With

13 regard to technical details, this -- well, first of all, I would like to

14 thank you. But perhaps it should be possible for someone to offer us to

15 copy this material. I know that he's going to come with a certain number

16 of cassettes, and I must admit that I don't see how we can copy this -- we

17 don't have machines for copying this. I can do this in Geneva, but it's

18 not the same in The Hague. So I don't know if the Prosecution would like

19 to talk about this later on and see whether we can solve these technical

20 problems for the coming Sunday. Thank you.

21 JUDGE ORIE: I take it that both parties take the necessary

22 measures in order not -- in order not to confront the Chamber next week

23 with all the communication problems that have arisen over the weekend.

24 And copying in Geneva should be the same as copying in The Hague, but

25 we'll see.

1 Perhaps we could now resume the examination of the expert witness,

2 who's waiting already and listened to our procedural issues.

3 Madam Guskova, the Defence will now resume your examination as an

4 expert witness.

5 Mr. Piletta-Zanin, when my bookkeeping is correct, then you would

6 have 20 more minutes available. Please proceed.

7 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you.

8 Q. Professor, given the fact that we don't have much time, I'd be

9 grateful if you could respond very briefly. You mentioned in the course

10 of your testimony a minute ago, you mentioned the name of

11 General Briquemont. Can you tell us very briefly what happened to this

12 general.

13 A. If we're speaking of General Briquemont, he slammed the door and

14 left the mission. Not literally speaking. He did that because he was

15 not -- he did not approve of the methodology of the work of blue helmet

16 forces. He believed that the majority of the adopted UN resolutions were

17 implemented. And in addition to that, he had very serious problems with

18 the safe havens. He believed that resolution 836, 824, which pertained to

19 safe havens or protected areas, were proclaimed on paper only but were not

20 implemented in practice. Instead of 7.000 troops, they were assigned

21 2.000 troops, and therefore it was impossible to implement those

22 resolutions.

23 In addition, that there were serious disagreements concerning the

24 fact that these protected areas were supposed to become demilitarised

25 zones. And this is something that Briquemont insisted upon. At the same

1 time, in the Security Council there were serious arguments and

2 disagreements concerning the definition of protected areas as areas which

3 could be subjected only to attack by the Serb side. It was not envisioned

4 that they could have been subjected to the attack by the Muslim side.

5 Therefore, in view of General Briquemont's attitude, the Muslim side

6 accused them of being biased and he, following that, left the mission.

7 When other officers arrived at the mission and upon glimpsing what the

8 situation was, all of them became rapidly aware of the fact that the

9 situation was much more difficult than it had seemed at first sight.

10 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous interpretation continues] ... Yes.

11 Mr. Piletta-Zanin, I received the request from the French transcribers

12 that you not put your next question to the witness until the translation

13 in French has been completed. Yes.

14 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I'll take note of that.

15 Q. Witness, what can you tell us - but very briefly - about the way

16 the Muslim forces were able to use these zones that you have mentioned?

17 And in particular, I'm referring to Sarajevo. What can you tell us about

18 this in the wartime situation?

19 A. As I've already said, there was a disagreement regarding the fact

20 that these zones were supposed to be demilitarised. However, the sides

21 were unable to reach agreement within the Security Council, and the zones,

22 the areas in the five cities that I've mentioned, were not demilitarised

23 in the end.

24 As a result of that, the Muslim army was able to concentrate its

25 military force within those five cities. We know that the Muslim side did

1 not -- Muslim army did not leave Sarajevo, Tuzla, Srebrenica. And because

2 of that they were able to conduct their military operations in these towns

3 and out of these towns. This is mentioned in the reports of the

4 Secretary-General.

5 Q. Thank you. Did this have an effect not only on the continuation

6 of the war but also on its duration; yes or no?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Thank you. But what do you mean by that? Very briefly.

9 A. When unfavourable conditions were created for one side and

10 favourable conditions for the troops of the other side, they start using

11 or abusing these conditions, and this is exactly what the Muslim side did.

12 This is a brief explanation.

13 Q. [Microphone not activated]

14 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, counsel, please.

15 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation]

16 Q. I would like to move on to another subject and to focus on the

17 issue of what we call provocations here. Are you aware of the existence

18 of provocations in the media; yes or no?

19 A. I would call that different. I really appreciate the question

20 that you put to me because we analysed this issue in depth. This was not

21 a provocation by mass media. This is a developed system of provocations

22 which one can observe or see from a historical distance. You can't look

23 at them independently. You have to look at them all together. What is

24 this all about? There are a whole number of cases following which certain

25 actions aimed against certain sides ensued. And simply speaking these are

1 provocations which were aimed at punishing Serbs.

2 Let's analyse the case of preparing sanctions against Yugoslavia

3 on the 30th of May, 1990. Not all of the members of the Security Council

4 were convinced that sanctions were necessary, and therefore something was

5 needed in order to pressure them into agreeing to this. And immediately

6 following that, on the 27th of May an incident took place at Vase Miskina

7 Street. In 1994, NATO revved up its planes to punish Serbs in

8 Bosnia-Herzegovina and an incident was needed in order to bring this into

9 action, following which on the 5th of February, 1994, Markale incident

10 took place. After that there was another incident on Markale, and

11 following that another more intense NATO action against Serbs. Therefore,

12 when analysing this, we came to the conclusion that this was not without

13 intention, and it was intended to punish the Serb side.

14 Q. Thank you, Professor. Since we have other questions, I suggest

15 that if I make a gesture, you should take that to mean that you should

16 stop and that we will move on to other subjects. This is just a

17 suggestion.

18 Could you briefly tell us why you can affirm before this Trial

19 Chamber that the so-called Vase Miskina incident represented such a

20 provocation, such a way of attempting to manipulate matters? What are

21 your sources? How do you know this, et cetera?

22 A. Unfortunately, one has to favour logical thinking on one side and

23 comments by General MacKenzie, who in his book said that there had been

24 ballistic experts which -- who pointed out that there were some strange

25 cases and incidents. However, there are no reports concerning this within

1 UN records. I believe that something will appear next year. And if you

2 give me some time, I can point out these peculiarities and weird aspects

3 of these incidents.

4 First of all, there were only Serbs queuing up in the line. The

5 line was not intended to stretch in the street, but they were asked to

6 wait in the street. The street had been blocked earlier and only certain

7 people were let through. And what is most unusual and strange was that

8 there were TV cameras standing ready and Briquemont said -- I'm sorry,

9 MacKenzie said that after the explosion all they needed to do was approach

10 this site, come closer by several metres, and make a footage of what had

11 happened. Several hours later the entire world was informed of what had

12 happened. Serbs had been accused. And after several days the Security

13 Council, influenced by this footage as well, voted in favour of sanctions,

14 although in the report of the Secretary-General it is nowhere mentioned

15 that it was only the Serb side that was guilty.

16 Q. [Microphone not activated]

17 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, counsel, please.

18 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Witness, without telling us what you were thinking of, for reasons

20 of time, do you think that in the history of Sarajevo there are other

21 situations, other events of a provocative nature that are comparable in

22 terms of their nature and political effects to what you have just

23 mentioned here? Could you just answer by saying yes or no.

24 A. Yes. I've already mentioned them.

25 Q. Thank you. We'll move on to another subject now. I would like to

1 talk about another problem, a historical problem. This has to do with the

2 meeting between Mr. Alija Izetbegovic and the American ambassador at the

3 time, Mr. Zimmerman. In your report you make certain claims with regard

4 to what happened immediately after the meeting, that is to say, with

5 regard to Mr. Izetbegovic's change of heart, the fact that he changed his

6 position. What do you know about this? How do you know about this? Et

7 cetera.

8 A. As far as I understand it, you're referring to Cutilheiro's plan.

9 Am I right? The meeting between Zimmerman and Alija Izetbegovic is

10 described in detail in Zimmerman's book. He doesn't say what advice he

11 gave to Izetbegovic, and Izetbegovic in his own book also fails to mention

12 that he had received an advice from Zimmerman, although people who were

13 close to them said to me that there had been a particular advice. Nobody

14 denies the fact that there had been a meeting, and the meeting took place

15 in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I assume that it was somewhere in the area of

16 Sarajevo. However, Zimmerman says that immediately following the meeting

17 with Alija Izetbegovic, he returned to Belgrade and sent a wire to his

18 superiors in the United States saying that Bosnia and Herzegovina should

19 be recognised immediately. Logically analysing this, we can conclude that

20 after this conversation Alija Izetbegovic refused to sign the Cutilheiro

21 plan and all of the efforts of the United States were directed at

22 recognising Bosnia and Herzegovina.

23 Q. Thank you. I'd like to move on to another subject now. I would

24 like to talk about the persecution of Serbs in Sarajevo. In your report

25 you mentioned that this -- such persecution had to do with the salaries

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank pages inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts. Pages 19447 to 19457.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 which depended on ethnic membership. And you also mentioned a point that

2 I am interested in now, and that has to do with the massacre of the Kazani

3 graves. I would like you to tell us what sources you used and what

4 information you had at your disposal with regard to the number of possible

5 victims in these graves.

6 A. Concerning the victims in Sarajevo, a number of documents and

7 records are emerging. In 1992, 1993, and 1994, during the conflict there

8 was practically no information. The information is emerging now. And in

9 1994, a trial was instigated against Muslim soldiers who had committed

10 crimes in Kazani. There were 14 people involved who committed crimes, and

11 this was reported in the papers. People are expecting that more

12 information will emerge regarding this crime, and there are different

13 numbers that are circulated, although it is widely believed that between

14 two and seven thousand people were killed there, in that incident. In

15 some different reports, it is mentioned that the number of victims went as

16 high as 10.000.

17 Q. Thank you very much.

18 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] For the French booth, it's not

19 200 but perhaps 10.000.

20 Q. Madam, were you yourself in Sarajevo? Were you able to see how --

21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, you're correcting the translation.

22 I'd always rather have this confirmed by the witness. It's not up to one

23 of the parties to say that. But is it correct that you said two to seven

24 thousand, rather than two to seven hundred, as the first figures you

25 mentioned?

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Two to seven thousand.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed.

3 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you.

4 Q. Madam, were you yourself in Sarajevo during the period that we are

5 interested in, 1992-1994? And if so, can you describe the daily life that

6 you were able to observe there. Not just that of soldiers but also the

7 daily life led by the civilians. What sort of impressions could an

8 observer gain?

9 MS. MAHINDARATNE: Mr. President, I object. This is going outside

10 the area of the report.

11 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, may I respond?

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

13 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] My learned colleague should

14 read pages -- read through pages 61, 62, and 63 or should reread these

15 pages.

16 JUDGE ORIE: The personal impressions of the expert witness while

17 visiting Sarajevo is part of the report, as I remember. So in this

18 respect, I would say the expert witness is also a bit a witness of fact in

19 this respect. Or would you have any objection against that?

20 MS. MAHINDARATNE: Very well, Mr. President.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed.

22 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Have you understood my question, madam?

24 A. Yes, I've understood the question, and I'll try to answer it

25 briefly. I was in Sarajevo in September 1994 after a long interval,

1 because before that I was in Sarajevo in the 1970s. And I read a great

2 deal about destruction, about exchanges of fire. And to be quite honest,

3 as a historian what struck me was that Gavrilo Princip's museum was gone

4 and the library was gone. As a scientist it was very hard to see that.

5 But following the bank of the Miljacka, I didn't see any major

6 destructions. I did see that in Vase Miskina all the kiosks were back up.

7 And I still remember a domestic scene how a Muslim vendor is carrying

8 coffee to his neighbour. So it was a rather peaceful scene. In other

9 words, Bascarsija, that was the heart of the city, was operating. There

10 was only one important building that was seriously damaged. And that was

11 the building -- the photograph of which appeared in all the newspapers and

12 everywhere, and that was not far from the hotel -- the hotel in which all

13 the journalists and international mediators lived. But otherwise, the

14 city lived. We were of course advised not to walk around the city, but I

15 wanted to see it so I did walk. But I did walk around -- I wanted to see

16 what it was like, and I felt safe.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Could I just ask for one clarification. You said

18 there was only one important building that was seriously damaged and that

19 was next to a hotel where the international journalists were residing.

20 What -- yes.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Holiday Inn.

22 JUDGE ORIE: What was the building that was seriously damaged you

23 were referred to? You said there was only one. Which one did you have in

24 mind?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The adminstrati. It was a

1 government building. It was a high-rise building.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, please proceed.

3 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation]

4 Q. You also spoke about the museum of Gavrilo Princip. Could you

5 tell us who, according to you, destroyed that museum.

6 A. Well, in an event which took place near Gavrilo Princip's museum

7 is a plate -- is an iron plate in the place where he stood when he fired

8 at the -- at the arch-duke. This iron plate -- this metal plate was

9 simply taken out, pulled out of the pavement. And as far as I know, this

10 museum was not destroyed. It was simply looted. It was completely

11 plundered, and it no longer exists.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, your 20 minutes are over

13 approximately, so if you could conclude in a couple of -- two or three

14 minutes, please.

15 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, thank you very much. I

16 will do so.

17 Q. Madam, and very quickly, please, with regard to Markale and a

18 possible problem, a matter of provocation, what could you tell us in a

19 minute?

20 A. Very briefly, I do not doubt at all that the shelling of Markale

21 did not happen from the Serb side, and there is evidence to corroborate

22 this.

23 Q. Thank you. What can you tell us regarding the investigation that

24 was conducted, if you, that is, know something about that?

25 A. As early as 1996, Yasushi Akashi in his interview to a German

1 paper said that there was a document about the UN investigations showing

2 that it was not done by the Serb side. David Owen speaks about that --

3 writes about that in his book and does it very eloquently. If there were

4 enough time, I'd quote it.

5 Q. You say -- you say in your report that David Owen said that his

6 information could not be revealed -- or who said that the United Nations

7 decided that such information should not be revealed, should not be

8 disclosed? So how do you know these things?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could the interpreter speak up,

10 please.

11 David Owen writes in his book that there were four reasons for

12 which this information should not be disclosed. One of the reasons is

13 that NATO troops were already ready to strike positions and that changed

14 plans completely. The second reason, where possible refusal of

15 Alija Izetbegovic to take part in further negotiations, which was very

16 important. The third reason was that everybody was already convinced,

17 that is, everybody was quite sure that allegedly this shell had come from

18 the Serb side and that completely changed the picture of what had

19 happened. And one of the principal reasons was that it could have

20 prejudiced the authority of the United Nations.

21 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I have only two questions

22 more, Mr. President, the last and the one before the last.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Two minutes. Not more than that.

24 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation]

25 Q. So my penultimate question, and very briefly: Madam, does -- when

1 the so-called Muslim forces were formed, the Green Berets and then the

2 Patriotic League, the formation of these forces, was this indicative of

3 the wish to wage war rather than a wish to have peace? Or what -- how

4 would you explain that?

5 A. Well, in one sentence, it would be -- my answer would be this:

6 The formation of a Muslim armed formations beginning in April 1991, when

7 the negotiations concerning the future of the SFRY was still underway,

8 testifies to the intentions to fight for the independence of Bosnia with

9 arms.

10 JUDGE ORIE: May I ask you. This is the answer you gave in your

11 report, isn't it? You're reflecting now what is in your report.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was answering questions. I don't

13 remember. I was answering questions, yes.

14 JUDGE ORIE: If you will have a question which has not been, as

15 the last three questions, finds an answer in the report. The Bench, of

16 course, has read the report very carefully.

17 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] My very last question,

18 Mr. President, is as follows.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

20 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Professor, can you confirm to us under oath the integrity of your

22 report which we have all read carefully, or would you -- and/or would you

23 like to add something to it? This is my last question.

24 A. I can add a great deal to my report because of late a large number

25 of documents have emerged which could supplement or complement what I've

1 written in it. But the concept as such, no, I wouldn't change it.

2 Q. Very well. But -- thank you.

3 JUDGE ORIE: I take it then -- because the last question were two

4 questions, as a matter of fact. First, whether you confirm whatever is in

5 your report. I do understand that you answered that question in the

6 affirmative and that you would like to add a lot. But perhaps that

7 question should have been put a bit earlier to you rather than as the last

8 question.

9 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] No more questions.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then Ms. Mahindaratne, is the Prosecution ready

11 to cross-examine the expert witness?

12 MS. MAHINDARATNE: Yes, Mr. President.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Then please proceed.

14 MS. MAHINDARATNE: Thank you, Mr. President.

15 Cross-examined by Ms. Mahindaratne:

16 Q. Good afternoon, Dr. Guskova.

17 A. I'm sorry. Could the interpreters speak up, please.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Or come closer to the microphone. The witness

19 has some difficulties in hearing the -- perhaps the volume could be

20 adjusted so that --

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Oh, yes, yes, yes. Of course. Yes.

22 That's right. Thank you.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Then please proceed, Ms. Mahindaratne.

24 MS. MAHINDARATNE:

25 Q. I take you to page 52 of your report, where you reported on the

1 Markale incident. Perhaps the corresponding page -- I have the English

2 translation.

3 You begin that section with the words, "In the Sarajevo

4 marketplace Markale, on February 5th, 1994, at 12.20 hours, a strong

5 explosion happened with unknown provenance of fired shells." And you use

6 the term "shells," in the plural. Is it your position that several shells

7 had been fired in the course of the Markale explosion of February 5th,

8 1994?

9 A. Different sources say that there were between one and three

10 shells, and that is why I put it as you see it here.

11 Q. So you yourself have not arrived at a particular conclusion on

12 that.

13 A. I wasn't at the Markale market, and all the information that I had

14 come from literature, when the authors said what the -- I took it from the

15 authors who mentioned one, two, or three projectiles, and that is why I

16 wrote this.

17 Q. You report further that eight persons were killed in the incident.

18 What is the source of your information to conclude that only eight persons

19 were killed?

20 A. I think this is a misprint. The text should have said "68."

21 JUDGE ORIE: Sixty-eight, you say. Yes. Because on the next page

22 you're talking about -- you quote, at least, 80 persons killed. So

23 that's -- but, therefore, I understood "8" to be a misprint. But I

24 thought of 80, but now you've explained to us that you have 68 in your

25 mind.

1 Yes, please proceed.

2 MS. MAHINDARATNE:

3 Q. Madam, do you know of the UNPROFOR investigation that was

4 conducted by way of a special team of experts into the Markale incident?

5 A. If you are referring to the Markale market I, to begin with it was

6 discussed at the blue helmet headquarters while I was there and later

7 on --

8 Q. If I may interrupt you. If I may interrupt you. I'm referring to

9 the Markale market explosion of the 5th February, 1994, which is what the

10 section in your report refers to. And my question to you is whether you

11 know of the UNPROFOR investigation which was conducted into the incident.

12 Do you know that such an investigation was conducted whereby a special

13 team of experts investigated into the incident and reported on it?

14 A. I'm saying that there was an investigation and there were the

15 first conclusion and the second one which was sent to the UN.

16 Q. Have you read the UNPROFOR investigation report which has been

17 published?

18 A. This investigation is mentioned in the report of the

19 Secretary-General to the Security Council.

20 Q. Madam, in your report you do not refer to the findings of the

21 UNPROFOR investigation team into the incident. So I'm asking you, have

22 you read the report?

23 A. No, I did not read the report myself.

24 MS. MAHINDARATNE: May the witness be shown P2261A.

25 Q. I take it, madam, that you read English. The quote is in English.

1 A. [No audible response]

2 Q. It is a question that you have not read this report before.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Could it perhaps please be put on the ELMO for just

4 one second, since there are so many reports.

5 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The registrar has just drawn my attention to

7 the fact that although the document has an R number, that it's not

8 tendered and admitted under seal. So I take it that it can be put on the

9 ELMO, Ms. Mahindaratne.

10 MS. MAHINDARATNE: Yes, Mr. President.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could you please put it on the ELMO.

12 It's a bit inconvenient for you, but putting it on this machine

13 allows us to read together with you. So if you would please turn to

14 the -- either read from the screen or ...

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't really see it well.

16 JUDGE ORIE: You could also turn to the original, which is to the

17 left of you on that machine. The usher would certainly assist you.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that will be fine.

19 MS. MAHINDARATNE:

20 Q. Madam, at the outset you testified that in arriving at your

21 conclusions you approached the subject in an extremely scientific manner.

22 A. Yes, I agree with that.

23 Q. Therefore, prior to reporting on the Markale market incident of

24 February 5th, 1994, should you not have perused the UNPROFOR investigation

25 report in order for your opinion to be an objective and impartial one?

1 A. Should I answer?

2 Q. Yes. I'm putting it to you. Should you not have first read this

3 report prior to compiling your section on the Markale market explosion in

4 order for your report to be an impartial and objective report?

5 A. Well, as a matter of fact I do not think that this report would

6 have changed my opinion, because the main reason for which this incident

7 happened, they're quite sure that it was a set-up, and it worked. So that

8 is why such an opinion emerged.

9 Another thing is important, that there are, in writing, the

10 opinions of people who were near the place of incident and which refute

11 the official point of view, and that allows us to question it and to try

12 to follow a different line of reasoning, precisely in an attempt to be

13 more objective.

14 Q. Madam, would you please turn to page 3 of this report.

15 MS. MAHINDARATNE: Perhaps the document may be placed on the ELMO.

16 Q. You will see quite contrary to what you report the investigation

17 team has found that the explosion was in fact caused by 120-millimetre

18 high explosive mortar and also, quite contrary to what you asserted with

19 regard to the casualties being inconsistent with a mortar bomb explosion,

20 the investigation team has found the casualties to be consistent with a

21 mortar bomb explosion. In view of this report, the official findings of

22 the UNPROFOR team of investigators, on what information or on what basis

23 do you conclude otherwise?

24 A. In this case --

25 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President.

1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

2 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, could we have

3 first the image corrected. If we are to follow the debate, we really need

4 to see the text.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could you please stay with it, Mr. Usher, so

6 that we --

7 So your question was on the basis of what you have drawn a

8 conclusion different from the one on this report.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can tell you what line of logic

10 did I follow in coming to my conclusions. To begin with, I took this

11 official point of view which I heard and which indeed existed at that time

12 in 1994, and say this is the -- these are the thoughts of the officers

13 that I talked to at the time in 1994. The subject of our conversation was

14 the reason which NATO found to develop its activities in that territory.

15 And what I believe, that our conclusions were then confirmed by later

16 findings. For instance, in what Lord Owen writes later in his book, and

17 he said that there was a document and there is the opinion of one

18 ballistics expert who believed that that shell could not have arrived from

19 the Serb side, because it either exploded directly there on the market or

20 came from somewhere else.

21 On the other hand, in the conversation with Colonel Demurenko, who

22 in relation to the incident Markale II, and he was talking to me as a

23 ballistics expert. Unfortunately, I am not an expert on ballistics, so I

24 can only convey to you his opinion. And he said that there was no such

25 120-millimetre shell which could produce such a large number of

1 casualties.

2 And thirdly, the thing which made me start questioning all this

3 was Mr. Yasushi Akashi's statement.

4 JUDGE ORIE: May I just ask for clarification first. On page 53

5 of your report you are referring to a conversation with Mr. Demurenko in

6 which it reads, "I have in mind 12-millimetre mine," whereas you just, as

7 far as I understood you correctly, you said "120" --

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It should be 120. 120. Yes, a

9 typing error again.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Ms. Mahindaratne.

11 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

13 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] To make things absolutely

14 clear, I speak as a principal, but nevertheless the name of Demurenko

15 which you mentioned is -- which we read in that text, is it the same name

16 that the witness mention a moment ago? Because we do not see it in the

17 transcript.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. It's been mentioned many times before. I don't

19 think there was any confusion in that respect.

20 Please proceed, Ms. Mahindaratne.

21 MS. MAHINDARATNE: Thank you, Mr. President.

22 Q. Madam, you stated that the report would not have changed your

23 mind. Even if you had read the report, it would not have changed your

24 mind. As an expert, isn't it incumbent upon you to examine all material

25 relevant to a particular issue, especially an impartial investigation

1 which has been conducted into the incident, the report relating to it,

2 prior to issuing an opinion on it?

3 A. You are quite right. But I never denied that there was an

4 official view concerning the explosion at Markale I that you are talking

5 about. What I tried to do was introduce a doubt, that is, to point out

6 that there was a different view other than the official one, and that one

7 is the one that I stand by.

8 Q. My question is: Even knowing that there was an official

9 investigation, you did not take the time to peruse the official

10 investigation report but based your conclusions on discussions with other

11 people, the sources of which you really do not refer to in your report?

12 A. Experience shows us that unless you question a document, unless

13 you check a document, then you can never attain the truth.

14 Q. Moving on to another area. I draw your attention to page 21 of

15 your report.

16 A. Could you please give me the heading so that I can find it quickly

17 in the Russian version.

18 Q. It's a section entitled "War objectives." And I'm referring to

19 the second paragraph under the section, which refers to the war objectives

20 of the Serb side.

21 Now, you enumerate four Bosnian Serb objectives under the title

22 "War objectives." Are you aware of the six strategic goals adopted by the

23 Bosnian Serb Assembly at its 16th session in Banja Luka on 12th May, 1992?

24 A. Yes, I am aware of it.

25 Q. Are you also aware --

1 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

3 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I have an objection to make.

4 We have to focus on what took place in Sarajevo. And I think that trying

5 to retrace the course of history in Banja Luka is not really necessary at

6 this point. Thank you.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, if you wanted to have to focus

8 exclusively on Sarajevo, you should have presented a different report.

9 Please proceed, Ms. Mahindaratne.

10 MS. MAHINDARATNE: Thank you, Mr. President.

11 Q. Madam, are you also aware that those six strategic objectives were

12 reiterated at a meeting of the presidents of the municipalities on 14th

13 May, 1992?

14 A. Six strategic goals that you are mentioning are completely

15 different things from these objectives. In my report, I mentioned the

16 objectives of the Serbs in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina that

17 had to do with their future. Whereas, the six so-called strategic goals

18 that you are mentioning are not really a strategy but, rather, a tactic.

19 Therefore, they could be considered as sub-items or ways of implementing

20 objectives of the leadership of Republika Srpska. So these are two

21 completely different matters.

22 Q. Madam, would you be able to identify those six objectives if you

23 were shown a document listing them?

24 A. No, I am aware of these six strategic goals. The first one --

25 Q. If I may interrupt you. I asked you the question whether you were

1 aware that those six strategic objectives were reiterated at a meeting of

2 the presidents of the municipalities on 14 May 1992, two days after they

3 were adopted at the assembly sessions. Are you aware of that?

4 A. I am aware of the fact that they were not adopted but, rather,

5 debated on, and certain people were informed about them. Therefore, I

6 believe that using the word "adopted" is not appropriate. The document

7 was drafted and all of the Serb municipalities had to be informed of it,

8 but it was not adopted. So shall I enumerate the strategic goals for you

9 now?

10 MS. MAHINDARATNE: May the witness be shown Exhibit P3413. It's a

11 new exhibit.

12 Q. Madam, would you please read out the title of this document or

13 identify this document.

14 A. "Meeting with presidents of municipalities in the area of

15 responsibility of the division." A meeting with presidents of

16 municipalities in the zone of responsibility of the division.

17 Q. On page 2 you will find the six strategic objectives which were

18 just referred to. Do you identify them? Page 2.

19 A. I would like to draw your attention to the agenda of this document

20 where --

21 Q. If I may interrupt you, please. My question to you is whether you

22 could identify the six strategic objectives which are enumerated on page

23 2. Do you see those six objectives set out on page 2?

24 A. Yes, I do.

25 Q. Now, would you please refer to the fifth objective. Could you

1 read that out, please.

2 A. In Russian it would sound as follows: "It was said that Sarajevo

3 had to be either divided or levelled to the ground."

4 Q. Now, you called this, to use your own terms, "tactics," and not

5 "objectives," as you've enumerated on page 21. Now, how does this relate

6 to the four objectives you set out in page 21? Which objective -- which

7 Serbian objective that you enumerated in page 21 encompasses this

8 particular tactic, that is, the fifth tactic, Sarajevo should be divided

9 or levelled to the ground?

10 A. Allow me to respond, please. The document that you're showing to

11 me is not the document that was adopted at the session on the 12th of May,

12 1992. The Assembly of Serb Peoples adopted six strategic goals which have

13 a completely different character and consequences. The first goal was to

14 divide the state from two other national entities. Then in goal 2, 3, and

15 4 they spoke about uniting those areas, extending the corridor in the area

16 of Brcko, in the valley of the rivers Drina and Una. And then the fifth

17 item, if you look carefully at the records of the meeting, they spoke

18 about splitting Sarajevo into a Serbian and a Muslim side. In Karadzic's

19 report, it was said that the Serbian state could not exist without

20 Sarajevo as well as that Alija's state could not exist without Sarajevo.

21 The sixth goal spoke about access to the sea. And the document that you

22 are showing to me is a document from a meeting - at least that's how it

23 looks to me - but it seems that the person who signed this document

24 attended the assembly session and then came back to his or her

25 municipality and then reported to them about what had transpired at the

1 session. Therefore, we cannot take this to be the strategic goal that was

2 presented at the session on the 12th of May and was recorded as such.

3 Q. Now, you referred to in your report as your fourth objective to

4 conclude a cease-fire on all the battlefronts and reinforce Serb positions

5 in the entire territory of Republika Srpska. Now, which tactic or

6 strategic objective enumerated in that document would relate to the fourth

7 objective?

8 A. Which document are you referring to? Could you please repeat that

9 to me.

10 Q. I'm referring to the document before you, which is placed before

11 you. My question -- yes. Yes.

12 A. This one here?

13 Q. Do you see any relationship to the fourth objective enumerated by

14 you and the six strategic objectives or tactics, as you put it, set out in

15 this document?

16 A. Generally these goals correspond to those that had been adopted at

17 the session of the assembly. The first one, the second one, the third

18 one, the fourth one, and the sixth one. All but the phrase concerning

19 Sarajevo levelled to the ground. There was no such phrase mentioned in

20 the document from the assembly. So it could have been an emotional

21 conveying of what had transpired at the assembly session.

22 Q. Madam, who has presided this meeting? I'm referring to the

23 meeting this document relates to. Could you please examine the document

24 and ...

25 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Mahindaratne, could we first ask whether the

1 witness has seen this document before. And could we ask her whether she

2 has been present. I mean, reading in a document who is presiding a

3 meeting, that is something apart from that -- it has been extensively

4 dealt with in previous testimonies -- might not be something you should

5 ask from an expert witness. I mean, the only thing you ask her is whether

6 she can read or not. The Chamber will accept that she can read.

7 MS. MAHINDARATNE: Very well, Mr. President.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Unless you have any specific reason to ask this

9 specific witness. But you may -- if it's of any use, then of course you

10 may draw her attention to the fact --

11 MS. MAHINDARATNE: I'll withdraw that, Mr. President.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed.

13 MS. MAHINDARATNE:

14 Q. Madam, isn't it the case that the second, fourth, and since you

15 challenged the fifth objective I will not refer it to -- and the

16 sixth -- the second, fourth, and sixth goals which you do concede to

17 enumerated in this document are not encompassed in the four objectives

18 that you reported on in your -- in page 21 of your report?

19 A. I will continue insisting upon the terminology. When we're

20 speaking about what the Serb people were fighting for, that's one thing.

21 We can call it "goals of the Serb peoples fighting." And if we're talking

22 about the means they would use to implement that and what they

23 specifically mean under that, then that could be called "a tactic."

24 I can also formulate this question in a different way. I've

25 already spoken about that when I was --

1 JUDGE ORIE: May I ask you the following: Would you please

2 carefully listen to the questions put to you and answer to those

3 questions. I think what Ms. Mahindaratne asked you: "and I think it

4 relates to your testimony where you said that the six strategic goals, or

5 rather, tactics, and could be considered as sub-items or ways of

6 implementing objectives of the leadership of Republika Srpska."

7 Ms. Mahindaratne now ask you to explain to her whether these six, as you

8 call them, "tactics," where they can be related to the four objectives you

9 described in your report on page 21. Because you explained to us before

10 that these were more or less sub-items. She specifically asked you

11 whether these were sub-items, apart from the discussion on whether number

12 5 really reflects what were the tactics, but how you can relate these

13 tactical six points to, she specifically asked, number 4 of your war

14 objectives, and if it could be categorised under number 3, 2, or 1, please

15 tell us. That was the question.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If we exclude the ending phrase of

17 item 5, then we could say that they fully correspond to each other.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But how are they related - that was the

19 question - to either number 4 or any of the other war objectives you

20 described in your report? Because you explained to us that these were

21 sub-items of the war objectives you described. So the question now is:

22 How to relate these six -- six, as you told us, tactical goals to the war

23 objectives you described. That is the question.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The relation is very simple. When

25 we say that certain area needs to be kept under control, the area mostly

1 populated by Serbian people, then that means that that territory needs to

2 be compact and must be linked by certain corridors. Items 1, 2, and 3

3 speak about the corridors that had to link these territories.

4 Item which speaks about the River Drina fully corresponds to item

5 3 in my report.

6 As far as concluding a truce, that is a particular tactic of the

7 Army of Republika Srpska which they used throughout the entire period.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Ms. Mahindaratne.

9 MS. MAHINDARATNE: Thank you, Mr. President.

10 Q. [Microphone not activated] May I draw your attention to page 39 of

11 your report.

12 A. Could you please give me the heading.

13 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: [Previous interpretation continues] ... I

14 would like to know, on page 2 of the translation of this

15 document -- because you are not going to use this document any more, are

16 you?

17 MS. MAHINDARATNE: I will come back to it, Your Honour.

18 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: Well, I would like to know if it says -- line

19 13 or something like that. Page 2 of the original is missing. Do you

20 have page 2 of the original? Because I think that we have this document.

21 We received this document before, but I am not sure. I think that we did

22 it.

23 MS. MAHINDARATNE: Your Honour, are you referring to page 2 of

24 the --

25 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: Of the translation.

1 MS. MAHINDARATNE: -- Of the translation?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Page 3 is missing in my copy as

3 well.

4 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: Page 2 -- I am asking -- I am asking to the

5 Prosecutor's counsel.

6 My question is whether you have the -- page 2 of the original.

7 MS. MAHINDARATNE: This is how it has been translated, Your

8 Honour: In fact, page 2 of the original --

9 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: Page 2 is missing.

10 MS. MAHINDARATNE: Is, Your Honour.

11 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: It's a fact.

12 MS. MAHINDARATNE: It's a fact.

13 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: Okay. Thank you.

14 MS. MAHINDARATNE: This is the way we've received the document,

15 Your Honour.

16 May I proceed?

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please proceed.

18 MS. MAHINDARATNE: Thank you, Mr. President.

19 Q. In page 39, as I said --

20 A. What heading, please?

21 Q. You referred to -- the title is "Situation around Sarajevo." And

22 I draw your attention to the last paragraph, where you refer to nine

23 municipalities and you claim that these municipalities were populated

24 mostly with Serb population. Now, for which period are you referring to

25 here when you say that these municipalities were populated by -- mostly by

1 Serb population? Are you referring to the period prior to the outbreak of

2 the conflict or thereafter?

3 A. Could you please tell me in greater detail what paragraphs you

4 have in mind.

5 Q. I'm referring to the paragraph where you start off with

6 "Leadership of the Republika Srpska wished at any cost to keep Sarajevo as

7 its capital or at least part of the city. Sarajevo with its suburbs is a

8 very large city, nine municipalities covered 1.113 kilometre square

9 populated mostly with Serb population, were controlled by Serbs and were

10 within the composition of the Republika Srpska." And you name the nine

11 municipalities. That's the paragraph I'm referring to. It is the second

12 paragraph under the section "Situation around Sarajevo." Have you --

13 A. Yes, I understand.

14 Q. Now -- well, my question to you is: For which period are you

15 referring to when you say these nine municipalities were mostly populated

16 by Serb population?

17 A. I was referring to the time period when Sarajevo had already been

18 divided along the ethnic lines.

19 Q. Could you give in terms of -- was it prior to the conflict, in the

20 course of the conflict, after the conflict? Can you give in terms of

21 years?

22 A. That was after the division of Sarajevo along the ethnic lines,

23 because the majority of Serb residents from ten municipalities were only

24 in four of them. But the borders had already been changed.

25 Q. [Previous interpretation continues] ... What was the source of

1 your information? Could you give the year, if it was based on a census

2 or -- what period are you referring to here? Is that a difficult question

3 to answer?

4 A. No, it's not a difficult question for me. I simply want to

5 clarify it. I was not referring to municipalities -- to ten

6 municipalities which according to the census covered Sarajevo. I was here

7 referring to other territories, including the municipalities which were

8 encompassed by Serbian Sarajevo after 1992, or let's say in the second

9 part of it.

10 Q. [Previous interpretation continues] ... You have clearly stated in

11 this last paragraph - and I quote to you - "leadership of Republika Srpska

12 wished at any cost to keep Sarajevo as its capital or at least part of the

13 city. Sarajevo with its suburbs is a very large city. Nine

14 municipalities, populated mostly with Serb population were controlled by

15 Serbs and were within the composition of Republika Srpska." And then you

16 go on to name, they were the following municipalities. Now, why -- what

17 is it that you're referring to when you say you were not referring to

18 municipalities? Clearly when you said that nine municipalities were

19 mostly populated by Serb population you're referring to these nine

20 municipalities. My question to you is: What is the source of your

21 information? Why are you reluctant to answer this?

22 JUDGE ORIE: Let's first try to avoid confusion,

23 Ms. Mahindaratne.

24 MS. MAHINDARATNE: May I approach this in a different way,

25 Mr. President?

1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Let me just ask you the following: In page 39

2 you are referring to nine municipalities populated mostly with Serb

3 population. Did I understand your testimony correctly that you were

4 referring to the situation in -- after 1992 or at least in the second part

5 of 1992, not to the period prior to the outbreak of an armed conflict?

6 THE WITNESS: [No audible response]

7 JUDGE ORIE: Then you referred to --

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's absolutely right.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In addition to that, it is

11 emphasised here that I was referring to the Serbian population --

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You were referring to the statistics of the

13 Serb authorities. Your report reads, "In these parts of the city which

14 was called Serb Sarajevo, according to the statistics of the Serb

15 authorities, 120.000 persons were living." Do you have the date of these

16 statistics? And perhaps I should look in footnote 276 because that's what

17 the testimony, as far as I understand, says and that's what the report

18 says, Ms. Mahindaratne.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. This pertains to the

20 personal -- to the information on Sarajevo printed in newspaper

21 Oslobodjenje in 1995.

22 MS. MAHINDARATNE:

23 Q. So would it be then correct to say that the -- these statistics

24 are for 1995? Is that what you said?

25 A. They were published in 1995.

1 Q. What was the ethnic composition of these nine municipalities prior

2 to the outbreak of the war? Was it still a case of majority of Serbian

3 population?

4 A. The Serbs were a majority only in four municipalities. In Pale

5 they constituted 68 per cent of the population; Ilijas, Ilidza, and Novo

6 Sarajevo.

7 MS. MAHINDARATNE: May the witness be shown a document,

8 Mr. President. It's the population census, the large document.

9 Therefore, it may be placed on the ELMO. I don't have sufficient copies

10 to pass around.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If you -- if you'd like to show that to the

12 witness, you're fully entitled to do so.

13 MS. MAHINDARATNE: If I may have the assistance of the usher.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could it be put on the ELMO in such a way that

15 we can follow it clearly on the screen.

16 Could you indicate what page you would like to be shown to the

17 witness.

18 MS. MAHINDARATNE:

19 Q. First of all, madam, do you recognise the census which has been

20 shown to you? Have you gone through this before?

21 A. You know what? When it comes to geographic --

22 Q. [Previous interpretation continues] ... If I may interrupt you.

23 My question to you was whether you perused this census before.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

25 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, simply we know

1 that there were at least three censuses in 1991 --

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

3 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] We'd like to know --

4 JUDGE ORIE: That's the reason why I ask --

5 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] -- Which census are we talking

6 about?

7 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous interpretation continues] ... And I think

8 that it is on the ELMO. And if you would look at your screen,

9 Mr. Piletta-Zanin, you would have no great difficulties to find out what

10 date -- what year, at least, is mentioned in the document.

11 Please proceed, Ms. Mahindaratne.

12 But may I ask you: If there's any further comments you would like

13 to make, ask me whether you can comment. But first answer the questions.

14 If there's anything important to be added, please tell me and I will give

15 you an opportunity to do so.

16 MS. MAHINDARATNE: Mr. President, I note the time. I was

17 wondering whether this would be an appropriate time for the break.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I think it would be an appropriate time.

19 We will adjourn until ten minutes past 6.00.

20 --- Recess taken at 5.49 p.m.

21 --- On resuming at 6.12 p.m.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Usher -- oh, yes. I see that the witness is

23 being brought in.

24 Ms. Mahindaratne, the Chamber wonders why you tell us that page 2

25 of a document is not available if the Chamber could find it in five

1 minutes during the break. Would it not have been appropriate for the

2 Prosecution to provide a full copy of that document? I'm going to refer

3 you to annex 83 to the report of Dr. Donia, exactly the same document,

4 although under a different ERN number. But the Chamber feels no -- that

5 it's not responsible for double filing of same documents.

6 MS. MAHINDARATNE: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. I was under

7 the impression that it was not available.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. It is.

9 MS. MAHINDARATNE: Also, Mr. President, may I just verify how long

10 I have --

11 JUDGE ORIE: Oh, I have to -- I did a search rather than the

12 bookkeeping at this moment. But I think you started, Ms. Mahindaratne, at

13 5.00. Then we went on to ten minutes to 6.00. It is approximately 50

14 minutes you've used by now. And since the Defence took a little bit over

15 one hour and a half, then you know that some 40, 45 minutes left.

16 MS. MAHINDARATNE: Thank you, Mr. President.

17 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

19 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. The

20 Defence also spent some time finding page 2. We'd like to know -- because

21 it seems -- it seemed that it was a new document, but we all now know that

22 it was not a new document. Could we know what the translation was based

23 on. I am talking about page 2, which was, we believe, deliberately

24 dropped out, we think. We believe that that was the case.

25 MS. MAHINDARATNE: That's certainly not the case, Mr. President.

1 Sometimes there are several translations made with regard to one

2 particular document, and I believe what happened was that one of those

3 translations which did not have the -- have page 2 was tendered with the

4 B/C/S, the original. And it is my fault, but certainly there was no

5 ulterior motives attached to that.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Is there any specific reason why the Defence

7 takes it that on purpose page 2 was left out whereas it was already in

8 evidence? If there's no specific reason ...

9 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President.

10 Because -- because no questions were asked -- no questions were asked of

11 this witness about what was this, the comment as such. And I will need

12 more time to ask questions in my re-examination. And we think that if the

13 witness had this whole document, that perhaps the answers would have been

14 different. And that is why we think that this was done on purpose.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I'm not fully convinced yet, but we'll

16 deliberate in the Chamber whether there's any reason to believe that there

17 was any intent.

18 MS. MAHINDARATNE: Mr. President --

19 JUDGE ORIE: Let's not spend too much time on it. We have

20 now -- at least you have a -- there is a full copy available if anyone

21 would like to inspect it either in translation or not, I have it with me

22 at this very moment. If not, let's please proceed.

23 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, might I have a copy of that or might I

24 borrow your copy. Thank you.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

1 MS. MAHINDARATNE: May I proceed?

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please do.

3 MS. MAHINDARATNE:

4 Q. Madam, please refer to page 7 of the official census. I'm

5 referring to the page which starts with Sarajevo and then Centar. Now,

6 you list Centar as one of the municipalities which had a majority Serbian

7 population, on page 39 of your report. The total population in Centar is

8 79.286, according to this census. And the Muslim population is 39.761.

9 The Serbian population, 16.631; Croatian, 5.428; Yugoslavian, 13.030; and

10 others, 4.436. Below that there is Hadzici, another municipality that

11 you've listed as having a majority Serbian population. The total

12 population, according to this census, is 24.200; Muslim population,

13 15.392; Serbian, 6.362; Croatian, 746; Yugoslavian, 841; and others, 859.

14 And I also take you to page 8, which lists Ilidza, total

15 population 67.937; Muslim population is 29.337; Serbian 25.029; Croatian,

16 6.934; Yugoslavian, 5.181; and others, 1.456.

17 Likewise, you would see below that Ilijas. Total, 25.184, on the

18 same page; Muslim, 10.585, Serbian, 11.325; Croatian, 1.736; Yugoslavian,

19 1.167; and others, 371.

20 And I draw your attention to page number 10, to Novi Grad, which

21 is also a municipality you've listed as having a majority Serbian

22 population. The total is 136.616, out of which Muslim population is

23 69.430; Serbian, 37.591; Croatian, 8.889; Yugoslavian, 15.580; and others,

24 5.126.

25 Below that, Novo Sarajevo -- I beg your pardon. You have not

1 listed Novi Grad but Novo Sarajevo, which gives the total population of

2 95.089; Muslim population, 33.902; Serbian, 32.899; Croatian, 8.798;

3 Yugoslavian, 15.099; others, 4.391.

4 I draw your attention to page 12, which lists Stari Grad and

5 Trnovo, which are two municipalities listed by you. Total, 50.744; Muslim

6 population, 39.410; Serbian population, 5.150; Croatian, 1.126;

7 Yugoslavian, 3.374; and others, 1.684.

8 Trnovo, likewise, total 6.991; Muslim population, 4.790; Serb --

9 THE INTERPRETER: Could the text on the ELMO be moved, please.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Usher, could you please move the text on the ELMO

11 such that the interpreters could -- perhaps not zoom out, because it might

12 even be more difficult, but to move a little bit upwards and then zoom in

13 again. That's downwards. If the document would be moved upwards.

14 MS. MAHINDARATNE:

15 Q. And in Trnovo the Serbian population is 2.059; Croatian, 16;

16 Yugoslavia, 72; and others, 54.

17 And finally, on page 13, Vogosca. Total, 24.647; Muslim

18 population, 12.499; Serbian, 8.813; Croatian, 1.071; Yugoslavian, 1.730;

19 and others, 534.

20 So according to this census, which is indicated as a final census

21 of 1991, except for Ilijas, all other municipalities -- all the other

22 municipalities that you listed as having a majority of Serb population in

23 1991, according to your source reference, had a majority of Muslim

24 population prior to the outbreak of the war.

25 A. And what is your question?

1 Q. So do you agree, then, that prior to the conflict in these

2 municipalities there were mostly Muslim population living, whereas after

3 the war, if your source citation is to be depended on, there -- those

4 municipalities had acquired a majority of Serbian population?

5 A. I'd like to make something clear with regard to my text. I'm not

6 talking about the ten municipalities listed in the census of 1991. I am

7 referring to territories and parts of municipalities and their boundaries

8 did not correspond to the boundaries of the former municipalities. We are

9 talking about the Republika Srpska, which was made of municipalities with

10 a mixed population according to the 1991 census. But it is better to rely

11 on the census of 1981, which is also official. I fully agree in six

12 municipalities out of ten, the Muslims were the majority.

13 Q. Moving on to another area. In page --

14 MS. MAHINDARATNE: May the document be returned.

15 Q. In page 45, if I may draw your attention to page 45 of the

16 document -- of your report.

17 A. Which chapter?

18 Q. Under the chapter "Suffering of Serbs," two pages down. You start

19 off -- this is on page 45, paragraph 1. You start off with, "The city was

20 blocked from the outside but it was blocked much more from the inside, and

21 this blockade was experienced as a much harder one."

22 And then further down that page you refer to these two types of

23 blockades again in a statement attributable to David Owen, and you go on

24 to say, "Sarajevo is actually under a double blockade. The first one was

25 placed by Serbs shelling the city from artillery, armament, and sniper

1 rifles, and by placing a circle around the city. The second blockade was

2 made by the army of the Bosnian government which had restricted its people

3 by interior blockade and bureaucratic obstacles."

4 Now, in the first paragraph, when you referred to the city being

5 blocked from the outside, you were referring to -- were you not referring

6 to the first one, what David Owen is speaking about, the first one is

7 placed by Serbs shelling the city from artillery, armament, and sniper

8 rifles, and by placing a circle around the city? That's the outside

9 blockade you are referring to, isn't it?

10 A. I didn't really get your question. Could you repeat it, please.

11 Q. Have you found the particular paragraph I'm referring to where you

12 speak of two types of blockades, one from the outside and one from the

13 inside? And you go on to say, "The interior blockade was experienced as a

14 much harder one." Did you find that passage?

15 A. I have, yes.

16 Q. Further down in that page you refer to the two types of blockades

17 again in a statement attributable to by David Owen. The first one is

18 described as, "Shelling the city --" let me quote you. "The first one was

19 placed by Serbs shelling the city from artillery, armament, and sniper

20 rifles and by placing a circle around the city." My question to you is:

21 You were referring to this first type of blockade when you referred to an

22 outside blockade to Sarajevo; wasn't it the case?

23 A. This is not me speaking. It is David Owen. And I am quoting him.

24 Q. That is so. But in paragraph 1, you do refer to the two types of

25 blockades. And my question to you is: Presumably you're referring to

1 that -- the first blockade that David Owen is speaking about, that is, the

2 encirclement of Sarajevo and shelling with armament and sniper rifles.

3 That's what you --

4 A. Yes. It was all there, yes.

5 Q. In view of that, what was the basis on which you concluded that

6 the interior blockade, to use your own words, "but it was blocked much

7 more from the inside and the blockade -- and this blockade was experienced

8 as a much harder one." What was the basis for your conclusion that the

9 inside blockade was experienced as a much harder one, as opposed to the

10 outside one and admittedly encirclement of Sarajevo and shelling and

11 firing with sniper rifles?

12 A. Regrettably in 1993 and 1994, one could practically not leave the

13 city. That is, people who lived in Sarajevo wanted to leave it. And this

14 also applies to other towns. And the leadership of Republika Srpska

15 repeatedly proposed to the Muslim side to reach an agreement whereby

16 everybody who wanted so could leave the city. And how difficult it was to

17 leave the city, well, I knew that because I worked with UNPROFOR and

18 talked to many people. Today it is written a great deal about those

19 people who participated as blue helmets in Sarajevo, profited from that

20 situation, and for a certain amount of money took people out of Sarajevo,

21 because otherwise it was very difficult. Today, information emerges how

22 these things were happening in Sarajevo. There are documents attesting to

23 this. There are memoirs. There are diaries. I talked with people who

24 had left Sarajevo and who found it very difficult to get out of it. But

25 that was, in point of fact, a government policy. It wasn't the policy

1 pursued by individual municipality leaders or some lower tiers of power.

2 And my observations fully coincide with what I wrote and what you can read

3 in what General Morillon and David Owen also stated.

4 Q. Moving on to another area. If I may draw your attention to page

5 48 to 52 of your report where you discuss the imposition of sanctions

6 against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. That is under the title "The

7 use of provocations for purpose of punishing Serbs."

8 On page 49, referring to the report of the Secretary-General, UN

9 Secretary-General, bearing number S-24049, you go on to say this: "In its

10 entirety, the report was presented an extremely complex and diversified

11 situation. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, I did not end with the conclusion

12 that it was necessary to introduce sanctions against Yugoslavia. It seems

13 that this was actually the reason why the report of the UN

14 Secretary-General was allegedly lost somewhere in the offices of the

15 United Nations and that it reached the desks of the Security Council

16 members only after they --"

17 THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry, could you please read slowly.

18 MS. MAHINDARATNE: And reached the desks of --

19 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Mahindaratne, you are asked to speak more slowly.

20 MS. MAHINDARATNE:

21 Q. "And it reached the desks of --"

22 JUDGE ORIE: I think that since the B/C/S interpretation asked my

23 attention, that there's something wrong now with the channels. On channel

24 4 I now heard B/C/S translation, where I would expect to hear the original

25 English or English translation.

1 Let's try it again. Ms. Mahindaratne.

2 MS. MAHINDARATNE: Yes.

3 Q. "And it reached the desks of the Security Council members only

4 after they had voted on the introduction of sanctions."

5 Now, in making that statement, you're clearly implying that the

6 report of the Secretary-General was prepared after the resolution imposing

7 sanctions was adopted. That's your assertion?

8 A. No. That is not correct. The report was prepared for that

9 particular session. But it did not turn up on the desks in front of the

10 Security Council members.

11 Q. That is correct. But in saying that it did not reach the desks of

12 the Security Council members until the resolution was adopted, you

13 obviously imply that the report had not been -- had been already written

14 prior to the resolution was adopted -- that the report was prepared before

15 the adoption of the resolution.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. What was the source of your information that this report got lost

18 in the United Nations and did not reach the desks until the adoption of

19 the resolution?

20 A. Many media outlets wrote about that. In June of 1994 there were

21 hearings held in the parliament of the Russian Federation concerning this

22 issue and I, as an expert of the parliament, had in my possession all

23 documents relating to the imposition of sanctions and the attitude of

24 Russia concerning that. And at the time we were discussing the issue

25 regarding why Russia had put its signature on the document imposing

1 sanctions. So this was based on the documents in our possession at the

2 time.

3 Q. Madam, prior to making that assertion, did you take the time to

4 peruse the whole report in its entirety?

5 A. Yes, certainly I did.

6 MS. MAHINDARATNE: May the witness be shown a document. It's the

7 report of the Secretary-General bearing number S-24049 of 30th May, 1992.

8 Q. Now, madam, your position was that this report was prepared prior

9 to the resolution was adopted, that is, resolution 757. That's your

10 position.

11 Would you please read the final paragraph of the report, that is,

12 paragraph number 17. Is it clear to you that by this paragraph that this

13 report has been prepared only after the resolution had been adopted?

14 Because there is a reference to the Security Council's decision today to

15 impose sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. There's a

16 reference to the resolution. So is it clear to you now that your position

17 that this report was prepared prior to the adoption of the resolution was

18 completely incorrect?

19 A. Based on the fact that the report itself appeared later, it is

20 quite possible that it was written up later on. When we analysed this at

21 our parliament session, this paragraph was missing. It wasn't there. We

22 had it in a different draft.

23 Q. Are you suggesting that the United Nations Secretary-General has

24 added a paragraph to this document later on to mislead some party? Is

25 that what your -- is that your position?

1 A. I don't know how this came about. I have no explanation for that.

2 Q. But are you implying that this document has been altered?

3 A. I wish to say that the report of the Secretary-General was written

4 based on the information of his representatives and it was prepared

5 specifically for the 30th and this session that took place on that day,

6 the session of the Security Council. And based on the report of the

7 report, they voted and adopted a decision.

8 [Prosecution counsel confer]

9 MS. MAHINDARATNE: Mr. President, that concludes the

10 cross-examination.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Piletta-Zanin, is there any need to

12 re-examine the witness?

13 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Microphone not activated]

14 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

15 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] In order to put these

16 questions, could the Prosecution now decide with regard to this second

17 page, the translation, could it decide which document we're going to be

18 working on.

19 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous interpretation continues] ... Phantom page.

20 As far as I understand, there is a document that has been used to be

21 translated, a document without page 2, and therefore the translation

22 incorrectly says that page 2 is missing, I take it that the translators

23 have been presented a document with a missing page 2. And we had already

24 in evidence an annex to the report of Dr. Donia, a report -- a document

25 which seems to be exactly the same do you mean, including stamps, et

1 cetera, which contains a second page. So I -- and of course we were

2 confronted only recently, but I'm certain that if you would like to have

3 the -- either the original with the page 2 that is already known to you,

4 but if you would like to look at it again, I'll be glad to provide you

5 with the B/C/S copy. And perhaps Mr. Ierace has finished by now the

6 English translation so that you can --

7 MR. IERACE: I have, Mr. President.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

9 MR. IERACE: And during the break and shortly after you alerted us

10 to this, as a result of some inquiries made during the break we have

11 located the full copy together with the B/C/S.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So if you would like to have a look at it, I

13 will be glad to leave both copies with you and ...

14 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

15 JUDGE ORIE: And you may now re-examine the witness.

16 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, we have found

17 this document during the break. It's the one that we -- it's the same one

18 that we had. But I wanted to be certain that the Prosecution had the time

19 to do what it should have done before, that is to say, to read this second

20 page. If this is the case, I will proceed with my re-examination.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

22 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you.

23 Re-examined by Mr. Piletta-Zanin:

24 Q. [Interpretation] Madam, you were shown a document before that was

25 not complete. I would now like to have a look at the copy which should

1 have been shown to you, the complete copy which includes page 2.

2 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] What should I do,

3 Mr. President? Should I provide this document that you have just given

4 me?

5 JUDGE ORIE: If you want to ask questions about the document, I

6 think you, with the consent of the parties, would then use this document

7 that has been annex 83 to the report of Dr. Donia. And if there would be

8 a copy available in English for me again, being the only one who provided

9 the translation.

10 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I may have one.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Less -- less --

12 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I have the English

13 translation, Mr. President.

14 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous interpretation continues] ... Please start.

15 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Madam, could you please briefly read page 2 of this document.

17 A. [No audible response]

18 Q. Thank you. I would now like you to read this so that we can

19 translate this as best as possible. The first point 3 on the first page.

20 Could you go back to page number 1, please. The first page -- no, the

21 first page.

22 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] For the booth, it's the first

23 page. It's not the third page. It's the third item, the third point.

24 Q. The first third point, do you see it? It starts with -- could you

25 read the first word out, please.

1 A. "Messages."

2 Q. Thank you very much. Having said that, could you examine this in

3 relation to page 2. That is to say, could this item be applied to what we

4 can see on page 2, that is to say - and I'll have to summarise this - can

5 it be applied to what is taking place in the theatre of operations, with

6 regard to the places, et cetera?

7 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] We're going to waste a little

8 time, Mr. President, but ...

9 A. It seems to me that this has to do with a meeting at which purely

10 military issues were discussed and also information on what had passed at

11 the Serbian assembly meeting in Banja Luka was presented as well. This is

12 as far as I can gather.

13 Q. Hence the character -- the tactical definition that you used. I

14 think that's the term that you employed a while ago. Is that correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Thank you. Witness, could you read what we didn't have a look at

17 earlier on. Could you read out loudly - it's the last page of the

18 document. And I have to find it myself -

19 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Just a minute, Mr. President.

20 [Defence counsel confer]

21 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

22 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you. I've found the

23 place. Thank you.

24 Q. Could you read out -- you can do it. You can use the Serbian text

25 which you are familiar with. It's page 4, and it starts with the words

1 "at the end of the meeting," et cetera. Could you read out the part that

2 starts with those words. Could you do that, please.

3 A. I can.

4 Q. Please do so.

5 A. "At the end of the meeting, Colonel Galic proposed the following

6 conclusions: Implement the decisions from the meeting in Banja Luka, but

7 it was necessary to submit them to the commands of units and

8 municipalities; hold the present positions and defend them without war;

9 continue with the growth and seek weapons and equipment for new" and then

10 I can see what does this pertain to. "All forces of the Serbian Republic

11 of Bosnia and Herzegovina should work towards the same goals. War

12 profiteering should be prevented. Wartime functioning of the economy

13 should be ensured and neighbouring municipalities should help each other

14 out. All the fighters should be commended for the combat results achieved

15 so far." This is a bad copy. However --

16 Q. That's quite right. I'll stop you there. It's a bad copy, but

17 thank you very much for having complied with my request.

18 Witness, my question is as follows: Isn't there contradiction, an

19 intrinsic contradiction in this document in that it's hard to explain why

20 it would be necessary to raze Sarajevo to the ground, according to the

21 phrase "[B/C/S spoken]", and at the same time to carry out a defence

22 without engaging in war? Have you understood the question? Because I can

23 see that for the Russian booth --

24 A. Yes, I have understood the question.

25 Q. Are you going to answer?

1 A. Yes. May I?

2 Q. Thank you.

3 A. I understood the question because the last phrases speak about a

4 meeting that had been held and at which issues that had to do with the

5 results of the assembly session held on the 12th of May in Banja Luka were

6 analysed. The last sentence says that documents from the assembly were

7 analysed and taken into account and not personal -- personal information

8 presented as to those documents.

9 Q. Isn't there contradiction between the term "[B/C/S spoken]" Which

10 I mentioned a minute ago and these indications made by Colonel -- by

11 General Galic that defence should be mounted without engaging in war?

12 Aren't these two positions contradictory in your opinion?

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Ms. Mahindaratne.

14 MS. MAHINDARATNE: Objection, Mr. President. The witness is being

15 led. It's a leading question.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Well, you're seeking -- well, if it's intrinsic, if

17 it comes from the text, Mr. Piletta-Zanin, I would say it hardly needs any

18 explanation, any confirmation. If it's not intrinsic, you should put

19 another question to the witness.

20 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Exactly.

21 Q. As a result, I would like to move on to another subject.

22 Witness - and I would like to focus on what was pointed out to you. It's

23 at page 48 and 50, and it has to do with reports from UN experts

24 concerning the Markale incident. Could you answer my question by saying

25 yes or no. Are you a ballistics expert; yes or no?

1 JUDGE ORIE: The witness has answered that question already. She

2 said, "I'm not a ballistics expert," so there's no reason to ask the

3 witness again.

4 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] That's quite right, but I

5 wanted to continue.

6 Q. Do you have any knowledge of any kind, witness, about the military

7 field or about explosives? I'm not just talking about ballistics. Or do

8 you have knowledge of any other kind? Yes or no?

9 A. I'm not an expert in ballistics.

10 Q. Thank you. On the other hand, madam, are you aware of the

11 conclusions reached in this report at the time?

12 A. No.

13 Q. I'll go back to that question because I'm not sure of what I

14 heard. At the time that your report was written, your expert report, were

15 you aware of the existence of this UN report and were you aware of the

16 gist of its conclusions; yes or no?

17 A. I didn't have it in my possession. I simply heard about it when

18 it was mentioned.

19 Q. I know that you didn't have these document, but my question is as

20 follows, madam: It's possible not to have a document but nevertheless be

21 familiar with certain things. Were you familiar with the conclusions in

22 general terms of this report? That is all I want to ask you. Yes or no?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Thank you. I will now go back to page 73 and 74. You answered

25 some of the Prosecution's questions about the interior, and you said

1 perhaps that it was worse than the exterior, according to the author that

2 you quoted. My question is as follows: With regard to this interior

3 blockade, were you personally aware of events in Sarajevo which could be

4 the basis for your conclusions? And if so, what were these events?

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Ms. Mahindaratne --

6 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation]

7 Q. What was this basis?

8 MS. MAHINDARATNE: This does not arise from cross-examination. I

9 did not ask questions from the interior blockade, details about it, at

10 least.

11 JUDGE ORIE: You asked about the basis for the conclusions that

12 the interior blockade was worse than the exterior blockade, so the Defence

13 is entitled to further investigate the reasons for this conclusion.

14 Mr. Piletta-Zanin, but could you please finish in a couple of

15 minutes. But objection is denied.

16 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I'll make an effort to,

17 Mr. President.

18 Q. Madam, you heard the question. Could you please answer the

19 question. What was your personal experience?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. So you did experience this. What can you tell us -- what can you

22 tell the Trial Chamber? What did you see? What did you find out about?

23 What did you feel, learn, et cetera?

24 A. Do you mean when I was in Sarajevo?

25 Q. Yes, with regard to the interior blockade. Yes, in fact that's

1 it.

2 A. I managed to take down the notes from the conversation with the

3 Muslim man who throughout the military operation lived in Sarajevo and is

4 living there nowadays as well. In my book, I reported his entire story,

5 and he said in great detail what sufferings he went through, and not just

6 him but the non-Muslim population, what they had to suffer through during

7 the war. And that is very important, and this is something that I

8 conveyed in my book.

9 Q. Very well. But what do you yourself know? What examples could

10 you provide us with? And I think that will be my last question.

11 A. I spoke with people who left Sarajevo with great difficulty but

12 left, with people who paid their way out, and all of this created a

13 general impression on how difficult it was for the non-Muslim population

14 in Sarajevo, regardless of how few of them there were.

15 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] If I may confer for 30

16 seconds. No more, Mr. President.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

18 [Defence counsel confer]

19 [Defence counsel and accused confer]

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, may I say two words

21 while we're having a break?

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But perhaps if the parties are conferring, I'd

23 rather not ask you to because they could not pay proper attention to your

24 words. What would you like to say, Ms. Guskova?

25 Yes, Madam Guskova asked whether she could say two words. I would

1 allow her.

2 Would you have any additional questions?

3 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] No. And perhaps she could say

4 a few words.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Ms. Guskova, we are not yet at the end of your

6 testimony. So if it would be any comments, perhaps leave it to the end.

7 If it is, however, something we should know about at this moment, please

8 go ahead.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I simply wanted to fill up the

10 break we were having. But I can wait until the end.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If there are no further questions,

12 Mr. Piletta-Zanin ...

13 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] No, Mr. President. Thank you.

14 [Trial Chamber confers]

15 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Guskova, since the Bench have a few questions

16 for you as well and since that will certainly take more than three, four,

17 or five minutes, we'll have to adjourn now, and we'd like to see you back

18 tomorrow morning at 9.00, not in this courtroom but in Courtroom II. May

19 I instruct you not to speak with anyone about your testimony -- about the

20 testimony you have given until now and the testimony you are still about

21 to give, and I'll ask Mr. Usher to escort you out of the courtroom.

22 Meanwhile, I will invite the parties to return to me as well page

23 2251, which is the fourth page of the translation I was so kind to provide

24 to the parties, so that my copy is complete again.

25 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I hope I'm not suspected of an

1 ulterior motive, but I don't believe I received the last page, if the

2 fourth page is the last page.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Well, at least let's -- perhaps it is on my desk so I

4 would then have to apologise. But if page 4 is missing, we'll find it. I

5 will --

6 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

8 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Everything is in the hands of

9 the witness now, I think. The witness should not leave with your

10 documents.

11 JUDGE ORIE: If there are any documents in the hands of the

12 witness at this very moment --

13 Yes. Madam Guskova, we're just wondering where -- we're just

14 wondering whether there's still one of the documents provided to you by

15 either the Chamber or the parties in your possession. I don't think it

16 is.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.

18 JUDGE ORIE: It was suggested by the Defence that you might have

19 one.

20 So we'd like to see you back tomorrow morning. I think the B/C/S

21 version is with Madam Registrar at this very moment.

22 So I suggest to the parties that I'll take back the B/C/S version

23 as well and that we work on a copy that will be provided overnight of this

24 document.

25 [The witness stands down]

1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Ierace.

2 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, you're welcome to take the fourth page

3 of the copy we found shortly after you brought this to light or before.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. It's with the same --

5 MR. IERACE: ERN number. I think it is.

6 JUDGE ORIE: -- As mine, so --

7 MR. IERACE: Exhibit 1, Mr. President.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Exhibit 1. Yes, that's page 2251. Thank you

9 very much for returning it.

10 We'll adjourn until tomorrow morning at 9.00.

11 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned

12 at 7.07 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday,

13 the 13th day of February, 2003, at 9.00 a.m.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25