Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 4885

 1                           Monday, 23 June 2008

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to everyone.

 6             Mr. Registrar, would you please call case.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning to

 8     everyone in the courtroom.  This is case number IT-06-90-T, The

 9     Prosecutor versus Ante Gotovina et al.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

11             Before I invite the Prosecution to call its next witness, I would

12     just like to inquire into a submission made by the Markac Defence.  We

13     received a submission, defendant Mladen Markac motion to have one of

14     Witness 81's statement deemed inadmissible; but it deals, as a matter of

15     fact, with the expansion of the scope of testimony for Witness 116.

16     These are two different witnesses.  On the first page, we find defendant

17     Mladen Markac to have, one, Witness 81's statement deemed inadmissible,

18     but then it continues about Witness 116.

19                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

20             JUDGE ORIE:  And I do understand that although the date is

21     20th of June, that it was filed this morning.

22             Mr. Kuzmanovic, any reason on why there was a reason to mix up

23     two witnesses.

24             MR. KUZMANOVIC:  Yes, Your Honour.  What ended up happening was

25     when it got sent, somehow it got -- the face page got mistranscribed, and

Page 4886

 1     we'll correct it; however, this morning, Mr. Misetic will address the

 2     other portion of the issue.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  At the same time, it is not just the cover

 4     page.  It is also the first page where we have two witnesses.

 5             MR. KUZMANOVIC:  Understood, Your Honour.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  May I take it that the submission is about

 7     Witness 116.

 8             MR. MISETIC:  Their submission is, yes.

 9             MR. KUZMANOVIC:  Yes, our submission is, Your Honour.

10             MR. MISETIC:  For the record, we, the Gotovina Defence, will be

11     filing a motion to strike the second 92 ter statement that is referenced

12     in the caption, which will hopefully filed in the next day or two.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Second 92 ter statement of Witness 116?

14             MR. MISETIC:  No.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  81.

16             MR. MISETIC:  81, yes.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  But, today, we are dealing with Witness 116,

18     so 81 will --

19             MR. MISETIC:  Will wait, yes.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  -- will wait until we've done with this one.

21             Then I also do understand that the there were no objections

22     against the admission of statements and exhibits, apart from the last two

23     ones, two maps to be exhibited, where I think it was the Gotovina Defence

24     who said it is irrelevant; and if it would be admitted, we'd need one

25     more day for cross-examination.

Page 4887

 1             Mr. Tieger, is there anything you'd like to -- you have already

 2     responded to that, saying that it is relevant.  The main issue seems to

 3     be that you say that whatever policy was there in view of Bosnia is

 4     irrelevant for this case.

 5             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Your Honour.  That also includes not just the

 6     maps but the transcript of the 29 October 1993 matter.  If I may, Judge,

 7     on various different levels, obviously it -- 1993 has got very little to

 8     do with this case.  It certainly has nothing that connects it to our

 9     client General Gotovina.  And, probably, the most significant issue here

10     with regard to this is it is actually a matter which will impeach the

11     Prosecution's witness, Ambassador Galbraith.

12             If the theory on bring this matter in, especially the whole

13     discussion in 1993, that President Tudjman had some idea to cleanse the

14     area of Serbs and he engaged in a methodology on that score, which is, I

15     assume, what the Prosecution is attempt to go bring this in, that is

16     undercut, not only undercut, but eliminated by this witness in

17     paragraph 81, where he notes in the first line:  "I don't think it was

18     Tudjman's plan to expel all Serbs from Croatia."  That's the

19     second-to-last paragraph in his statement.

20             That being said, Your Honours, number 1, it certainly well

21     outside the time-frame of this indictment; number 2, there is nothing

22     whatsoever linking any comments by President Tudjman at any time-frame to

23     General Gotovina; and, number 3, the admission of this evidence is

24     impeaching their own witness, which, Your Honour, quite frankly, under

25     Rule 90 is improper.  I mean, the Prosecution is allowed to put their

Page 4888

 1     case on and their cases comes from this particular witness, but

 2     impeaching their own witness is yet a different matter.

 3             So, suffice it to say, just based on the first line in

 4     paragraph 91 alone, there's really no relevance to this particular line

 5     of inquiry on Bosnia and what President Tudjman's comments were on

 6     Bosnia.

 7             I note, Your Honour, that the entire matter of President Tudjman

 8     and Bosnia has been the subject of the Prlic case, which I believe

 9     started sometime 2007, and it looks destined to end sometime in the

10     latter part of 2009.  So we're talking about an extremely complex issue

11     which has been highly debated in another forum within the ICTY.  I don't

12     think we need get that fair, Judge.

13             The fact of the matter is that it has absolutely no relevance to

14     this case, and this particular witness is going to say that in his -- in

15     paragraph 91 [sic], exactly what he outlined before, that it wasn't

16     Tudjman's plan to expel all Serbs from Croatia.

17             Now, the other aspect to this, Judge, and a matter which we also

18     take in on Rule 90(H) is the matter of probative value verse prejudice.

19     I mean, what is the probative value of this particular line of inquiry

20     vis-a-vis the prejudice that will emanate to our client, especially when

21     the Prosecution has got absolutely nothing to tie General Gotovina to

22     this item.

23             Given those circumstances, Judge, what I have just outlined, the

24     time-frame, the lack the relevance, the lack of connection, and the fact

25     that this particular witness undercuts this is entire theory, especially

Page 4889

 1     vis-a-vis Operation Storm, there's simply no reason to allow this item

 2     into evidence.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger.

 4             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  First, before we continue, I see "paragraph 91."  On

 6     the transcript, I think I heard you say "81," and that seems to be more

 7     in line with your argument.

 8             MR. KEHOE:  No.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  I don't think it was.  Tudjman's plan appears in 81.

10             MR. KEHOE:  81.  If I said "91," I meat "81."

11             I apologise for that.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  I don't know where the mistake was, but let's

13     proceed.

14             Mr. Tieger.

15             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Your Honour.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  I think I spoke too quickly as well.

17             MR. KEHOE:  If I may just correct one other item.  What I was

18     talking about on the prejudicial -- the probative value being outweighed

19     by the prejudicial effect is Rule 89(D).  I misspoke and talked about

20     Rule 90; it's Rule 89(D).

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger.

22             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, Your Honour.  The Defence argument concerning

23     these issues appears to conflate several matters.  I don't know if I can

24     you think tangle them, but let me try quickly.

25             First of all, the allegation that, for example, the 1993

Page 4890

 1     transcript is untimely because it is early, or because it demonstrates no

 2     explicit link to the accused, does not go to the issue for which that

 3     document was produced and the witness's comments about them.  The witness

 4     offers extensive testimony about the position and attitudes of the

 5     Croatian leadership toward the continued presence of Serbs in the

 6     Krajina.  He explains and will explain to the Court the basis for his

 7     understanding of those views.  That includes his deals with the Croatia

 8     leadership from the commencement of his term as ambassador.

 9             That document points to an expression of views that is consistent

10     with and that form part of the basis for his assessment of

11     President Tudjman's views about multi-national states, about the need for

12     ethnic homogeneity in a state and its resultant implications for actions

13     that were taken in connection with this case.

14             This is not an attempt to criminal responsibility for actions in

15     Central Bosnia.  The fact that there may be some overlap with another

16     case currently ongoing in this institution does not mean that the Court

17     should be precluded from hearing evidence that is relevant to this case.

18             And, clearly, evidence of President Tudjman's views and the views

19     of other Croatian leaders about such issues as ethnic homogeneity,

20     population transfers, and the like, is relevant to this Court, and should

21     be heard.

22             In so far as impeaching one's witness is concerned, I think the

23     Court is entitled.  First of, all this is not an impeachment.  Defence

24     quotes one passage of the witness's statement.  It is clear that that

25     statement continues:  He didn't start out in 1991 to do this.  It also

Page 4891

 1     goes on:  That had the Serb population remained, policies would have been

 2     such to make them leave.  There are other portions of his statement and

 3     of his anticipated evidence that will make clear the policies that were

 4     implemented in the Krajina to ensure that Serbs did not return and to

 5     ensure a largely homogeneous state.

 6             All of this evidence is of clear relevance to this case, and

 7     should be heard by the Court.  In so far as the balance of the evidence

 8     to the potential prejudice, there's no attempt here to, as I say,

 9     litigate the issue of criminal responsibility for a Central Bosnia.

10             The Court is clearly capable of segregating these issues to the

11     extent that witness received information and that is relevant to this

12     case.  And, certainly, as I have mentioned, the positions and attitudes

13     of the Croatian leadership, and particularly President Tudjman,

14     concerning Serbs and ethnic homogeneity is relevant and, indeed, should

15     be heard.

16             And the Court can easily separate those issues, particularly in

17     light of the fact that the emphasis will be on the issues I have

18     mentioned and not -- not criminal responsibility for actions in

19     Central Bosnia.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

21             MR. KEHOE:  May I respectfully.  First of all, as Your Honour was

22     pointing out the obvious, I mean, President Tudjman is not on trial hear.

23     Of course, the reason that the Prosecution wants to put this is in is to

24     somehow link this up to General Gotovina and somehow have this item out

25     is there that is some kind of overflow on to General Gotovina with

Page 4892

 1     absolutely no evidence whatsoever.  And if that is clearly what is

 2     envisaged in 89(D), when we talk about prejudice outweighed by the

 3     probative value, what other reason could there be for the Prosecution to

 4     put this in, if it wasn't to somehow bring General Gotovina in to this

 5     when there is no evidence whatsoever?

 6             Now I will tell you, Judge, that the time involved in answering

 7     President Tudjman's views in Bosnia and all the matters that are coming

 8     in is just an enormous undertaking.  I mean, logistically here - I know

 9     time is a concern to Your Honours - logistically here, it is physically

10     impossible a this juncture to meet that.

11             I mean, if this goes forward in this fashion, in the way that the

12     Prosecution wants to propose it, then it is going to significantly

13     lengthen this matter and possibly call this witness back at some other

14     juncture, but certainly lengthen any case as we develop this matter with

15     witnesses to come.  I don't know how far that's going to go time-wise.

16             But, suffice it to say, the simply matter here, as a result of

17     paragraph 81 - and this case involves Operation Storm.  It doesn't

18     involve Bosnia, it doesn't involve all these other matters, it involves

19     Operation Storm - is that Tudjman didn't have any intent to cleanse the

20     Croats -- excuse me, the Serbs from Croatia.

21             Now, if that's the case, as we move into Operation Storm, that

22     there was no intent to exclude the Serbs from Croatia, and this is a

23     matter with which General Gotovina is called do answer these charges, how

24     is this other matter relevant to a case against General Gotovina?  Not

25     President Tudjman, or not some other leader that has not been charged;

Page 4893

 1     General Gotovina.  How is that relevant?  Nothing the Prosecution has

 2     just said, in the speech they just gave, answers that very crucial

 3     question:  The link to this man and his right to answer that particular

 4     evidence.

 5             This is going way far afield to try to bring in evidence that

 6     simply doesn't exist linking General Gotovina to any idea of expelling

 7     Serbs from Croatia.  It simply doesn't.  And if the Prosecution has that

 8     evidence, let's deal with that evidence.  Let put that on the table right

 9     now, so General Gotovina through his counsel can answer it; not through

10     these innuendos and allegations and 1993 conversations, especially in

11     light of this comment by Ambassador Galbraith who was here at the time

12     who said that Tudjman had no such intent certainly as it pertained to

13     Operation Storm.

14             It is just an enormous undertaking that they have thrown before

15     this Chamber that if allowed to pursue, it is going to take an enormous

16     effort to answer.  I don't want to engage in hyperbolic arguments, Judge,

17     but I raised the Prlic matter simply because that is what they have been

18     doing for the past two years.

19             But it all comes down to relevance, some connection to General

20     Gotovina; and in light of what Ambassador Galbraith said that there was

21     no intent by Tudjman to exclude the Serbs from Croatia, this is a

22     non-issue in this particular Chamber and this particular case with regard

23     to General Gotovina.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kuzmanovic.

25             MR. KUZMANOVIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

Page 4894

 1             Your Honour, I'd like to add something to this discussion, and

 2     that is this:  I'd like to know when the decision was made to enter into

 3     this discussion by the Prosecution of using ethnic maps through

 4     Ambassador Galbraith, because the first notice we got of this was on

 5     June 20 when this exhibit showed up on our e-mails, and an e-mail

 6     exchange occurred between counsel for General Gotovina and Mr. Tieger

 7     about this subject.

 8             It's not as if this was something that we were received notice of

 9     and had plenty of time to prepare for and knew something about in

10     advance.  This was something that was thrust upon us at the last minute,

11     an entirely huge issue, involving, as Mr. Kehoe said - I'm not going to

12     repeat what he said - but, obviously, a number of complicated facts and

13     opinions and about a person who is not on trial.

14             So, you know, this case is about Operation Storm and the relevant

15     responsibilities, if any, of these defendants for the acts alleged in the

16     indictment; not something that happened in Bosnia occurring around

17     discussion in 1993 through a witness who really has, in my view, nothing

18     to do with my particular client in terms of what he says in his

19     statement, or it is just general background information which really

20     isn't necessary.  And as far as I'm concerned, it runs far afield from

21     the issues of the indictment in this case relevant to these clients in

22     this case.

23             Thank you.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  Could we hear from the Cermak Defence

25     whether they --

Page 4895

 1             MR. KAY:  Yes, Your Honour.  It seems that the scope that the

 2     Prosecution are using in relation to this matter falls outside the ambit

 3     of the case that is on trial here concerning Operation Storm.  And it is

 4     quite clear from what they are doing, they are seeking to provide

 5     foundation from elsewhere in support of their argument in relation to

 6     Operation Storm but not directly related to this particular case.

 7                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  The Chamber will take a while to consider the

 9     matter.

10             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, I'm sorry.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger.

12             MR. TIEGER:  I didn't have a chance to respond.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  I do agree, but I also had in mind to ask the other

14     Defence counsel to give their views.  They've done so, meanwhile.  But if

15     an objection is made, if it is in response to Mr. Kehoe, usually you

16     ask -- you just do not respond yet, but you ask whether there is a second

17     round of argument.  That is not a drama here.

18             MR. KEHOE:  I do apologise, Judge.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  But, then, I think it is also fair to give Mr.

20     Tieger a brief opportunity; although, I did not hear much new argument,

21     Mr, Tieger, so if you could keep it short.

22             MR. TIEGER:  Very short, Your Honour.

23             First of all, three matters, I guess, quickly:  Number one, the

24     attempt to disentangle President Tudjman from this case is clearly in

25     opposite, and would be, in any event; but clearly so by virtue of the

Page 4896

 1     fact that there is a JCE allegation.

 2             Number 2, Mr. Kehoe said part of the argument is based on the

 3     fact that the witness's testimony is that there was no intent to exclude

 4     Serbs from Croatia.  I think his evidence is quite to the contrary, and

 5     the Courts needs to here that.

 6             Number 3, as far as the maps are concerned, they are practically

 7     matters that could be judicially noticed.  There were only put on the

 8     exhibit list to provide clarification to the Court in so far as was

 9     necessary based on witness evidence.  It doesn't involve new matters, and

10     it arises directly from information that is part of the witness's

11     proposed 92 ter statement and supplemental information.

12             It is nothing new and was only an attempt to provide, if

13     necessary, any visual assistance to the Court about the matters raised in

14     the statement itself in so far as boundaries were discussed, and in so

15     far as particular locations, and some particular locations are, indeed,

16     mentioned where the witness travelled, are raised.

17             So nothing new was raised by those maps.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Could I ask you, because, of, course the Chamber has

19     not seen the maps, are these the kind of maps that were produced on the

20     basis of the 1991 census which we have seen in other cases and just gives

21     percentages?

22             MR. TIEGER:  Absolutely correct, Your Honour.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  The Chamber will consider the matter.

24                            ---  Break taken at 9.28 a.m.

25                            --- On resuming at 9.35 a.m.

Page 4897

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  The Chamber denies the objections based on lack of

 2     relevance and impeachment of the own witness.

 3             Mr. Tieger, at the same time, the mindset of those who

 4     participated in the joint criminal enterprise in earlier stages is not of

 5     vital importance.  I mean, we should focus not on the background, so we

 6     should avoid that what is naturally as a background should not become the

 7     foreground.  So, therefore, the Chamber is not interested to hear

 8     evidence on everything that happened in Bosnia.

 9             As far as impeachment is concerned, especially if you look at

10     paragraph 91, Mr. Kehoe very much stressed the first sentence of that

11     paragraph; and, of course, that paragraph says more than just what are

12     not the plans of Mr. Tudjman, who is in the indictment one of the

13     participants in the joint criminal enterprise.

14             Of course, he is not an accused in this case, but he is in the

15     indictment part of the joint criminal enterprise.  So his development of

16     thoughts and what he later may have done, whether or not together with

17     the accused is still to be established, is not lacking all evidence.

18             Then, finally, the maps.  The maps, the Chamber grants your

19     request to add them to the 65 ter list.  At the same time, the Chamber

20     will consider what the relevance of those maps is when it comes to the

21     testimony and when these maps will be introduced through this witness.

22             As I said before, the Chamber had not seen the maps.  Meanwhile,

23     we have looked at a copy, and it seems it is the ethnic composition of

24     Bosnia; and, therefore, we would have to establish a clear link with this

25     case, this case which is I wouldn't say an entirely out of Bosnia.  I

Page 4898

 1     mean, they are close to the border.  Things happened over there which

 2     also have some or may have some bearing on this case, but the whole

 3     ethnic map of Bosnia seems not to be foreground information.

 4             So, the Chamber reserves its position in this respect until these

 5     maps are tendered into evidence through this witness.

 6             Any other matters at this moment?  If not, then, first of all, I

 7     see, Ms. Schildge, you're present in the courtroom.  That is on the basis

 8     of the decision and the request made.  Ms. Schildge, perhaps, one

 9     question.

10             The Chamber decided last week on the basis of a letter presented

11     by the Gotovina Defence that the scope of the cross-examination would a

12     bit expanded if we compare it with the earlier decision.  I see you're

13     nodding yes.

14             We have not considered one moment that this letter was not a true

15     letter from the US government; so, therefore, we grant it on the basis of

16     this confidence.  We granted the decision.  And if that would be

17     otherwise, then, of course, we would like to hear from you.  But from

18     your body language at this moment, it appears there is no problem in this

19     respect.

20             Then, Mr. Tieger, are you ready to call your next witness.

21             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, Your Honour.  Thank you.

22             The Prosecution calls Ambassador Peter Galbraith.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Meanwhile, I see that a corrigendum was filed on the

24     23rd of June in relation to the issue I raised earlier; that is, about

25     the issue of the submission dated 20th of June, and I might have been

Page 4899

 1     mistaken when I said it was filed the 23rd of June.  I haven't seen the

 2     original registration page.  I see now that at least the corrigendum was

 3     filed on the 23rd.

 4                           [The witness entered court]

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning, Mr. Galbraith.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Good morning, Your Honour.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  I invite you to put on your headphones, not because

 8     you wouldn't understand the English language, but sometimes we get

 9     messages from the interpreter's booth.

10             Mr. Galbraith, before you give evidence in this court, the Rules

11     of Procedure and Evidence require you to make a solemn declaration that

12     you will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

13             The usher now hands out the text of this solemn declaration, and

14     I ask to you make that solemn declaration.

15             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

16     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  Please be seated, Mr. Galbraith.

18             Mr. Galbraith, if I address you as "Mr. Galbraith," and not as

19     "Ambassador Galbraith," that is because I have developed a habit that

20     everyone who appears in this courtroom, irrespective of rank, position,

21     et cetera, is here just as a person.  It has got nothing to do with

22     disrespect.  Everyone does it the way he wants to do it.

23             Mr. Tieger, are you ready to examine the witness.

24             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, Your Honour.  Thank you.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  You will be examined by Mr. Tieger who is counsel

Page 4900

 1     for the Prosecution.

 2                           WITNESS:  PETER GALBRAITH

 3                           Examination by Mr. Tieger:

 4             MR. TIEGER:

 5        Q.   I will break that egalitarian tradition, as is common with

 6     lawyers, and say good morning, Ambassador.

 7        A.   Good morning.  You know how it is with titles.  The title plus

 8     two euros, I can ride the tram.

 9        Q.   Let me begin by, first of all, ask you to state your name for the

10     record?

11        A.   Peter Woodward Galbraith.

12        Q.   I would like to provide the Court with some quick snapshot of

13     your background.  If I may, I will just recite some of the highlights and

14     ask you to affirm those if I have stated them correctly.

15             You were educated at Harvard, Oxford, and Georgetown

16     universities, receiving a bachelor's degree from Harvard, a masters from

17     Oxford, and a law degree from Georgetown university.  Is that correct?

18        A.   It is.

19        Q.   Following that, you had a career as the senior advisor to the

20     United States Senate, foreign relations committee from 1979 to 1993?

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   During the latter period of your work as senior advisor, you had

23     a mandate to deal with the difficult locations in the world; and in the

24     course of that effort, paid four visits to the region of the former

25     Yugoslavia in 1991 and 1992?

Page 4901

 1        A.   Yes, that is correct.

 2        Q.   And as a result of that, you reported to the committee regarding

 3     ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

 4        A.   Yes, that is correct.

 5        Q.   You were appointed as the United States ambassador to Croatia,

 6     indeed, the first United States ambassador to the independent Republic of

 7     Croatia, in June of 1992 and served until January 1998?

 8        A.   Yes, that is correct.

 9        Q.   And just catching up very quickly, since that time, you have

10     taught for some years at the United States -- sorry?

11        A.   Sorry.  Did you say June of 1992?  It would be June of 1993.

12        Q.   Thank you for that.  I may have misspoken.  Thanks for that

13     correction.

14             You taught at the United States National War College from 1988 to

15     2003?

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger --

17             THE WITNESS:  I did, although with a period in East Timor.

18             MR. TIEGER:

19        Q.   And that work in East Timor was as the director for political,

20     constitutional, and electoral affairs for the United Nations in East

21     Timor, where you became the cabinet member for political affairs when the

22     interim government was formed.  Is that right?

23        A.   That is correct.

24             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, if we could presented to the witness

25     65 ter 5206.  Perhaps, I could ask -- well, I see the usher is well ahead

Page 4902

 1     of me.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I take it there is no problem that the witness

 3     has his statements in front of him.

 4             MR. TIEGER:

 5        Q.   Ambassador, although the problem with the pace of speech has been

 6     exclusively mine, I do want to remind you to pause between question and

 7     answer to allow the interpreters to catch up, and I will also try to

 8     deliberately speak closer to ease their task as well.

 9             Ambassador, looking at this exhibit before you now, is this a

10     statement that you gave to the Office of the Prosecutor?

11        A.   It is.

12        Q.   Did you review this document before coming to court?

13        A.   I did.

14        Q.   Does it accurately reflect the information that you provided to

15     the Office of the Prosecutor?

16        A.   It does.

17        Q.   And is the information contained in that statement true and

18     correct, to the best of your knowledge?

19        A.   It is, subject to the supplemental -- some corrections made in

20     the supplemental statement that I prepared in interviews with you.

21        Q.   Thank you.  And if you were asked about the same matters here in

22     Court today, subject to the caveat you have just mentioned, would the

23     information you provided be the same?

24        A.   It would.

25             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, I would also like to present the

Page 4903

 1     supplemental information sheet to the witness, and that is 65 ter 5235.

 2        Q.   And, Mr. Ambassador, does this document contain the corrections

 3     to your earlier statement that you mentioned, as well as supplemental

 4     information concerning that statement?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Have you had a chance to review this document before coming to

 7     court?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   Does it accurately reflect the information that you provided to

10     the Office of the Prosecutor?

11        A.   Yes, it does.

12        Q.   Is the information contained in that document true and correct,

13     to the best of your knowledge?

14        A.   Yes, it is.

15        Q.   And if you were asked about the same matters here in Court today,

16     would your answers be the same?

17        A.   Yes, they would.

18             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, I would tender both documents.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe.

20             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Your Honour.

21             My inquiry on the main statement of the witness is when it was

22     actually finalised.  Obviously, this is not signed.  I don't have a

23     signed copy.  I don't think one was ever produced.  It notes date of

24     interviews, but doesn't note any date of finalisation of this document.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  The cover page, Mr. Tieger, says the 5th of

Page 4904

 1     February.  I think it was 22nd of February -- no.  It say the 5th of

 2     February, 2008.  It gives dates of interview is 22 February and

 3     13 April 2007.  I don't know what explains the 5th of February, 2008

 4     date, which I find on the cover page.

 5             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, Your Honour.  The finalisation, as it were,

 6     occurred at or about the time of the date shown on the document itself.

 7     The ambassador reviewed and approved the contents of the document

 8     sometime relatively shortly before that.  There was, indeed, a period of

 9     time between - a significant period of time, indeed - between the date of

10     the last interview and the finalisation of the document; not through any

11     fault of the witness, simply because of the hope there would be an

12     additional opportunities to address issues.  Then the imminence and the

13     trial date meant the document had to be finalised.

14             MR. KEHOE:  My questioned was when it was formalised, Judge.

15     Normally - and I am not a stickler for procedure - but, normally, we have

16     a signature page to say that the witness signed off at a particular time.

17     That's all.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  At the same time, I think the witness just testified

19     that this is the statement he gave.  This replaces his signature, I would

20     say.

21             MR. KEHOE:  I understand that, Judge.  I would just like to know

22     when was this document finalised.  That's all.  If, in fact, this is

23     after 13 April 2007, I'm just asking when.

24             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, I don't have the precise date.  I

25     believe it was late January that the witness finalised, or sometime in

Page 4905

 1     January, and then the additional aspects of clearance process kicked in.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  And "finalising" means reviewing the text as written

 3     down on paper, in view of what the witness said during his interview, and

 4     then agreeing upon this being the text of his statement?

 5             MR. TIEGER:  Correct.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 7             MR. KEHOE:  The only other issue, Judge, is reserving my

 8     objections on the matter that we took prior to witness entering.  I have

 9     no objection.  With regard to the supplemental statement, I can talk to

10     counsel about that, and it does include some of the matters that I had

11     raised prior to the witness coming in.  Of course, we continue our

12     objection on that score.  But absent those corrections, there are no

13     other objections, except those previously stated.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Thank you.

15             Other Defence teams?

16             Mr. Kuzmanovic.

17             MR. KUZMANOVIC:  Your Honour, I take the same position as

18     Mr. Kehoe on the objections.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  [Overlapping speakers] ... and no objections at this

20     moment against admission?

21             MR. KUZMANOVIC:  That's correct, Your Honour.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kay.

23             MR. KAY:  No.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Same for all three Defence teams.  So we're

25     talking about, first of all, the statement where we find the -- where we

Page 4906

 1     find the 5th of February, 2008 on the cover page, and where we find dates

 2     of interviews, 22nd of February and 13th of April, 2007.

 3             That is 65 ter 5206, Mr. Tieger.  The number does not appear on

 4     our last list, but that is the one, I think, we're talking about.

 5             Mr. Registrar, that will be number?

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P444, Your Honours.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  P444 is admitted into evidence.

 8             The additional statement, of which the Chamber received copy only

 9     at 11 minutes past 9.00 this morning, we'll have a look at it.  We

10     haven't seen it yet.

11             Any objections against or did your position include the

12     supplemental information sheet?

13             MR. KEHOE:  My position included the other supplemental

14     information sheet.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  I see other Defence counsel not objecting against

16     that position.

17             That is 65 ter 5235, Mr. Registrar, would be number?

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P445, Your Honours.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  P445 is admitted into evidence.

20             You may proceed, Mr. Tieger.

21             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Your Honour.

22             Your Honour, I'd like to try to deal with this as expeditiously

23     as possible with some of the exhibits.  So my proposal would be as

24     follows:  With respect to the exhibits that were discussed and referred

25     to the statement, those would include the following, and I will describe

Page 4907

 1     them as I go through as well, in addition to P numbers:  P5200, the US

 2     embassy coded cable 07-0037; 65 ter 5201, US embassy coded cable

 3     07-70-0079; 65 ter 4028, presidential transcript dated 7 August 1995; 65

 4     ter 2222, presidential transcript dated 3 August 1995; 65 ter 650,

 5     presidential transcript dated 18 August 1995; 65 ter 2814, electronic

 6     intercept of RSK leadership dated 4 August 1995; and two excerpts from

 7     the book entitled, "The United States and Croatia, A Documentary

 8     History," dated 2 June 1994 and 29 June 1994.  The exhibit number for

 9     that book is 65 ter 2575.

10             So I would ask that, in light of the admission of the statement,

11     that those documents be admitted.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Are there any objections?

13             MR. KEHOE:  First matter, I think, Judge, is that I believe that

14     65 ter 4028 has already been admitted into evidence, D276 [sic].

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  It appears on my list as D296.

16             MR. KEHOE:  The other matter on the excerpts from the book,

17     counsel just talked about two.  The 65 ter list I have on the 2575 has,

18     in fact, six aspects to that.  Is counsel only putting in the first two?

19             MR. TIEGER:  I would be happy to have those all admitted.  I was

20     just going through it sequentially.  I think those are the two

21     specifically mentioned in the statement.

22             MR. KEHOE:  Fine.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Nevertheless, I mean, you just mentioned the

24     dates of the 2nd of June and the 29th of June.  Would you, at a later

25     stage, want to tender the other four items from the book as well?

Page 4908

 1     Because, if so, we could immediately already ask the Defence whether

 2     there is any objection.

 3             MR. TIEGER:  That is a great idea, Your Honour.  I am pleased to

 4     do so.

 5             MR. KEHOE:  With regard to the rest of that book, I think it is

 6     best to put it in as one exhibit.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And that's true for the other Defence counsel

 8     as well, I see.  Yes.

 9             Mr. Kehoe, and with the others?

10             MR. KEHOE:  Yes.  With regard to the other presidential

11     transcripts, Your Honour, we are researching some matters concerning

12     those transcripts.  So, while we can proceed with the examination, if we

13     just reserve on admission for seven days, so we can take a look at those

14     yet further, we can tell the Court our conclusions next Monday -- our

15     position next Monday, excuse me.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Mr. Tieger, I do not know to what extent it

17     will bother you if with he have no designation yet on the presidential

18     transcript, which apparently we have, as a matter of fact, two

19     presidential transcripts, Mr. Kehoe.  That is 65 ter 2222 -- no.  The

20     other one is not tendered, 29 October 1993.

21             You didn't mention that one, Mr. Tieger, did you?

22             MR. TIEGER:  Perhaps not.  I'm sorry, Your Honour.  That would be

23     65 ter 816.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I do not remember that you mentioned it, or am

25     I wrong?  He did.  No.  At least my staff supports me, which is always

Page 4909

 1     good.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  Okay.  In keeping with the Court's suggestion in

 3     connection with the book excerpts, I will also be wanting to tender other

 4     listed presidential transcripts, which were meetings that were taped and

 5     transcribed in which the witness was a participant, I could go through

 6     the formalities, but I don't think there is any dispute about that, the

 7     fact that he was a participant; and for that reason, I would be tendering

 8     those, and I can enumerate those.  The one expectation is the transcript

 9     of 11 August, where there is reference to the meeting of the previous day

10     which the witness attended.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Then the other presidential transcripts, I

12     have got on my list is 816, and I'm referring to the 65 ter numbers.  You

13     want to tender that as well, Mr. Tieger, then?

14             MR. TIEGER:  816, Your Honour, is the one you just mentioned

15     previously --

16             JUDGE ORIE:  [Overlapping speakers] ... I have another one,

17     3347 --

18             MR. TIEGER:  Correct.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  -- and 2368.  You want to tender now all four of

20     these presidential transcripts?

21             MR. TIEGER:  And 4053, Your Honour.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  4053, which is I think -- yes.  4053 that is not

23     described as presidential transcript, but the minutes from the meeting

24     held the 10th of August.

25             MR. TIEGER:  Yes.  It is the same category of documents, just a

Page 4910

 1     different named, I see.  And the final one is again the same, but also

 2     described as minutes of the meeting, and that's from 11 August.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now, in view of the earlier series, Mr. Kehoe,

 4     we have 816, which was not mentioned previously by Mr. Tieger; we have

 5     4053, minutes, 10th of August; we have 40634, minutes of the meeting,

 6     11th August; we have 3347, presidential transcript, and apparently it's

 7     about the 16th of August, 1995; and 2368, which is a presidential

 8     transcript of the 14th of September, 1995.

 9             Any objection?

10             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, sorry.  One more, and I apologise.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  One more.

12             MR. TIEGER:  I would like to add 65 ter --

13             JUDGE ORIE:  [Overlapping speakers] ... the list gets longer and

14     longer, Mr. Tieger --

15             MR. TIEGER:  65 ter 4474, presidential transcript dated

16     January 17th, 1995.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  And is that one that was added?

18             MR. TIEGER:  That, I believe, was provided to the Defence, and I

19     hope copied to the Chamber at the same time as the others.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  We received not copies yet, but at least that you --

21             MR. TIEGER:  I'm sorry --

22             JUDGE ORIE:  -- that you may use that document.

23             MR. TIEGER:  The problem may be, I see, the document description

24     has it as July 17th, rather than January 17th.  The ERN is the same, the

25     65 ter number is the same.

Page 4911

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  And is it July or January now?

 2             MR. TIEGER:  It is January.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  It's January.  So that is a mistake in your -- a

 4     mistake in your e-mail of the 18th of June, 1.36 p.m.

 5             Mr. Kehoe, we have now added to the previous list 816, 4053,

 6     4064, 3347, 2368, and 4476 --

 7             MR. KEHOE:  I believe that's 4474, Judge.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  4474.  Yes, I made a mistake there.  And, as a

 9     matter of fact, I think, Mr. Tieger made a mistake because on the

10     transcript, and that's corresponds with what I wrote down, is 4476.

11             You told me 4474, Mr. Tieger.

12             MR. TIEGER:  It should, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Then the last one is 4474.

14             Mr. Galbraith, it looks as if we are bookkeepers, but we have to

15     get the record straight.

16             Any objection?

17             MR. KEHOE:  Your Honour, if I can just reserve consistent with my

18     prior objection, to look at some matters concerning these particular

19     exhibits, and I will report back to the Chamber.  I don't think it will

20     hold up the actual examination.  If we can MFI these individual

21     transcripts, we will be able to move forward, and I will get back to you,

22     Your Honour, with regard to our position as expeditiously as possible.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Sometimes we admit it in the absence of a

24     clear objection, a substantive objection, and then we are willing to

25     review our decision, if it comes down that.  It comes down to

Page 4912

 1     approximately the same.  Since the Chamber would like have to have the

 2     MFI list as short as possible, we might choose, for practical reasons,

 3     the solution to admit and to review, if there is any need to do so.

 4             MR. KEHOE:  The Defence has some authentication issues that we

 5     are researching in the spirit of full candor, but that is exactly --

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  That is on the record.  And, of course, admission is

 7     on the basis of the lack of any authentication issues at this moment.

 8                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar will read out the numbers under which

10     the documents for which, apart from the reservation just expressed by

11     Mr. Kehoe, there are no objections under what numbers they are admitted

12     into evidence.

13             Mr. Registrar.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter 5200 becomes Exhibit P446;

15     65 ter number 5201 becomes Exhibit P447; 65 ter number 2222 becomes

16     Exhibit P448; 65 ter number 650 becomes Exhibit P449; 65 ter number 2814

17     becomes Exhibit number P450; 65 ter number 2575 becomes Exhibit

18     number P451; 65 ter number 816 becomes Exhibit number P452; 65 ter number

19     3347 becomes Exhibit number P453; 65 ter 2368 becomes Exhibit number

20     P454.  65 ter number 4053 becomes Exhibit number P455; 65 ter number 4064

21     becomes Exhibit number P456; and 65 ter number 4474 becomes Exhibit

22     number P457.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  All these exhibits are admitted into evidence.  I

24     add to that, in relation to P451, it's the full set of six excerpts from

25     the book.

Page 4913

 1             Mr. Tieger, you may proceed.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 3             Before I do, I'm not entirely clear on the nature of the Defence

 4     objection or the extent of the need to -- to delve with the witness into

 5     those documents.  As mentioned, with the exception of the August 11th

 6     transcript, those are meetings attended by the witness which the witness

 7     has had an opportunity to review and reflect the subjects discussed.

 8     Perhaps, I can talk with the -- with my learned friends at the break and

 9     see the extent it may be necessary to get into that with the witness.  I

10     certainly don't want to have to call him back once any objection is

11     raised.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  I think, as a matter of fact, the problem is if the

13     Defence is still exploring what may be the problems, then, of course, it

14     is difficult at this moment to explain exactly what it is, apart from

15     what they have in mind at this very moment.

16             If there is anything, Mr. Kehoe, that could assist the Chamber

17     and that could be introduced through the witness, of course, we should

18     not waist the opportunity to do so.

19             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Your Honour.  I don't think it is going to

20     forestall the examination of the ambassador at this juncture.  I will

21     consult with Mr. Tieger at the break and let him know the parameters of

22     any concerns that the Defence might have.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, that's appreciated.

24             Please proceed.

25             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Your Honour.

Page 4914

 1             At this point, I'd like to read a summary of the witness's

 2     evidence pursuant to Court practice.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Galbraith, we usually read summaries of written

 4     statements just in order to make the public aware of what we are talking

 5     about.

 6             Please proceed.

 7             MR. TIEGER:  Peter Galbraith was the United States ambassador to

 8     Croatia from 24 June 1993 to 3 January 1998.  In that capacity, he had

 9     extensive contacts with members of the Croatian leadership, Krajina Serb

10     leadership, international representatives, and others dealing with the

11     region.

12             Ambassador Galbraith was active in attempting to broker a

13     peaceful settlement between Croatia and the Krajina Serbs, including the

14     Z-4 plan.  As Operation Storm became imminent, he met with

15     President Tudjman on 1 August 1995, and advised President Tudjman to take

16     care in protecting Serb civilians and UN personnel if an attack was

17     launched.

18             On the 2nd of August, Ambassador Galbraith met with Milan Babic

19     to convince him to accept terms for peace.  Babic agreed to conditions.

20     And on the 3rd of August, as negotiations in Geneva were taking place,

21     Ambassador Galbraith met with President Tudjman to explain his meeting

22     with Babic and the opportunity for a peaceful solution.

23             President Tudjman --

24             JUDGE ORIE:  No, no, Mr. Tieger.

25             You may proceed.

Page 4915

 1             MR. TIEGER:  President Tudjman expressed skepticism that Babic

 2     could deliver, and it was clear to Ambassador Galbraith that the attack

 3     would go forward.

 4             During the course of his work, Ambassador Galbraith had regular

 5     and extensive contact with President Tudjman and other Croatian leaders,

 6     and learned of their attitudes and positions regarding the presence of

 7     Serbs in Croatia.  President Tudjman believed that states should be

 8     ethnically homogeneous or close to it.

 9             He believed and stated that the Serbs in Croatia, and

10     particularly the Krajina, were too numerous and constituted a strategic

11     threat to Croatia.  He approved of population transfers to create largely

12     homogeneous states or areas.  President Tudjman also had racist views

13     towards Muslims.  President Tudjman considered that his arguments about

14     Serbs and Muslims were irresistible, and he, therefore, did not need to

15     mask these views.

16             After Operation Storm, President Tudjman explained --

17             JUDGE ORIE:  No, no, Mr. Tieger.

18             MR. TIEGER:  President Tudjman explained clearly to Ambassador

19     Galbraith that the Serbs that had left should not come back.  Measures

20     were imposed to ensure that the Serbs would not, in fact, return,

21     including laws confiscating property and preventing people from returning

22     after giving them only 30 days to do so.  Although that deadline was

23     extended under pressure, means were imposed to prevent Serbs from meeting

24     those deadlines and making it impossible to reclaim property.  Meanwhile,

25     a large part of Serb property was being systematically destroyed by

Page 4916

 1     Croatian armed forces and others.

 2             Ambassador Galbraith received information from many sources about

 3     the crimes and about the extensive and systematic destruction of Serb

 4     property and about widespread killings.  His own observations were

 5     consistent with those reports.  Ambassador Galbraith assessed that such

 6     destruction could not have taken place without the orders, approval, or

 7     acquiescence of Croatian leadership.  He constantly raised with Croatian

 8     leaders the issue of crimes against Serbs and Serb property, and the

 9     obstacles imposed against Serb return.

10             In response, there was first stonewalling and denial, and then

11     grudging acknowledgment or deflections, such as asserting that Croat

12     civilians returning to the area were doing it and that it was outside the

13     control of the officials.  Although pressure by the international

14     community over time had some positive effect over the time, particularly

15     on the right of return and the destruction diminished, by the end almost

16     all had listen looted and/or destroyed.

17             That concludes the summary, Your Honour.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Just because it might be important, page 29, line 7

19     it could be that on the French transcript the fact that the killing was

20     widespread is missing.  Just for the preparation of the transcript.

21             Mr. Tieger, please proceed.

22             MR. KEHOE:  If I may, Your Honour.  I don't normally object to

23     the summary of counsel, but, of course, I do in this sense, in the sense

24     that it is being given to the public as it doesn't accurately reflect the

25     scope of the Ambassador's testimony concerning Operation Storm.

Page 4917

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, I do understand that.  I suggest the

 2     following procedure:  You inform Mr. Tieger during the break in what

 3     respect you disagree with the summary.  We see whether Mr. Tieger agrees

 4     with you, yes or no.  Either you come up with a joint proposal to -- to

 5     amend the summary, or you just inform the Chamber in what respect you

 6     disagree and preferably in writing.  It can be do done in an incidentally

 7     formal way.  We all know that the summary is not evidence, but,

 8     nevertheless, I fully agree with you that public should be properly

 9     informed.

10             Please proceed.

11             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Your Honour.

12        Q.   Ambassador, welcome back.

13             We've indicated already that you began your term as ambassador in

14     June of 1993.  Can I ask you, then, to describe to the Court the

15     prevailing conditions at that time and their impact on your focus of

16     activities and your priorities?

17        A.   The war in the former Yugoslavia had been going on for two years.

18     29 per cent of the territory of the Republic of Croatia was occupied by

19     rebel Serbs who were backed by Serbia.  In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there

20     was a three-way war between the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian government,

21     and the HVO.  There were hundreds of thousands of refugees in Croatia,

22     perhaps six or 700.000, who had passed through Croatia; and the

23     international community, including my own government, were frankly

24     despairing as to what might be done about this situation.

25             I arrived as the first ambassador actually in circumstances where

Page 4918

 1     the United States was on the verge of not sending an ambassador to

 2     protest what Croatia was doing in Bosnia and Herzegovina; that is, it's

 3     support for the HVO which was fighting and committing atrocities against

 4     the troops -- against the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian government.

 5             And so my initial focus -- well, the first point I would say is

 6     that I realised that there was going to be no solution to this conflict,

 7     unless we could end the fighting between the Muslims and the Croats in

 8     Bosnia.  So that was the first focus of my activities.  And in order --

 9     before we could end the fighting, we had to end the atrocities.  And, so,

10     in the summer of 1993, I worked with Croatian officials to get Bosnian

11     prisoners released from camps where they were being held in inhumane

12     conditions, to try and stop the shelling of Mostar, and to reduce the

13     level of atrocities.

14             In 1994, the focus -- or in late 1993/1994, the focus shifted to

15     try and arrange a peace agreement between the Bosnian government and the

16     Bosnian Croats; and we succeeded at the end of February, beginning of

17     March of 1994, when we concluded the Washington agreement that created

18     the federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and which immediately and

19     successfully ended the Muslim-Croat war.

20             At that point, at the request of President Tudjman, I turned my

21     attention to negotiations with -- between Zagreb and rebel Serbs in Knin,

22     to try and find a political settlement in Croatia.  Those negotiations

23     had been ongoing under the auspices of the United Nations.  The Russians

24     got involved, and Tudjman wanted the Americans to be involved.

25             I eventually formed a group with the United Nations, the

Page 4919

 1     Russians, and the European Union.  It became known as Zagreb 4, or Z-4,

 2     and we sponsored a three part process to try to find a peaceful

 3     settlement in Croatia.  First was a cease-fire which was successfully

 4     negotiated in March of 1994.  That was followed by agreement on economic

 5     and confidence building measures in December of 1994.  And parallel to

 6     the economic and confidence building measures, we worked up a political

 7     plan, which became known as the Z-4 plan, that would have provided for

 8     very substantial autonomy for the Krajina Serbs within the

 9     internationally recognised borders of Croatia.

10             That plan was presented to the parties, not only as a document to

11     be negotiated about, not on a take it or leave it basis, that was

12     presented in January of 1995.  President Tudjman very reluctantly

13     accepted it and agreed to negotiate on it, but the leader of the Krajina

14     Serbs, Milan Martic, refused to touch the document.  He refused to

15     receive it.  And at that point, the negotiations between the two sides

16     broke down, as it turned out, irretrievably; although, I made efforts to

17     try and get them started again.

18             In the summer, or in May to July of 1995, things began really to

19     fall apart.  UN peacekeepers were taken in hostage; then and in July came

20     the attacks on the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa, which fell; and then

21     an attack on Bihac, which was carried out both by the Bosnian Serb army

22     and by the army of the Republika Srpska Krajina, that is, the rebel

23     Croats.

24             And at that point, the Croatian government took the decision

25     that -- that this was the opportune time to move militarily to recover

Page 4920

 1     Croatian territory, and a series of events - I could describe in more

 2     detail - but a series of events set in motion which led to Operation

 3     Storm.

 4        Q.   And just a small possible correction Ambassador.

 5             At line 32-- sorry, page 32, lines 20 to 21, you referred to the

 6     rebel Croats, and I take it that you meant rebel Serb army?  Actually, it

 7     said "carried out by both the Bosnian Serb army and the army of the

 8     Republika Srpska, that is, the rebel Croats."

 9        A.   I, of course, meant rebel Serbs; as we saw them, rebel Serbs, who

10     were, in fact, citizens of the Republic of Croatia.

11        Q.   Now, do you recall when you first learned of plans by the

12     Republic of Croatia to move onto the -- into the Krajina with a military

13     operation?

14             And in that connection, perhaps I can refer you to another

15     document that is on the exhibit list, and that is 65 ter 5231.

16             MR. TIEGER:  It is Ambassador Galbraith's diplomatic diary, and

17     can that be presented on screen.

18        Q.   Ambassador, for your benefit, I think that is the third tab in

19     your binder.  You may have already found it.

20        A.   I have found it.

21        Q.   Ambassador, that indicates diary enters from June to

22     November 1995.  I take it you're familiar with this document.

23             When were the entries in this document prepared or recorded?

24        A.   Generally, on a daily basis; that is, either the evening of the

25     day or the day after the events described, but sometimes more time would

Page 4921

 1     have elapsed because I would have been out of town or perhaps too busy to

 2     have recorded for an individual day.  So sometimes it would have been

 3     several days at a time.

 4        Q.   Can I ask to you turn to page 20 of that document, please,

 5     looking at the entry for July 24th.

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   It indicates in the first sentence:  "War appears imminent.  The

 8     Croatian plan to move tomorrow at 4.00 a.m. on Bosanska Grahovo.  The

 9     Serbs have artillery in Sector South and plan to retaliate by shelling

10     Croatian coastal cities.  The Croatian plan would then to take a sharp

11     left at Gravoho, and move on to Knin."

12             Again, that is page 20 of that document.

13             Ambassador -- Ambassador, was this around the time that you

14     learned that there was a plan for an operation into the Krajina, or do

15     you recall whether you were aware of that at that time?

16        A.   I was aware of that prior to that time.  I think the date the day

17     I became -- well, I was first told that there was going to be an

18     operation was the day that I took the defence attache, Colonel Rick

19     Herrick, over for his farewell call with Defence Minister Gojko Susak and

20     his replacement, Colonel John Sadler.  And at that time, either at that

21     meeting or at a lunch at the Intercon in Zagreb, Susak told me of the

22     plans for a military attack on the Krajina.

23             MR. KEHOE:  Your Honour, if we can just sharpen this date, I

24     think the diary reflects June 10th on page 12, second paragraph.

25             THE WITNESS:  Let me clarify.

Page 4922

 1             I knew substantially before June 10th, and this is reflected in

 2     lots of documents, that it was Tudjman's plan in 1994 to take the Krajina

 3     militarily.  As is true for the entry on this date, we believed that he

 4     would do this when the United Nations mandate ran out November 30th.  The

 5     reason being that that would be a time of the year when it would be very

 6     difficult for weather reasons for Serbia to resupply the Krajina, but

 7     where it would be still relatively easy for Croatian forces to attack up

 8     from the coast and where it wouldn't do any damage to the Croatian

 9     tourist season.

10             It was later in July, because of what happened in Srebrenica and

11     Zepa and because of the Bihac crisis, that these plans were advanced to

12     take advantage of the -- well, for two reasons:  First, to save Bihac.

13     The last things that the Croatians wanted was for Bihac to fall, and then

14     you would have a single western Serb entity, Krajina and Bosnia.  You

15     would also have 160.000 people who would be going to Croatia as refugees.

16     And I have to tell, although I am sure this will come up in the further

17     testimony, it was the last thing that the United States wanted to see

18     either.

19             But the decision to do it in July was not -- Croatia did not

20     advance the date of this operation until after Srebrenica and until the

21     Bihac crisis.  And, so, I believe that I was told a very short period of

22     time after Croatia had made the tentative decision.  I don't think it

23     made the final decision, well, if you look at the transcript, even up

24     until the day before; but it was around the 20th of July that they made

25     the initial decision that this was the time to do it.

Page 4923

 1             MR. TIEGER:  And, Your Honour, I note the time.  If the Court

 2     does intend to journey, before we do so I wanted to clarify for the

 3     registrar, who I think had an inquiry of the page numbers of the portion

 4     of the diary just referred to by counsel, and perhaps even the previous

 5     page number.  I believe that was a reference to the entry of June 10,

 6     which appears on -- the relevant portion which appears on page 12 of the

 7     diary.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  I found it, yes.  Page 12, second paragraph,

 9     concerning June 10th.

10             Now, this document is not in evidence.  Is there any intention to

11     tender it?

12             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, there is, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

14             MR. KEHOE:  No objection, Your Honour.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  No objection.  I hear no objection from other

16     Defence teams.

17             Then the diary entries of June-November 1995 of the witness,

18     Mr. Registrar.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  That becomes Exhibit number P458.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  P458 is admitted into evidence.

21             Mr. Tieger, I think we should take a break now.

22             Mr. Galbraith, we will have a break now of 25 minutes.  We resume

23     at 11.00.

24                           --- Recess taken at 10.37 a.m.

25                           --- On resuming at 11.13 a.m.

Page 4924

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger, please proceed.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 3             Before I begin, I'd like to indicate to the Court that it appears

 4     that one of the pages of the diplomatic diary was not copied in e-court,

 5     and that's the page that is marked on the diary, 29, which appeared --

 6     which would have appeared between page 22 and page 23 of the e-court

 7     version.  The pages marked in the diary don't correspond precisely to

 8     e-court.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  And, apparently, the hard copy that was sent has the

10     same problem.

11             MR. TIEGER:  Okay.  I have copies here.  Fortunately, I know that

12     I checked with Mr. Kehoe, he does have that page in the copy of the diary

13     he has.  But if other counsel need a copy or for the benefit of the

14     Court, I have copies of that particular missing page now.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  If you have it, that saves us from printing

16     it.

17             Mr. Kehoe.

18             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Your Honour, I do have that.  My issue is on a

19     different subject that I did address with Mr. Tieger concerning the

20     transcript, and just --

21             JUDGE ORIE:  This seems not to deal with authenticity, but rather

22     by error.

23             MR. KEHOE:  Yes.  The authenticity issue we will address yet

24     further after I get some additional information.

25             But by way of clarity, Your Honour, on page 34, line 19, I

Page 4925

 1     believe there is some concern about the date on that line, and the year.

 2     I may have misheard the witness, but --

 3             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, I'm not at all sure that that is an

 4     error, but I would be happy to clarify it with the witness.  I think that

 5     is the best way to do it.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  That's the best way to do it; otherwise,

 7     Mr. Kehoe still has an opportunity in cross-examination to deal with the

 8     matter.

 9             Please proceed.

10             MR. TIEGER:

11        Q.   As long as it was raised, Mr. Ambassador, let me take to you the

12     portion of the transcript.  As indicated, that was page 34.  The question

13     was -- you are attempting to sharpen the date.  When you first learn that

14     there would be a military operation to retake the Krajina, you said

15     beginning at line 17:  "Let me clarify.  I knew substantially before

16     June 10, and this is reflected in lots of documents, that it was

17     Tudjman's plan in 1994 to take the Krajina militarily."

18             And you went on:  "As is true for the entry on this date, we

19     believe that they would do so -- do this when the United Nations mandate

20     ran out November 30th," and then it goes on.

21             So the question is, Ambassador:  Did you mean 1994 or some other

22     date?

23        A.   Thank you.  I meant 1995; that is, that the UN mandate ran from

24     March - it was eight months - I think from March until the end of

25     November.  It was at that point, in 1995, that Tudjman's plan was to take

Page 4926

 1     the Krajina.

 2             As long as we're on this subject, I realise I made another point

 3     that merits clarification on exactly this issue.

 4             It was on the 21st of July that I went down to Brioni - this is

 5     1995 - for a dinner with President Demirel.  And at that dinner, Susak,

 6     the defence minister, told me that they would have a military operation.

 7     It was later, I think July 22nd, looking at the diary, that I had the

 8     lunch that I referred to with Colonel Herrick and Colonel Sadler.  And on

 9     that occasion, Susak gave us the date.  But it would have been on the

10     21st that he had first indicated to me, and it was also clear from what

11     Tudjman was saying that Tudjman had made a decision that they were going

12     to go ahead with a military operation -- or very likely to go ahead with

13     a military operation in connection with the Bihac crisis.

14        Q.   Thank you, Ambassador.

15             Now, in connection with the Bihac crisis, that's also mentioned

16     in your statement, I think at paragraphs 19 -- that's 92 ter statement,

17     P444, at paragraphs 19 and 20, in which you indicate that:  "During the

18     same period, the threat to Bihac lessened in the face of Serb

19     withdrawal," at paragraph 19.  And then in paragraph 20:  "Now we move

20     again to start again the peace progress.  There was a hierarchy of evil."

21             Can you describe to the Court, quickly, the reduction of the

22     threat to Bihac and the efforts in connection with the peace process that

23     resulted?

24        A.   Yes.  Basically, what happened was you had on the 13th of July,

25     the fall of Srebrenica; then the disappearance and massacre of

Page 4927

 1     20 per cent of the population, the men and boys; then you had the fall of

 2     Zepa around the 26th of July, but the attack on it had been going on for

 3     some time; and in around the 20th or 17th, or something, of July, the

 4     attack on Bihac.

 5             So, as we saw it, there was a concerted effort on the part of the

 6     Bosnian Serbs, and in the case of the Bihac joined by the Croatian Serbs,

 7     to wipe these enclaves off the map.  And we believe, given what they had

 8     done in Srebrenica, that there was a very good chance that they would do

 9     the same thing in Zepa and in Bihac.

10             That is why we were very sympathetic to the Croatian military

11     offensive that went up the Livno valley that put pressure on the Serbs,

12     and, indeed, why we did not object to military action that would have

13     come through the Krajina to relieve the siege of Bihac.  But precisely

14     because the Croatian military actions were having a significant impact on

15     the Serbs, the prospect of Bihac falling had, by the very end of July,

16     began to recede.  And at that point, I believed that there was an

17     opportunity to -- for a negotiated settlement.

18             I wasn't at all sure that there would be a negotiated settlement

19     that would actually work, but that there was an opportunity and that we

20     should take advantage of this opportunity.  That then explains why, at

21     the very final hours, I went to Belgrade and tried to produce a deal that

22     might have headed off Operation Storm.

23        Q.   And your statement -- your statement indicates , at paragraph 22,

24     and again that's P444, at paragraph 22, that you met with

25     President Tudjman on the 1st of August; and, I believe, in addition your

Page 4928

 1     diplomatic diary, at the page marked 28, which I think is page 22 in

 2     e-court, also addresses that meeting.

 3             During the course of that meeting with President Tudjman,

 4     Ambassador, did you outline the proposal to move the peace process

 5     forward, and did you also address US concerns about a military operation

 6     and the US position in connection with that possibility?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   And does your -- does your diary and your statement indicate the

 9     position outlined by you, on behalf of the US, in connection with the

10     possibility of a military operation?

11        A.   Yes, it does.

12        Q.   And those were?

13        A.   Well, first, that the United States was committed to a peaceful

14     solution to the Krajina problem, and that nothing that we said should be

15     construed as a green light to military operation.

16             Second, and we put great emphasis on this, that if there is a

17     military operation, that Serb civilians will have to be protected; that

18     POWs will have to be well treated; and that any repeat of the atrocities

19     that had occurred in the Medak Pocket in 1993 would have very series

20     consequences for US/Croatian relations.  If there were atrocities, that

21     would very much affect our relationship in a negative, do great damage to

22     our relationship with Croatia.

23             Third, if Croatia undertook a military operation, that it would

24     do so alone.  It could not expect any help from the United States if

25     things did not go as expected.

Page 4929

 1             And, fourth, that the safety of UN peacekeepers was paramount,

 2     and that Croatia would have to avoid doing anything that put UN

 3     peacekeepers and other personnel at risk.

 4        Q.   Now, in paragraph 23 of P444, you explained the reasons why

 5     warnings were issued about the need to protect Serb civilians.

 6             You say:  "I issued the warnings about the need to protect

 7     Serbian civilians because there were a number of reasons to be worried

 8     that persecutions of civilians were likely.  I knew that

 9     President Tudjman saw Serbs as a threat and wanted an ethnically

10     homogeneous Croatia.  I also knew that Serbia civilians had been attacked

11     in previous Croatian military operations such as Medak Pocket and Flash."

12             Then you go on to indicate that your concern was reflected in a

13     statement later.

14             Does that paragraph accurately state the reasons why the warnings

15     about the need or US concern about what might happen to civilians were

16     issued?

17        A.   Yes, it does.

18        Q.   Now, in the meeting on August 1st, did President Tudjman outline

19     for you the conditions, Croatia's conditions, for a peaceful resolution

20     in anticipation of your meeting with Milan Babic?

21        A.   He outlined the conditions for a peaceful resolution, which are

22     contained in the diplomatic diary; that is, the immediate withdrawal from

23     Bihac, the opening of the oil pipeline through Sector North, immediate

24     negotiations to reopen the Zagreb-Split railroad, and immediate

25     negotiations for the political reintegration of the Krajina into Croatia.

Page 4930

 1             At that time, these were his conditions and these were being

 2     presented as an ultimatum at a meeting to be held August 3rd in Geneva

 3     under the sponsorship the ICVY, the International Conference on the

 4     former Yugoslavia, and under the chairmanship of Thorvald Stoltenberg.

 5             At that time, then I told him that Babic was interested in seeing

 6     me, and he said, "Well, that would be interesting."  I think Babic had

 7     proposed a date of Thursday or Friday, and he said, "Don't wait until

 8     then; do it sooner."  But these points were not in connection with my

 9     meeting with Babic, these were simply the Croatian ultimatum, and the

10     focus really was on that August 3rd meeting.

11        Q.   And did you meet with Milan Babic thereafter?

12        A.   I met with him on the 2nd of August in Belgrade.

13        Q.   Okay.  With what result?  Did you outline the conditions that had

14     presented to you, and what was the response?

15        A.   I painted -- I began the meeting by painting the starkest picture

16     of what was likely to happen, and I put the blame very squarely on the

17     Krajina Serbs who had done two things:  First, they had crossed the

18     international border into Bihac; and, second, they had refused to

19     negotiate on the basis of a proposal that was with put forward by the

20     United States, Russia, the United Nations, and the European Union.  That

21     is, basically, the most powerful institutions in the world, at least with

22     regard to that part of the world.

23             Then I outlined to him the Croatian conditions, and his response

24     was very interesting.  I expected him to argue, but he didn't.  He said:

25     "I understand completely why the Croatians are about to attack us.  I

Page 4931

 1     cannot understand why our leaders have behaved as they -- they do."  He

 2     said that he accepted Tudjman's ultimatum, all the points.  He said,

 3     "Except, I have difficulty in publically saying that I will accept

 4     negotiations for the reintegration of the Krajina into Croatia."

 5             And, so, I said to him, "Well, I thought about that, and what I

 6     think you can do is publicly announce that you will accept negotiations

 7     on the basis of the Z-4 plan, because the Z-4 plan is a plan for the

 8     reintegration of Krajina into Croatia.  But I need to tell Tudjman

 9     privately that you understand you will never get the level of autonomy

10     that was discussed in the Z-4 plan.  What might have been possible in

11     January of 1995 is not possible in August of 1995."  He said he

12     understood that.

13        Q.   Ambassador, I may have been remiss in not asking you earlier to

14     indicate to the Court who Milan Babic was, why you were dealing with him,

15     and -- well, I think it is clear.

16        A.   Milan Babic was the prime minister of the so-called Republika

17     Srpska Krajina; that is, the rebel Serb entity.  He also headed the

18     political party that had the most popular support in the Krajina.  That

19     was a majority in the parliament.  He was, however, a political opponent

20     Milan Martic, the president, who controlled the military and, therefore,

21     exercised substantially more power than Babic.

22        Q.   Your supplemental statement, I believe -- supplemental

23     information sheet, excuse me.  That is P445, and I believe it indicates,

24     at paragraph 18, your review of the transcript of August 3.

25             MR. TIEGER:  And, Your Honours, I should indicate that the

Page 4932

 1     ambassador in an opportunity to see a revised transcript that conforms to

 2     an issue raised during the opening statement, and contains the

 3     translation, a revised translation, of the B/C/S transcript.

 4        Q.   And, as indicated in P445, Ambassador, that indicates that as you

 5     were relating to -- and I should indicate for your benefit and the Court,

 6     this is a transcript of a meeting with President Tudjman, in which you

 7     related your discussion with Milan Babic.  You.

 8             Are quoted there as saying:  "As we know very well, that many

 9     Serbs living there would leave, probably the majority of them.

10             Do you recall indicating that to President Tudjman and to Milan

11     Babic earlier; and if so, can you explain why you said to Babic that many

12     Serbs, probably the majority of them would leave?  And as I indicated,

13     that is addressed at page 18 of P445, the supplemental information sheet.

14        A.   Yes.  The point I was trying to make to Babic is that if the

15     Krajina Serb population was gone, there would never be a political

16     settlement for them, and so they were much better off to accept a deal

17     with Croatia now, even if it was far from ideal from their specific, than

18     to have the marry solved militarily and then to have the entire

19     population leave.

20             Now, why did I say to him, to Babic, that I thought the entire

21     population would leave?  Well, because through the entire conflict in the

22     former Yugoslavia when territory changed hands, populations left or were

23     expelled; because when Croatia took over Western Slavonia in May 1 and 2,

24     of 1995, just a few months before, 10.000 of the 13.000 Serbs left there;

25     because of Croatia's conduct in previous operations had, in particular,

Page 4933

 1     Medak Pocket, had involved atrocities.  So I knew the population would

 2     have a well-founded fear of what might happen.

 3             I knew Tudjman's own statements and view that the Krajina Serbs

 4     were a strategic threat to Croatia, and I also knew the relentless Serb

 5     propaganda about how the Croatians were basically born-again Ustashi,

 6     World War II fascist, who repeat all atrocities of the Ustashi.  So it

 7     was the combination of all those things that led me to say to Babic that

 8     the Serb would say leave.  But Babic was -- I didn't have to persuade him

 9     of this.  He understood completely that this was going to happen.

10             Then with Tudjman, on the 3rd of August, I was simply recounting

11     to him the -- the entirety of my conversation with Babic, so he would

12     understand how we had gotten this deal in which Babic had, in my view,

13     accepted Tudjman's ultimatum.

14        Q.   You mentioned your meeting with President Tudjman following your

15     discussion with Milan Babic.  How did you present the situation as it

16     existed at that time to President Tudjman, and what was his reaction?

17             I believe that is found in or you address those issues to some

18     extent at paragraph 26 of your statement, and pages 31 through 32 of your

19     diary as marked on the diary page, which I believe would be page 24 of

20     the e-court version, the August 3rd meeting.

21        A.   My basic -- I mean, of course, the words are reflected in the

22     diary and, as you know, in the transcript.  But my basic message was that

23     Babic had accepted Tudjman's ultimatum, that we could not know whether

24     Babic was going to be able to deliver the Krajina Serb leadership, but

25     that it was worth taking a little bit of time to find out if he would.

Page 4934

 1             That was -- that basically is what I was trying to persuade

 2     Tudjman of.  I just described my own negotiations, and I also delivered a

 3     demarche on behalf of the United States.

 4             It was clear to me -- I think I saw Tudjman at 5.45.  It was

 5     clear to me that what I was saying was falling on deaf ears.  He was -- I

 6     believed he had already made the decision to go to war.  It was

 7     interesting for me, then, to read the transcript of the subsequent

 8     national security meeting that began at 6.00, where the issue was

 9     actually debated and they did give considerable -- they did give

10     consideration to the American demarche and what I had to say.

11             But, certainly, the impression I had at that meeting was that the

12     issue was settled.

13        Q.   And did you -- subsequently, did you in connection with that

14     issue hold a press conference - I believe that is addressed at pages 208

15     through 210 of the book, "The United States and Croatia:  A Documentary

16     History" - about the opportunity presented as a result of your

17     discussions with Babic?

18        A.   I felt we should do everything possible for peace.  So,

19     typically, when I would go see, Tudjman - or frequently anyhow - the

20     press would be gathered out the presidential office.  I actually had our

21     public affairs officer make sure that they were there.  So I then issued

22     a statement, saying that Babic had meet Tudjman's -- it was wasn't a

23     statement.  I gave remarks that Babic had met the terms of Croatia's

24     ultimatum; and that, in my view, there was no reason for a war.  I didn't

25     say there wouldn't be a war, although that was a bit misinterpreted.  I

Page 4935

 1     simply said that there was no reason for way.

 2             I also felt, as a moral matter, that I owed it to Babic who had

 3     made this commitments to state publicly that the United States stood

 4     behind them, and that we hoped there would be an opportunity for peace.

 5        Q.   Now, Ambassador, you referred, both in connection with the

 6     reasons why you issued the warnings to President Tudjman about Serb

 7     civilians and I believe earlier in your testimony, to President Tudjman's

 8     views of the presence of Serbs in Croatia.

 9             Let me ask you, as a preliminary matter, how frequently and

10     regularly you met with President Tudjman during the -- your term as

11     ambassador?

12        A.   In the first two and a half years, I met with him very

13     frequently; I would say several times a week, on some occasions several

14     times a day.  Not all these would have been meetings at his office.  We

15     would have met in other places.  I went down; and when he vacationed in

16     Brioni, I went down from time to time to be there.

17        Q.   And can you also describe the frequency of your meetings with

18     other leading Croatian officials and who some of those leading people

19     were?

20        A.   My closest contacts were with Defence Minister Gojko Susak, who I

21     simply saw all the time, and this was a fast-moving situation.  I suppose

22     I saw him four or five times a week, sometimes more.  We often spoke; and

23     Foreign Minister Mate Granic, whose ministry was just across the park,

24     maybe a one-minute walk from the American embassy.  Again, I would see

25     him four or five times a week.  We would speak on the phone all the time.

Page 4936

 1             The other official that I dealt with -- among the other officials

 2     I dealt with a lot were Hrvoje Sarinic who, was Tudjman's Chief of Staff

 3     and who was became the lead Croatian negotiator on the Eastern Slavonia

 4     peace agreement, which is a set of negotiations that followed Operation

 5     Storm that I was the mediator of; Miro Tudjman, Tudjman's son, who was

 6     head of the Croatian intelligence service.  I saw him somewhat less

 7     frequently; Djurdja Susak, who was Miro's deputy and the wife of the

 8     Defence minister.

 9             And, of course, there were many others, but the big three would

10     have been Granic, Susak, and Sarinic.

11        Q.   In P444, your 92 ter statement, in paragraphs 31 through 31, you

12     address President Tudjman's views on a number of related subjects,

13     including his belief that states ought to be ethnically homogeneous or

14     close to it, his belief and statements that Serbs in Croatia were to

15     numerous and constituted a strategic threat to Croatia, his views about

16     population transfers, his views that the Krajina Serbs represented, as I

17     think I mentioned, a strategic threat.

18             Can you describe for the Court, in as much -- in any more detail

19     than is necessary, those views on both the continued presence of Serbs in

20     Croatia and population transfers and ethnic division.

21        A.   First, I think a word about Tudjman.  He was an extremely

22     confident leader, very confident in his own abilities.  He was a

23     historian by academic training.  He was a strategist, but he thought of

24     himself as a strategist on a grand scale.  He had strongly-held beliefs

25     which he felt would be self-evident to a rational Westerner, like the

Page 4937

 1     American ambassador.  So he never hid his views.  And he believed that

 2     states were -- European states were much better off if they were

 3     ethnically homogeneous.  Kind of an odd argument for him to think that an

 4     American, given the nature of our country, would believe that, but he

 5     just assumed that I would accept that.

 6             He saw because of their geography that the Krajina Serbs were a

 7     particular threat.  They were located, after all, in such a way that they

 8     almost divided the northern part of Croatia from the coast.  He, as a

 9     historian, he spoke about approvingly of population transfers,

10     particularly the population transfer that took place in 1923 after the

11     Greek-Turkish War, in which the Greek population of Anatolia was sent to

12     and Greece, and the Turkish population in Greece was sent to Turkey.

13             Although I would argue with him about this, pointing out the

14     enormous human misery that was involved in that exchange and that fact

15     that it really hadn't made for an enormously peaceful relationship

16     between Greece and Turkey over the next 75 years, that made no difference

17     to him.

18             He also believed that, and this really fit in the same world

19     view, that Bosnia should be divided with a homogeneous Serb part to the

20     east, and a Croat part - and sometimes it would be different views -

21     either a Croat part that also included the Muslims in the west; and in

22     this context, he looked very much at the idea, for geographic reasons, of

23     exchanging Banja Luka, which was - well, at this point, 1995 - had become

24     almost a purely Serb city as a result of ethnic cleansing - for Tuzla

25     which was an overwhelmingly Muslim city.

Page 4938

 1        Q.   And did you hear similar views expressed by other Croatian

 2     leaders be with whom you had contact?

 3        A.   Tudjman's views, among the senior Croatian leaders with whom I

 4     met, Tudjman's views were pretty much his.  He was the one guy who

 5     believed in what I call a great Greater Croatia; that is, one that would

 6     include the Bosnian Muslims.  There were other Croats or Croatians who

 7     believed in what I call the smaller Greater Croatia, which would include

 8     Herzegovina.  This was certainly true of the Defence Minister Gojko

 9     Susak, and it's also true of a number of the people in the ruling

10     circles.

11             I would say at that time that 90 per cent or more of the Croatian

12     people actually rejected either idea of Greater Croatia.  There was, I

13     think, no support for the idea of dividing Bosnia in two, the way Tudjman

14     wanted to do it.  And, on the whole, the Herzegovinians were rather

15     unpopular in Croatia.  So while there were sympathy for fellow Croats in

16     Bosnia, there wasn't a strong desire of the Croatian people to annex

17     territory in Bosnia.

18        Q.   In paragraph 65 of your 92 ter statement, P444, you refer to

19     Mr. Sarinic describing Serbs as a cancer on the stomach of Croatia.

20             Can you describe this for the Court, and what you understood this

21     reflected about his views concerning the continuing presence of Serbs in

22     Croatia?

23        A.   Well, once the Serbs had left Croatia, neither Tudjman nor the

24     senior people in his government wanted the Serbs to come back, and

25     Sarinic was in many ways a cipher for Tudjman.  Susak and Granic had

Page 4939

 1     their own personalities.  They would express views that were different

 2     from Tudjman, but Sarinic basically repeated what the president wanted.

 3             At this time, this is a few weeks after Operation Storm, I am, on

 4     instructions from my government, I am criticizing Croatia for the human

 5     rights abuses that are taking place in the Krajina, and insisting that as

 6     a fundamental matter of human rights, the Serbs should have the right to

 7     return home and recover their property.

 8             We were also trying to get Croatia to -- to reverse a decision

 9     which was to strip the Krajina Serbs of citizenship and to confiscate

10     their property unless they claimed it in 30 days.  Of course, nobody was

11     allowed to come back in the 30 days.  So this would have been why I was

12     talking to Sarinic about this issue.  And in this conversation, in

13     August of 1995, he said, "We cannot except them to come back.  They are a

14     cancer in the stomach of Croatia."

15             I just thought that was just a shocking metaphor about people

16     who, we felt, were citizens of the country and had the same rights as

17     other citizens of the country.

18        Q.   Ambassador, let me direct your attention next to, and you had

19     begun to do so already, to the period of time after the commencement of

20     Operation Storm and after the majority of Serbs were no longer in the

21     Krajina.

22             In paragraph 42 of your 92 ter statement, you indicate that

23     immediately after the large-scale flight of Serbs from the Krajina, you

24     expressed the view that it was not ethnic cleansing, as explained in

25     testimony during the Milosevic case.  Perhaps, it would have been more

Page 4940

 1     helpful if the statement included that, your description of that in the

 2     Milosevic case or your explanation about that in the Milosevic case.

 3             But can you tell the Court what you were referring to by ethnic

 4     cleansing in that context, both the context in which you said that and

 5     what you meant by saying that it was not ethnic cleansing?

 6        A.   Well, ethnic cleansing, as I considered it to be, involved

 7     actions to expel the population through military attacks, terror,

 8     mass rape, killings, to make sure that everybody who survived left, the

 9     burning of homes.

10             Basically, ethnic cleansing was what took place in Croatia in

11     1991, in Eastern Slavonia, and in the Krajina where the Serbs ethnically

12     cleansed the Croats who lived there, and what took place in Bosnia in

13     1992 where the Bosnian Serb army used mass killings, mass rape, putting

14     people in concentration camps, destroying their homes, to expel them and

15     to therefore make ethnically pure a large part of Bosnia that had not

16     been Serb but which then became Serb.

17             In my view, the Croatian -- Croatia did not do this in Operation

18     Storm, because when the Croatian forces arrived, the Serbs were already

19     gone.  So you couldn't ethnically cleanse somebody who was not there.

20     This is it not to say that they wouldn't have done it had the population

21     been there, but the fact is the population was not there when the

22     Croatian forces actually arrived.

23             So that's what I meant by that statement.  I have to say that I,

24     over the years, have regretted that I made it, because it was

25     misunderstood and sort of seemed to be an apology for the Croatian

Page 4941

 1     military action, and that was not whey intended.  It was simply a

 2     technical explanation as to why it was not ethnic cleansing.

 3        Q.   And in connection with Serb flight, I also want to ask you about

 4     any information you received concerning the role of so-called psy-ops, or

 5     psychological operations, or electronic warfare?

 6        A.   Well, I talked to Defence Minister Susak about this, and he was

 7     very proud of the psychological operations in which they had given

 8     instructions for -- to the population on how to leave, and a variety of

 9     other measures that I have to say at this point some of the details of

10     which escape me.

11             And, of course, I also had reporting from our own sources, for

12     example, the defence attache, about the psychological operations, and

13     then these later became a subject of controversy.

14        Q.   You address that, to some extent, in paragraph 61 of your 92 ter

15     statement, again referring to discussions with Minister Susak, and you

16     say in the third sentence of paragraph 61:  "At one point, he said that

17     they had managed to give the order for the Serbian population to leave

18     through their electronic warfare."

19             Did Minister Susak describe the particular order that was given

20     for the Serbian population to leave?

21        A.   I don't recall that he did.  As I recall, he talked about roads

22     that people should take, but my understanding is that the Serbian

23     authorities gave an order for the population to leave.  So, as I say in

24     this statement, that he was either from -- he was known to exaggerate, so

25     he may have been taking credit for something that was happening anyhow

Page 4942

 1     for an order that the Serbs had given.

 2             Incidentally, I should add one another point, which is not in

 3     here.  The Croatian intelligence on the Serbs was extremely good, and so

 4     it is quite possible that the Croatians knew that the Serbs were going to

 5     give an order for an evacuation, and then either jump the gun or did

 6     things to confuse it as part of their psy-ops.

 7        Q.   Now, I think that's also reflected in an entry in your diary,

 8     which is marked the 9th of August.  It is marked on the diary page the

 9     9th of August, which is found at page 38 in the diary.

10             MR. TIEGER:  That's 31 of the e-court version, Your Honours.

11        Q.   That's in the second full paragraph.  In the bottom of that, you

12     note:  "Susak was also very proud of his psy-ops."

13             But I also wanted to ask you about another entry in the diary,

14     and that is Minister Susak saying that one of his planes had bombed a

15     refugee column, but by mistake.

16             I wanted to ask you whether you received information from General

17     Cervenko also concerning attacks on refugee columns, and in that

18     connection -- or prospective attacks on refugee columns.  And in that

19     connection, I would like to direct your attention to an entry for the

20     19th of September, which is at page 57 as marked in the diary, and I

21     believe page 50 in the e-court version.

22             In the second paragraph of the September 19th entry, you refer to

23     a conversation with General Cervenko; and then, after referring to a

24     particular incident, you say:  "This is another sign of stress between

25     Cervenko and Susak about which he is remarkably candid.  A few weeks ago

Page 4943

 1     he showed Clark orders from Susak to open up artillery on 40.000

 2     civilians concentrated in Topusko area because there were ARSK units

 3     among them.  Cervenko said he went to Tudjman to get that order

 4     countermanded."

 5             MR. KEHOE:  If I may, Judge, interrupt.  This matter is outside

 6     the scope of this indictment.  This is in Sector North.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  Yes.  As we discussed on a number of other

 9     occasions, Your Honour, there is an difference between showing evidence

10     of intent, motive, pattern, and so on, than eliciting evidence

11     specifically designed or directly related to a particular incident for

12     which criminal responsibility is alleged.  It is clear that this kind

13     information is relevant and could be useful to the Court in assessing

14     what happened in the indictment area and in the indictment period.

15             MR. KEHOE:  May I respond, Judge?

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, please do.

17             MR. KEHOE:  On that score, Judge, if it was, in fact, relevant,

18     then it should have been in his statement, and it's not.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger, concentration of information in

20     statements apparently is the issue.

21             MR. TIEGER:  The statement was taken at a time when I didn't have

22     the diplomatic diary, Your Honour.  That document has been disclosed.  I

23     believe it has been in the possession of the Defence for some time.  In

24     any event, the statements do serve a particular purpose, but they should

25     far from exclusive.  There is obviously no intention on the part of the

Page 4944

 1     Prosecution, given the timing of receipt of the diplomatic diary, and I

 2     might also add that this was contained in the supplemental information

 3     sheet at page -- or paragraph --  Again, I may oblige to withdraw that

 4     Your Honour.  I don't -- I can't find it at the moment.

 5             In any event, as I said, we endeavour to put all material

 6     available to us in the supplemental information sheet, and the original

 7     statements wasn't in possession of the diary at that -- at the time the

 8     statement was given.  And, furthermore, I mean, it is almost impossible

 9     to include all aspects that are relevant to the case in either a 92 ter

10     statement or even supplemental information.

11             So I don't think that is a basis for exclusion.  If it became

12     habitual and large portions of evidence that was led from a witness was

13     not available to the Defence, that would be one thing.  But in this case,

14     the diary has been available to Mr. Kehoe for at least as long as it has

15     been available to me, if not longer, based on the information received.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Of course, how much time you've had to review

17     material that would be - I'm not giving a decision yet - that would be

18     irrelevant, of course, is not a matter that really gives any weight.

19                           [Trial Chamber confers]

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger, the Chamber is aware that this is in

21     evidence, it has been admitted into evidence.  The Chamber is not seeking

22     to or would not consider to be greatly assisted by further exploring the

23     matter.

24             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Your Honour.

25        Q.   Now, Ambassador, you have already begun to address the issue I

Page 4945

 1     next wanted to raised in your discussion concerning Mr. Sarinic's

 2     comments.  But, as indicated by that testimony, and as in a number of

 3     paragraphs in the 92 ter statement, President Tudjman's position on the

 4     return of Krajina Serbs was that they simply couldn't come back.

 5             Now, you say, in paragraphs 34, 36, and 75 of your statement,

 6     that he established constructs to achieve just that.  You refer to the 30

 7     days to return or lose property, and then a- and then keeping Serbs from

 8     getting back in to meet that condition, the extension to 90 days which

 9     was still insufficient.  And in paragraph 75, you state that

10     President Tudjman's initial plan was to bar prospective returnees, but

11     that the US forced him to back down.

12             Can you describe, although I know you have begun to do so, these

13     barriers to Serb returns that were erected and how they were implemented

14     and their success?

15        A.   There were both legal and practical barriers to Serb return.

16             Tudjman referred to these people as "obtansi" [phoen], as people

17     who had opted out of Croatia because they had left.  And, initially, in

18     August, Tudjman -- Croatia said that anybody who did not return been 30

19     days and register for citizenship would not be able to return to Croatia

20     and their property would be confiscated, at which point, then, the

21     confiscated probably would become part of the overall settlement between

22     -- of property claims in the former Yugoslavia, in other words.  And, of

23     course, the idea was that Serb property would be offset against Croat

24     property, Croatian property that had been seized or destroyed in Eastern

25     Slavonia and Bosnia and that sort of thing.  That was a way to guarantee

Page 4946

 1     that people would get absolutely nothing.

 2             Under US pressure, the deadline was extended for 90 days in, I

 3     suppose, sometime in September.  Then it was the -- this deadline was

 4     eliminated in sometime in December.  And in 1996, again under intense

 5     pressure from the United States, Croatia agreed that Serbs could return.

 6             But that wasn't the end of the store because, in fact, nobody

 7     returned, or almost nobody returned.  When the few people did try to

 8     return, they found they couldn't get visas if they were in Serbia.  If

 9     they tried to recover their property, the local officials would never

10     return it.  There would be people living in it; nobody would evict those

11     people who were living in it.  So, as a practical matter, there were

12     virtually -- the system was set up to guarantee that there would be no

13     returns; and, until 2000, there were virtually no returns or very few.

14             Beyond that, beyond the legal barrier, the effort to legally

15     strip Croatian citizenship from these people, the effort to legally

16     confiscate their property, the Croatian authorities in the Krajina region

17     either ordered or permitted to happen the systematic destruction of -- of

18     all -- of thee greatest part of the Serb important.

19             So once your house was burned and all possessions looted, your

20     farm animals killed or stolen, there was nothing for you to return to.

21     And this, incidentally, was a very marginal part of Croatia, and people

22     had a very low income and suffered from four years of total isolation.

23     People were living at the margin.  So when you take away their house, you

24     burn their house, you take away their property, you kill their farm

25     animals, there is no way that anybody can return there and make a living.

Page 4947

 1     I believe that was an intentional policy, either orders to destroy the

 2     property or --

 3             MR. KEHOE:  Excuse me, Your Honour.

 4             With regard to that, I object.  I believe --

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, that is the answer the witness gives.  He

 6     is not asking for beliefs.  Of course, there is need to further explore

 7     on what his belief is based on, but it's not a reason to intervene.

 8             Please proceed.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Again, either that this was on orders or something

10     that the state authorities permitted to happen because it served their

11     purposes.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger, could you please explore the factual

13     basis on which this one belief or the other belief is based upon.

14             MR. TIEGER:  Of course, Your Honour.

15        Q.   Ambassador, the Court is interested in hearing from you

16     additional information about the basis for your belief that this

17     destruction was intentional; that is, either orders or permitted to

18     happen.

19        A.   Yes.  First, this was when -- this was an area without a

20     population.  The people who were there were -- was the Croatian military

21     in the immediate aftermath of Operation Storm, so they were in control.

22     This wasn't like the Krajina Serb army or some of the other armed forces.

23     This was the most disciplined military and the best military in the

24     former Yugoslavia, in my view.

25             So there they were, in control; and while they were in control,

Page 4948

 1     almost from the start, the looting and burning is taking place.  I

 2     describe my own observations in Petrinja of going there, I think, on the

 3     6th of August, a few hours after it fell.  Again, the Croatian military

 4     fully in charge; going back there on the 9th with increasing signs of

 5     looting.

 6             I had embassy officers down in Knin coming, I think, the 7th or

 7     8th of August - it is in the diary, the precise date - reporting as they

 8     were approaching, first through Drnis, seeing recent destruction; coming

 9     into Knin where buildings on the outskirts were being burned; one of the

10     officers coming up to some Croatian soldiers and saying, "The house is on

11     fire.  Are you going to do anything about it," and then realising that

12     these were the people setting the fires.

13             And, again, given the scale, I don't think that you can argue

14     that these were -- and how long it took or the period of time over which

15     it took place, I don't think that you can say these were isolated

16     incidents.  So, to that, I guess I could add a further observation of

17     coming on September 20th to Donji Lapac, a town that was 90 per cent --

18     98 per cent Serb, I believe.  The most Serb municipality in Croatian in

19     which, in my estimation, 70 per cent of the buildings in Donji Lapac -

20     and these were apartment blocks and things like - had been torched.  None

21     much them had been damaged in fighting.  They had been systematically

22     torched, and all the ones that hadn't been torched had been all looted.

23             So, again, given the nature of the Croatian state, given that it

24     was a disciplined military, given that it was an organised and efficient

25     state, I don't or I cannot accept the idea that this it was -- that these

Page 4949

 1     things happened spontaneously.  I can think that they only happened

 2     because the Croatian state authorities, Tudjman and his -- the gang

 3     around him, wanted this to happen.

 4             I put that, then, in the context of Tudjman's desire for an

 5     ethnically pure Croatia.  His belief in ethnically homogeneous states.

 6     I put this in the context of, as we have already discussed, of these

 7     laws, the utterly unfair laws, that were intended to prevent, to deny

 8     Serbs Croatian citizenship and to confiscate their property.  I put this

 9     in the context of comments, which I heard from lots of Croatians, that

10     the Serbs were a cancer on -- Krajina Serbs were a cancer on the stomach

11     of Croatia.  And, finally, as I look at the transcripts of some of these

12     presidential meetings, you can see, for example, Susak talking, boasting

13     about how Grahovo is now ethnically clean.

14             So these are all the reasons why I believe that either this was

15     on orders or something that was permitted, and I can't say because I

16     don't have a smoking gun of some direct order.  But I cannot believe that

17     this happened except for it being something that the Croatian authorities

18     that Tudjman wanted to have happen or was pleased was happening as it was

19     happening.

20             MR. KEHOE:  Excuse me, Your Honour.

21             On this score, obviously the witness has been shown a series of

22     transcripts from which he bases his opinion, and we would like a list of

23     the transcripts that they -- that the witness was, in fact, actually

24     shown.

25             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, the transcript to which the witness

Page 4950

 1     just referred to is the August 12th, which is in evidence.  It came in

 2     this morning through this witness.

 3             MR. KEHOE:  With this particular witness, this witness was not a

 4     participant in that meeting, but was this witness shown anything else

 5     which he wasn't a participant?

 6             MR. TIEGER:  I believe the Defence has the full list.  I think

 7     that we -- that the witness has referred explicitly, to the best of my

 8     recollection, to all the transcripts which he was shown, and they've

 9     either -- and I think they're in evidence.

10             MR. KEHOE:  Here is the problem, Judge --

11             MR. TIEGER:  Excuse me.  Im' sorry to interrupt.  This particular

12     issue arises in the context of a presidential transcript which was

13     introduced this morning, and contains a reference which Mr. Kehoe

14     apparently overlooked, but it is in the August 11th transcript.

15             MR. KEHOE:  May I respond, Your Honour.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, please.

17             MR. KEHOE:  It's not a matter of overlooking that, Judge.  What

18     we are entitled to and what General Gotovina is entitled to is the facts

19     and circumstances upon which Ambassador Galbraith is going to testify, be

20     it in his 92 ter statement or a supplemental --

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Why not ask Mr. Galbraith on which transcript he --

22             MR. KEHOE:  Well, I think there is a larger issue here, Judge.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  But that is the issue at this moment.

24             MR. KEHOE:  I have a separate issue, Judge, which is how are we

25     supposed to prepare to meet, with all due respect, the Ambassador's

Page 4951

 1     testimony?  How are we supposed to prepare to meet that when such an item

 2     of that is not given in the indication, and why was it?  Why was it shown

 3     to him.  This is not something that was a fact that he heard and observed

 4     because he was not a part of that meeting.  But now we have evidence that

 5     it is presented.  It is not a fact, it is not something that he observe,

 6     certainly a transcript that he reviewed that he was not an participant

 7     in, to which we is now have to answer.

 8             MR. KAY:  Can I raise just one matter.  I'm trying to find an

 9     11th of August transcript, Your Honours.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  I see minutes of the an August 11th, 1995 meeting,

11     participants.  That is P456; that is, 11st of August.

12             MR. KUZMANOVIC:  Your Honour.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, Mr. Kuzmanovic.

14             MR. KUZMANOVIC:  I would like to add to what Mr. Kehoe said.

15             In essence, what is happening here is the Ambassador is being

16     presented with a list of transcript or transcripts most of which he was

17     not a participant in, and then he is asked:  "What are your opinions

18     based on the transcripts?"  Not directly, but all he is being asked is to

19     give opinion testimony on what the transcripts are, and that's not what

20     the Ambassador is here to talk about.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  That seems to a misrepresentation what happened.

22             But, Mr. Tieger.

23             MR. TIEGER:  I'm glad the Court appreciates that.  That is

24     precisely my point.  First of all, I mean it is a misrepresentation on

25     several levels, first of all, to say most of which he didn't participate

Page 4952

 1     in.  That was made very clear this morning which documents came in, and I

 2     made explicit that this was the only one in which the witness had not

 3     participated.  I did not seek to elicit testimony from the witness about

 4     those transcripts and his conclusions drawn from them.

 5             The Defence has been on notice of the witness's views concerning

 6     the systematic destruction and the basis for that systematic destruction

 7     in the course of a very fulsome answer and very useful answer about how

 8     came to that conclusion, the witness appended at the very end his

 9     recollection of reading one thing from a transcript which is in evidence.

10              It is extremely unfair and in accurate to accuse the Prosecution

11     of presenting witness with materials so he can form some independent

12     conclusion about it.

13             Beyond that, that, to some extent, that has been something we've

14     seen in other context when documents that witnesses haven't seen have

15     been presented to them, so that they can offer a view about the

16     information contained in those documents based on their own unique

17     experiences in the Krajina.

18             So, even had that been done, it is far from clear there is

19     anything inappropriate about it here, but that's not what happened here.

20             MR. KEHOE:  May I respond, Judge.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  I think we will first see whether there is any need

22     for further debate.

23                           [Trial Chamber confers]

24             JUDGE ORIE:  The Chamber denies the objection.

25             The witness gave some judgements which are always of a mixed

Page 4953

 1     nature.  We asked or invited Mr. Tieger to further explore the factual

 2     basis for that.  The witness gave some facts he observed himself; the

 3     witness gave some facts that were apparently reported to him, like the

 4     soldier who only became aware that it was these soldiers.

 5             Mr. Galbraith, I take it you were not standing next to that

 6     soldier at this time.

 7             THE WITNESS:  No.  Let me just explain --

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  No, no.

 9             The exploring the basis on which the witness gave his judgement

10     opens up exactly what sources he used, sources that can be used in

11     cross-examination could explore what he heard or not.  Of course, the

12     problem always is that in this kind of situations, that those who

13     participated in meetings matters, et cetera, observed matters, matters

14     are reported to them, they form an opinion on this on which they further

15     act, et cetera.

16             So, therefore, under those circumstances, the objection is

17     denied.

18             Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.

19             MR. KEHOE:  Might I raise one issue, Your Honour, and it goes

20     exactly --

21             JUDGE ORIE:  As long as it is not challenging the ruling I just

22     gave.

23             MR. KEHOE:  It is not, Your Honour.  It's just exploring what

24     Your Honour just said.

25             An Your Honour, at line 23 through 25, exploring exactly what

Page 4954

 1     sources he used - I believe you said exactly what sources he used - how

 2     do we know what sources he used if we don't have disclosure of those

 3     sources?  Obviously, it was unknown to us, until just now, that a

 4     transcript at which the ambassador was not present was used during the

 5     prep session to further whatever testimony the Prosecution was going to

 6     lead during the course of this testimony.  And absent this one comment

 7     about this, it's unknown to me how we are supposed to explore those

 8     sources if we do not have disclosure of them.

 9             Never, when I was going through this and going through the

10     statements, it didn't dawn on me that something that at which the

11     ambassador was not present, nor participated in, would be used during the

12     course of his prep session, when we were talking and have been talking so

13     much about facts and circumstances.

14             So, unless there is some procedure coming from the Office of the

15     Prosecutor, a disclosure to the Defence of everything that they've shown

16     a witness in preparation, then I think that we don't have any way to

17     explore on cross-examination the sources that he used.

18             The fact of the matter is this particular item was shown to the

19     witness before it went into evidence.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger, are you willing to further tell

21     Mr. Kehoe what other material was shown to the witness during the

22     proofing sessions or while preparing his testimony.

23             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, I believe, as I stated, that I

24     stated --

25             JUDGE ORIE:  This is all.

Page 4955

 1             MR. TIEGER:  That is exactly right.

 2             And, furthermore, I think, well, first of all, that's whether or

 3     not that's simply an inquiry about matters to or procedures to be adopted

 4     in the future, or, in fact, a continuation of the debate about this

 5     particular objection is another story.  But, there, the Defence has ample

 6     opportunity to explore with any witness the basis for his opinions, the

 7     documents he was shown, and --

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  I think, as a matter of fact --

 9             MR. TIEGER:  [Overlapping speakers] ... that's the way the --

10             JUDGE ORIE:  -- Mr. Tieger, we are revisiting the same matter.

11             Mr. Kehoe, you heard from Mr. Tieger that the material that was

12     shown to Mr. Galbraith, and, of course, you could ask him whether he has

13     any different recollection, that the matters we have now on our exhibit

14     list and most of which was admitted into evidence that that's the

15     material you went through with the witness in preparing him for his

16     testimony.

17             Yes.

18             MR. KEHOE:  I understand, Judge.  I understand that that's the

19     position with regard to this witness.  We have been in trial for

20     sometime, and I don't really know about that, prior witnesses.  But I

21     understand with regard to this witness that this is the -- all of the

22     items that have been shown.  It does, in fact, present some preparation

23     difficulties as we move forward.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Then you may please proceed, Mr. Tieger.

25             If there's any reason to revisit this matter in more general

Page 4956

 1     terms, then I can tell you Mr. Kehoe whatever documents you get to trace

 2     all the impressions, documents, the witness gathers over a couple of

 3     years being, I would say, involved in many matters to - of course, it is

 4     fair that we have it now on or list what was shown to the witness - but

 5     to have the illusion that you could find the roots of every tiny little

 6     bit of that is just impossible.  Let's be aware of that.

 7             MR. KEHOE:  I am aware of that, Judge, and I know that the

 8     Ambassador's long experience in this area and his positions have been

 9     formulated by many different facts and circumstances.  I'm concerned

10     about is the documents that are shown to witnesses before they come into

11     this courtroom.  Now it did surprise me that this, in fact, has been

12     shown to this witness and has been used as a basis, further basis, of his

13     position.  And that's what I'm concerned with, not everything else.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  That's on the record.

15             Mr. Tieger you, may proceed.  While I'm looking at the clock,

16     perhaps it is even wiser to have a break.

17             I have to apologise.  During the last break, I was doing

18     something else and just forgot about the time, which I do not encourage

19     anyone to do.  I will try to improve my performance and back at ten

20     minutes to 1.00.

21                           [The witness stands down]

22                           --- Recess taken at 12.32 p.m.

23                           --- On resuming at 12.51 p.m.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, I heard that you would like to put

25     something on the record in the absence of the witness.

Page 4957

 1             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Your Honour.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Please do so.

 3             MR. KEHOE:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 4             What I'd like to address with the Court is the fact that this

 5     witness is, in fact, giving what is essentially expert testimony based on

 6     his opinion.  Obviously, there has been no notice of that score under

 7     Rule 94 bis.  But, in essence, the testimony that he has given for the

 8     past, well, some time, in this session, has not been based on facts --

 9     excuse me, has been based on facts, but then he opines on those and

10     offers his conclusion.  That is expert testimony; and based on that we

11     object to that testimony because, number one, he has not been noted as an

12     expert and such testimony is violation of Rule 94 bis.

13                           [Trial Chamber confers]

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Your objection is on the record and gives the

15     Chamber, at this moment, no reason to not further receive the witness of

16     this witness.

17             Could the witness be brought into the courtroom.

18                           [The witness entered court]

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger.

20             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Your Honour.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  For the parties, I do not know whether I misspoke on

22     67, line 25.  I think I said to receive the evidence of the witness;

23     whereas, the transcript says otherwise.  I do not know whether I made the

24     mistake or whether the mistake was made by another.

25             If I did it, apologies.

Page 4958

 1             Please proceed.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you.

 3             Your Honour, can we next call up P446.

 4        Q.   Ambassador, I'd like to direct your attention to P446 which is a

 5     coded cable, and I believe is dated 31 August 1995.

 6             Just for the benefit of the Chamber, in deciphering some aspects

 7     of the cables, is it correct that you can identify the date of that

 8     document by the notation which is immediately to the left of the

 9     unclassified marking at the top?

10        A.   Yes, that is correct.

11        Q.   So it indicates the month and the year to the right, and then the

12     date is the first notation of the --

13        A.   And the time.  So it would be the 31st of August -- I'm sorry,

14     even with these glasses.  I think it is 11.15 -- sorry.  Well, it's 1518,

15     Zulu.

16        Q.   Sorry.  If this is helpful, it is contained in tab 5 of your

17     binder.  It might make it easier to read.

18        A.   Yeah.

19        Q.   Now, you described, earlier in your testimony, the views about a

20     largely ethnically homogeneous Croatia and the constructs implemented to

21     keep Serbs from returning.  I want to ask you if you were aware of who

22     was supposed -- what Croatian leaders intended for the demi-graphics of

23     the Krajina in the aftermath of Operation Storm.

24             And I want to turn your attention to paragraph 43 of P446 which

25     indicates as follows:  "The offensive and resultant population

Page 4959

 1     displacements has caused a massive refugee problem.  The Croatian public

 2     announcement to give security guarantees to the Serbs in the region was

 3     intended for Western propaganda purposes.  The goal of the Croatians is

 4     to 'ethnic cleanse' the region to make room for approximately," and the

 5     coma looks like 100.000, but there appears to be an extra zero.  Perhaps

 6     you will be able to clarify.

 7             "Croatian refugees to settle in the area," and then it goes on to

 8     describe how that is substantiated by the practice of taking Serbs to

 9     transition camps.

10             First of all, Ambassador, was that your understanding at the

11     time; that is, that the goal was to make room for Croatian refugees in

12     lieu of the Krajina Serbs who had fled?

13        A.   The first point I would make is that Tudjman, when really

14     pressed, spoke about, you know, maybe 10 percent of the Serb population

15     being there; although, though I think he was against any of it being

16     there.  That, of course, left a lot of vacant space, and his idea was

17     that Croats from the Diaspora might then come to the Krajina and settle

18     there.

19             It is possible that he spoke or the Croatian leadership spoke

20     about 100.000 Croat refugees from the fighting in Bosnia.  That would be

21     some from Eastern Slavonia.  Also, he expected some people to come back

22     from the Diaspora, and that they would all come and settle there.

23        Q.   And if I could turn your attention next to P447, that's in tab 6

24     of your binder, Ambassador.

25        A.   Mm-hm.

Page 4960

 1        Q.   This is a coded cable dated 11 December 1995, and is this a cable

 2     from you, Ambassador?

 3        A.   It is a cable from me, and it is a cable that I personally wrote,

 4     which is evident from the use of the first person.  Also, it was sent in

 5     a channel that would have gone directly to the Secretary of State.  It

 6     was sent, I believe, in anticipation of his visit to Zagreb.

 7        Q.   Excuse me.  Just a moment.

 8             Now, Ambassador, this cable indicates that, in paragraph 3:

 9     "Croatia continued to bar Krajina Serbs from returning their homes and

10     has arbitrarily confiscated their property.  Far from being apologetic,

11     Tudjman yesterday told visiting congressman that it would be impossible

12     for these Serbs to return to the place where their families lived for

13     centuries.  The burning of Sipovo, for which he rightly called Tudjman on

14     the carpet, was part of a broader strategy to creat a Serb-free cordon

15     sanitaire around the Croatian heartland.  The same systematic burnings of

16     Serb homes followed Croatia's August capture of Krajina and

17     September capture of Serb towns in western Bosnia.  None of this was," as

18     Tudjman claimed to you, "the isolated acts of angry men."

19             Can you describe to the Court what you were intending to convey

20     with this cable, Ambassador?

21        A.   I was intending to convey the same thing that I did in the answer

22     I gave before the break, which is that -  these were judgements that I

23     formed in 1995, as is obvious from this cable that - that the systematic

24     destruction of the Krajina was something that was either planned or

25     permitted, but anyhow it was something that was intended to happen by the

Page 4961

 1     Croatian -- by Tudjman and the Croatian authorities.  It was not because

 2     or it didn't take place because of angry Croats returning and wanting to

 3     take revenge on Serb property.  It wasn't isolated acts.  It was a matter

 4     of state policy.  That was my message to the Secretary Of State, and that

 5     was a judgement that I formed well before I sent this cable because it is

 6     reflected in other messages I sent as well.

 7        Q.   Had you sent a similar message -- I'm violating the rule of

 8     pausing.

 9             Had you sent a similar message to the secretary earlier in the

10     year?

11        A.   On September 11th -- I should explain, for the benefit of the

12     Court, there is an channel in which an ambassador sends a message

13     directly to the Secretary of State, either it can be very sensitive

14     issues, but usually on policy -- or quite often it would be on policy

15     matters, and it isn't used very frequently.

16             But on September 11th, I sent a cable exactly on this subject, in

17     which I again said that what was going -- the destruction in the Krajina

18     was part of a pattern intended to make it impossible for Serbs to return

19     home, and that the United States should condition its relations with

20     Croatian on Croatia permitting Serbs to return home, giving them

21     citizenship on their permitting Serbs to recover their property, making

22     restitution for property that was destroyed, on providing conditions of

23     security so that people could return home.  And if Croatia didn't do

24     that, we should have a series of really very strong measures that we

25     would not -- we would block Croatia's integration into Western structures

Page 4962

 1     and talk to our European allies of keeping them out of the European

 2     structures, that we would keep them out of the NATO structures, that

 3     unless Croatia did these things, we would not be supportive of the

 4     reintegration of Eastern Slavonia.  In other words, that our entire

 5     relationship should depend significantly on Croatia's reversal of a

 6     policy that was in place, which was to prevent the return of Serbs and

 7     to, by law, and by -- by having conditions of insecurity in the Krajina

 8     region.

 9        Q.   Now, Ambassador, you refer in this cable to a Serb-free cordon

10     sanitaire around the Croatian heartland.  Can you explain what you meant

11     by that?

12        A.   Yes.  In the area to the west of -- of the Krajina region in

13     Bosnia which had been Serb-populated, Croatia had taken this over in the

14     1995 offensive that followed Storm, and allowed or ordered the systematic

15     burning of Serbs' homes and properties, preventing Serbs from returning

16     to this area.  The idea was that this thing would become a Croatian area,

17     it would be a buffer to Croatia proper, and I think it was also part of

18     Tudjman's idea that this area would along with Herzegovina eventually be

19     annexed to Croatia as part of this scheme of a Greater Croatia.

20        Q.   And did you -- I'm going to refer to paragraph 23 of P445, and

21     ask you if you saw personally examples of what you just referred to and

22     also heard and also received reports about it.

23        A.   Yes, I did.

24        Q.   Okay.

25             MR. TIEGER:  And, Your Honour, just for benefit of the Court, if

Page 4963

 1     I could call up the P52 -- or, excuse me, 65 ter 5233.

 2        Q.   That's, I believe, tab 17 in your binder, Ambassador.

 3             It takes time because maps take a long time to load

 4     electronically.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger, you are aware that there was a possible

 6     objection against this.

 7             MR. TIEGER:  Oh, I'm sorry.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  No.  I think earlier we discussed the adding this --

 9     this map to the 65 ter list, and I then reserved the position of the

10     Chamber as far as relevance is concerned for this map.

11             So, perhaps, also in your questions make it immediately clear

12     what the relevance is; and then before the witness answer the question,

13     then at least the Defence should have an opportunity to oppose it.

14                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

15             MR. TIEGER:

16        Q.   Ambassador, you refer, in paragraph 23 of your supplemental

17     information sheet, to observing what happened when the HVO took over some

18     towns in western Bosnia and seeing it in several places, including

19     Mrkonjic Grad.  Can you first point out where Mrkonjic Grad is on this

20     map?

21        A.   It is in western Bosnia; I guess, to be precise, the north-west

22     quadrant.

23             MR. TIEGER:  And if we could enlarge that, yeah, the portion of

24     the map to the left.  Sorry.  Okay.

25             And if the cursor could be moved to the right.  All right.  A

Page 4964

 1     little further to the right, please.  A little further to the left.  I'm

 2     sorry.  I think the --

 3        Q.   Ambassador, perhaps you can direct the -- are you referring to

 4     the right, to the area where the cursor is now shown?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   And --

 7        A.   And you will note is Sipovo is just below there.

 8        Q.   And then referring to the cordon sanitaire that you testified

 9     about, is -- does that include the area shown in red on the Croatian

10     border?

11             MR. KEHOE:  Judge, please.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

13             MR. KEHOE:  My objection at this point, of course, relevance on

14     this particular.  The other aspect of this particular aspect is if this

15     is some allegation with regard to the HV, this was not HV-controlled

16     territory.  At any point, it was controlled by the ABiH, so --

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger.

18             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, I have no need to belabour the point.

19     The witness referred to certain locations.  I indicated I thought it

20     would be helpful to the Court to observe those locations.  In context,

21     the witness referred to Serb-populated areas.  The map depicts what is

22     Serb populated, what is not, at least in 1991.  The witness has testified

23     about that.  I tendered the map, but I don't need to go into it any

24     further.

25             MR. KEHOE:  The problem is, number one, obviously our initial

Page 4965

 1     objection concerning going into these Bosnian matters; but, number two,

 2     this was an area that was not under HV control, nor is there in any

 3     foundation that it was.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger, I mean, you are apparently formulating

 5     your objection on the basis of an assumption; that is, what I did not

 6     hear in the question of Mr. Tieger that this was an area under HV

 7     control.

 8             The witness referred to a certain place.  Mr. Tieger now asked

 9     where we find this on the map.  Now, if you have made your objections

10     against this map to show it on, a map which gives some information about

11     the ethnic composition of the population, then we could, of course,

12     choose a rather complex way to try to find another map, and then to see.

13     I don't know to what extent the ethnic composition is very relevant at

14     this moment, Mr. Tieger.  But at this moment, the Chamber is inclined,

15     since there have been no questions about it, inclined to rather use the

16     questioned map only to find the place the witness mentions.

17             So I'm colour-blind for this moment.

18             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Your Honour.  And if I can just clarify, what I

19     am saying is that at this town was, in fact, burned, it was not under HV

20     control.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  You're giving evidence, Mr. Kehoe, which we leave

22     usually to the witnesses.

23             Mr. Tieger, please proceed.

24             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Your Honour.  That's fine.  I would also

25     add that there has been testimony in this case earlier, and with this

Page 4966

 1     witness, concerning Grahovo and Glamac.  I think, to the extent that the

 2     ethnic composition of those locations is of assistance to the Court, I

 3     think, the map is useful in that regard as well.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Now, of course, the source, I don't know whether it

 5     is a contested source, but it appears to be an ethnic map of Bosnia and

 6     Herzegovina.  We're just focussing only on the border areas there, and

 7     this is a map which is based on or depicts the results of the 1991

 8     census.  Is there any dispute about that?

 9             MR. KEHOE:  Your Honour, with this particular map, if it is the

10     census map of the typical census map, no, I don't have a dispute about

11     that.  My --

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  That's at least now clear.  Is there any

13     dispute about whether the map does reflect properly the outcome of the

14     census?

15             We have not yet heard or the only thing that is said until now,

16     and there Mr. Tieger was more or less giving evidence which I think he

17     should leave to others, is that Mr. Tieger said Grahovo and Glamac.  I

18     think that you added something like that this was mainly Serb areas, but

19     I can't find it on the transcript, so I may be mistaken.

20             MR. TIEGER:  [Overlapping speakers] ... this is in reference to

21     the map itself, Your Honour.  What the map depicts about the demographics

22     of that area is linked to earlier testimony concerning those areas.

23     That's all, and it could be helpful.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Let's move on and see.

25             MR. TIEGER:  Sorry, Your Honour.  I'm just trying to determine

Page 4967

 1     the extent to which I may be able to curtail the examination.

 2        Q.   Quick question, Ambassador:  In paragraphs 46 of your statement,

 3     at 46 at 56, you refer to criticism by the United States and by you of

 4     the crimes that were taking place and the responses of Croatian

 5     officials.  You indicate, in particular in paragraph 56, that you were

 6     constantly raising the issue of atrocities with various leaders and what

 7     response you received.

 8             In paragraph 13 of your supplemental information sheet, that's

 9     P445, you refer to a response from Foreign Minister Granic who told you

10     on 13 October that he had not defended Croatia's conduct after Storm

11     because he couldn't do that.  He disapproved of what was happening in the

12     Krajina, and wanted to make sure that you understood and didn't associate

13     him with it.

14             I wanted to ask you if that 13 October discussion with Mr. Granic

15     is also reflected in your diary of that date?

16        A.   It is.

17        Q.   Ambassador, just to round this out a bit, after the -- after

18     Operation Storm and the events that you described in the weeks and months

19     that followed the commencement of Operation Storm, did you continue to

20     engage in efforts to resolve the conflict in Croatia?

21        A.   Yes, I did.  I was the principal mediator, along with UN Envoy

22     Thorvald Stoltenberg, the editor of the Erdut Agreement, which provided

23     for the peaceful reintegration of Eastern Slavonia, the last bit of

24     Serb-held territory.

25        Q.   And the Erdut Agreement, that was concluded when?

Page 4968

 1        A.   November 12th 1995.

 2        Q.   And did you go on to engage in efforts in Dayton to resolve the

 3     overall conflict in the former Yugoslavia?

 4        A.   I had been at Dayton at the very beginning and at the very end;

 5     but for most of the Dayton period, I was, in fact, working on doing

 6     shuttle diplomacy between Zagreb and Erdut, which is where the local

 7     Serbs met to try and resolve that problem.

 8             The Dayton talks began on the 1st of November, so this was

 9     something that occurred simultaneously with Dayton.

10        Q.   And did the Erdut Agreement signal the beginning of the end of

11     the conflict in Croatia between Croatian and the Krajina Serbs, or was

12     there continued fighting thereafter?

13        A.   No.  It very much was the beginning of the end, and I have to say

14     what it provided for was a two-year UN transitional administration which

15     Croatian authority was gradually introduced, and at the time end of that

16     two-year period, most of the Serb population remained.  Some part of the

17     Croat population which had been expelled in 1991 returned, but it was the

18     first time in that five-year period, four-year period that a territory

19     changed hands and the population that was not from the group that was

20     acquiring the territory actually remained.

21             I might also add that one of -- this was very much related to our

22     concerns about the fate of the other Serbs in Croatia, because in order

23     to get this peace agreement in Slavonia, we had to persuade the Eastern

24     Slavonian Serbs that they could live in Croatia and be full citizens of

25     the country.  That was very hard to do when there were laws that said if

Page 4969

 1     you didn't return in 30 days, you would lose your property.  And,

 2     furthermore, some part of the Serbs from the Krajina had gone to Eastern

 3     Slavonia.  So the question was how would you handle them.

 4             We needed to have a Croatia that followed international standards

 5     for human rights, which meant people who were citizens of that country

 6     had a right to the citizenship and had the right to the property.  That

 7     was essential, not just because it was right, not just because it an

 8     internationally recognised human rights, but because it was essential to

 9     the peace process in Easter Slavonia; and Eastern Slavonia was, in fact,

10     essential to getting to the Dayton Peace Agreement.

11             So there was a lot of stake on these issues.

12             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, if I could just have a moment.

13             Your Honour, that concludes my examination-in-chief, and I would

14     tender the map.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Tieger.

16             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, sorry, I will also indicate to my

17     learned friends that I will had some bar table submissions.  They needed

18     so time to completely review the documents, but I would like to get those

19     to the Court, just to be of assistance.  I was encouraged to do that as

20     soon as possible, so I'm trying to do that.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  We received copy of at least of the list.  Of

22     course, we have not seen anything.

23             When could I hear from the Defence whether there are any

24     objections against exhibits tendered from the bar table.

25             MR. KEHOE:  Your Honour, if we could have seven day period of

Page 4970

 1     tome just to look at them.  They're quite extensive.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger.

 3             MR. TIEGER:  They are extensive in that respect, and I don't have

 4     any theoretical problem with the time-period.  I just --

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  You didn't raise the documents with the witness; so,

 6     to that extent, it may be related in one way or the other.  Of course, if

 7     the Defence would like to use them in cross-examination, they're always

 8     free to do so.

 9             But the Prosecution is not insisting on a decision to be taken

10     earlier than the seven days requested by the Defence?

11             MR. TIEGER:  I certainly wouldn't insist on an immediate

12     decision; that would not be fair.  And, again, I'm just trying to balance

13     the Court's interest in having the documents available at the earlier

14     opportunity, against the Defence need to --

15             JUDGE ORIE:  [Overlapping speakers] ... no.  If there would be

16     any objections, I take it that the Chamber would need to have them

17     available anyhow, because we would then have to look at the documents in

18     order to decide on the objections.

19             So, therefore, the Chamber would like to receive whatever the

20     position of the Defence will be already to receive those, those

21     documents.

22             MR. TIEGER:  And I would only add, Your Honour, to the extent is

23     Defence is aware of any objections to those documents, that it might

24     implicate, if not the need, then the utility of raising them with this

25     witness, then we would certainly like to know as soon as possible.

Page 4971

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  I take it that is it understood, Mr. Kehoe?

 2             MR. KEHOE:  Well, Your Honour, the issue is that I received these

 3     documents on Friday, in transit; and they are quite extensive and it is

 4     going to present some difficulties.  If I had them sometime prior to

 5     that, you know, I it would have been a lot easier.  But there is a lot

 6     going on here.

 7             Mr. Misetic is bringing something to my attention.  Might I have

 8     a moment, Your Honour.

 9             MR. KUZMANOVIC:  Your Honour, while they're discussing, we got

10     the e-mail on the 20th and I got the two binders worth of documents

11     during the break, so it is going take a little bit of time.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  The invitation is that whenever something

13     comes into your mind, don't hesitate to already inform Mr. Tieger and the

14     Chamber about any objections.  Of course, therefore, don't wait until you

15     have reviewed everything, if you come across anything that with a cause

16     some problems.  I see Mr. Kuzmanovic nodding.

17             Mr. Kehoe.

18             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Your Honour.  Mr. Misetic highlights to me that

19     the one issue that comes up is the 8th -- August 3rd transcript [sic],

20     which involves the ambassador.  We don't have an objection to that.  We

21     will be putting the audio in during the course of the testimony, so I

22     don't believe that with the array that the Prosecution just put in that

23     that is the only one that --

24             JUDGE ORIE:  [Overlapping speakers] ... that is the 8th --

25             MR. KEHOE:  [Overlapping speakers] ... the 3rd, Your Honour.

Page 4972

 1     It's the 3rd of August.

 2             MR. KUZMANOVIC:  P448, Your Honour.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  P448.  Then, Mr, Kehoe, you will be the first one to

 4     cross-examination?

 5             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Your Honour.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Galbraith, you will be first cross-examination

 7     by Mr. Kehoe who is counsel for Mr. Gotovina.

 8             Please proceed, Mr. Kehoe.

 9                           Cross-examination by Mr. Kehoe:

10        Q.   Ambassador, good to see you again.

11        A.   Good to see you.

12        Q.   Ambassador, I would like to talk to you, if we could just go back

13     to your 92 ter statement.  I believe it is 444.  I would like to go back

14     to some of your discussions about the Krajina Serbs, and just predate

15     your discussions with Mr. Babic in Belgrade, and just go back a bit

16     further and ask you to elaborate on a few matters, if you could.

17             And I'd like to direct your attention, first, to paragraph 6 of

18     your 92 ter statement, and you note that Slobodan Milosevic called all

19     the shots with the Krajina Serbs:  "Among other things, including what I

20     saw of his control at negotiations, Milosevic was involved with the

21     payment of salaries of the ARSK and possibly police.  All the fuel came

22     from Serbia and was obvious that the Krajina Serbs were heavily dependant

23     on Serbia."

24             Just waiting for the translation to catch up.

25             Mr. Ambassador, tell us a little bit about the control that

Page 4973

 1     Slobodan Milosevic exercised over the Krajina Serbs, if you could?

 2        A.   It was very substantial.  He manipulated the elections in the

 3     Krajina in 1994 to defeat Babic and to bring Martic into power.  He paid

 4     the salaries, he supplied the fuel.  I believe or I'm sure that he was

 5     the one who obstructed the Z-4 plan, for reasons that had little to do

 6     with Krajina, but with his concerns about Kosovo and his hope to make

 7     some deal with Tudjman, who frankly was open to a deal, in which Serbia

 8     might acquire some Croatian territory.

 9             So, yeah, I think he very much called the shots in the Krajina.

10     I could go on at greater length, but that was my conclusion.

11        Q.   Let me -- just following up on your statement, did he control the

12     military as well?

13        A.   Oh, yes, he certainly did.  He changed the general after the --

14     after rockets were sent on to Zagreb, on May 2nd and 3rd of 1995, I think

15     in part because he didn't want to have another rocket attack on Zagreb.

16        Q.   And that would have been the replacement of General Celeketic by

17     of General Mrksic?

18        A.   That is correct.

19        Q.   When the Krajina Serbs were initially set up back in 1991, was he

20     receiving the report of Slobodan Milosevic as far as back as then?

21        A.   Yes, I believe -- that I believe is the case.  Obviously, I only

22     came on the scene full time in June of 1993.

23        Q.   And --

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe.

25             MR. KEHOE:  I'm sorry.

Page 4974

 1        Q.   Sorry, Mr. Ambassador.

 2             And you noted for us that you believe that he rigged the

 3     election, if you will, in 1994.  Can you tell us about that a little bit?

 4        A.   Yes.  Babic was, I think, the most popular person in the Krajina,

 5     and I think he was the one leader who had some, and I want to underscore

 6     the word "some," real concern for the population.  And, therefore, he had

 7     some degree of independence from Milosevic, and Milosevic didn't like

 8     that.

 9             So you had a vote, and, again, you have to go back and check the

10     records.  I'm doing this from memory, but it was quite extra ordinary.

11     In the first round, I think Martic got 24 per cent and Babic got 48 or 49

12     per cent, and somehow in the second round Martic actually won.  I think

13     you would have to -- this is almost unprecedented in the history of

14     run-offs, that you have that kind of switch from one round to the next,

15     where all the votes go to the candidate who finished second when he was

16     that far behind.

17             Again, you would have to check on the exact percentages.  I may

18     not have it right, but I think I have it right in the generality.

19        Q.   So your conclusion, at the time, was that he --

20             JUDGE ORIE:  No, Mr. Kehoe.

21             MR. KEHOE:  I'm sorry.

22        Q.   So your conclusion at the time that even through 1995, he was

23     directing matters in the Krajina?

24        A.   Yes, that was my conclusion.

25        Q.   Now, just backing up to 1991, and I'd like to ask you just a

Page 4975

 1     couple of questions about the Greater Serbia and Milosevic's involvement

 2     in some of that, and I just reference some of your prior testimony.  We

 3     are not going to go into it in great detail.

 4             But in this testimony that you gave in the Milosevic case at page

 5     23081 that you said, at line 21, that you believe that Slobodan Milosevic

 6     was the architect of a policy of creating a Greater Serbia and that

 7     little happened without his knowledge or involvement.

 8             Can you explain that for us a little bit?

 9        A.   Well, there are many aspects of this:  One is that the JNA, which

10     was the Yugoslav People's Army, was responsible to -- Milosevic was

11     effectively in charge of it; and, nominally, it was a different

12     structure.  And the JNA - and this was, of course, when the Krajina

13     rebellion began; this was part of Yugoslavia, at least legally - the JNA

14     did not behave as a neutral force, but it sided with the Krajina Serbs,

15     helping to cease this area from Croatia.

16             Then in Bosnia, in 1992, it was even more blatant.  Milosevic and

17     the JNA arranged for the Bosnian Serbs in the JNA to be in Bosnia; and

18     then at one point in time, something like May of 1992, the JNA withdrew

19     from -- from Bosnia.  I think, maybe, at that point, it was renamed the

20     Yugoslav People's Army.  What remained in Bosnia, which was JNA with all

21     the equipment, with all the logistics, became the Bosnian Serb army.

22             And I could also go on to add, as we did the peace negotiations

23     in Dayton, the man who we negotiated with was Milosevic, even though

24     these were peace negotiations about -- that theoretically was about the

25     sovereign state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and where the Bosnian Serb

Page 4976

 1     leaders were present.  Basically we didn't talk to them at all.  The -- e

 2     got the deal by talking to Milosevic.

 3        Q.   So he spoke for every -- for all the Serbs?

 4        A.   He did, yes.

 5        Q.   So was it clear to you, Mr. Ambassador, that when the Krajina

 6     Serbs had set up their rebel government, it was the idea of ultimately

 7     becoming part of this Greater Serbia?

 8        A.   Yes.  That is my belief, at the time that it was set up.

 9        Q.   Let me show you a map, if I may, and this is it 1D33-0001.

10             I'm sorry, can we make that 1D33-0002.

11             Let's take look at this initially, if we could just examine this

12     and if we could move to the next map, which is a little bit more

13     specific, 1D33-0002.

14             Mr. Ambassador, this is a map that was the borders of the Greater

15     Serbia, according to the memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences

16     and Arts.

17             Mr. Ambassador, was that your understanding of what the

18     aspirations of the Greater Serbia advocates, including Slobodan Milosevic

19     for their ultimate goal of achieving a Greater Serbia?

20        A.   I don't know if this particular map reflected those aspirations.

21             I testified that Tudjman was a very strategic thinker.  You may

22     not like his strategy but he was very strategic.  Milosevic, in my view,

23     was not strategic at all, he was very tactical, and he eventually

24     manoeuvred Serbia down to the size it is today.  So whether at some point

25     he had this in mind, or people around him, what -- his goals kept

Page 4977

 1     changing because, again, I don't think he really thought strategically,

 2     but he did want a Greater Serbia.

 3             Some of this territory, obviously Split would seem to me to have

 4     been a -- and perhaps some of the territory in Slovenia would have been

 5     going too far.  But he certainly wanted a Greater Serbia that included a

 6     fair amount of what is shown on this map.

 7        Q.   If we could continue on, and let's get down to the effect of the

 8     breakaway republic -- the so-called Republic of Serb Krajina.

 9             Did it in fact divide Croatia into several parts?  And, if so,

10     what did it do to the Republic of Croatia?

11        A.   Well, the first point is that it divided, if you will, mainland

12     Croatia from the coast.  When I -- when I took up my responsibilities as

13     ambassador, there was in fact no land link between Split, which was

14     Croatia's second city, and Zagreb, which was its largest city and

15     capital, and that is because the Serb territory came down to an inlet by

16     Maslenica, and there wasn't a bridge there.  Shortly after I arrived, a

17     bridge was built and the Serbs shelled it.

18             But in June of 1993, the country was divided.  The way people had

19     to travel was either by boat, which is what I did on my first trip to

20     Split, or you took a ferry over to the island of Pag and you bypassed

21     this area.

22        Q.   And this particular situation was going on from 1991 certainly

23     until the 1995 period of time, by and large, was it not?

24        A.   It got -- the answer, by and large, yes; but it did get better in

25     1993 with the opening of the Maslenica bridge, and it got better,

Page 4978

 1     significantly better, I think, in 1994 after the cease-fire, which was

 2     the first stage of the Z-4 process, the cease-fire of 29 March 1994.

 3        Q.   That's a practical matter -- I'm sorry, I got to take break.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, I'm looking at the clock.  It is a

 5     quarter to 2.00.  Perhaps we first ask the witness, Mr. Galbraith, I

 6     should like to instruct you that you should not speak with anyone about

 7     the testimony -- the testimony you have already given today or the

 8     testimony still to be given in the days to come.

 9             We will resume tomorrow morning at 9.00, and if I'm not mistaken,

10     in this same courtroom.

11             MR. KEHOE:  Your Honour, I think the calender had us tomorrow

12     afternoon, in Courtroom II, unfortunately.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Then I'm not wrong on one front but on both,

14     Mr. Kehoe, that must be some conciliation to you.

15             Mr. Galbraith, we would like to see you back tomorrow in the

16     afternoon at 2.00 and in Courtroom III, as you -- no, II, Courtroom II -

17     now I am really making all the mistakes I can make - which is a far

18     smaller courtroom.

19             Mr. Usher, could you please escort Mr. Galbraith out of the

20     courtroom.

21             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour.  I just wanted to call your attention

22     to a scheduling issue.  I don't know how long this is going to last, and

23     I am afraid I had assumed it was all morning sessions.  But I have to

24     back with my children who are in Norway on Thursday evening because my

25     wife is leaving the next morning and --

Page 4979

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Well, one of the things why I asked Mr. Usher

 2     to escort you out of the courtroom because that's what -- exactly what I

 3     wanted to raise with the parties.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Okay.  Thank you.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  You will be informed as soon as possible, although

 6     the unexpected now and then happens.

 7             THE WITNESS:  I understand that.  Just if there is afternoon

 8     sessions, it becomes harder, on Thursday.  That's all.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, I do understand.

10                           [The witness withdrew]

11                           [Trial Chamber confers]

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger, one short question to you.  The Chamber

13     wondered whether what we heard over the last 15 minutes, whether when

14     we're talking about Greater Serbia, when we are talking about a lot of

15     other things, whether that was contested by the Defence, the role of --

16     most part of the role of Milosevic.

17             MR. TIEGER:  Nothing that I heard, Your Honour.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  That's one.

19             Mr. Kehoe, you raised the issue of relevance, time-frame,

20     territorial scope several times.  Now we find ourselves in a situation

21     where you apparently have sought to elicit evidence from this witness

22     which is not contested in any way, certainly is mainly outside the scope,

23     the temporal scope of the indictment, and the geographical scope as well.

24             As I said before, background is background and should not become

25     foreground.  So I'm not saying that you could not touch upon these issues

Page 4980

 1     but, first of all, it would perhaps have been good to verify with

 2     Mr. Tieger to what extent there is any major difference of view on -- on

 3     the Greater Serbia idea, and it could of course mean that in the

 4     follow-up that we get to the real core.

 5             But when assessing how the time in cross-examination was used,

 6     either at the end of the day tomorrow, or the day after that, the Chamber

 7     certainly will take into consideration whether you started focussing on

 8     the most vital points or whether we spent lots of time on background

 9     rather on that what really is in the foreground of this case.

10             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Your Honour, and may I respond?

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, you may briefly respond.

12             MR. KEHOE:  Yes.  First, Your Honour, I was up for 15 minutes and

13     getting into this area, and this area was brought to the fore, which we

14     will develop, because it is quite clear that based on the testimony that

15     was elicited from this witness vis-a-vis Mr. Babic and those negotiations

16     in the first couple of day the of August of 1995, that the Prosecution is

17     trying to challenge the necessity for launching Operation Storm.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Is that true, Mr. Tieger?  One necessity -- I always

19     thought that, as such, the military operation as such whether there would

20     have been other ways out, that that is not the issue in this case,

21     whether it was justified or not justified to regain Croatian territory.

22             Mr. Tieger.

23             MR. TIEGER:  That position, Your Honour, as discussed earlier,

24     has not changed.  Nevertheless, it is relevant and --

25             JUDGE ORIE:  [Overlapping speakers] ...  so whether it was

Page 4981

 1     necessary or relevant, I mean, I do understand that that is not the

 2     issue, although the witness has spent a few words, a few lines on -- in

 3     his statement, to some extent a bit repetitiously, introduced again today

 4     that there might have been other options still available at the 2nd or

 5     3rd or 4th of August.

 6             That's --

 7             MR. KEHOE:  Your Honour, if it was not a subject of debate, why

 8     was it led in direct examination?  Your Honour has been on the parties

 9     about taking unnecessary issues that aren't on the table, and we spent 45

10     minutes talking about his negotiations with Babic and Tudjman.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  I don't know whether that's a fair reflection of

12     what happened.  The -- as I said before, background should be background.

13     It could well be, Mr. Kehoe, and therefore I'm expressing myself in a

14     cautious way, that where we have now the background that we get quickly

15     to the foreground.  Nevertheless I would say that you were rather far

16     away from the conflict.  At least Mr. Tieger stayed within the year

17     mainly.

18             MR. KEHOE:  Oh, two years, Judge, 199e and 1991.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  He could not change the date of appointment of

20     Mr. -- Ambassador Galbraith.

21             MR. KEHOE:  [Overlapping speakers] ...

22             JUDGE ORIE:  The only thing that I would like to convey to you is

23     that it's the shared view of this Chamber that there is at least a risk

24     that you run out of time where the background has been fully illuminated

25     and the foreground not yet, and it's just for you to be aware that this

Page 4982

 1     is the provisional impression of the Chamber.

 2             MR. KEHOE:  And, Your Honour, with all due respect, I have to

 3     take issue with that, given the fact that the Chamber didn't stop the

 4     Prosecution from going through an issue that they now say was not a

 5     subject of debate, and that my issue, and given the fact that he was

 6     going to go through that, was simply trying to answer that issue.  That's

 7     how I started with the ambassador.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger, I'm not seeking, as a matter of fact to

 9     have a full debate on this at this moment.

10             MR. TIEGER:  I just want to clarify, Your Honour.

11             My response was in connection with matters raised earlier; that

12     is, the legal justification for launching Operation Storm and whether

13     that is at issue in this case.  The intent behind is it another matter,

14     and to the extent that the information provided can be useful to the

15     Court in assessing the circumstances and to the extent that there was any

16     imminent prospect of peace and that was known to various people within

17     the region, I think the Court has already seen evidence from witnesses,

18     regular witnesses who were aware of that, it sheds light on all of that.

19     It is useful in -- in that way.

20             Now, this is a different story from whether or not the

21     Prosecution contests Slobodan Milosevic's role in the Krajina, and if --

22     to the extent that the Court inquired about the Prosecution's position in

23     connection with that, I think all parties are aware of that, in view of

24     the cases that have preceded this one.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Although I see quite some differences between

Page 4983

 1     starting with the Greater Serbia issue or whether we focus on what

 2     happened in the last days before Storm and the context in which, for

 3     example, the issue, which apparently is a contested issue, who invited or

 4     urged the Serb population to leave, or whether they were at all urged to

 5     leave, and, if so, by whom, that appears to be all within the last couple

 6     of day, weeks, months, perhaps.

 7             Mr. Kehoe, I do see that you do not agree with me.  The main

 8     issue I wanted to raise is that if we're running out of time, that the

 9     Chamber, on the basis of the observations, until now, sees that this is a

10     risk, and you have now convinced me there is only a small risk of not

11     having heard the foreground and have spent too much time on the

12     background.  We're not going to discuss this at this moment any further.

13             Mr. Tieger.

14             MR. TIEGER:  Sorry I didn't want to interrupt, I know we're

15     running out of time.  I wanted to raise this issue before we adjourned

16     and that is I see from the schedule that we are currently expected to

17     have an afternoon session on Thursday.  I wanted to bring that to the

18     attention of the Court.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, if it can -- if that can be changed.  If we

20     needed all the Thursday afternoon session.

21             Could I then inquire, and then I really stop, on how much time

22     the Defence teams would need?

23             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Your Honour, I'm going to play the audios of the

24     transcripts that you heard, and -- in part.  That will take some time to

25     go through this and the various nuances that have been laid out.  This is

Page 4984

 1     a very, very extensive --

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  If you start with the explanation --

 3             MR. KEHOE:  [Overlapping speakers] ... I want Your Honour to

 4     understand because I don't seem to be doing well the other way.  When I

 5     give you a time-frame without giving an idea of where I'm going, I don't

 6     seem to be very successful, so I would like to tell exactly where I'm

 7     going, and as I will tell you where I'm going on this Greater Serbia

 8     issue, but I would say with what I am doing here will take me about six

 9     hours.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Other Defence teams.

11             MR. KAY:  If I do ask any questions, it wouldn't be more than 20

12     minutes.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  And then for the Markac Defence.  Mr. Kuzmanovic.

14             MR. KUZMANOVIC:  Your Honour, obviously it depends on what

15     happens before me, but two hours at least.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Two hours at least.  We will consider it and have a

17     look at Thursday's session.

18             We stand adjourned until tomorrow afternoon, quarter past 2.00,

19     Courtroom II.

20                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.57 p.m.,

21                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 24th day of June,

22                           2008, at 2.15 p.m.