1 Friday, 6 November 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone.
7 Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning,
9 everyone in and around the courtroom.
10 This is case number IT-06-90-T, the Prosecutor versus Gotovina et
12 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
13 Mr. Albiston, I would like to remind you that you're still bound
14 by the solemn declaration that you've given at the beginning of your
15 testimony, that you'll speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
16 the truth.
17 THE WITNESS: Yes, Mr. President.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Gustafson, are you ready to continue your
20 MS. GUSTAFSON: Yes, Your Honour. Thank you.
21 WITNESS: CHRISTOPHER ALBISTON [Resumed]
22 Cross-examination by Ms. Gustafson: [Continued]
23 Q. Good morning, Mr. Albiston.
24 A. Good morning, Ms. Gustafson.
25 Q. Yesterday, just before we ended for the day, I was asking you
1 some questions about the practice of not investigating killings after
2 Operation Storm, and yesterday you agreed that the killings that were
3 taking place were one of the most serious and immediate problems of crime
4 in the aftermath of Operation Storm, and, therefore, that it should have
5 been a focus of police resources. And then I asked you if the practice
6 of not investigating killings was inconsistent with your view of what the
7 policing priority should have been, and you mentioned certain
8 post-conflict obstacles, such as a lack of territorial control. And then
9 I asked you about whether -- if a sanitation team could collect bodies,
10 whether that indicated an investigation could take place. And I'd like
11 to hopefully clear this up by asking this in a more concrete way by
12 reference to an example that you're aware of, which is Grubori. And you
13 stated yesterday that you were aware that there was no investigation into
14 the killings in Grubori and that the bodies were sanitised, and that was
15 at page 91.
16 Now, in relation to that incident, there was no obstacle to
17 investigating those killings relating to the post-conflict situation, was
19 A. I'm certainly aware of no obstacle from the position of civilian
20 policing, no.
21 Q. So that was an example where the Croatian authorities could have
22 investigated, but did not, based on your review and assessment of the
23 evidence; is that right?
24 A. Insofar as I can see, I can see no reason why.
25 Q. Now, I would like to ask you a question about whether, in
1 reviewing the material you were provided, whether you saw evidence of an
2 attitude of tolerance or indifference on the part of the Croatian
3 authorities towards the crimes of looting and burning and killing, and
4 I'd just like to review a few examples so that you know what I'm
5 referring to.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Gustafson, the previous answer of the witness
8 "Insofar as I can see, I can see no reason why."
9 The question was that it was an example that they could have
10 investigated, but they did not.
11 Now, it's not entirely clear, but I understood your answer to be
12 that you did not see any reason why they had not investigated.
13 THE WITNESS: That's correct, Mr. President.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you.
15 Please proceed.
16 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you, Your Honour.
17 Q. And the first example is from an HRAT report for the
18 12th of August, and this is P32, and it refers to a meeting with
19 General Cermak, and the report states that:
20 "In a meeting with the sector commander, Cermak stated that life
21 in Knin and in the sector was getting back to normal. He responded to an
22 inquiry for information concerning the rash of fires throughout the area
23 by insisting that the phenomenon had no official sanction and that action
24 is being taken by authorities to stop it."
25 It's at the bottom of this page:
1 "The position appears to be belied by the substantial number of
2 HV military personnel and Croatian civilian police, who are observed
3 passing areas of major conflagration without stopping or, indeed,
4 appearing to take notice of the ongoing destruction."
5 Another example is the evidence of Mr. Jan Elleby, who was the
6 deputy chief then chief of UN CIVPOL in Sector South, and he stated that
7 some attempts were made to stop the looting, but in his view, it was not
8 very persistent, nor did the police seem interested. And he recalled an
9 example of observing a soldier carrying a stereo out of a building and
10 walking past a police officer, who did nothing. That's at P215, page 3.
11 Another example is an ECMM report for the 4th of September,
12 describing the killing of an old lady in the village of Palaca
13 report notes that the ECMM team had found a lot of blood and one bullet
14 shell in the house of the killed lady, and the answer of Croatian police
15 concerning this case was that the old woman died because she had low
16 blood pressure. And that's at P2157, paragraph 4.
17 And an ECC
18 he described as an unwillingness on the part of the authorities to stop
19 the criminal acts, and he based this, in part, on his observation that he
20 saw policemen hanging around the center of Knin or manning check-points
21 with five to seven men, just stopping the cars of international
22 organisations, while trucks and civilian cars would pass without being
23 checked. And that's at D820, page 3.
24 And the last example is a UN CIVPOL weekly report for the
25 21st to 26th of August, and the report states on page 5 that:
1 "On the 23rd of August, at a meeting with the chief of police for
2 Drnis, UN CIVPOL learned that no one had been booked for arson up until
3 that point, and the chief of police stated that, in his opinion, most of
4 the houses were burning because of electrical faults."
5 And that's at P230, page 5.
6 Now, my question is: Did you see evidence like this, and do you
7 agree that it's evidence of an attitude of tolerance or indifference
8 towards crimes?
9 A. There's an awful lot in the question, and I certainly do not
10 intend to try to address and dismiss each of the things that you've
11 raised, because when I read the documents, I saw the examples and others
12 of the sort which you have mentioned, and taken as a whole, they present
13 a very unsatisfactory picture of police efforts and, indeed, efforts of
14 many people. I think there are other factors to take into consideration,
15 and I don't say what I'm about to say by way of excusing bad behaviour by
17 Policemen, in my experience, are not very good at putting out
18 fires. Policemen, when told to stand on check-points and check vehicles,
19 are reluctant to undertake other duties which might result in them
20 failing to discharge the duties to which they have been allocated.
21 There are, as I suggested yesterday, many things which make
22 civilian policing in these sorts of conditions problematic. I don't, for
23 one moment, try to excuse or dismiss the sort of problems to which you
24 alluded in your question. I think that it is extremely likely, on my
25 reading of the evidence, that some of the civilian policemen who were
1 engaged in this area at this time had a problem with attitude. Maybe
2 that's an expression which we use in our job which doesn't translate
3 particularly well, but let me put it this way: Their attitude towards
4 the efficient discharge of their duties may not always be what it should
5 be, and their attitude towards the impartial discharge of their duties
6 may not always be what it ought to be. Those problems exist in policing
7 worldwide, and they come to the fore in periods of violence and,
8 particularly, inter-communal or ethnic or religious violence. I think
9 that's fairly well known, and I don't doubt that there were instances of
10 it here. And the sort of examples which you cite in your question may
11 well be that.
12 If we look at whether that was organised or tolerated, well,
13 I think you would have to examine the conduct of individual supervising
14 officers. In this case, in the lower ranks, some of the supervising
15 officers may not have been performing their duties particularly well if
16 the policemen under their command were not performing their duties very
18 But so far as the documents relating to policy are concerned,
19 I think they show a rather different story, and we went over that ground
21 Q. There's quite a bit in that answer. I'd just like to pick up on
22 one thing you is said, which is:
23 "I think it's extremely likely, on my reading of the evidence,
24 that the civilian policemen who were engaged in this area at this time
25 had a problem with attitude."
1 Now, based on your review of the evidence, did you consider this
2 likelihood of a problem with attitude to be something that may have
3 affected the performance of the Croatian authorities in addressing crime?
4 A. No, because I think the problems to which you have alluded,
5 they're not generic, or from my reading of the documents they are not --
6 they don't permeate the entire civilian police. There are examples of
7 poor policing, which I would expect to find, and I make no attempt to
8 excuse that. In fact, quite the contrary. From my professional
9 perspective, of course, I take a very dim view of it.
10 Q. So, for example, when the HRAT report states that the position of
11 General Cermak that action is being taken by authorities to stop the
12 crimes is belied by the substantial number of HV and civilian police who
13 are observed passing areas of major conflagration without stopping or,
14 indeed, appearing to take notice of the ongoing destruction, that's not
15 something that, in your view, would permeate the entire civilian police
16 or the entire system at the time?
17 A. Well, I don't know whether that observation by that witness
18 carries all the implications which I feel that are conveyed in your
19 question, because the people concerned, who were identified passing by,
20 may well have had other priorities that they were being directed to
21 attend to. I don't know the answer to that on the basis of the document
22 which you cite.
23 Q. Well, when I read a number of examples to you, you confirmed that
24 you had seen examples like that and --
25 A. Oh, yes.
1 Q. -- many more?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And in light of the clear number of times you've seen similar
4 observations, I'm wondering how you can conclude that that's not
5 something that permeated the system at the time, if monitor after monitor
6 is saying the same thing based on similar observations.
7 A. Well, I think what monitor after monitor is seeing is significant
8 disorder. They're seeing looting and burning, which they report, because
9 that's what monitors do, that's what monitors are looking for. And
10 I think in this circumstances, that's -- in these circumstances, that's
11 what monitors are expecting to find. I don't think it necessarily
12 follows that a failure of the police to address all these issues quickly
13 and effectively can be attributed to the sort of reasons which I think
14 you're suggesting. I think there are many more reasons which are also --
15 it's also necessary to bring into the equation, including shortage of
16 resources, the need to perform other directed duties, the need to
17 establish control over the situation, and so on. I think there's
18 sometimes -- there's sometimes a danger, when people are making comments
19 on these situations, that they don't appreciate the level of chaos, the
20 difficulty with communications, with effective command and control, and
21 so on, that all large organisations experience in their day-to-day work
22 and especially in situations in which they're deployed operationally to
23 deal with difficult problems.
24 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you, Mr. Albiston. I have no further
1 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Higgins, are you ready to re-examine the
2 witness? In view of what I said yesterday as far as cross-examination is
3 concerned, Ms. Higgins, do you consider it -- and I'm also addressing
4 you, Mr. Kehoe. Do you consider it the proper sequence that you'll now
5 re-examine or that first an opportunity would be given to Mr. Kehoe to
6 address the matters he apparently had on his mind and which could be
7 considered as a matter which is a matter being raised in
8 cross-examination rather than in re-cross? I'm asking your view on what
9 would be the proper order, and I'll give an opportunity to Mr. Kehoe as
10 well to address that question.
11 MS. HIGGINS: In my submission, Your Honour, I have discussed
12 with Mr. Kehoe the area of questioning that he wishes to undertake this
13 morning, and given that they do not overlap, it would, in my submission,
14 be appropriate for me to re-examine Mr. Albiston and then for Mr. Kehoe
15 to address the issues he has.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I wanted to raise the matter, but, Mr. Kehoe,
17 I take it that since Ms. Higgins is reporting on the result of your
18 conversations, that you would agree.
19 MR. KEHOE: I do, Mr. President. Thank you.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kuzmanovic.
21 MR. KUZMANOVIC: Your Honour, I know yesterday we talked about
22 cross, and I wanted to raise that issue, but we're done. I may have one
23 or two questions in re-cross related to the testimony that was
24 forthcoming from Ms. Gustafson's cross. So it may be covered by --
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
1 MR. KUZMANOVIC: -- Ms. Higgins, it may not, just for
2 Your Honours' knowledge.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Let's -- if Ms. Higgins has no problem, even
4 not knowing what the areas are you'll cover --
5 MR. KUZMANOVIC: We did discuss --
6 JUDGE ORIE: Oh, you did discuss it.
7 MR. KUZMANOVIC: Yes, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Well, then, Ms. Higgins, please proceed.
9 MS. HIGGINS: I'm grateful.
10 Re-examination by Ms. Higgins:
11 Q. Now, Mr. Albiston, I want to raise with you, first of all, a
12 matter that was raised this morning. You were asked the question, in
13 reviewing the material you were provided, whether you saw evidence of an
14 attitude of tolerance or indifference on the part of the Croatian
15 authorities towards the crimes of looting and burning and killing. And
16 then Ms. Gustafson referred to a few examples which she put to you.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Now, when you wrote your report, Mr. Albiston, you refer to what
19 can only be described from paragraph 3.63 as a ream of documentation
20 between Mr. Moric and Lausic, and also police administrations. And if
21 you can go to that section of your report, what I intend to do, rather
22 than pulling all these documents up, is to go through them briefly and to
23 see if you recollect these documents, which might enable you to give a
24 fuller answer to the question that was posed to you this morning.
25 Are you with me, Mr. Albiston?
1 A. Yes, certainly.
2 Q. The first document, for the record, is D50, which was a Moric
3 order to police administrations in which he referred to asking to be
4 informed about whether or not there was cooperation between the police
5 administrations and the fact that he had ordered linking with the
6 military police in order to stop houses being burnt and other people's
7 movable property being taken away unlawfully in the liberated territory.
8 And that date was the 22nd of August, 1995. You may also recall in that
9 document that he asked whether or not on-site investigations were being
10 carried out and whether or not crimes were being investigated. Do you
11 recall the tenor of that document?
12 A. Yes, I do, and others like it, in particular where Mr. Moric is
13 lambasting his junior officers for the reports not being up to the
14 standard or in the timeliness that he required.
15 Q. Indeed. Now the next document, D49, again, just to put the tenor
16 for your recollection, a document from Josko Moric, dated of the
17 18th of August, to police administrations, referring again to the
18 torching of houses and illegal taking away of people's movable property,
19 and he refers to:
20 "In order to put a stop to this problem, I order, inter alia,
21 on-site investigations, forensic and operative processing."
22 And he goes on to state that:
23 "If the military police cannot perform the task of investigation
24 and forensic and operative processing, the civilian police will do it
25 alone, irrespective of whether the perpetrator wears a Croatian Army
1 uniform or not."
2 Do you recall that document?
3 A. Yes, I certainly do.
4 Q. Next document, D574, for the record, document from Josko Moric to
5 the police administrations, which again refers to the fact that:
6 "We requested a report on linkage with the military police in
7 order to prevent further torching of houses and illegal taking of movable
8 property," dated the 30th of August.
9 Do you recall that document?
10 A. Yes, ma'am.
11 THE INTERPRETER: Kindly slow down when reading. Thank you.
12 MS. HIGGINS: Sorry, I apologise.
13 Q. The next document that you cite, Mr. Albiston, is a document from
14 Josko Moric again to the police administrations, dated the
15 11th of September, ordering the supply of joint data concerning the
16 burning of houses, illegal appropriation of other people's movable
17 property, cooperation with the military police, and implementing measures
18 for the period between the 22nd of August and the 10th of September.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Next document, D594, dated the 13th of September, another
22 document from Josko Moric which again refers to this, the need for a
23 joint operational meeting in order to assess the situation and problems,
24 which included the level of public law and order and the level of
25 protection of lives and property for all people.
1 Familiar to you, Mr. Albiston?
2 A. Yes, yes.
3 Q. One more, D597, dated the 2nd of October, again from Josko Moric
4 to the civilian police administrations:
5 "Submit combined information for the period between the
6 22nd of August and the 2nd of October on murders, arsons, explosions,
7 property seizure. Conducted on-site investigations. Perpetrators known.
8 Unknown perpetrators, and abuse of uniform."
9 A. Yes, yes.
10 Q. A document you cite, Mr. Albiston?
11 A. Certainly.
12 Q. And then you also cite a collection of documents from within the
13 civilian police authorities concerning reports back to Josko Moric, which
14 include: D7 -- sorry, D573, dated the 24th of August, from Drago Matic;
15 D575, another report back from Drago Matic, dated the 1st of September;
16 D580, another report back, dated the 12th of September, Drago Matic
17 again; and there are also references in your report, a number of them,
18 concerning joint meetings to stop crime.
19 Do you remember that collection of documents --
20 A. Certainly.
2 One more, D584:
3 "More joint meetings in respect of law and order."
4 That is just a mere flavour of the documents you cite in your
6 Now, you have been asked that question, and Ms. Gustafson relied
7 on three examples -- three or four examples that she cited to you.
8 Please answer the question in the round, taking into account the evidence
9 that you have cited in your report as to whether or not there was an
10 attitude of tolerance or indifference on the part of Croatian authorities
11 towards crime of looting, burning, and killing.
12 A. Well, the short answer is, No. And I think to the list of
13 documents, we might usefully add D595. What I was trying to convey in my
14 answer to Ms. Gustafson was that whilst an examination or my examination
15 of the documents did not reveal any high-level behaviour of the type
16 which I think Ms. Gustafson is suggesting, it is nevertheless frequently
17 the case, and appears to have been the case in these particular
18 circumstances, that in times of significant violence and disorder, there
19 will be failings in individual police operations and in the behaviour of
20 individual police officers, and I don't think that that would be disputed
21 on the basis of the evidence. That's not the same thing as saying that
22 this behaviour or these failings were in any way tolerated by the
24 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Higgins, I heard a question put by Ms. Gustafson
25 about evidence of an attitude of tolerance or indifference, not
1 authorities. So you changed the question a bit. I look at page 5,
2 lines 6 and 7, where Ms. Gustafson, at least in that instance, is not
3 primarily referring to authorities. Therefore, in order to then later
4 say, Well, you gave an answer to this question, where you put a different
5 question to the witness, and of course it's perfectly clear that the
6 examples given by Ms. Gustafson are reports of what was observed on the
7 ground, and the witness explained to us what he expected monitors to look
8 for. But you are citing, if I could say, a different type of evidence;
9 that is, how the -- those on a higher level, responsible for the
10 functioning of the police, what they put on paper. And, therefore, it's
11 difficult for me to understand why you rephrase the question by
12 Ms. Gustafson in the way you did.
13 MS. HIGGINS: With all due respect, Your Honour, I refer you to
14 page 3, where the question reads:
15 "... whether you saw evidence of an attitude of tolerance or
16 indifference on the part of the Croatian authorities towards the crimes
17 of looting and burning and killing."
18 I accept the examples that Ms. Gustafson has put --
19 JUDGE ORIE: They were all -- and then the question was again
20 phrased without the authorities being mentioned.
21 MS. HIGGINS: Well, the two questions are there, Your Honour, on
22 the record, and in my submission, I'm entitled to ask Mr. Albiston about
23 the examples that he has cited. The question is broadly phrased.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but you referred to the second question because
25 you were referring to the three examples only given by Ms. Gustafson. So
1 I expect then that you would refer to the question that was at that
2 moment put by Ms. Gustafson.
3 But let's -- let's continue, and let's clearly keep in mind that
4 apparently, from the questioning, it appears that two levels are
5 addressed in the questions and in the documents as to indifference and
7 MS. HIGGINS: Thank you.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Gustafson.
9 MS. GUSTAFSON: I apologise for the interruption. If we could
10 just move briefly into private session.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We move into private session.
12 [Private session]
6 [Open session]
7 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're back in open session.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
9 Please proceed, Ms. Higgins.
10 MS. HIGGINS: Thank you, Your Honour.
11 Q. Now, Mr. Albiston, you have been asked to distinguish clearly
12 between three concepts, in fact. One is de facto command and control,
13 one is de jure command and control, and the other which we've referred to
14 is a concept of influence. Do you understand?
15 A. Yes, I do.
16 Q. Now, at various places during the course of your testimony,
17 leaving aside your report for the moment, you have stated that Mr. Cermak
18 had no de facto command over the police. For the record, transcript
19 pages 23948 to 9, and 23837 to 8; transcript 23992; transcript 24021.
20 These are examples, Mr. Albiston.
21 You've also said in your evidence that Mr. Cermak had an
22 administrative function rather than an operative command. Do you recall
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. For the record, transcript 23766 to 7. That Mr. Cermak was not
1 within the policing hierarchy; is that a fair representative of --
2 A. Certainly that is my reading of the documents, ma'am, yes.
3 Q. Examples, transcript 23786, transcript 23825. And you've also
4 addressed that officials of the MUP did not believe that Mr. Cermak had
5 authority. Transcript 23807, transcript 23808.
6 And you've referred to a relationship of cooperation, not
7 subordination, in terms of Mr. Cermak's role with the civilian police.
8 Do you recollect that?
9 A. Yes, certainly.
10 MS. HIGGINS: Transcript page 23923, as an example to assist the
12 Q. Now, just so that it's clear, Mr. Albiston, I am interested in
13 whether or not Mr. Cermak -- at this stage in our questioning and
14 answering during this part of the evidence, I'm interested in whether or
15 not Mr. Cermak had de facto command and control over the civilian police.
16 All right?
17 Now, again, it's not in dispute, and if it is my learned friend
18 will indicate so, that in your review of between 2.000 to
19 4.000 documents, and in the writing of your report, and in the selection
20 of documents you looked at, is it right that the document collections
21 included, for example, internal MUP communications between Moric and the
22 police administrations?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Documents between police administrations and police stations?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Internal police administration memoranda?
2 A. Certainly.
3 Q. Internal police station memoranda and notes of meetings between
4 the military police and the MUP?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Documentation between the military police and the MUP concerning
7 coordination of activities?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And documents relating to, for example, the staffing of police
10 and the sending of separate police units?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Documents relating to passes, freedom of movement?
13 A. Certainly.
14 Q. Some articles from the local press?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Criminal reports addressed to the higher echelons within the MUP?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Documents which you say show Mr. Cermak passed on information to
19 the police about crimes?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Communications with members of the international community that
22 Mr. Cermak had?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Documents within the international community network sent between
25 their various bodies?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And minutes of meetings that were held with the international
3 community, between them and Mr. Cermak?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Now, when you were considering these different collections, did
6 you consider these collections in terms of de facto, or de jure, or both?
7 A. Both, certainly.
8 Q. Thank you. Now, yesterday you were asked in detail about several
9 of Mr. Cermak's orders to the police. Do you recall that?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Is it right that you have reviewed all seven of Cermak's orders
12 to the civilian police?
13 A. Yes, I have.
14 Q. Now, it was put to you that they spanned between August to
15 October, and I want us to look a little bit more closely at them, please,
16 as a collection in the round.
17 MS. HIGGINS: Now, to assist the Bench, I'm going to call them up
18 one by one relatively speedily, but I would ask, just to assist
19 Mr. Albiston, if I could hand him a hard copy collection of the orders
20 that I'm going to refer to. Thank you.
21 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
22 MS. HIGGINS: And if Madam Usher could assist me by calling up
23 P512, please, onto the screen.
24 Q. And for the record, as it's coming up, Mr. Albiston, you have it
25 in front of you. It's an order dated the 8th of August, and it concerns
1 UNCRO helicopters and their inspection. Do you recall that document?
2 A. Yes, I do.
3 Q. And it was addressed to the military police and the Knin police
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Next document, please, P --
7 JUDGE ORIE: We just spent attention -- we paid attention to the
9 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
10 JUDGE ORIE: I was misinformed. I apologise. Please proceed.
11 MS. HIGGINS: Thank you.
12 Q. The next document on the screen, please, P53, which you have,
13 Mr. Albiston?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. An order addressed to the MUP and the military police, dated the
16 8th of August. And you will recall that it refers there to all UNCRO
17 elements with clearly-displayed insignia may move freely in the areas of
18 Knin and Drnis?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. You see that one?
21 A. Yes.
22 MS. HIGGINS: The next document, please, is under seal, so if it
23 could not be put on the public screens.
24 Q. You have it in front of you. It's D501, and I'll simply refer to
25 it being of the date of the 10th of August, and the fact that it went
1 to -- it's CC'd, it states, to the commander of the MUP and the
2 headquarters, Administration of the MOHV. Do you see that?
3 A. I see that one, yes.
4 Q. Thank you. Another August order, which is D303, 9th of August:
5 "Immediately set up a team, members of military police and
6 personnel from the Knin Police Administration with the task of finding
7 the UNCRO vehicles."
8 A document very familiar to you, Mr. Albiston?
9 A. It is.
10 Q. Sent to the commander of the Knin police station and the
11 commander of the Knin -- commander of the Knin police station and the
12 commander of the Knin military police?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. I'm going through these rather speedily, but the next document,
15 please, is D503, 12th of August, and a similar sort of order here.
17 "Immediately form teams consisting members of the MUP ..."
18 Again, teams from the MUP and teams from the military police with
19 the task of finding and returning the stolen UNCRO vehicles?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. The sixth order, which is still dated the -- in August, which is
22 the 15th of August, P509?
23 A. Yes, I have it.
24 Q. Yes, sent to the Knin police station and Knin military police,
25 referring to the unhindered entry into the town of Knin at all
1 check-points of the military and civilian police. Again, an order
2 familiar to you?
3 A. Yes, certainly.
4 Q. We have it on our screens there. I know the Bench is familiar
5 with it.
6 The seventh order is the only one, in fact, which is not in
7 August, and it's dated the 11th of October, and it concerns there the
8 temporary transfer of a part of MUP officers within the Knin police
9 station to the old grammar school, sent to the Knin police station?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Now, my question in respect of these orders is the following: In
12 terms of the seven orders, looking at the documents in the round, in your
13 opinion, do they or do they not show de facto command and control by
14 Cermak over the civilian police? And if you could give your reasons in
15 your answer, Mr. Albiston, please.
16 A. Well, the short answer is, No, and the reasons are as follows:
17 If General Cermak had any genuine de facto command over the police in
18 this area over this period of time, a period when certainly for part of
19 the time, as we have discussed this morning, there were significant
20 policing problems, I would expect to see a significant volume of orders,
21 instructions, requirements for reports as to what exactly was being done
22 about it. And I was questioned yesterday as to whether I examined both
23 de facto and de jure concepts in my report. I think my report addresses
24 the concept of de facto authority, but it was suggested to me that I had
25 failed to address the possibility that General Cermak had or may have had
1 some additional authority outside the legalistic approach, which it was
2 suggested that I took to his authority; namely, some personal authority
3 which had been granted to him by President Tudjman. And, of course, I
4 have given some thought to this concept, and I think it's right that I
5 should say to this Chamber that in all the documents that I saw, I do not
6 see any evidence that this transaction whereby General Cermak was granted
7 this additional authority outside the rules and regulations which I
8 addressed, other than the suggestion which Ms. Gustafson put to me which
9 arises from a meeting sometime later between President Tudjman and
10 Mr. Cermak, and one other document which I think might conceivably be
11 prayed in aid of that document, and I'm not sure of its number, but I'm
12 sure that the OTP or the Cermak Defence team may be able to lay hands on
13 very quickly, but there is a document in which President Tudjman says,
14 and I think it may be he's addressing the press or more likely a private
15 meeting, but he says words to the effect that either Brigadier Forand, by
16 name, or the Canadians have some problems in South Sector, but I've sent
17 Ivan Cermak, or General Cermak, who is a serious man, and these problems
18 will be addressed.
19 Now, in all the documents that I have seen, and I am quite
20 certain that it well exceeds 2.000, I have seen no other indication of
21 any informal or ultra vires authority over anything being granted to
22 General Cermak. And if that authority had been granted, I cannot
23 conceive how the police would have been expected to recognise and
24 implement that authority unless someone had told them about it. And
25 there is no indication that I've seen that anyone did tell them about it.
1 Now, I have served in different police organisations and worked
2 with many different police officers, and none of us take authority unless
3 we recognise it and we've been told about it.
4 Q. Just to go back -- I'm going to ask you some questions about that
5 in a moment, leading on from what you've said, but can I just go back,
6 for the moment, to the orders?
7 What observations do you have on the number of orders Cermak gave
8 to the civilian police and the nature of their subject matter in relation
9 to the issue of de facto command and control, please, Mr. Albiston?
10 A. Well, some elements of the orders are matters which most police
11 officers would consider to be administrative rather than operational, and
12 I think I addressed this Chamber previously on what I saw the distinction
13 as being. Some of them are clearly related to problems arising in
14 relation to the international community or matters which need to be
15 addressed in relation to that.
16 Q. Now, in relation to the document you referred to, which was a
17 transcript concerning Tudjman stating that he'd sent a serious man down
18 there, which is a document you draw our attention to --
19 A. Yes, it's the only one I could think of which might -- which I've
20 read that might give substance to this concept of some sort of informal
21 authority or authority which falls outside the documents which I studied
22 which relate to the legal position for controlling the MUP.
23 Q. Well, Mr. Albiston, nowhere -- you've read that document.
24 Nowhere in that document does it state that Tudjman gave authority to
25 Mr. Cermak over the civilian police, does it?
1 A. No, it certainly doesn't, but it -- I quote that document because
2 I was trying to think, in fairness, from the point of view of balance,
3 had I seen anything which I might have thought would support the argument
4 which was put to me, and that's the only one I could think of.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Gustafson.
6 MS. GUSTAFSON: Your Honour, I'm not sure where the line of
7 questioning is going. But if it is going where it appears to be going,
8 in the direction of the assignment of tasks by President Tudjman to
9 General Cermak, then I have objections and submissions I'd like to make
10 in relation to that, and it would be best -- be done outside the presence
11 of the witness, I think.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Well, now there's a problem, Ms. Gustafson. You say
13 if it goes in this and this direction --
14 MS. GUSTAFSON: Well, perhaps --
15 JUDGE ORIE: -- then I would like to -- because I would then have
16 to establish whether the line of Ms. Higgins would go in a certain
17 direction. Would it be good that either you're convinced that that's the
18 way it will go, then we'll ask Mr. Albiston to leave the courtroom; if
19 not, please verify with Ms. Higgins in which direction her line of
20 questioning will further continue? Which of the two would you prefer?
21 MS. GUSTAFSON: I would prefer it would be verified with
22 Ms. Higgins.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Why not you verify it? Why should this
24 Chamber -- you apparently have an idea of what line of questioning would
25 cause you some problems. Why would -- why not verify that with
1 Ms. Higgins?
2 MS. GUSTAFSON: Well, Your Honour, I just don't think it's
3 appropriate to direct [sic] her directly across the courtroom.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Well, perhaps not --
5 MS. GUSTAFSON: [Overlapping speakers] -- I'm happy to wait until
6 she asks more questions and then I can object.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I do understand that you would not, microphone
8 switched on, start a conversation with Ms. Higgins. At the same time, I
9 do not see any problem in, microphone switched off, that you verify with
10 Ms. Higgins, whether you could expect a problem to arise or not. But if
11 you would prefer to wait and see in which direction it goes, then we'll
12 invite Ms. Higgins to proceed.
13 Please do so.
14 MS. HIGGINS: Thank you, Your Honour.
15 Q. I'm going to come back to some questions in a moment concerning
16 the topic that we've just been discussing, but I now would like to move
17 into private session, please, to raise another matter with you,
18 Mr. Albiston.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, could we move into private session.
20 [Private session]
11 Pages 24085-24093 redacted. Private session.
5 [Open session]
6 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're back in open session.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
8 MS. HIGGINS:
9 Q. I'm now dealing with the issue of freedom of movement,
10 Mr. Albiston, so you know where I'm going.
11 At some point yesterday, you were asked the question:
12 "How did you come to the conclusion that it was Mr. Moric rather
13 than General Cermak who was the man responsible for freedom of movement,
14 in light of the fact that each of them had issued an order in this
16 Do you recall that series of questions?
17 A. Yes, I do.
18 Q. Now, in your answer, you referred to the 3rd of August document
19 from Josko Moric --
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. -- which is, I don't think there's any dispute about, P493, as
22 you referred to Tolj and Rebic --
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. -- and that document refers to an order, in fact, by Josko Moric
25 stating that journalists, foreign statesmen and so on can enter the
1 liberated the territory at the said check-points in the operations area
2 only by producing a passed signed jointly by Tolj and Rebic. Do you
3 recall that?
4 A. Yes, I do.
5 Q. I'd like to just ask you to take a look at D1769, please, and ask
6 you whether this would assist you or not in answering more
7 comprehensively the question you were asked about Moric or Cermak in
8 respect to freedom of movement and why you said it was Mr. Moric.
9 The first page here in front of us, dated the 8th of August,
10 refers to the arrival of reporters and public figures in the liberated
11 area. It was a document that I referred you to during my
13 A. Yes, I see it.
14 Q. If we can just go over the page, please. It refers to:
15 "... without necessary permissions in the area of Petrinja and
16 the Plitvice lakes, but permission from the Ministry of Defence of the
17 Republic of Croatia
18 And if you refer paragraph 2 as well, towards the end, please.
19 Now, does this document provide you with any assistance,
20 Mr. Albiston?
21 A. Yes. It's the assistant minister in the interior issuing a
22 direct instruction on the 8th of August. It does mention, actually, in
23 the second paragraph, Operation Povratak, the return operation, and
24 I think there are other documents in the case which show that Mr. Moric,
25 in particular, was concerned with this operation, and there would be
1 implications for freedom of movement and authority to move in the area in
2 relation to the management of Operation Povratak. So I think that would
3 be an indicator, perhaps, of Mr. Moric's authority in this area.
4 Q. Thank you. Now, one last area that I wish to deal with with you.
5 It was put to you yesterday that there was no evidence that
6 anyone in the MUP thought that Mr. Cermak didn't have authority to issue
7 P509, which was the order. You have it there in front of you in the
8 orders collection. It was the order, if you recall, of the
9 15th of August, where the writing states:
10 "From the 15th of August onwards, allow civilians unhindered
11 entry into the town of Knin at all check-points of the military and
12 civilian police on all axis roads to the town."
13 A. Yes, I see it.
14 Q. Do you recall that?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. What I'm interested in -- I'm grateful. Bearing in mind the
17 question that you were asked by Ms. Gustafson --
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. -- what I'm interested in and what we have looked at is the
20 documentary background to this order, and I'd like us to look very
21 briefly at the chain of documents in the series looking at the issue of
22 whether or not anyone in the MUP thought that Mr. Cermak didn't have
23 authority. I'm going to pull them up quickly onto the screen, the
24 documents which you're familiar with, and ask you whether or not they
25 assist you in answering that question more fully in the round.
1 MS. HIGGINS: Now, the first document, please, is D1014.
2 Q. As it's coming onto the screen, you will recall this document.
3 It's a document from Ivo Cipci, dated the 8th of August, and it refers to
4 there being great pressure to visit the liberated territories. It's
5 addressed to the Povratak section of the Ministry of the Interior, and
6 the text refers to him asking to be provided with precise instructions as
7 well as your opinion on the aforementioned problem, i.e., who to give
8 passes to. Do you recall that document?
9 A. Yes, I do, yes.
10 MS. HIGGINS: The next document is D494, please.
11 Q. Now, again, as it's coming up, a document from Ivo Cipci, dated
12 the 15th of August. And you'll recall, Mr. Albiston, this is a document
13 whereby Ivo Cipci submits to the Povratak staff a copy of the pass for
14 entering the garrison issued by Cermak, and it states:
15 "Please reply and confirm the validity of the passes for civilian
16 persons in question."
17 You recall that document?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And you've seen there the writing at the bottom that we looked at
20 in detail in examination-in-chief?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. "Cermak will issue an order on the annulment of travel passes?
23 And freedom of movement"?
24 A. Yes.
25 MS. HIGGINS: D495, please.
1 Q. Again, this was the pass that was submitted with the writing at
2 the bottom, which you've looked at before, handwritten. It states:
3 "According to the MUP staff announcement, it is valid only for
4 military personnel and civilians working in the Croatian Army. I will
5 inform the staff of the MUP that all passes be revoked until further
6 notice," et cetera.
7 And that document should be just coming on your screen now.
8 A. Yes, I see that. Thank you.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 MS. HIGGINS: And just before we come on to P509, could I have
11 D496 on the screen, please.
12 Q. A document dated the 15th of August. Ivo Cipci again:
13 "Please give us urgent directions as to how we should act."
14 And the handwritten part, which you've looked at, in the top
15 right section of the document, which states:
16 "Call the Split-Dalmatia PU and say that Cermak will annul the
17 passes today."
18 A. Yes.
19 MS. HIGGINS: The next document, then, is P509, please, which is
20 the order from Ivan Cermak.
21 Q. And this was a document collection you looked at in that order,
22 Mr. Albiston, in your report?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Yes?
25 A. Yes. I have the paper copy here, yes.
1 Q. Now, do these documents which I've shown to you assist you in
2 answering the question more fully as to whether or not anyone within the
3 MUP was challenging Mr. Cermak's authority?
4 MS. GUSTAFSON: Sorry, Your Honour, just the question that
5 Ms. Higgins was seeking clarification from cross-examination was whether
6 anyone in the MUP thought that General Cermak didn't have the authority
7 to issue P509 at the time. I'd just like to clarify that.
8 MS. HIGGINS: Well, if Mr. Albiston could bear that question in
9 mind as well and answer in the round, I'd be grateful. Thank you.
10 THE WITNESS: Well, in relation to the question of which I have
11 just been reminded by Ms. Gustafson, I think the original answer I gave
12 was, No, and I think that answer makes sense.
13 This is a permissory dictum, if I can put it that way.
14 To address Ms. Higgins' question about "in the round," I think
15 the answer in relation to what the MUP at the time thought about
16 Mr. Cermak's authority iis that so far as the MUP chain of command was
17 concerned, going down to Mr. Cipci and looking at these documents, they
18 did not believe that General Cermak was playing a role in
19 Operation Povratak insofar as it related to the issue of passes.
20 MS. HIGGINS: Mr. Albiston, I'm grateful. I have no further
21 questions for you.
22 And I'm grateful to the Bench for the indulgence of an extra ten
23 minutes or so.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Ms. Higgins. I think it would be best,
25 unless you'd finish within ten minutes, Mr. Kehoe, that we first have a
2 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, I do appreciate it. I will finish
3 quickly. However, I think, in the interests of speed, I have a document
4 that I'm not sure if the witness has seen or not seen. It is on the
5 65 ter list. It is an 18-page document. I'm not going to go through the
6 whole document, Mr. President, but it may be easier, when the questioning
7 begins, if the witness has the opportunity to take a look at this
8 65 ter document. It is 65 ter 2561.
9 I did not consult with my colleagues yet on this score, but if,
10 with their indulgence, they think this is a proper way, I would
11 appreciate it. And, again, I think we might be able to move more quickly
12 in that fashion.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Gustafson.
14 MS. GUSTAFSON: No objections to that, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE ORIE: No objections.
16 Then we'll first have a break, Mr. Albiston, not until I've given
17 Mr. Kuzmanovic an opportunity to address the Chamber.
18 MR. KUZMANOVIC: Thank you, Your Honour. I similarly would -- it
19 would be more expeditious. I have a document, which is a Defence
20 exhibit, D692. It would make my cross-examination probably even much
21 shorter if Mr. Albiston would have a chance to review that document.
22 It's very -- it's not very long, Your Honour. It's a quick read.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Albiston, you've informed us about the
24 number of documents you've looked at. From now on -- you said 2.000 to
25 3.000, or 2.000 to 4.000. It will now be 2.001 to 4.001, or even 2.002
1 to 4.002. You'll be provided with the documents.
2 We'll take a break, and we'll ask you to work during that break
3 and read those documents.
4 We'll resume at five minutes to 11.00.
5 --- Recess taken at 10.27 a.m.
6 --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, are you ready to -- well, to further
8 examine Mr. Albiston?
9 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President, I am.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Albiston, you'll now be further examined by
11 Mr. Kehoe. Mr. Kehoe is counsel for Mr. Gotovina.
12 Please proceed.
13 Further Cross-examination by Mr. Kehoe:
14 Q. Good morning, Mr. Albiston.
15 A. Good morning, Mr. Kehoe.
16 Q. Just a couple of issues. The first issue I would like to clarify
17 is a series of questions that you were asked by Ms. Gustafson yesterday,
18 and this would be at page 24.033, line 25, going on to 24.034. And I
19 read those numbers out for the purposes of the Chamber and parties,
20 Mr. Albiston, but I'll read you the question and answer.
21 "Q. So when you said, 'An examination of the documents in the
22 case reveals that responsibility for the prevention of crime lay with the
23 MUP,' would it be better to clarify that to be civilian crime?"
24 And your answer is:
25 "Yes, the investigation of crime, until such time as it is
1 demonstrated that, in fact, it doesn't involve elements over which the
2 civilian police can exercise that authority."
3 If I could just clarify that a bit and put it in practical terms.
4 The MUP has primary responsibility for crime until it is demonstrated
5 that, for instance, a member of the HV was involved, and once it is
6 demonstrated that a member of the HV is involved, primacy then turns to
7 the military police; is that correct?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Now, the next issue I would like to address with you is -- and
10 these are meshed to some degree, but it has to do with the burial
11 procedures, the pathological examinations, the autopsy examinations, that
12 you referred to in the round with Ms. Gustafson. And did you have a
13 chance to take a look at that document that I referred you to, that
14 18-page document, 65 ter 2561?
15 A. Yes, I did, sir.
16 Q. Okay. We don't need to bring that up, but we're going to get to
17 that, so -- it's an 18-page document, and I'm sure you understand why it
18 was beneficial to take a look at it.
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Had you seen that document before today, sir?
21 A. No, I had not, sir.
22 Q. Okay. Now, you were asked a series of questions by
23 Ms. Gustafson, and why don't I just go through these very quickly, your
24 response. And if we could break it up a little bit, and please break-in
25 at any point if I'm either moving too fast or -- which I tend to do, or
1 you want to explain something. And this -- I would like to begin this
2 questioning and your answers at 24.040, beginning at line 22. And
3 Ms. Gustafson asked:
4 "Now, on the issue of the procedure to be undertaken with dead
5 bodies, you are aware, are you not, based on the evidence that you have
6 reviewed, that a procedure was implemented after Operation Storm whereby
7 dead bodies were treated as if they were combat victims, no on-site
8 investigations were carried out in most cases, and the corpses were
9 collected, identified where possible, and buried without conducting an
10 investigation to determine the cause of death; is that right? Did you
11 learn that?
12 "A. It seems clear to me, from the documents, that that happened
13 on a significant number of occasions, yes."
14 Just turning -- Ms. Gustafson further clarified that, and we're
15 going to break that question up a little bit, Mr. Albiston, when we get
16 to the documents.
17 MR. KEHOE: But if I can refer the Chamber and my colleagues to
18 24 -- excuse me, 24.043 at line 11.
19 Q. "Q. And would you agree now that not investigating killing
20 victims is a defect in that system?"
21 Answer at line 13:
22 "Well, as I stated in evidence, in ideal circumstances every
23 death which does not have a certificate and an explanation should be
24 treated by the police as a suspicious death and investigated accordingly,
25 until such time it is found to be otherwise. I am not sure that was
1 entirely practical in these circumstances, but I do accept your
2 suggestion that there were bodies buried in circumstances which I, as a
3 police officer, would wish had not happened, because I think even bodies
4 with some element of decomposition may yield information to
6 Now, if I can go through --
7 JUDGE ORIE: You were reading, Mr. Kehoe.
8 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. I'm sitting here in the back
9 row, out of practice, so my apologies to the interpreters.
10 Q. Mr. Albiston, let me take this one by one and go into the alleged
11 procedure that was presented by the Office of the Prosecutor on the
12 examination of bodies.
13 And if I can have you look at D235.
14 Now, Mr. Albiston, well, the other document that I gave you was
15 much more lengthy. This is only a two-page document. Again, I'm not
16 sure if you've seen this before, dated 7 August 1995.
17 A. Yes, I have seen this document, Mr. Kehoe.
18 Q. Yes. Now, in the first full paragraph after the agenda and the
19 numbers, it notes that:
20 "Since in the area of army activity war operations are being
21 conducted, it is crucial to carry out clearing up the terrain in that
22 area, and it is our task to carry out the identification of persons in
23 the prescribed manner, and it is not necessary to conduct on-site
25 Now, you know, based on your examination of the documents,
1 Mr. Albiston, that this was a decision that was made virtually on the
2 heels of Operation Storm, where there was concern about bodies on the
3 terrain, wasn't there?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And obviously it was August, which adds to decomposition and also
6 adds to possibilities of disease, et cetera, prior to bodies being
7 properly buried?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And I may have misspoke with regard to the date, itself. This on
10 the 7th of August, when military operations are still ongoing, isn't it?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Now, you described, during the course of your testimony with my
13 colleague, Ms. Higgins, and with my colleague, Ms. Gustafson, about a
14 period of chaos and disarray which ofttimes is present both during combat
15 operations and after combat operations?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Now, with regard to this policy that Ms. Gustafson refers to on
18 page 24.040, about not examining dead bodies that were found, that was
19 not a continuous policy of the Croatian authorities as we moved through
20 August of 1995, was it?
21 A. It doesn't appear to be, no.
22 Q. Well, let us bring up on the screen a document that --
23 MR. KEHOE: 65 ter 2561, a Prosecution document. If we could
24 bring that up on the screen.
25 And, Mr. President, this document, and I say this for the
1 clarification of the witness, itself [sic], we are -- from time to time,
2 as we take them off e-court, there are documents with highlighting on
3 these documents, and I do believe that as we see from the document on the
4 screen, not so much on page 1, but certainly it begins on page 2, there
5 is highlighting, and I just want to tell the Court we did not put that --
6 I certainly did not put that on there. It was just on there when I took
7 it out of e-court.
8 Q. I believe, Mr. Albiston, you can see some faded highlighting in
9 the document that you have.
10 A. Yes. Mr. Kehoe, I read this document during the break. I didn't
11 pay any attention to which areas were highlighted and which were not.
12 Q. That's fine, sir. Now, just looking through this document, this
13 is -- tell us about this document, Mr. Albiston. I mean, what did you
14 see in this document, what did you conclude from this document about the
15 procedures that were employed in this document, which is a 31 August 1995
16 report concerning the discovery of dead bodies in the territory liberated
17 during Operation Storm in the Sibenik Police Administration?
18 A. The first thing I can say is that I have not seen this document
19 previously. From a professional police point of view, it's quite an
20 impressive document. I would say it increases my professional esteem for
21 those who were conducting the operations which are described in the
23 Q. Now, if we could just look at a couple of items, and certainly I
24 don't intend to go through 18 pages of this document with you,
25 Mr. Albiston. But in the preamble paragraph, it -- in the first page,
1 this document is being sent, as you can see, by the crime police, and
2 I think you can see it on the upper right-hand corner in the stamp that
3 it's being sent to the District Public Prosecutor's Office in Sibenik. I
4 don't know if that's abundantly clear, but you see the stamp in the upper
5 right-hand corner. There it is, there it is, that stamp. It's being
6 sent by the crime police to the District Public Prosecutor's Office, and
7 this, we see in the preamble paragraph, it talks about these are bodies
8 discovered during Operation Storm in both Sector North and Sector South.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Now, the next -- if we can turn to the next page, again in the
11 preamble paragraph -- in the first paragraph, excuse me, they are
12 bringing to the pathology wards both civilians and combat casualties, are
13 they not, sir?
14 A. Absolutely.
15 Q. If we can turn to page 7 of the document -- excuse me, page 6.
16 Apologies. Now, these are bodies just globally found between -- the
17 document reflects between the 4th of August and, I believe, the last one
18 is -- in this report, in any event, is the 19th of August of 1995. And
19 just if we go through the 16 and 17, we highlight civilians, or they're
20 certainly identified of a civilian age, and they come from Kistanje. Do
21 you see that? They're taken from the pathology department in Kistanje?
22 A. Yes, I see that, yeah.
23 Q. Now, if we can turn to the next page, and I'm interested in
24 entry 22. Now, this is a report of 8 August 1995 involving a member of
25 the ARSK named Nikola Vranjkovic. Now, it notes that he was wounded, and
1 I'm talking about the last paragraph in 22, he was wounded by several
2 projectiles fired during the night of 5 and 6 August, 1995, while combat
3 actions in the Skradinsko Zaledje - pardon my pronunciation - were
4 ongoing. He was transferred to the hospital by HV members in an
5 ambulance on 6 August 1995
6 autopsy were performed by Dr. Boris Brkic.
7 If we can turn to the top of the next page, and this is the
8 question I want to ask you about, the top of the next page, Mr. Albiston:
9 "We have already informed the Military Public Prosecutor's Office
10 of this incident in a special report," it gives the number, "dated
11 10 August 1995
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Now, that indicates quite clearly from the document that these
14 entities of the crime police are conducting these autopsies and providing
15 information to the appropriate authorities as they see it, be it the
16 public prosecutor, which is a civilian arm, or the military prosecutor,
17 which is a military arm; is that right?
18 A. That's certainly the inference I would take from this.
19 Q. In your assessment of that as a professional police officer of
20 many years' experience, how do you conclude? Is that a proper way to go,
21 proper thing to do under the circumstances, as we find ourselves
22 post-Operation Storm, August 1995?
23 A. Yes, absolutely. I think in combat, it's physically impossible
24 to treat all casualties of combat as potential crime scenes or anything
25 of the sort, but this document, which as I said earlier I haven't seen
1 before, strikes me, in view of the dates to which it relates, as being
2 quite impressive.
3 Q. And you did note in this document of other instances where
4 information was passed on to the Military Public Prosecutor's Office?
5 A. Yes, yes, I read the whole document. Thank you.
6 Q. Now, let me address with you, if I may, your comment about the
7 practicalities. And I'm referring to what -- the quote that I had before
8 of you saying regarding the burial of these bodies was not entirely
9 practical under the circumstances, and I want to address that issue with
11 MR. KEHOE: But before I do, I would like to offer into evidence
12 65 ter 2561.
13 MS. GUSTAFSON: No objections.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D01783.
16 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
17 Please proceed, Mr. Kehoe.
18 MR. KEHOE: Thank you, Mr. President.
19 Q. If I could just show you a -- several documents which are similar
20 to some of the documents you saw before, especially the map --
21 MR. KEHOE: And if I could bring up on the screen D806.
22 And, Mr. President, just by way of clarification, I use this
23 document -- and if we could have the English translation. I believe it
24 is the -- my colleague, Ms. Higgins, introduced a similar map with
25 basically similar lines under 65 ter 2D00789. I was looking in e-court.
1 I didn't see an admission on that. I may be mistaken, but as I was
2 pulling it up from the records, was it just given an MFI number of 1778
3 or -- but this document, itself, was --
4 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, could you assist us?
5 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. 65 ter 2D00789 was given
6 Exhibit D01778, marked for identification.
7 MR. KEHOE: I'll use this document, Judge, but therein was my
8 confusion. And I can just use this for the purposes of this examination.
9 The point will be the same.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we'll have to check why it was marked for
11 identification. I don't remember, but perhaps you could assist us,
12 Ms. Higgins.
13 MS. HIGGINS: I do. I gave the Prosecution an opportunity to
14 check the contents of the map, and I understand Ms. Gustafson said she
15 had no problem with it. So, of course, that can be on the record and the
16 exhibit number corrected in due course from MFI.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then the status of this document could already
18 be changed now into an exhibit. That is, it is admitted into evidence.
19 Please proceed, Mr. Kehoe.
20 MR. KEHOE: Yes. Thank you, Mr. President.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps for the record, I should clearly state that
22 D1788 is admitted into evidence.
23 Please proceed.
24 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, I think -- is it 1788 or 17 -- excuse
25 me, I'm sorry, 1788. My apologies. Yes.
1 Q. Now, Mr. Albiston, this is a map quite similar to what you looked
2 at, and what we have on the left-hand side is the Zadar-Knin
3 Police Administration, with the green line in the middle being the
4 liberated territory post-Operation Storm. And I believe, from the maps
5 you had before, that virtually within 24 hours, the Zadar-Knin
6 Police Administration Crime Police Section had another almost
7 6.000 kilometres to -- square kilometres to take care of; is that right?
8 A. Yes. I think on one of the maps I saw the figure was a little
9 over 5.000 square kilometres, but I wouldn't quibble about the exact
10 magnitude. Very large, I would say.
11 Q. And --
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kehoe, sorry to interrupt you again.
13 Where I sought to avoid confusion, I may have created confusion,
14 because we now have D1778 and D1788, and I picked the wrong one to be
15 admitted into evidence. It is D1778 which is now admitted into evidence.
16 There was some confusion on the record. I interrupt you because
17 otherwise if it comes a few pages further down, then people might be
18 misled by that.
19 Please proceed.
20 MR. KEHOE: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. President.
21 Q. Now, I want to talk to you about some of the practical
22 circumstances here and highlight those.
23 The Trial Chamber had the testimony of the public prosecutor,
24 Mr. Galovic, who told us at page 19.677, line 5, to 19.678, line 4, that
25 there were three investigative judges for the Zadar-Knin
1 Police Administration prior to Operation Storm and after Operation Storm.
2 Mr. Kardum, who you've referred to previously on occasion, noted for us
3 that, and this is at page 9.325 to 9.326, line 6, that -- I'll just read
4 the question to you. Question on page 9.326:
5 "Q. Mr. Kardum, I think it's abundantly clear now on the record,
6 but just to be certain, you had only 12 crime scene examiners
7 subordinated to you during August of 1995; correct? And if you could
8 answer yes or no, that would be very helpful.
9 "A. That is correct."
10 On the prior page, this is 9.325, line 16, at line 16:
11 "The 12 crime scene examiners that I had in my police force prior
12 to the Oluja were taken over -- they took over -- in addition to the
13 regular duties which they normally did, they also took over assignments
14 in the POW holding centre and partly also supported the sanitation
16 Now, as we go through the clearing up of these bodies, as an
17 expert, consider for us and discuss with us, Mr. Albiston, the fact that
18 the same three investigative judges now had well in excess of
19 5.000 square kilometres to take care of. I think you talked about the
20 geographical distances. And then you had the same 12 crime police
21 investigators who had that same area, while also having to deal with
22 prisoners of war and other matters. I mean, what is the practical effect
23 and the strain on a police department to have to cover that type of area
24 while also crossing their T's and dotting their I's with you, if you
25 will, with every body that may be found in August of 1995? Could you
1 tell us and help us with that?
2 A. I think the level of work generated, the distances to be
3 travelled, the potential difficulties which would be involved in routing
4 day-to-day travel at this period, and the numbers of persons involved
5 measures against the numbers of jobs which they were being asked to do,
6 is, by itself, a problem, and I think it doesn't need me to make a
7 professional judgement or a guess. I think it comes through the
8 documents that these people were extremely busy.
9 And I think it may be worth remembering that when we're talking
10 about crime scene examination, it's something rather more than going and
11 taking photographs of a physical place or a body in a place. If we take,
12 for example, the case of a suspected unlawful killing, the scene of the
13 death will be a crime scene. The body of the victim will be a crime
14 scene and will continue to be a crime scene as it is in transit. And
15 when it is in the hospital or the -- whatever other place a post-mortem
16 examination is carried out, the suspect or suspects will themselves be
17 crime scenes that need to have forensic examination. And if the police
18 officers and the forensic investigators are not very careful about how
19 they behave, they will, themselves, become potentially crime scenes. So
20 it's a very elaborate and difficult procedure, and it requires sufficient
21 resources to address the numbers of cases which it's being asked to
23 Q. So if we talk about this in very practical terms, using the map
24 that's on the screen, hypothetically we have a body in Korenica in the
25 north, a body in Donji Lapac -- the "D. Lapac" is Donji Lapac, a body in
1 Kijevo, a body in Kistanje, assume that the sanitation teams found these
2 bodies in these various locations, and you have three investigative
3 judges with 12 crime scene -- excuse me, 12 members of the crime police
4 who have all these other duties, what, as a practical matter under these
5 conditions are the sanitation teams supposed to do under the
7 A. Well, I think you're asking your senior officers to exercise good
8 qualities of leadership and to establish priorities. And I notice, from
9 the document which you showed me, Mr. Kehoe, that one of the questions
10 which is addressed in the official form for setting out the response to
11 this, it comes towards the back of the document which you gave me, gives
12 an opportunity to explain why an investigating judge was or was not
13 present at the scene of an on-site investigation, and, you know, the
14 judge was not available or could not attend is one of the explanations as
15 to why the on-site investigation can be carried on in his or her absence.
16 I imagine that in these circumstances, that might be invoked from time to
18 If you're discussing all the different areas in which the bodies
19 can be found in the month of August in Croatia, then these people would
20 have been very busy and, I hope, moving very quickly from place to place,
21 but it would still have been a big task.
22 Q. I'm not presenting to you, Mr. Albiston, that the police did
23 everything -- crossed all their T's and did everything -- crossed all
24 their T's and dotted all their I's perfectly in this. I'm not presenting
25 that to you. But I submit to you, is it practical, in this situation,
1 with all of the problems that you raise, command and control,
2 communications, chaos, getting control of the area, was it practical to
3 conduct a crime scene investigation for every body that a sanitation team
4 found with only three investigative judges and twelve members of the
5 crime police?
6 A. Well, in my judgement, no, that wouldn't be possible.
7 Q. Mr. Albiston, thank you very much. I have no further questions.
8 I appreciate it.
9 MR. KEHOE: Thank you, Mr. President.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Kehoe.
11 Mr. Kehoe, as far as this document is concerned, which the
12 witness read during the break, we see that there are brief descriptions
13 of situations where bodies were brought to a place where they were
14 examined. Is there any underlying material available?
15 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, I will look. We took this from the
16 Prosecutor's 65 ter list. I will consult with my colleagues across the
17 well to see if there's additional documentation. I know that Mr. Misetic
18 was scouring through our database yesterday to see if we could find
19 additional documents. We did not find any. That being said, I'm not
20 saying that they're not there, but we will take -- make additional
21 efforts to find supporting documentation for this.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kuzmanovic.
23 MR. KUZMANOVIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE ORIE: You'll now be further examined, Mr. Albiston, by
25 Mr. Kuzmanovic. Mr. Kuzmanovic is counsel for Mr. Markac.
1 Please proceed.
2 Further Cross-examination by Mr. Kuzmanovic:
3 Q. Good morning, Mr. Albiston.
4 A. Good morning, Mr. Kuzmanovic.
5 Q. Page 55 of your report describes your experience in Kosovo as
6 United Nations police commissioner from 2001 to 2002 --
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. -- where you were responsible for the command and control of
9 4500 police officers and the development of a multi-ethnic police force;
11 A. That's correct.
12 Q. Now, you had obviously, then, some experience in formation of a
13 police force and the implementation or the attempts to continue the
14 implementation of law and order in a post-conflict area; correct?
15 A. Absolutely, yes.
16 Q. The -- you had mentioned during the course of your
17 cross-examination and re-examination by Ms. Higgins the
18 Operation Povratak; correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. You are familiar with what Operation Povratak is, are you not?
21 A. Well, insofar as it relates to the documents which I've seen,
23 Q. Yes. And Operation Povratak was the Croatian Ministry of
24 Interior's attempt to set forth and establish law and order on the newly
25 liberated territories; correct?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And is there anything that you saw about Operation Povratak which
3 would lead you to believe that there was any flaw or anything wrong,
4 obviously other than the limitation in resources, in its implementation?
5 A. No. Limitation of resources, that's a matter for a government.
6 That is -- that is the only way that I could see that improvements could
7 have been achieved through -- from civilian policing perspective.
8 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's request: Could we slow down a
9 little, please.
10 MR. KUZMANOVIC: I apologise. It's been a while.
11 Q. So in essence, Operation Povratak, from your review of the
12 documents that you saw, represented to you, at least, a legitimate
13 attempt by the Croatian government to restore or create a situation in
14 which there could be law and order in the post-conflict situation?
15 A. Certainly insofar as it relates to civilian policing and the
16 establishment of civilian law and order, the documents which I saw
17 indicate that there was a thorough attempt to achieve that, yes.
18 Q. Now, over the break you had a chance -- or we gave you the
19 opportunity to review what has been marked and previously admitted into
20 evidence D692. Did you have a chance to review that, Mr. Albiston?
21 A. I did, yes, sir.
22 Q. Had you had a chance or were you familiar with the contents of
23 D692 before looking at it today?
24 A. I'm not sure whether I actually -- well, I certainly didn't read
25 it as a Chamber document for this Chamber. I may have read it in my
1 previous work. I'm certainly familiar with the subject matter which it
2 deals with.
3 Q. Okay. And just for the benefit of the Chamber and the record,
4 this is a December 1999 report prepared by Mr. Bernard Kouchner, relating
5 to the situation of the attempts to restore law and order to Kosovo prior
6 to your coming there in 2001; correct.
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. If we look at page 6 of that report --
9 MR. KUZMANOVIC: And if we could pull that up on the screen,
11 Q. The third paragraph that starts, "We are deeply concerned ..."
12 The paragraph begins:
13 "We are deeply concerned about the situation of minorities. A
14 close look at the trend in crime shows a clear improvement. A drop from
15 50 murders during each of the first weeks to 3 murders last week cannot
16 be ignored."
17 Now, at the particular time that this report was written,
18 Mr. Albiston, the -- Kosovo was essentially being administered or policed
19 by an international police force; correct?
20 A. That's correct, yes.
21 Q. So during the time of an international police force's activities
22 inside Kosovo, at least at some point there were 50 murders a week that
23 had eventually dropped to 3?
24 A. That's correct, yes.
25 Q. Now, you had a chance to review a great deal of documentation,
1 and obviously you were not in Sector South or in the liberated
2 territories immediately after Operation Storm, but at least from the
3 documents was it your observation that the situation had improved after
4 the restoration of the civilian police authorities or the implementation
5 of Operation Povratak within the former Sector South, there was an
6 improvement in the situation in terms of the nature and extent of the
7 killings and crimes?
8 A. Insofar --
9 MS. GUSTAFSON: Sorry, Your Honour. I don't --
10 MR. KUZMANOVIC: I'll rephrase it.
11 MS. GUSTAFSON: Improvement from what --
12 MR. KUZMANOVIC: It was a confusing question, and I'll repeat the
14 Q. Mr. Albiston, I think you probably understood the gist of my
15 question, but I'll try to make it a little less confusing.
16 It's obvious that -- or you can tell me. Did you detect an
17 improvement in the situation, the crime police, the level of crime, the
18 amount of crime that went on within Sector South, after
19 Operation Povratak? Was there an improvement, or did the amount of crime
20 increase, did it decrease? Can you tell me that, from your review of the
22 A. Yes, I can say that the situation during the period which I
23 reviewed improved. And if you're drawing my attention to comparisons
24 with Kosovo, I think it would be fair to say that it improved more
25 quickly in the area which this Chamber is considering than it did in the
1 area for which I had responsibility subsequently.
2 Q. And can you explain that briefly?
3 A. Well, yes. The killings, despite the presence of a significant
4 KFOR military operation and a gradually increasing civilian police
5 operation, continued in Kosovo for some time after what might be
6 considered the watershed of June 1999. The nature of the killings
7 changed, the nature of the criminality changed, and there was a steady
8 reduction, but the difficulties, in my assessment, persisted longer than
9 the difficulties in the area which the Chamber is considering after
10 Operation Storm.
11 Q. Mr. Albiston, if we look at page 6 again, toward the bottom of
12 this document, if we could -- the last paragraph, please. The first
13 sentence, and this is referring to Kosovo, it says:
14 "It took 15 years in Lebanon to achieve reconciliation. It
15 cannot be done here," meaning Kosovo, "in six months."
16 After your experience in Kosovo, and having dealt with
17 implementing a policing system, and being responsible for the operational
18 control and command of police officers, can you compare and contrast the
19 situation relating to reconciliation in Kosovo to the situation in
20 Sector South, if you can do so with respect to the documents that you
22 A. I'm not sure that I'm in a position to comment on community
23 relations in the Sector South area on the basis of the documents that I
24 have seen. My knowledge of that would be very scant by comparison to my
25 knowledge of the other theatre.
1 Q. Okay, fair enough. The last question I'd like to ask you --
2 actually, the second-last question relates to the last page of this
3 particular report. Under "Conclusions" -- we'll wait for it to come up
4 on the screen.
5 Before we get to that, you had seen -- you had been to the area
6 of Sector South; correct?
7 A. I have, yes. I was there during April for a few days,
8 April 2008.
9 Q. And Mr. Kehoe had showed you on the map, I think it was D806 and
10 there's no need for us to call it up right now, but the extent to which
11 the increase in size had happened for the Zadar-Knin
12 Police Administration; correct? You had seen that on the map?
13 A. Oh, yes, I've seen the map, yes.
14 Q. And one of the factors, in terms of policing and investigations
15 and processing of crime, has to do with the nature of the terrain, does
16 it not?
17 A. Oh, certainly.
18 Q. And you had an opportunity to experience that terrain, did you
20 A. I did, yes.
21 Q. Can you describe for the Chamber, as -- I assume you'd never been
22 there before.
23 A. I'd been in Croatia
25 Q. Can you describe for the Chamber the nature and extent of the
1 terrain and what difficulties it would present from a policing
3 A. Well, certainly. The terrain is mountainous. The quality of the
4 roads, when I visited them, was not good, and I have no reason to suppose
5 that the quality of the roads was any better 13 years previously,
6 certainly at the end of a military campaign, in view of the use of mines,
7 shells, and the presence of heavy armoured vehicles and so on. It's
8 unlikely, in my view, to have been better. So movement by road would be
9 comparatively slow, and I think I've alluded earlier in my evidence to
10 what problems that might generate. It also is not just a question of how
11 quickly you get to a scene because of what we talked about in relation to
12 crime scenes, suspects, witnesses, and so on, but it also inhibits the
13 amount of work that you can get done during the working day.
14 Q. Now, Mr. Albiston, I'll go back to the conclusion in this
15 document, D692. The last -- the first paragraph of the conclusion
16 states, and this is in December of 1999:
17 "It is clear that the deficiency in the law enforcement
18 capability provided by the international community and the lack of
19 sufficient assistance in the administration of justice has fostered the
20 climate within which human rights violations documented in this report
21 have taken place. Impunity for the acts committed has resulted from
22 failures to conduct serious investigations, and this impunity, in turn,
23 has perpetuated the violence."
24 Now, I wanted to ask you, specifically, in that paragraph, in
25 relation to your experience in Kosovo and trying to relate that
1 experience to what you've reviewed for your expert testimony in this
3 It's true, is it not, that at the time this report was written,
4 and you've testified that it was the international community that was,
5 for lack of a better term, responsible for the policing at that time --
6 A. Oh, it certainly was, yes. It's provided by the United Nations
7 resolution. It's set out in 1244 of 99 that the responsibility for the
8 administration of the province of Kosovo
9 responsibility for policing it fell to civilian police provided by
10 contributing countries of the United Nations.
11 Q. And it's true, is it not, that in your experience, at least in
12 your review of the documents, that once the territory in Croatia
13 expanded for the Zadar-Knin Police Administration, there were many, if
14 not the majority of those officers, that were not familiar with the new
15 expanded territory, and the roads, and the places, and the -- where the
16 events occurred; correct?
17 A. Yes, certainly, there is evidence which I reviewed which shows
18 precisely that.
19 Q. And the same situation that you had in Kosovo, people who were
20 not familiar with the roads, were not familiar with the places, you had
21 that same situation there?
22 A. Oh, we were all -- we were all foreigners, yes. Well, all the
23 internationals, obviously, were foreigners.
24 Q. Mr. Albiston, I don't have any further questions. Thank you very
1 MR. KUZMANOVIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Kuzmanovic.
3 Questioned by the Court:
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Albiston, you read, during the break, this
5 report, and you said you were -- let me find it. I think you said you
6 were impressed. Let me find your words exactly. Apparently, you did not
7 use that word.
8 THE WITNESS: I think I said, Mr. President, it increased my
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
11 THE WITNESS: Professional esteem.
12 JUDGE ORIE: I'll find you. Yes. You said:
13 "From a professional police point of view, it's quite an
14 impressive document."
15 So "impressive" was on my mind. And you said:
16 "I would say it increases my professional esteem for those who
17 were conducting the operations which are described in the document."
18 THE WITNESS: Yes.
19 JUDGE ORIE: I saw the document only after the break for the
20 first time. Could you further explain what increased your esteem? From
21 what I see in this report, that it's mainly bodies brought in for an
22 autopsy were identified, and we find some description of what most likely
23 and sometimes expressly is considered to be the cause of death. I do not
24 see much police work in that, apart from autopsies and trying to find out
25 or establishing what the identity of that person is. Could you explain
1 to me what the -- how impressive this document is without knowing what
2 other police activities have taken place?
3 A. Well, Mr. President, this document was new to me. It shows
4 police work being carried out or work which will assist police
5 investigations being carried out in many cases on dates which are
6 relatively early during the period which we're considering. It was, as I
7 said, one that I haven't seen before, and it's reassuring to know that
8 these basic procedures are being -- not only being carried out, but being
9 documented here.
10 There's a case in which a wounded man is taken away, who
11 subsequently dies, but he appears to receive correct treatment. There
12 are other examples of where the police are trying to describe what the
13 circumstances of the death are, and this seems to me to indicate, in some
14 cases at quite an early stage, attempts to run normal policing, and that
15 is despite the difficulties of achieving that which I suggested in my
16 evidence yesterday.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Would you agree with me that in many of the reported
18 cases, we do not find that much detail which you would wish to know about
19 the circumstances under which that person died; seeing elderly people
20 being brought in, 75, 80 years, bullet wound, that's it?
21 A. Yes, but, Mr. President, I don't know from this document whether
22 what we are reading is intended to be a full forensic report on each
23 individual case. I read it as a summary of a number of cases, I think
24 19 in number or is it -- maybe it goes up to 26, but, anyway, a good
25 number of cases, and that this document doesn't purport to be a detailed
1 rehearsal of all the evidence in every case. But maybe I'm wrong. It's
2 the first time I've seen it, and I don't know what background material
3 there may be which enables the author of this document to submit it for
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So would you then agree with me that without
6 knowing why the forensic pathologist comes to the conclusion that someone
7 was killed -- committed suicide by hand-grenade, what would have been the
8 reason to believe that it was not someone else throwing a hand-grenade
9 rather than --
10 A. Yes.
11 JUDGE ORIE: -- the person who is, well, considered to have
12 committed suicide, would you agree with me that without knowing the
13 background, that it's rather difficult to give a fair assessment of how
14 sound the police work was and perhaps follow up on what was reported.
15 A. Well, I would certainly like more information to give a better
16 judgement, but I wouldn't necessarily expect to find that information in
17 this document.
18 JUDGE ORIE: No, but you say it's quite an impressive document,
19 and you say:
20 "I would say it increases my professional esteem for those who
21 were conducting the operations."
22 A. Yes.
23 JUDGE ORIE: The question that came to my mind is: I'd like to
24 know more before I could assess the quality of the police work either
25 prior to bringing in the bodies or as a follow-up of what apparently is
1 established, including elderly people being apparently killed by shot
2 wounds. Would you agree with me that for a good assessment, that you'd
3 wish to know more?
4 A. Certainly I would like more information, Mr. President, yes.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but that's not an answer to my question. We
6 all always want to have more information. Of course, I asked you
7 whether --
8 A. Well, yes.
9 JUDGE ORIE: -- for a sound assessment of the quality of the
10 police work, whether you would need such information.
11 A. I understand the distinction. I am impressed that this document
12 exists at all in the circumstances in which we are describing.
13 JUDGE ORIE: And could you explain why that surprises you?
14 A. Because --
15 JUDGE ORIE: Why it impresses you?
16 A. Because we discussed yesterday, when Ms. Gustafson was asking the
17 questions, about the quantity and the quality of investigations, and I
18 agreed with Ms. Gustafson that, in my view, some of the achievements of
19 the police -- the civilian police left something to be desired, this
20 document seems to me to -- as the balance goes, it sits on the side of
21 the balance which gives credit to the police, rather than the opposite.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's -- I do understand that. That's your
23 appreciation of this document.
24 I have no further questions.
25 Ms. Gustafson, you are last in line.
1 MS. GUSTAFSON: No questions, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE ORIE: No questions.
3 Then, Mr. Albiston, this concludes your testimony in this court.
4 I'd like to thank you very much for coming and for having answered all
5 the questions that were put to you by the parties and by the Bench. And
6 I wish you a safe journey home again.
7 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Mr. President. Thank you, Court.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Usher, could you please escort Mr. Albiston
9 out of the courtroom.
10 [The witness withdrew]
11 JUDGE ORIE: I see that the -- yes, Ms. Higgins.
12 MS. HIGGINS: Sorry to interrupt, Your Honour. It's just one
13 administrative matter which I'd like to clear up in respect of
14 Mr. Albiston's testimony and a document.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
16 MS. HIGGINS: Your Honour referred yesterday to D505, and we were
17 looking at, firstly, the first letter of that document, and we undertook
18 that we would upload a corrected version. The Croatian version, as you
19 will remember, said the 19th of September.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
21 MS. HIGGINS: We have had the document checked, and it will be
22 uploaded today, the English version, so that's corrected.
23 The second-page letter that went with that document, we found is
24 already, in fact, D1041 and bears the correct date in both versions, and
25 again those documents have been checked, if that assists the Court.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, thank you very much for that.
2 I nevertheless suggest that we keep the whole of the second page
3 together with the other documents. It's -- unless all of it is already
4 under that other number available. These were two documents, two
5 different dates.
6 MS. HIGGINS: I agree with Your Honour's --
7 JUDGE ORIE: So D1041, I think you said.
8 MS. HIGGINS: D1041, yes.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Is that -- apart from that, it bears the
10 correct date, is it also the two-document exhibit or is it just the
11 second one?
12 MS. HIGGINS: Just the second letter.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Just the second letter. Then I suggest that for
14 D505, that the correct version of the first page, that is, with the right
15 date on it, as you said was uploaded, and then for the second document,
16 that we have the correct version, as you say, as we find it already in
17 D1041, it will be uploaded again --
18 MS. HIGGINS: Yes.
19 JUDGE ORIE: -- will be uploaded as well in D505, so that at
20 least we have proper translations.
21 MS. HIGGINS: Yes.
22 JUDGE ORIE: And then we have -- at one point we have a double,
23 but I think it's better to leave it that way rather than to change it and
24 to create a puzzle for those who are perhaps at a later time reading the
1 MS. HIGGINS: I'm grateful.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Then is the Cermak Defence -- I see, Mr. Cayley, you
3 have changed positions. Is the Cermak Defence ready to call its next
5 MR. CAYLEY: We are, Your Honour. If I could just raise briefly
6 two housekeeping matters. One is relatively straightforward.
7 This witness has to return to the United Kingdom this weekend, I
8 told the Trial Chamber, and I just wanted to respectfully remind you.
9 It's Remembrance Sunday this weekend, and he has to leave sharp at 13.45.
10 He will return on Sunday night to be with the Court again on Monday. And
11 he simply asked me to respectfully ask you that.
12 The second matter is, and I've spoken to Mr. Hedaraly about this,
13 the witness produced a corrigendum this week in respect of the report
14 that was filed by us in September, and he incorporated the corrections
15 that he made into a version of the report. We would like to exhibit that
16 version as opposed to the first version because, in essence, it
17 incorporates the corrections. I've told Mr. Hedaraly that the witness
18 has told me that the only corrections within the new version are those
19 that are referred to in the corrigendum. It may be that Mr. Hedaraly
20 wants some time to check that. And if so, it can be marked for
21 identification and then admitted when the Prosecution is content.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Hedaraly.
23 MR. HEDARALY: That's fine, Your Honour. I think we have started
24 checking, and I don't think there will be a problem, if that's the
25 witness's representation. We'll just make sure that those are the only
1 changes. But I have no objection, in principle, to the corrected report
2 replacing the report that is now on file, to the extent that the changes
3 will not result in substantial changes to the -- to also where the --
4 where the sentences are in the report for the sake of referencing. And I
5 understand that the right pages now have been -- there was some issue
6 with the wrong pages in the corrigendum, but I understand from Mr. Cayley
7 that that has been fixed, so we should not have any problems with that.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then the revised version, if that's uploaded,
9 then we'll have that marked for identification until Mr. Hedaraly has
10 finished his part of the job.
11 MR. CAYLEY: I'm obliged, Your Honour. Thank you.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Usher, could you please escort the next
13 witness into the courtroom. I do understand that it's Mr. Deverell.
14 Meanwhile, I do understand that the parties were provided with
15 the new court schedule for early next week, in which more detailed times
16 are given, and that the commitment by the parties, that the evidence of
17 Mr. Deverell will be concluded by Wednesday, is on the basis of this new
18 scheduling scheme.
19 MR. CAYLEY: Yes, Your Honour.
20 [The witness entered court]
21 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon.
22 THE WITNESS: Good afternoon, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon, Mr. Deverell.
24 Mr. Deverell, before I'll invite you to make the solemn
25 declaration, I'd like to explain to you that I commonly address witnesses
1 by "Mr.," and that's not in any way to be understood as disrespectful for
2 rank, academic qualifications, et cetera. It's just the way in which we
3 address witnesses, the Bench does, address witnesses who are supposed to
4 give their evidence or their expert evidence, as all other witnesses.
5 Mr. Deverell, Madam Usher will now hand out to you the text of a
6 solemn declaration, and I would like to invite you to make that solemn
8 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
9 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Deverell. Please be seated.
11 Mr. Deverell, you'll first be examined by Mr. Cayley, who, as I
12 take it you know, is counsel for Mr. Cermak. And in order to avoid
13 whatever nervosity, this Chamber will adjourn at a quarter to 2:00 sharp.
14 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
16 WITNESS: JACK DEVERELL
17 Examination by Mr. Cayley:
18 Q. Just for purposes of the record and before we begin,
19 General Deverell, I have told you this before, but just to remind you,
20 between us our interpreters, who are translating into the French and
21 Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian language, so it's helpful, one, if we both try
22 and speak slowly, but steadily, and, secondly, if you take a break
23 between my question and your answer, and that way they'll keep up with
25 Just for the purposes of the record, your name is
1 General Sir Jack Deverell, and you are a retired British Army general; is
2 that correct?
3 A. That is correct.
4 MR. CAYLEY: If, please, we can have in front of you 2D00790,
5 which is your updated report.
6 Q. Am I correct in saying that you incorporated, within this version
7 of the report, the matters you identified in your corrigendum this week?
8 A. I did.
9 Q. Is this the report?
10 A. Yes.
11 MR. CAYLEY: If, Your Honours, that could be marked for
13 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D01784, marked
15 for identification.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
17 MR. CAYLEY: And the next document, if we could have 2D00791, and
18 if the witness could be shown the second page and the third page. And
19 the next page, please.
20 Q. Is this the corrigendum that you produced for your report this
22 A. Yes, it is.
23 Q. And they are largely corrections to footnotes; is that right?
24 A. That is correct.
25 Q. And there are some textual changes in there, too; is that right?
1 A. That is correct.
2 MR. CAYLEY: And if I could apply for that to be admitted into
3 evidence, please.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Hedaraly.
5 MR. HEDARALY: Maybe I got confused, but if the new report
6 incorporates all of these changes, I thought that was the reason why we
7 would admit the new report -- or discuss the new report into evidence, to
8 obviate the need to have a report and a corrigendum into evidence. So if
9 we have the new report which incorporates the corrigendum corrections, I
10 just don't see the purpose in having the corrigendum into evidence.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Cayley.
12 MR. CAYLEY: I think the purpose of the corrigendum, Your Honour,
13 is to identify the changes that the witness has actually made. It's in
14 the interests of transparency so that everybody knows what has happened,
15 so I would like it to be admitted into evidence, please.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Hedaraly, no objections, I take it.
17 MR. HEDARALY: No.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D01785.
20 JUDGE ORIE: And that document can already be admitted. It
21 doesn't -- there's not a need to be MFI'd first. Therefore, it is
22 admitted into evidence.
23 Please proceed.
24 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Your Honour.
25 And the last document is 2D00792.
1 Q. General Deverell, do you recognise this document?
2 A. Yes, I do.
3 Q. And what is this document?
4 A. It is an additional note which discusses my involvement with the
5 Cermak Defence team, and also covers some of my other commitments that I
6 have been involved in during my time whilst I'd been involved in this
7 particular trial.
8 Q. Is this an accurate reflection of all of the contact that you've
9 had with the Cermak Defence team?
10 A. Unfortunately, it's not, because I'm afraid, by my own stupidity
11 and inefficiency, I failed to translate from my notes onto the -- onto
12 the actual document one other visit, which I would like to ask the
13 Chamber to allow me to insert, and that is between the 21st and
14 25th of April, 2008, I visited The Hague and attended some court
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Cayley, this now on the record, so therefore --
17 MR. CAYLEY: Perfect, Your Honour, yes.
18 JUDGE ORIE: -- I don't think that we need a new additional note
19 to be drafted. May I take it that you want to tender this additional
21 MR. CAYLEY: I would like to tender that document, yes, please,
22 Your Honour.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Hedaraly, no objections.
24 Madam Registrar.
25 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D01786.
1 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
2 Please proceed.
3 MR. CAYLEY: If we could just briefly look at the second page.
4 Q. This is a fairly self-explanatory document. What I'd like to
5 briefly ask you about are the issues related to the original report that
6 you filed and the work that you were requested to do on the report after
7 that initial presentation to the team. Could you explain exactly what
8 you did?
9 A. Yes. I was asked, because it was felt that the report was too
10 long and contained too much repetition and, therefore, was not as
11 focussed as it -- as it should have been, and I was very happy to accept
12 and agree to that criticism, and therefore I did change the sequence of
13 the report, and I also, as a result, managed to, I hope, remove some of
14 the unnecessary repetition, although some is still there. And that was
15 really -- that was really it. It was a removal of repetition and a
16 change in the sequence.
17 Q. And you specifically refer, in your note, to the discussion about
18 Grubori. What were you asked to do there?
19 A. I was asked to remove what you could call my -- my précis of what
20 happened at Grubori, my workings, almost, which was, Mr. Kay said, would
21 be dealt with elsewhere. I was happy to do that. It didn't change my
22 conclusions about Grubori, which remain in the report, and neither did
23 it -- clearly did it change my view of that particular incident. And I
24 was -- I was willing to conform with that request.
25 Q. And you state, at the end of that particular section on that
1 page, that the team made it clear from the outset that it was your report
2 and that you had a duty to ensure that the views represented were yours
3 and yours alone. I'm putting it in the sense of referring to you. Can
4 you just expand on that a little bit?
5 A. Yes. I was -- I was constantly righted by the team that it was
6 my duty to reflect my views in my report, and I had no difficulty with
7 that. Quite obviously, I knew that was to be my -- that was my duty.
8 But the team were -- took great pains to make sure that whatever --
9 whatever discussions that we had, whatever things might have been
10 mentioned, that I had to be -- it had to be my view and I had to be
11 confident that it was entirely my view and it had not been influenced by
12 them. And as I said, at the end, and it is quite clear, and I mean what
13 I've said, this I have done.
14 Q. And lastly in this document, on the last page, if we could have
15 the last page, in terms of your other professional obligations, I don't
16 want to go through them with you, but is that an accurate representation
17 of the other activities that you'd been involved in?
18 A. Yes. There's the odd smaller thing I'm involved in, but it's
19 insignificant and doesn't influence what I've done in this -- this
20 particular part of my -- my work.
21 Q. Thank you, General. In the first part of your report -- do you
22 have your report to hand?
23 A. I do.
24 Q. And you also have, I think, the bundle next to you of the
1 A. I do.
2 Q. And what I'm going to do, in order to try and accelerate the
3 process, is to show you documents on the screen, as opposed to having you
4 try to go through that bundle of footnotes and trying to find the
5 documents, which I think is going to take a lot of time.
6 If you could turn, please, to part 1 of your report, these are
7 your biographical details. I do not intend to go through all of the
8 details of a long and distinguished career. I simply would like to ask
9 you some questions that are relevant to this particular evidence that
10 you're giving here today.
11 Is it right that you've commanded at every level in the
12 British Army, up to and including a brigade?
13 A. Yes, it is.
14 Q. And it's right to say that between 1997 and 2001, you were the
15 deputy commander of the UK Field Army; is that right?
16 A. That is true.
17 Q. And how many men were within the UK Field Army at that time? And
18 women, I'm sorry.
19 A. Approximately 75.000.
20 Q. Between 2001 and 2004, what position did you occupy?
21 A. I was Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Northern Region, which
22 is a NATO appointment.
23 Q. And can you very briefly tell the Court what that particular
24 position involved?
25 A. I was a subordinate commander to the supreme allied commander,
2 Allied Forces North and Allied Forces South, and I was responsible for
3 the northern half, which is essentially from the Alps to the North Cape
4 It was a command which had no soldiers. Those soldier-sailors and airmen
5 would have been assigned to us in the event of a conflict, in the event
6 of the security of Northern Europe being -- being affected, and it would
7 have been in the probably hundreds of thousands, the low hundreds of
8 thousands, as a force. And I was responsible for three subregional
9 headquarters, Norway
10 component headquarters, a maritime headquarters in the United Kingdom and
11 an air headquarters in Germany
12 Q. And during that period of time, I think you were the operational
13 commander of the first NATO force in Afghanistan. Is that right?
14 A. That is correct.
15 Q. And you commanded that operation from Brunssum, in the
17 A. I did. There was a lieutenant general in Kabul who was
18 conducting the day-to-day operations. I gave him what was termed
19 operational direction from Brunssum, where my headquarters was located.
20 Q. Just to go back in time a little bit to talk about operations in
21 which you'd been involved, I think, as a young infantry lieutenant, you
22 served in Aden
23 A. That's correct.
24 Q. And can you just briefly tell the Court what you were doing
1 A. Aden
2 Arabian Peninsula, and we were involved in counter-insurgency operations
3 against a political -- a series of political militias who were trying to
4 ensure that the British left the British colony of Aden, and it was
5 essentially internal security. It was low-level violence from militias
6 involving small arms, grenades, et cetera, and more serious violence in
7 the rural areas.
8 Q. From 1969 to 1986, I think you spent a total of six years in
9 Northern Ireland. Again, very briefly, can you tell the Court what you
10 were doing and the positions that you occupied?
11 A. I started off in Northern Ireland commanding a platoon of about
12 30 men, and I finished in 1986 commanding a battalion of some 600 men.
13 The situation in Northern Ireland was extremely confused, especially in
14 the early days, and it was an internal security issue. There had been a
15 breakdown of law and order. There was an attempt to change the political
16 structure through violence, and there was a religious -- a religious
17 interface problem as well. That developed and changed throughout the
18 time. And in the border areas there was a different form of violence.
19 It was not public violence, it was not public disorder, but it was
20 attacks on security forces, police and soldiers, and also civilians from
21 different religious and political groups.
22 Q. What experience have you had of dealing with the United Nations
23 during your career?
24 A. I was once, for four months, the commander of a company of about
25 120 men who had a role on the Green Line in Cyprus, wearing Blue Berets,
1 as part of the United Nations operation to monitor the cease-fire
2 arrangements between the Turks and the Greeks.
3 Q. What experience in the former Yugoslavia do you have, if any?
4 A. Between September and the end of February/beginning of March
5 1998-1999, I was the deputy commander operations, so I was responsible
6 for directing the operations of the NATO sustainment force based in
8 that the two-entity armed forces obeyed the Dayton Agreement.
9 Q. Thank you, General. Now let's move into the meat of your report.
10 I'd like to move around, so I'm not going to be going in any
11 order and I will not be asking you --
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Cayley, I'm looking at the clock. Since you are
13 changing subjects, I wonder whether this would be a good time to have a
14 break so that you --
15 MR. CAYLEY: Of course, Your Honour, I think it's a very good
16 time. Thank you.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Then we'll have a break, and we'll resume at a
18 quarter to 1:00
19 --- Recess taken at 12.21 p.m.
20 --- On resuming at 12.51 p.m.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Cayley, you may proceed.
22 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Your Honour.
23 Q. General Deverell, one last question based on the prior subject
24 that slipped my mind. Have you had experience, as a senior officer, in
25 dealing with international organisations such as the UN, the ICRC?
1 A. Yes, I have, mostly in -- almost entirely in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
2 when we had a United Nations high representative out there, and I dealt
3 particularly with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and the
4 International Red Cross and a plethora of other organisations. And, of
5 course, I also had some dealings when, in particular, setting up the
6 operation in Afghanistan
7 Q. Dealing with the same issue, the interface between military
8 forces and the international community?
9 A. Exactly.
10 Q. If we could now move, as I said before, into the main part of
11 your report, and if you could turn to part 4. And here you address
12 general principles of command and control and subordination in the armed
14 Are principles of command and control and subordination fairly
15 common across all military forces or are they not?
16 A. In my experience, they're common across all military forces in,
17 you know, developed countries, with armed forces that look very similar
18 for clear reasons; that armed forces tend to do a similar job, whichever
19 country they belong to.
20 Q. Now, you refer in your report to something called military
21 doctrine. Can you explain very briefly to the Judges what you mean by
22 "military doctrine"?
23 A. Yes, it's the over-arching philosophy which -- from which
24 everything else flows, your structures, the way you approach things, your
25 equipment, the numbers of soldiers you have, the balance between your
1 navy, army, and air force. In some countries, doctrine can be rather
2 prescriptive. It can tell people what to do. In other countries,
4 approach matters, how to think, how to deal with a complex problem, in
5 terms of how you approach it, which then leads you to take decisions as
6 to what you will do.
7 Q. Can you explain to the Court what you understand "command and
8 control" to mean?
9 A. It used to be just "command," but -- deemed as just "command,"
10 but really since the Second World War the word "command and control" has
11 come in. The "command" is this sort of -- how can I describe it? It's
12 the conceptual activity, it's the analysis of a problem, and it is the
13 way a commander and his staff use their intellect and judgement and
14 experience to come up with solutions to complex problems. The "control"
15 element is the mechanistic element. It's, of course, radios, it's
16 telephones, it's satellites, it's computer capability, but it is also
17 process and procedure, how many meetings you have, who is in those
18 meetings, what those meetings deal with. It deals with something we call
19 battle rhythm; that is, the way the staff actually support the commander
20 in his analysis, his decision-making, his planning, and in the
21 implementation of that plan.
22 Q. Going to part 4(e) of your report, where you address the issue of
23 unity of command and subordination, what do you understand by the meaning
24 of "unity of command"?
25 A. Well, it is -- it's fundamental. One of the principles of
1 military effectiveness is actually unity of purpose. When you consider
2 that war is -- conflict is the breakdown of normal processes, the
3 breakdown of society, if that's the way you wish to define it, then the
4 military have to find sort of coherent ways of dealing with that, and
5 therefore it is very important you have this unity of purpose. And you
6 can only -- as far as I'm concerned, you can only achieve that if you
7 have one person responsible for a task, whether that task is a big task
8 or a small task, and that one person has to have the unity of command.
9 He has to know who he is commanding, and those who are commanded by that
10 person must understand that they are commanded by that person. And it is
11 all about tasking.
12 Q. When you say "it's all about tasking," can you explain what you
13 mean by that?
14 A. Yes. A military mission is -- is divided into specific tasks,
15 and people are allocated tasks, and they are obliged to carry out those
16 tasks. That is the reason they are in command, whether that is command
17 of a large organisation or the command of a platoon or a section of seven
18 or eight men. And it is very important that that task is clearly
19 defined. It is sometimes limited in time and space and duration, and, of
20 course, the essential element of the task is that the person has the
21 resources which enable him to do it, or her to do it. So there is a very
22 strong resource implication there which the commander, the senior
23 commander, has to take into account.
24 Q. Talking now specifically about subordination, what do you
25 understand "subordination" to mean?
1 A. "Subordination" is quite simply the authority given to somebody
2 to task a person or a group of people, a group of units, in their
4 Q. Did you find that the principles of unity of command and
5 subordination were reflected in Croatian Army doctrine?
6 A. They're laid down absolutely clearly. It's one of the -- one of
7 the guiding principles.
8 MR. CAYLEY: If, please, we could have P1116 [Realtime transcript
9 read in error "P1186"] on the screen, and it's Article 49 of that
10 document. I believe it's on page 21 of e-court. That may not be
12 Q. Just while we're waiting, General, for the purposes of your
13 report, did you review both JNA and Croatian Army doctrine from the
14 documents that you were provided with?
15 A. Yes, I did.
16 Q. Now, if you'll look at the English version on the left-hand side,
17 and if you look at Article 49 --
18 MR. CAYLEY: Perhaps the screen, Madam Registrar, could be
19 adjusted so that the witness can see the entire English version.
20 MR. HEDARALY: I'm really sorry, but I read on the transcript it
21 says "P1186." It's the right document on the screen, but just for later
22 on, so that there's no confusion.
23 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. Hedaraly. It's P1116.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Hedaraly.
25 Please proceed.
1 MR. CAYLEY:
2 Q. Now, you've covered much of this in what you've already said, but
3 now looking at it in the perspective of Croatian Army doctrine, do you
4 have any comments on Article 49?
5 A. I can only see half of it still, but I think I can see the most
6 important bit. It says clearly that it shall be based on -- sorry, can
7 you make it smaller? Thank you. I can see that, thank you very much.
8 Thank you. It says really what I've just commented, that it's based on
9 the basic principles of unity of command and the obligation to carry out
10 decisions, commands, and orders of a superior. And I would find that
11 written in different ways in all sorts of documents in guiding military
12 forces in other countries.
13 Q. And it refers to one superior. What is the significance of that?
14 A. That there is one person who must be responsible for a task.
15 Q. If we could move on, and I'm afraid we're going to have to go
16 backwards a little bit in your report to part 3, where you deal with the
17 normal training and background of general officers.
18 Now, you retired from the British Army as a full general, I think
19 what is sometimes known as a four-star general in NATO terminology.
20 That's right, isn't it?
21 A. That's correct.
22 Q. And what I would like to know is the training and experience,
23 very briefly. And I know that we dealt with your career. I don't need
24 to repeat your career details, but the training and experience that you
25 had throughout your career in order to rise to the rank of general.
1 A. I'm sorry, I wasn't quite -- I didn't quite catch that question.
2 Q. What I'd like to ask you is this: Obviously, you've referred to
3 your biographical --
4 A. Yeah.
5 Q. -- details. I don't need to go through that again, but what I'd
6 like you to outline to the Judges is the training and --
7 A. I see.
8 Q. -- experience that you've had throughout your career to get from
9 the lowest which you were in the army to a full general.
10 A. Your Honour, there's essentially three levels of military
11 training, and again these tend to be common throughout certainly Europe
12 and the United States and other similar areas. The first is the basic
13 level, the foundation training, which is teaching young officers, men and
14 women, how to command their soldiers at the tactical level, and it
15 introduces them to military law, administration, logistics, welfare. It
16 provides the foundation knowledge they need. Depending how successful
17 they are in that, you then get, after about ten years, to a third
18 level -- I'm sorry, a second level, which is really preparing you for
19 more important posts up to and including lieutenant colonel, perhaps
20 working in a superior headquarters or a Ministry of Defence, and you
21 start then getting into the implementation of higher-level policy and, of
22 course, command at a higher level. And then for a relatively few number
23 of officers, there is a third level which -- for which you can be
24 selected, and that takes you into the political-military interface. It
25 prepares you for senior command appointments, two-, three, or four-star,
1 to use the NATO terminology. You will be trained amongst civilians --
2 with civilians and civil servants, sometimes the police, and it is
3 focussing you -- focussing on trying to train you in order to create
4 policy rather than merely implement it.
5 Q. How many years' training have you been through during your entire
6 career, do you think?
7 A. I don't know exactly, but I would suggest that probably I've
8 probably done something like six years' full-time training on courses
9 over four months in duration in my 40-odd years, including initial
10 officer training.
11 MR. CAYLEY: If we could please have D1007 on the screen.
12 Q. Now, I'm right in saying, General, while we're waiting for that
13 to come on the screen, that you were provided with some information, with
14 information that the Cermak Defence team had on Mr. Cermak's background,
15 were you not?
16 A. I was.
17 Q. Now, this is a decree, first of all, posting Mr. Cermak to be a
18 reserve officer of the Croatian Armed Forces. And if we could scroll
19 down, I think there is a second document within that, and this is a
20 decree on appointment. Do you -- can you see that clearly?
21 A. I can, thank you.
22 Q. And you've seen this document before?
23 A. Yes, I have.
24 Q. Now, the rank of colonel general, does that rank exist in the
25 British Army?
1 A. Not by that name. It's the equivalent, I believe, of lieutenant
3 Q. Now, if we could go back to the first document. Do you refer to
4 this document in your report?
5 A. Yes, I do.
6 Q. Now, the particular part that I'd like to know if you know
7 anything about is where it says:
8 "To the rank of colonel general, administrative service."
9 Does that phrase mean anything to you, "administrative service"?
10 A. Not specifically, but it says -- what it says to me, clearly, is
11 that General Cermak's future employment should be limited to
12 administration of some sort within -- within an administrative area, no
13 doubt because of his previous experience.
14 Q. Now, in terms of the study that you made of Mr. Cermak's
15 background, can you make any comment to the Court on how qualified you
16 felt he was for the position of colonel general in the Croatian
17 Armed Forces? As a military man, I'm speaking here specifically.
18 A. Well, from the evidence I saw, from the documents I read, I found
19 no evidence that he had ever been in the army in a meaningful way; that
20 he'd been a general because he was the assistant chief of logistics,
21 because that is what the Croatian government did, and that he had had
22 none of the experience that I would have thought would have been required
23 for somebody to be given the sort of -- or to be given an active role in
24 the Croatian military. I think I say in my report he was uniquely
1 Q. Sorry, uniquely unqualified for what?
2 A. For a military role.
3 Q. Can we now please look at part 6 of your report. Do you have
4 that in front of you?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And this is addressing the subjects of garrisons, generally,
7 Knin Garrison and the Croatian Army garrison commander.
8 General, have you ever been a garrison commander?
9 A. I have. Between 1988 and 1991, when I was commanding a brigade,
10 I was also the garrison commander.
11 Q. Now, can you explain to the Court what a garrison commander is?
12 A. I say in my report garrisons to armies are to armies what ports
13 are to navies, and that is true. They are the sort of -- the static base
14 from which operational units are deployed to train or to conduct
15 operations, wherever those operations might be. They're the place where
16 the families, if there are families, live and are looked after. They're
17 the place where they leave their equipment behind to be looked after
18 which they're not taking on operations. There are a mass of other issues
19 which are required, and other resources and capabilities which are
20 required to maintain those units, to give them the support they require,
21 both administrative and training support, whilst they are there or whilst
22 they are deployed elsewhere. They are the essential underpinning of your
23 military effectiveness.
24 Q. Are they peacetime or wartime structures?
25 A. They are, in my experience, peacetime structures.
1 Q. Now, have you looked at Croatian Army doctrine on garrisons?
2 A. I have.
3 MR. CAYLEY: If we could please have Exhibit D32, and this will
4 be page 11. I'm told by my case manager it's page 13.
5 Q. Have you seen this document before, General?
6 A. Yes, I have.
7 Q. And is it referred to in your report?
8 A. It is referred to in my report.
9 Q. Now, first of all, in terms of comparing the garrisons that
10 you're familiar with to the garrisons at least you saw from the
11 regulations in Croatia
12 A. No, I think that that represents what I would have expected to
13 see, in general terms, in dealing with other garrisons, and British
14 garrisons, for that matter.
15 Q. Now, looking at Article 52:
16 "The garrison commander is responsible for placement, order,
17 discipline, and service in the garrison."
18 Now, I want to essentially break this sentence down and then go
19 to the next sentence. What do you understand by the meaning of the word
21 A. That is a word, I believe, which is used to mean billeting or
22 accommodation, and we would have used the word "accommodation."
23 Q. Accommodation for what?
24 A. For soldiers, and their families, no doubt, but essentially for
1 Q. And then dealing with "order, discipline -- order, discipline ...
2 in the garrison," what do you understand that to mean in terms of the
3 garrison commander?
4 A. "Order" I take it to mean -- and to a degree it's linked to
5 service. "Order" is all about providing the services required in the
6 garrison, those support services. For example, it might be eating
7 arrangements. It might be refurbishment capabilities, the repair of
8 vehicles. And the "order" bit is that those capabilities -- those
9 resources are properly managed, that they are opened at times when it is
10 convenient to those that are you supporting, the units, to make use of
11 them, and that they are properly organised, that they're properly
12 sustained, and that the units, themselves, know that perhaps their slot
13 is between 9.00 and 10.00 in the morning and another unit goes there
14 between 10.00 and 11.00, so you don't get overcrowding. That is the
15 meaning, in my mind, of "order." It is the good ordering of the
16 resources and the people who work for the garrison commander who are
17 responsible for running those resources -- those capabilities.
18 "Discipline" is what underpins it. It is the capacity of a
19 commander to impose those rules on people and have the ability to
20 sanction them if they break those rules. "Service," as I've said, is
21 linked with "order," and I think in this instance it means that the
22 garrison is supposed to provide a 24-hour service; for example, a duty
23 officer who can be used to deal with whatever incidents might occur
24 during your 24-hour period.
25 Q. You've stated in your answer that essentially these terms apply
1 to eating arrangements, refurbishment capabilities, repair of vehicles.
2 What kinds of facilities are these?
3 A. They're largely static facilities, and they're logistic support
4 facilities or administrative facilities.
5 Q. Now, the next sentence, which states:
6 "All units and institutions within the garrison are subordinate
7 to the garrison commander in matters of order, discipline and service."
8 Can you explain to the Court what you understand that to mean?
9 A. I understand that to mean that the unit commander -- I'm sorry,
10 the garrison commander can expect units making use of those facilities to
11 obey his instructions, the instructions of the garrison. For example,
12 and I've used this example before, that is, timings of the opening of the
13 dining hall, the allocation of timings for units to use refurbishment
14 facilities, or laundries, or any of those other support -- support
16 Q. Does it -- does this provision apply simply to units moving
17 through the geographical area of a garrison?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Why not?
20 A. Because that would immediately interfere with the unity of
21 command, if the garrison commander could task or impose tasks upon a unit
22 which was not subordinated to him just because it happened to be in the
23 garrison area. What is expected, as a unit moves through a garrison
24 area, is that it obeys, for example, speed limits imposed by the garrison
25 or route directions put in place by the garrison, and that is an
1 expectation which is well known. It is accepted as part of the way you
2 do your business. It doesn't have to be laid down. It is an
4 Q. Now, without going through them in detail, if you look at
5 Article 54, and specifically 54(c), do you see that in front of you?
6 A. Yes, I do.
7 Q. Is that the kind of activities that you would expect a garrison
8 to be involved in?
9 A. Yes, it is.
10 Q. Does that bear any similarities to British garrisons, those
11 particular activities?
12 A. It's similar. I've never known a British garrison to be
13 responsible for bathing in rivers, lakes, or the sea, but the rest -- the
14 rest is pretty accurate.
15 MR. CAYLEY: Okay. If we could now please look at D34. And just
16 one moment. It's page 2, Madam Registrar.
17 Actually, if the witness, I'm sorry, could just be shown the
18 front page so that he can confirm that he's seen this document before.
19 Q. General, have you seen this document before?
20 A. Yes, I have.
21 Q. And is it referred to in your report?
22 A. It is referred to in my report.
23 Q. And if we could turn the page, and if we could please look at
24 paragraph 2, have you considered that particular paragraph, General?
25 A. I have.
1 Q. Now, what I'm particularly interested in is the phrase:
2 "The garrison commands do not have an operational function or the
3 right to command HV units, except precisely prescribed authorities
4 regarding work, order and discipline in the garrison," et cetera. I
5 won't read the rest of it.
6 Can you explain to the Court what you understand that to mean?
7 A. Yes, I can, and it goes back to what I said in my -- one of my
8 previous answers, because it actually says that the garrison commander
9 does not have an operational function or the right to command HV units,
10 except when they are engaged in using the facilities of the garrison;
11 that is, those facilities which we've previously seen, whether they be
12 laundries, bathing in lakes, training facilities, ranges, or whatever.
13 Q. Is that what you would expect to find?
14 A. That's what I would expect to find, absolutely.
15 Q. Now, if we look at the next paragraph, which is paragraph 3, and
16 I won't read it out, but you can see what it states. Can you explain to
17 the Court what you understand the meaning of cooperation and coordination
18 of tasks of the garrison with the bodies that are listed there? And if
19 it assists, you can actually give examples from the United Kingdom.
20 A. Your Honours, garrisons exist within the civil structure of a
21 country. That's plainly obvious. And they rely -- almost certainly they
22 will rely, and in my experience, which I will talk about in a second, you
23 rely on the support of that civil structure, whether it be for your
24 utilities, water, electricity, other fuel, whether it be for welfare
25 services to help you deal with your families, employment services for the
1 employment of families and relatives, and the police -- the civil police,
2 for either national disaster, terrorist activity, or the fire service
3 because you depend upon them for their support in fighting fires, there
4 are a mass of structures out there which will support that garrison. The
5 garrison does not have the capability to do it itself. That is exactly
6 my experience when I was a garrison commander, and we regularly had to
7 cooperate with the police and the -- those who gave us -- supplied us
8 with our utilities, and to a degree coordinate our activities so that the
9 garrison could be properly supported.
10 Q. And in terms of your interpretation of this provision that we're
11 looking at here, can you say anything about that?
12 A. Yes. I believe the garrison commander was tasked here to
13 establish levels of cooperation with other government departments in
14 order that the garrison should be able to play its proper role both in
15 the support of the armed forces and as part of, because it existed in,
16 that civil structure.
17 Q. And when you were garrison commander, that relationship that you
18 had with the police, did that put you in command of the local police?
19 A. No, it did not. And if ever one gave the impression that you
20 were about to tell the British police what you would wish them to do, you
21 were reminded very firmly that you were not in charge of the police.
22 They were very much -- they very much had primacy.
23 MR. CAYLEY: Now, let's look briefly, please, at D33. And this
24 is, I believe, pages 9 and 10 -- I'm sorry, pages -- it's the last five
25 pages of that document. If we could just -- this is D33, yes. If we
1 could have, please, the last five pages of that document. The last four
2 pages, I'm sorry. Yes, perfect.
3 Q. And, again, General, have you seen this document before?
4 A. I have.
5 Q. And do you refer to it in your report?
6 A. I do.
7 Q. Now, can you explain what you understand this document to be?
8 A. This is -- we would call it an establishment table, and it gives
9 the total numbers and breaks down those numbers into separate component
10 bits for any particular organisation, military establishment.
11 Q. And you have them in the UK
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Can you describe to the Judges, based on the actual establishment
14 figures and the manning figures, and we know this is for the
15 Knin Garrison on the 31st of August, can you describe to the Judges what
16 type of headquarters this was?
17 A. It's a very small headquarters and will not have a great deal of
18 capability. As we can see, it's only got five officers, three civilians,
19 so -- and nine people, a total of nine people. It means it's a
20 headquarters that is supporting a commander with very limited tasks and
21 very limited authority and responsibility.
22 Q. And how large would an operational headquarters be?
23 A. It depends exactly what the task of that headquarters is. But as
24 a guide, you would find brigade headquarters in a developed --
25 developed -- the armed forces -- I'm sorry, the armed forces of a
1 developed country would probably have something in the region of 40 to
2 50 officers responsible to support the commander, and they would be split
3 up into -- into disciplines; administrative, logistic, planning,
4 intelligence, communications, et cetera. And there's a whole raft of
5 NATO doctrine which dictates that within a nation, and each one would
6 have its own head and a certain number of officers, and, of course,
7 soldiers to support those disciplines. And they are the people who
8 provide the specialist advice to help the commander analyse, decide,
9 plan, and implement, and then monitor the implementation of the plan.
10 They are the people who do the coordination and help with the direction.
11 Q. Now, just bearing in mind all of the documents that you -- that
12 we've just addressed, the garrison regulations, the size of the
13 headquarters, I want you to consider briefly the following. Now, you
14 were provided, I believe, with a copy of the indictment in this case at
15 the beginning of the case, weren't you?
16 A. I was.
17 Q. And did you read that document?
18 A. I did.
19 Q. Now, I just want to briefly put to you a narrative from that
20 indictment, and I would like you to comment on it. And this is
21 paragraph 7 in the last indictment, and it reads as follows:
22 "In his combined capacities, Ivan Cermak participated in various
23 structures of power and responsibility and possessed effective control
24 over members of the HV units or elements who comprised or were attached
25 to, or operated in the Knin Garrison, and also over civilian police who
1 operated in the garrison area and areas adjacent to it. The HV units
2 comprising or operating in the garrison and adjacent areas included,
3 without limitation: The 4th and 7th HV Brigades; the 1st Croatian Guards
4 Brigade (1 Hrvatski Gardijski Zdrug); the 113th Infantry Brigade;
5 142nd Infantry Brigade; 144th Infantry Brigade; 126th Home Guard
6 Regiment" - I'm not going to try and pronounce that - "the 6th Home Guard
7 Regiment; the 7th Home Guard Regiment; the 134th Home Guard Regiment; and
8 a combined Military Police Company."
9 Now, putting aside for one moment the military police, which we
10 will come to later, can you give your comments on that narrative, please?
11 A. It struck me, when I saw that part of the indictment and I then
12 looked at the size, experience, and skill sets, if I may use that jargon,
13 of Knin Garrison in August of 1995, that it was my judgement that that
14 headquarters was not in the position to exercise any form of control at
15 all of those units that you've just mentioned.
16 Q. Now, you said earlier in your evidence, and you explained the
17 meaning of the term -- that the garrison commander did not have
18 operational control of HV units. Does that also affect your position in
19 respect of this paragraph?
20 A. Well, of course, it is stated quite clearly in regulations that
21 he did not. But even if he had done, by whatever means, and I saw no
22 evidence of this at all, the size of his headquarters, the experience of
23 the people in it, and his own experience would have made it, to me,
24 extremely difficult, to the extent it was inconceivable that he could
25 have exercised any form of control -- operational control over those
2 Q. In the documents that we provided to you, did you see any orders
3 from Mr. Cermak to those units?
4 A. None.
5 Q. Did you see any reports from those units to Mr. Cermak?
6 A. None.
7 Q. Does that have any significance for you?
8 A. It does. I mean, you -- you can't -- you can't control tactical
9 formations, as these were, which by definition are spread out on a
10 battle-field which was very expansive, without issuing them with orders,
11 and you cannot understand what they are doing. Therefore, you are
12 incapable of analysing the situation, and, therefore, deciding and
13 planning and then implementing a new plan, unless you receive reports
14 which contain necessary and important information back from them. And I
15 saw no evidence of either that information being sent by those units to
16 Knin Garrison headquarters, for the attention of General Cermak, nor did
17 I see any orders given by him to those units.
18 Q. Now, the provisions -- the narrative that I've read to you
19 essentially suggests that Mr. Cermak possessed effective control because
20 these units were -- who comprised or were attached to or operated in the
21 Knin Garrison. Have you seen any evidence at all that these units were
22 part of the Knin Garrison?
23 A. I've seen no evidence that they were part of the Knin Garrison.
24 Q. Have you seen any evidence they were attached to the
25 Knin Garrison?
1 A. I've seen no evidence that they were attached to the
2 Knin Garrison.
3 Q. And in terms of operating within the garrison area, would that
4 have subordinated them to the Knin Garrison?
5 A. No, but it would -- because it would have been -- it would have
6 undermined the whole concept of the unity of command and -- sorry, it
7 would have undermined the whole concept of unity of command.
8 Q. Now, if we could move, please, to part 3(b) of your report. And
9 you actually speak of this in a number of parts of your report, but I'm
10 interested in lines 12 to 15 of your report on page 8, where you state
11 that there were three elements to Mr. Cermak's appointment. And we've
12 dealt with the first one already, that the garrison -- was Mr. Cermak a
13 classical garrison commander, in your view?
14 A. No, he certainly wasn't, on two counts. Firstly, he had none of
15 the experience that you would have expected a garrison commander to have.
16 And, secondly, he was a colonel general rather than a major or a colonel.
17 Therefore, he was over-ranked, in my -- in my judgement, he was
18 over-ranked for that particular role.
19 Q. Now, you say that he had two other roles, and we'll go into these
20 in more detail next week, but you say:
21 "Secondly, he was an ad hoc administrator to facilitate the
22 normalisation of Knin."
23 What do you mean by that?
24 A. Well, he was sent by President Tudjman with a sort of - can I use
25 the phrase - a general direction to sort out -- I think the phrase I
1 heard was to sort out Knin, and I know we will be maybe discussing that
2 in more detail later, but from my point of view, that meant that he was
3 involved in the urban regeneration of Knin, getting the trains, the
4 drains working, opening the shops, getting the banks working, getting
5 civilians back, and starting -- starting the whole process of
6 regenerating Knin as part of a civil society.
7 Q. And have you seen evidence to that effect? We'll look at some of
8 that --
9 A. Yes, I have, yes.
10 Q. And, lastly, this last position that you say, as appointed
11 contact for international organisations, can you explain what you mean by
13 A. His direction from the president, I think -- and this again was
14 slightly vague, he said he was told to go and help the Canadians. He
15 became, I believe, the point of contact really by default, particularly
16 because he happened to be a very senior officer by rank. And my
17 experience of international organisations, and having been part of one,
18 myself, is that you do tend to look at -- to seek the most senior officer
19 present and make a presumption -- an assumption that he has the power
20 that you would normally associate with somebody of that rank.
21 Q. Have you actually experienced that, yourself?
22 A. I have. I fear that I've done it myself. It is partly -- it's
23 part of the human dynamic, really. You're trying to get somebody who has
24 the capacity to deliver and somebody who can deal with you, so that you
25 can do your business as effectively and quickly as possible. And I think
1 it's a natural instinct for those who are confronted with a very
2 confusing and dynamic situation, members of the international community,
3 to try and seek those they believe provide them with the capacity to
4 deliver that which they want.
5 Q. Now, in terms of his position as garrison commander, these other
6 two functions that you've identified, urban regeneration, you call it,
7 point of contact, were they part of the job description of a garrison
9 A. No, they were not.
10 Q. And do you draw any conclusions from that?
11 A. Yes. The appointment of garrison commander gave him none of the
12 authority or responsibility that he -- or none of the authority that he
13 required to do the other two jobs.
14 MR. CAYLEY: If we could please now look at 2D00632.
15 Q. Now, there are many documents in this case, and you've referred
16 to this in a number of places in your report, but I'm not going to refer
17 you to all of them, where you address the issue of military governor.
18 Have you seen documents in the case where Mr. Cermak is referred to by
19 members of the international community as the military governor?
20 A. I have.
21 MR. CAYLEY: Sorry, 2D00632.
22 MR. HEDARALY: I think that's 65 ter 2D.
23 MR. CAYLEY: Sorry, thank you.
24 Q. While we're waiting for it, did you, in fact, find for the
25 Cermak Defence team a definition in your NATO -- I think it's
2 A. Yes, I did.
3 MR. CAYLEY: If we could go to the next page of that document.
4 Just, Mr. President, for explanation, obviously we're not going
5 to offer the entire dictionary into evidence. This is just an extract,
6 and we've provided the parties with the web site so that people can
7 inspect it.
8 Q. Now, this is a definition which you found, General Deverell. Can
9 you explain to the Judges what you understand a military governor to be?
10 A. Your Honours, I -- the military governors appear to me, from
11 this, to be a post and appointment that is only required when you are in
12 a foreign country, a different country, and the civil structure has
13 broken down, that the rule of law is no longer respected, and that you do
14 not get the normal pegs of civilian -- of civilian authority in place,
15 and by default, the army -- the military organisation is seen to be the
16 only one which has the capacity to exercise control, in terms of rule of
17 law, and perhaps to operate the utilities -- the basic utilities of life.
18 And therefore a military governor can sometimes be appointed with a
19 military administration.
20 Q. Now, you say "when you are in a foreign country." What do you
21 mean by that?
22 A. Well, if you're operating outside your own country.
23 Q. Now, specifically, it states in this definition "in an occupied
25 A. Correct.
1 Q. Now, can you give the Judges any examples that you know of where
2 a military governor was appointed?
3 A. I believe I'm correct, in terms of Laws of Armed Combat, that all
4 forces have a responsibility, as they take ground, to provide those
5 essential support elements for the population that they liberate or
6 otherwise. The evidence I will use or the example I will use --
7 Q. Can I interrupt you, because I think maybe you didn't understand
8 my question. I want you to give an example of a military governor.
9 A. Yes, yeah. The British military governor in Germany at the end
10 of the Second World War is an example of the absence -- with the
11 breakdown of Nazi Germany and the civil authority there, the vacuum was
12 filled by military governments provided by both -- by France
13 United States, Russia
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Cayley, I'm looking at the clock --
15 MR. CAYLEY: Yes.
16 JUDGE ORIE: -- and in view of the wish of the witness to --
17 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE ORIE: I don't know whether this --
19 MR. CAYLEY: It's a good place, yes.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Deverell, I would like to instruct you that you
21 should not speak with anyone about your testimony, whether testimony
22 already given today or still to be given next week. And we'd like to see
23 you back Monday morning, 9.00.
24 We adjourn, and we resume on Monday, the 9th of November, at
25 9.00, Courtroom III
1 [The witness stands down]
2 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.44 p.m.
3 to be reconvened on Monday, the 9th day of
4 November, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.