Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 7126

 1                           Thursday, 24 July 2008

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.21 p.m.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Good afternoon to everyone in and around this

 6     courtroom.

 7             Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  Good afternoon to

 9     everyone in the courtroom.  This is case number IT-06-90-T, the

10     Prosecutor versus Ante Gotovina et al.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

12             Mr. Russo, you're on your feet.  May I take it that you will call

13     the next witness?

14             MR. RUSSO:  That's correct, Mr. President.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And if the witness is still in the witness

16     room, then we could ask Madam Usher not to rush too much so that I can

17     read meanwhile a decision by the Chamber, at least the reasons for a

18     decision.

19             I would like to deliver the reasons, the Chamber's reasons for

20     granting trial-related protective measures for Witness 86.  On the 24th

21     of June, 2008, the Prosecution filed a motion requesting that the Chamber

22     order the trial-related protective measures of pseudonym and face and

23     voice distortion for Witness 86.

24             On the 25th of June, the Cermak Defence filed a response in which

25     it did not oppose the request for protective measures.  The Cermak

Page 7127

 1     Defence observed, however, that in order to prevent the identity of the

 2     witness becoming known, it is most likely that the testimony of the

 3     witness would be heard entirely in closed session.  The following day,

 4     the Markac Defence filed its response not opposing the request for

 5     protective measures, though disagreeing with the Prosecution's arguments

 6     in support of the motion.

 7             Also on the 26th of June, 2008, the Gotovina Defence stated in

 8     court that it did not oppose the motion but similarly disagreed with the

 9     Prosecution arguments in support of the motion.  The Gotovina Defence

10     joined the observation of the Cermak Defence on the need to hear the

11     testimony of the witness in closed session.  These submissions of the

12     Gotovina Defence can be found at transcript pages 5225 and 5226.

13             At transcript page 5226, the Prosecution agreed with the Defence

14     on the need to hear the testimony of Witness 86 in closed session.

15             On the same day, the Chamber granted the motion and decided that

16     in order to protect the identity of the witness it would hear the

17     testimony of the witness in private session unless a party applied for a

18     portion to be heard in public session.  This decision can be found at

19     transcript pages 5227 and 5228.  The public was informed of this decision

20     at transcript pages 5230 and 5231.

21             The Chamber held in its reasons for its first protective measures

22     decision in this case, which can be found on the pages 2610 and 2611,

23     that the party seeking protective measures for a witness must demonstrate

24     an objectively grounded risk to the security or welfare of the witness or

25     the witness's family should it become known that the witness has given

Page 7128

 1     evidence before the Tribunal.  This standard can be satisfied by showing,

 2     for example, that a threat was made against the witness or the witness's

 3     family.  The mere expression of fears by a person is insufficient to

 4     justify protective measures.

 5             Witness 86 is a Serb who lives in Croatia.  Following Operation

 6     Storm he continued his professional activities in Croatia.  The Chamber

 7     found that the expected testimony of Witness 86 could antagonise certain

 8     persons in the place where he lives and works.  The witness had already

 9     experienced, apparently as a result of media attention, that unidentified

10     individuals attempted to contact him.  In the absence of any objections

11     raised by the Defence, the Chamber found, for the aforementioned reasons,

12     that the Prosecution has demonstrated an objectively grounded risk to the

13     security of Witness 86 should it become known that he has given evidence

14     before the Tribunal.

15             The Chamber furthermore considered that in light of the nature of

16     the anticipated evidence of the witness, the only effective way to

17     protect his identity was to hear his testimony in private session.

18             And this concludes the Chamber's reasons for its decision to

19     grant protective measures for Witness 86.

20                           [The witness entered court]

21                           WITNESS:  ROLAND DANGERFIELD

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Good afternoon.  Mr. Dangerfield, at least I assume

23     that you're Mr. Dangerfield.  Before you give evidence in this court, the

24     Rules of Procedure and Evidence require you to make a solemn declaration

25     that you will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

Page 7129

 1     truth.  The text is now handed out to you by Madam Usher, and I would

 2     like to invite you to make that solemn declaration.

 3             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

 4     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Dangerfield.  Please be seated.

 6             You will first be examined by Mr. Russo, who is counsel for the

 7     Prosecution.

 8             Mr. Russo, please proceed.

 9             MR. RUSSO:  Thank you, Mr. President, and good afternoon Your

10     Honours.

11                           Examination by Mr. Russo:

12        Q.   Good afternoon, Mr. Dangerfield.  If you could please state your

13     full name for the record.

14        A.   My full name is Mr. Roland Charles David Dangerfield.

15        Q.   Mr. Dangerfield, do you recall giving two statements to the ICTY,

16     one dated the 21st of December, 1995, and the other dated 8 to 9 January

17     2008?

18        A.   I do.

19             MR. RUSSO:  Mr. Registrar, if we could please have 65 ter 5263.

20        Q.   And Mr. Dangerfield, if I could direct you to the screen in front

21     you.  On the right-hand side, and I would ask Mr. Registrar to scroll,

22     please, to the final page of that exhibit.

23             Mr. Dangerfield, do you recognise this as the statement you gave

24     the ICTY on 21 December 1995?

25        A.   I do.

Page 7130

 1             MR. RUSSO:  And, Mr. Registrar, if we could please have 65 ter

 2     5264.  And again if we could scroll -- actually, I believe it will be to

 3     the third page of this particular exhibit.

 4        Q.   Mr. Dangerfield, do you recognise this as the statement that you

 5     gave the ICTY on 8 to 9 January 2008?

 6        A.   I do.

 7        Q.   Now, did you have a chance to review both of those statements

 8     prior to coming to court today?

 9        A.   Yes, I did.

10        Q.   And are both of those statements true and accurate to the best of

11     your knowledge?

12        A.   Yes, they are.

13        Q.   And do both of those statements accurately reflect what you told

14     ICTY investigators?

15        A.   Yes, they do.

16        Q.   And if you were asked the same questions in court here today,

17     would your answers be the same as in those two statements?

18        A.   Yes, they would be.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             MR. RUSSO:  Your Honour, at this time I move for the admission of

21     65 ters 5263 and 5264.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  No objections.  Mr. Registrar.

23             MR. RUSSO:  Your Honour, 65 ter 5263 becomes Exhibit number P695,

24     and 65 ter 5264 becomes Exhibit number P696.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  P695 and P696 are admitted into evidence.

Page 7131

 1             MR. RUSSO:  Thank you, Mr. President, and if I could have the

 2     assistance of Madam Usher, would like to hand hard copies of the

 3     statements to the witness.

 4             And with the Court's permission, Your Honour, I'd like to read a

 5     brief summary of the 92 ter statements.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Please do so.

 7             MR. RUSSO:  Thank you.  Roland Dangerfield was a sector liaison

 8     officer for the British contingent of the UNPROFOR mission and was based

 9     in Knin.  Prior to Operation Storm, he travelled throughout Sector South

10     to gather intelligence on HV and ARSK operations for Sector South

11     commander General Forand.  He observed that after an ARSK mobilisation on

12     27 July 1995, the town of Knin was virtually empty of any men of combat

13     age and that there were no defensive positions or heavy weapons in the

14     town.  He was present in Knin during the artillery attacks on 4 and 5

15     August 1995, and observed the shelling the town approximately once an

16     hour from the balcony of the UN HQ building.

17             He heard rockets and heavy artillery fired into the town to begin

18     attack on the morning of both days, which he described as intense and

19     lasting for approximately an hour and a half on 4 August and half an hour

20     on 5 August.  He observed that after the initial salvo on each morning

21     the shelling became sporadic and consisted only of heavy artillery.  He

22     also observed that no one area or military target ever appeared to be

23     targeted by more than three or four rounds, and he described the

24     artillery attack in general as a blanket shelling of Knin.  He neither

25     heard nor saw any outgoing fire from the town of Knin on the 4th or 5th

Page 7132

 1     of August, 1995.

 2             After Operation Storm, he witnessed HV soldiers looting houses in

 3     Knin while the police did nothing to stop it, but that houses marked with

 4     the phrase "Croatian house," in B/C/S were left alone.

 5             He travelled to Kistanje on 9 August 1995 where he found the town

 6     empty of civilians but houses burning and HV soldiers looting.  He also

 7     travelled extensively throughout Sector South during August and September

 8     1995 and recalled seeing Croatian special police preventing access to

 9     areas that were burning, and he estimated that approximately 80 to 90 per

10     cent of the villages he saw suffered burning within the first few weeks

11     after Operation Storm.

12             Mr. President, Your Honours, that concludes my summary.

13        Q.   Mr. Dangerfield, can you please tell the Court what your position

14     and function was in Sector South in and around August of 1995.

15        A.   Yes.  In August 1995, I had been tasked by the British

16     headquarters in Gornji Vakuf in Sector South-west to move to Knin, the

17     headquarters of Sector South, to act as a liaison officer, and this was

18     largely because there was a lack of information between the two sectors

19     and it's customary on operations for sides to exchange liaison officers

20     to establish what is going along -- on along the boundary between the two

21     sectors.

22        Q.   And can you tell the Court how far in advance of Operation Storm

23     you began doing this?

24        A.   I was there approximately six weeks to two months before

25     Operation Storm began.

Page 7133

 1        Q.   And can you give the court some idea of how much ground you

 2     covered in Sector South during that time?

 3        A.   Within Sector South I knew all the major routes.  I travelled

 4     extensively with my driver off the main routes where there were

 5     barricades restricting my freedom of movement.  I made sure it's my job

 6     to get round them and establish what was going on.  And in short, I knew

 7     Sector South extremely well.

 8        Q.   And did that include both the ARSK and the HV side of Sector

 9     South?

10        A.   I made in my job to be on both sides of the border, because that

11     was my job to establish what was going on on both the HV and the ARSK

12     sides.

13        Q.   And you've mentioned roadblocks or restrictions on your movement.

14     Can you give the court some idea of who restricted your movement and how?

15             THE INTERPRETER:  Can the speakers please pause between question

16     and answer.  Thank you.

17             THE WITNESS:  Could you just repeat the question, please.

18             MR. RUSSO:

19        Q.   Sure.  You indicated in your previous answer that if there were

20     roadblocks in your way you would try your best to get around them.  I

21     would like you to give the Court an idea for what kind of restrictions on

22     your movement you faced.

23        A.   Both sides, the HV and ARSK, typically put roadblocks up.  This

24     was barriers, rubble, sand, anything to restrict the movement across the

25     roads.  These were normally manned, and I was physically stopped from

Page 7134

 1     going through various areas, and that was by both sides.

 2        Q.   And concentrating now just on the ARSK side of Sector South, can

 3     you give the Court any idea of where in general your movement was

 4     restricted?

 5        A.   My movement was restricted particularly along the sensitive

 6     border areas.  Within the actual centre of the sector it was not too bad.

 7     On occasion it was difficult, and on one occasion I was detained for two

 8     hours along with my driver, but I was released without any further

 9     action.  So it was really restricted just along the sensitive border

10     areas between the two warring factions.

11        Q.   And did the ARSK also restrict your movement to inspect or

12     observe ammunition or weapon sites?

13        A.   The military and weapon sites were particularly sensitive, and

14     therefore invariably I was not allowed to enter, and if at all possible,

15     I was restricted from getting close to these sites.

16        Q.   Thank you.  And in spite of these restrictions, were you

17     nevertheless able to get an impression for the relative capabilities of

18     both the HV and the ARSK?

19        A.   Yes, I was.

20        Q.   If you can, please, can you tell the Court what your impression

21     was of the capability of the ARSK to withstand an operation such as

22     Operation Storm?

23        A.   When I travelled around Sector South, I was always surprised, I

24     think it fair to say, how little heavy weaponry the ARSK had.  Yes, they

25     had tanks.  Yes, they had artillery pieces.  But I commanded a squadron

Page 7135

 1     of 12 Challenger tanks and I never in my whole travels around Sector

 2     South saw a collection of that many tanks in anyplace.  So my assessment

 3     of the ARSK was they were woefully equipped to deal with any assault on

 4     them.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Now, I'd like to move to a discussion of the

 6     situation in Knin in particular prior to Operation Storm, and if I could

 7     refer you to your first statement, that's the first tab you have there,

 8     your first statement at paragraph 23.  And this is -- appears in e-court

 9     on the English on page 6, the B/C/S on page 4.

10             Again at paragraph 23, you indicate that after the ARSK

11     mobilisation on 27 July 1995, the town of Knin was virtually empty of any

12     men of combat age.

13             Can you please explain to the Court how it is you knew that?

14        A.   Yes.  In the six weeks to two months that I had been in Sector

15     South and particularly in the Knin area, Knin was a busy town of its

16     size, a lot of civilians, and indeed a largely -- no, that would be

17     incorrect.  A large amount of soldiers of combat age.  And this was

18     particularly on the day of rotation.  Now, I can't specifically remember

19     which day the rotation took place, but there was always a large number of

20     soldiers in and around the bars and cafes of Knin.  And this was

21     apparent, because there seemed to be -- seemed to me to be far more

22     military people than civilians within the town.

23        Q.   And after the mobilisation on the 27th of July?

24        A.   After the mobilisation on the 27th of July there were very few

25     soldiers.  In fact, I would take it down to a handful.  And when I drove

Page 7136

 1     around Knin extensively to see what was left after the mobilisation,

 2     particularly around the military sites, I could put it down to possibly

 3     less than a hundred soldiers.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  And moving to paragraph 15 of that same statement and

 5     in e-court the English this appears from pages 4 to 5, and in B/C/S it's

 6     on page 4.

 7             Now, Mr. Dangerfield, at paragraph 15 you indicate that on 29

 8     July, civilians in Knin were packing up and leaving on buses along a

 9     route into Bosnia.  And I would like you, please, to explain to the Court

10     first again how you knew that and what exactly the information was you

11     collected.

12        A.   Yes.  Within Knin town itself there appeared to be a large amount

13     of the civilian population packing up, and they were leaving their houses

14     carrying suitcases, plastic bags, and in fact I would describe it as

15     their worldly possessions, and it was clear that they were leaving the

16     area.

17        Q.   And in that paragraph you reference a very specific route by

18     which they left on buses.  Can you tell the Court how you know that they

19     took that route?

20        A.   I was fascinated that so many people were leaving the area, and I

21     made it my business to follow them and establish exactly what it was that

22     they were doing, and so those buses I followed on the route that I

23     described in my statement, and that is accompanied by specific grid

24     references detailing that route.

25        Q.   And can you give the Court any idea of whether this appeared to

Page 7137

 1     be officially organised or conducted according to some plan?

 2             MR. KEHOE:  Excuse me, Your Honour.  With all due respect, that's

 3     if he knows and no speculation, please.  If he doesn't know, he doesn't

 4     know.  If he has information -- concrete information and not speculation,

 5     that's a different matter.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Russo asked whether on its appearance the

 7     witness gained the impression that this was officially organised or --

 8     organised or conducted according to a plan.

 9             And, Mr. Dangerfield, therefore you're invited to first describe

10     your observations, and if that on the basis of that information you

11     formed any opinion about it at the time - I'm not inviting you at this

12     moment to develop further opinions on it - you may tell us, but please

13     first describe what you observed.

14             THE WITNESS:  My observations were that the transport that the

15     civilian population was getting into ranged from at one end the buses and

16     trucks.  In the middle of that ranged cars and any other such vehicles,

17     and at the bottom end it would have been trailers towed by horses,

18     donkeys, mules.  And those were my specific observations.  There was no

19     marshalling areas for an exodus of the population.

20             MR. RUSSO:

21        Q.   Thank you.  And, Mr. Dangerfield, did you see any ARSK military

22     or police officials involved in this movement of people?

23             MR. KEHOE:  I assume, by just time-frame, I assume we're talking

24     about the 27th of July.

25             MR. RUSSO:  Actually, we're talking about the 29th of July.

Page 7138

 1             MR. KEHOE:  29th of July.  So be it.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  I think that was clear from the previous questions

 3     and, Mr. Kehoe, therefore, I think there was no need at this moment to

 4     intervene.  Please proceed.

 5             MR. KEHOE:  With all due respect, Judge, with a record that will

 6     be reviewed down the line, I just wanted to get a specificity on the

 7     date.  I apologise for any inconvenience and I just wanted verify that.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  It's for the second time, now, that you now

 9     intervene between question and answer and that's, of course, what is

10     certainly allowed to do if there is any need to do that but otherwise it

11     might interrupt the flow of evidence.

12             Please proceed.

13             MR. RUSSO:  Thank you, Mr. President.

14        Q.   Mr. Dangerfield, I'd like to move now to the events of 4 August

15     1995, and if you could please describe for the court what you personally

16     saw and heard of the artillery attack on that day.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Russo, are you interested in receiving an answer

18     on the question you put to the witness before Mr. Kehoe intervened?

19             MR. RUSSO:  I apologise, Your Honour, yes.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Well, you don't have to apologise.  You are

21     putting the question.  I take it that you are interested, as is the

22     Chamber, to hear the answer.

23             Perhaps you now repeat the question.

24             MR. RUSSO:  Certainly, Your Honour.

25        Q.   Mr. Dangerfield, again confining yourself to what you personally

Page 7139

 1     observed and within the time-frame of 29 July 1995, can you please tell

 2     the Court whether you saw any RSK military or police officers involved in

 3     the movement of people out of Knin.

 4        A.   I saw no official police or ARSK soldiers involved in that

 5     movement.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  So now we'll move to the 4th of August, and again

 7     I'll ask you to please describe for the Court what you saw and heard of

 8     the shelling on that day.

 9        A.   It was just before 5.00 in the morning, and I was up and about in

10     the headquarters of Sector South.  I was getting ready for the day's

11     work, and shortly before 5.00 there was an incredible noise over and

12     around the top of the UN headquarters.  It was a massive noise.  It

13     sounded like a giant sheet of paper being ripped.  There was a whoosh, a

14     whoosh, whoosh, whoosh, and this initially I did not know what it was.

15     However, it became very apparent quickly that we or the surrounding area

16     was receiving a lost incoming rocket fire, and this was then accompanied

17     by artillery fire, and the difference between the two is that the

18     artillery shells have a whistling sound as they come in.

19             At that stage, as you would understand, I was in an unprotected

20     building.  I decided that I'd had enough and along with my driver we

21     grabbed all of our equipment and ran for the bunker.

22             Now, the bunker is a bunker.  It is not a soundproof building.

23     And that fire of rockets and artillery continued approximately for the

24     next 90 minutes continuously.

25        Q.   And can you describe for the Court what you witnessed when you

Page 7140

 1     emerged from this bunker and approximately at what time you actually came

 2     out of the bunker?

 3        A.   From my recollection it was approximately 6.30 a.m. or just

 4     after.  We came out of the bunker.  There was still artillery screaming

 5     in but obviously not of the same intensity that it had been for the

 6     previous 90 minutes.  It was the early morning, and Knin was covered in a

 7     blanket of dust and smoke.

 8        Q.   And if I can -- well --

 9             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

10             MR. RUSSO:

11        Q.   First let me ask you, after you emerged from the bunker did you

12     at any time observe the town of Knin and where shells were falling?

13        A.   Initially, it was very difficult to see where the shells were

14     falling because of this blanket of smoke, and the UN headquarters, when

15     you stand on the balcony there, was roughly at the same level as the

16     smoke.  So you could tell that it was the top.  But the climatic factors

17     prevailed.  It was the summer, and as the temperature rose, so the ground

18     heated up and the smoke -- the smoke dissipated, the dust settled, and

19     from I, would put it, the middle of the morning you could start to see

20     shells landing.  You could continually hear them screaming into the town,

21     and so you had -- or certainly I had a better idea of where they were

22     landing.

23        Q.   Thank you.  And let me refer you now to paragraph 30 of your

24     first statement, and in e-court in the English that is page 7 to 8, and

25     in B/C/S pages 5 to 6.

Page 7141

 1             Mr.  Dangerfield, in paragraph 30 you indicate some areas where

 2     you saw shells landing on that day, and I'll ask you if you recall

 3     marking these areas on an aerial photograph of Knin.

 4        A.   Yes, I do.

 5             MR. RUSSO:  And, Mr. Registrar, if we could please have 65 ter

 6     5355.

 7        Q.   And if I may, I will simply walk you through some of these making

 8     reference to paragraph 30.

 9             In that paragraph you indicate that you saw shells landing in

10     residential areas north of the Pol station, and I'll ask you if those

11     areas are the two which you had marked as A on this picture.

12        A.   That is correct.

13        Q.   Thank you.  You also mention you saw shells landing in the

14     vicinity of the railway station, and I will ask you if that corresponds

15     to the circle marked as B.

16        A.   That is correct.

17        Q.   Again you indicate shells fell near an ammo bunker 200 metres

18     west of the UNHQ compound, and I'll ask you if that is the circle marked

19     as C.

20        A.   That is correct.

21        Q.   Again the parliament building, and I will ask you if that is the

22     area marked as D.

23        A.   Yes, it is.

24        Q.   The area you indicate where shells fell around the base of the

25     Knin castle, is that the area which you have marked as E?

Page 7142

 1        A.   Yes, it is.

 2        Q.   And the helipad or football pitch, is that the area marked as F?

 3        A.   Yes, it is.

 4        Q.   And finally the Pol station, is that the area marked as G?

 5        A.   Yes, it is.

 6        Q.   And to be clear, Mr. Dangerfield, are all of these areas where

 7     you personally observed shells landing?

 8        A.   Yes, they are.

 9             MR. RUSSO:  Your Honour, at this time I would move for admission

10     of 65 ter 5355.

11             MR. KEHOE:  Well, I object, Judge.  This -- apparently, there was

12     a map that was submitted that is attached for the 21 December 1995 that I

13     note here is referred to in paragraph 35, and then I note that this map

14     is one of -- that was done here in 2008 to 22nd of July, 2008.  I am

15     frankly more interested in the one that was done 13 years ago.  That's

16     set forth in paragraph 35 as opposed to one that was done this week.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, what was done when we do not know.  We see

18     that a date appears for the name of the witness, and the date is located

19     this year.

20             Mr. Russo, could you either, without giving evidence yourself,

21     inform the Chamber, or could you clarify the issue together with the

22     witness?

23             MR. RUSSO:  Certainly, Mr. President.

24        Q.   Mr. Dangerfield, could you please tell the Court when it was that

25     you marked this particular photograph?

Page 7143

 1        A.   I marked this particular photograph on the date that I had

 2     signed.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             MR. RUSSO:  Mr. President, I can tell you we did receive a

 5     question from the Defence regarding the map which was originally attached

 6     to the statement.  We indicated to the Defence that that map could not be

 7     found despite our efforts to locate it, which was in part the reason why

 8     I asked Mr. Dangerfield to again indicate these areas on the aerial

 9     photograph of Knin, and on that basis I would again move its admission.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  At least it is clear now that where the statement is

11     from quite many years ago that the map was produced this same week.

12             Any objections, Mr. --

13             MR. KEHOE:  Your Honours, not to admissibility but just to

14     weight.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, this becomes Exhibit number P697.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  P697 is admitted into evidence.  You may proceed,

18     Mr. Russo.

19             MR. RUSSO:  Thank you, Your Honour.

20        Q.   Mr. Dangerfield, if I could refer you to paragraph 26 of your

21     first statement, and the e-court in English, this is at pages 6 to 7 and

22     the B/C/S page 5.  And if we could keep this image, please, up here on

23     the screen.

24             Mr. Dangerfield, I'm going to ask you a few questions about the

25     military targets which you identify in paragraph 26, many of which are

Page 7144

 1     located next to or near the areas where you indicate you saw shells

 2     landing, and specifically looking at the two areas which you have marked

 3     as A on Exhibit P697, we can see that those two areas are on opposite

 4     sides of the Knin general supply which you have identified in paragraph

 5     26 as a military target.  One of the areas is directly north of the Pol

 6     station, as you also identify in paragraph 26, and the other is directly

 7     south of the main Knin army barracks, which you likewise identify as a

 8     military target in paragraph 26.

 9             I'd like you, if you can, to tell the Court based on what you

10     observed whether the shells you saw landing in those two areas marked as

11     A appear to have been fired at one of the military targets near them.

12        A.   Within those areas initially there were a few rounds, but as the

13     day went on, it became apparent to me that there were far too many shells

14     landing in those areas to be dependent on ballistic variations in the

15     rounds and indeed any associated climatic conditions that could cause

16     them to fall there.  So it was my assessment that there were indeed too

17     many shells falling into those areas.

18        Q.   Thank you.  And likewise for the area marked as B, it is clearly

19     adjacent to the railway station in which you also identify as a military

20     target.  Does the same situation apply to the area marked as B?

21        A.   Yes, it does.

22        Q.   And again the area that you mark here as E, around the base of

23     the Knin castle, that is bordered again by things you identify as

24     military targets.  Does the same situation apply to the area marked as E?

25        A.   I would give the same answer.

Page 7145

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Now, if we could move to paragraph 32 of your

 2     statement, and the e-court in English is at page 8, in B/C/S it's page 6.

 3     In paragraph 32, Mr. Dangerfield, you indicate that refugees and troops

 4     began withdrawing through Knin at approximately 1700 hours and that the

 5     shelling at that stage was at a minimum.  I would like you please to give

 6     the Court some idea of what this minimum was in terms of intensity or

 7     otherwise.

 8        A.   There had been the initial bombardment for the first 90 minutes

 9     of the day from 5.00.  As I indicated earlier on, that intensity

10     lessened, and it was sporadic artillery fire throughout the rest of the

11     day.  So when I say a minimum, it was that continued intensity.  I would

12     suggest, in my opinion, that a minimum is enough to be noticeable.

13        Q.   Thank you.  And did it appear to you that the troops and military

14     vehicles which you indicate were part of this movement, did it appear to

15     you as though they were guarding the retreat of the civilians who were

16     also retreating?

17        A.   The column of military vehicles and personnel and civilian

18     personnel were leaving.  There was no indication of any fighting

19     withdrawal.  There was no tank barrels pointing in the direction of the

20     suspected HV threat, and that was of the minimal number of tanks that

21     there were.  So no -- there was no fighting withdrawal, and to me it was

22     a rapid exodus and almost each for themselves.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Russo, could I seek clarification of one of the

24     previous answers.

25             You said that you would suggest that in your opinion a minimum is

Page 7146

 1     enough to be noticeable.  Now, that, of course, requires an understanding

 2     of what you consider noticeable.  If you say one shell an hour can be

 3     noticed and in that sense would be noticeable, then even one shell in 24

 4     hours would be noticeable.  So to be quite honest, I am a bit lost with

 5     your answer.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Two to three rounds per minute, sir.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  Please proceed, Mr. Russo.

 8             MR. RUSSO:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 9        Q.   If we could move briefly to your second statement.  I believe

10     that is P696.  At paragraph 5 and e-court in English this appears at page

11     2, and likewise in the B/C/S.

12             Mr. Dangerfield, in paragraph 5 there you indicate that at 1900

13     hours, the intensity of the shelling, it decreased significantly, but

14     that there was a heavy volley of shells lasting approximately 15 minutes

15     landing in the town on the night of 4 August.  Are you able to tell the

16     Court when, if at all, the shelling actually stopped on that night?

17        A.   The shelling did not stop that night.

18        Q.   Can you tell the Court what time you went to bed or what time you

19     stopped observing this shelling?

20        A.   It was later on in the evening, sometime between the hours of

21     10.00 and 12.00 at night, and it was at that stage that I was going to go

22     to bed.  In fact, I was considering not going to the bunker at all.  I

23     considered the sporadic shelling that was continuing not to be a threat

24     to the UN headquarters.  But at approximately sometime between those two

25     hours that intensity kicked up again, definitely with artillery shells

Page 7147

 1     and a few rockets, and it was at that stage that myself and my driver

 2     headed for the bunker.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Now, on the 4th of August, Mr. Dangerfield, were you

 4     sending reports on what was happening in Knin to the British G2 cell?

 5        A.   I could not for the first hour and a half because I was in the

 6     bunker, but once we came out at approximately 6.30 in the morning we were

 7     able to gather what reports there were from the various national

 8     battalions within the sector, and equipped with my satellite telephone I

 9     was able to file reports through to the British headquarters in Gornji

10     Vakuf.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             MR. RUSSO:  Mr. Registrar, if we could please have 65 ter 446.

13        Q.   Mr. Dangerfield, do you recognise this document as one of the

14     reports you prepared on 4 August?

15        A.   Yes, I do.

16        Q.   And I believe you've already touched on it a bit, but can you

17     just give the Court an idea of where the information for this report

18     comes from?

19        A.   This is the overview document, and therefore it is a summary

20     constructed by me from the various reports that we received from the

21     national battalions within the area known as Sector South.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Russo, on your exhibit list, under 446 we find

23     different ERN numbers than the ones we find on this document.  I'm not

24     trying to make matters even more complex, because the numbers indicated

25     there are following the numbers.  If we look at the statements,

Page 7148

 1     apparently they have been either attached or having been very close to

 2     that, and now we have different numbers.  I don't know whether there's --

 3     is there any explanation for or is it just to be ignored?  If so, you

 4     would be invited next time to give the ERN numbers you're using in court

 5     on your exhibits list.

 6             MR. RUSSO:  Yes, Your Honour.  I'll certainly take your guidance

 7     on that.  I can tell the Court that this particular document arrived in

 8     our office through several means.  One, as you can tell, from General

 9     Andrew Leslie, which is why the AL5 appears at the top.  It was attached

10     to one of his statements.  It also came to our office separately on its

11     own and once again it was attached to the supplemental witness statement

12     of Mr. Dangerfield, and each time it came in it received a different

13     electronic reference number.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now, I just hope that we have the right ERN

15     numbers in the e-court version so that we're using the same here in court

16     as -- because I do not know whether you uploaded the others ones or --

17     apparently, you uploaded this one but perhaps the others ones as well.

18             MR. RUSSO:  Yes, Your Honour.  This one was the first -- uploaded

19     the first we received that's why it made it on to the 65 ter list first,

20     and I thought it would be, perhaps, duplicative to re-upload it as part

21     of the supplemental statement.  So simply I kept this one where it was

22     and removed it from the supplemental statement when that was uploaded

23     into e-court.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Then, of course, it remains a puzzle how the other

25     number came to appear on your 65 ter list but let's forget about it.

Page 7149

 1     Please proceed.

 2             MR. RUSSO:  Is there any objection to the admission of the

 3     document?

 4             MR. KEHOE:  No objection, Your Honour.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, this becomes exhibit number P698.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  P698 is admitted into evidence.

 8             MR. RUSSO:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 9        Q.   Mr. Dangerfield, moving now to the 5th of August, I would ask you

10     again to very briefly explain for the Court your observations of the

11     artillery attack on that day.

12        A.   The artillery attack on the 5th of August started just again

13     before 5.00 in the morning, and the initial intensity was of a similar

14     level to that on the 4th of August.  And that continued for approximately

15     30 minutes.

16        Q.   And where were you during this initial half an hour?

17        A.   I -- I was again in the bunker.

18        Q.   And can you tell the Court what you did after you came out of the

19     bunker?

20        A.   It was a similar process to the previous day.  I made it my

21     business to find out what was going on again throughout the area known as

22     Sector South to establish exactly what the HV movement was and indeed any

23     ARSK movement.  And I filed my report through to the British headquarters

24     as I had done on the previous day.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Referring back to paragraph 30 of your first

Page 7150

 1     statement, you indicate, I'll quote:  "On both the morning of 04 and 05

 2     August, there was so much artillery fire it could not possibly have been

 3     directed because there was so many shells and rockets landing in such a

 4     short time."

 5             If you're able I'd like you to explain to the Court exactly why

 6     you believe that the number of shells landing in a given area would have

 7     an impact on the ability to direct fire?

 8        A.   As I explained there was a blanket of dust and smoke across Knin

 9     in those early hours, and that blanket was sufficient that even from our

10     close vantage point you could not see exactly where those rounds were

11     landing.

12             Now, in order to adjust the fire and give it accuracy, you must

13     see where it is landing, make your adjustments, and continue.  And

14     therefore, the weight and intensity of that fire almost prohibited these

15     actions.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Moving now to paragraph 33 of that statement, and

17     this appears in e-court at page 9 in the English and page 6 in the B/C/S.

18     You indicate, and I'll quote again:  "From 10.45 hours you could hear the

19     odd tank round and many small arms rounds being fired.  There was no

20     artillery, and I could neither hear or see any resistance."

21             Can you please clarify for the Court whether this tank and

22     small-arms fire that you heard was coming from inside Knin?

23        A.   The small-arms fire and tank fire was not coming from inside

24     Knin.  Indeed, throughout the entire time I was there I never saw or

25     heard any fire going out from Knin.

Page 7151

 1        Q.   Can you then tell the Court where the tank and small-arms fire

 2     was coming from at that time on the 5th of August?

 3        A.   From our position in the UN headquarters, judging by the sound, I

 4     would say it appeared to come from the area -- the settlement known as

 5     Drnis.

 6        Q.   And is that to the south of Knin?

 7        A.   From recollection it's the south-west.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  And the sounds of tank and small-arms fire, did it

 9     sound to you like the sounds of combat?

10        A.   It did not sound like combat.  Indeed there seemed to be no

11     retaliation.

12        Q.   And later in that same paragraph you indicate that the

13     7 Puma Brigade was the first to enter Knin with their tanks and APCs

14     arriving in a convoy, not moving tactically, which led you to believe

15     that they did not expect any resistance, and I'd like you please to

16     explain to the Court why tanks arriving in a convoy would indicate to you

17     that no resistance was expected?

18        A.   From my experience of tanks, tanks moving along a road move

19     tactically.  It is not a safe area to be going along.  They move along

20     leapfrogging each other along the critical points of a road thus clearing

21     the way ahead for troops following.

22             These vehicles moved in a column, people on top of the tanks, in

23     the vehicles, all together in one long column, cheering, and it was

24     perfectly clear they were expecting no ARSK soldier or attack from within

25     Knin.

Page 7152

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Moving to the following paragraph.  You indicate:

 2     "There seemed to be little control once the HV entered Knin.  Troops

 3     systematically looted house.  Small-arms fire and mysterious detonations

 4     were heard for at least a week afterwards."

 5             Can you tell the Court whether you personally observed these

 6     things happening?

 7        A.   Yes.  Obviously I had very little view on that initial day

 8     because I was confined to the UN barracks, but on the 7th of August, but

 9     more particularly the 9th of August, I was able to get out in my Land

10     Rover with my driver and start patrolling again.

11             There were HV soldiers in large numbers within Knin, and it was

12     clear that there was little or no control.  I saw soldiers going into and

13     out of houses removing various electrical items and anything else that

14     they saw fit.

15        Q.   If I could please cabin you if you're able to recall

16     specifically, you mentioned the 7th of August.  Can you tell the Court,

17     did you get out of the compound and into Knin on the 7th of August?

18        A.   Yes.  That was a particular day because it was the day that the

19     UN special envoy Yasushi Akashi visited.  I believe he landed in -- on

20     the helicopter pad of the UN barracks and part of a long convoy including

21     press.  We escorted him to the hospital.

22        Q.   And did you stay escorting Mr. Akashi around for the day?

23        A.   No, I did not.  As soon as we had a chance, on the way back

24     myself and my driver broke away from that convoy and took a look and a

25     patrol around Knin town, and therefore from a first-hand account of

Page 7153

 1     myself I was able to see exactly what was going on.

 2        Q.   And on that day, the 7th of August, what exactly was going on?

 3        A.   As I described earlier on, that was when the looting was going

 4     on.  The general lack of discipline and control.  It was clear to me that

 5     the soldiers were doing what they saw fit.

 6        Q.   Did you see any officers or commanders present while this was

 7     happening?

 8        A.   No.  It was -- it was particularly evident that there were no

 9     officers or anyone who appeared to be in a position of authority

10     controlling what was going on.

11        Q.   You mentioned earlier that you had gotten away from Mr. Akashi's

12     convoy.  And if someone had been off of that convoy, would what you saw

13     have been evident to anyone not following that column?

14        A.   Yes.  This was completely overt behaviour, and even when we drove

15     past it did not stop, and it seemed to be the normal behaviour throughout

16     the town on that day.

17        Q.   Later in that same paragraph you say that:  "Trucks pulled up at

18     houses.  I witnessed all sorts of electrical items being loaded into cars

19     by soldiers while police did nothing to stop it.  This went on for at

20     least two weeks."

21             I'd like you to please clarify for the Court whether this

22     particular sentence refers to events that you witnessed happening in

23     Knin.

24        A.   As soon as I got an opportunity to patrol out of Knin, I made it

25     my business, as I had done prior to the 4th of August, to patrol

Page 7154

 1     throughout Sector South.  And on -- or, rather, in those areas that I

 2     patrolled, that behaviour seemed to be the pattern throughout the area.

 3        Q.   And based on your own observations, did this kind of looting

 4     continue in Knin for two weeks after Operation Storm?

 5        A.   Yes.  At least two weeks, I would say, and it was throughout

 6     Knin.

 7        Q.   The trucks -- trucks and cars being used during this looting, can

 8     you tell the Court whether these were military trucks or civilians?

 9        A.   The vehicles being used were both military and civilian.  It

10     appeared to me that whatever vehicle you had, you filled it up with

11     whatever you could get your hands on.

12        Q.   Mr. Dangerfield, is there any doubt in your mind as to whether

13     the individuals you saw engaged in this behaviour were in fact HV

14     soldiers?

15             MR. KEHOE:  Objection.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe.

17             MR. KEHOE:  Does he have some background information?  That's

18     pure speculation.  Has he any doubt?  What is replete in this is that

19     people in camouflage uniforms, as the Prosecution well knows the entire

20     place had camouflage uniforms on.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  But the question was not whether they were soldiers

22     or not but whether the witness had any doubt on his mind but if it ever

23     came up.  That is, of course -- that was the question, but before that

24     question be put to the witness I think we, Mr. Russo, you should go in

25     some detail as to what he described as far as the appearance of the

Page 7155

 1     persons he saw taking whatever they wanted.  And I think at an earlier

 2     stage the witness testified that these were military, but I have to find

 3     that and see whether that's correct.  At the same time, I remember from

 4     his statement that he refers to how people were dressed or sometimes

 5     about military and civilians.

 6             Could you please, before you ask him whether -- and that is a

 7     question of fact, whether ever doubt came to his mind.  If you ask me

 8     whether I ever doubted some matters, that is just a matter of fact.  But

 9     before you put that question, of course, it would be good to see what

10     observations created an apparent impression and what circumstances

11     perhaps may have caused any doubt on your mind.

12             MR. KEHOE:  And if I may, Judge, what this Court has said over

13     and over again is that the Court and the Chamber wants facts.  Not

14     speculation, just facts.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Mr. Kehoe, I said that the question of whether

16     I ever experienced doubt on my mind is a question of fact.  But --

17             MR. KEHOE:  I understand your interpretation, Your Honour.  I

18     understand.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Mr. Russo, nevertheless you're invited to

20     first explore what the witness observed and what at any time would or

21     would not have created either an impression in his mind or doubt on his

22     mind.  Please proceed.

23             MR. RUSSO:  Thank you, Mr. President.

24        Q.   Mr. Dangerfield, you indicated at the inception of your testimony

25     that prior to Operation Storm you had had the opportunity to visit both

Page 7156

 1     sides, both HV and ARSK sides of the zone of separation.  Let me ask you

 2     first, while you were on the HV side did you have an opportunity to see

 3     what kinds of uniforms the HV soldiers were wearing?

 4        A.   Yes, I did.  I knew the difference between ARSK soldiers and HV

 5     soldiers when wearing their uniform.

 6        Q.   Can you give the Court a description of the typical -- or what HV

 7     soldiers' uniforms looked like?

 8        A.   I'm afraid after 13 years my memory on that is not distinct.

 9        Q.   Did you at the time, when you were on the HV side of the zone of

10     separation, have an opportunity to see the kinds of trucks and vehicles

11     which were used by the HV army?

12             MR. KEHOE:  Well, Your Honour, I -- I object at this point.

13     We're now in 2008 with the witness giving testimony, and he doesn't

14     recall, and to try to bootstrap our way into this by something back in

15     1995, I object.  He doesn't recall.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  I think the first question what he didn't recall was

17     about how people were dressed, and I think this question is now about

18     trucks and vehicles.

19             MR. KEHOE:  Then what I caution the Chamber is that that's the

20     road that the Prosecution is trying to travel on, and I just bring this

21     up as a cautionary measures and we'll see where the questioning goes.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Mr. Russo.

23             MR. RUSSO:  Yes, Your Honour.

24        Q.   If I could -- do you need me to repeat the question?

25        A.   No.  I think I can make it a short answer.

Page 7157

 1             On those days that I was travelling within Knin and throughout

 2     Sector South, when I saw the looting the large numbers of individuals

 3     carrying out that looting were wearing HV uniform.

 4        Q.   Thank you for that.  Let me take you back to the previous

 5     question.  When you were on the HV side of the zone of separation prior

 6     to Operation Storm, did you have an opportunity to observe the vehicles

 7     that the HV were using?

 8        A.   Yes, I did, and prior to my deployment to the area part of my

 9     training had been specific recognition of the warring factions' vehicles,

10     uniforms, ranks, and insignia.

11        Q.   Thank you.  And did the vehicles that were used in the looting

12     after Operation Storm, which you indicate in paragraph 34, were used

13     during this looting, were those the same kinds of vehicles you saw on the

14     HV side of the zone separation?

15        A.   Yes, they were, and invariably their registration plates had the

16     letters HV, Hotel Victor.

17             THE INTERPRETER:  Kindly slow down for interpretation.

18             MR. RUSSO:

19        Q.   And I understand that you have difficulty recollecting here and

20     now.  I'll ask you, when you made your first statement in December of

21     1995 and indicated that there were soldiers doing certain things, at that

22     time did you have a clear recollection of what, for example, HV soldiers

23     wore?

24        A.   Yes, I did.

25        Q.   Thank you.  In paragraph 13 of your first statement, in e-court

Page 7158

 1     this appears page 4 of English and page 3 of the B/C/S, in paragraph 13,

 2     Mr. Dangerfield, you indicate that there were houses that were spared

 3     from looting and that these had signs on them.  I would like you to

 4     please explain that for the Court.

 5        A.   Yes.  In short, those houses had in Serbo-Croat the words

 6     "Croatian house," and that was painted on.

 7        Q.   How did you know that they said "Croatian house"?

 8        A.   Again I, as the British Army always does, received basic training

 9     in the language of the country that we would be visiting.

10        Q.   And is your command of the Serbo-Croat language the same today?

11        A.   No, it is not.

12             MR. RUSSO:  Your Honour, I don't know if this is an appropriate

13     time for a recess.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  We started at a quarter past 2.00.  The first

15     session usually takes one hour and a half.  So there is still 15 minutes

16     to go.

17             MR. RUSSO:  Thank you.

18        Q.   Mr. Dangerfield, you indicate at paragraph 9 of your first

19     statement, this appears in English at pages 3 to 4 and in B/C/S at page

20     3, in paragraph 9 you indicate that the first time you got out of the

21     compound you witnessed the "complete change to Knin."  I would like you

22     to please explain to the Court what you meant by that?

23        A.   The complete change to Knin applied to the population and the

24     state of the city.  As I indicated earlier on, it had been a -- what I

25     would describe as a bustling town for its size.  People frequenting the

Page 7159

 1     bars and cafes, going about their everyday business.

 2             After the 4th and 5th of August, it became clear to me that there

 3     were very few civilian personnel remaining within that city.  The

 4     population had diminished, and indeed when I travelled around the city I

 5     saw evidence of the considerable bombardment that that city had received.

 6        Q.   Can I take that last sentence of your answer -- well, let me just

 7     ask you.  Did you observe shelling damage in Knin?

 8        A.   Yes, I did, and it was clear that it was fresh shelling damage,

 9     and again we had received training in identifying from which directions

10     mortars and shells, by their distinctive patterns had come.  It was also

11     clear to me that the buildings in the areas that I described and

12     highlighted on the map had also been hit.

13        Q.   And are you referring to the areas which you circled on the

14     aerial photograph?

15        A.   I am indeed.

16        Q.   And can you tell the Court whether the damage that you saw from

17     shelling was concentrated or confined to any particular areas of the

18     town?

19        A.   It was throughout the town.

20        Q.   Thank you.  I'd now like to discuss your observations of what

21     happened outside of Knin in the weeks following Operation Storm.

22             In paragraph 10 of your first statement, and in e-court that is

23     page 4 in English and page 3 in B/C/S, in paragraph 10, Mr. Dangerfield,

24     you indicate that on 9 August, which was the first time that you had a

25     patrol, you visited the town of Kistanje, and can you please describe to

Page 7160

 1     the Court what it was you witnessed happening in that town.

 2        A.   I remember it well.  When we drove into the outskirts of Kistanje

 3     it was clear to me that there were a lot of individuals dressed in

 4     Croatian military uniform.  The atmosphere was tense.  My appearance in

 5     the Land Rover that I was travelling was clearly unwanted.

 6             The other thing that was particularly noticeable to me, that

 7     there seemed to be a lack of artillery or indeed fire from tanks.  There

 8     was -- i.e., there was no damage to the buildings from that sort of

 9     thing, and that was recognisable.

10             What was clear was that the vast majority of Kistanje was on

11     fire.  Soldiers were there doing looting, celebratory fire into the air,

12     and indeed there was -- appeared to be a complete lack of control of what

13     was going on in Kistanje.

14        Q.   And can you give the Court some idea of approximately how many

15     Croatian soldiers you saw in the town?

16        A.   From my judgement it was company strength.  So I think we would

17     be looking at approximately 150 to 200 soldiers.

18        Q.   And again were you able to distinguish any officers or commanders

19     in that town?

20        A.   No.  It was the same story as it had been throughout the rest of

21     the sector on my patrols.  There just seemed to be an apparent lack of

22     control over what was going on.

23        Q.   Were there any civilians present in Kistanje on that day?

24        A.   On that day I saw no civilians.

25        Q.   Mr. Dangerfield, did you travel to other towns and villages

Page 7161

 1     within Sector South in the weeks following Operation Storm?

 2        A.   Yes, I did.

 3        Q.   And again if you could give the Court some idea of the amount of

 4     ground you covered within Sector South in those weeks?

 5        A.   Within those weeks, as I had done prior to the 4th and 5th of

 6     August, I travelled extensively throughout Sector South.  Indeed, I

 7     remember surviving on six hours sleep a night, travelling and patrolling

 8     for at least another 14 hours throughout the day, and with the remaining

 9     time I had I was writing and filing my reports.

10        Q.   And in your second statement, which I believe is P696, at

11     paragraph 7 -- this is e-court English page 2, as well as the B/C/S.  In

12     that paragraph, Mr. Dangerfield, you estimate that 80 per cent to 90 per

13     cent of the villages that you saw in Sector South in the weeks after

14     Operation Storm suffered some form of burning.

15             Can you tell the Court whether that estimate is based on your

16     personal observations?

17        A.   It is indeed, and that percentage I would describe as extremely

18     accurate, and it appeared that the majority of the sector was on fire.

19        Q.   In the next paragraph on -- in that statement you indicate that

20     you personally observed HV soldiers standing around in towns and villages

21     where houses and crops were burning.  Can you give the Court any idea of

22     how often you saw this type of thing?

23        A.   This was a daily occurrence.  In fact, one almost became blase

24     about it.  You travelled around the area and it was just a familiar

25     picture and sight on every day.  On one occasion I visited the village of

Page 7162

 1     Cetina and this standard behaviour of looting and burning was going on.

 2     In fact, for a while my presence was not noticed, and indeed a truckload

 3     of soldiers drove into the village all firing their weapons into the air.

 4             When our presence was noticed, we were detained.  Momentarily

 5     admittedly.  Identification was checked, and I would say it was for no

 6     longer than five or ten minutes, but nevertheless we were detained, and

 7     after some discussion we were escorted from the sector and indeed made it

 8     our business to find a route back into the sector to continue with our

 9     routine patrols.

10        Q.   When you say escorted out of the sector, does that mean out of

11     Sector South entirely?

12        A.   That is correct.

13        Q.   And staying in that same paragraph, Mr. Dangerfield, you indicate

14     that Croatian special police prevented access to areas that were burning.

15     And I'd like you to please tell the Court whether you were ever

16     personally prevented by the special police from entering areas that were

17     burning.

18        A.   Yes, I was.

19        Q.   And at the time did you know what a special police officer was,

20     and can you tell the Court how you knew that?

21        A.   Yes.  I had received the training prior to deployment, and we

22     knew the order of battle of all the military and what I would describe

23     loosely as paramilitary personnel.  Not just on the Croatian side but on

24     the Bosnian side and the Serbian side, and that was standard practice for

25     our training.

Page 7163

 1        Q.   And, Mr. Dangerfield, do you recall writing an article regarding

 2     your experiences during and after Operation Storm?

 3        A.   Yes, I do.

 4             MR. RUSSO:  Mr. Registrar if we could have 65 ter 5265.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Russo, are you referring to the essay "The Fall

 6     of the Republic."

 7             MR. RUSSO:  I am, Your Honour.  I do understand there is an

 8     objection to this document.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  I don't know if whether there's an objection.  It's

10     not on the 65 ter list, isn't it?  There is first an application to have

11     it on the 65 ter list.

12             MR. RUSSO:  I apologise, Your Honour, that is correct.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Any objection against having it added to the 65 ter

14     list which is not yet the same as being admitted into evidence.

15             MR. KEHOE:  No, Your Honour.  And my objection with regard to

16     this document was not through Major Dangerfield but through another

17     witness.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, but -- first thing first.  There's no objection

19     against adding it to the 65 ter list.  Mr. Russo, therefore that request

20     is now granted.  Please proceed, and if it comes to tendering the

21     document, we'll hear from the Defence whether in relation to this witness

22     there will be any objection.  Please proceed.

23             MR. RUSSO:  Thank you, Mr. President.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  But at the same time I'm looking at the clock.  I

25     don't know how much time you'd still need.

Page 7164

 1             MR. RUSSO:  I was going to admit this document and complete my

 2     examination, Your Honour.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Then perhaps we'd better finish.  Yes, please

 4     go ahead.

 5             MR. RUSSO:

 6        Q.   Mr. Dangerfield, looking at the document on the screen, is this

 7     the article that you wrote?

 8        A.   Yes, it is.

 9        Q.   And can you tell the Court when it was written?

10        A.   Yes.  It was constructed from my reports gathered over the

11     period, but I constructed this particular document ten days after the 4th

12     and 5th of August.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             MR. RUSSO:  Your Honour, at this time I would move for the

15     admission of 65 ter 5265.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  As a contemporaneous document drafted by the

17     witness.

18             MR. RUSSO:  Yes, Your Honour.

19             MR. KEHOE:  No objections, Judge.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit number P699, Your Honours.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  P699 is admitted into evidence.

23             MR. RUSSO:  Thank you, Mr. President.  That concludes my

24     examination.

25             And thank you, Mr. Dangerfield.

Page 7165

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Russo.  Since you've got one minute

 2     left before the break, I would seek on one point clarification.

 3             Mr. Dangerfield, when you were invited to describe the sound of

 4     combat, you used the word "retaliation," which in law has a very specific

 5     meaning, and I wondered whether in more neutral terms you were referring

 6     to what I learn to be return fire.

 7             THE WITNESS:  That would be correct.  I heard no return fire.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  We'll have a break, and we'll resume at

 9     ten minutes past 4.00.

10                           --- Recess taken at 3.45 p.m.

11                           --- On resuming at 4.12 p.m.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, you're standing, so I inform

13     Mr. Dangerfield that you'll now be cross-examined, Mr. Dangerfield, by

14     Mr. Kehoe who is counsel for Mr. Gotovina.  Please proceed, Mr. Kehoe.

15             MR. KEHOE:  Thank you, Your Honour.

16                           Cross-examination by Mr. Kehoe:

17        Q.   Good afternoon, Mr. Dangerfield.

18        A.   Good afternoon.

19        Q.   Mr. Dangerfield, you noted during the course of your direct

20     examination that you were filing continuous reports over the course of

21     the 4th and the 5th and I suppose thereafter, and we have been presented

22     with your report P697 of the 4th of August, and this is a one --

23     three-page report.  Are there others?

24        A.   Not in existence.

25        Q.   Well, what does that mean, "not in existence"?  Where are they?

Page 7166

 1     Or what happened to them, better still?

 2        A.   They would have been filed along and kept for record by my

 3     headquarters.  When I say "my headquarters," I say the Sector South-west

 4     British headquarters.

 5        Q.   And when you say that they are no longer in existence, what did

 6     your British headquarters in Sector South do with a UN document?

 7        A.   I have no idea.  When I say "not in existence," I was

 8     referring -- what I actually meant is I have none of them in my

 9     possession.

10        Q.   So as far as you know, these reports should still be with the UN?

11        A.   If that is what they have chosen to do is to keep them, then yes.

12     If they haven't, then no.

13        Q.   Well, Mr. Dangerfield, do you know if for a fact your reports

14     were destroyed?

15        A.   No, I do not.

16        Q.   Well, when you mentioned to us that they were no longer in

17     existence, did someone tell you that they had been destroyed?

18        A.   No.

19        Q.   No?

20        A.   No.

21        Q.   Now, you sent these reports to your headquarters in Gornji Vakuf;

22     is that right?

23        A.   That is correct.

24        Q.   Now, you also sent them to your British headquarters in Split,

25     didn't you?

Page 7167

 1        A.   That is correct.

 2        Q.   Now, do they exist at the British headquarters in Split?

 3        A.   Could you repeat the question, please?

 4        Q.   Do your reports still exist that you sent to the British

 5     headquarters in Split?

 6        A.   That headquarters ceased to exist some time ago.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  But if I may ask your attention for the question,

 8     which was slightly differently phrased the second round.

 9             First Mr. Kehoe asked whether they exist at the British

10     headquarters in Split, but when he repeated his question, "Do your

11     reports still exist that you sent to the British headquarters in Split?"

12     which is different because they may be somewhere else but he was now

13     identifying your reports by the ones being sent to Split, so therefore

14     whether those headquarters still do exist is not relevant.  It's the

15     existence of the reports sent to that headquarters.

16             THE WITNESS:  Thank you for clarifying the question, sir.  I

17     don't know whether those reports still exist.

18             MR. KEHOE:

19        Q.   Well, sir, where were the records that were at British

20     headquarters in Split be archived?

21        A.   I do not know the answer to that.

22        Q.   Now, you also sent your records to the Ministry of Defence in

23     London, too, didn't you?

24        A.   No, I did not.

25        Q.   Well, did you seen them to London?

Page 7168

 1        A.   No, I did the.

 2        Q.   So the only two locations you're saying that you went them were

 3     to -- were the British headquarters in Gornji Vakuf and the British

 4     headquarters in Split.

 5        A.   Yes.  And I think it's important to clarify that whilst every

 6     report should have gone to the headquarters in Gornji Vakuf, it was on my

 7     own decision-making process as to whether they should go to the

 8     headquarters in Split.  So I don't believe that every report will have

 9     gone to the headquarters in Split.

10        Q.   Who is DLC in your distribution network in P697?

11        A.   I believe those letters stand for data link cell.

12        Q.   And what is a data link cell?

13        A.   I have no idea.

14        Q.   You have no idea?

15        A.   Yes.  I believe that may be part of the headquarters that collate

16     the material that I sent.

17        Q.   Sir --

18        A.   But apart from that, I cannot be more precise.

19        Q.   Sir, you were sending it to Split.  You were sending it to Gornji

20     Vakuf, and you're sending it to this DLC, but you don't know what DLC is?

21        A.   I know what the letters stand for, but the exact make-up of that

22     particular organisation I don't.

23        Q.   Well, sir, when -- when the information was going to DLC, who was

24     on the receiving end of that information?

25        A.   I don't know.  As a military man, occasionally or more often than

Page 7169

 1     not you are given orders, and you carry out those orders to the best of

 2     your ability.  Sometimes that means that you do things that not all the

 3     time you know why, and not always is it the case is it my position to

 4     question why.  It is my position to do.

 5        Q.   Mr. Dangerfield, who gave you the order to send these reports to

 6     DLC?

 7        A.   It would have been my chief sector liaison officer in the

 8     headquarters in Gornji Vakuf.

 9        Q.   And who was that?

10        A.   That would have been Major -- Major May of the Royal Marines.

11        Q.   And what is Major May's first name, do you know?

12        A.   I don't know his first name, I'm afraid.

13        Q.   But he was a Royal Marine?

14        A.   That is correct.

15        Q.   Were you -- was the recipient of this information on DLC, was

16     that MI6?

17        A.   I have no idea.

18        Q.   Well, were you working for MI6 at the time?

19        A.   As far as I know, no.

20        Q.   Well, if you were working for MI6, would you know?

21        A.   I don't think so.

22        Q.   So what you're saying is when you were operating in the field,

23     you could have been working as a representative or agent of MI6, right?

24        A.   Wrong.

25        Q.   Well, sir, you just told us that were you working for MI6, and

Page 7170

 1     you said, "As far as I know, no."  Is that right?

 2        A.   That's what it says.

 3        Q.   And then I asked you, "If you were working for MI6, would you

 4     know?"  And your answer was, "I don't think so."

 5        A.   That's what it says.

 6        Q.   Okay, sir.  As you moved around the area, you were trying to

 7     gather information on HV movements and ARSK movements; is that right?

 8        A.   That is correct.

 9        Q.   And the reason why you were sent by your headquarters in Gornji

10     Vakuf to Knin was to gather yet more information.  Isn't that right?

11        A.   Yes, that's correct.

12        Q.   And if I can turn your attention to your reports, and I am

13     referring to your reports now, and I'm talking about P698, and if I may

14     be mistaken I may have these numbers incorrect, Madam Registrar, but I do

15     believe that P698 was the last document that -- that the witness put in,

16     which is The Fall of the Republic of Serb Krajina.  I believe -- is

17     that's 697, Your Honour?

18             JUDGE ORIE:  I think it was 699, but correct me when I'm wrong.

19             MR. KEHOE:  699.  My apologies.

20        Q.   Now, you note that in the beginning of -- this is in paragraph 2

21     of 699, if we could bring that up, "Since May of this year our job had

22     been to monitor the build-up of Croatian forces to the western cell in

23     south-east of the United Nations sector.  We also had been monitoring the

24     response to this by the army of the Republic of Serb Krajina."

25             Now, you knew, sir, when you came -- let me withdraw that and

Page 7171

 1     backtrack a bit.

 2             Before you went to Knin, you knew that the HV troops that were in

 3     the Livno Valley and up on the Dinara were commanded by General Gotovina,

 4     didn't you?

 5        A.   I don't know that.

 6        Q.   Well, you did receive information about HV movements going up the

 7     Livanjsko Polje valley prior to the attack on Grahovo, didn't you?

 8        A.   To clarify, receiving information, I would have been informed

 9     about it, yes.

10        Q.   Well, prior to going into Knin you did receive briefings and

11     other items of information in your headquarters in Gornji Vakuf as to

12     what was going on in the Krajina, didn't you?

13        A.   I remember receiving a briefing.

14        Q.   And that was so you could better understand what was going on

15     when you eventually got to Knin.  Isn't that right?

16        A.   I think that's fair to say.

17        Q.   Now, let us go to an exhibit and if we can do our best to

18     recreate this briefing, and if I may get this number correctly, and that

19     is 1D420015.

20             And, Mr. Dangerfield, this is series of slides that I'd like to

21     take you through.

22        A.   Yep.

23        Q.   Now, Mr. Dangerfield, these are a series of military operations

24     by the HV forces beginning in the winter of 1994 and culminating in the

25     fall of 1995, and approximately the 11th of October.  And if we can go

Page 7172

 1     through the next slide.  Now, just to orient you on this, as you can see

 2     it's the HVO ABiH held territory and of course the other areas of Bosnia

 3     and Croatia with the Bihac pocket in the centre.  And throughout your

 4     time there there were attacks on and off on the Bihac pocket by the Serb

 5     forces, wasn't there?

 6        A.   I was not monitoring Bihac, so I can't comment on that.

 7        Q.   Well, sir, you were in G2 we know from your statement, and G2 is

 8     an intelligence gathering component, isn't it?

 9        A.   I would say information gathering.

10        Q.   I'll use your word.  It's an information gathering component.

11     And when you were getting your debriefing as to what was going on with

12     the HV, it's fair to say that as part of giving you a view of the

13     terrain, you were told what the situation was in the area in 1994 and

14     1995, weren't you?

15        A.   You said I was getting a debriefing.  I never received a

16     debriefing.  My job was to concentrate on the area known as Sector South.

17        Q.   Well, sir, you did receive a briefing, did you not?

18             JUDGE ORIE:  There seems to be debriefing, briefing apparently is

19     the issue, Mr. Kehoe.  I heard something which sounded to me as briefing

20     but is on the transcript as debriefing.  I'm referring you to page 46,

21     line 22.

22             MR. KEHOE:  Maybe I'll withdraw.  Maybe we're talking past each

23     other just a tad, Your Honour, and I'll clear it up.

24        Q.   I think you told us you received training in languages.  You

25     received training in military.  You used training on the warring

Page 7173

 1     factions, and you received training on uniforms.  Did you also receive

 2     training on weapon systems?

 3        A.   When you say "training on weapon systems," could you clarify

 4     exactly what you mean, sir?

 5        Q.   Were you given information by your headquarters on weapon

 6     systems?

 7        A.   Recognition of weapon systems, yes.

 8        Q.   You were given training on recognition of weapon systems in

 9     addition to the other items of training I just talked about, that being

10     language, uniforms, the warring factions.  Isn't that right?

11        A.   That is correct.

12        Q.   Now, as part of the information you received, let us turn to the

13     next slide.  This is Operation Winter '94, 29 November to 24 December,

14     1994.

15             Now, when you received the briefing, you also received

16     information on the deployment of forces both on the HV side, and let me

17     include HV-HVO side, as well as on the Serb side, and in that I mean the

18     RSK side as well as the VRS, right?

19        A.   I'd just like to make a comment on these slides.  These are not

20     my slides.  They are not the slides I would have been briefed with, if

21     indeed I was briefed with slides at that time.  Computer technology was

22     not sufficient, nor was the funding within the British Army to produce

23     such material.  Therefore, I don't feel that I can comment on the slides

24     that you are producing in front of me.

25        Q.   Well, sir, I wish I had the slides or the information that you

Page 7174

 1     looked at when you were being briefed, but looking at the slide that is

 2     before you and looking at the information that you received by your

 3     headquarters in Gornji Vakuf, did they explain to you the operation run

 4     by the HV and the HVO under the command of General Gotovina in the winter

 5     of '95 and that the area -- excuse me, the winter of '94-'95,

 6     apologises -- excuse me, winter '94, or the area in blue was an area that

 7     was taken by HV-HVO forces during the time-frame 29 November to 24

 8     December 1994?

 9        A.   I think we had a rough idea of what was described as the zone of

10     separation between the warring factions.  What I think is clear is that

11     they did not have sufficient detail, and therefore that is why I was

12     deployed as the sector liaison officer between the sectors known as

13     Sector South and Sector South-west.

14        Q.   Well, based on the information that you got at the time and the

15     information that you received subsequently, do you look at this map and

16     recognise that one of the first offensives in this series of offensives

17     that was conducted by General Gotovina was Winter '94, and it took

18     control of this area, as we move up the Dinara that is shaded here in the

19     light blue?

20        A.   This was prior to my deployment, so I don't recognise that.

21        Q.   Well, sir, you received -- when you got a briefing, you received

22     information about what was going on in the theatre prior to you getting

23     to the theatre, did you not?

24        A.   We -- we got a strategic outline.

25        Q.   And part of that strategic outline included this military

Page 7175

 1     operation by the HV and the HVO in the winter of '94, didn't it?

 2        A.   I do not recall this specific military operation being briefed.

 3     That's not to say I did not be briefed on it or was not briefed on it.  I

 4     do not recall being briefed on it.

 5        Q.   Well, were you briefed -- and my apologies, Your Honour if, I'm

 6     going too fast.  Mr. Dangerfield, sometimes with us speaking the same

 7     language we need to just pause a bit.

 8             Were you briefed on these military operations in -- of any kind

 9     in the winter of 1994?

10        A.   I don't believe I was briefed on specific military operations.  I

11     believe that I --

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Could I -- Mr. Dangerfield, I now and then switch to

13     other languages, and I have to check whether the translation is -- is

14     where we are.  That is what caused for a little bit of a longer pause.

15             Mr. Kehoe, if you apologise for going too fast, ask someone to

16     listen to the French or the B/C/S channel and find out whether they have

17     finished their translation.

18             MR. KEHOE:  I will give that task to Mr. Akhavan.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  He's trained in languages as well.  Yes, I do

20     understand.  Please proceed.

21             MR. KEHOE:  Yes.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  And I think the last -- because -- Mr. Kehoe, I have

23     a bit of a problem.  You produce on the screen an enormous lot of

24     information, and I think the first thing, and it -- slowly we came to

25     that, is to find out whether the witness was briefed about the operation

Page 7176

 1     Winter, and that could be asked even without having a lot of military

 2     information on a map which may be known, may be totally unknown to the

 3     witness.  Therefore, let's go from the broad picture to the details.

 4             MR. KEHOE:  I understand.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

 6             MR. KEHOE:

 7        Q.   Without talking about a specific operation, Mr. Dangerfield, were

 8     you briefed on what was happening up on -- in this area and up on the

 9     Dinara in the conflict that took place in the winter of '94?  Do you

10     recall that at all?

11        A.   No.  I wouldn't have been briefed on such a specific operation.

12     I would have been briefed on the rough outline of where the warring

13     factions were, because of course when I deployed to the region, I was not

14     initially deployed into this area.  So my first job was doing something

15     else as another sector liaison officer.

16        Q.   I understand, sir.  Let me briefly go through, then, in your

17     statement, and again I'm looking at P699.  I don't know if you have that

18     in front of you, Mr. Dangerfield, but --

19        A.   Could you direct me more specifically, please?

20        Q.   Yes.  That's the one, The Fall of the Republic of Krajina, the

21     article that you wrote.

22        A.   Thank you.

23        Q.   And in the second-to-last paragraph in the second sentence --

24     pardon me, the third sentence, "Since May."  Do you see that?  "Since May

25     the Croat forces"?

Page 7177

 1        A.   "Since May of this year our job had been to monitor the build-up

 2     of Croatian forces," is that the paragraph?

 3        Q.   No, sir.  It's the one the -- the paragraph beginning "Around the

 4     21st of July..."

 5        A.   Okay.  I've got it.

 6        Q.   Now just go down to the third sentence.

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   Now, since -- it notes that since May the Croat forces had been

 9     attacking up the Livanjsko Polje valley to the east of the strategically

10     important Dinara Mountains.

11             So you did have briefings on the HV movement in the spring of

12     1995, didn't you?

13        A.   I -- I didn't have briefings.  As I said, I received a briefing,

14     and what I've written here will have been information that I made it my

15     job to find out prior to my deployment.

16        Q.   So you did learn that in fact there were HV offensives in the

17     spring of 1995 up on the Dinara.  Is that right?

18        A.   I think I would have learned that the HV were gaining ground,

19     yes.

20        Q.   And let us look again -- and by the way, by this point when you

21     were making it your business to find out what was going on, by this point

22     in your job with G2 you knew that these HV forces were being commanded by

23     General Gotovina, didn't you?

24             JUDGE ORIE:  One second.  You may answer the question.

25             THE WITNESS:  I'm not sure I did know that, no, sir.

Page 7178

 1             MR. KEHOE:

 2        Q.   Well, let us look at these next several slides quickly, and if

 3     is -- if we can go back to 1D420015.  And if we could go to the third

 4     slide in.  And I'm -- Mr. Dangerfield, I'm going to show you a couple of

 5     slides and then ask you a few questions.

 6             If you could go to the next slide.  This is a depiction of the

 7     map immediately before Jump-1.

 8             Can we go to the next slide.  If we can just look at that.  This

 9     is the Jump-1 from 7 April 1995.  The light blue area again being the

10     area that was taken in Jump-1.

11             If we go to the next slide.  This is Jump-2.  Now, this Jump-2,

12     sir, takes place in June 4 to 11 of 1995.  Now, in June you knew, sir,

13     that there were attacks by the VRS in Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde, and

14     also additional pressure being put on Bihac; is that right?

15        A.   That is correct.

16        Q.   Let us turn to the next slide which is the Jump-2 slide.  Now,

17     this is the -- again, sir, these are the operations.  When you talk about

18     your Croatian forces since May attacking up the Livanjsko Polje Valley,

19     these are the operations that you're generally referring to; isn't that

20     right?

21        A.   I think before I continue it's important to divorce my answer

22     from the slides.  I am answering the questions on my information that

23     I've written here.  So the information I will give you refers to this:  I

24     do not recognise these slides.  There is a lot of small information on it

25     which I haven't put there.  It's not British.  It hasn't been verified by

Page 7179

 1     me, so I cannot comment on anything of that.

 2             So when I write about something in here, it's a -- more

 3     strategic, it's an overview.  It's the sort of information that you could

 4     read in a newspaper written by a defence correspondent.  It is of no more

 5     detail than that.

 6        Q.   Well, when you were providing information to your headquarters in

 7     Split and your headquarters in Gornji Vakuf and to DLC, whoever that is,

 8     you weren't providing them with information that they could run on --

 9     read in the Daily Telegraph, were you?

10        A.   That would be correct.

11        Q.   It was important for them to know, consistent with what you said

12     in your statement of P699, that your job -- or "Our job had been to

13     monitor the build-up of Croatian forces."

14        A.   Just a word on the statements you refer to P699.

15        Q.   That is the magazine article, sir.

16        A.   Okay.  My paperwork is not labelled as such, so could we make

17     sure we clarify exactly which statement it is when we speak about it --

18        Q.   Absolutely.  And --

19        A.   Thank you.

20        Q.   -- that's a fair comment, sir.  And if at any time,

21     Mr. Dangerfield, you have about what I'm referring to --

22        A.   Absolutely.

23        Q.   -- please stop me.

24        A.   That's fine.

25        Q.   And if I overlook it, I will certainly provide it to you.  What I

Page 7180

 1     was referring to just then was your article The Fall of the Republic of

 2     Serb Krajina, and that's P699.  And frankly, when I give the designation

 3     P699, it's more for the record than it is for you.

 4             My question, if we can go back to that, is that the information

 5     that you were providing to your headquarters both in Gornji Vakuf and

 6     Split and to this DLC was information that was important for them to

 7     understand the Croatian -- the build-up of Croatian forces and the

 8     Croatian forces' activities; right?

 9        A.   I think it's important to note was not just Croatian.  It was

10     ARSK and all the warring factions.

11        Q.   But talking about this particular operation in the spring -- in

12     June of 1995 and the HV forces in this regard, this is the type of

13     information you would be passing on to your headquarters and to DLC?

14        A.   I can't comment on June of 1995.  What I can comment on is the

15     information on that particular operation in 1995, but what I can comment

16     on is the information that is in the statements that I have given and any

17     factual information that I got from off the ground.

18             MR. KEHOE:  Your Honour, I was just waiting for my signal to ...

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Mr. Kehoe, I earlier asked you to start with

20     the broad picture.  Did you ever report about an operation you knew under

21     the name "Jump-2"?

22             THE WITNESS:  No, sir.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Did you ever report on an operation in which

24     apparently combat took place close to the Croatian-Bosnian border between

25     the 4th of June and the 11th of June, 1995?

Page 7181

 1             THE WITNESS:  No, sir.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Kehoe.

 3             MR. KEHOE:

 4        Q.   Mr. Dangerfield, what operations did you report on that you refer

 5     to in your article in the second to last paragraph of Croatian forces

 6     attacking up the Livanjsko Polje valley?

 7        A.   Okay.  That information is information that I will have gained

 8     from general knowledge.  As I said, the sort of information that you

 9     could gain from a newspaper.

10        Q.   Did you report on the battle to take -- let me withdraw here,

11     that you note again in your statement 699, that Bosanski --

12             JUDGE ORIE:  That's the article again --

13             MR. KEHOE:  The article, my apologies, Judge.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  -- because it confuses the witness.

15             MR. KEHOE:  My apologies, Judge.

16        Q.   The article again in that same paragraph that:  "Bosanski Grahovo

17     was of vital for instance the Serb Krajina as it was their main supply

18     route from the Bosnian Serb stronghold of Banja Luka."

19             If we could turn to the next slide.

20             Now, did you report on the fighting or the attack by the HV and

21     the HVO on Bosanski Grahovo that you refer to in your Article P699?

22        A.   I cannot remember specifically.  If it's somewhere in any of my

23     statements, could you please direct me to it, please?

24        Q.   Well, you talk about it, sir --

25        A.   I talk about it in this article.  If I have reported it somewhere

Page 7182

 1     else, could you direct me to it, please?

 2        Q.   Unfortunately, sir, I don't have the rest of your reports.

 3        A.   Okay.

 4        Q.   And that is why I'm asking the question did you report on it.  I

 5     note in your article P699, in the last two paragraphs you talk about the

 6     importance -- the vital importance of Bosanski Grahovo and in the next

 7     paragraph, "In the last week of July," and I'm quoting, "In the last week

 8     of July the Croat forces moved swiftly and decisively to take the town of

 9     Bosanski Grahovo.  This was major blow to the Krajina Serbs as it cut off

10     their supply route."

11             Now --

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, in your question you said, "Did you" --

13     it says -- "All right.  Under fighting or the attack by the HV and the

14     HVO on Bosanski Grahovo that you referred to in your article P699."

15             Now, the witness is asking where in this article he refers to the

16     fighting or the attack by the HV and the HVO on Bosanski Grahovo.  Where

17     do we find that?

18             MR. KEHOE:  As I was just quoting, Your Honour, it is at the

19     bottom of the first page on P699, and we can bring P699 back up on the

20     screen, and we can see it in that area.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

22             MR. KEHOE:  So it should be the bottom of page 1.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Is that now clear to you, Mr. Dangerfield?

24             THE WITNESS:  It is.  Thank you, sir.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  You write about it, now Mr. Kehoe asks questions

Page 7183

 1     about it.

 2             MR. KEHOE:

 3        Q.   If you can go back to the 1D420015, the slide for Operation

 4     Summer '95.  And then as that's coming up, Mr. Dangerfield, I refer you

 5     to your -- again, your article at P699, and you -- you note that in the

 6     first sentence in about the second week of July the Bosnian Serb army had

 7     attacked the UN declared safe area of Srebrenica and taken it.

 8             Now, if we can look at -- we can go to the next page of the

 9     slide -- excuse me, the preceding page, please.  It should be -- that's

10     right.  That's fine.

11             Now, if we see in the right-hand side of this photograph, as we

12     move into July this is when the attacks were taking place on Srebrenica

13     and Zepa.  Excuse me, summer -- I'm sorry.  It should be two prior to

14     this slide, page 8.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, I'm -- the first sentence in about the

16     second week of July, what page are we now?

17             MR. KEHOE:  We're still on page 1.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Still on page 1.  Paragraph?

19             MR. KEHOE:  Paragraph three.

20        Q.   Staying with this, Mr. Dangerfield, this is the area, of the

21     time-frame in July of 1995 where Srebrenica had been overrun, Zepa, there

22     was attacks on Sarajevo, and also the Bihac pocket was being attacked by

23     a combination of VRS and the ARSK along with the forces of Fikret Abdic.

24     Isn't that right?

25        A.   I can't recall specifically who was in charge of that operation.

Page 7184

 1        Q.   Well, if we move to the next page -- the next slide, excuse me.

 2             Just in the interest of time if we could go through this just

 3     briefly.  This is the area, if you recall, that was taken by HV-HVO

 4     forces, including Grahovo, that you refer to in the last paragraph of

 5     P699.  Is that right, sir?

 6        A.   You're linking the slide to my statement.  I have a to divorce

 7     both of them from each other.  I do not know, and I don't recognise

 8     whether that is the correct line or not.  So I can only comment on what

 9     is in my statement, and that is, as I said before, the sort of

10     information that you or I could read in a newspaper written broad-brush

11     by a defence correspondent.

12        Q.   Well, sir, is this the general a that was based on your

13     recollection?  Is this is the general area that had been taken by the

14     HV-HVO in the Summer '95 operation?

15        A.   I'm simply not prepared to comment on that because as I say I

16     cannot comment on something that is not mine.

17        Q.   Well, let us move to the next slide which is Operation Storm, and

18     you did report on Operation Storm.  If you could go to the next slide.

19     Operation Storm we have this areas that are outlined, and if we can go to

20     the next slide.

21             Now, sir, you understood the importance of Operation Storm for

22     the -- both the RSK and for the HV to take.  Isn't that right?

23        A.   I was a 25-year-old captain when this happened, and you would

24     have read this article, and to me the whole thing was very interesting.

25     I was more interested on what was happening on the there and now, what

Page 7185

 1     was happening on me -- on my patrols.  I may have understood the reasons

 2     why, but I was not working at the strategic level.

 3        Q.   Well, sir, you were there to gather information and to pass it

 4     on.  When you were gathering this information, did you ask the questions

 5     as to why it was necessary for the HV, under the command of

 6     General Gotovina, to take Knin?

 7        A.   I didn't ask the questions, but I think I probably knew it from

 8     background reading from books I probably bought in a library.

 9        Q.   And what did you know?

10        A.   I think Knin being a city, being probably the largest city -- or

11     certainly it was the largest city within the area known as Sector South.

12     I knew it was of importance.

13        Q.   Okay, sir.  And it was their communication centre, was it not?

14        A.   I don't know that.

15        Q.   It was the ARSK centre of government, was it not?

16        A.   I'm not -- I'm not sure.

17        Q.   Were you familiar at the time of any of the particular troop

18     movements in and around Knin at the time?  I'm talking about on the 4th

19     and the 5th during Operation Storm.

20        A.   On the 4th and the 5th we were in the barracks in the UN

21     compound.

22        Q.   If you'd just go to the next slide quickly and we'll get through

23     this?

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Dangerfield, that's not an answer to the

25     question.  The question was whether you were familiar at the time.  That

Page 7186

 1     could have been by personal observation.  That could have been by

 2     receiving information from other people.  Even if you are, as you said,

 3     in the barracks, that doesn't necessarily mean that you do not become

 4     familiar with certain matters.

 5             Mr. Kehoe, you may proceed.

 6             MR. KEHOE:  Yes.

 7        Q.   I'm just going to try to go through these and see exactly what

 8     you know, sir.  This is the 8th of August, and are you familiar at the

 9     top of this item of the area where the confrontation -- confrontation

10     line solidified as of the -- as of August 8th?

11        A.   This is a large-scale map.  I dealt with maps 1:50.000 which to

12     you and I means one square, one kilometre.  That was the level of detail

13     I was dealing with.  So I can't comment on maps of this scale.

14        Q.   Well, did the line -- if you look at the top, did the HV-VRS-ARSK

15     line solidify itself in and around Drvar, and did you see that when you

16     were driving around on the night?

17        A.   I can't recall visiting specific places on specific dates.  If

18     you could direct me in my -- in my reports where that is, then maybe I

19     can read it and look in more detail.

20        Q.   Sir, I'm just taking you based on your statement that you were

21     driving all around the place with your driver and your vehicle as of the

22     9th, and I'm asking you whether or not you saw this particular

23     confrontation line or visited it.

24        A.   I can't comment on the 9th, on specific dates, without my memory

25     being jogged.

Page 7187

 1        Q.   Let us turn to the next slide.  Were you aware of a

 2     counter-strike by the -- by the -- excuse me, by the combined VRS-RSK

 3     forces?  And if we can go -- on the 12th.  And if we go to the next

 4     slide.  And the counter-attack by HV forces under the command of

 5     General Gotovina on the 13th.  Were you aware of that when you were down

 6     in the area?

 7        A.   I can't comment on the specifics of the map where it is

 8     indicated -- I believe you are indicating to whatever it is that took

 9     place.  So I cannot comment further, I'm afraid.

10        Q.   Well, generally speaking without -- without -- if we can just

11     move away from the specifics and just talk generally, were you aware of

12     this going on on the 12th and the 13th of August?

13        A.   I can't comment.

14        Q.   If I might have a moment, Your Honour.

15             [Defence counsel confer]

16             MR. KEHOE:

17        Q.   When you say you can't comment, does that mean you don't know?

18        A.   I don't think it means I don't know.  I just don't recall it.  I

19     just don't recall having information on it.  I -- if it's -- I need to --

20     if you're asking me to comment on stuff, information that I've written in

21     any of my reports that are present here, then, yes, I can, but I can't

22     tie specific dates, places, actions, unless I've written on them.

23        Q.   Well, I mean on that score let me just show you another map on

24     the 18th of ground taken from the counter-attack of the HV forces under

25     the command of General Gotovina.  That would be the next slide.

Page 7188

 1             That shows the confrontation line as of the 18th after the

 2     counter-attacks.  Now, just generally speaking on this entire matter,

 3     sir, you did know -- when did you leave Knin?

 4        A.   I think it would have been early September.

 5        Q.   So -- and where did you go?

 6        A.   Home.

 7        Q.   In early September, I mean, did you learn of the HV moving

 8     forward in early September in an operation called Operation Maestral?

 9     And let me just move to the next slide and let me put you in there.  We

10     can go to the next page.

11             Now, you did know, Mr. Dangerfield, that the combined forces of

12     the HV-HVO, along with the ABiH, did in fact attack the Bosnian Serb

13     forces in conjunction with the ARSK, and did you learn that they took

14     during this operation called Maestral from the 8th to the 15th of

15     September, 1995, did you learn they took 2.500 square kilometres of

16     territory and penetrated 30 kilometres into VRS territory?  Did you learn

17     that?

18        A.   In September 1995 I was more interested in going home to England

19     where I hadn't lived for five years.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  But, Mr. Dangerfield, the question was not what you

21     were mainly interested in, but Mr. Kehoe put to you, I must say, quite a

22     complex question containing a lot of information, so let's try to take it

23     one by one.

24             Did you know that the combined forces of the HV and the HVO,

25     along with the ABiH, did attack the Bosnian Serb forces in early

Page 7189

 1     September?

 2             THE WITNESS:  No, I did not, sir.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  So then I may take it that you didn't know that it

 4     was 2.500 square kilometres, that it was the 30 kilometres?  It's --

 5             THE WITNESS:  No, sir.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe.

 7             MR. KEHOE:  Yes.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  I earlier consulted my colleagues, and we all agreed

 9     that the purpose of hearing the testimony of a witness is not to educate

10     the witness on the events that happened so that he goes home as a wiser

11     man but that the Chamber hears evidence and that the Chamber learns more

12     about what happened and what the witness can tell us.  That might be a

13     little bit lost in the last half hour, if not 35 minutes.  Please

14     proceed.

15             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Your Honour.  And I will move ahead, and just

16     given the witness's --

17        Q.   I take it from your testimony that you have no further knowledge

18     of HV activities after your departure in September of 1995.  Is that

19     accurate in?

20        A.   That's correct, sir.

21             MR. KEHOE:  Your Honour, if we just move through the rest of

22     these slides quickly.  After Maestral I will show the Court these --

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Is this about what the witness just said, that he

24     doesn't know anything about?

25             MR. KEHOE:  No, it's just that this is presenting the balance of

Page 7190

 1     this to the Chamber, and it's --

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, we are here to -- let's look at the next slide

 3     as you suggested.

 4             MR. KEHOE:  I can -- I can deal with this after the witness gets

 5     off the stand with this particular document, Judge.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  But have you really -- of course I wondered over the

 7     last half hour also whether a lot of these matters as to which party took

 8     control of what area, and even with the size of the areas, if the witness

 9     apparently and repeatedly told us that he does not have the oversight

10     over what happened there, why not try to seek an agreement, because it

11     seems that most of this most likely would not very much be contested

12     when -- whether Bihac was in danger.  I think we heard already some

13     evidence on that.  We have heard evidence on the Srebrenica, Zepa, and

14     Gorazde.  The witness clearly indicates that he was focusing on other

15     matters.  He learned from it as a newspaper reader on some elements.  Why

16     then not try to seek an agreement rather than spending 40 minutes in

17     court on matters the witness says, "I was not focusing on that.  I didn't

18     know anything about that," where these seem to be issues that might not

19     be that much contested?

20             I take it there will not be much of a disagreement about who

21     attacked Srebrenica, when it was attacked, what the status of Srebrenica

22     was at that time.  Similar issues for Bihac on which we heard some

23     evidence as well.

24             And now you are telling us, Mr. Kehoe, that you take us quickly

25     through the remaining slides which contains, apparently, a lot of

Page 7191

 1     information which -- the basis for which is entirely unclear, maybe all

 2     through who was where, at what moment in time, what operation was

 3     running, but that's not the way this Chamber wants to receive evidence.

 4             Please proceed.

 5             MR. KEHOE:  Your Honour, if I may.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  You may proceed, Mr. Kehoe.

 7             MR. KEHOE:  Well, I mean, just on the basis of how -- of going

 8     forward.  It was the basis of providing and allowing -- putting -- we are

 9     required under the rules to put our case to the witness and if the

10     witness doesn't know all this stuff that's fine.  The fact is that if he

11     does know something that's going to add to this, it's of benefit to the

12     Chamber.

13             Now, this gentleman says that he doesn't know anything after he

14     left in September, so we will dispense with going through the rest of

15     them.  However, it does reflect exactly what he knew at the time and what

16     he observed, and I will move to another topic.

17        Q.   Now, sir, when you talked about what you observed in the theatre,

18     and I do believe that you said that you thought that the ARSK was

19     woefully under-equipped.  Is that basically an accurate statement?

20        A.   I remember using words along those lines.

21        Q.   Now, on that score, sir, you were not permitted by the ARSK, or

22     were you, to go to any of their ammunition depots?

23        A.   I never went to an ammunition depot prior to the 5th of August.

24        Q.   Let me show you a video, and I just want to have you look at

25     this.  And this is an HTV video, and it deals with the seizure of

Page 7192

 1     weaponry at Golubic.  Do you know where Golubic is, sir?

 2        A.   No, I don't, sir.

 3        Q.   We -- so I take it you weren't aware that there was an ARSK

 4     weapons depot there?

 5        A.   Could you spell that location, please.

 6        Q.   I will put it on the screen in one second, 1D360007.  This again,

 7     Your Honour, is a film HTV for the 14th of August in Golubic.  Sorry.  Do

 8     you know where Golubic is?

 9        A.   Mr. Kehoe, the witness asked to spell it for him.  I think

10     it's --

11             MR. KEHOE:  It's on the screen.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  It's on the screen.

13             MR. KEHOE:  It's on the screen.

14             THE WITNESS:  I've never seen that spelling before.  This is not

15     my video, so I'm afraid I can't comment on it.

16             MR. KEHOE:  If we can play it, sir.

17                           [Videotape played]

18             MR. KEHOE:

19        Q.   Now, sir, you were -- you were unaware that they had this type of

20     weaponry.  Isn't that right?  And I say "they," I'm talking about the

21     army of Republika Srpska Krajina?

22        A.   What type of weaponry?

23        Q.   The weaponry that we just saw on this video, rockets, mortars,

24     ammunition.  You were unaware that they had anything like this?

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Russo.

Page 7193

 1             MR. RUSSO:  I'm sorry, Your Honour.  I understand the take on

 2     what was seen as opposed to what was found in there.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  I take it that on the assumption that what was said

 4     to be found in this depot, that on the assumption that that would be

 5     accurate, that Mr. Kehoe now asks Mr. Dangerfield whether he was aware of

 6     such equipment to be available to the ARSK whether or not in Golubic.

 7     You may answer the question.

 8             THE WITNESS:  I cannot comment on this specific video and this

 9     specific location.  However, I did say earlier on that prior to my

10     deployment I had training in weapons recognition.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  That's not an answer to the question,

12     Mr. Dangerfield.

13             In the -- in the video, whether or not accurate because you don't

14     have any personal knowledge of that, it was explained that they found in

15     Golubic rockets and mortars, ammunition.  The question is whether you

16     were aware that large quantities of rockets and mortars, ammunition was

17     stored by ARSK forces.

18             I think that, Mr. Kehoe, is the question.

19             THE WITNESS:  I can't comment specifically on this, but I do know

20     that armies, when they're preparing for war, have arms and ammunition

21     dumps.  So --

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  That's a general statement on what armies

23     usually do.  We have to clearly distinguish from what armies usually do,

24     what exactly there was in Golubic, but now the question was about whether

25     you were aware of the ARSK having at its disposal in the area in which

Page 7194

 1     you were working large quantities of rockets and mortars, ammunition.

 2     Were you aware or were you not?

 3             THE WITNESS:  There were arms and ammunition dumps that we were

 4     told were there.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Of this kind of heavy weaponry?

 6             THE WITNESS:  I could not visits them because we were prevented

 7     from visiting them, so I could not verify specifically whether they did

 8     or did not have this level of weaponry.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  But they had depots?

10             THE WITNESS:  That is correct, sir.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Kehoe.

12             MR. KEHOE:

13        Q.   Now, sir, they also had -- ARSK also had tracked vehicles, didn't

14     they?

15        A.   I think the general description of tracked vehicles is fair, yes.

16        Q.   And what tracked vehicles did they have?

17        A.   Specifically I can remember they had T-34 tanks, but it appeared

18     to me that other tracked vehicles, which you could give a variety of

19     descriptions to, had modifications to them that you would not

20     specifically recognise.

21        Q.   And what tracked vehicles are you referring to?

22        A.   I would suggest to tracked troop carrying vehicle that might have

23     had one or two recoilless rifles/rocket launchers welded onto the side.

24        Q.   And you saw evidence of tracked vehicle movement just prior to

25     Operation Storm, didn't you?

Page 7195

 1        A.   That is somewhere in one of my statements I recall reading.

 2     Could you direct me to it, please?

 3        Q.   I certainly can.  I believe it's P698, paragraph 10.  It's a --

 4     actually, it's your report, the Brief Overview for Sector South.

 5        A.   Okay.  Could you direct me to where?

 6        Q.   Paragraph 10, sir.

 7        A.   Sorry.  Thank you.

 8             MR. KEHOE:  Your Honour, while the witness is reading we'll offer

 9     into evidence 1D36007, which is the video that just was played.

10             MR. RUSSO:  No objection, Your Honour.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar.

12             THE WITNESS:  Yes, in the statement it says:  "SLO recces last

13     week saw considerable evidence of road use by ARSK tracked vehicles."

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Before we continue, could we ask

15     Madam Registrar to assign a number to the video.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, this will become Exhibit number

17     D715.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  And that is a video and transcript, I take it.  D715

19     is admitted into evidence.  Please proceed.

20             MR. KEHOE:

21        Q.   And where was that -- that evidence?  Where did you see the

22     evidence of the use of tracked vehicles?

23        A.   I haven't got a specific location down there.

24        Q.   And you don't recall?

25        A.   Not the specific location.

Page 7196

 1        Q.   Now, also prior to Operation Storm, you told the Prosecutor

 2     several days ago, two days ago, that you observed the ARSK had

 3     helicopters as well.  Is that right?

 4        A.   They had certainly more than one helicopter.

 5        Q.   Now, how many did you see?

 6        A.   I don't recall specifics.

 7        Q.   You also told the Prosecutor they had tanks, as you said today.

 8     How many did you see?

 9        A.   I can't recall specific numbers, but as I said earlier on, I

10     never saw a significant gathering of them.

11        Q.   Well, you also told the Prosecutor that you saw APCs.  How many

12     did you see?

13        A.   If I'd seen a decent sized gathering of them it would have been a

14     memorable event.  I did not see a decent sized gathering so it would not

15     have been a memorable event.  So it would not have been more than two or

16     three.

17        Q.   And artillery pieces, sir, did you see artillery pieces?

18        A.   I suspect in my time there I probably saw in total throughout the

19     area of Sector South no more than half a dozen.

20        Q.   Well, on the morning of the 4th of August, where were these APCs,

21     the tanks, the helicopters, and the artillery pieces?  Where were they?

22        A.   I don't know the specifics to that.  If you can point me to it in

23     my report, then I can give you that.

24        Q.   Sir, I'm asking you do you know where all that equipment was --

25        A.   I don't --

Page 7197

 1        Q.   -- the morning of the 4th.

 2        A.   I don't recall.

 3        Q.   Now, going back to your statement, you note in -- and I am

 4     talking about your first statement, if I may, so I can give you an

 5     accurate description of this.  Paragraph 22 of -- we've got P695, your

 6     statement of 12/21/'95.

 7             Now, taking you to the days just prior to Operation Storm, and

 8     you note in paragraph 22 that there was a full mobilisation of the ARSK;

 9     is that right?

10        A.   That's the information that was passed to me.

11        Q.   And that would --

12        A.   -- from within the headquarters of Sector South.

13        Q.   You note in paragraph 24 of that same statement:  "The ARSK stop

14     all UN movement between Knin and UNBCP at Strmica."

15        A.   I do indeed.

16        Q.   Now, at this particular time the battle of Grahovo had just ended

17     and Grahovo had fallen.  Isn't that right?

18        A.   I'm not aware of as to the specific date or when that had

19     happened.

20        Q.   Well, it was in the late July period of time that Grahovo fell,

21     didn't it?

22        A.   We're looking at paragraph 25.  It says:  29th of July,

23     "Colonel Leslie tells me that the ARSK troops in the Bosanski Grahovo

24     area are whoever they are."  So that is the most detailed information I

25     have on that.

Page 7198

 1        Q.   Well, sir, did you see ARSK troop and equipment movement through

 2     Knin up to Strmica in the latter part of July 1995?

 3        A.   Sorry, could you just repeat that question, please?

 4        Q.   I will.  Using as a frame of reference your paragraph 24 on the

 5     restriction of movement between Knin and Strmica, did you see the ARSK

 6     move troops and commitment -- equipment through Knin up to Strmica in the

 7     latter part of July of 1995?

 8        A.   I think I recall seeing limited equipment.  I do know there was a

 9     battle going on at some stage, because from the border crossing point at

10     Strmica up into the mountains troops would go up, injured would come

11     back.  And when I say equipment, it might have been the odd rocket

12     launcher, one tank.

13             I'm sorry, I've lost the typed script on my left-hand screen.

14     I've got two of my statements on both screens.  Thank you.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Dangerfield, one of the questions that was asked

16     about the battle of Grahovo, you said, "I'm not aware as to the specific

17     date or when that had happened."  Then Mr. Kehoe asked you, "Well, it was

18     in the late July period of time that Grahovo fell, didn't it?"  And then

19     you answered what Colonel Leslie told you.

20             I see in your article:  "In the last week of July the Croat

21     forces moved swiftly and decisively to take the town of Bosanska

22     Grahovo."  It surprises me a bit that where your article clearly states

23     this that you are talking about ARSK troops in Bosanska Grahovo.  The

24     question simply was about whether it fell and that's what your article

25     says.  So therefore, I do understand that you are precise in your

Page 7199

 1     answers, that you do not want to say anything that you're not certain

 2     about.  At the same time, you're invited to answer questions.

 3             Please proceed, Mr. Kehoe.

 4             MR. KEHOE:

 5        Q.   Did you know in your information-gathering that the ARSK was

 6     planning a counter-attack against the HV in late July, early August of

 7     1995?  Did you know that?

 8        A.   I didn't gather that information in Sector South, so I have no

 9     idea what they were planning at the end of July.

10        Q.   Were you talking to ARSK personnel during this period of time?

11        A.   No, I wasn't.

12        Q.   So the information that you got came solely within UN Sector

13     South headquarters?

14        A.   No, the information I got was information I gathered off the

15     ground.  So the information I gathered was specifically where I went out

16     and gathered it for myself.  There may have -- no, in fact there was

17     information that I also gathered from the United Nations battalions

18     within Sector South and from United Nations military observers.  So I had

19     a variety of sources.

20        Q.   Now, during your gathering of information from a variety of

21     sources, did you ever hear the description of an ARSK offensive called

22     Dinara '95?

23        A.   No.

24        Q.   Let me turn your attention to the 4th of August and the entire

25     operation, and I'd like to move this into two separate areas, one the

Page 7200

 1     shelling, and, one the actual operation.  I mean, you note in your --

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe -- Mr. Kehoe, I'm looking at the clock,

 3     and at the same time I get a feeling that we are moving to a bit of a

 4     different subject.

 5             MR. KEHOE:  We, sir, we are, sir.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Then I'd first like to have the break.  But before

 7     we take a break, could I ask Madam Usher to escort the witness out of the

 8     courtroom.

 9             [The witness stands down]

10             JUDGE ORIE:  My question may not come as a surprise.  How much

11     time you think you would need, Mr. Kehoe?

12             MR. KEHOE:  If I look at the difficulty that --

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please, for Mr. Kehoe.

14             MR. KEHOE:  Excuse me.  If I look at the difficulty that I've had

15     getting answers for this witness, I would say about three hours.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I would say perhaps the difficulties might be

17     less if you -- although I do recognise that to some extent what you say

18     is right, to some extent also you cause part of the problem yourself by

19     the way you're questioning the witness.  The Chamber will consider also

20     in view of the way in which you used your time until now how much time it

21     will grant, but before we make final scheduling arrangements, and perhaps

22     we also might delay this, but I'd like to hear from other Defence counsel

23     how much time they would need.

24             MR. CAYLEY:  Yes, Your Honour.  I anticipate based on what I've

25     heard about so far about 15 to 20 minutes.

Page 7201

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Mr. Mikulicic.

 2             MR. MIKULICIC:  Yes, Your Honour.  Speaking from my position I

 3     could anticipate two hours.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  So the existing claim -- well, at least the wishes

 5     amount to five and a half hours.  Three hours for you, Mr. Kehoe, 20

 6     minutes for Mr. Cayley, and then two and a half hours.  That comes close

 7     to six hours.

 8             Perhaps as the Chamber will consider the matter, I take it that

 9     Defence counsel will consider the matter as well, I would not be

10     surprised if the consultation with my colleagues would result in an

11     outcome that we would certainly conclude the testimony of this witness

12     before the recess.  We have a break and we will resume at five minutes to

13     6.00.

14                           --- Recess taken at 5.32 p.m.

15                           --- On resuming at 5.58 p.m.

16                           [The witness takes the stand]

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe.

18             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Your Honour?

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Before we continue, I would like to deal briefly

20     with one procedural matter.

21             I do understand that both Prosecution and Defence would like the

22     Chamber to -- to override the time limits under Rule 126 bis.  Now, the

23     variation of time limits under Rule 127 starts:  "Save as provided by..."

24     et cetera, et cetera, "... the Trial Chamber or Pre-Trial Chamber may on

25     good cause being shown by motion."  May I take it that your motion of all

Page 7202

 1     parties is that the good cause to override the time limits under Rule 126

 2     bis is that it would cause you extreme difficulties during the recess

 3     period to respond in time.  Is that your motion?

 4             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Your Honour.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Is that your motion, Mr. Tieger?

 6             MR. TIEGER:  That's correct, Your Honour.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Then the Chamber will decide on this motion in which

 8     good cause was shown for extending in general terms the time limit

 9     provided for in Rule 126 bis, that is that a response to a motion filed

10     by a party shall be filed within 14 days of the filing of the motion,

11     that as of next Monday, which is the first day of the recess, is extended

12     in general terms to three weeks instead of 14 days for the two weeks to

13     come.  That means that a motion filed in the last week of the recess,

14     that the Chamber would expect a response within 14 days.  That means that

15     you would then, within the first week after the recess -- and the recess

16     is not four weeks, but the recess is three weeks.  We are not sitting the

17     first week after the recess.  If this causes you major problems, I could

18     extend this ruling to three weeks.  It would then cover the whole of the

19     recess but not the first week of non-sitting after the recess.

20             What is your wish?

21             MR. KEHOE:  I think we contemplated that it would cover the

22     entire four weeks.  I did talk to Mr. Waespi about it, Mr. Tieger, and I

23     think that that's what we were talking about, because I think people were

24     otherwise --

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Otherwise, then it would mean that a motion

Page 7203

 1     filed one day before the four weeks expire, that you would have three

 2     weeks.  That sounds not, in my ears, to be the right solution.

 3             Then we would extend it to the full three weeks of the official

 4     ICTY recess.

 5             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Your Honour.  I think that would be -- suffice.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  And that is the recess that starts next Monday and

 7     lasts for three weeks.

 8             Mr. Tieger.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  I actually perhaps didn't think through all the

10     variations and as Mr. Kehoe indicated, I think he was communicating with

11     Mr. Waespi on this, but I think we also contemplated that there'd be at

12     least some measure of consideration for motions filed immediately before

13     the recess, that somehow there'd be an extension --

14             JUDGE ORIE:  You'd like to make it effective today, because --

15             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Your Honour.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Today.  Well, let's say on the -- is there any

17     filing to be expected today?

18             MR. KEHOE:  I think that we'll probably file something --

19             JUDGE ORIE:  You'll file.

20             MR. KEHOE: -- maybe tomorrow.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Then we'll extend that --

22             MR. KEHOE:  [Overlapping speakers] filed.

23             MR. MISETIC:  It's already filed.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  It's already filed.  But of course an extension of

25     time can be given even if the time has not yet elapsed although the

Page 7204

 1     motion has been filed.

 2             Then, also looking at my colleagues, but then this ruling that

 3     the 14 days time limit in Rule 126 bis, as of today, is generally

 4     extended to three weeks, and this ruling is valid for any motion filed as

 5     of today until the end of the official recess of the Tribunal, which is

 6     one week before we resume our hearings.

 7             Yes?  Okay.

 8             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Your Honour.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  We have dealt with that.  Then we continue

10     with the examination of the witness.

11             Mr. Kehoe, I looked again at Rule 90(h).  You don't have to put

12     your case to every witness.  Rule 90(h) says that:  "In the

13     cross-examination of a witness who is able to give evidence relevant to

14     the case for the cross-examining party, counsel shall put to that witness

15     the nature of the case of the party for whom that counsel," I think it

16     says, "appears which is in contradiction of the evidence given by the

17     witness."  So that's a very limited situation.

18             May I draw your attention especially to both in 90(h)(i) and (ii)

19     "...where the witness is able to give evidence relevant to the case for

20     the cross-examining party."  That is the first thing to be explored and

21     apparently there are areas where the witness is not able to do so, then

22     of course the usual rule 90(h)(i) applies.

23             Mr. Dangerfield, at the same time I'd like to ask you and to urge

24     you to answer the questions in the most direct way.  If you don't know,

25     tell us.  If you do know, tell it.

Page 7205

 1             And, Mr. Kehoe, you're invited to put questions in as direct a

 2     manner as possible to the witness.

 3             The Chamber will look at the next 55 minutes to see what would be

 4     appropriate as far as the allocation of time.  I already said before, and

 5     it has not changed, that we'd like to conclude perhaps not one minute

 6     before the recess, perhaps even a bit more, because there might be a few

 7     other matters.

 8             Keep that in mind, and we'll further observe the way in which the

 9     witness is cross-examined.

10             Please proceed.

11             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Your Honour.  Thank you.

12        Q.   Mr. Dangerfield, I'd like to point your attention to your brief

13     overview report of the 4th of August.  For the record that's P698.

14             Do you have that before you, is sir?

15        A.   Yes, I do.

16        Q.   Now, I'm going to go through a series of areas in this document

17     and then ask you a few questions, and I'd like to start with paragraph 2

18     of that document on page 1.  It notes that in the first sentence:  "It

19     was a long time before HV-HVO made any headway on the ground," and then

20     you discuss the five areas of attack -- axes of attack, Excuse me.

21             And if I move to -- move to paragraph 10 of this same document,

22     and you're reflecting back on what happened on the 4th.

23             You note that the second sentence:  "G2 assessment is that Knin

24     may fall by dark of 05 August.  In order to do so, I believe that the HV

25     will require a more successful day than today.  Troops approaching from

Page 7206

 1     the south face a stiff opposition."  And then you saw that -- that the

 2     same sentence we talked before about the tracked vehicles.

 3             And if we can go to paragraph 11:  "In the west HV advances face

 4     problems of indirect major routes and at times difficult terrain in the

 5     approaches towards Knin."

 6             And once again paragraph 12:  "While Knin may come under heavy

 7     artillery attack again, the considerable presence of ARSK forces in the

 8     area will require more time before they come under direct fire from HV

 9     tanks."

10             Now, I just wanted to go through those -- those items for you.

11     And your assessment was that, even going back to paragraph 2, is that the

12     ground forces of the HV-HVO were having a difficult time fighting the

13     ARSK, weren't they?

14        A.   They are assessments based on the reports from the national

15     battalions on the ground.  The actual verification of the troops on the

16     ground was not verified by myself.

17        Q.   But the suffice -- I'm sorry.  But it would be accurate to say,

18     Mr. Dangerfield, that there was heavy fighting between the HV and RSK

19     troops throughout the entire area at the commencement of Operation Storm,

20     was there not?

21        A.   The information I have given is, as I say, based on reports.  I

22     can't say for certain that there was.

23        Q.   Well, based on the information that you received, this is

24     certainly what you sent down to Split and to Gornji Vakuf as to what the

25     situation was at the end of the 4th; right?

Page 7207

 1        A.   That is correct, but then I never managed to see in my entire

 2     time in Sector South sufficient forces.

 3        Q.   Well --

 4        A.   So my assessment was they didn't have very many forces, but the

 5     reports from the other nations suggest otherwise.

 6        Q.   So the reports from the other nations that were out in the area

 7     and observation posts, were contrary to the information that you gathered

 8     yourself.  Is that accurate?

 9        A.   No, because they're different sources of information on different

10     days.

11        Q.   Well, if the information that you were coming back with

12     indicated, and I'm talking about indications from the various battalions,

13     indicated to you that there was heavy fighting between the HV and the

14     ARSK, where did this information come from?  Where did these soldiers for

15     the ARSK come from?

16        A.   The information in this particular report is based on the reports

17     received from the outlying United Nations battalions.

18        Q.   That's not my question, sir.  My question is --

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, you put two questions.  The first:  Where

20     did this information come from.  And then without waiting for the answer,

21     you asked:  Where did these soldiers for the ARSK come from.  So these

22     were the two questions.

23             MR. KEHOE:  I apologise for that, Judge.  They are two questions

24     and that was improper.  And I will --

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, it's not easy to answer them.  Of course we

Page 7208

 1     should explore whether the witness knew where these soldiers -- where he

 2     said he didn't know they were there where then at least they came from.

 3             Let's try to take it step-by-step.  Please proceed.

 4             MR. KEHOE:

 5        Q.   Mr. Dangerfield, you noted for us that the information you were

 6     receiving from the UN battalions was that there was heavy fighting going

 7     on between the HV and the ARSK; is that correct?

 8        A.   The reports indicated that.

 9        Q.   The reports that you were receiving?

10        A.   The reports at that came from the other battalions indicated that

11     there may have been heavy fighting.

12        Q.   Now, my question for you is:  If there were ARSK soldiers that

13     were fighting against these HV soldiers, where did these ARSK soldiers

14     come from?

15        A.   I didn't physically see the soldiers, so I don't know where they

16     came from.

17        Q.   Now, there was a considerable presence of ARSK forces in the

18     area, was there not?

19        A.   When you say "the area," could you clarify that, please?

20        Q.   Well, let's go directly to your statement and maybe you can

21     clarify it for us.

22        A.   Yep.

23        Q.   Paragraph 12:  "While Knin may come under heavy artillery attack

24     again, the considerable presence of ARSK forces in the area will require

25     more time before they come under direct fire from HV tanks."

Page 7209

 1             Now, going back to the question that I asked before, and that's

 2     in line 14 when I said to you:  There was a considerable presence of ARSK

 3     forces in the area, was there not?

 4        A.   No, there wasn't.

 5        Q.   See what you wrote down in this report is either not true or

 6     incorrect?

 7        A.   No.  I'm not saying that about this report at all.

 8        Q.   Well, you told your superiors in Gornji Vakuf and also in Split

 9     that there were considerable presence of forces -- of ARSK forces in the

10     area, and by that you meant the Knin area, didn't you?

11        A.   I don't believe I did.

12        Q.   Well, let's -- let's develop that further.  What area did you

13     think you were talking about, or what area were you talking about?

14        A.   This is 13 years on.  I believe it may have been a misuse of the

15     English language and how it was written down.

16        Q.   Well, what you thought was going to happen, Mr. Dangerfield, was

17     that that was going to be a bloody stand in Knin, didn't you?

18        A.   Could you direct me to my statement -- in my statement to the

19     words you just used, please?

20        Q.   Let's go back to paragraph 15?

21        A.   Thank you.

22        Q.   This is your conclusion, isn't it:  "The request for aid to

23     evacuate women and children leaving behind ARSK troops shows signs of a

24     disturbing final showdown."

25             Now, before we move on -- excuse me let me ask a you question,

Page 7210

 1     sir.  You believed that with the considerable ARSK resources that Knin

 2     was going to be defended in a bloody last stand, didn't you?

 3        A.   No.  I think I'm referring there to any of the civilians that

 4     were left in Knin.

 5        Q.   Well, let's go back up to paragraph 13, and we can answer that

 6     question.

 7              "In a meeting today with UN personnel from HQ Sector South, the

 8     local RSK personnel requested humanitarian assistance.  The RSK personnel

 9     were described as hysterical and in a state of bewilderment.  They have

10     asked for UN support to evacuate some 32.000 people from the Krajina,

11     including 15.000 from the Knin area.  These will be women and children up

12     to the ages of 15.  Those remaining will be purely ARSK troops."

13             So from your own statement the evacuation was going to take

14     place.  There was, as you say in paragraph 12, a considerable presence of

15     ARSK forces in the area, and you believed, as of the end of the day on

16     the 4th, that this showed signs of a disturbing final showdown, or as you

17     say two lines later in 15, "a bloody last stand."  Isn't that right?

18        A.   I think that would be referring to the less than a hundred

19     soldiers I spoke about earlier on.

20        Q.   So when you are talking about your hundred soldiers, is that the

21     considerable presence of ARSK forces in the area that you refer to in

22     paragraph 12?

23        A.   Area's not geographically specific in terms of size.

24        Q.   Let me ask you a question, sir, about this document.  Have you

25     met with anybody other than the Office of the Prosecutor in the past six

Page 7211

 1     months about your testimony in this case?  And I'm not referring to

 2     members of the Office of the Prosecutor.  I'm talking about other people.

 3        A.   No, I have not.

 4        Q.   You haven't sat down with anybody from the British government, is

 5     that right?

 6        A.   No, I have not.

 7        Q.   So let me ask a you question.  How long were you in the military,

 8     sir?

 9        A.   Sixteen years, sir.

10        Q.   And you're familiar with the fighting in built-up areas, aren't

11     you?

12        A.   I understand that term.

13        Q.   And you understand that fighting in built-up areas is probably --

14     I'm just waiting for the translation.  And you understand that fighting

15     in built-up areas is the bloodiest combat for an infantry soldier that

16     there is, isn't that right?

17        A.   I believe so.

18        Q.   And the one thing, the one thing that the military -- as a

19     military man, the one thing you want to avoid is fighting in built-up

20     areas because of the carnage that comes out of it.  Isn't that right?

21        A.   Under certain circumstances I think that would be fair to say.

22        Q.   Now, when you are referring to this last showdown, you

23     believed -- I'm sorry, Judge.  Sorry.

24             I apologise, Mr. Dangerfield.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Pause now and then.

Page 7212

 1             MR. KEHOE:  I understand, Judge.

 2        Q.   Now, when you're referring to this last showdown, this bloody

 3     last stand as you say in 15, you were referring to your belief that it

 4     would take a fight in a built-up area with a tremendous amount of carnage

 5     before Knin fell.  Isn't that what you believed, and isn't that what you

 6     sent on to your headquarters?

 7        A.   I think we expected any ARSK troops that were remaining to come

 8     back to Knin.  I don't think we were expecting them to go straight

 9     through Knin and out of the area.

10        Q.   So taking your answer, you expected retreating ARSK forces, and I

11     take this -- by the way, let me ask you a question.  What time of day did

12     you file this report, do you know?

13        A.   No, I don't.

14        Q.   Well, as of the end of the 4th, you expected retreating -- or

15     ARSK forces to come back into Knin for a last-pitched stand to protect

16     the city, didn't you?

17        A.   That's my assessment, and that's what I would have done.

18        Q.   Now --

19        A.   It's not necessarily what they would have done or what they did.

20        Q.   Given the fact that you would have done it as a military man, you

21     would agree with me it was more than reasonable for General Gotovina to

22     conclude, as you did, that the ARSK would do the same thing, that is,

23     have a last-pitch stand in Knin.  Isn't that right?

24        A.   I don't know what is reasonable for General Gotovina.  I don't

25     know how he specifically operates, so I can't comment on that.  Or

Page 7213

 1     operated.

 2        Q.   Well, the forces of the ARSK did in fact withdraw for the defence

 3     of Knin on the evening hours of the 4th, didn't they?

 4        A.   I don't believe so.

 5        Q.   Let me turn to you D713.  This is an article or, actually, an

 6     interview from Radio Belgrade as of 2200 hours, 20 hours GMT on the 4th

 7     of August.  And this is a BBC Summary Service of Radio Belgrade.  If we

 8     can scroll down just a bit at mid-page.  Up a little bit more.  Okay.

 9     That's good.  In the middle of that page, question to the -- General

10     Mrksic:  "Does this mean that they have breached the front line?

11              "No.  The disengagement line has not been changed, our forces

12     have withdrawn to the positions to the direct defence of Knin."

13             Do you have any information, sir, that what General Mrksic was

14     saying is incorrect?

15        A.   I can't comment on aspects of media and journalism.

16        Q.   Well, isn't what General Mrksic said consistent with the report

17     that you said -- that you wrote on the 4th of August about there going to

18     be a final showdown and a last bloody stand?  Isn't that consistent with

19     what you wrote to your headquarters?

20        A.   I can't comment on General Mrksic.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  You're not asked to comment on General Mrksic.

22     You're asked whether what you read as what General Mrksic allegedly has

23     said, whether that would be consistent with your report.  That was the

24     question.

25             THE WITNESS:  I don't believe so, sir.

Page 7214

 1             MR. KEHOE:

 2        Q.   Why?

 3        A.   Because I don't know that this is what General Mrksic said.  This

 4     is a piece of paper with a transcript.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Dangerfield, you're not invited to -- to comment

 6     on whether these are the words of General Mrksic, yes or no.  It is put

 7     to you that General Mrksic has spoken these words, and on an assumption

 8     that that is what he said, you're invited to see whether this is

 9     consistent or inconsistent with what you reported.

10             Could you please answer that question?

11             THE WITNESS:  I don't believe it is consistent, sir.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  And then Mr. Kehoe intended then to have a pause,

13     and then to ask you why.  Could you explain?

14             Mr. Dangerfield, could you explain why you consider what was put

15     to you as the words of General Mrksic is not consistent with your report?

16     I appreciate that you took a pause, but it was a rather long pause.

17             THE WITNESS:  The English language is very complex, and I don't

18     believe -- I'll just rewind.  Different words and phrases mean different

19     things, and I am not certain that what he is saying is consistent with

20     what I am saying, and therefore I cannot say whether it is consistent or

21     not.  This is someone else's translation.  It is not my translation, so

22     it doesn't necessarily mean the same thing to me.  So I am not prepared

23     to say that it is consistent.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Then you are in a position to explain to us how you

25     understand these words.  Whether that is what Mr. Mrksic meant is a

Page 7215

 1     totally different matter, but the wording as it comes to you now, in your

 2     understanding of the English language, which again might be a different

 3     one from mine, but could you please explain in what respect the words

 4     apparently spoken by Mr. Mrksic, as you understand them, are inconsistent

 5     with what your reporting?

 6             THE WITNESS:  Okay.  The paragraph begins the Mrksic paragraph,

 7     "No, the disengagement line"?  Is that correct, the paragraph you're

 8     referring to?

 9             MR. KEHOE:

10        Q.   That's -- that's the paragraph, sir.

11        A.   Okay.  Let me just read my bit.  Okay.  I believe that Mrksic is

12     saying that his troops have withdrawn to positions and that they are

13     controlling various areas.  I refer to areas, as I'm not sure of Kordun,

14     exactly where that is.  As for "we shall create conditions," and

15     everything else, I don't think that applies, and therefore with the

16     advance -- with what's written in my statement, with the advancing

17     Croatian troops looking at Knin as their final objective and ARSK troops

18     remaining, I'm not specific on numbers.  I have said:  "Milan Martic will

19     have to surrender or face a bloody last stand in the capital of Krajina,"

20     and that is my opinion.  Surrender bit is not consistent with this

21     passage of General Mrksic's, and I have -- I have written "face a bloody

22     last stand."  "A bloody last stand" does not refer to a specific number

23     of troops and he has referred to the direct defence of Knin.

24        Q.   Well, sir, where did you get your information about the bloody

25     last stand and the final showdown that you put in this report?

Page 7216

 1        A.   From the various sources within the headquarters of Sector South.

 2        Q.   Who?

 3        A.   Well, it could have been the ops room, the UNMOs.  Either of

 4     those sources.

 5        Q.   Well, sir, there was still fighting -- if I can just pause a bit.

 6     There was still fighting going on on the evening of the 4th between the

 7     HV and the ARSK, was there not?

 8        A.   I don't know.

 9        Q.   Let me show you -- read you something from a clip which is D123,

10     4 August, 1995, at 23.40.  You remember Colonel Leslie, don't you?

11        A.   I do indeed.

12        Q.   Question:  "In your judgement are the Croats on point of taking

13     the town?"  Talking about Knin.  Leslie:  "Taking Knin, no.  We've had no

14     reports of Croatians being within direct fire range of Knin, and there's

15     still a lot of Serbs in Knin and in the surrounding hills so there we

16     go."

17             Was that the situation on the evening of the 4th, sir?

18        A.   That's Colonel Leslie's interpretation of it, yes.

19        Q.   Do you disagree with Colonel Leslie's interpretation?

20        A.   I would disagree with "there's still a lot of Serbs in Knin."

21        Q.   Were you in Knin on the 4th?

22        A.   No, I was not, but I had been prior to it.

23        Q.   On the 5th, the fighting still continued on the 5th.  And let me

24     go to your article, and that would be The Fall of the Republic of Serb

25     Krajina, P699, paragraph 4.  This is after the -- after the carryover

Page 7217

 1     paragraph it is the third paragraph down on page 4.

 2              "I learnt from various sources that in the south the Croatian

 3     forces advancing from Sinj had taken considerably more ground than we

 4     expected.  Intelligence revealed that they had actually advanced the full

 5     10 kilometres.  We later learned that the Croats had been

 6     counter-attacked and driven back by the Serbs twice.  To the rest of the

 7     sector, the Croats had considerably less success and appeared to face

 8     much stiffer opposition."

 9             So you -- there was still a significant amount of heavy fighting

10     between the HV and the ARSK again on the 5th of August, wasn't there?

11        A.   Those were the reports that came in from the other battalion.

12     They were not specifically verified, nor more importantly confirm by

13     myself.  "Heavy" is a relative term.

14        Q.   But you accepted those reports, Mr. Dangerfield, and you noted

15     that the Croats had considerably less success and appeared to face much

16     stiffer opposition.  Those were your words, were they not?

17        A.   Those were words from my interpretation of the battalion's

18     outline.  As I said, I did not specifically verify and confirm those

19     actions, operations, ongoing battles.  So then nothing was confirmed by

20     me on that subject.

21        Q.   Did you use those reports to update your superiors?

22        A.   I don't recall.

23        Q.   Did you use those reports to write this article P699?

24        A.   Some of them I will have done.

25        Q.   So when they told you about this opposition and fighting, you

Page 7218

 1     accepted it as true, didn't you?

 2        A.   I accepted it as the opinions of those who filed their

 3     information.  Whether it is true or not is not for me to say.

 4        Q.   Let us move on.  If I might have one moment, Your Honour.

 5             Let me cover a few things that were covered on direct examination

 6     dealing with your reports, and in paragraph 33 Mr. Russo -- and the

 7     report that I'm talking about is 695.  I apologise, sir.  That's your

 8     report of 12/12/95, and I believe you were quoted that the 7th -- the

 9     middle of paragraph 33 -- are you with me, sir?

10        A.   I am indeed.

11        Q.   And again if I get ahead, just please stop me.

12             "7th Puma Brigade was the first to enter the town.  All the HV

13     military vehicles had stickers on denoting this.  The first vehicles in

14     were the tanks and the APCs.  They arrived in a convoy and were not

15     moving tactically because of this.  I don't think they were expecting

16     much resistance.  At about 1300, trucks and jeeps arrived."

17             Now, sir, what time -- I'm sorry.  What time did the 7th

18     Puma Brigade arrive in Knin that you observed and what you're referring

19     to?

20        A.   I don't know.  It would be sometime on the date that I put in

21     here, so sometime on the 5th of August.

22        Q.   Well you note here that the jeeps came at 1300?

23        A.   Trucks and jeeps, yes.

24        Q.   Is that about the time the Puma Brigade came?

25        A.   Reading that text, I suspect it was prior to that but not by

Page 7219

 1     much.

 2        Q.   Approximately when?

 3        A.   I don't know.  Sometime in the previous couple of hours.

 4        Q.   So sometime between 11.00 and 1.00?

 5        A.   I'm happy to accept that approximation.

 6        Q.   When you wrote this --

 7        A.   I don't know when I wrote this.

 8        Q.   Excuse me, I'm just waiting for the --

 9        A.   Sorry.

10        Q.   Sorry.  When you wrote this, sir --

11        A.   Yeah.

12        Q.   -- did you know that the HV was already at the hospital and

13     inside by 11.00 in the morning?

14        A.   No, I didn't.

15        Q.   So if they were in radio communication and if they were in the

16     hospital, it would be reasonable for the HV, as they were driving

17     through, to conclude that they weren't going to face any resistance;

18     right?

19        A.   No, because I believe the hospital is some way out from the

20     centre of Knin.

21        Q.   How far?

22        A.   I'd have to look at the map to be specific.

23        Q.   Were they carrying radios?

24        A.   Who?

25        Q.   The HV have radios?

Page 7220

 1        A.   The ones at the hospital?

 2        Q.   The ones that you saw.

 3        A.   Okay.  The ones that I saw on the tanks or the trucks, and the

 4     jeeps?

 5        Q.   Anywhere.

 6        A.   I don't know.

 7        Q.   Now let's talk for a minute about the shelling of Knin.  You

 8     noted in your statement, if I may, that when the shelling started, and

 9     I'm referring you to -- you to 699.  That isn't your statement.  It's the

10     article.  I apologise.  And in the last paragraph it says, "When it came

11     it was a shock and truly terrifying."  In the last sentence:  "And within

12     seconds my actions were those of someone who was terrified and in a state

13     of panic."

14             I think you told us this morning that you went down for the first

15     hour and a half or so and you were in bunker; is that right?

16        A.   I went down there from about 5.00 till 6.30.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Last paragraph of what, Mr. --

18             MR. KEHOE:  Last paragraph of the -- the article of -- I

19     apologise, Judge.  This is the 699, The Fall of the Republic of the Serb

20     Krajina.  It's on the second page of this article, the last paragraph.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

22             MR. KEHOE:

23        Q.   So for the first hour and a half you have no knowledge exactly

24     what was being targeted HV fire, do you?

25        A.   Yes, Knin in general.

Page 7221

 1        Q.   Did you see it?

 2        A.   No, but it sounded like it.  It was rockets and shells of

 3     considerable proportion.

 4        Q.   Do you know what was in fact hit at 5.00 in the morning or

 5     between 5.00 and 6.30?

 6        A.   I could not identify anything specifically as I was in the

 7     bunker.

 8        Q.   When you came out of the bunker you noted that there was a

 9     tremendous amount of smoke.  Isn't that right?

10        A.   I did say that.

11        Q.   And in your statement --

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Dangerfield, Mr. Kehoe asked you whether that's

13     right.  Of course he quotes you because you've said that.  He's seeking

14     confirmation that what you said is what you meant to say, and then the

15     answer, "I did say that," does not give the information Mr. Kehoe is

16     seeking.

17             At the same time, Mr. Kehoe, the witness has, of course, already

18     testified as to the accuracy and -- so therefore you often start asking

19     whether something is right when you could move on more quickly.

20             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, sir.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

22             MR. KEHOE:

23        Q.   Now, in your statement of -- P695, your 1990 -- I apologise, 1995

24     statement.  This is on page 7 of P695, in the centre of the page.  You --

25     if I may, we're just going to bring this up on the screen.  Can we go to

Page 7222

 1     the next page on that, please.  I think there's a B/C/S -- that's the

 2     page.  If we just go to the middle of the page, there, the top -- excuse

 3     me.  Just down a little bit.  Okay.  Let me see.  That's good.  About

 4     midway down of that paragraph of paragraph 30.

 5             It notes:  "The town of Knin."  Do you see that, sir?  "The town

 6     of Knin was also covered by so much dust?"

 7        A.   Yes, I do.

 8        Q.    "The town of Knin was covered with so much dust and smoke from

 9     the shelling that no one would have been able to see where the rounds

10     were landing unless they were standing in the immediate vicinity of the

11     impacts."

12             Now, where do you say in this statement that the smoke cleared

13     and that you were able to see the point of impacts?  Please look through

14     this, or if you know off the top of your head I'd invite you to tell us

15     where that is.

16             MR. RUSSO:  Your Honour, I'm sorry, but if counsel knows it's not

17     in there --

18             MR. KEHOE:  It's not in there.  If you stipulate to that we'll

19     move on.  It's not in there, is it?

20             MR. RUSSO:  I'll stipulate to that.

21             MR. KEHOE:

22        Q.   Let me show you a photograph that's in evidence, and it is --

23     yeah.

24             MR. KEHOE:  If I can just explain this, Judge.  It's actually

25     D569, but if, Madam Usher, you could bring it up as 1D380203.  This is

Page 7223

 1     one of those photographs, Judge, that we had put in through Sanction, and

 2     I don't think it was uploaded between the time we used it and the time

 3     of ...

 4             If we could blow that up a little bit.

 5        Q.   Sir, that is photograph that was on the left-hand side OTP taken

 6     of -- in late November -- or November of last year.  I'm not certain of

 7     the exact date, counsel.

 8             And then the last one is one taken at the same time both from the

 9     balcony area of the headquarters for UN Sector South.

10             Now, just looking at the first one on the right-hand side with

11     the smoke in the distance, that was essentially the viewpoint that you

12     had when you were looking into downtown Knin, didn't you?

13        A.   I don't recognise this photo, and I don't recognise what time of

14     the day it was taken.

15        Q.   Well, you talked to us -- I can offer to you that this was taken

16     into the early morning hours during the attack.  It was presented in a

17     video coming from the OTP.

18             But your viewpoint going into Knin was -- looking at the

19     photograph on the left, that would be a viewpoint going into downtown

20     Knin.  Isn't that right?

21        A.   I don't remember the viewpoint from the balcony looking into

22     Knin.

23        Q.   Well --

24        A.   And I don't recognise that photo.

25        Q.   Well, when you were offering testimony this morning about the

Page 7224

 1     areas of impact in Knin, you have no idea of what was actually impacted,

 2     do you?

 3        A.   I do, because when I stood on the balcony and viewed it I was

 4     using binoculars.

 5        Q.   Binoculars.  You didn't say that this morning, did you?  So you

 6     were with binoculars and the smoke cleared; is that right?

 7        A.   I think -- I think you said, sir, that the -- this photo, you

 8     know, is an early morning shot.  I certainly recall being able to stand

 9     wherever I did on that headquarters.  The smoke had lifted, and when I

10     was viewing through my binoculars, when I could and when the time

11     allowed, I could see the areas, not the precise impact point, but the

12     areas as I circled on the map where the rounds were falling.  So, yes, I

13     can say that the rounds were falling into those residential areas

14     categorically.

15        Q.   Categorically.  Let's pull up P62.

16             Now, sir, in your statement of -- before we go to this, of 695,

17     you offered us, one, two, three, four, five -- six various targets, and

18     I'm talking about paragraph 26 of your statement, and you left out or you

19     didn't designate the headquarters of the army of the Republika Srpska

20     Krajina.  Where is it?

21        A.   There's something wrong with this photo.

22        Q.   Well, it's the photo you used to circle this -- it's the same

23     photo you used to circle under P697 this morning.  The same one.

24        A.   It just doesn't look similar.

25        Q.   Well let's go back to 697, P697.  We'll use that one.

Page 7225

 1             MR. KEHOE:  I'm sorry, Madam Usher.  I apologise.

 2        Q.   Now, you recognise that one, don't you?

 3        A.   It may be similar.  I'm prepared to say that I believe it's a

 4     different resolution, and so it may -- it certainly appears different.

 5        Q.   What appears different?

 6        A.   The two pictures.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  It's not photoed well on that.

 8             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, sir.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Apparently the witness may have problems zooming in

10     and zooming out, and what you see on the screen is not what you see if

11     you're marking something on a desk or a table, but let's move on.

12             MR. KEHOE:

13        Q.   Where is the headquarters of the army of Republika Srpska

14     Krajina?

15        A.   I can't comment on that.  All I can comment on are the various

16     locations that are printed on the map, on the map that I have signed and

17     the residential areas that I have located.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Dangerfield, a question is put to you, and

19     I'd -- if you say, "I can't comment on that," the issue is not whether

20     you feel that you can comment on it but whether you know the answer to

21     the question.

22             The question was:  Where is the headquarters of the army of the

23     Republika Srpska Krajina?  Do you know or do you not know.

24             THE WITNESS:  I don't sir.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

Page 7226

 1             MR. KEHOE:

 2        Q.   Well, let's look at the actual targets that you gave us, and in

 3     paragraph 26.  Could you go to paragraph 26?  You gave us a series of

 4     items with a six-digit grid, and that's -- we know from other witnesses

 5     that the six-digit grids is a hundred metres by a hundred metres; is that

 6     right?

 7        A.   That's correct.

 8        Q.   Let's look at the grid reference that you -- if we could put

 9     1D420001 on the screen.  If we can spin that, please.  The other way.

10     Sorry.

11             Now, this is a grid reference you gave us in C for the general

12     supply, and the grid reference you gave us within a hundred metres is

13     363775.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Russo.

15             MR. RUSSO:  Yes, Your Honour.  The -- looking at this series of

16     pictures in this exhibit, it appears that, and correct me if I'm wrong,

17     Counsel, that they're going to put to the witness that the areas that

18     he's identified, the grid square references that he's identified, are

19     different from the areas where he identifies that they are using this

20     Google image map.  I'm not aware of, and certainly we'd like to know what

21     the foundation for the fact that the grid square reference can be placed

22     on using Google Earth; specifically, that the grid square reference that

23     he used when he picked the map can be superimposed on an image from which

24     we don't know the elevation and we don't the other factors.

25             In other words, they're going to put to him that this is correct

Page 7227

 1     and what you said was incorrect.  I'd like some foundation laid for the

 2     fact that this is correct, please.

 3             MR. KEHOE:  May I respond.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, yes, please.

 5             MR. KEHOE:  Grid references are grid references no matter where

 6     you go and what you do, and the grid references are within -- the

 7     six-digit grid references put in by the witness are within a hundred

 8     metres of one another.  All one need do is go out and look at the grid

 9     references given by the witness and compare it to the grid references on

10     the map, and I will tell you categorically that on the five grid

11     reference that he put down he's 0 for 5.

12             MR. RUSSO:  Your Honour, I would agree that grid square

13     references are uniform; however, they're uniform to uniform maps.  This

14     is not a map, this is a satellite image for which we don't know the

15     elevation at which it's taken.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  And now I have to shed my own light and please

17     correct me when I'm wrong.

18             Grid references refer to a division in squares of the earth

19     surface.  Now, if you have a larger map, the -- that means a scale with a

20     lower number, 1:5.000, 1:10.000, then the grid references, the grid

21     rectangulars appear larger on the map as everything appears larger on

22     that map.  So to that extent when you have a larger map the grid

23     references will enlarge with it, and if you take a map with more

24     precision, a scale lower than the previous one, then it will adapt.  So

25     therefore, it does not depend on the maps.  The grid reference will

Page 7228

 1     always appear on the same location on the map.  Otherwise, you might have

 2     a problem, because if you manipulate the maps seriously enough then Rome

 3     suddenly would be New York.  Let's proceed.

 4             Mr. Russo, if there's any reason to correct my understanding of

 5     this, please do so, but I'm usually rather hesitant to give my own views

 6     on matters.  But if you agree then please feel free, or think it over

 7     perhaps during the night, because it's 7.00.

 8             MR. RUSSO:  Yes, sir.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  We will continue with grid references tomorrow

10     morning.  But, Mr. Dangerfield, first I'd like to instruct you that you

11     should not speak with anyone about the testimony, whether that's the

12     testimony you gave today or whether that's the testimony still to be

13     given tomorrow.  We -- we'd like to see you back, and we will adjourn

14     until tomorrow morning, 9.00 in this same courtroom.

15                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.01 p.m.,

16                           to be reconvened on Friday, the 25th day of July,

17                           2008, at 9.00 a.m.