Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 11798

 1                           Friday, 14 November 2008

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to everyone.

 7             Mr. Misetic, I see you're ready to continue your

 8     cross-examination.

 9             Mr. Novakovic, I'd like to remind you that you're still bound by

10     the solemn declaration you gave at the beginning of your testimony; that

11     is, that you would speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

12     truth.

13             Please proceed.

14             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I believe we have to call the case

15     yet.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Oh, yes.

17             I think it's not been done.

18             Mr. Registrar.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning to

20     everyone in the courtroom.  This is case number IT-06-90-T, The

21     Prosecutor versus Ante Gotovina, et al.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

23             Thank you, Mr. Misetic could for reminding me.  We can't do

24     without each other.

25             Please proceed.

Page 11799

 1                           WITNESS:  KOSTA NOVAKOVIC [Resumed]

 2                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

 3                           Cross-examination by Mr. Misetic:  [Continued]

 4             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 5        Q.   Good morning again, Mr. Novakovic.

 6        A.   Good morning, Mr. Misetic.

 7        Q.   Now, we left off yesterday talking about the evacuation, and I

 8     would like to play -- now, first, let me state this:  You yourself wound

 9     up in Banja Luka on the 7th of August, 1995.  Correct?

10        A.   I did, indeed.

11        Q.   And do you recall appearing on a television programme in the

12     studios of TV Banja Luka along with Savo Strbac?

13        A.   I believe it was either once or maybe twice.

14        Q.   I would like to show you a clip from your appearance on

15     television in Banja Luka on the 7th of August.

16             MR. MISETIC:  And, Mr. Registrar, this is 1D61-0238, please.

17                           [Videotape played]

18             TV Host:  [No interpretation]

19             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

20             "Novakovic:  First of all, a large number of the members Krajina

21     army are located in there units which have been withdrawn to other

22     territories; that is to say, in their units which had been withdrawn

23     according to our plan, as we said at the beginning.  In any case, there

24     are a number of members of the army of Srpska Krajina who haven't taken

25     care of their families, which didn't have an adult family member.  You

Page 11800

 1     you may have noticed that the tractors, we had used tractors mainly, were

 2     driven by 15-year-old girls and even 10-year-old girls.  There was nobody

 3     else to drive the vehicles, so we had to engage a member of the Serbian

 4     army to take care of their family because, as we have said, we wanted to

 5     look after the civilian population."

 6             MR. MISETIC:

 7        Q.   Now, Mr. Novakovic --

 8                           [Defence counsel confer]

 9             MR. MISETIC:  Your Honour, I am alerted to the fact that the

10     first portion of the video does not appear in the transcript, but I think

11     we can take care of that later.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  I don't think whether we can take care of that

13     later.  Have you -- you've provided the booth with transcripts in both

14     languages, and I take it that you will tender these transcripts as well.

15     So, therefore, at least what is said is then part of the evidence, even

16     if it does not appear in its entirety on the transcript.

17             MR. MISETIC:  Yes.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  And may I take it that that portion is not of vital

19     importance.  Is that understood?  It is rather an introduction as to what

20     follows and what is on the transcript.

21             MR. MISETIC:  Correct, Your Honour.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Under those circumstances, we can proceed.

23             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

24        Q.   Now, Mr. Novakovic, there, on the 7th of August, you say that

25     "the units had been withdrawn, according to our plan."  What plan?

Page 11801

 1        A.   One might conclude that from the clip that we saw, but it is out

 2     of the context.

 3             I use this word "plan" very often, but there was no plan at all

 4     to move units.  But everything happened very chaotically.  I did say in

 5     public that there was a plan, because I didn't want to say in front of

 6     the audience that there was no plan whatsoever.  So what I'm saying is

 7     there was no plan.  Everything was done very chaotically.

 8             You can see what the audiences were.  The audiences were in

 9     the -- the Republika Srpska, three days after the aggression.  Everybody

10     was frustrated, so I wanted to play the whole thing down in order to

11     avoid panic among the people.

12        Q.   I note you didn't say -- you said they were withdrawn according

13     to plan.  You didn't say they fled because of panic and fear caused by

14     shelling.  Correct?

15        A.   Not correct, no.  I used the word "plan," but there was no plan

16     in place.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic, it seems to be clear that it was window

18     dressing rather than the truth, what was said on television.  That is at

19     least how I understand the testimony of Mr. Novakovic.

20             MR. MISETIC:  Well, that's what he says --

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, that is what you said.  What he said at the

22     time, we know that from the clip.

23             MR. MISETIC:  Yes.  Okay.

24        Q.   Also, this statement you made in the clip, where you say soldiers

25     were engaged:  "We had to engage soldiers to drive tractors" where a

Page 11802

 1     family didn't have someone to drive a tractor because 10 and 15-year-olds

 2     were driving these tractors.

 3             Who engaged these soldiers?

 4        A.   Unfortunately, nobody.  Yesterday, as we noticed, I said that

 5     many people left their units of their own will because their primary

 6     concern was to look after their families.  If shelling was taking place

 7     within the territory of a unit, person -- people would normally be

 8     concerned about the destiny of their families.  All our soldiers had

 9     families, and they -- their families were primary concern.  Those, who

10     left their units to look after their families, mostly did not come back

11     from their families, and that's why we did not need so many vehicles as

12     we requested from UNPROFOR.

13             We had enough private tractors that people drove themselves, and

14     that's how units of broke up, by and large.  I repeat, our fighters,

15     heads of families would leave of their own will to see what was happening

16     with their families.  What they found there was shelling, a state of

17     chaos, and they would simply get on their tractors and started moving,

18     even before the things happening the way I described them before.

19        Q.   So, when you say in the video "there was nobody else to drive the

20     vehicles, so we had to engage a member of the Serbian army to take care

21     of their family," you're saying, you actually didn't engage those people.

22     They just left on their own.  Correct?

23        A.   Absolutely correct, yes.

24        Q.   Now, Mr. Strbac was sitting next to you in that studio, and I

25     would like to play a clip from the say TV programme --

Page 11803

 1             MR. MISETIC:  I am sorry, Your Honours.  I am reminded to tender

 2     1D61-0238 into evidence.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Hedaraly.

 4             MR. HEDARALY:  I know the Defence is planning to play more than

 5     one clip from this television programme, as Mr. Misetic has just

 6     indicated; and given the witness's answer about the context given, I

 7     would like to at least have, for us, the full version of that programme

 8     to see if we think there is anything else that is context relevant and we

 9     may want to tender.

10             If specific clips are being tendered, I think -- at least the

11     Prosecution is entitled to still look at the whole thing.  Then we made

12     decide if we want to raise the Chamber's attention to other portions.

13             MR. MISETIC:  I'll play the clip, Your Honour.  I don't think

14     that is a basis, though, to say that this portion would be inadmissible,

15     because --

16             JUDGE ORIE:  No, I did not understand Mr. Hedaraly was -- but

17     it's just a request that when deciding on admission, that the Defence

18     would be invited to give the whole clip to the Prosecution, so to see

19     whether there are any other portions they would like to have admitted

20     into evidence as well.

21             MR. MISETIC:  That's fine, Your Honour.

22             MR. HEDARALY:  If we receive it this, we have no objection to

23     this clip.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, that is how I understood you.

25             Mr. Registrar, this portion of the clip.

Page 11804

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, this becomes Exhibit number D925.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  D925 is admitted into evidence.

 3             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. Registrar, if could I have 1D61-0237, please.

 4                           [Videotape played]

 5             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Mr. Strbac.

 6             "The Croats never intended to live with the Serbs in the former

 7     Croatia.

 8             "This was now best seen in the latest examples of their

 9     aggression in Western Slavonia and now in Dalmatia, Lika, Banja, and

10     Kordun.  All of us who were in a position to speak to international

11     officials constantly kept warning them of this fact and spoke of it, that

12     the Croats didn't want to live with us and that we could not allow

13     ourselves to live with them so that the genocide committed against us in

14     the past would not be repeated.  I use the term we dare not live

15     ourselves, because it has a stronger meaning than we do not want to live

16     with them.  We do not and cannot, of course, live with them and because

17     of this, if it was necessary, first and foremost, that we preserve our

18     biological potential, our people.  We could have died off.  The civilian

19     population could have been killed.  Our civilians and women could have

20     been killed.  We need our biological potential for something that is

21     hopefully yet to come.

22             "On the day of the most recent aggression against Krajina, my

23     association, Veritas, wrote a letter to Boutros-Ghali, in which we

24     alerted him with regards to this:  A never before seen massacre which

25     would be launched against the Serb population, which is why it was

Page 11805

 1     decided in the end to begin the exodus in order to protect the people."

 2             MR. MISETIC:

 3        Q.   Mr. Novakovic, Mr. Strbac says, at the end of that clip:  "It was

 4     decided in the end to begin the exodus in order to protect the people."

 5             That is, in fact, what happened.  You and the leadership of the

 6     RSK decided to begin an exodus.  Correct?

 7        A.   No, it's not correct.  First of all, Mr. Strbac was not

 8     authorised to give any such evaluations or judgements and we clarified

 9     only too well yesterday that we evacuate only four Northern Dalmatia

10     municipalities, and the municipality of Gracac in Lika.  I would like to

11     say that this was not a decision on my part.  I did draft a document, but

12     the decision was of the Supreme Defence Council of Defence, and we

13     demonstrated that rather clearly yesterday.  The population, as you all

14     know, the population of Kordun and the 21st Kordun Corps was still

15     encircled.  It was not outside of the territory of the Republika Srpska

16     Krajina.

17             Therefore, I cannot interpret the statements provided by

18     Mr. Strbac, but they do not reflect the situation.  It is a statement

19     that was given two or three day the subsequently.  He did not have any

20     competences.  He was only the secretary of the government, nothing more.

21        Q.   Well, do you agree with that with Mr. Strbac's assessment that:

22     "We cannot allow ourselves to live with the Croats"?

23             Did you agree with that assessment at the time?

24        A.   I always thought that we could live together with Croats and

25     along Croats, but I am afraid that Mr. Strbac is right, that, not Croats,

Page 11806

 1     but the Croatian government did not want to live with us.  I would not

 2     apply this across the board and involve the whole Croatian nation.

 3        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... as Mr. Strbac said, you and

 4     the leadership decided to "save the biological potential" of the Serb

 5     population by beginning the exodus.  Correct?

 6        A.   That's not a correct statement.  It is correct that we decided to

 7     protect the population of Northern Dalmatia and municipality of Gracac.

 8     In Lika, we evacuated them within the territory.  That was our original

 9     decision, but things transpired differently as a result of the situation

10     on the ground.

11        Q.   Do you recall if in this TV show you corrected Mr. Strbac or

12     said, "No, Mr. Strbac, I disagree with you.  We can, in fact, can live

13     with the Croats"; or that his claim that the exodus that had decided,

14     that that was wrong?

15             Do you recall ever challenging that assertion during this

16     hour-long programme?

17        A.   We were guests.  We did not have an opportunity to confront each

18     other.  There were a few breaks during which we could have maybe talked,

19     but not in the studio in this live programme.  You saw that the anchor

20     put a few questions to each and every one of us, and it was really not a

21     place for us to confront each other.

22        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... I tender 1D61-0237 into

23     evidence.

24             MR. HEDARALY:  Subject to the same proviso.  In this clip, I know

25     there was, in fact, a break within the portion that is tendered, so I

Page 11807

 1     think it is even more important that we get the full version to examine.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  I don't know whether there was break in the portion

 3     tendered or there was a break in the programme, but you observed

 4     apparently a break.

 5             Mr. Registrar.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, this becomes Exhibit number D926.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  D926 is admitted into evidence.

 8             Please proceed.

 9             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

10             For the record, Your Honour, there is an break, and it is just to

11     save us from having to do three clips instead of two, but that's why it

12     was made clear with a -- a dark screen and then the next clip.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

14             MR. MISETIC:

15        Q.   Now, yesterday, Mr. Novakovic, you testified on direct

16     examination.

17             MR. MISETIC:  And if I could pull it up, this is page 11.728,

18     beginning at line 23, continuing through 11.729, line 3.

19        Q.   And, yesterday, in recounting how the decision was made to issue

20     the evacuation order, of which you are the author, you say, you came to

21     Mr. Mrksic's office.  "Mr. Mrksic then briefed us on the situation and

22     said, literally, 'President Martic spoke with Prime Minister Babic who is

23     in Belgrade.  Babic, as we all know, attended the meeting with US

24     Ambassador Peter Galbraith, and I think that Croatia will not stop.'"

25             Now, I'd like to show you a transcript of an intercepted

Page 11808

 1     telephone conversation on the 4th of August, 1995, which purports to be

 2     between Mr. Mrksic and Mr. Babic?

 3             MR. MISETIC:  If could you have 1D61-0177, please.

 4        Q.   And it says at the top:  "A certain Milan makes a telephone call

 5     and talks to an unknown.  We think that it is General Mrksic."

 6             And if you look at it, it says, a little bit down:  "The hell

 7     with everything.  Do whatever you can."

 8             Then:  "It's like this, I talked to Galbraith, and based on his

 9     words, there is no way they'll stop."

10             Then a little bit father down:  "Do something to make this stop."

11             Then voice number one, which is the voice that mentioned meeting

12     with Galbraith says:  "Listen, there is nothing that can be done.  Pull

13     the people out of there."

14             Response:  "All right.  We're starting to do with that.

15             "Well, did they stop with that?

16             "Hell, no."

17             Then it continues on down.  Somebody else jumps on the line and

18     says:  "All right.  Here is Mile (potentially, Mr. Martic) He wants to

19     talk to you.

20             "Okay."

21             Then the third voice:  "Milan, from the Supreme Defence Council

22     only the General and I are here, so we are thinking of extracting the

23     women and children."

24             Then the voice from Belgrade says:  "There is no other option.  I

25     talked to Galbraith an hour ago.  Judging from what he said, I don't

Page 11809

 1     think they'll stop.  Conduct every action as planned."

 2             Then voice number 3:  "So that means that we're extracting, does

 3     it?"

 4             Answer:  "Yes."

 5             Voice 3:  "Okay.  Then we're going up as discussed."

 6             Now, Mr. Novakovic, based on your testimony yesterday in direct

 7     examination, you seem to have some knowledge of the fact that Mr. Babic

 8     was on the line with Mr. Mrksic in the afternoon of the 4th.

 9             My question is:  Looking at this conversation, looking at the

10     fact that one of the speakers references having met with Mr. Galbraith,

11     when voice number 3 says "Okay.  Then we're going up as discussed," can

12     you help us on what that might mean?

13        A.   What was the time of this intercept or this conversation?

14        Q.   Mr. Novakovic, I'll ask the questions, but I think you can see

15     very well on the screen at what time the report was prepared?

16             MR. HEDARALY:  I'm sorry, Your Honour.  If he is asking a

17     question about a document --

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is very important; otherwise, I

19     can't answer the question.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Hedaraly is speaking.

21             MR. HEDARALY:  I think if he is asked a question on something

22     that that happened based on his testimony that was for a specific time, I

23     think he is entitled to know what time, not just when the intercept was

24     sent, but what time the conversation was.  It does appear on the document

25     below the line "General Staff of the SVK.  That appears to me, after the

Page 11810

 1     first numbers, to be "04/08/95 1630," which would suggest to, me but

 2     Mr. Misetic can correct me, that is on the 4th August of 1995 at 4.30 in

 3     the afternoon.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic, you asked the witness to tell us what

 5     something means, and then he is entitled to know what we know about the

 6     context.

 7             When the report was made it is clear that is 19 hours 20 minutes

 8     [sic] ?  927.55.  That at least is what is shown on this.  But the time

 9     of the conversation, could you help us and could you help the witness.

10             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. Hedaraly has already testified --

11             JUDGE ORIE:  No.  As you know, Mr. Hedaraly's testimony is not

12     evidence.

13             MR. MISETIC:  Well, it's not evidence also done in the presence

14     of the witness, but I will leave it to you, Your Honour, when testifying

15     before the witnesses.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Let's proceed and suppress some irritation

17     which is, by the way, understandable.

18             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

20             MR. MISETIC:

21        Q.   Mr. Novakovic, let's assume that it's at 1630.  Now, that doesn't

22     change what my question is, which is:  As a participant in the events in

23     question here, can you help us understand what it means when it says,

24     "Okay.  Then we're going up as discussed"?

25        A.   I believe that the timing is important, because yesterday I said

Page 11811

 1     that, at that time, I was in General Mrksic's office around that time, in

 2     principle.

 3             So one might say that at the time I was present.  I was privy to

 4     that conversation that took place.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  That's not an answer to the question.  The question

 6     was whether you --

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have not finished.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Please proceed.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that when Mrksic had briefed

10     us, he will already told us that Mr. Martic had spoken with Mr. Babic,

11     and that Mr. Babic had conveyed a message that he received in his

12     conversation with Mr. Galbraith.  Although, I would like to say that

13     there was Mr. Galbraith's statement that everything had been resolved and

14     there was no need for war, but that's in a different context.

15             After these conversations, we were informed that Croatia would

16     not stop, and that we should evacuate the population from Northern

17     Dalmatia, as I already told you, and from the municipality of Gracac in

18     Lika.

19             This term, "up," "down," doesn't mean anything.  It probably

20     means Knin.  It is very difficult to interpret these terms "up" and

21     "down," and some other inappropriate words, but this is just the

22     mannerism and the words that people use.

23             Some of the inappropriate words here, this is something that I

24     did not use.  Very concretely, where it says "get out of that hole," that

25     could concretely mean that the population should be moved from Knin, in

Page 11812

 1     my view.  It doesn't mean that this it is really correct, but it would

 2     reflect the situation as it was at the time.

 3        Q.   Here's the sentence:  "There is no other option.  I talked to

 4     Galbraith an hour ago.  Judging from what he said, I don't think they'll

 5     stop.  Conduct every action as planned."

 6             What plan?

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Misetic please speak into the

 8     microphone.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's possible that Martic had

10     already called him up before this conversation, and that he had told him

11     what the standpoint of the Supreme Defence Council was and asked for his

12     approval to move the population, because you couldn't move the population

13     from the entire area and the Gracac municipality without approval.  So

14     one can assume that he did give his approval for that.

15             I know personally that Mr. Kovacevic, the minister from the same

16     office, called up Mr. Babic.

17        Q.   Mr. Novakovic, my question is -- he says:  "Conduct every action

18     as planned."

19             My question is:  What was the plan?

20        A.   I told you.  The decision assumed there was a plan.  The decision

21     stated very clearly what had to be done:  Evacuation of the population

22     that was unable to fight in the direction of Srb and Lapac in the

23     municipalities of Dalmatia and Gracac.  There was no other plan.

24        Q.   Let's look a few lines down.  Voice number 1, then, from Belgrade

25     says:  "I think I'll call these ministers tomorrow for a meeting with

Page 11813

 1     Mladic.  I don't know what.

 2             "Okay."

 3             Where was the meeting with Mladic supposed to be?

 4        A.   I don't know that.  Probably on the territory of Republika

 5     Srpska.  I can't speculate.  General Mladic was the commander of the army

 6     of Republika Srpska at the time.  So I can assume that, but I wouldn't

 7     like to speculate.  I don't know.

 8        Q.   And which ministers would be meeting with Mladic?

 9        A.   I don't know that either.  All I know is that some of our

10     ministers weren't always in Knin.  Some of them travelled between Eastern

11     Slavonia, Vukovar, Beli Manastir.  They are somewhere in Belgrade, some

12     perhaps in the Republika Srpska, so I don't really know that.

13             I know that several ministers who there were in Knin at the time,

14     and they were people with whom I cooperated closely on the 4th of August,

15     1995, but I wasn't fully aware of the movement of the ministers at the

16     time.

17             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I ask that the exhibit on the screen

18     be marked, and I tender it into evidence.

19             MR. HEDARALY:  No objection.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, this becomes Exhibit number D927.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  D927 is admitted into evidence.

23             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. Registrar, if I could have Exhibit D106,

24     please.

25        Q.   Mr. Novakovic, in your statement, you say that the decision to

Page 11814

 1     evacuate was not published in the media.  Do you recall that in your 2001

 2     statement?

 3        A.   Yes.  It couldn't be published because the media weren't

 4     functioning.

 5        Q.   Well, this is a transcript of an interview General Mrksic gave on

 6     the evening -- in the evening of the 4th of August to Radio Belgrade.

 7             It says -- in the first portion, Mr. Mrksic says:  "Knin is

 8     enveloped by dark.  Evacuation of the population is ongoing.  Enemy

 9     forces reached at four to six kilometres from the city of Knin."

10             Question:  "Does that mean our lines have been penetrated?"

11             Answer:  "No.  We are maintaining contact.  Our forces withdrew

12     to the positions for the direct defence of Knin."

13             Now, Mr. Novakovic, in fact, General Mrksic -- well, let me ask a

14     preliminary question.  Your were the -- General Mrksic's officer

15     responsible for information.  You would have had some knowledge of

16     Mr. Mrksic having an interview with Radio Belgrade.  Correct?

17        A.   Yes, yes, I was aware of that.

18        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ...

19        A.   I wasn't there at the time, but I was with him for most of that

20     evening; however, I wasn't there when he gave the interview.

21        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... aware at the time that he

22     told Radio Belgrade that the evacuation was under way?

23        A.   Probably.  Yes, it was no longer a secret.

24        Q.   So when wasn't it a secret any longer?  What time did it not

25     become a secret any longer?

Page 11815

 1        A.   It stopped being a secret, and we spoke about this yesterday,

 2     after 1800 hours when I read that decision, and a large of number of

 3     journalists were present at the meeting.  We told them it wouldn't be a

 4     good idea to publish this before the decision was conveyed through the

 5     civilian defence channels or civilian protection channels.  But when the

 6     civilian protection organs had conveyed the decision to their

 7     commissioners in those four municipalities in Dalmatia and Gracac

 8     municipality, then that decision was no longer a secret.

 9        Q.   Okay.  Then, in fact, at some point, you are aware that the

10     evacuation decision did get into the media on the evening of the 4th.

11     Correct?

12        A.   Yes, absolutely, yes.

13             MR. MISETIC:  Your Honours, I was also going to use the Sekulic's

14     book at this point, but given the witness' answers, I don't need to;

15     however, I think this is a good opportunity to, as we discussed

16     yesterday, tender the two chapters of the Sekulic book, which would be

17     1D44-0003.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Then from the bar table.

19             MR. MISETIC:  Yes, that's fine.

20             MR. HEDARALY:  No objection.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar, two chapters from the Sekulic book.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit number D928.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  D928 is admitted into evidence.

24             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you.

25        Q.   Mr. Novakovic, I'm going to take --

Page 11816

 1             MR. MISETIC:  With the indulgence of the Trial Chamber, I have a

 2     bit of a longer video.  This is, I believe, approximately 11 minutes.

 3        Q.   This is Mr. Milan Martic who gave an interview in Banja Luka at

 4     an unspecified date, but believed to within one year of Operation Storm.

 5     And in this clip, Mr. Martic discusses the events of the 4th of August,

 6     1995.

 7             MR. MISETIC:  And, Your Honours, transcripts have been provided

 8     to the booths, and I would like to play the video in its entirety,

 9     because it is Mr. Martic speaking.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Could I ask whether there is any possibility that we

11     make breaks now and then in playing the video, because otherwise the

12     interpreters may be minutes behind, which makes it very difficult to keep

13     a close eye on translation.  So say, for example, after every one or two

14     minutes, you just stop for a second.

15             MR. MISETIC:  Yes, Your Honour.

16             The video, Mr. Registrar, is 1D61-0240.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  I've got one question before we start it.  It says

18     "Autumn 1995."  You said it was within year --

19             MR. MISETIC:  I will actually check on that.  This may be more

20     accurate, that it is the Autumn of 1995, I think, based on the context of

21     what he is saying in the clip.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

23                           [Videotape played]

24             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

25             "Martic:  That first day, the 4th of August, you yourself were

Page 11817

 1     present when Knin was bombed along with other places.  The Croats didn't

 2     have any significant success, other than shifts in the Dinara mountain

 3     and the Mali Alan in Velebit.  Everything else somehow wept according to

 4     its own course; and considering the Croats were in Zagreb that day,

 5     especially within the shelters expecting us to react by shelling them, we

 6     conclude that there was no need to bomb Zagreb during those initial

 7     moments.

 8             "What is quite indicative, though, is that I received five phone

 9     calls that day from Milan Babic, from Milosevic's office, for one sole

10     purpose which was to suggest that I shouldn't bomb Zagreb.  I took this

11     information on record and responded that we should assess what to do at

12     the neglects time.  No one from the authorities in Serbia from the regime

13     on contacted me.  They simply circumvented me, and all contacts were

14     conducted with General Mrksic.  Later on, I saw the name requests not to

15     shell Zagreb.

16             "In the evening at 7.30 p.m., the Croatian Central News Programme

17     was on.  We had the generator and electricity within the headquarters.

18     The Croats announced the cessation of air threats in Zagreb because some

19     general of theirs, the cessation of the air-raid warning in Zagreb

20     because some General of theirs - Tolj, I believe was his name - said that

21     all the citizens should leave their shelters in Zagreb because the Serbs

22     supposedly didn't have the necessary range.  I subsequently sent General

23     Mrksic the order to bomb Zagreb with all possible means at our disposal

24     and with all the ammunition we had.  He replied, 'Okay.  I understand.'

25             "Unfortunately, nothing came of this order of mine; rather, to

Page 11818

 1     make things even more interesting, they replaced the commander of the

 2     Kordun Corps, Colonel Veljko Bosanac, behind my back, for fear that I

 3     would directly issue him an order for such an attack, because they

 4     disposed of the assets up there.  They replaced him and appointed a new

 5     guy, so that the order couldn't possibly be executed; and, unfortunately,

 6     not a single shell fell onto Zagreb, even though we had millions of

 7     reasons to do so.  Then the worse scenario took place, which was that at

 8     a given moment, during my brief absence, an order that had been written a

 9     couple of months prior to in Belgrade was issued, calling for action, in

10     according with orders to withdraw the army, which I wasn't even aware

11     of."

12             "Journalist:  On that unfortunate day, the 4th of August, what

13     was your last order as the Supreme Commander?"

14             "Milan Martic:  My last order was what I told you about the

15     shelling of Zagreb at approximately 7.30 p.m., when I saw that the Croats

16     were -- what the Croats were announcing.  By prior to that -- just a

17     moment.  But prior to that, I had passed a decision - unfortunately, I

18     had no one to consult about it - at 1700 hours to withdraw the civilian

19     population from the cities which were under constant shelling, such as

20     Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac.

21             "The order clearly stated that the non-combat population was to

22     withdraw to the villages which were not being shelled, ending with Srb

23     and Lapac, which were in the Krajina and not in the Sumadija.  I passed

24     such an order for one reason only, and that was because I remembered

25     Western Slavonia and the massive suffering of civilians there, when I was

Page 11819

 1     attacked even by the Serbian regime and all those who conducted

 2     different -- waged different politics than my own.  This was a mistake.

 3     I said that I wouldn't repeat the mistake and withdraw everyone.  But all

 4     those capable for military service along with myself were to take a rifle

 5     in hand and fight for the Krajina.  I say that I had no one to consult

 6     with, and I gave the order.  That order exists to this day.  I have it.

 7             "Although, later on, numerous attempts were made to manipulate

 8     these facts, that this was practically the key, that I passed to the

 9     order to for the army to withdraw which later proved to be untrue,

10     because that same evening, I suggested to General Mrksic that we launch a

11     counterattack towards Mount Dinara, that I personally lead the men, as I

12     know the Dinara area well, and that we could surprise the Croats.  Upon

13     which, he just stared at me blankly, as if to say nothing would come of

14     this.

15             "I didn't know about this famous order to withdraw the army, nor

16     could I have even anticipated it, considering the fact that the Croats

17     have experienced no significant successes up to that time I believed that

18     the next day would be better for us, to our advantage, and it surely

19     would have been.  My absence from the headquarters, which lasted some two

20     hours, was enough for General Mrksic to gather all of his corps

21     commanders, whom he had appointed in the meantime with new men, and to

22     tell them to act in accordance with this new order, which had been

23     prepared by Milosevic some months previously.  It was sufficient for me

24     to have been absent for that period of time for this to be issued.  My

25     return to headquarters, where I had gone previously in order to set up

Page 11820

 1     Radio Knin for it to start function, as a false Radio Knin, had been

 2     broadcast and it was deceiving our people.

 3             "When I returned, I was confronted by an odd situation.  Everyone

 4     was whispering about something, those colonels, generals, so that I

 5     couldn't hear.  But I believed they were whispering about minor issues

 6     having to do with command tactics, and I said to myself, It's okay, this

 7     is nothing serious.  Later, in the evening, sometime around midnight, I

 8     asked to get some rest, because I hadn't slept for two days.  However, I

 9     was immediately received a telephone call from Dr. Karadzic and

10     Krajisnik.  The lines were still functioning, and they needed to tell me

11     something to give me suggestions, so I couldn't sleep.  It was then that

12     Mile Mrksic suggested for the first time, regarding the command

13     conditions which were truly dire, that it was impossible to command from

14     Knin and that it was time to go to Srb.  I said that it is out of the

15     question.

16             After a certain period of time, after a half an hour of

17     whispering with some colonels, I suggested that we go to Padjene, a

18     location located above Knin.  They said there was an excellent command

19     post there, in the sense that the normal command was possible there and

20     that such tactics would then be implemented so that the Croat would say

21     not be able to find us.  I relented then, and said, 'If you're going to

22     Padjene, then okay.'  They could barely wait.  They simply collected

23     their things, and I didn't know they had previously dismantled everything

24     within the headquarters and they left.  I remained with my men sometime

25     until 3.00 or 4.00 in the morning, and left for Padjene where I

Page 11821

 1     encountered them.  First of all, I realized this was not a command post

 2     as they had told me.  There was some form of communications system there,

 3     but this was not what I expected.  But I said it myself, Okay, I guess

 4     they'll assemble it.  They have good communication officers and things

 5     will get better.

 6             "Then I asked to go to get some rest, and they immediately

 7     provided me with some sort of bed.  My men who had accompanied me also

 8     rested a bit, and -- sometime around 5.00 in the morning, and we awoke at

 9     approximately 8.00.  There was shelling going on; however, this didn't

10     bother me.  It was a Saturday, yes, but it was odd that there was no

11     yelling going on.  Then, all of a sudden, we jumped and saw there was no

12     command located there.  They had simply run away from there without even

13     waking me up, which is truly shameful.  For sometime we remained there in

14     Padjene; and around 10.00, I went to search for the command.  Only then

15     did we realize what I could not have possibly anticipated, when I came

16     across a unit which was in Zitnic, mostly comprised of men from Knin and

17     surrounding villages.

18             "I encountered them towards the end of Padjene and in Kravlja

19     Draga, as we call it.  I asked the men where they were going, and they

20     said 'We received order to withdraw.'  'What orders to withdraw?  Get

21     back there,' I said, 'the order to withdraw is invalid.'  I found their

22     commander, Colonel Davidovic, and asked him, 'Man, what is this supposed

23     to mean?'  The soldiers surrounded him and defended him.  He was not to

24     blame.  He received an order.  He was acting like a convict.  At the top

25     of Otric, I needed a few hours to breakthrough."

Page 11822

 1                           [Technical Difficulty]

 2             MR. MISETIC:  We now appear to have a technical problem, Your

 3     Honour.  I think the problem is here with the computer.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  We immediately get the explanation on the screen

 5     what happened.  It can't locate a file.

 6                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  A technician will be here to see whether a

 8     technician could assist, and then --

 9             MR. MISETIC:  I'm told --

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic, since, apparently, those who are

11     knowledgeable are working on the problem, two matters:  The first matter

12     is I got the impression, right or wrong, that there might be something

13     missing in the first portion of the transcript, and I ask for special

14     attention to that, mainly in relation to - let me just have a look at

15     where - somewhere in the middle of page 19, where Mr. Martic says that

16     nothing came of this order of his.  I think I heard, following the

17     French, that there was something of an order on shelling Zagreb, but all

18     the equipment available.  I might be mistaken, but it is difficult to

19     follow both the transcript and what we find in the video clip as English

20     translation and, at the same time, to follow the French.

21             I haven't got the transcript here.  Is it true that something is

22     missing there?

23             MR. MISETIC:  Well, Your Honour, I believe you're referring to

24     line 14 there when he says:  "Unfortunately, nothing came of this order

25     of mine."

Page 11823

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I think I earlier heard something about what

 2     that order was, something about -- but it could be that --

 3             MR. MISETIC:  Yes.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Did I hear something in French that there is with an

 5     order using all -- but I might have been lost there.

 6             MR. HEDARALY:  I have on the transcript that was provided by

 7     Mr. Misetic to us, that there does appear to be one or two lines that are

 8     not reproduced in the live transcript.  It is the transcript 1D61-0240 at

 9     the middle of the second paragraph, right after where it says:  "I

10     subsequently sent General Mrksic the order to bomb Zagreb with all

11     possible means at our disposal and with all the ammunition ..." --

12             THE INTERPRETER:  Kindly slow down for the interpretations.

13     Thank you very much.

14             MR. HEDARALY:  Sorry.

15             "I subsequently sent General Mrksic the order to bomb Zagreb with

16     all possible means at our disposal and with all the ammunitions we had."

17                 He replied:  "Okay.  I understand, as they say.

18     Unfortunately, nothing came of this order of mine."

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, yes.  Those two lines, I heard them in French

20     and I didn't see them on the transcript.  So, therefore, that is now

21     corrected.  We don't have to play it again.

22             Have, meanwhile, the tell problems been resolved?

23             MR. MISETIC:  Yes, Mr. President.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Then proceed on from the point where we were, and

25     let me just check that exactly.  "He was acting like a convict," I see at

Page 11824

 1     this moment on my screen, and those are the almost the last words on

 2     the --

 3             MR. HEDARALY:  It was at 8.27.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  8.27.

 5                           [Videotape played]

 6             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

 7             "Martic:  At the top the Otric, I needed a few hours to

 8     breakthrough.  I encountered a brigade from the Dinara.  Now you can only

 9     guess when they had left, and it was there that I encountered our Colonel

10     Radic.  He was pulling his hair out, 'Don't ask me anything, don't ask me

11     a thing,' and so forth.  I saw an odd situation.  'Where is Mrksic,' I

12     said.  He replied he was Srb.  They, therefore, escaped to Srb.  I needed

13     a few hours as well from Srpski Klanac.  I couldn't break through.  I

14     went to Srb on foot, only to find them in Srb, to find the famous HQ

15     which had no command.  They didn't even have a telephone.

16             "I saw everything was nearly completely lost.  I said, 'Mile,

17     what is the meaning of this?  Do you have military police at your

18     disposal.  Stop these people.  I will address they them.'  'I could see

19     he didn't even make any attempt to,' he said.  'Well, you know, we'll do

20     it in Petrovac.'  This was enough of an indication to me that this was

21     the verge of an unprecedented betrayal I couldn't have even dreamed of.

22     It was impossible to think that something like this could happen before

23     your eyes.

24             "Then, during those moments, I was literally on a the brink of a

25     nervous breakdown, not knowing what to do.  The people were leaving.  No

Page 11825

 1     one could stop them.  I remained with my associates to the very last man

 2     in Srb, until they withdraw.  Then I left, not knowing whether the

 3     Ustashas had arrived to Licka Kaldrma at Resanovac, in the area towards

 4     Drvar.  I remained there in the area almost one month after the fall of

 5     the Krajina.  I think that when I recall these events, I can say, God

 6     forbid that one's worst enemy ever have to endure what we endured in

 7     those moments.

 8             "Journalist:  That last day, the 4th of August, how many of your

 9     closest associates were with you in Knin, specifically the prime

10     minister, ministers.

11             "Martic:  Well, there was no one, apart from two, three of them.

12     I think Toso Paic was in Kordun as the minister of internal affairs.  I

13     believe Suput was in Lika.  As far as I know, Drago Kovacevic was in

14     Knin.  All the others were outside of Knin.  They were all somewhere in

15     Belgrade, Novi Sad, and God knows where else.  They had important

16     business to tend to.

17             "Journalist:  Including the prime minister?"

18             "Martic:  Including the prime minister, who went to meet with

19     Galbraith and who signed the Z-4 plan without my knowledge, although I

20     don't know about this.  On the day before the attack, Milan Babic

21     accepted the plan without having consulted with anyone, probably only

22     with Milosevic.  He signed the famous Z-4 plan.  But aside from the Z-4

23     plan and the guarantees Galbraith gave regarding no attacks, we were

24     attacked.  This, too, was probably supposed to serve as a form of

25     deception, the idea we were not going to be attacked, so that we remain

Page 11826

 1     unawares.

 2             "Personally, with regards to the attack, I must state that no one

 3     informed me of the attack, not even from my State Security Services, who

 4     had also fled a day earlier; nor General Mrksic, who knew in advance, but

 5     didn't inform me.  They simply believed I didn't need to be informed, but

 6     didn't inform me.  They simply believed I didn't need to be informed,

 7     even though, naturally, I'm not the type of man that would leave, flee.

 8     I would do something prior to the attack to alarm those who died in their

 9     sleep, where I personally could have been killed as two shells passed by

10     myself and my children, so that part of the population that did die while

11     sleeping would not get hurt.  I would have done something to enable the

12     population to get into their shelters and basements.

13             "Journalist:  Do you think they really knew about the attack?"

14             "Martic:  They did, they did.  He admitted to this fact later on

15     and talked around about how he knew and how he believed that there was no

16     need to inform anyone, and went on to tell a ridiculous story about how

17     he didn't even want to call his driver, so that he could go on foot and

18     so on.  I mean, he knew, which he confirmed on numerous occasions to many

19     people.  But he didn't feel it was necessary to inform me.

20             "Journalist:  We had a news conference that day on Friday, where

21     UNPROFOR Sector South's information chief, Alun Roberts, clearly and

22     concisely said they had received notice at a quarter 4.00 in the UNPROFOR

23     HQ, in Knin, that the attack would anyone at 500 hours.  The sirens were

24     not sounded.

25             "Martic:  Well, they weren't sounded simply because Mile Mrksic,

Page 11827

 1     who knew in advance, so he says, as he admitted to numerous witnesses,

 2     that he was told at 3.00.  My Security Service, which incidentally fled

 3     the day before out of Knin, new much more in advance.  None of them felt

 4     the need to inform me, for me to have order, or should this have been an

 5     order by General Mrksic to perhaps to alarm the people, to sound the

 6     sirens, and for the people to take shelter.  I mean, we could have at

 7     least managed to save those ten, 15 people who were in their beds during

 8     the first shelling, as was the case with the deceased Ms. Marjanovic who

 9     led the dance school and so on.

10             "Journalist:  Many people say that the road taken by a refugee

11     column from Srb to Republika Srpska was cleared two days prior.  Is this

12     true?  Do you have any information regarding that?"

13             "Martic:  Not two days prior.  The road was cleared 15 days to a

14     month earlier.  It was cleared more for communications, at least that it

15     is what was discussed, to enable better communication towards

16     Martin Brod, which, for economic reasons and for all other interests, is

17     not a bad thing.  But it seems basically that the road was cleared due to

18     the fact that a deal made in Belgrade was being prepared.  This is

19     clearer than ever that the road was made for this reason, which,

20     naturally, I could not have known.

21             "Journalist:  Despite these facts, do you think the RSK, on the

22     4th of August, could have defended itself?

23             "Martic:  I am convinced that regardless of the fact that I have

24     to note that NATO aviation participated in the attack, NATO aviation

25     destroyed our relay systems, destroyed our electric electronic

Page 11828

 1     installation systems, because we ended up with no electricity."

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  The volume is gone.

 3                           [Technical Difficulty]

 4             MR. MISETIC:  We have a problem with the audio, I believe.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  May I draw your specific attention to the fact that

 6     it's not just the interpreters who have to translate but also the

 7     transcriber which has, understandably, difficulties in following the

 8     speed.  We have to verify that both the interpreters and the transcriber

 9     is at the point where the video is.

10             Now that the sound is back, let's get it a try.

11                           [Videotape played]

12             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

13             "Martic:  As was the late Marjanovic, it was the case of that

14     women who led the dance school and so on.

15             "Journalist:  Many people say that the road taken by the refugee

16     column from Srb to Republika Srpska was cleared two days prior.  Is this

17     true?  Do you have any information regarding this?

18             "Martic:  Not two days prior.  The road was cleared 15 days to a

19     month earlier.  It was cleared more so for communication, at least that

20     it is what was discussed, to enable better communication with

21     Martin Brod, which, for economic reasons and for all other interests, is

22     not a bad thing.  But it seems basically that the road was cleared due to

23     the fact that a deal was being made in Belgrade.  This is clearer than

24     ever, and the road was made for this reason, which, naturally, I couldn't

25     have known.

Page 11829

 1             "Journalist:  Despite these facts, do you think the RSK, on 4th

 2     August, could have defending itself.

 3             "Martic:  I am convinced that, regardless of the fact that I have

 4     to note that NATO aviation participated in the attack, the NATO aviation

 5     destroyed our relay systems, destroyed our electronic installation

 6     systems, and we ended up with no electricity.  All of this was done by

 7     NATO aviation; however, I state that had there not been Milosevic's

 8     deception with the famous General Mrksic, we would still have been in

 9     Krajina today.  We would have suffered more casualties.  This goes

10     without saying.

11             "But considering the lie of the land, the possibilities of

12     hindering their advance throughout the Krajina, I am sure the Croats

13     would not have succeeded in taking over the whole Krajina.  It is

14     possible that they would have had some success advancement of their front

15     lines, but we would also have had some successes.  I must say that we had

16     the possibility of taking over Karlovac, Biograd, and some other places.

17     So how would they have ended up after all this combat?  They wouldn't

18     have succeeded had barriers been properly installed within the territory

19     which the terrain allows for.

20             "They would not have been able to conduct manoeuvres with

21     artillery, and their infantry, thus, would not have had any significant

22     success.  Therefore, I'm sure that we would have had casualties, there is

23     no doubt, many more casualties than we suffered in this exodus, but we

24     would have remained in the Krajina."

25             JUDGE ORIE:  We had one portion we see and read twice, but apart

Page 11830

 1     that, I think we have a complete record.

 2             MR. MISETIC:  Apologies to the court reporter and interpreters

 3     for the extra work.

 4        Q.   Mr. Novakovic, you've now seen Mr. Martic's version of events, at

 5     least as he stated them to that journalist.  Mr. Martic claims that the

 6     evacuation had been planned months in advance.  Do you know anything

 7     about that?

 8        A.   No.  I think many of the things he said were of his own accord,

 9     and I was surprised the animosity he expressed towards Mr. Mrksic.  I

10     don't think that is true.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, Mr. Hedaraly, you --

12             MR. HEDARALY:  I think there is a vagueness to the question.

13     We're talking about -- because Mr. Martic talks about both the decision

14     to the civilian populations of the --  and the army that apparently

15     withdrew as well.  So if those two can be clarified and not be confused.

16             MR. MISETIC:  Your Honour, I would -- again, this is the second

17     time in front of witness, offering alternative explanations.  If there

18     are going to be speaking objections, I would ask the witness be --

19             MR. HEDARALY:  Well, if the question is vague and is leading to

20     confusion --

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  But then to explain what is vague and what

22     leads to confusion, that, of course, could be --  I must say, I

23     immediately add to that, that it happens on both sides now and then, but

24     we should really refrain from giving -- in objections, to give further

25     hints, or whatever, to a witness.

Page 11831

 1             MR. HEDARALY:  I apologise for that.  But if the witness is shown

 2     a 15 minute clip and asked a vague question, Your Honour, I don't think

 3     it is a fair question.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm not saying that what you say is not correct, but

 5     it's whether it should be said in the presence of the witness.

 6             Now the witness has answered the question.  Is there any need

 7     to -- it's now on the record, Mr. Hedaraly.  I take it that Mr. Misetic

 8     has heard your observation and will certainly try to avoid to make any

 9     vague references.

10             Please proceed.

11             MR. MISETIC:  Let me, then, make it even more clear.

12        Q.   Mr. Novakovic, whether he is talking about the evacuation of the

13     RSK military or the evacuation of RSK civilians, he is referring there to

14     some preparation of Mr. Milosevic's, as a matter of fact, he said by

15     name.  Correct?  Is my understanding correct?

16        A.   An evacuation of the civilian population and the evacuation of

17     the armed forces are two separate items.  It is beyond dispute that

18     Mr. Martic referred to those, but it is incorrect.

19        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... is my interpretation correct

20     that Mr. Martic is suggesting that it was military led by General Mrksic

21     who, together with Belgrade, was responsible for the evacuation of the

22     military?

23        A.   Obviously, Mr. Martic said that, but that is not true.

24        Q.   Mr. Martic refers to the clearing of the road towards Martin Brod

25     having been done within a month, according to him, of Operation Storm,

Page 11832

 1     and suggests in the video that this was part of whatever had been agreed

 2     upon in Belgrade.  Are you familiar with the fact that the road towards

 3     Martin Brod was cleared within one month of Operation Storm?

 4        A.   Mr. Martic did not decidedly say that it was because of that

 5     reason.  It was cleared at the moment when the only link with Knin

 6     towards the interior was cut off to Strmica and Bosansko Grahovo.  It is

 7     well known that the HVO and the HV by that time, by the 27th of July, had

 8     reached Bosansko Grahovo.  Therefore, the road from Knin towards the

 9     interior of the Krajina was no longer in operation, in particular towards

10     the RS.  The reason the other road was cleared is because it was already

11     in existence and it was simply made wider, those few kilometres of it.

12        Q.   Now, you made mention a few times in your testimony about the Z-4

13     plan and some agreement with Mr. Galbraith having been reached.  Were you

14     aware of the fact that Mr. Martic had no knowledge of Mr. Babic having

15     reached any agreements with Mr. Galbraith?

16        A.   As far as I know, Mr. Martic was authorised by -- Mr. Babic was

17     authorised by Mr. Martic to sign that agreement.  That was clear.  After

18     all, Mr. Babic called from Belgrade about that, informing of that plan

19     from Mr. Mrksic' office.  As far as, I know Mr. Martic did not oppose it,

20     at that time or later.  As for Mr. Martic commenting on it a few months

21     the later, that is a different matter.

22        Q.   Were you aware of the fact that Mr. Martic had ordered General

23     Mrksic at 7.30 in the evening of the 4th of August to launch a massive

24     attack on Zagreb?

25        A.   That was not quite so.  I was present.

Page 11833

 1        Q.   Well, when you say "not quite so," how was it then?

 2        A.   I was present, and I was about to continue.

 3             The three of us, Mr. Martic, Mr. Mrksic and I, watched the prime

 4     time news on TV Zagreb.  When the news were over, around 8.00, the anchor

 5     said that there was no longer an air-raid in force in the city, and

 6     Mr. Martic's idea was that Zagreb should be attacked.

 7        Q.   Let me ask --

 8        A.   Mr. Mrksic and myself exchanged glances and did not offer any

 9     comment.

10        Q.   Where -- go ahead.

11        A.   May I continue?

12             Actually, I think put the question of what it actually meant.  We

13     should go public with our intention to try to hit a target, perhaps not

14     Zagreb it self, but a military target, say, an HQ or the Main Staff.

15             I also asked what the goal of that was supposed to be, shall we

16     achieve something we did in Western Slavonia?  In other words, that

17     action was to supposed to justify everything that was taking place.

18             I will try to be clearer.  The shelling of Zagreb when the

19     operation in Western Slavonia was taking place --

20        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ...

21        A.   Well, just let me finish, briefly.

22        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ...

23        A.   It basically served as an excuse for the tragedy that

24     subsequently occurred in Western Slavonia.  I also asked them or told

25     them that we had about 30 to 40.000 people at our disposal, and that

Page 11834

 1     there was no general agreement on bombing military -- urban targets.

 2             Mr. Mrksic then said that he didn't think it would be wise to

 3     shell Zagreb.  Mr. Martic did agree with that, I claim that, and he no

 4     longer insisted on it.  I know that for a fact, since I was present.

 5        Q.   Mr. Novakovic, where were you physically located when Mr. Martic

 6     issued - however you want to phrase it - he says an order, you say not

 7     quite an order.  But where were you physically located in Knin?

 8        A.   We were on the first floor in the -- of the building in the

 9     office of Mr. Mrksic who was in command of the armed forces of the

10     Krajina.  I was there, Mr. Mrksic, and Mr. Martic.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Novakovic, could I ask you to focus your answers

12     very much on the question, so if someone asks you where you were, to tell

13     us the location.  If Mr. Misetic would like to know who else were there,

14     he will certainly ask you.

15             Please proceed.

16             MR. MISETIC:  Yes.

17        Q.   Now, Mr. Novakovic, I'd also like to know why you are present at

18     a meeting between the president of --

19        A.   [No interpretation]

20        Q.   -- why you are present at meeting with the president of the

21     so-called RSK and with General Mrksic.  Why did you need to be present at

22     such a meeting?

23        A.   It was not an official meeting.

24        Q.   Was it a leisurely meeting?

25        A.   During the evening, I frequently spent my time with the president

Page 11835

 1     and the commander.

 2        Q.   Mr. Martic says, in the video, that he had been criticised for

 3     not ordering the evacuation in Western Slavonia and says, "I wouldn't

 4     repeat that mistake."

 5             Now, let me ask you again, did Mr. Martic, in fact, say this at

 6     the meeting where he dictated the order to you and you wrote it down?

 7     Didn't he mention that he was taking the decision because he did not want

 8     to repeat the same thing that happened in Western Slavonia?

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Before you answer the question.

10             Mr. Hedaraly.

11             MR. HEDARALY:  There is a mischaracterization.  I don't think

12     there is any evidence of Mr. Martic dictating an order to Mr. Novakovic.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Perhaps, we first raise -- I think it is my

14     recollection that a draft was made and read out, and --

15             MR. HEDARALY:  I don't want testify and be accused of doing that.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  No, no.

17             MR. HEDARALY:  THE testimony was that it was Mr. Mrksic who gave

18     the instructions to Mr. Novakovic.

19             MR. MISETIC:

20        Q.   Well, in any event, Mr. Martic is present at that meeting.

21     Correct?

22        A.   [No verbal response]

23        Q.   Yes?  Okay.

24             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  There was no audible

25     answer.

Page 11836

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  The answer was not heard by the interpreters.  I

 2     think it was in the affirmative.  If everyone agrees, we can proceed.

 3             MR. MISETIC:

 4        Q.   Yes, Mr. Novakovic, do you recall Mr. Martic saying at the

 5     meeting that --

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... saying at the meeting that

 8     he did not wish to repeat the same mistake by not ordering the evacuation

 9     of the -- the same mistake that happened in Western Slavonia by not

10     ordering the evacuation of the population fast enough?

11        A.   It is possible he said that, but I didn't hear it.

12        Q.   Now, let's go to follow up on this alleged discussion that you

13     were present at, where you stopped discussion about firing at military

14     targets.

15             Who is --

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic, if we are --

17             MR. MISETIC:  Briefly, Your Honour.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  [Overlapping speakers] ... yes.

19             Then please proceed.

20             MR. MISETIC:  [Overlapping speakers] ... first, let me tender the

21     Martic video into evidence.  It is 1D61-0240.

22             MR. HEDARALY:  No objection.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit number D929, Your Honours.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  D929 is, which apparently includes the transcript,

Page 11837

 1     is admitted into evidence.

 2             Please proceed.

 3             MR. MISETIC:

 4        Q.    Mr. Novakovic, Marko Vrcalj was the chief of artillery of the

 5     RSK.  Correct?

 6        A.   [No verbal response]

 7             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. Registrar, 1D61-00, please.

 8        Q.   Mr. Novakovic, Marko Vrcalj was the chief of the artillery of the

 9     army of the RSK.  Correct?

10        A.   Yes, it is.

11        Q.   This is his Mr. Vrcalj's book that he wrote about these events?

12             MR. MISETIC:  And if we could turn to page 9 in the English,

13     please, at the bottom -- actually, the next page.

14             I'm sorry, Mr. Registrar.

15        Q.   Now, this is the section where Mr. Vrcalj says at --

16             MR. MISETIC:  Sorry.  If we could scroll down to the bottom of

17     the English page, please.

18        Q.   Now, Mr. Vrcalj here says:  "In the afternoon when the Orkan

19     commander briefed me to have completed the tasks he has received, I

20     ordered him to get ready to fire to the military targets in Zagreb ..."

21             MR. MISETIC:  Then it goes on to the next page.

22        Q.   "... and Dugo Selo, and that the firing was to start at 0700

23     hours the following morning."

24             Now, towards the middle of the page in English, in the paragraph

25     that begins, "We headed up towards Serb," in the middle, it says:

Page 11838

 1     "Looking at the column of people leaving their homes to go to the

 2     unknown, knowing that the Orkan commander has gotten a task to fire at

 3     Zagreb, I had to reach the commander to tell him, to tell the guy not to

 4     fire at Zagreb.  If he was to fire any shells at Zagreb, the Ustashas

 5     would lift up their own air force and would mutilate those innocent

 6     people."

 7             Who passed this order to Mr. Vrcalj's ^ to fire at Zagreb at 7.00

 8     a.m. on the 5th?

 9        A.   I don't know that.  I don't even know if there was such an order.

10             MR. MISETIC:  [Previous translation continues] ... be marked, and

11     I tender it into evidence.  I will be using more excerpts of the book,

12     and then we can take a break.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

14             MR. HEDARALY:  I'm just seeking clarification that the 25 pages

15     in the English, is that what is being tendered.

16             MR. MISETIC:  Yes, this is what we got from OTP.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Does that cover the other portions --

18             MR. MISETIC:  [Overlapping speakers] ... to be using.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  --  that you're going to use at a later stage?

20             MR. MISETIC:  Yes.

21             MR. HEDARALY:  No objection.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  No objections.

23             Mr. Registrar.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D930, Your Honours.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  D930 is admitted into evidence.

Page 11839

 1             First of all, we have spoken at a speed which was most likely

 2     unable to be followed.  When the Chamber admitted into evidence the video

 3     and the transcripts, that does not appear yet.  Perhaps, when corrected,

 4     it would appear.

 5             But just out of an abundance of caution, I repeat that the video

 6     played, and I think it was D929, if I am correct, Mr. Registrar, was

 7     admitted into evidence, together with the transcripts.

 8             How much time would the parties need, Mr. Hedaraly, to briefly

 9     discuss the issue of the photospread?  Would further submissions three,

10     four minutes for you be enough?

11             MR. HEDARALY:  I think so, Your Honour, for us.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic.

13             MR. MISETIC:  [Overlapping speakers] ...

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Then I suggest that we do that immediately after the

15     break.  I prefer to do these things before the break because the

16     time-limits are more easily kept, but I'm confident that you will be

17     strict.

18             We will do that after the break.

19             Mr. Novakovic, we will have a break.  We resume a at 11.00.  We'd

20     like to see you back a little bit after 11.00, because we have to deal

21     with a lot of matters first; that is, the issue related to the photo

22     spread in relation to Witness 3.

23             We resume at 11.00.

24                           --- Recess taken at 10.36 a.m.

25                           [The witness withdrew]

Page 11840

 1                           --- On resuming at 11.05 a.m.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic.

 3             MR. MISETIC:  Yes, Your Honour, I think we should go into private

 4     session.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  We turn into private session.

 6                           [Private session]

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 11841











11  Pages 11841-11846 redacted. Private session.















Page 11847

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11                           [Open session]

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we're back in open session.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

14                           [Trial Chamber confers]

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Perhaps we use the time meanwhile.  Since now the

16     list of sources has been received, are there any further submissions as

17     far as the two documents, the map and the description, any further

18     submissions on the basis of what you have received; or are you not yet at

19     that point?

20             MR. MISETIC:  I was going to put some questions to him in cross,

21     perhaps at the end.

22             Quite simply, the book he references doesn't match, in some

23     respect, with what he has put on the map.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.

25                           [The witness entered court]

Page 11848

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Novakovic, Mr. Misetic will now continue his

 2     cross-examination.

 3             Please proceed.

 4             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 5        Q.   Mr. Novakovic, going back to the Martic video, he referenced a

 6     potential counterattack on the Dinara.  Were you involved in the

 7     discussions he had with General Mrksic about launching counterattack on

 8     the Dinara, on the evening of the 4th?

 9        A.   No, I wasn't present when that was being discussed.

10        Q.   You heard Mr. Martic's words, and I'm going to ask you as someone

11     who was involved in these events and afterwards:  When Mr. Martic talks

12     about what happened on the 4th of August as being an unprecedented

13     betrayal, he is talking about an unprecedented betrayal by the

14     authorities in Belgrade and the military of the so-called RSK, isn't he?

15        A.   That's what he says, but I think that is arbitrary.

16        Q.   Now, let's talk a little bit about the civil protection, how that

17     worked.  You mentioned it briefly in your direct examination, and you

18     were shown some routes for evacuation from Benkovac.  So let's start with

19     Benkovac.

20             MR. MISETIC:  And, Mr.  Registrar, if I could have 65 ter 3489,

21     please.

22        Q.   Now, this is -- this is a document from 1993, January.  A plan

23     for evacuation of civilian population.  It talks about the buses

24     available, it identifies the drivers, identifies the reserves.

25             MR. MISETIC:  If we can turn the page.

Page 11849

 1        Q.   It says, in case of evacuation, it identifies where the vehicles

 2     will be parked, how many people can be carried in each vehicle.

 3             Then it says:  "If the evacuation becomes large-scale and is

 4     limited by time constraints, the closest buses shall be used, namely,"

 5     and identifies the drivers.

 6             And, now, yesterday, at trial transcript page 11.715, at page --

 7     sorry, at line 25, you testified that Benkovac plan was for "a movement

 8     of about ten to 20 kilometre," you said.

 9             Now, the last line there in the plan says:  "There are 100 litres

10     of petrol in vehicles which is enough to cross 2 to 300 kilometres."

11             How far could you get from Benkovac -- let me put it a different

12     way?

13             You could get to Bosnia with one of these vehicles, according to

14     this plan.  Correct?

15        A.   It was probably assumed that vehicles should go there and come

16     back again with that fuel.

17        Q.   It says --

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic, just from my recollection of the

19     Benkovac plan, which was with the numbers of cars and kilometres, 25, 25,

20     30, 35, that's what you're referring to?

21             MR. MISETIC:  Yes.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm just putting this to you because it is it on my

23     mind, and sometimes I think it's good to know what is on my mind.  You

24     have seen that in this plan that calculations were made of the totality

25     of kilometres needed by cars.  I was puzzled by it, because how could you

Page 11850

 1     add just 25 kilometres and then end up with 500 or 3.000?  I gave that

 2     some thought; and for me, but if you further want to explore that matter,

 3     please do so --

 4             MR. MISETIC:  We will.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  -- but just for you to know, if you multiply the

 6     numbers of cars and distance, then you will see at the end, more or less

 7     the result is that calculations were made on the basis of so many cars,

 8     so many kilometres, which would then result in a large -- much larger

 9     number of kilometres.  That's how I understood the plan on paper.

10             I know that no attention was paid to it when the witness was

11     examined on that plan.  But that, for me at least, that caused me not to

12     put any further questions, because I thought I finally understood how the

13     calculations for the kilometres were done in this plan.

14             Just for your information.

15             MR. MISETIC:  Yes.  What I intend to do, just so you are aware,

16     is take the plans and then show you how they evolve over the course of

17     the next two years.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  That's fine.

19             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I ask that this exhibit be marked,

20     and I tender it into evidence.

21             MR. HEDARALY:  No objection.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D931, Your Honours.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  D931 is admitted into evidence.

25             MR. MISETIC:  [Previous translation continues] ... go to 65 ter

Page 11851

 1     2550, please.

 2        Q.   This is list of local communes to which fuel for evacuation of

 3     civilians has been delivered.  Now, this is 30th of March, 1995.  Were

 4     you aware that these types of lists and plans were being updated

 5     into 1995?

 6        A.   I assumed that, yes.

 7        Q.   Well, you had some involvement, did you not, in evacuation

 8     preparation?

 9        A.   No, I didn't say that.

10        Q.   Did you attend meetings where preparation of evacuation had been

11     discussed?

12        A.   No, but I had indirect information.

13        Q.   From where?

14        A.   From expert people who dealt with that information.  I mentioned

15     Mr. Babic and other people, and it was part of my duties to monitor the

16     organisation of the life of the civilian population.

17        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ...

18        A.   So I had information on all issues.

19             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I ask had a this exhibit be marked,

20     and I tend it into evidence.

21             MR. HEDARALY:  No objection.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  As D932, Your Honours.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  D932 is admitted into evidence.

25             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. Registrar, if I could have 65 ter 608, please.

Page 11852

 1        Q.   Now, Mr. Novakovic, this is a document called "Republic of

 2     Serbian Krajina republic civilian protection staff."  It is the --

 3             MR. MISETIC:  If we turn the page to page - let me see - it's

 4     numbered page 3.  The date on it is -- it says, for the place, "Knin,"

 5     and the date is August 1994.

 6             If we turn to the page to the next page, it is the assessment of

 7     threats and possibilities for protection and rescue.  It goes through in

 8     great detail the different types of civilian protection measures that

 9     would be undertaken in different situations.

10             So if we could go to page -- numbered page 8 in the English, and

11     go to the bottom, please.  It talks about different zones of

12     vulnerability, and that the so-called RSK has been divided in three zones

13     of vulnerability.

14             If we can turn the page in English, it identifies --

15             MR. HEDARALY:  I'm sorry, Your Honour.

16             Is it possible to have the corresponding B/C/S for the witness as

17     we're moving along, so that he can follow as well.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  I don't think the B/C/S, at this moment, matches.

19             MR. MISETIC:  It's an OTP number, Your Honour, so I don't know if

20     there's something wrong with the exhibit or not.

21             MR. HEDARALY:  I think the page doesn't match.  I think it's a

22     matter of combining the two and figuring out.

23             MR. MISETIC:  I don't speak B/C/S.

24             MR. HEDARALY:  I can't help --

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Let's see whether we can get for the witness the

Page 11853

 1     portion in his language on the screen which you want to refer to,

 2     Mr. Misetic.

 3             MR. MISETIC:  Page 4 of the B/C/S version.

 4        Q.   Now, it says:  "The first -- the zone of the first degree of

 5     vulnerability include the following."

 6             MR. MISETIC:  If we turn the page in English, then it describes

 7     villages and towns located in the buffer zone.  Frontier villages located

 8     within ten kilometres.  Villages and towns in the general area of the

 9     above mentioned tactical axis.

10             Scrolling down, there is a second degree of vulnerability, which

11     includes towns and villages at a distance of 20 kilometres from the line

12     of demarcation.  They would be threatened in the case of initial discuss

13     by enemy forces.  Then the third degree includes small enclaves between

14     the tactical axis.

15        Q.   So the civilian protection organised itself by the location of

16     certain villages and areas and their proximity to the front lines.  Is

17     that correct, Mr. Novakovic?

18        A.   Yes, it is.

19        Q.   Okay.

20             MR. MISETIC:  Now, if we could go to page 31 in the English,

21     please.

22        Q.   Now, you say, in your witness statement, that there were no plans

23     at the republican level, but only at the -- the regional or municipal

24     levels.  However, the actual civil protection --

25             MR. MISETIC:  It's page 14 of the Serbian.

Page 11854

 1        Q.   The actual civil protection plan says:  "For successful command

 2     of protection and rescue operations, it is necessary to organise the

 3     following command organs."

 4             The first command organ is the republican civilian protection

 5     staff.  Correct?

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic, isn't it, 15 on the -- at least what I

 7     have is 15 out of 15 -- oh, it's 14 numbered, but 15 in the last page of

 8     the document.  As uploaded, numbered page 14.  Yes, I now see it.

 9             MR. MISETIC:

10        Q.   So the way -- you are already testified, I believe, that

11     Mr. Babic was, in fact, an assistant minister of defence of the so-called

12     RSK.  Correct?

13        A.   Yes, of the RSK.

14        Q.   He, in fact, was at the republican level in organizing civil

15     protection.  Correct?

16        A.   Yes.  As I said, he was the head of the civil protection staff.

17     He had his associates, including regional representatives for Northern

18     Dalmatia, Kordun, Banja and so on and so forth.

19        Q.   Civilian protection measures would be taken with him at the top

20     of the pyramid, and then it would go all the way down, according to this

21     chart, to civilian protection commissioners in large apartment buildings,

22     blocks of buildings, streets, villages, enterprises, and other legal

23     entities.  Correct?

24        A.   Yes.  First, the republican, then the regional and municipal

25     staffs, and then the various civil protection staffs and commissioners.

Page 11855

 1     It was a system which went from the top, the republican level, down to

 2     basically almost every building.

 3        Q.   Okay.

 4             MR. MISETIC:  Now if we can turn the page in the English, and if

 5     we can scroll down, yes.

 6        Q.   Now, although the document is dated August 1994, it says:  "The

 7     republican civilian protection staff studied and adopted this assessment

 8     of threats and possibilities for protection and rescue at its first

 9     session held on 14 July 1995."

10             Do you recall such a meeting and the fact that this plan was

11     passed on the 14th of July, 1995?

12        A.   No.  I am not familiar with it, and I am also not sure whether

13     this is an assessment or a plan.  There's a difference.

14             MR. MISETIC:  Well, let's go to D440, Mr.  Registrar.

15             I'm sorry.  I forgot to ask that that exhibit be marked, and I

16     tender it into evidence.

17             MR. HEDARALY:  No objection.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D933, Your Honours.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  D933 is admitted into evidence.

21             MR. MISETIC:

22        Q.   This is now from the Ministry of Defence, Lika administration,

23     regional civilian protection staff, on 15th July, and it cites an order

24     of the RSK republican civilian protection staff, dated 14 July 1995.

25             MR. MISETIC:  And if we could turn the page, please.

Page 11856

 1        Q.   At point 3, it says:  "To prepare adequately the leaders of

 2     activities in the evacuation and movement of the population."

 3             Now, were you aware that as early as the 15th of July, orders

 4     were being passed to begin to prepare leaders of activities in the

 5     evacuation and movement of the population?

 6        A.   I was not familiar with it.  This seems to be done well.  If

 7     there was a threat or a danger, then it was only natural to prepare the

 8     leaders of activities.  This does not mention any particular evacuation

 9     but preparation, and that can take between a few months and up to a year.

10        Q.   If we look at point 5, it says:  "In the conduct of these

11     activities, establish continuous cooperation with the commands of the

12     Serbian army of the Krajina in your area of responsibility."

13             Now, can you explain to us why civil protection was being

14     coordinated with military?

15        A.   It is only logical.  One couldn't move in the field without

16     having the army of the RSK move, particularly during times of an imminent

17     threat of war or danger of war.  In particular, large quantities of

18     vehicles and people could not be moved without coordination with the

19     armed forces.  Instead of the civilians, such people could be someone

20     else, such as units that were introduced in the area.  Therefore, the

21     coordinate was needed --

22        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... let me ask you a different

23     question related to this topic.

24             You have indicated that part of your portfolio was dealing with

25     religious affairs.  Correct?

Page 11857

 1        A.   Yes.  Quite right.

 2        Q.   In the course of your time in the so-called Krajina, did you have

 3     occasion to meet with Episcop Longin?  L-o-n-g-i-n.

 4        A.   He was not a bishop, but a member of the Orthodox church, and I

 5     met some other Catholic and Orthodox priests and officials.

 6             MR. MISETIC:  [Previous translation continues] ... if I could

 7     have 1D61-0231, please.

 8        Q.   This is a news -- a religious news bulletin from Zagreb carrying

 9     news about various issues from the 29th of June, 1995.

10             MR. MISETIC:  And if we could go to the second page on the

11     English, please.

12        Q.   It talks about -- it provides a Croatian translation of a the

13     report of the European Community Monitoring Mission regarding their

14     meeting with the Serbian Orthodox Episcop of Dalmatia Longin in Knin.

15             In the ECMM --

16             MR. MISETIC:  It's page 3 of the Croatian version.

17        Q.   In the ECMM Weekly Report, which was dated 16 June -- and you

18     will see that in the ECMM report, according to this news item:  "Episcop

19     Longin stated that they, the Serb Orthodox church ..." --

20             MR. MISETIC:  Let me see if I can find it.  It's point C in the

21     Croatian at the bottom.

22        Q.   "Episcop Longin stated that they, the Serb Orthodox church,

23     should the Croatian army attack the Krajina, would advise the population

24     to leave the Republic of Serbian Krajina, considering the Croats actually

25     want a territory without the Serbs.  This has been proven through events

Page 11858

 1     from 1st of May in Western Slavonia when the territory was ethnically

 2     cleansed in civilised and technical manner, although Croatia has laws in

 3     writing which protect the Serb minority.  The Croats have frightened

 4     these people to such an extent that they (the Serbs) fearing for their

 5     own lives, massively fled.  Episcop Longin stated another example of how

 6     Croatia forced the Serbs who previously wanted to remain in Croatia to

 7     change their surnames."

 8             Now, as someone who dealt with religious issues and knew Episcop

 9     Longin, it was, in fact, the position of many in the Serbian Orthodox

10     church that if the Croatian army launched an attack, that the civilian

11     population should leave.  Isn't that right?

12        A.   I am not aware of that.  I believe it was quite the other way,

13     that it was the position of the Orthodox church that the priesthood and

14     the civilians remain.  I know Mr. Longin personally, although I was not

15     present at this meeting.

16             I was an assistant commander, but not in terms of coordinating

17     religious activities.  My task was to deal with the religious affairs in

18     the armed forces, and we had an example in -- by way of a law from 1928

19     from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, indicating how such religious matters

20     were dealt, and we applied some of those provision.  Otherwise, I don't

21     know it was the position of our church, as you stated it here.

22             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I tender 1D61-0231 into evidence.

23             MR. HEDARALY:  No objection.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D934, Your Honours.

Page 11859

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  D934 is admitted into evidence.

 2             MR. MISETIC:

 3        Q.   Mr. Novakovic, I think I understood your proofing statement

 4     correctly that you were shown simulated evacuation video during your

 5     proofing.  Am I correct in that?

 6             Let be me specific.  Maybe I don't understand what proofing is?

 7             When you met with the Prosecution before appearing in court

 8     yesterday, in meeting with them, did they show you a video of an

 9     evacuation drill?

10        A.   Yes, they did.

11        Q.   Had you seen that evacuation video before?

12        A.   It is possible I had, although I'm not sure; however, I know that

13     there were such drills.

14        Q.   Were you generally aware that TV Knin was broadcasting images of

15     evacuation drills?

16        A.   Yes.  I was following all radio and TV stations, Zagreb,

17     Belgrade, Banja Luka, and Knin, as well.

18        Q.   As someone in the military of the so-called RSK at the time, what

19     was the purpose of broadcasting such evacuation drills in the media?

20        A.   The purpose was to inform the people and to familiarise them with

21     the procedure in case of an attack or aggression, and I think it was a

22     fair thing to do.

23        Q.   Okay.

24             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. Registrar, if I could have Exhibit D255,

25     please.

Page 11860

 1        Q.   This is an order of Mr. Babic on the 29th of July.  He orders --

 2     first of all, we references the declaration of the state of war, and

 3     orders continuous duty rosters to be established.  Then orders municipal

 4     civilian protection staffs to also establish continuous duty rosters;

 5     update plans for sheltering, evacuating, and providing treatment; and put

 6     into readiness organised civil protection units.

 7             MR. MISETIC:  If we could turn the page.

 8        Q.   Point 3 is monitor the situation through relevant SVK commands.

 9             Then point 5:  "Starting at 1300 hours on 30 July 1995, report

10     daily to this staff on the measures and activities taken as well as any

11     problems."

12             Now, the whole civilian protection organisation was being led by

13     Mr. Babic at the top of the pyramid, correct, that's why he needed to be

14     updated everyday?

15        A.   Yes, that is correct.

16             MR. MISETIC:  Now, Mr.  Registrar, if I could have 65 ter 1884,

17     please.

18        Q.   This is the minutes of the government meeting in the government

19     building in Knin on 29th July, chaired by Mr. Babic.

20             Point 2 says -- references the decision to proclaim a state of

21     war.

22             MR. MISETIC:  And if we could go to page 9 in the English, which

23     is just under paragraph 3.7.1 in the Serbian.  Page 4 of the Serbian.

24     Okay.

25        Q.   The conclusion is, first:  "Road links through Doljani and

Page 11861

 1     Tiskovac urgently need to be put in operation."

 2             Where are Doljani and Tiskovac?

 3        A.   Doljani and Tiskovac are to the north of Knin in Lika.

 4        Q.   Are they border towns, bordering on Bosnia and Herzegovina?

 5        A.   Not quite, but relatively close by.

 6        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... roads be put into operation?

 7        A.   Could we please go back to the page where the date was?

 8        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ...

 9        A.   It is quite clear you know that on the 27th of July, the Croatian

10     army enter Bosansko Grahovo and that the road was cut off.

11        Q.   Okay.  The next point is, right below that:  "PTT communications

12     urgently need to be put into operation by transferring to the relay

13     system."

14             Why was it urgent and a decision made at the level of the

15     government that the PTT system needed to be urgently put into operation

16     by transferring to the relay system?

17        A.   I'm not sure why.  Probably some of the relay stations had been

18     taken over by the Croatian army and could no longer be used.

19        Q.   The reason the government is talking about this in point 2 of the

20     conclusions is that the PTT system was important to the defence of the

21     so-called RSK.  Correct?

22        A.   It was important for the defence and for the life of the

23     population.

24             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I tender this exhibit into evidence.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  No objection from Mr. Hedaraly; therefore,

Page 11862

 1     Mr. Registrar.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D935, Your Honours.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  D935 is admitted into evidence.

 4             MR. MISETIC:  If we could now go to 1D61-0160, Mr.  Registrar.

 5        Q.   This is now a document from the regional civilian protection

 6     headquarters in Lika.  It references the order of Mr. Babic that we just

 7     saw, dated the 29 July 1995, which is Exhibit D255.

 8             Now this regional chief orders, again:  "To maintain

 9     uninterrupted duty at municipal CZ or civilian protection headquarters."

10             Within point 2, the last entry says:  "Established to what extent

11     companies can be involved in implementing measures to protect, rescue,

12     relocate, and evacuate the population."

13             Are you familiar with what and how companies participated in

14     protection, rescue, relocation, and evacuation of the population.

15        A.   Not quite, but I assume it included the firemen and some medical

16     personnel from the health centres.  I am familiar with it in principle,

17     but not in terms of details.

18             This may have included some construction companies as well.

19        Q.   Okay.

20             MR. MISETIC:  I ask that this exhibit be marked, and I tender it

21     into evidence.

22             MR. HEDARALY:  I have no objection.  I just note that it is

23     outside the area of indictment, but I have no objection on the admission

24     of the exhibit.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Any comments on that, or just --

Page 11863

 1             MR. MISETIC:  I think it is all interrelated on the issue that

 2     we're raising, Your Honour.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, I do understand.

 4             Mr. Registrar.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D936, Your Honours.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  D936 is admitted into evidence.

 7             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. Registrar, if I could please have 65 ter 1345.

 8        Q.   Now, this is the Drnis civil protection, and it's dated 31

 9     July 1995.  It's a report to the Ministry of Defence.  Talks about, in

10     point 1:  "Permanent duty watch by the staff members and Ministry of

11     Defence employees has been introduced."

12             MR. MISETIC:  If we could turn the page in English.

13        Q.    "When we spoke with the commissioners, we familiarized them with

14     the present situation and the measures and actions they are obliged to

15     take in this regard.  Special emphasis was put on sheltering and

16     preparatory actions for an evacuation."

17             Then it says one line below:  "List of persons to be evacuated

18     has been updated.  The fuel distributed in November 1994 has been

19     checked, as has been the roadworthiness of vehicles.  With the exception

20     of the problems in the town of Drnis, where two vehicles were found to be

21     faulty, there were no problems of any sort with neither vehicles nor fuel

22     in the entire municipality."

23             Now, Drnis is a front line town.  Isn't that right, Mr.

24     Novakovic?

25        A.   Yes, that's correct.

Page 11864

 1        Q.   And as a front line town, it was particularly important to be

 2     ready to evacuate the population from the Drnis municipality.  Correct?

 3        A.   Yes, that's correct.

 4        Q.   And with respect to the zones that we looked at before, the three

 5     zones that the civilian protection would look at, in the event of the

 6     onset of hostilities, the Drnis municipality, being in zone 1, would be

 7     the first to evacuate its civilian population out of the combat zone.

 8     Correct?

 9        A.   Yes.  That's correct, and that's how it was, actually.  That was

10     carried out.

11        Q.   You say that's how it actually was.  What happened was in --

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   -- in the morning hours, in the earlier part of the operation,

14     the evacuation order was issued to Drnis, and those people would be

15     relocated toward Knin area.  Correct?

16        A.   That's correct.

17        Q.   So do you recall seeing civilians on the move, on the morning of

18     the 4th, in and around Knin who, in fact, had removed from the front line

19     area of Drnis, as a result of the civilian protection measures being

20     undertaken?

21        A.   There were some individual ones in the morning, but for the most

22     part, there was more of that in the afternoon.

23             MR. MISETIC:  I ask that the exhibit be marked, and I tender it

24     into evidence.

25             MR. HEDARALY:  No objection.

Page 11865

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D937, Your Honours.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  D937 is admitted into evidence.

 4             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. Registrar, if could I have Exhibit D254,

 5     please.

 6        Q.   Mr. Novakovic, this is a document internal to the SUP or the

 7     secretariat of internal affairs, dated 31 July 1995.

 8             It says -- these are now the -- pursuant to the state of war and

 9     the experience in Western Slavonia, there is an order that says:  "All

10     secretariats of the interior are to prepare, within their organisational

11     units, for the rapid evacuation of the following archives and day-to-day

12     documentation."

13             Within point 1, the SUP is to prepare to evacuate registers of

14     birth and citizenship.

15             Why, on the 31st of July, would the SUP have to remove registers

16     of birth and citizenship?

17        A.   It doesn't say they have to pack them up, but that they have to

18     prepare them for fast evacuation.

19             It means they have to have packing material ready.  So it says

20     here prepare, it doesn't say pack, and that is a big difference.

21        Q.   I draw your attention to the reference at the introduction that

22     says "drawing on the experience of Western Slavonia."

23             Now, in Western Slavonia, the civilian population left.

24        A.   Unfortunately, they left, but most of them -- most of the ones

25     who remained were killed.  These activities -- well, that's always what

Page 11866

 1     is referred to when experience is mentioned.  You've jogged my memory

 2     now.

 3             Most of the population of Western Slavonia, including women and

 4     children who remained behind, were killed.

 5        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... debate with you about

 6     Operation Flash.  Let's stay focussed.  Let's try to find a common

 7     language where neither one of us will dispute.

 8             The Serb population of Western Slavonia after Operation Flash was

 9     no longer there.  Do you agree with me?

10        A.   I agree.  Absolutely.

11        Q.   Now --

12        A.   That's correct, yes, for several reasons.

13        Q.   When Minister Pajic draws on the experience of Western Slavonia,

14     what is he talking about is they need to prepare -- prepare to evacuate

15     registers of births and citizenship because, like Western Slavonia, it

16     may come to the fact that the population will not be there in the event

17     of a HV offensive.  Correct?

18        A.   Not just that.  The books that remained, the registers that

19     remained there, were destroyed and burned.  So what you say is correct,

20     but the other part is missing.

21        Q.   And how do you know they were burned?

22        A.   Well, I know because I studied that issue.  I have a lot of

23     information.

24        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... specific source for that

25     claim?

Page 11867

 1        A.   I cannot give you any concrete proof now.  I haven't thought

 2     about it.  I might be able to do it next time.

 3        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ...

 4             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. Registrar, if I could have -- I'm sorry, is

 5     this -- oh, this is already in evidence.

 6             Mr. Registrar, if I could have Exhibit D256, please.

 7        Q.   Mr. Novakovic, I'm going to show you Mr. Babic's order from the

 8     2nd of August.

 9             Now, Mr. Babic is ordering, on the basis of another order:

10     "Immediately and no later than 1900 hours on the 3rd of August to forward

11     a report covering the following issues."

12             Point 1 is sheltering; point 2 is evacuation; point 3 is care.

13             MR. MISETIC:  If we could turn the page.

14        Q.   And, there, you see the rest of what he is asking for.

15             So were you aware that civilian protection was, in fact, then

16     speeding up its plans to be done by the evening of the 3rd of August?

17        A.   I don't believe it was the 3rd of August, but for the ten or 15

18     last days, they were certainly speeding up, because it was evident that

19     something was going to happen, and they always had aggression in mind.

20             MR. MISETIC:  [Previous translation continues]... please.  65 ter

21     3120, please.

22        Q.   Now, that same day, the day 2nd of August, Mr. Babic issues

23     another order:  "Preparation for evacuation of material, cultural, and

24     other assets.  Through municipal civilian protection staffs, organs and

25     organisations, immediately order preparations to be conducted for the

Page 11868

 1     evacuation of the following:  Material goods, archives, registers of

 2     births, marriages, and deaths; record files and materials of a

 3     confidential nature; movable culture assets; money and accompanying

 4     documents."

 5             It is signed by Mr. Babic, and he says to send -- at the end, he

 6     says --

 7             MR. MISETIC:  If we could turn the page in English.

 8        Q.   "Send daily reports on pro progress of preparations by 2000 hours

 9     to this staff starting on 4 August 1995."

10             Now, if I'm not mistaken, this order was passed before the order

11     that we just saw on the screen; and then Mr. Babic, in the order we just

12     saw on the screen, asks, instead of 4 August, that it be moved up to

13     3 August.

14             My question to you, sir, is:  Why is the Ministry of Defence

15     ordering the preparation of the evacuation of birth registers, marriage

16     registers, death registers, movable cultural assets, money and

17     accompanying documents, and materials of a confidential nature?

18        A.   I think Mr. Babic and his service did this well, and I have to

19     say putting it in the overall context, that had everything been carried

20     out as it was envisaged in this order and envisioned by Mr. Babic and his

21     associates, there might not have been what happened.

22             A little while ago, you showed me that film, and there's

23     something that I forgot to mention.  Slunj, Drsic [as interpreted], and

24     other municipalities whose members were well trained in civilian

25     protection, they were not evacuated outside the territory of the Krajina

Page 11869

 1     until they found themselves surrounded.  So had everything been carried

 2     out properly as it was envisioned - and it is always envisaged better

 3     than it is carried out and implemented - some activities might not have

 4     taken place.  The population might have moved just a short distance and

 5     not left the territory entirely, and everything would depend on the

 6     further advance of the Croatian forces, and this was done correctly.

 7        Q.   Mr. Novakovic, but part of the plan, would you agree with me,

 8     envisaged that the population might, in fact, move out of Croatia, and

 9     you would need to take all these documents with you?  Wasn't that part of

10     what the plan foresaw that is correct possibility as well?

11        A.   No, that possibility is not mentioned.  That is your conclusion,

12     and I don't want to comment on it.

13             MR. MISETIC:  Your Honours, I tender 65 ter 3120 into evidence.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  No objection, Mr. Hedaraly.

15             Mr. Registrar.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D938 Your Honours.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  D938 is admitted into evidence.

18             MR. MISETIC:

19        Q.   Now, Mr. Novakovic, the fact of the matter is that, prior to

20     Operation Storm, you were encountering a serious problem of people

21     already fleeing the so-called RSK and leaving the territory.  Isn't that

22     right?

23        A.   That problem existed, yes, I don't deny it.

24             MR. MISETIC:  And if I have on the screen, please --

25        Q.   In particular, in the military, you were having people massively

Page 11870

 1     desert and leaving for the so-called Republika Srpska or the FRY.

 2     Correct?

 3        A.   Well, yes, but it was not large-scale.

 4             MR. MISETIC:  If could I have on the screen, please, 1D61-0274.

 5        Q.   I'm going show you, Mr. Novakovic, an order issued by General

 6     Mrksic, establishing ad hoc military courts on the 30th of July, 1995.

 7             This is the decree, and we have translated the relevant portions.

 8        A.   Yes, yes.

 9        Q.   And on the 30th of July, 1995, in Article 2:  "Ad hoc military

10     courts shall issue judgements of the first and last instance, to military

11     persons from compositions of units ... for criminal offences against the

12     armed forces and as follows:  The failure or refusal to carry out orders;

13     insubordination; surrendering to the enemy; arbitrary abandonment of

14     duties during combat; abandonment of position against orders; weakening

15     combat morale; and combat situations."

16             Article 6 --

17             MR. MISETIC:  Next page in the Serbian:

18        Q.   "The ad hoc military court can deliver the death sentence.  In

19     order to deliver the death sentence, the court must have a unanimous vote

20     from all members of the Court."

21             Article 7:  "There is no possibility of appeal against the

22     judgement of the ad hoc military court."

23             Can you explain to the Court, please, Mr. Novakovic, why General

24     Mrksic needed to order to issue for a formation of ad hoc military courts

25     which had the power in both the first and last instance to issue the

Page 11871

 1     death sentence?

 2             I'm sorry, signed by Martic, is the decree.

 3        A.   I was about to say that this is not issued by Mr. Martic, but by

 4     Mr. Mrksic.  This decree took along time to prepare.  I think my

 5     associates worked on this, because for a long time, we had had a problem

 6     with establishing military courts.  We worked on that for a long time,

 7     and you know what the competents of military courts are.  They had far

 8     broader competences.

 9             Because of certain problems that occurred, this decree had more

10     of a psychological effect.  We worked on it for a long time, and I know

11     that Mr. Martic and his office added something to this decree.  And where

12     the more severe sanctions were provided for, he authorised the commander

13     of the military district to mitigate the measures, and the ultimate

14     approval rested with the president of the republic.  This is something in

15     favour of this presidential decree.

16             I have to say that it was in the implemented in one single case.

17        Q.   Well --

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic, you started asking whether General

19     Mrksic needed to issue this decision; then you corrected yourself and you

20     said it was signed by Mr. Martic.

21             Then you, Mr. Novakovic you said:  "I was about to say that this

22     was not issued by Mr. Martic, but by Mr. Mrksic.

23             MR. MISETIC:  It's the next page in this series Your Honour.  It

24     is suggested by Lieutenant-Colonel Mile Mrksic, "whose proposal is ..."

25     Then it is signed by Martic pursuant to his decree.  So it is both of

Page 11872

 1     them.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, I was a bit confused by not having everything

 3     before me.

 4             MR. MISETIC:  If you turn to the next page in English.

 5             This is the proposal sent on the same day by General Mrksic to

 6     the Supreme Defence Council, and it's the next page in the B/C/S.

 7             His proposal is that this be instituted:  "And as you say, he

 8     says they would be rare in everyday practice, but would surely have a

 9     great psychological effect on the possible were perpetrators.

10             "For this reason, we recommend that our proposal be accepted and

11     that the stated decree be signed by the president of the RSK."

12        Q.   SO this is, in fact, a proposal by the military which was then

13     signed by Mr. Martic on the 30th of July 1995.

14             My specific question to you, Mr. Novakovic, is:  Why, on the 30th

15     of July, does this decree need to be passed?  What's happening on the

16     30th of July that requires an ad hoc tribunal with the power to issue the

17     death sentence?

18        A.   I think the date has nothing to do with this order or this

19     decision.  As I said previously, this decision took longer than a month

20     to prepare.  So it was a coincidence that it was on the 30th.  It might

21     have been prepared on the 30th of June or July.  So the date is purely

22     accidental.  There was no special reason for it to be done on that date.

23     I know that it was sent back to the president's office more than once to

24     be further worked on.

25        Q.   Mr. Novakovic, right after the fall of Grahovo , did you have not

Page 11873

 1     problems with units that were abandoning their positions, units that had

 2     been defeated in Grahovo and that were not executing orders?  Didn't you

 3     not have that problem?

 4        A.   No, I didn't have that problem.  As I explained a little while

 5     ago, not a single unit left its positions.  There were only individuals

 6     who left their positions.  That's a big difference.  I don't think it's

 7     the same thing.

 8        Q.   You had a problem with individuals abandoning their positions,

 9     particularly after the fall of Grahovo.  Correct?

10        A.   Yes, there were -- there was always that problem.  It may have

11     been a little worse but not too much.

12             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I ask that this exhibit be marked,

13     and I tender it into evidence.

14             MR. HEDARALY:  No objection.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D939, Your Honours.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  D939 is admitted into evidence.

18             Mr. Misetic, I'm looking at the clock in order to find a suitable

19     moment for a break.

20             MR. MISETIC:  I'm just going to complete this area.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  If it is just to be completed in the next couple of

22     minutes, then please proceed.

23             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. Registrar, if I could have D923, please.

24        Q.   This is now again General Mrksic's report.

25             MR. MISETIC:  And if we could numbered page 16 in the English,

Page 11874

 1     and page 10 in the B/C/S, please, numbered page 10.  Okay.

 2        Q.   Mr. Novakovic, I just asked you about this problem, and here's

 3     what General Mrksic wrote:  "Since the fall of Grahovo, 29 July 1995,

 4     people have been deserting the western part of the Republic of Serbian

 5     Krajina every day.

 6             "By exercising control over the bridge over the river Korana in

 7     Slunj, on the 1st and 2nd of August, it was found that there were about

 8     400 conscripts among 700 individuals who tried to cross the river Korana

 9     towards Vojnic.

10             "Since Grahovo fell until the beginning of the aggression of the

11     Croatian army on the western part of Republic of Serbian Krajina, about

12     2.000 conscripts have deserted war units in various ways."

13             MR. MISETIC:  Then if we flip four pages in, which is numbered

14     page 20 at the bottom, and page 12 of the B/C/S.

15        Q.   Under the section titled, "Decision on evacuation," second

16     paragraph --

17             MR. MISETIC:  Sorry, page 13.  The next paragraph would be on

18     page 13.  There you go.

19        Q.   "In the practice, some sort of evacuation from Republic of

20     Serbian Krajina has been going on for years, and especially after the

21     fall of Grahovo and after Knin was endangered from the axis of the Dinara

22     mountain.  From 1992 until August 1995, 28.000 conscripts have moved out

23     from the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

24             "In the situation when people did not believe in the possibility

25     of self-defence, without the help of the VRS and the Yugoslav army, no

Page 11875

 1     one could have stopped the evacuation during the aggression."

 2             Now, Mr. Novakovic, the reality was that after the fall of

 3     Grahovo, you had a serious problem with people leaving, both civilian and

 4     military, from the so-called RSK.  Correct?

 5        A.   As I said just a while ago, the civilian population left in a

 6     disorganised manner of their own free will, in individual cases and in

 7     individual instances; and you saw that there were a number of people from

 8     the territory of the RSK.

 9        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ...

10        A.   I'm sorry.  I didn't understand your question.

11        Q.   These are people that were leaving before Operation Storm.

12     Correct?

13        A.   Yes, before that aggression of the 4th of August, yes.

14             MR. MISETIC:  This would be a good time for a break.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  It is, Mr. Misetic.

16             Could I ask already, Madam Usher, to escort Mr. Novakovic out of

17     the courtroom.

18                           [The witness withdrew]

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic, earlier, you had drawn your attention

20     to the 100 litres which would take you quite a distance.  I then shared

21     with you that I made some thoughts on the Benkovac evacuation plans,

22     trying to see how this was calculated, whether it would be long range or

23     short range evacuation, because that is apparently the issue apart from

24     organised or not organised.

25             Now, you have drawn your attention today to the Drnis report,

Page 11876

 1     saying that they had checked all the means of transportation, that the

 2     fuel and everything fine.  Now, attached to that report is a list, first

 3     of all, of ladies who would assist in evacuation matters, but also a long

 4     lest of those transportation means and the fuel which was available.

 5     There, we find numbers of tractors and drivers and quantities of fuel

 6     distributed.

 7             I am trying to reconcile the distance with fuel.  You have drawn

 8     your attention to 100 litres, which would take at a far as distance.

 9     There, for example, I find four tractors, 40 metres, which ten metres a

10     tractor, which, again, might go a short range.

11             I just want to let you know that I'm trying to understand all of

12     it:  And, also, since you have drawn your attention to the fact that 100

13     litres would take you far, then, of course, if I see ten litres a

14     tractor, I think that is less far than -- -

15             MR. MISETIC:  I can tell what you what our position is, Judge.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

17             MR. MISETIC:  The Drnis specific issue is because you have had

18     some witnesses, whether UN or otherwise, talking about civilians on the

19     move earlier on than when the evacuation order was issued.

20             Our position is that's true and that that was organised, which

21     the witness has now, in my opinion, confirmed, that front line villages

22     were evacuated into Knin.

23             So that's the point that I'm trying to make there, that this is

24     not spontaneous exodus, as may be suggested by the Prosecution, but was

25     organised.

Page 11877

 1             The second issue is, we don't dispute that - and I think the UN

 2     has made clear and the documents made clear - that they were short of

 3     fuel for the longer trek that was decided and they saw it.

 4             It says in the UN reports:  "Fuel to move 32.000 people to

 5     Benkovac -- sorry, Petrovac and Banja Luka."

 6             So our position is not necessarily that it was organised and

 7     planned two years in advance that they would all move out to Bosnia, but

 8     that there is with an infrastructure in place which went all the down to

 9     apartment buildings.  It was activated.

10             The fact that the decision was made without sufficient fuel is

11     something that is a fact, but that is the way it wept.

12             I think this is our evident to address the issue of spontaneous

13     movement versus organised movement.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, at least now I understand.  So even if the 100

15     litres which would take you far would have been 15 litres, then you would

16     say that is exactly the reason why they needed more and perhaps they may

17     have had sufficient fuel at some places.

18             MR. MISETIC:  Correct.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  At least I understand the position of the Defence in

20     this respect.

21             We will have a break and resume at five minutes to 1.00.

22                           --- Recess taken at 12.34 p.m.

23                           --- On resuming at 1.11 p.m.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  The Chamber apologises for the late start, but as it

25     sometimes happens, the breaks are even more busy than what happens in

Page 11878

 1     court.

 2             Mr. Misetic, please proceed.

 3             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 4        Q.   Mr. Novakovic, going back to this issue about the evacuation

 5     preparation, you yourself attended a meeting on the 3rd of August at

 6     1330 hours, with Veljko Popovic, Sava Milovic, and Drago Vujatovic to

 7     discuss the preparations for the evacuation, didn't you?

 8        A.   I don't recall that.

 9        Q.   Well, let me see if can I refresh your recollection.

10             Can you tell the Court, first, who Drago Vujatovic is?

11        A.   Drago Vujatovic used to be the head of civilian protection in

12     Knin municipality.

13             MR. MISETIC:  [Previous translation continues] ... if I could

14     have 1D61-0051 on the screen, please.

15        Q.   I'm going to show you the witness statement of Drago Vujatovic

16     again, dated 6 March 2007.

17             MR. MISETIC:  If we could turn to page 4 in the English,

18     paragraph 20, please.

19        Q.   Now, it says:  "3 August 1995, at 1330 hours, I remember

20     attending a meeting with Kosta Novakovic; Veljko Popovic, chairman of the

21     executive committee of the Knin authorities; and Sava Milovic.  The

22     purpose of the meeting was to discuss the possibility of evacuation of

23     civilian population; that is, to discuss if there were enough shelters,

24     fuel, for the movement of the population from outside to the shelters in

25     Knin, and food and sanitary facilities.  It was a very short meeting, and

Page 11879

 1     no final decisions were made."

 2             MR. MISETIC:  If we go to paragraph 21.

 3        Q.   He says:  "I have been shown a document bearing number 01329697,

 4     dated August 2nd, 1995," and that is one of the Dusko Babic orders that I

 5     showed you earlier from the 2nd of August.

 6             "Although I have never seen this document before, I believe that

 7     this document is what triggered the meeting on August 3, 1995, as the

 8     matters listed in the document were the topics of discussion at the

 9     meeting."

10             Now, Mr. Novakovic, why were you at a meeting on the 3rd of

11     August to discuss the evacuation plans that Mr. Babic had put in place on

12     the 2nd of August?

13        A.   I have to say that I do not recall this meeting, although it is

14     possible that I attended it.

15             In any case, the meeting was not in relation to the document you

16     mentioned.  I saw no documents before they were shown to me by the

17     Prosecution.  I was probably there on some business or visiting

18     Mr. Popovic.  Who was the president of the executive council for Knin

19     municipality.

20             What was the reason that he called these gentlemen to attend, I

21     don't know.  In principle, I never held meetings in other branches

22     without the presence of their heads or chiefs.  I certainly would not

23     have gone to speak to Mr. Vujatovic without the regional head, which was

24     Mr. Kekic, and in particular without Mr. Babic who was their superior.

25             This was not an official meeting.  It is possible that there was

Page 11880

 1     some discussion on these issues, but can I freely state that I never went

 2     to other governmental branches or bodies to have meetings at lower levels

 3     bypassing their superiors.

 4        Q.   Now, none of the other individuals that Mr. Vujatovic says were

 5     present at the meeting were part of the RSK military, were they?

 6        A.   No, no, they were not.

 7        Q.   Why -- do you have any explanation for why, from the military

 8     side, you would be present at this meeting?

 9        A.   I had lots of contacts during any given day, even up to 30 with

10     various representatives of international organisations and from our

11     governmental bodies.  Some of them were private contacts, and I did not

12     keep track of all those.  I communicated with many people, since that was

13     the scope of my authority given to me by the commander.

14        Q.   Let's turn your attention back to the 4th of August.  And in your

15     statement, it is clear that you know Mirko Bijlanovic, who is the senior

16     logistic officer of the ARSK.

17             MR. MISETIC:  And, Mr. Registrar, if we could have exhibit D161,

18     please.

19        Q.   These are his notes.

20             MR. MISETIC:  And if we turn to page 6 of -- numbered page 6

21     of 10, and page 9 in the -- yes, that's it.

22        Q.   From his notes on what happened on the 4th of August, he writes.

23             MR. MISETIC:  This is -- I'm sorry.  This should be page 3 at the

24     top in the English, but for some reason on the bottom, it says 6 of 10.

25             Could we scroll down, please.  Can with go three pages forward.

Page 11881

 1     There we go.  That's it.

 2        Q.   It says, Mr. Novakovic:  "At 1820 hours, I returned to the OCGS

 3     Serbian Krajina army Main Staff operations centre, where I met Colonel

 4     Novakovic.  He says, 'We will engage the UNPROFOR capacities for the

 5     elevation of the population beside our own,'" and it should say "free

 6     capacities."

 7             "I was caught by surprise and asked him, 'What are you talking

 8     about?  What evacuation?'"

 9             Then it goes on.

10             MR. MISETIC:  If we turn the page in English.

11        Q.   He says:  "Following this explanation, I returned to the PKM and

12     made an order that ..."

13             MR. MISETIC:  Page 11 of the B/C/S, please.

14        Q.   "... the buses available for evacuation were to report at the

15     Knin bus station, and that this must be arranged with the Knin bus

16     company manager.

17             "That all the free transport capacities belonging to the corps

18     and trailers belonging to the L. Trans Company were to be sent to Golubic

19     to take out ammunition and the mines and explosives primarily the hand

20     head anti-artillery rocket launchers and various other weapons:

21             "That the 15th corps must send available vehicles to Tiskovac

22     warehouse in order to remove ammunition and MES."

23             Next line:  "That emptying the Kosovo and Stara Straza reservoirs

24     must start immediately."

25             Now, Mr. Novakovic, it's clear that Mr. Bjelanovic put military

Page 11882

 1     resources into assist in the evacuation.  Is that correct?

 2        A.   I don't know what the explanation given by General Bjelanovic

 3     was, but it is obvious that there was need for fuel.  As you could see

 4     before, we expected UNPROFOR to secure that.  The only bigger issue we

 5     had was with fuel.  However, this is not very clear to me.  You haven't

 6     read out the whole thing, and some of the parts are not very legible.

 7        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... you passed the order for the

 8     evacuation to Mr. Bjelanovic.  Correct?  That part is true?

 9        A.   No, it is not.  You misread.  First of all, I was not

10     Mr. Bjelanovic's superior.  I know him very well and I can testify that

11     this is his handwriting.  He was my boss twice; whereas, on the 4th of

12     August, we were workmates.  I was an assistant in one department and he

13     was an assistant in another.

14             It says here that I provided him with some information at

15     6.20 p.m. which is not realistic, in terms of time.  We could see that

16     there was a meeting with UNPROFOR that I chaired between 6.00 and

17     7.00 p.m.; therefore, this must have been closer to 7.00 p.m.

18             Had you read out the whole thing, you would also said that we met

19     and I briefed him, thinking that he had information from the commander.

20     He said that the commander had arrived and that he had explained to him

21     something.  As I said yesterday, my duty was only to read out the

22     decision to the civil protection organs.  That was the scope of my

23     competence.  I did not pass the decision.  I merely technically processed

24     it, read it out, and was not competent to implement it.

25             I believe we clarified that yesterday.

Page 11883

 1             Could you please read out the whole thing that Mr. Bjelanovic

 2     wrote.

 3        Q.   Well, let me ask you a question.

 4             With respect with the decision to start emptying all of the

 5     military ammunition facilities, what was the purpose at or around 1820 or

 6     1900 of emptying the arms depots?

 7        A.   I'm not familiar with that.  I don't know why Mr. Bjelanovic

 8     drafted this note, and I did not meddle with his department, although I

 9     had worked in logistics for a number of years.  However, at this point in

10     time, I was not competent in that area, and I showed no particular

11     interest in it.

12        Q.   Were military resources put into the evacuation of the civilian

13     population, to your knowledge?

14        A.   One could say no to that.  For the most part, what was used were

15     tractors, civilian vehicles, and the odd military vehicle.  But, in

16     principle, no.

17        Q.   Mr. Novakovic, do you know who Radivoje Nikolic is?

18        A.   I don't know whether we have the same person in mind.  I know

19     Radivoje Nikolic who was a well-known Knin attorney.  I think he was in

20     the judiciary at Knin at that time.

21        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... was at one time the

22     secretary of the Veritas organisation?

23        A.   I don't know.  It is possible that he worked for the

24     organisation.

25        Q.   Do you know of a unit, an RSK unit, which was known by the name

Page 11884

 1     Mindjusari?

 2        A.   It was not a unit, it was a band.  It could be that in a

 3     video-clip, they may have played as soldiers, but they were actually a

 4     band of four to five guys.

 5        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... where the HV breached RSK

 6     lines, ARSK lines, you mentioned in the Velebit area.  I believe you then

 7     said that there was a breach in Vrlika.  Is that right?

 8        A.   That is right.  Well, not in Vrlika, but from the direction of

 9     Sinj towards Vrlika, next to Perica dam and Ocestovo village.

10        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ...

11        A.   I don't know that.

12        Q.   You were unaware that the HV had managed to breach ARSK positions

13     up on the Dinara in the afternoon of the 4th?

14        A.   I was.  We knew there were movements at Dinara, although we had

15     no price information.

16        Q.   Did General Mrksic know, on the day of the 4th, that there had

17     been a breach up on what is known as Srbena Zemja [phoen]?

18        A.   I think he probably knew.

19        Q.   Did you know?

20        A.   I don't remember whether I knew, but I didn't know that that part

21     of the front line was in danger and closest to Knin.  It was there that

22     the HV and the HVO units had entered the area right after

23     Bosansko Grahovo had fallen in June.  The village of Strmica, at that

24     time, had been emptied because it had been exposed to shelling.

25        Q.   Well, Mr. Novakovic, isn't it true that the HV breach of the ARSK

Page 11885

 1     line up on the Dinara is what caused panic to start in Knin on the 4th of

 2     August?

 3        A.   I don't think that was of primary importance because the

 4     population didn't know what was going on, on Dinara either.  The panic

 5     was caused because of the shelling, rather than the Croatian army

 6     breaching our lines.  The population did not know about it, since they

 7     were not able to feel that themselves.

 8             MR. MISETIC:  [Previous translation continues] ... 81, please.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic, it is repeatedly happened that you ask

10     the registrar already to do something when the previous translation was

11     still continuing.

12             Now, for the record, could you please repeat.

13             MR. MISETIC:  Yes, I apologise.

14             1D61-0181, please.

15             This is the witness statement of Radivoje Nikolic.  And if we

16     could go --

17             MR. HEDARALY:  Sorry, Your Honour.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic.

19             MR. HEDARALY:  Given the witness's answer, can we please confirm

20     that it is the same person that we're talking about, since the witness's

21     answer is not clear.  I don't know if that is going be covered or not by

22     Mr. Misetic.  The witness indicated -- I don't know if we're talking

23     about the same person.  I just want the record to be clear.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Can you meet this concern of Mr. Hedaraly.

25             MR. MISETIC:  Sure.  If we go to page 2, although I don't know if

Page 11886

 1     it is relevant to whether it is the same person or not, to what the

 2     purpose of what I am posing the question for.

 3             But page 2.

 4             If we could not show this to the public, Mr.  Registrar, just

 5     because I don't think that is his home address, but in case it is, Your

 6     Honour, so that it is not broadcast.

 7        Q.   He says, in the first paragraph :  "Practically speaking, I

 8     myself, Savo Strbac, who is the head of the Veritas organisation; and one

 9     fellow lawyer in Knin, Savo Popovic, were mostly involved in the

10     negotiation.

11             Then he says he used to serve as the vice president of the

12     Commission for the Exchange of Prisoners of War and Missing Persons of

13     the Republika Srpska Krajina."

14             Do you know that person?

15        A.   Yes, that is the man.

16             MR. MISETIC:  If we could go to page 5 of the statement, please,

17     at the very bottom, the paragraph begins:  "Around 1.00 or 2.00 p.m. ..."

18        Q.   "Around 1.00 or 2.00 p.m., some shells fell on the hill called

19     Spas.  You could smell smoke and something burning, actually the pine

20     trees.  Just at that time, some people arrived from the direction of the

21     mountain Dinara.  They were called Mindjusari.  They told us that the

22     front line on Dinara was broken, and that some of our units were

23     beginning to retreat."

24             He said says that:  "At that time, my neighbour, Captain

25     Milivojevic returned, and he informed that he had now such information.

Page 11887

 1     He said, in a military slang, 'Everything is under control.'  Also, at

 2     that time, my father arrived ..."

 3             MR. MISETIC:  The next page in the B/C/S, please.

 4        Q.   "... and wants to know what is happening, since he had also heard

 5     the front line on Dinara was broken.  All of the acquaintances, friends

 6     relatives arrived, all of them will having this panicking information

 7     that the front line was broke on Dinara.  I didn't want to believe that.

 8     I tried to make order and peace in the basement with some other older

 9     people, since the others in the basement were in panic."

10             MR. MISETIC:  Then if we go three paragraphs down.

11        Q.   "Now panic overwhelmed the city.  A little bit before 6.00 p.m.,

12     we could hear Radio Knin.  They gave us no information.  In the meantime,

13     my godfather's mother arrived and told us that she had valid information

14     from one of the Mindjusari, who returned from Dinara, that the front line

15     was broken in Mount Dinara and that we should all pack and leave the

16     city.  To explain what are the Mindjusari, it was a special unit of

17     capable young men.

18             "At that time around 6.00 p.m., a great number of cars from the

19     upper part of the city was leaving the city, moving towards

20     Bulina Strana."

21             Mr. Novakovic, this is, in fact, what happened on the afternoon

22     of the 4th of August, correct, the front line was breached, panic started

23     ensued, you issued the evacuation order, and people started to leave?

24     Correct?

25        A.   It is it not.  It is your personal point of view.  As I

Page 11888

 1     explained, many people didn't know about it.  You see here for yourself

 2     when the captain says that things were under control.  It was one of the

 3     Mindjusari.  It was may have been a guy who deserted his units, and such

 4     people always tried to come up with a reason to justify their behaviour.

 5             It is customary, whenever somebody did something wrong, it is

 6     always someone's else's fault and there is always a good reason for it.

 7     To me, that piece of information was irrelevant; however, it did excerpt

 8     certain influence.

 9        Q.   Well, Mr. Novakovic, it also had the added benefit of being true.

10     Right, this information that you say is being passed by someone who is

11     coming up with, basically, an excuse.  Right?

12             He is passing along true information because it turns out that

13     you know that, in fact, the front line was breached on the Dinara.

14     Correct?

15        A.   No, we didn't know.  It could be true, but it could not have had

16     any effect if it was not confirmed.  For the most part, people didn't

17     know about it, and even at the command, the situation was not clear.  The

18     corps commander was there, as well as some other commanders, who had

19     different explanations.  This cannot be taken as truthful.  It only be a

20     version of events, a person's interpretation of what he had seen; and, by

21     the way, this person was not even a soldier.

22        Q.   Okay.

23             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I have completed this topic.  I have

24     one more or two more topics to deal with it.  In the last five minutes, I

25     would like to clean up something that we discussed yesterday, if I may.

Page 11889

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Then we will allow Mr. Novakovic already to

 2     leave the courtroom.

 3             MR. MISETIC:  Well, I want to put it to him right now, if I may.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Oh, you want to put it to the witness.  I wasn't

 5     with you because you were so vague.

 6             MR. MISETIC:  Sorry.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 8             Mr. Novakovic, Mr. Misetic has a still-pending matter to raise

 9     with you.

10             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. Registrar, if I could have 1D61-0355, please.

11        Q.   Mr. Novakovic, I just want to take you back one moment to our

12     discussion yesterday about SVK officers simultaneously being active

13     officers in the Yugoslav army.  I have before you now a document you

14     authored on the 17th of January, 1994.

15             What you wrote was:  "Based on an order by the commander of the

16     SVK and an evident need for an altogether more thorough process of

17     informing the active military persons ... we are delivering the following

18     information."

19             Point 1:  "As a response to incorrect questions as to why the

20     officers joined the RSK (SVK), the answer is very clear and simply:  We

21     are responsible as educated and professional people - Krajina people - to

22     fight together with the people of the RSK for the survival and freedom of

23     the Serbian people, our grandfathers, fathers, and offspring.

24             "Point 2:  Why have the active duty servicemen from the Yugoslav

25     Army been assigned to the SVK?  Because they were born on the territory

Page 11890

 1     of the former Republic of Croatia and RSK.  If, at this moment, active

 2     duty servicemen born outside the territory of the RSK were to be assigned

 3     by orders to the SVK units, this would be considered as the involvement

 4     of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the war."

 5             Then point 3:  "What is the status of the active duty servicemen

 6     in the SVK?  Their status is the same as the status of the active duty

 7     servicemen in the Yugoslav army."

 8             4:  "Where are the active duty servicemen registered, in which

 9     military post?  The active duty servicemen are registered in a separate

10     military post with a code for each separate garrison."

11             We can skip to 6:  "Are there any changes?  Nothing changes.

12     Instead, they exercise their rights the same way they do -- they did so

13     far in accordance with the laws and regulations of the SRJ, which is the

14     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

15             "Is there any difference in salary?  In essence, no.  They

16     receive a salary with a 10 to 20 per cent increase."

17             Finally, number 10:  "What is the status of officers who refuse

18     to join the SVK?  These active duty officers are put on disposal which

19     lasts for a maximum of six months, and on the expiration of that

20     time-period, those who have met the conditions for retirement, 30 years

21     of service, are retired, and the rest lose their status as active duty

22     servicemen."

23             "Signed, Kosta Novakovic."

24             Mr. Novakovic, it is, in fact, true that while you were serving

25     in the army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, you were an active member

Page 11891

 1     of the Yugoslav army.  Correct?

 2        A.   Could you read point 5 which you skipped, please.

 3        Q.   No problem.

 4             "Are the active duty officers upon joining the RSK transferred,

 5     i.e., transferred on official duty?  Yes.  With the referral of the

 6     active officers to the SVK, the same will be appointed to their

 7     appropriate duties and will be no longer registered at their previous

 8     formation posts."

 9        A.   That's part of your answer.  He can't be a member of any other

10     army.  It says quite clearly that they have been transferred and that

11     they will be no longer registered at their previous duties, so that

12     people who were transferred were no longer registered as having duties in

13     the army of Yugoslavia.

14             I think that is an important part of the answer.

15        Q.   Now, again --

16        A.   Yes, please go ahead.

17        Q.   Two questions:  You were an active duty servicemen of the

18     Yugoslav army considered to be on duty.  That's correct, isn't it?  It's

19     either yes or no.

20        A.   One could say that conditionally speaking, because as I explained

21     previously, we were registered in the personnel centres, and this was

22     elaborated quite sometime before.

23        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... second and final question:

24     If you or any other Yugoslav officer born on the territory of the

25     Republic of Croatia refused to go serve in the army of the Republic of

Page 11892

 1     Serbian Krajina, you would have been put on disposal for six months; and,

 2     after, that if you still refused, you would have been either forced to

 3     retire or you would have lost your active duty status.  Is that correct?

 4        A.   It's partly correct.  That's possible because that is what it

 5     says.  I don't deny that that's what this document says.  I'm held

 6     responsible for this document, although I didn't sign it.  Those were the

 7     interpretations, but I don't know of a single instances when someone lost

 8     their job because they didn't join the army of the RSK.

 9             So this information is evidently linked to the large number of

10     questions arriving from people, especially people who had families.  So

11     they had no know what the technical solutions were as regards their

12     salaries and what their families would live on.  The family had to be

13     provided for.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I tender 1D61-0355 into evidence.

16             MR. HEDARALY:  No objection.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D940, Your Honours.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  D940 is admitted into evidence.

20             We'll adjourn for the day, Mr. Novakovic.  We'd like to see you

21     back Monday morning, 9.00, in this same courtroom.

22             Any adjustments as far as time estimates are concerned?

23             MR. MISETIC:  I will try to finish within the first session.  I

24     have one major topic area to cover with him, and then a relatively

25     smaller area.  I will try to get it done by the first session.

Page 11893

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Anything further adjustments as far as other parties

 2     or other Defence teams are concerned?

 3             MR. KAY:  Your Honour, I have no questions.

 4             MR. MIKULICIC:  Mr. President, I will tell you, it very much

 5     depends on the progress of Mr. Misetic, but I don't estimate that I will

 6     need more than one session.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  So, Mr. Novakovic, I again instruct you that you

 8     should not to speak with anyone about either the testimony you have given

 9     already or the testimony still to bee given.

10             We adjourn and we resume on Monday, the 17th of November, at

11     9.00, Courtroom I.

12                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.50 p.m.,

13                            to be reconvened on Monday, the 17th day of

14                            November, 2008, at 9.00 a.m.