Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 24912

 1                           Friday, 20 November 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to everyone.

 7             Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning

 9     everyone in the courtroom.  This is case number IT-06-90-T, the

10     Prosecutor versus Ante Gotovina et al.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

12                           WITNESS: MATE GRANIC [Resumed]

13                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Granic, I would like to remind you that you're

15     still bound by the solemn declaration you have given at the beginning of

16     your testimony.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand, Your Honour.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi, if you're ready to continue your

19     cross-examination, you may proceed.

20             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

21                           Cross-examination by Mr. Waespi: [Continued]

22        Q.   Good morning, Dr. Granic.

23        A.   Good morning.

24        Q.   Let's talk about the issue of the return of the Serbs.  In

25     paragraph 10 of your witness statement, you say that in April 1998, you

Page 24913

 1     strongly supported the plan and programme of refugees return to Croatia.

 2     And in paragraph 24, you mention an intensive programme of return of

 3     refugees and displaced persons.  Now, that's three years after

 4     Operation Storm that these intensive programmes are implemented or

 5     discussed; is that correct?

 6        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, the process of talks about the return of refugees

 7     began back in Dayton in November 1995.  The first thing that was agreed

 8     was the Erdut Agreement on peaceful -- on the peaceful reintegration in

 9     of Croatian Podunavlje.  And then in January 1996 I visited Belgrade, and

10     with the foreign minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

11     Milan Milutinovic, I started talks about the principles of protecting

12     private property and the return of refugees, and we issued a joint

13     communique in Belgrade.  In May 1996, I proposed to Belgrade a bilateral

14     agreement on the protection of minorities that included the turn of

15     refugees.  Several years later that proposal was accepted.  Then on the

16     1st of August, 1996, during talks of heads of state and foreign ministers

17     of the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the

18     so-called Athens Declaration was adopted.  Its main points were the

19     protection of property and the return of refugees.  Then in August I

20     signed in Belgrade an agreement on the normalisation of relations between

21     Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which inaugurated the

22     principle of protection of property of both physical and legal persons,

23     and it also regulated the issue of the right of refugees to return, and

24     it was only then in 1997 that main agreements were reached with the

25     UNHCR.  And finally in the beginning of 1998, the preconditions existed

Page 24914

 1     for such a plan and programme.  Prior to that President Tudjman and the

 2     Croatian parliament adopted the decision on amnesty.  Many trust-building

 3     measures and security-building measures needed to be put in place for

 4     that plan to be implemented.

 5             As for the speed with which all this developed, we drew on the

 6     experiences of other countries and the experience of the UNHCR, and they

 7     believed that our pace was very reasonable and that we took these steps

 8     at the right time.

 9        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Granic.  When you talk about the fact that UNHCR

10     said it was a reasonable pace, Ambassador Galbraith testified here that

11     only enormous pressure of the US and European Union made you and

12     Mr. Tudjman agree on paper that Yugoslavia had to accomplish these steps

13     in relation to the return.  Do you agree that it was the enormous

14     pressure from the US and European Union that forced you to seriously

15     think about these programmes?

16        A.   Ambassador Galbraith had frequent talks with me.  We talked both

17     as statesmen and as friends.  It's true that he put pressure for this to

18     happen as soon as possible.  However, I needed no pressure from

19     Peter Galbraith; on the contrary.  I myself was making efforts and worked

20     for this.  You must not forget that there were various opinions within

21     the government.  Whether it was the right time, not for the return of

22     refugees, Serb refugees, as such, but whether the time was right in terms

23     of the general atmosphere and the security of these refugees when they

24     return.  In these discussions I was helped by the position of

25     Peter Galbraith, and I valued them greatly.

Page 24915

 1        Q.   Let's talk about another government, not the US government but

 2     the French government, and you agree with me that also the French

 3     government had concerns about the property loss, famous property loss,

 4     and concerns about the issue of the Serbs returning to -- to the Krajina.

 5     Do you remember that?

 6        A.   I do.

 7             MR. WAESPI:  Mr. President, if we could have 65 ter 7478.

 8        Q.   And this is a note of a meeting between you, Dr. Granic, and

 9     French Ambassador Gaillarde on 19 September 1995 in Zagreb.  And I'd like

10     to show you first the cover page.

11             MR. WAESPI:  Mr. President, at least I have a problem that it's

12     not shown on my screen.  I don't know how about my colleagues.  Now it's

13     shown.  Thank you.

14        Q.   Do you remember meeting Ambassador Gaillarde on the 19th

15     September in Zagreb, Dr. Granic?

16        A.   Now that I see this signature of my chef de cabinet, yes,

17     certainly.

18        Q.   Let's move to paragraph 2.  In English -- sorry, page 2 in

19     Croatian and page 3 in the English.  I want to read out what

20     ambassador Gaillarde said or how he's quoted:

21             "Ambassador Gaillarde thanked the minister for seeing him at such

22     short notice and stressed that he had been given an instruction by his

23     government to present a bilateral verbal demarche because of the concerns

24     felt in Paris caused by frequent and identical reports made by various

25     observers, humanitarian organisations, the ECMM, and the UN, about

Page 24916

 1     frequent case of endangering private property and persons in the recently

 2     liberated areas.  In addition, he expressed concerns about various legal

 3     acts and administrative acts and project related to the return of Serbs,

 4     especially the one announced -- especially the one announced on 4

 5     September, which leaves only 30 days for the refugees to register for the

 6     return.  They are afraid that this decree means actual disposition.

 7     Friends of Croatia are therefore wondering whether the Republic of

 8     Croatia is really prepared to accept those who want to return because

 9     things sometimes look as if everything is being done to prevent their

10     return."

11             Then there is a piece of information about the visit of the

12     president of the republic, and then in the second paragraph you answer

13     that it was decided to extend the deadline for those who wanted to return

14     and the parliament will also adopt it.

15             Now, this is again a clear indication from one of your friends

16     that things are going wrong in Croatia in relation to the return of the

17     Serbs; is that correct?

18        A.   Thank you for showing this record of the talks between me and the

19     French ambassador.  I must stress that a clear distinction has to be made

20     between two things.  One thing is the return of refugees, and the second

21     thing was the protection of the enormous amount of property that suddenly

22     became the target of criminals, looters, robbers in various groups.  And

23     when the Croatian government make the decision to take over that property

24     for management and administration, it was the first time we were handling

25     such a problem.  There was not even much international experience with

Page 24917

 1     this sort of thing.

 2             There were all sorts of ideas, totally unacceptable, somewhat

 3     acceptable.  And finally it was decided to place this property under

 4     protection.  That's what our lawyers suggested.

 5             The term of 30 days was not designed to prevent the return of

 6     Serbs, because realistically speaking, there were no conditions at the

 7     time for a mass return of the Serbs.  I tried to describe the timeline of

 8     all the steps taken for the Serbs to return.  At that time, only

 9     individual family reunions were possible, not return on a massive scale.

10     However, we took on board very seriously all the suggestions of the

11     international community, such as those of Mr. Galbraith and

12     Mr. Gaillarde.

13             In this instance we said -- I said that we are going to accept

14     these suggestions, that the deadline needs to be postponed.  I must

15     emphasise that four months later in Belgrade, at a press conference and

16     jointly with Milan Milutinovic, the Yugoslav foreign minister, we said

17     that all the refugees who were not responsible for grave violations of

18     international law may return and that private property is protected.

19        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Granic.

20             MR. WAESPI:  Mr. President, I'd like to tender this document.

21             MR. MIKULICIC:  No objections, Your Honour.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will become Exhibit P2670.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

25             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

Page 24918

 1        Q.   Dr. Granic, do you agree with me that if you make these public

 2     speeches or these negotiations with Mr. Milutinovic to press conferences,

 3     all these efforts on paper are worthless if President Tudjman and others

 4     around him publicly say that it would be impossible for the Serbs to

 5     return to the place where their families lived for centuries?

 6        A.   I want to avail myself of the opportunity to say in my answer the

 7     following:  President Tudjman was a historian and a statesman at the same

 8     time.  There is a clear distinction between the two personalities.  I

 9     know that best as his foreign minister and his close associate.

10             In all that I was doing, I had his support.  Without him, I would

11     not have been able to do anything.

12             Tudjman the historian is something different.  He frequently

13     addressed the international community, from various ambassadors to

14     Presidents Clinton and Chirac, and presented his positions as an

15     historian concerning the relations between Croats and Serbs and

16     Bosnia-Herzegovina as well.  He said that to everyone who wanted to

17     listen.  However, Tudjman as a statesman was a pragmatic man who

18     throughout, until his illness, abided by the recommendations of the

19     international community.

20             MR. WAESPI:  Mr. President --

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi, this happens again and again that you

22     put a question which allows the witness to comment on matters which may

23     be slightly related but which are not a real answer to your question.

24     Why not ask the witness whether he's aware of such statements and then

25     ask him on the basis of those statements.  Then we know the context of

Page 24919

 1     the statements.  We know the exact text of the statements to the extent

 2     it is available, and then to ask whether this would or would not

 3     undermine any commitment on paper, because that's apparently what you

 4     would like to know.  And we now know that President Tudjman was an

 5     historian and statesman, but an answer to your question, we have not got.

 6             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you -- [overlapping speakers]

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Perhaps this is not the first that time this

 8     happens, not only yesterday, but today as well.  I think that it would be

 9     appropriate that if you ask whether something is a short period of time

10     or three months and you get a lengthy answer, that you'd guide the

11     witness to your question again and to ask him to respond to that question

12     again.

13             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Granic, could you please carefully listen to

15     what exactly Mr. Waespi is asking you and to start with -- with giving an

16     answer to that question.  And if Mr. Waespi wants to know more or

17     background, then of course he'll ask for more information.  If at the end

18     of your testimony you think that very important matters have not been

19     brought to our attention, you will have an opportunity to add whatever.

20     But at this moment I invite you to focus on the question when answering

21     it.

22             Please proceed.

23             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you for your guidance, Mr. President.

24        Q.   Occasionally, Mr. Granic, I try to lift my hand, but I will put

25     it on the record.

Page 24920

 1             MR. WAESPI:  Mr. President, can we move to 65 ter 7501, please.

 2        Q.   This is a press report that relates to an interview Mr. Tudjman

 3     gave to a German magazine called "FOCUS."  Do you know the German

 4     magazine "FOCUS"?  Did you read it at that time?

 5        A.   Yes.  I followed "FOCUS," among other publications.

 6        Q.   And it's dated 4th of September, 1995.  And if we go just to the

 7     last part, second page in English and second page in Croatian.  Last

 8     question.  The interviewer asks:

 9             "Can the 150.000 displaced Krajina Serbs go back home?"

10             "Tudjman:  If the Krajina Serbs wanted to stay home, they would

11     never have left in the first place.  The return of all of them is

12     virtually unthinkable."

13             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, if we could have the witness -- it's

14     not on the B/C/S side.  If he could be shown the B/C/S.

15             MR. WAESPI:  Yes, certainly.  I apologise.  I hadn't noticed

16     that.  Yes, we have it now.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  There it is.

18             MR. WAESPI:

19        Q.    "In any case, this does not lie in the interests of a

20     normalisation of Croatian-Serbian interests, but we will adhere to human

21     rights and permit the Krajina Serbs to return in individual cases."

22             Now, did you read this interview with Mr. Tudjman in "FOCUS" at

23     that time?

24        A.   No.  No, I did not discuss this interview, but I can comment

25     off-the-cuff.  These are Tudjman's historical estimates based on the

Page 24921

 1     amount of people who did not wish for a Croatian state, the amount of

 2     people who participated in the insurgency, and the number of people who

 3     had committed grave crimes, that it was unthinkable.  That's Tudjman's

 4     historical evaluation, which proved to be right to a great extent.

 5     However, Tudjman as a statesman and I as foreign minister worked

 6     exclusively on the basis of international law, international treaties,

 7     and everything that was needed to achieve the return of refugees.

 8        Q.   Dr. Granic, there is no qualification in President Tudjman's

 9     answer about war criminals.  The question of the interviewer was about

10     the 150.000 displaced Krajina Serbs.  And President Tudjman, whether as

11     an historian or statesman, publicly, in a German newspaper, said that:

12             "The return of all of them is virtually unthinkable.  In any

13     case, this does not lie in the interests of normalisation of Croatian

14     Serb interests."  That's what he said.

15             MR. MIKULICIC:  Sorry to interrupt.  Could we please place in

16     time that piece of document.

17             MR. WAESPI:  4th of September.

18             MR. MIKULICIC:  1995.

19             MR. WAESPI:  That's correct.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This period was a time when there

21     were still plans for an attack to be launched from the Federal Republic

22     of Yugoslavia against the Republic of Croatia.  It was a time when

23     terrorist groups that would come to Croatia were publicly mentioned, the

24     time when the so-called government in exile was established, and its goal

25     was to launch terrorist attacks.  So in other words, we should consider

Page 24922

 1     the period at which this was stated by President Tudjman.

 2             In my capacity as the foreign minister, as soon as the Erdut

 3     agreement was reached, I believed, and I received support from

 4     President Tudjman for that, that I should make efforts to have the Serbs

 5     who were refugees return to Croatia, and I really worked devotedly about

 6     that.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Granic, could I ask you one question.  You put

 8     this in the context of danger and attacks still to be considered.  Could

 9     you tell us where in the words reported to have been the words of

10     Mr. Tudjman any reference to this as a reason for at that moment not all

11     the Serbs returning is found?

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this is my

13     interpretation of Tudjman's statement.  He did not consult me, nor did I

14     consult him, nor did I read this statement at the time, but I know his

15     line of thinking at the time.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Granic, I asked you where in the text you find a

17     point of reference which would support this part of your interpretation

18     that it -- that this --

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have never read

20     this interview, so I cannot answer this question, except for the last

21     quotation.  I don't know.  I haven't read the interview.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  But in that last quotation, where do you find a

23     reference that Mr. Tudjman may have been hinting at the threat of an

24     imminent attack or terrorist activities which would temporarily --

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In this answer given by

Page 24923

 1     Mr. Tudjman, one cannot see that.  I do not see it here.  As I said, I

 2     explained the context of the period, but I don't see it here,

 3     Your Honour.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

 5             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Waespi.

 7             MR. WAESPI:  I'd like to tender this document.

 8             MR. MISETIC:  No objections, Your Honour.

 9             JUDE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit P2671.

11             MR. WAESPI:  I'd like to move to --

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Exhibit P2671 is admitted into evidence.

13             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I'd like to move on to

14     the next document which is 65 ter 7473.

15        Q.   And, Dr. Granic, that's a meeting between the president and the

16     prime minister Nikica Valentic, other people, on the 24th of April, 1998,

17     a meeting that you did not attend.  And I'll read a relevant part on

18     page 3 in English and page 5 in Croatian.  And the issue at stake between

19     President Tudjman and Mr. Valentic is an incident, a resent incident in

20     Bosnia where Serbs had prevented some Croats from attending mass, and

21     President Tudjman says:

22              "They attacked him, and they wouldn't allow the Croats attend

23     the mass ... therefore, I think that the developments in Bosnia are good

24     for us, because they will become aware how silly their request is that we

25     should have all Serbs return to Croatia.  How can you return all those

Page 24924

 1     Serbs to Croatia ..."

 2             Now, you weren't at the meeting.  Were you aware of comments to

 3     that nature President Tudjman said?

 4        A.   I'm not aware of this meeting.  I did not attend it, so it's very

 5     difficult for me to comment on it.  But I do know that

 6     Mr. Nikica Valentic was not the prime minister at the time.  He was prime

 7     minister until the month of August 1995, and at this point in time he was

 8     not the prime minister.  However, I do know that in the month of

 9     April 1998 there were big discussions about the plan and programme for

10     the return of refugees and that there were differences within the

11     Croatian government, not whether the return of the Serbs should be

12     allowed but whether this was the right time for their return.  There were

13     different opinions voiced, and at the cost of resigning my position in

14     the government, I requested from President Tudjman that he should support

15     the plan for the return of refugees, and President Tudjman finally did

16     support my position.  I believe that it was quite democratic to discuss.

17     There were various opinions voiced, but eventually I got the support of

18     President Tudjman for the plan for the return of refugees, and this was

19     probably part of the discussions about the return, but I am not aware of

20     this meeting.

21        Q.   But I suggest to you that this quote from President Tudjman in

22     explicit terms reveals what his true intentions were in relation to the

23     Serbs.  Do you agree with me?

24        A.   I talked with the president on many occasions.  He believed that

25     a return en masse would not happen because many Serbs - and time proved

Page 24925

 1     him to be right - did not wish to recognise Croatia as their state.  That

 2     was what Tudjman believed as an historian, and he often repeated that.

 3     However, Tudjman as the statesman, and that was most important, supported

 4     all the plans that I have talked about, let me not mention them again,

 5     and this is a historical fact.

 6        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Granic.

 7             MR. WAESPI:  Mr. President, I'd like to tender this document.

 8             MR. MIKULICIC:  No objections.

 9             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I have an objection.  The objection

10     is before we put it into evidence, we get these transcripts and what

11     somebody said at a private meeting.  But I believe the burden is on the

12     Prosecution to tie the transcript to some act of the government or some

13     policy or something on the ground.  That's their 90(H) obligation.  And

14     if that's case, then let's put it to a witness who is clearly -- here has

15     relevant information and knowledge, but we're not talking -- we're not

16     trying people for, you know, what somebody said in a private meeting,

17     but, rather, for something concrete, and I believe they have a burden to

18     now tie this to something to show that the policies that the witness has

19     testified about in fact were not implemented or other policies were

20     implemented or ...

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi.

22             MR. WAESPI:  Mr. President, the witness here came to testify and

23     did testify about these plans to allow the return, about the will of the

24     Croatian government, about the meetings they had the international --

25     internationals.  And it's the position of the Prosecution that it is only

Page 24926

 1     on paper that there was no will from the Croatian government to

 2     implement, to invite the Serbs back, and this goes to support this

 3     opinion.

 4                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Objection is denied.  Please proceed, Mr. Waespi.

 6             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I'd like to tender the

 7     document.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will become Exhibit P2672.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  P2672 is admitted into evidence.

11             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

12        Q.   Now, you, Dr. Granic, had, as early as September 1995, some

13     doubts about the return of the Serbs as well.  And I'd like to show you a

14     document that's already in evidence.  That's P2540, a meeting of

15     9 September 1995.  And I'm interested in English page 11 and Croatian

16     page 27.  And the context is that you, Dr. Granic, and Mr. Zuzul talked

17     to the president about Mr. Bildt and discussed, you know, his

18     relationships with the Serbs and others, and you also discuss

19     international media.  And then you say as follows:

20             "That's right --" in the middle of the English -- "I have used

21     the opportunity to explain one thing more.  The Figaro and La Croix and

22     everyone was there about the question of Serbs and their departure, that

23     in this respect it's not realistic to expect those participating in

24     fighting to return.  They cannot return.  They won't return.  Their

25     families, they do not want to return.  Besides, Martic has announced a

Page 24927

 1     guerilla warfare to at least 50 years.  We must consider it.  Therefore

 2     we cannot have this factor of instability again.  I wish to say that it

 3     is possible to use our brains in defending our standpoint."

 4             Now, do you remember having made this comment to the president in

 5     September 1995?

 6        A.   Yes, and it is very logical.  It is completely correct.  At the

 7     time when Martic announced that there would be guerilla warfare for

 8     another 50 years, those people who had killed 14.000 people and wounded

 9     36.000 and who had taken part in the fighting, I said that it was not

10     realistic that all of them would return, and I think that this was a

11     quite logical statement from my part, and I think that I also this in

12     public to the media in the same period.  So put it precisely.  Those who

13     had participated in the fighting, it is not realistic that all of them

14     should return.  And this was precisely what was going on.

15     President Tudjman and the Croatian parliament adopted the law on amnesty

16     and abolition, but it was logical that it was not realistic that all such

17     people should return, and I do not see anything in this that is

18     incorrect.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Granic, I noticed that after 80 per cent of your

20     answers you're seeking eye contact with the accused.  That is not common

21     for a witness to do, and I would certainly not encourage you to continue

22     to do that.

23             Please proceed, Mr. Waespi.

24             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

25        Q.   I'd like to move on to 65 ter 7471, and this is a meeting of

Page 24928

 1     11 August 1995, in which, Dr. Granic, you were present, and you were

 2     discussing the upcoming election.

 3             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, before we move on to another

 4     transcript, is there a point that the Prosecution wishes to put to the

 5     witness about the last passage?  He just was asked, did you say this?

 6     And then we don't have the Prosecution putting its case, whatever the

 7     case was, on the excerpt.  What's the point?

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  He asked an explanation.  Apparently Mr. Waespi is

 9     exploring the attitude of political leaders during this period of time,

10     that is, from before, but mainly after Operation Storm on their attitude

11     to Serbs remaining, and if they have not remained on the territory of the

12     former RSK, what efforts were made to make them return in view of the

13     claims that they were welcome to remain living there, that they should

14     not leave.  And as a consequence he's exploring the -- I would say the --

15     to what extent these were expressions of what really was on the mind of

16     those who spoke these words.  That's what Mr. Waespi is exploring, and --

17             MR. WAESPI:  That's correct, Mr. President, and -- and I outlined

18     what other people said, and I went on to say that the witness himself had

19     doubts about that.  And there's a lot of cover, Mr. President, and I

20     would really like to move on and not be interrupted by Mr. Misetic.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic, you asked a question more or less,

22     rather than raising an objection.  If you want to raise an objection --

23             MR. MISETIC:  It is an objection, Mr. President.  It's an

24     objection that we're moving through this case without the Prosecution

25     putting its case to the witness.  While I understand your comment,

Page 24929

 1     Mr. President, I didn't understand that that's the case of the

 2     Prosecution.  So hence the confusion that you're understanding one thing;

 3     I believe Mr. Waespi is attempting to put something else.  I certainly

 4     didn't understand that the issue is -- concerns the Serbs who remained in

 5     Croatia, as you've put it, but, rather, the issue was the return of those

 6     who left.  And all of this is precisely the reason why I believe the

 7     Prosecution should put to a witness what their case is and not leave it

 8     open to interpretation.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I did not consider exploring these -- this

10     attitude as being -- as being -- I did understand it as being a factual

11     element in the case that is put by the Prosecution.  But, Mr. Waespi, it

12     wouldn't damage - I would say, it would perhaps even be good - if you

13     explain to the witness what your case in this respect is to the extent it

14     is not yet clear to him.

15             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

16        Q.   Dr. Granic, I put to you that there was no will by the Croatian

17     government to get the Serbs who had left for whatever reason in the

18     aftermath of Operation Storm back, and you were among these people who

19     had serious doubts about whether it would be realistic to invite the

20     Serbs back.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi, now what is the Prosecution's case

22     exactly in this respect?  I can imagine that -- and as I said before,

23     that the fact you're exploring may shed some additional light on -- but

24     isn't it true that it's the case of the Prosecution that Operation Storm

25     was an instrument to expel the Serbs rather than -- and that an

Page 24930

 1     obstruction for their return may have some meaning in this context, but

 2     these accused are not charged with obstructing the return, but, rather,

 3     they're charged or they are accused of joining in an exercise to drive

 4     them out.

 5             MR. WAESPI:  This is correct.  It shows the intent.  It

 6     corroborative of the element of intent, that we say they expelled the

 7     Serbs, and we have discussed that yesterday about this international

 8     reactions, again the corroboration, and this shows that the Serbs didn't

 9     leave on their own, and now the Croatian government makes all these

10     efforts to invite them back.  It shows the intent of what was in the mind

11     of the JCE members before Operation Storm was launched.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  You would say the events after they left which are

13     indicative for -- the attitude of the political, military, and other

14     leaders is indicative for what they had on their minds during

15     Operation Storm when Serbs left, and as the Prosecution puts it, that

16     they were -- through Operation Storm they were forced to leave.

17             MR. WAESPI:  Yes.  In particular since the defence is that there

18     was no JCE because the Croatian government, you know, made all these

19     appeals, come back, all these programmes, and we say this is just not the

20     reality.  That's the Prosecution's case.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

22             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I was actually going to raise then

23     the objection.  I'm glad that's on the record, but now given that

24     Mr. Waespi has put Mr. Granic's comments in the context of the mens rea

25     overall of a JCE, that must mean that he considers that Mr. Granic was

Page 24931

 1     part of it.  Given that the comment now is indicative of intent or

 2     mens rea of before and during Operation Storm, we have not yet heard the

 3     case put to this witness about the existence of a JCE before or during

 4     Operation Storm and what he knows about it.  And I was going to raise the

 5     issue at the break that under 90(H) he has now put him in the JCE.  He

 6     needs to put his case to him about that.

 7                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Whatever you may submit at this moment the Chamber

 9     does not see that Mr. Waespi is under an obligation to further put or to

10     put in further detail its case in relation to the testimony of this

11     witness and this witness.  Please proceed.

12             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

13        Q.   Let me move on to the next exhibit, I'm not sure I announced it

14     yet, 65 ter 7471, a meeting - I think I might have discussed that -

15     involving the upcoming elections.  And this is on page 14 in English and

16     page 64 in B/C/S.

17             The president says as follows:

18             "Moving on to item 3.  The Presidency of the Croatian Democratic

19     Union as the majority party has issued a decision to call an election in

20     the autumn.  In this connection all the necessary legal preparations need

21     to be put in place, and one of the important decisions is to prepare a

22     list of members of national minorities - not only Serbs, but all the

23     national minorities - in these parts."

24             Ivan Milas:

25             "Establishing the number, that is a better way of putting it."

Page 24932

 1             President:

 2             "Yes, establishing the number, yes."  Then in brackets:  "(In

 3     order to protect the rights)(laughter)."

 4             Now, Mr. Granic, do you remember having attended this meeting?

 5        A.   I certainly attended it, it's visible in the minutes.

 6        Q.   Do you remember the laughter after the protection of the rights

 7     of the Serbs and all the national minorities were discussed?

 8        A.   I do not remember the details, but I'm not surprised.  It is

 9     certain that at the meetings of the VONS -- and I said also when the

10     issue how to protect the property was discussed, there were unacceptable

11     ideas voiced, the less acceptable ones and more acceptable ones.  So not

12     everything that was said at the VONS meetings is wholly writ, nor were

13     all the people who discuss this thinking the same about the strategic

14     interests of Croatia.  But we have to emphasise what the point in time

15     was.  It was the period immediately following the conclusion of the

16     Operation Storm.  It was a moment at which it was very probable and

17     possible that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would launch an attack

18     against Croatia.  It was also a point in time when there was absolutely

19     no chance at that moment that someone would return in an organised

20     manner.  So at that point in time when the president made the decision to

21     slate the elections, a comment like this was also made.  In my view this

22     comment was certainly inappropriate, and I do not support it.

23        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Granic.

24             MR. WAESPI:  Mr. President, I'd like to tender this document.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  No objections.

Page 24933

 1             Therefore, Mr. Registrar.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit 2673.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  P2673 is admitted into evidence.

 4             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 5             I would like to move to a meeting between President Tudjman and

 6     Croatian ambassadors of the 18th August 1995, and this is 65 ter 4103.

 7        Q.   Now, discussed here are, among other things, public and

 8     international media perception of Operation Storm and its aftermath.

 9             Now, Mr. Granic, I don't see a reference, although there is one,

10     actually, later in the document.  Do you remember having been present?

11        A.   You should show that to me so I could see it.  It says here that

12     I attended it so I probably did.  But I was a foreign minister for seven

13     years and another two and a half years under a different president, so a

14     total of more than nine years, and I attended numerous meetings.  I see

15     my name here at the beginning, so it's certain that I was there.

16        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Granic.  Let's move to page 30, and in English and

17     in Croatian it's page 52 out of 58.

18             Now, President Tudjman says, and the sentence starts in English

19     at the end of page 29 in English:

20              "But in practice the essence of the problem is that it would be

21     normal that Banja Luka belongs to the west part, and Tuzla to the east.

22     And then the problem would be resolved, because it's not the issue of a

23     demarcation between Croatia and Serbia, but between the west and Russia.

24     And Russia openly wants to expand to the west as much as possible.  It's

25     not only unpleasant for Croatia to have Serbs in Banja Luka and on the

Page 24934

 1     west like we have them within 30 kilometres of Zagreb, but it's

 2     unpleasant for the west as well."

 3             Do you remember this quote by President Tudjman to the Croatian

 4     ambassadors?

 5        A.   I do.

 6        Q.   Do you think that's an appropriate comment from the head of state

 7     about a minority in one's own country to call them -- to have --

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. --

 9             MR. MISETIC:  We can't get the B/C/S screen -- I think the

10     transcript should be shown to him in the original.

11             MR. WAESPI:  Yes, certainly.  It's page 57 out of 58.  Yes.

12     That's the correct page.

13             MR. MISETIC:  I don't see the words "Banja Luka" on this page.

14             MR. WAESPI:  Sorry, 52.  I misspoke.  52 in Croatian.  Yes.  The

15     comment starts at the very bottom "Prema tome."

16        Q.   So please read these first three lines, and then we move on to

17     the second page in Croatian.  Go to the next page.

18        A.   I cannot really see the page.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  I think we're now at the top of this page where it

20     continues.

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I comment now?  It's true that

22     President Tudjman as a historian had certain thoughts about the strategic

23     interests of both the east and the west, but I must stress that as the

24     foreign minister, I was the main negotiator on behalf of Croatia with the

25     US in Washington Agreement and the Split Declaration and Vienna Accords.

Page 24935

 1     And in all these talks, Croatia was the most constructive player and

 2     partner for the west in stopping the war and achieving peace, and

 3     President Tudjman supported me in this all the way.

 4             MR. WAESPI:

 5        Q.   Yes.  I'm not going into that.  My question was related to this

 6     comment of the head of State of Croatia talking to his ambassadors,

 7     ambassadors to the world, including you, saying that:

 8             "It's not only unpleasant for Croatia to have Serbs in Banja Luka

 9     and on the west like we had them within 30 kilometres from Zagreb, but

10     it's unpleasant for the west as well."

11             Do you think that's an appropriate comment?

12        A.   It's a comment of President Tudjman, but you must bear in mind,

13     sir, the time when it was made, the brutal war, the crimes committed in

14     Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and you must realise that at this

15     time horrible crimes were still happening, and the horrible aggression of

16     Milosevic, Karadzic, and Mladic was ongoing.  Tudjman is talking within

17     that context.  It was not peacetime.  It was still the time of a brutal

18     war.

19        Q.   Dr. Granic, you were actually in cold sweat when you were

20     listening to the speech President Tudjman gave in Karlovac when he told

21     the Serbs who do not accept the Croatian state not to come back anymore.

22     Isn't that correct?  That's what you said in your book.

23        A.   That's correct.  At that time, I was the foreign minister, and my

24     entire thinking was primarily about Croatia's relations with the world.

25     President Tudjman was head of state.  That's when he started his

Page 24936

 1     electoral campaign, and he put it very precisely:  Those who do not

 2     accept the Croatian state.  And he also said that there were torchings

 3     and crimes on our part that must stop.

 4             In that case it was not convenient for me as the foreign minister

 5     that he should speak about Serbs at all, except to say that we need to

 6     prevent crimes after Operation Storm.  However, Tudjman must have been

 7     talking, carried away by the realisation that approximately 90 per cent

 8     of the population of Croatia was thinking along the same lines, that

 9     around 30.000 people in split were appealing to him to resolve the

10     problem of Vukovar, which he promised he would do in a peaceful way.  But

11     certainly I as the foreign minister was thinking more about international

12     talks.  And for me diplomacy was the highest priority, and that meant

13     that not one more word must be said that could offend our friends in the

14     world.

15             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness repeat the last thing he

16     said.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Granic, you're invited to repeat the last words

18     you said.  I read to you what is now at the transcript:

19              "... and that meant that not one more word must be said that

20     could offend our friends in the world."

21             What did you say following the phrase I just read?

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] After that I said those who were

23     the target of Tudjman's message, namely Serbs who did not accept Croatia

24     as a state, did not really care at all about whatever Tudjman may say.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Waespi.

Page 24937

 1             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 2        Q.   So are you saying that you were sweating cold because of the

 3     image of Croatia that could be tarnished by the comments of

 4     President Tudjman?  You did not care about, you know, how the Serbs who

 5     might be listening - after all, they were also addressed - to this speech

 6     by President Tudjman, about how would feel about their head of state

 7     talking about them?

 8        A.   Sir, I devoted a number of years of my life to accommodating

 9     displaced persons, refugees, and the return of the Serbs.  And at least

10     twice in my career I risked my entire career because I fought for the

11     return of the Serbs, and I offered my resignation even to

12     President Tudjman for the sake of this.  I wanted every person who was

13     exiled from Croatia to return, but of their own free will, which is the

14     fundamental principle of the UNHCR.  Refugees must be returning of their

15     own free will.  I'm the last person whom you can accuse of not caring.  I

16     cared.  I cared for every individual Serb to return, everyone who wanted

17     to, and I said many times.  All of these are historical documents from

18     the Dayton Accords and the talks on the normalisation of relations, and,

19     finally, the plan for return of refugees.  I succeeded.  And finally

20     every Serb was enabled to come back to Croatia, everyone has guarantees

21     for their own private property, and I can say that I did succeed in the

22     end.

23        Q.   Actually, I wasn't asking about your concerns, but let's move

24     on --

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi, if you ask the witness whether he had --

Page 24938

 1     was in cold sweat because he didn't care, you are asking him about his

 2     feelings at that moment, and then if he explains that, you can't say, "I

 3     wasn't asking about your concerns," because you were.

 4             MR. WAESPI:  I apologise, Mr. President.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

 6        Q.   Let's go to the next issue.  This is Grubori.  You were, I

 7     believe, asked in chief already about the incident of Grubori, and we

 8     have now D1812 in evidence, which you have been shown by Mr. Misetic.  If

 9     we could call D1812, please.

10             MR. MIKULICIC:  Sorry to interrupt, Your Honour.  If I remember

11     well, my examination-in-chief has never touched the issue of Grubori.

12             MR. WAESPI:  Yes.  I apologise as well for Mr. Misetic who showed

13     the document to the witness.  It's -- it was 65 ter 7486, and I believe

14     it's now D1812.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic.

16             MR. MISETIC:  This is not the document, I don't believe, that

17     Mr. Waespi's looking for.

18             MR. WAESPI:  Yes, that's correct.  Perhaps let's focus on

19     65 ter 7486.  And hopefully we have a B/C/S translation.  Otherwise, I'll

20     read briefly the key issues.  This is an Associated Press document.

21     Date's 28 August 1995.  Location, Zagreb.

22              "The new footage taken by the UN in southern Croatia shows Serb

23     houses in flames and two Serb civilians slain in their homes."

24             Then the village of Grubori is mentioned.  Then we have a

25     Mr. Flynn saying that almost every structure in this hillside village is

Page 24939

 1     in flames.  And then we come to you, Dr. Granic:

 2              "Following a meeting with European union diplomats on Monday,

 3     Croatian foreign minister Mate Granic called the incidents isolated

 4     events which express the frustrations of people whose property was

 5     entirely destroyed.

 6              "Granic told diplomats that the government shortly would issue

 7     precise data related to Croatia's four-day blitz offensive to retake most

 8     rebel-held land."

 9             Now, do you remember the incident of Grubori and that you made a

10     comment stated or picked up a Associated President.

11             MR. KUZMANOVIC:  Your Honour, I'm going to object to that.  It

12     was established yesterday that the comment was unrelated to Grubori, and

13     I think it's misleading to present this witness as stating that this

14     comment was related to Grubori.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi --

16             MR. WAESPI:  I'm fine to ask him --

17             JUDGE ORIE:  -- we have two -- Mr. Granic is reported and

18     questions were put to him to put clearly, and, of course, to put Grubori

19     in the context of a four-day blitz offensive needs at least further

20     explanation.

21             MR. WAESPI:  I can ask the witness directly.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, but let's not repeat any questioning that has

23     occurred already at an earlier stage of his testimony.

24             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

25             If we could move to P602, please.  P602 should be a letter by

Page 24940

 1     Elizabeth Rehn to Dr. Granic.  If we could move on to the next page,

 2     please.  Yes.  That's the letter I'm interested in.

 3        Q.   Dr. Granic, this is a letter from Elizabeth Rehn the Special

 4     Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, and it goes to you.  And

 5     she talks about the Grubori case.

 6             MR. WAESPI:  Perhaps if we could move to the second page in

 7     Croatian as well.  If there is one.  Yes.  Here we have it.

 8        Q.   Now, Mr. Granic, do you remember having received a letter from

 9     Elizabeth Rehn in relation to the Grubori events?

10        A.   Yes, I do.

11        Q.   Now, this letter is fairly detailed, if you recall the letter or

12     you can briefly go through it.  It discussed --

13        A.   I've been through it.

14        Q.   It discusses the number of civilians killed, states that the

15     entire hamlet was set ablaze, discusses the fact that a group of Special

16     Police had been observed, the time of the incident, registration plate

17     numbers, and Ms. Rehn is requesting information in paragraph 2 on page 2

18     of the actual letter.  And in Croatian it's also the next page.

19             Ms. Rehn asks:

20             "Will you please let me know the identities of the persons who

21     used these vehicles?"

22             And Ms. Rehn asks other questions in this respect.

23             Now, I take it you remember that you did respond to Ms. Rehn's

24     letter.  Do you remember that?

25        A.   I do.  When I received that letter I talked to my associates, and

Page 24941

 1     I asked the chief of the section for human rights in my department to ask

 2     for an official report from the Ministry of the Interior.  I had heard

 3     before that that a incident had occurred in Grubori, but in the Croatian

 4     press it was described as a clash with terrorists.  So until I received

 5     the letter from Elizabeth Rehn, not much attention was given to it.  So I

 6     asked for an official report, and based on that official report I

 7     answered the letter pursuant to the official information provided by the

 8     Interior Ministry.

 9        Q.   So by the moment you received the letter 27 February 1996, not

10     much attention was placed on it, despite the fact that there were public

11     international media report about that as early as late August 1995.

12        A.   First and foremost, I was foreign minister.  I dealt with the

13     most important talks about war and peace, both on Bosnia and Herzegovina

14     on the process of peaceful reintegration, or normalising relations with

15     Belgrade, negotiations with Slovenia, and many other things.

16             The letter was addressed to me as foreign minister, although we

17     had a vice-president for humanitarian issues.  I answered courteously

18     based on official reports that I received from the interior ministry,

19     although it was not my area of competence.

20        Q.   Let's look at your response to Elizabeth Rehn, which is a Defence

21     exhibit -- Defence document 3D00532, and it's a letter dated 26th of

22     June, 1996.  So a few months after the letter you received from

23     Elizabeth Rehn.  And I take it you read English, Dr. Granic.

24        A.   It's all right.

25        Q.   Now here you inform Elizabeth Rehn that:

Page 24942

 1             "Regretfully the investigation of this serious crime has not

 2     yielded any results, but efforts are made to identify the perpetrators.

 3     As soon as any results are available, I will inform you of that."

 4             Now, did you ever get back to Ms. Rehn about Grubori, about any

 5     new results you might have been informed about?

 6        A.   I don't remember.  I was in touch with her several times, but I

 7     don't remember if we discussed Grubori again.  I received Mrs. Rehn as

 8     the foreign minister, and we co-operated very well, but humanitarian

 9     issues were not my area of work apart from the fact that as foreign

10     minister I led negotiations with Belgrade and negotiations about the

11     modalities of the return of refugees, but I was not in charge of

12     humanitarian issues or investigations.

13        Q.   But do you agree with me that the letter of Elizabeth Rehn we

14     have seen a moment ago was really detailed and should have allowed you --

15     not you as a person, but the Croatian authorities, judicial authorities,

16     to pick that up and do a serious investigation?

17        A.   I agree that these reports whether they are completely accurate

18     or not should have been enough to start a serious investigation.  I agree

19     with that.

20        Q.   Would there be an example of what you said yesterday, that the

21     German -- the Croatian judiciary didn't show enough perseverance in

22     addressing the crimes in the aftermath of Operation Storm?

23        A.   Personally I was advocated a greater degree of firmness.  For

24     instance, when we received reports about Varivode which was a clear case

25     of crime, we discussed it immediately at a cabinet session.  I personally

Page 24943

 1     believe that every case needs to be investigated through and through and

 2     perpetrators found, and that it was very important for moral reasons,

 3     that it was important for Croatia and for her future.

 4             MR. WAESPI:  I'd like to tender the response of Dr. Granic.

 5             MR. MIKULICIC:  No objections, Your Honour.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit P2674.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  P2674 is admitted into evidence.

 9             Mr. Waespi, I'm looking at the clock.

10             MR. WAESPI:  Yes, it's a good moment.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

12             MR. WAESPI:  I finished the Grubori incident.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Let me inquire whether you still -- whether you're

14     still confident that you'll conclude your cross-examination in the next

15     session.

16             MR. WAESPI:  Yes, I am.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  You are.

18             Then I'm looking at the other parties.  As matters stand now, how

19     much time would be needed for re-examination, Mr. Mikulicic?

20             MR. MIKULICIC:  Your Honour, as matter stands now, I will need

21     20 minutes.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

23             MR. MIKULICIC:  At least half an hour -- at most half an hour,

24     sorry.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

Page 24944

 1             I'm looking at the other parties.

 2             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I was going to ask for 15 minutes,

 3     but I'll work with Mr. Mikulicic to make sure we can finish today.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  We'll have a break, and we'll resume at five

 5     minutes to 11.00.

 6                           --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

 7                           --- On resuming at 11.14 a.m.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi, I'm regretting now that I asked before

 9     the break whether you were confident that you could finish within the

10     next session.

11             Mr. Granic, you know that the breaks and the pauses and meeting

12     are often busier than the meetings themselves.  Urgent Tribunal matters

13     kept me out up to the point where even the other Judges were considering

14     to sit under Rule 15 bis, but let's get started.

15             Please proceed.

16             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you.  I think I'll be done in half an hour or

17     so.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  Please proceed.

19             MR. WAESPI:  First of all would I like to tender the document we

20     discussed before the break which is 65 ter 4103 that related to the

21     meeting on the 18th August 1995.

22             MR. MISETIC:  No objections, Your Honour.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit P2675.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  P2675 is admitted into evidence.

Page 24945

 1             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I would also like to at

 2     this point to tender the excerpt from Dr. Granic's book which was -- I

 3     think it received an exhibit number.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  It was MFI'd.  And if any of the other parties would

 5     like to add any portion selected by them, we'd hear from them.  That's

 6     the present situation.

 7             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 8        Q.   Before I continue, Dr. Granic, before testifying here in

 9     The Hague, did you have a meeting -- did you talk to members of the

10     Gotovina Defence?

11        A.   Before I came here I talked to them while I was in Zagreb when I

12     gave my statement and when we were making arrangements.  And when we

13     received the materials as the Bench instructed me, that was when I talked

14     to them.

15        Q.   Yes.  I was interested in the Gotovina Defence, the Defence --

16     members of the Defence team of Mr. Gotovina, for instance Mr. Misetic or

17     Mr. Kehoe or some other members of the Gotovina Defence team.  Did you

18     talk to them?

19        A.   I talked with members of -- Mr. Mikulicic, Mr. Rendulic, and

20     Mr. Tom Kuzmanovic.

21        Q.   So you did not talk to members of the Gotovina Defence.

22        A.   [No interpretation]

23        Q.   Thank you, Witness.

24             I'd like to go --

25        A.   No.

Page 24946

 1        Q.   -- to an issue you discussed with Mr. Misetic about the refugees

 2     and the speech by Ms. Ogata.  Let me first show you 65 ter 7508, which is

 3     an Agence France Presse report dated 26 September 1995, and it discusses

 4     the joint Croatian-Bosnian plan to second tens of thousands of Bosnian

 5     refugees in Croatia back to occupy land recently concurred from the

 6     Bosnian Serbs.  And it apparently has upset humanitarian agencies.  The

 7     UN officials were, and I quote, "Extremely concerned at the prospect of a

 8     mass repatriation of refugees given the unstable situation in Bosnia."

 9     And there's a comment by the UNHCR as well.

10             Now, where you aware that there was these concerns by

11     international organisations with Croatia forcing Bosnian refugees back

12     into Bosnia?

13        A.   I am aware of this, after the Operation Storm and after the

14     signing of the agreement, or to put it more precisely, after the

15     Washington Agreement was signed there was some discussion to the effect

16     that the Croats and the Bosniaks return to the area that were safe.  I

17     know that the international community was actively involved in this and

18     wished that the return not be fast, but that it should proceed strictly

19     according to the plan.  I know that there were some difficulties, and

20     personally I was in favour and I supported the positions of the

21     international community.

22        Q.   And that relates to Bosnia.

23        A.   Yes, correct.  It was the return of the Croats and the Bosniaks

24     to the territories within the federation that were safe.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 24947

 1             MR. WAESPI:  I'd like to tender this document, Mr. President.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  No objections.

 3             Mr. Registrar.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit P2676.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

 6             MR. WAESPI:

 7        Q.   Now if we could have D690, and that's the speech of Ms. Ogata you

 8     were shown yesterday.  And I'm sure you recall our discussion about that

 9     or your discussion with Mr. Misetic yesterday.

10             Now, on page 2 of that document we have the heading of

11     "Refoulement."  Here Ms. Ogata reports the following:

12              "In the past two months, more than 3.000 Bosnian and Muslim

13     refugees have been forcibly returned from Croatia to towns in Western

14     Bosnia and Herzegovina recently captured by Croat and Muslim forces such

15     as Glamoc, Bihac, Velika Kladusa, Bosanski Petrovac, and Kluj.  Some of

16     these areas are close to front lines and are believed to be heavily

17     mined.

18             The next paragraph:

19             "Moreover, recently the government of Croatia has decided to

20     revoke the status of refugees originating from federation -- the

21     federation and newly captured territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina as

22     part of a plan to begin returning them home."

23             Now, would you agree with me what Ms. Ogata is discussing here

24     are the so-called mass repatriations in Bosnia discussed in the article

25     which we saw a moment ago?

Page 24948

 1        A.   I know precisely what issue this was and what this was all about

 2     so that I can answer all your questions relating to this.

 3        Q.   Yes.  I'll just move on asking -- quoting a couple of parts from

 4     the Ogata speech.  But my question to you right now is:  What Ms. Ogata's

 5     talking about here is the same issue we have seen in the media article

 6     just a moment ago?

 7        A.   Yes.  More or less it is the same issue.

 8        Q.   Now, Ms. Ogata went on to say:

 9             "I fully appreciate that the more than 200.000 Bosnian refugees

10     in Croatia represent a great burden on the country's resources.  However,

11     I also strongly believe that repatriating large numbers of them at this

12     time, when neither a comprehensive peace has been achieved, nor

13     rehabilitation work has yet begun, would be premature.  The refugees have

14     already suffered enough in exile.  Let us not compound their plight by

15     returning them to an area which is neither safe nor ready to receive

16     them."

17             Would you agree that this reflects a concern about Bosnia and

18     that the numbers are too high?

19        A.   After the Washington Agreement, the government of Bosnia and

20     Herzegovina and of the Federation wished that the return of refugees

21     should begin as soon as possible, and in particular the Bosniaks were

22     very sensitive, and they wanted the Bosniaks from Croatia not to leave to

23     third countries, and the plans were made at the appeal and at the request

24     of the government of the Federation for them to return as soon as

25     possible.  However, then as we can see, Ms. Ogata and the high

Page 24949

 1     commissariat intervened and they requested that the rules of return be

 2     strictly adhered to, and that meant that there could be no quick return

 3     until all the conditions had been met and the security was complete.

 4             Personally, I supported Ms. Ogata's position.  The plans were

 5     made, and this position was fully taken into account, the position

 6     expressed here by Ms. Ogata.

 7        Q.   And one of the concerns she had is that to a certain extent the

 8     conflict in Bosnia was still ongoing.  That's why it was unsafe to send

 9     large numbers of refugees into Bosnia.  Is that correct?

10        A.   In the areas where the refugees were supposed to return there was

11     no fighting any more, but it is a fact that a great part of Bosnia was

12     occupied and that according to the assessment of Ms. Ogata there was

13     still no conditions for all these refugees to return.  Personally, I

14     think that this was correct, and I supported this position.

15        Q.   Now let's go to page 4 of the document, speech by Ms. Ogata in

16     English, and I think Mr. Misetic drew your attention to that section

17     where Ms. Ogata discusses three phases of refugee repatriation.  And this

18     is in the third paragraph on this page which starts with "Secondly."

19        A.   Mm-hmm.

20        Q.   And I read the last one or two sentences of that paragraph that

21     starts with "Secondly."

22             "Returning large numbers of refugees to areas which are not yet

23     ready to receive them can have very serious consequences not only for the

24     refugees themselves but for the stability in the area concerned.  I am

25     thinking particularly of the still fragile situation ... of the

Page 24950

 1     Federation."

 2             Now, what Ms. Ogata is talking about is -- the Federation is

 3     Bosnia; is that correct?

 4        A.   Yes, that is correct.

 5        Q.   And that's what she was discussing in the first part of the

 6     document when we looked at these comments about Velika Kladusa,

 7     Bosanski Petrovac, and so on; is that correct?

 8        A.   The Bosanski Kladusa issue is completely different, and she

 9     described it very nicely, so I would ask you to say a bit more about

10     this.  This 100.000 people related to other areas within Bosnia and

11     Herzegovina, their return, I mean, and the problem of Kladusa was

12     separate.

13             The issue about Kladusa was that Mr. Abdic's forces fought, these

14     were the forces of Bosniaks headed by Mr. Abdic, against the 5th Corps of

15     the BH army, that is to say the official government of

16     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And after the conclusion of the operations in which

17     Croatia supported the official government of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

18     these refugees fled before the 5th Corps into Croatia.  So they just

19     crossed the border into Croatia.  And practically on one side we had the

20     request of the official government of Bosnia-Herzegovina that they

21     returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on the other hand there was the

22     wish of these people who were still under great influence of Mr. Abdic

23     that they remain in Croatia and not return because they didn't feel safe.

24     So we were under pressure of the official government of Bosnia and

25     Herzegovina, and eventually we decided to listen to the advice of

Page 24951

 1     Ms. Ogata.  Germany also provided some assistance, and at that time they

 2     remained in Croatia.

 3        Q.   Yes.  Thank you.  The only issue I was interested in was whether

 4     in your understanding Ms. Ogata was talking about events, the stability

 5     of the area in -- in Bosnia and not elsewhere.

 6        A.   Yes.  She was thinking about stability in Bosnia, in the area

 7     around Bihac, because the 5th Corps of the BH Army had won, and she had

 8     justified fears that there might be retaliation.

 9        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Granic.  Let me turn to my last issue, and that's

10     something you have discussed yesterday.

11             You told us yesterday -- you remember when we were exploring your

12     knowledge about events, especially about when you heard for the first

13     time about crimes, torching, looting, killings, committed by members of

14     the Croatian Army.  You remember that discussion?

15        A.   Yes, I remember everything I said yesterday.

16        Q.   Now, you said, and I quote you from yesterday's transcript --

17     unfortunately, I don't have the comprehensive numbering -- at pages 127,

18     128:

19              "The first information I got as far as torching and looting is

20     concerned that they," members of the Croatian Army, "were involved I

21     began to receive sometime in September.  I don't know exactly when.  We

22     had what we call rumours.  Rumours began to reach me that there was

23     involvement in individual cases of the army too."

24             Now, let me show you a couple of documents.  The first one is

25     P2159, and this is a -- the witness statement which evidence of

Page 24952

 1     Mr. Lausic.  In e-court it's paragraph 45, in English.  And I can already

 2     read the last sentence of paragraph 212, and this discusses knowledge of

 3     the Croatian leadership, about crimes.  The last sentence in paragraph

 4     212:

 5              "I can say with certainty that the highest level of the military

 6     and state were informed on a daily basis of all the cases of crimes

 7     committed and military indiscipline for the entire territory of the

 8     Republic of Croatia."

 9             That's the first quote.  Let me move to D49.  And D49,

10     Dr. Granic, is a very urgent report from Josko Moric to police

11     administrations all over that area, Dalmacija.  18 August 1995.  Now,

12     here's what Mr. Moric says:

13              "Written and oral reports by police stations and police

14     administrations show that there are daily cases of torching of houses and

15     illegal taking away of people's movable property in areas liberated in

16     Operation Storm.

17              "Most of these acts are perpetrated by individuals wearing

18     Croatian Army uniforms.  The facts indicate that these individuals are,

19     formally and actually, members of the Croatian Army, but there are also

20     individuals who are not members of the Croatian Army but are wrongly

21     wearing Croatian Army uniforms."

22             This is 18th August, 1995.  It goes to the chief of police

23     administrations, crimes committed by members of the army.

24             And the last document is D506.  This is a document as early as

25     9 August 1995, and it comes from Mr. Lausic, and it's addressed to

Page 24953

 1     Mr. Susak, Defence Minister; Zvonimir Cervenko, chief of the

 2     General Staff; Miroslav Tudjman, the director of the Croatian

 3     intelligence service; and other people including Mr. Tolj [phoen].

 4             If we go to the second page, we see that Mr. Lausic reports that:

 5             "There are grave problems because of the large number of HV

 6     members in the settlements, and their commanders do not exert influence

 7     over them so that there are attempts at random plunder and burning of

 8     buildings."

 9             And then he proposes appropriate measures.

10             Now, you as the foreign minister selling the Croatian state of

11     affairs to the whole world, you were on the basis of rumours you say you

12     received in September that army members have been involved in these

13     crimes.  That's your basis despite the fact that it was well known within

14     the Croatian authorities, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence, that

15     almost from the outset members of the Croatian Army were involved in

16     crimes.  How do you explain that?

17        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, as you can see, none of these memos were

18     addressed to me.  At the time, according to the constitution, we had a

19     semi-presidential system in which I as the foreign minister reported to

20     the president of the country about diplomacy and foreign affairs.

21     Mr. Susak, as the defence minister, reported about Defence.  Mr. Jarnjak

22     as the interior minister reported about the internal affairs.  No one

23     meddled with anyone else's affairs.  This was not allowed.

24             I never received any memos either from the Ministry of Defence or

25     the Ministry of the Interior except for official discussions at

Page 24954

 1     government meetings and other official discussions at the meeting of the

 2     VONS, or if we requested official written reports about certain specific

 3     events.

 4             I have told this Tribunal that I was personally touched very much

 5     when I heard in late August that the scope of crimes which occurred in

 6     the ground was more widespread than I had known before that, thanks to

 7     what I had heard through official reports.  So this was the reason why I

 8     could not have received such information except if I had heard them

 9     officially expressed at the government meeting or at the meeting of the

10     council for national security.

11             And another thing, up until that time, around the month of

12     September, it was being talked about people in uniforms.  It was then

13     that I heard that some members of the army also participated in the

14     torching, looting, and everything else.

15        Q.   We heard yesterday from you, and it's part of your book, that you

16     had meetings with Mr. Susak, with Mr. Tudjman, Mr. Jarnjak, all these

17     people, throughout August, and they never informed you, despite fact that

18     you raised this issue with them, what information they had received from

19     the ground.

20        A.   Say it very precisely, Mr. Prosecutor.  It was a time when I met

21     Mr. Susak and Mr. Jarnjak at official meetings, because simply there was

22     too much work for me to hold any private meetings with them.  This just

23     didn't happen.  It was only at official meetings, and the only situation

24     when I requested to have a meeting with them was when I heard the

25     information from many sources, as I said yesterday, that the scope of the

Page 24955

 1     problems on the ground was much greater than I had been aware of

 2     previously.  That was when I requested to hold separate meetings with

 3     them.

 4        Q.   The question I was asking you is whether Mr. Susak, as an

 5     example, raised with you the information he received on 9th of August, in

 6     relation to the army committing crimes.  That should have been important

 7     information for you to receive when you talked to your interlocutors at

 8     the international level.

 9        A.   Before this Honourable Court I said very precisely yesterday, and

10     I wrote in my book exactly what I heard.

11        Q.   Is it possible then that you were completely out of tune of what

12     was happening, that people did not inform you of what they heard or saw

13     or were informed about what was happening, really happening, on the

14     ground?

15        A.   I have to repeat once again.  I told what I had heard and what I

16     knew, but now I'm saying with hindsight that Minister Susak must have

17     believed he was capable of dealing with the problem himself on his own,

18     but that's what I'm -- what I can say only with hindsight.

19             You must remember that as the foreign minister I was simply

20     elsewhere every other day dealing with foreign affairs.  My primary job

21     was communication with the international community, continuing the US

22     peace initiative, opening talks with Belgrade.  The events following

23     Operation Storm and the crimes that occurred inflicted great damage to

24     all my efforts, that's certain.  As a human being, as the foreign

25     minister, as a diplomat, I was inflicted.  I was enraged over every

Page 24956

 1     torched house, over every murder.  I was deeply unhappy about all that.

 2     I was doing all I could.  And when I realised that this evil could not be

 3     stopped with the speed that I thought necessary, I turned to the media,

 4     and I wanted wide coverage in order to stop that evil as soon as

 5     possible.

 6        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Granic.  I have no further questions for you.

 7             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Waespi.

 9             Mr. Mikulicic.

10                           Re-examination by Mr. Mikulicic:

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Granic, you'll now be re-examined by

12     Mr. Mikulicic.  Mr. Mikulicic, as you know, is counsel for Mr. Markac.

13     Please proceed.

14             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

15        Q.   [Interpretation] Good day, Mr. Granic.  Yesterday in the course

16     of your evidence and the day before yesterday, on several occasions you

17     mentioned the number 3 or 4.000 crimes that were prosecuted and the

18     illegal nature of the acts that occurred after the liberation.

19        A.   Yes, I remember.

20        Q.   And when Judge Orie asked you where you got that number, said

21     you'd heard it at a cabinet session or in the media.

22        A.   It was at an official cabinet session, and it was covered by all

23     the media.

24             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can I have D1339, please.

25        Q.   Dr. Granic, we'll now see a document that has been exhibited, and

Page 24957

 1     it provides certain information that the Defence of accused Markac

 2     received from the Republic of Croatia.

 3             MR. MIKULICIC:  I was asking for 1331.  I'm sorry, I saw in

 4     transcript that it was wrongly mentioned, 39.  It has to be 1331.  Sorry

 5     for that.

 6        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Granic, through official channels we

 7     received from the Ministry of Justice a document containing the numbers

 8     for prosecutions and crimes that occurred after Operation Storm.

 9             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can you open page 3 of this

10     document.

11        Q.   At the bottom we see a table showing the total number of crimes

12     and criminal proceedings.  The first line is the number of indictees and

13     criminal acts, 3.978.  The next line shows that there were 1.949

14     judgements; out of which 1.492 guilty verdicts, that is convictions;

15     179 acquittals; and 278 reversals of judgements.

16             The statistics that we got from the Ministry of Justice, does it

17     remind you of the sources that you used when you got that number, 3 to

18     4.000 crimes?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             MR. MIKULICIC:  Just for a reference, let me also call -- or,

22     rather, refer to D1392, which is the white paper containing the same

23     numbers.

24        Q.   Can we now call D429.

25             Mr. Granic, when you were cross-examined by the Prosecutor and

Page 24958

 1     questioned by the Trial Chamber, there was also the issue of the total

 2     number of refugees who returned eventually to Croatia.  Let us wait for a

 3     second to see the document.

 4             This is a table made by the Ministry for Public Works and

 5     Reconstruction, department for refugees.  You see that up to 2nd December

 6     1996, total returnees were 123.469.  It's in column number five from the

 7     left.

 8             Does this number correspond to what you mentioned in your

 9     evidence?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   Can we now call P2671.  This exhibit that we will soon see was

12     discussed between you and the Prosecutor, and it's a document from the

13     4th of September, 1995.

14             Tudjman is quoted on the last page when he said regarding the

15     issue of whether 150.000 Krajina Serbs may return home, President Tudjman

16     answered it was unthinkable for all of them to return.

17             In your answer you explained your understanding of the context,

18     and then the question followed if military operations were still ongoing

19     and what the security situation was.

20             Can we see page 2 in the Croatian where the journalist asks

21     President Tudjman, What will happen if the conflict in Eastern Slavonija

22     cannot be ended peacefully, will there be a new offensive?

23             Tudjman says:

24             "Yes.  In the following three months, we will do our utmost to

25     achieve a peaceful solution, but if that is impossible, we will have no

Page 24959

 1     choice but to mount a new operation."

 2             Mr. Granic, at the time of this interview in September 1995, in

 3     the state political leadership was the military option still under the

 4     consideration in order to recover occupied territories?

 5        A.   We hoped and we believed -- let me be very pragmatic.  The

 6     international community, especially the US, we hoped would help us

 7     achieve a peaceful solution, but we were obviously prepared to go for the

 8     military option if necessary.

 9        Q.   In that political environment at the time, when the military

10     option was still on the table, was it possible to proceed with a

11     systematic return of refugees?

12        A.   Not only was it impossible, but even if we had wanted to proceed

13     we would not have received the support of the UNHCR.  We had heard a

14     moment ago from the Prosecutor about the positions of Mrs. Sadako Ogata

15     concerning the federation.  I supported them at the time.  And the same

16     was true of Croatia at the time.  There was no time to think -- that was

17     not the time to think about systematic return, only individual returns,

18     and individual returns proceeded very intensively as you can see from

19     that table.

20        Q.   Could you place in the same context the events that occurred

21     after the liberation action of Storm concerning the regrouping of the

22     fugitive military conscripts from the occupied territories and from the

23     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?

24        A.   Certainly.  Those were indisputable facts.  Karadzic and Martic

25     were boasting that they were recruiting younger refugees into the Army of

Page 24960

 1     Republika Srpska, that they were also setting up terrorist units, that

 2     they had created a government in exile.  So at the time the possibility

 3     that a part of the Croatian territory would again be cut off by actions

 4     mounted from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  That was a high

 5     priority for Croatia.  If I remember well, the reports I had as the

 6     foreign minister at UN Security Council sessions [as interpreted], I

 7     think that about 14.000 [as interpreted] of our soldiers were deployed on

 8     the front line facing the FR Yugoslavia.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic, you're on your feet.

10             MR. MISETIC:  Yes.  Just if you'll give me the leeway,

11     Mr. President.  At page 48, line 7.  It was interpreted as UN Security

12     Council sessions, and I believe the witness said --

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Let's ask the witness.

14             You said:  "If I remember well, the reports I had as the foreign

15     minister at ..." some sessions.  What session were you referring to?

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The National Security Council of

17     Croatia.

18             Thank you, Mr. Misetic.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

20             MR. MIKULICIC:  I've just been advised by my colleagues,

21     Your Honour, that there is also doubt on number that witness mentioned,

22     so could we ask him again.  Is it really number of 14.000 or some other

23     number he had in mind he had mentioned.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Granic --

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thirty thousand soldiers were

Page 24961

 1     deployed on the eastern border.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  This all being on the record, please proceed.

 3             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.  Can I now ask for

 4     3D00960.

 5        Q.   [Interpretation] Dr. Granic, there was also talk about a decree

 6     of the Croatian government that was later written into law, the decree on

 7     the provisional restriction over administration of abandoned property.

 8     That decree gave course to great reservations and comments.

 9             I'll show you the transcript of the 262nd session of the Republic

10     of Croatia government from August 1995.  1st August 1995.

11             MR. MIKULICIC:  Well, I'm afraid this document that we are

12     looking at the screen is not the right one that I'm looking for.  This is

13     a, let's say, summary of that government's meeting, and I was asking for

14     the transcript of the meeting which is 3D00968.  But let me check,

15     Your Honour, just a minute, please.

16             So we could go to the second page in English, and six page in

17     Croatian version, please.

18        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Granic, at this session the cabinet

19     discussed the idea and the need to adopt a decree restricting the

20     disposal of property.  And Mr. Misetic, whom you mentioned as deputy

21     prime minister in charge of this work is giving a statement of reasons in

22     the first passage.

23             I'd just like to repeat, there are several categories of property

24     and several categories of citizens involved.  Page 3 in English.  And

25     Mr. Misetic goes on to say what property this is, and he says, first of

Page 24962

 1     all, this is the property of the citizens of Croatia who on that

 2     notorious 17th of August, when the aggression against Croatia started,

 3     left for the occupied territories.

 4             What here does he mean when he says 17th August as the date of

 5     aggression against Croatia?

 6        A.   17th August 19 --

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness repeat, please.

 8             MR. MIKULICIC:

 9        Q.   Mr. Granic, the interpreters did not hear you.

10        A.   1990.  17 August 1990.

11        Q.   It is clear now.  So this is one category of property that was

12     included in the decree, and then the deputy prime minister Misetic says

13     the following in the same paragraph:

14              "Then we are dealing here with the property of natural persons

15     and legal entities, citizens of the then republics of Serbia and

16     Montenegro whose property is in the territory of the Republic of

17     Croatia."

18             And in the next paragraph he talks about the third category which

19     was actually the subject of discussion here, and that was the property of

20     those citizens, primarily of those in the occupied territories, who left

21     the Republic of Croatia after the liberation of those occupied

22     territories.

23             All these three categories of property are rated by this law as

24     the property without the proprietor, as their proprietors left the

25     Republic of Croatia.

Page 24963

 1             And then Mr. Misetic talks about the purpose for adopting this

 2     law.  And he says the purpose of this law is to make this property

 3     subject to proper management as the good governor would do in order to

 4     avoid an unfathomable damage to this property, as well as to ensure that

 5     through the proposed fashion of management and manipulation of this

 6     property a number of Croatian citizens, primarily the Croats who were

 7     expelled by the Serbs from other areas and from other countries, would

 8     benefit from this property, primarily from the area of the former

 9     Yugoslavia to the area of the Republic of Croatia.

10             And then if we turn the page in Croatian - the English page we

11     have is okay - Mr. Misetic further says somewhere around the top third of

12     the page, this is what he says:

13              "There have been quite a few proposals and opinions.  The final

14     proposal of coordinating bodies for internal affairs and of all others

15     who took part in the creation of this law is that all this property is to

16     be sequestered by the Croatian state.  Therefore, meaning that the State

17     of Croatia shall be responsible for its management, rather than to state

18     in a law or in an enactment that this is property of the Republic of

19     Croatia."

20             Mr. Granic, is your recollection to this -- to these events in

21     accordance with this as it was expressed by the deputy prime minister?

22        A.   Yes.  My recollection is exactly the same.  I'm not a lawyer, but

23     what I know precisely and what I advocated as the foreign minister was

24     that by this, the issue of property would not be resolved, but

25     exclusively the protection of property at that point in time.  And of

Page 24964

 1     course as it is noted here, there were between 25 and 30.000 refugees,

 2     mostly Croats who had been expelled from Bosnia and Herzegovina, from

 3     Republika Srpska, from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and who were

 4     in the area.  And another thing that was considered was to allow them to

 5     use houses that had not been damaged in order to resolve the humanitarian

 6     problem.  So the priority was only to protect property rather than to

 7     resolve the issue of the property.  And I know this precisely for the

 8     following reason:  After several months, on the 10th of January, 1996, I

 9     said in Belgrade that private property of refugees was inviolate, and on

10     the 31st of August I signed the agreement on the normalisation in which

11     this was set out.

12        Q.   Thank you for your answers, Mr. Granic.  I have no further

13     questions.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic.

15             MR. MISETIC:  Yes.  Thank you, Mr. President.

16             MR. MIKULICIC:  Sorry, Your Honour, I forgot something.

17             Could I tender into the evidence the last document.  It is

18     3D00960.

19             MR. WAESPI:  No objections.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1823.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  D1823 is admitted into evidence.

23                           Further cross-examination by Mr. Misetic:

24        Q.   Good afternoon again, Dr. Granic.

25        A.   Good afternoon.

Page 24965

 1        Q.   First, let me clarify something because there may have been some

 2     confusion.  You did not meet with the Gotovina Defence after you began

 3     your testimony.  But prior to your testimony we did have a meeting,

 4     Mr. Kehoe, me, and yourself, in the offices of the Markac Defence the day

 5     you arrived in The Hague; correct?

 6        A.   Yes, that's correct.

 7        Q.   Now, you were asked some questions, and this is Exhibit P2675, it

 8     is a presidential transcript, and you will recall that the -- that there

 9     was a comment taken about President Tudjman speaking to his ambassadors

10     about his views concerning Serbs in Banja Luka and -- as well as Russia's

11     influence and how the west would also be impacted by Serbs in Banja Luka.

12             Now, I'd like to show you or play for you an audio of a meeting

13     between President Tudjman and Mr. Holbrooke on the 17th of September

14     1995.

15             Mr. Galbraith is also present, and again it's the same topic,

16     Serbs in Banja Luka, Russia's influence, and what President Tudjman means

17     by this.  So if we could take a listen to a broader context of that line,

18     and then I'll ask you some questions about that.

19             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. Registrar, I believe this is 65 ter 1D357.

20                           [Audiotape played]

21             "[Interpretation] To suggest to them such a territorial division

22     whereby Banja Luka would go to the Western part of the Federation and

23     Tuzla to the Eastern part.  And this way we'd have a civilizational and

24     humane solution, that they are not ethnically clean.  Therefore, let the

25     Serbs remain in the Federation as well as the Muslims and the Croats in

Page 24966

 1     the Serbian part.  Based on the reciprocal guarantees of human and ethnic

 2     equality.  In that case we would have a boundary between the East and the

 3     West, between Russian and Western influence for the future, so that we

 4     wouldn't have to fear any future war."

 5             MR. MISETIC:  Now, Mr. Granic, what President Tudjman was talking

 6     about is Serbs staying in Banja Luka, but being part of the Muslim/Croat

 7     federation.  And Tuzla, Bosnians, Muslims, and Croats staying in Tuzla

 8     but becoming part of the part of the Republika Srpska.  Is that accurate?

 9        A.   That's completely accurate.  If I may give you a brief comment on

10     that.  Your Honours, sometime around, I believe, the 14th or the 15th of

11     June 1995, in Geneva, the Contact Group at the level of ministers where I

12     was also present on behalf of the Republic of Croatia adopted a decision

13     that in the future Bosnia and Herzegovina there will exist

14     Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that

15     the relation would be 51 to 49 per cent, but nothing was decided about

16     the demarcation of borders between Republika Srpska and the Federation of

17     Bosnia and Herzegovina.

18             After the joint operations of the BH Army, the HVO, and the army

19     of the Republic of Croatia, with the full support of the USA, and this

20     was the time before the Dayton agreement, there was no agreement about

21     borders, and President Tudjman was, therefore, talking about a very

22     legitimate option, legitimate because there was no demarcation of

23     borders.  It was just talking in principle about the relations.  And when

24     on the 14th of October, 1995, about which I testified, when the State

25     Secretary Christopher called me and so did embassy --

Page 24967

 1     Ambassador Holbrooke to President Tudjman and told us to stop before

 2     Banja Luka.  They also called President Izetbegovic and

 3     President Tudjman.  It was only then that the Americans said, No, don't

 4     go for that, and we are not in fair of this option.  So up until that

 5     time it was a legitimate option.

 6        Q.   Okay.  Mr. Granic, on the basis of President Tudjman's comments

 7     that what he wants is for the territory to be part of the federation, the

 8     territory of Banja Luka, but he's prepared to accept that Serbs would

 9     stay in Banja Luka -- the comment that was read to you in P2675 about how

10     "it would be unpleasant for Croatia to have Serbs in Banja Luka and on

11     the west like we had them 30 kilometres from Zagreb, but it is unpleasant

12     for the west as well," is President Tudjman there referring to Serb

13     people, or is he referring to Serb entities like the RSK and the

14     Republika Srpska?

15        A.   In that context he meant drawing the borders between

16     Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and he

17     noted, and this was a well-known opinion that he held, that the Serbs in

18     Banja Luka were western oriented just like the Serbs in Tuzla were

19     connected with Belgrade much stronger, and that was what Tudjman had in

20     mind at the time.

21        Q.   Thank you.

22             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I tender 65 ter 1D357 into evidence.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi, no objections?

24             MR. WAESPI:  I'm sorry, I -- this was which document?

25             MR. MISETIC:  It's the audio with the transcript.

Page 24968

 1             MR. WAESPI:  Yes.  No objections.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, that becomes Exhibit D1824.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence into evidence.

 5             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 6        Q.   Mr. Granic, you were asked quite a lot of questions about your

 7     knowledge of crimes committed by members of the Croatian Army, and I'd

 8     like to explore -- explore that topic a bit because it was put to you

 9     that either you knew about them or that other people were lying to you

10     about this issue.  So let's see if we can quickly go through that.

11             You've already seen, and we went through this yesterday so

12     there's no need to pull this up again, but the transcript of the

13     conversation between Mr. Radic and President Tudjman which took place on

14     the 22nd of August, which is Exhibit P463, at page 5 where Mr. Radic is

15     saying that it is not the Croatian Army but the 5th echelon that is

16     committing these crimes.

17             If we can move to another document, which is Exhibit D426.  And

18     you will note that this is a closed-session meeting of the Croatian

19     government on the 23rd of August.  We'll wait for the English translation

20     to come up, but, Mr. Granic, you will see at the bottom in the Croatian

21     you were not present for this meeting, but if we turn the page in

22     Croatian and stay on the first page in English, you'll see that present

23     was, in fact, your then deputy minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Sanader;

24     correct?

25        A.   Yes, that is correct.

Page 24969

 1        Q.   And would -- if Mr. Sanader as your deputy attended a meeting, a

 2     closed-session meeting of the government, would you receive a report from

 3     him or from somebody else to you because you were absent telling you what

 4     the meeting was about or what was discussed at the meeting?

 5        A.   If it was something very important, he would have told me.

 6        Q.   Well, let's -- let's take a look, if we may, at English page 21,

 7     Croatian page 42.  It's the bottom of the page in Croatian, the bottom

 8     paragraph, and it's the third and fourth paragraphs on the English page.

 9             Now, these are the words as recorded of the prime minister,

10     Mr. Valentic, and speaking to the government he says:

11             "Speeding up the procedure of solving citizenship issues, the

12     Ministry of Administration should speed up the procedure as much as

13     possible ..."

14             And if we could turn the page in Croatian, please.

15             "... of course the social and health care, as we have arranged,

16     have to be intensified in the areas where people live regardless of their

17     nationality.  Special care has to be provided to the Serb population.

18     There is no need to mention how important this issue is today in both

19     political and humanitarian terms, and it has to be outspoken that all the

20     liberators who are liberating for the third time, those are the worst,

21     they must be prevented.  After the army had passed and the war is

22     virtually over, some fake heroes emerged who are the most dangerous for

23     Croatia at this moment.  There are places for them to fight at if they

24     want to find" -- I think it says, "if they want to fight they should tell

25     us, and we will send them.  There are several front lines where fighters

Page 24970

 1     are needed, but we will not allow them to fight around Knin and around

 2     Okucani."

 3             Now, Mr. Granic, first, can you explain in case it's unclear,

 4     when the prime minister says, "those who are liberating for the third

 5     time," what is he really referring to?

 6        A.   All those who were committing crimes, and most of them were

 7     wearing Croatian Army uniforms.  And I have said this a number of times.

 8     I was difficult to distinguish then because most of the people were

 9     wearing the Croatian Army uniform in this area, and I think that it was

10     only logical that the criminals who went there in order to loot, it was

11     easier for them to enter these areas if they were wearing uniforms.  What

12     I can also say is that the prime minister believed at the time that

13     whoever was committing crimes was doing this against Croatia, and he

14     never made any distinction who it was.  Whoever was doing it was doing it

15     against Croatia.  Whoever was committing any crimes was working against

16     Croatia, even those who, as he put it, went to liberate areas after they

17     had been liberated and that they were causing the greatest damage for

18     Croatia.

19        Q.   And is it correct to say that the assessment was as Mr. Valentic,

20     the prime minister, lays out, that it was after the army had passed and

21     the war is virtually over that that's when some "fake heroes" emerged,

22     that that was the assessment at the time?

23        A.   Yes, that is correct.

24        Q.   You'll note in the next paragraph, and -- he says -- now he's

25     talking about the decree on property.  He says:

Page 24971

 1             "... is very significant.  We are aware of all the constitutional

 2     restrictions.  You are familiar with my position.  We will not allow any

 3     violence, but we have to do something.  It is better to find a

 4     preliminary solution than to allow anarchy.  We will find a

 5     constitutional and formal way to find a solution, a preliminary solution

 6     which will lead us to a final solution of that issue.  No one can keep it

 7     under control.  We do not have sufficient army and police to keep under

 8     control 30 or 40.000 apartments."

 9             Now, Mr. Granic, was that in fact one of the reasons for the

10     property law, the fact that Croatia felt that this would improve the

11     security of the housing that was placed under the law?

12        A.   That was the main reason, Mr. Misetic.

13        Q.   Now, would the prime minister, Mr. Valentic, would he have been

14     able to express these kinds of views and implement policies towards

15     fixing the security situation on the ground had that been in conflict

16     with President Tudjman's objectives?

17        A.   No.  That would have been impossible.  If he had a different

18     opinion, then Prime Minister Valentic would go to see President Tudjman

19     and would have told him his opinion because he was a very independent

20     man.  So this was really his sincere opinion, and it was not contrasted

21     with what President Tudjman believed.

22        Q.   Let's look at another conversation on the same day.  So these are

23     now -- this is the third conversation within the two-day period.  This is

24     Exhibit D890.  And you were asked several questions about whether

25     Mr. Susak or Mr. Jarnjak were lying to you.

Page 24972

 1             And if we could go to page 9 in the English.  This is a meeting

 2     between Minister Susak, Minister Jarnjak, and the president on the 13th

 3     of August.  It's on page 9 in the English and page 17 in the Croatian.

 4             Now, at the top in Croatian and the upper middle part in the

 5     English, Mr. Jarnjak is speaking, and he says:

 6              "There's a huge problem that now after Storm and after Flash" --

 7     he says, "however, there's a huge problem that now after Storm and after

 8     Flash there are now again so many weapons in private hands, explosives

 9     uncontrolled, that is simply -- I don't know.  We will now pass this law,

10     and we will have to launch a massive campaign for the return of these

11     weapons.  Look, I know of rifles, automatic ones, anything you want."

12             And Minister Susak says:

13             "Mr. President, here in a house, a private house, to get in there

14     and find 100 kilogrammes of explosives, that's nothing."

15             Now, if we could turn the page in English, please, and in

16     Croatian.  And then towards the bottom in English.  Actually, if we could

17     scroll up to the top in English, please.

18             Mr. Susak says:

19             "We are doing this without a law.  What we're dealing -- what

20     we're doing with the mobilisation, because we're simply taking away by

21     force ... there is no law saying what you're allowed to do and what

22     you're not.

23              "There was a law stating what is allowed and what is not," this

24     is Mr. Jarnjak, "but the problem is that nobody will report, nobody will

25     report anybody.  You have plenty of grenades."

Page 24973

 1             Now, if we scroll down a bit and turn the page in Croatian,

 2     please.

 3             Mr. Susak then tells the president:

 4             "But they hand in the weapons they were issued officially.  But,

 5     Mr. President, what they had now in the operation, especially the home

 6     guard and the reserves, they wouldn't record anything they took.  We gave

 7     him a rifle, and he will return the rifle to us.  But the fact that he

 8     took two more on top of that, that's something we have no record of."

 9             Now, Mr. Granic, the three conversation I've now referenced to

10     you took place over a period of two days, the 22nd and 23rd of August.

11     All of them are private conversations not for public consumption, not to

12     deceive the international community.  Was it in the fact the case that

13     the assessment of the Croatian government which you were reporting at the

14     time was that these were being committed after Operation Storm by persons

15     not under the control of the Croatian government?

16        A.   First of all, I see these talks for the first time, but I'm

17     familiar with the context, and the context is quite accurate.  That means

18     there were problems with demobilisation and the retrieval of weapons,

19     there were many, many weapons out of any control.  And of course these

20     men were wearing uniforms, they had weapons plenty, and it was easy for

21     them to get together into criminal gangs.  That was a huge problem.

22             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I have approximately ten minutes of

23     questions left.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Then we'll first have a break, Mr. Misetic.  We'll

25     have a break, and we'll resume at five minutes to 1.00.

Page 24974

 1                           --- Recess taken at 12.34 p.m.

 2                           --- On resuming at 12.58 p.m.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic, please proceed.

 4             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 5        Q.   Mr. Granic, you were asked some questions about Bihac, and you

 6     were shown the, as Mr. Waespi referred to it, the famous Brioni

 7     transcript.  The suggestion that was put to you was that Bihac had become

 8     a pretext by the 31st of August, and I'd like to ask you some questions

 9     on the following:  First of all, were you aware that Mr. Akashi had, on

10     the night before the Brioni meeting, sent a fax to President Tudjman

11     where he had essentially claimed that Mr. Martic had agreed to a six

12     point agreement which included that he would withdraw from Bihac.  Were

13     you aware that the president had received such a communication from

14     Mr. Akashi the night before the Brioni meeting which would be the 30th of

15     July?

16        A.   I know only in general terms about it, and President Tudjman told

17     me about it himself.

18        Q.   Well, were you aware that in fact Mr. Akashi had not reached an

19     agreement because Mr. Martic had backed out of the agreement.

20             MR. MISETIC:  And for the reference of the parties and the

21     Chamber, this is the testimony of Mr. Akashi at transcript page 21690,

22     beginning at line 10.

23        Q.   That in fact Mr. Akashi had sent that message to

24     President Tudjman even though he knew at the time that Mr. Martic had not

25     agreed to the six-point plan including the withdrawal of his forces from

Page 24975

 1     the Bihac area?  Did you subsequently learn that?

 2        A.   Yes.  We had precise information that Mr. Martic was not

 3     intending to accept any kind of agreement, that his intention was to join

 4     Karadzic's forces and move forward to capture the occupied territory of

 5     Bihac.

 6        Q.   Now, Mr. Granic, Mr. Galbraith testified in this case, and an

 7     audio of his meeting with President Tudjman on the 1st of August, which

 8     would be the day after the Brioni meeting, was played in court, and this

 9     is at transcript page 8 -- sorry.  Transcript page 5029, beginning at

10     line 8.  And the audio shows that Mr. Galbraith had reported to

11     President Tudjman the day after the Brioni meeting:

12              "Today, however, we see little sign that the Serbs are

13     withdrawing from their siege of Bihac, little sign that they are

14     honouring previous agreements, that is, the oil -- opening the oil

15     pipeline, little sign that they are engaged on the issues that you have

16     raised, opening the railroad connection or beginning negotiations on

17     political summit, and little sign that they are prepared to allow UNCRO

18     to exercise its full mandate, and if so, we have no immediate optimism

19     about negotiations on a political settlement."

20             Now, were you aware, in fact, that after the Brioni meeting, the

21     day after, the ambassador to the United States advised President Tudjman

22     that the United States saw little sign that the RSK Serbs were

23     withdrawing from their siege of Bihac and little sign that they were

24     honouring previous agreements?  Were you aware that the ambassador had

25     told the president that?

Page 24976

 1        A.   Yes.  Yes, I am aware.  President Tudjman told me so himself.

 2        Q.   Now, the decision to actually launch Operation Storm was reached

 3     at the VONS meeting on the 3rd of August and not the Brioni meeting on

 4     the 31st of August -- 31st of July; correct?

 5        A.   Quite correct.

 6        Q.   By that time, I believe you've already testified, but let's

 7     confirm, by that time Bihac was in fact one of the strategic objectives

 8     of launching Operation Storm.

 9        A.   One of very important strategic objectives.  I, as the foreign

10     minister, was in daily contact either with the foreign minister Sacirbey

11     or with Haris Silajdzic who was the prime minister or with President

12     Izetbegovic.

13        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Granic.

14             And the final topic is this issue of Mrs. Ogata, the UNHCR, and

15     the turn of refugees.

16             MR. MISETIC:  If we could please have on the screen Exhibit D690

17     again, please.  And if we could again go to page 4, please.

18        Q.   Now, you were shown the portion in the paragraph that begins

19     "Secondly," and in the middle of the page there's the following two

20     sentences:

21             "Returning large numbers of refugees to areas which are not ready

22     to receive them can have very serious consequences not only for the

23     refugees themselves but for the stability in the area concerned.  I am

24     thinking particularly of the still fragile situation in the area of the

25     Federation."

Page 24977

 1             Now, when you were asked about whether Mrs. Ogata meant -- was

 2     she exclusively referring to the federation in your understanding of what

 3     UNHCR's policies were in terms of when large numbers of refugees should

 4     be repatriated, or was this a principle of UNHCR that applied to all of

 5     the republics of the former Yugoslavia?

 6        A.   Quite certainly it applied equally to the federation and the

 7     Republic of Croatia.  Mrs. Sadako Ogata treated them equally.

 8        Q.   And on this point as someone who dealt extensively with the

 9     issue -- well, let me ask you the question.  As minister of foreign

10     affairs you've talked about you dealt with the issue of refugee returns.

11     You were familiar with that issue as it connected to -- as that issue is

12     interconnected throughout the countries of the former Yugoslavia.  In

13     other words, the issue of refugee returns to Croatia was related to the

14     issue of refugee returns to Bosnia, to Serbia, et cetera; is that

15     correct?

16        A.   As deputy prime minister, I worked intensively for accommodating

17     refugees and displaced persons for almost two years.  As a foreign

18     minister, I discussed the topic frequently, although Professor

19     Albert Rebic, who was a member of the cabinet and directly in charge of

20     displaced persons and refugees was the main person dealing with it.  But

21     since this was often the topic of international discussions, I was

22     well-versed with the whole issue and the problems involved as a foreign

23     minister.

24             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. Registrar, if we could have Exhibit D691,

25     please.

Page 24978

 1        Q.   Mr. Granic, this is a record of the meeting of the

 2     Security Council on the 5th of September, 2002, and I'd like to use this

 3     just to discuss the principles that we've discussed now, and this will be

 4     my last question.

 5             If we could go to page 5 in this document, please.

 6             The discussion is about Kosovo.  It is three years after the

 7     conclusion of hostilities in Kosovo, and this is an address to the

 8     Security Council by the assistant -- Assistant Secretary-General for

 9     peacekeeping operations, Mr. Annabi, A-n-n-a-b-i.

10             And if we could scroll down, please.

11             If you look on your screen, Mr. Granic, on the left-hand column,

12     Mr. Annabi says:

13              "In this context, recent statements by Kosovo Serb internally

14     displaced persons that they are planning to block the crossing points on

15     the administrative boundary line with Kosovo later this month if they are

16     not allowed to return en masse are cause for concern.  Although the

17     impatience of internally displaced persons is understandable, given the

18     still delicate state of intercommunal relations, any action along those

19     lines would only be counter-productive and would be harmful to the return

20     process."

21             The next paragraph says:

22             "There cannot be artificial mass return.  UNMIK's return policy

23     is based on the right of individual return in an organised way so that it

24     can be sustainable.  This requires careful preparation on the ground to

25     ensure that the physical infrastructure - meaning houses, employment, and

Page 24979

 1     access to public services - is in place to welcome the returnees.  It

 2     also requires a careful handling of relations with the neighbouring

 3     Kosovo Albanian communities to diminish the potential for return-related

 4     security incidents."

 5             Now, you were -- it was put to you this morning by Mr. Waespi

 6     that the Croatian plan was passed in June 1998, and it was suggested to

 7     you that this was an unreasonable delay in enacting this Croatian

 8     government programme.  We see here that even three years after the Kosovo

 9     conflict was over the United Nations itself was opposed to mass return,

10     and instead was espousing certain principles in the Security Council.

11             Were these the principles upon which Croatia's return policy were

12     based as outlined by Mr. Annabi concerning Kosovo?  Are these

13     international principles?

14        A.   Yes, the very same principles that Mrs. Sadako Ogata referred to.

15     And when we were making the programme, we were making it together with

16     the UNHCR and with the international community.  Of course the

17     international community was impatient for as many people to return as

18     soon as possible, but we stuck to the recommendations of the UNHCR.

19             And there's another thing.  As this report clearly says, it was

20     necessary also to achieve an internal consensus.  That was not an easy

21     thing to do.  A consensus that the time has come for massive returns.

22     And I believe that at that time the unanimous consensus in Croatia was

23     finally reached that an organised massive return of refugees is possible.

24        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Granic, for your answers.

25             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I have no further

Page 24980

 1     questions.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Misetic.

 3             Any questions from the Cermak Defence?

 4             MR. KAY:  No, Your Honour.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  If you'd give me one second.

 6                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 7                           Questioned by the Court:

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Granic, I would have a few questions for you.

 9     You remember that you were asked about what President Tudjman said during

10     a meeting with Mr. Holbrooke, Mr. Clark, and Mr. Galbraith.

11             Could I have P449, page 17 English, page 33 B/C/S.

12             I think you explained to us that President Tudjman, when saying

13     that he'd be very content if about 10 per cent of them returned, that he

14     meant to say at least 10 per cent, not more than 10 per cent.  That's --

15     and you explained that you could interpret this on the basis your

16     knowledge of the thoughts of President Tudjman.

17        A.   Correct, Your Honour.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Could I take you -- no.  Let me -- you also told us

19     that human rights, that it was always intended that human rights would be

20     observed in relation to minorities, including Serbs.  Is that also

21     correctly understood?  It's very much a --

22        A.   Correct.  Correct, Your Honour.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Could I take you to -- could I take you to P461,

24     page 54 in the B/C/S.  And I'm not interested at this moment in the

25     English version, I would say for obvious reasons.

Page 24981

 1             This page 54 out of 64?  Could we then move to page 55.

 2             Could I invite you to read the portion at the top of the page

 3     where Mr. Susak is speaking, and then after that to read the words of

 4     President Tudjman after that.  Just read them for yourself.

 5        A.   I've read it.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Could you comment on what President Tudjman says

 7     here in relation to human rights.

 8        A.   I did not attend that meeting, so I'm not the best person to

 9     comment.  I think this is a transcript from Brioni, isn't it?

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

11        A.   I know only what I discussed myself in the break with

12     President Tudjman, and I know one thing, that even our friends in the

13     world were saying -- not the Americans, but let's say the Germans, they

14     were saying we don't have the forces for a rapid military operation.  The

15     president talked to the soldiers --

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Granic, if you want to say at any later stage

17     something you discussed during the break, that's fine.  But I'm asking

18     you your comments of this part of the transcript in relation to the words

19     used by President Tudjman.  And if you would like to add anything at a

20     later stage, you're free to do so.

21        A.   The president -- and I repeat I wasn't there at the meeting.  The

22     discussion was about a flyer inviting local Serbs to stay and

23     guaranteeing their civil rights.  Quite certainly that was not -- it was,

24     in fact, a time before a military operation that had yet to be won.  I

25     cannot really comment, because in my discussions with Tudjman, it was

Page 24982

 1     never questioned that we would guarantee civil rights to the Serbs.  I

 2     cannot say any more because I did not attend that meeting.  And this

 3     thing, I guarantee ostensibly civil rights, that that's not something

 4     that Tudjman ever told me.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  You do understand his words then, although you

 6     explain to us that this comes as a surprise that President Tudjman here

 7     expresses that the rights of Serbs might or would not be observed.  Is

 8     that ...

 9        A.   Your Honour, that's right.  This is a discussion before the

10     military operation with the military leaders.  It's not a discussion with

11     the government or the foreign minister or with those officials in charge

12     of human rights or international conventions and treaties.  This is a

13     discussion with the army.  Since wasn't there, I can't say any more.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  If you would have seen these words, would you have

15     spoken with President Tudjman, and would you have explained to him that

16     you could not agree with this?  Is that ...

17        A.   If I had seen this or if I had been there, then I would have

18     said, "Mr. President, we have to honour human and civil rights very

19     honestly and sincerely."  That's how I would react in any other

20     situation.

21             But I think -- I mean, you see this is a different context, and

22     this is a sentence that's really cut off, that trails off.  I cannot say

23     with any certainty what President Tudjman meant 15 years ago.  I think he

24     was speaking exclusively about a flyer that may help achieve military

25     victory.

Page 24983

 1             As for human rights, if anyone in my hearing ever said ostensibly

 2     in connection with human rights, my reaction would always have been the

 3     same.  We have had honour human rights always, everywhere, and that's our

 4     supreme principle.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, which would contradict ostensibly observing

 6     human rights.

 7        A.   I think, Your Honour, that the president certainly didn't mean

 8     that we would ostensibly respect human rights.  I think this sentence

 9     belongs in the context of a conversation to which I was not present, and

10     I cannot give any further comments.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now, apparently the president used the word

12     "toboze."  Is there anything you would like to tell us about the use of

13     that word by the president?  Did he often use that?  Do you have no

14     recollection of him using it?

15        A.   Yes, he used it sometimes.  I said that the president was not a

16     diplomat, although he was a statesman.  He was an expert in the modern

17     understanding of human rights, but it's indisputable that every move I

18     made -- and I did all I did to protect the Serb minority and all

19     minorities, the protection of property and the return of refugees.  Every

20     movie made was supported by Tudjman.  And as for his communication

21     skills, he had been an outcast from public life for a -- for a long time,

22     and he was not an expert in international treaties or human rights.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Is it true that you earlier said that he was not an

24     expert in the modern understanding of human rights, because on the

25     transcript it appears as if he was an expert, but you told us he was not

Page 24984

 1     an expert.  Is that correctly understood?

 2        A.   I said, and I stand by it, the president was not a diplomat, and

 3     he was not an expert in modern understanding of human rights, but he had

 4     a very good basic understanding that the highest standards of human

 5     rights must be guaranteed to Serbs in Croatia.  He understood that very

 6     well.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Do you have any idea, if you know, please tell us,

 8     what was good about the confusion that was apparently the chaos that was

 9     apparently sought?  If you know.  If you've got no idea, then please tell

10     us as well.

11        A.   No.  No, I know nothing about this.  I cannot comment.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  From any other conversation, because you were not

13     present here, have you gained any understanding of how showing people the

14     way out would encourage them not to leave?

15        A.   I know nothing about the session itself except that it was held

16     and that President Tudjman discussed the military readiness of the army

17     to execute the task of liberating the occupied territory of Croatia and

18     emerging at the borders as well as the military assistance to Bihac.  And

19     of course the third point was the assistance to the US peace initiative.

20             Now, I spoke to the president myself that day --

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Until now you have told us what the meeting

22     was about.  I asked you whether you had any conversation.  So I see that

23     you now come to that point.  Please proceed with your answer.

24        A.   I spoke to him that day myself.  The president asked me to give

25     him a precise evaluation at the international level, the US evaluation,

Page 24985

 1     and the evaluations of the leading states in the world.  I shared with

 2     him those appraisals, and I said that the presidential statement will be

 3     heard at the Security Council, and I repeated this:  We have to honour

 4     the international conventions on the laws of warfare.  We have to respect

 5     civilians.  We have to respect the UNCRO soldiers, and the operation has

 6     to be swift.  That's the same thing our friends are recommending,

 7     especially the US.  And I repeated it at least twice.  President,

 8     everyone will have as much respect for us as we have respect for

 9     international convictions and the international humanitarian law.  And he

10     said, Okay.  I'll convey this to the soldiers and to Minister Susak.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  I understand this answer that you had no

12     conversation in which, as I asked you, that you gained any understanding

13     of how showing people the way out would encourage them not to leave,

14     because I do not find any response to that question in your answer.

15             May I take you now to P463.

16        A.   No.  That is correct, Your Honour.  I did not talk to him about

17     this, and I cannot say anything.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  That's -- could I take you to P463.  Page 14

19     in the B/C/S and page 10 in English.

20             Now, let me see.  Did I make a mistake?  Is this 46 -- there we

21     are.

22             This is a transcript of a conversation between the president and

23     Mr. Radic.  Could I ask you to read the words spoken by Mr. Radic, but

24     perhaps we should move to page 15.  No.  Perhaps I'll invite you to start

25     reading at -- no.  We are here at 14.  Could we move to page 13.  When

Page 24986

 1     I'm talking about pages, I'm referring to e-court pages, and this seems

 2     to be a problem.

 3             Could you start reading the observations at the bottom of -- next

 4     page, 14 e-court.

 5             Could I ask you to read the last portions of what Mr. Radic said.

 6     Once you finish this page, please tell me so we can move to the next

 7     page.

 8        A.   Yes, we can move to the next page, Your Honours.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  You earlier told us that because of your knowledge

10     of the thoughts of President Tudjman, you could interpret his reference

11     to being happy with 10 per cent to return, that that would be -- not less

12     than 10 per cent.

13             The text you've just read where Mr. Radic said:

14             "We should by no means let more than 10 per cent of Serbs be here

15     ever again, because that's where we were cut off."

16             Where the president said "not even 10 per cent," I have some

17     difficulties in reconciling your interpretation of what President Tudjman

18     said to Mr. Holbrooke, Clark, and Galbraith with what he says to

19     Mr. Radic.  Could you help me out?

20             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic.

22             MR. MISETIC:  I'm not sure if -- well --

23             JUDGE ORIE:  No.  Let --

24             MR. MISETIC:  I think we established yesterday what we were

25     talking about.

Page 24987

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I would like to -- yes.  Nevertheless, would I

 2     like to put this to the witness.

 3        A.   Your Honours, I can assist you.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Please.

 5        A.   Thank you, Your Honour.

 6             This was, of course, a private conversation between Jure Radic

 7     and the president that I was not familiar with.  This is the first time I

 8     see the transcript.  But in the transcript it says very clearly that

 9     Jure Radic says that in that area there should be no more than

10     10 per cent of Serbs, rather than only 10 per cent of Serbs or less

11     should return to the Republic of Croatia.  This is a big difference.

12     Jure Radic is saying here that as many Croats as possible should be

13     returned to this area so that the number of Serbs in the area would be

14     less than 10 per cent.  And, frankly, there was not a session of the

15     government or the VONS, the security for the protection of national

16     security, where this was mentioned.  These are the positions at the time

17     of the minister who was in charge of demographic reconstruction and who

18     believed that this area that had been vacated by both Serbs and Croats

19     should be repopulated by as many Croats as possible.  That was the issue,

20     rather than the issue of return of Serbs to Croatia, but that as many

21     Croats should be brought to this area as possible.  And of course, these

22     were the views that were never realised, and there was never any session

23     of the Croatian government where any conclusion of this kind was adopted.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  What was the percentage of Serbs in the area

25     referred to before Operation Storm?

Page 24988

 1        A.   In that area, and it was an area with mixed population, so

 2     probably there were equal per cents.  I don't know exactly, but I suppose

 3     that in the wider area there were equal numbers of Serbs and Croats,

 4     perhaps even some more Serbs.  It depends on the area that Jure Radic had

 5     in his mind.  And I don't know which exact area he had in his mind here,

 6     but it was an area with a mixed population of Serbs and Croats.  I don't

 7     know exactly because I cannot see from this which area he had in mind and

 8     how large an area.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Do the words "We should by no means let more

10     than 10 per cent of Serbs be here ever again," is that just mathematics,

11     or is it more?

12        A.   I think this only refers to mathematics.  Obviously, Jure Radic

13     had an idea that as many Croats as possible should inhabit this empty

14     area.  And let me also say that none of these ideas ever came into being,

15     and no topic similar to this one was ever addressed at the meeting of the

16     Croatian government.  There were discussions about the return of Croats

17     from the world, but I should note that the Croats who had fled Serbia,

18     most of them ended up in big cities and the majority of them in Zagreb.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  So you say that limiting Serbs to live in the area

20     referred to by the number of 10 per cent never was government policy.

21        A.   Yes, absolutely so.  The government never made any such decision

22     nor discussed that, at least as far as I can remember, and so far I have

23     quite a good recollection.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Do you agree that from what we read here that the --

25     President Tudjman was even more strict where he said "not even 10

Page 24989

 1     per cent"?  Even if it's not -- I'm now talking about his personal

 2     attitude and his personal approach to the matter.

 3        A.   Of course, Your Honour, I'm commenting on something that I see

 4     for the first time now.  However, I know that President Tudjman had the

 5     idea that as many Croats as possible from around the world should return

 6     to Croatia once an Independent State of Croatia was constituted.  That

 7     was one of his sincere ideas that never came into being in any respect.

 8             Another idea was that the area that was empty, and that continues

 9     to be empty to this day, should be populated by as many Croats as

10     possible.  This is another idea that never came into being in any way,

11     but it was not an idea or -- and it did not have anything to do with

12     preventing the return of Serbs to Croatia.  He just wanted more Croats to

13     live there.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now let's -- if you have a room where there's

15     place for ten people, if I say I want nine places for ethnicity A,

16     wouldn't it true that there's only one place left for the other

17     ethnicity?  I mean, I'm just trying to understand --

18             MR. MISETIC:  Judge, this is outside the context of the

19     transcript.  If we could refer to the transcript --

20             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm asking -- I'm testing the reasoning of this

21     witness, not specifically in relation to this.

22             Please proceed, Mr. Granic.

23        A.   Your Honour, this has been an empty space.  It was empty, and it

24     is still empty.  It's poorly developed economically.  And the president's

25     thoughts were certainly focused on strategic issues, because this was an

Page 24990

 1     area where the Serbs in Croatia had rebelled.  This was an area that had

 2     seen 14.000 casualties and 36.000 wounded.  And the first assessment was

 3     that the damage was 37 billion US dollars.  And when president was

 4     thinking about this, this was what he had in mind, rather than that he

 5     was against the return of the Serbs.  These were his thoughts.

 6             That is what, I suppose, the president was thinking.  And after

 7     the Operation Storm and after some time, we introduced some areas where

 8     special care was needed, where we stimulated both Croats and Serbs to

 9     live in these areas.  The taxation was reduced.  There were special

10     stimulants introduced in the municipalities, and still it did not

11     contribute to an increase of the number of Croats who would return to

12     these areas, not at all.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you for those answers, Mr. Granic.

14             Mr. Waespi, you were the last for re-cross, and as often, the

15     Chamber put the questions.  Any need to put further questions to the

16     witness?

17             MR. WAESPI:  Thanks for the invitation.  No questions.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Any further questions from any of the Defence teams?

19             MR. MIKULICIC:  No questions, Your Honour.

20             MR. MISETIC:  Yes, Mr. President, if I may quickly.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  In we could limit to --

22             MR. MISETIC:  Five minutes.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  That's fine.  Then at least I'm saying yes, but I'm

24     hoping to get the support from those assisting us.  Please proceed.

25             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

Page 24991

 1                           Further cross-examination by Mr. Misetic:

 2        Q.   Mr. Granic, the transcript on the screen, you were asked about

 3     limited space.  And if we look at what's actually discussed, we talked

 4     about this yesterday.  First of all, the territory in question is the

 5     Petrova and Zrinska Gora, which you circled on the map; but secondly,

 6     what Radic says is, "There where we have to establish some kind of a city

 7     sooner or later."  Mr. Radic is actually talking about not using -- not

 8     simply using the available facilities there, but actually building a city

 9     right in that location, and it's -- because it's a strategic area of

10     Croatia where it could easy be cut off and was cut off during the war;

11     correct?

12        A.   Correct.  That's what the first area to be cut off.

13        Q.   Okay.  Now --

14        A.   Together with Knin, that was the first area.

15        Q.   Let's put everything back in the context of this war.  And let me

16     point out something that General Mrksic testified about when he was here

17     in front of the Chamber, and he said this three times.  I'll refer to it

18     just once, which is at transcript page 1905, line 20, is where it begins.

19     And General Mrksic's theme was:

20             "We didn't have an army and a people; we had an armed people."

21             Now that was the perception of -- two weeks after Operation Storm

22     of many in the Croatian government; correct?

23        A.   Yes, correct.

24        Q.   Now, you were asked about the Brioni meeting.

25             MR. MISETIC:  And if I could please have Exhibit D1454, please.

Page 24992

 1             Mr. Granic, what's going to be shown to you is a transcript of

 2     the VONS meeting on the 3rd of August.  You are present at that meeting.

 3     Also present is every important minister of the government as well as the

 4     prime minister, and you've already testified this is where the decision

 5     to launch Operation Storm happened.  We talked about civil rights,

 6     toboze, civil rights, et cetera.  But let's quickly take a look at what

 7     was discussed about that issue.  If we can go to page 5 in the English,

 8     please.

 9             This is -- and I'm going to go through this quickly, Mr. Granic.

10     This is where Mr. Zuzul talks about the American conditions and the need

11     to protect civil rights.

12             If we could go to page 8, please.  Towards the bottom Mr. Jarnjak

13     is speaking, and he says -- I'm sorry, this is where you were speaking,

14     and you also convey the messages concerning the need for protection and

15     respect of human rights.  That's there.

16             If we go -- there are several other entries, and I'll just for

17     the record to save time, they are at page 9, page 11, and page 12 of

18     the -- this transcript concerning the issue of protection of human

19     rights.  Mr. Susak in the transcript says that he had met with

20     Mr. Jarnjak and the security plan was prepared.  And if we go to page 22,

21     please.

22             The president there says, towards the bottom:

23             "Very well let's go to work.  I haven't heard the opinion on

24     this.  I said I thought I should address the Serb population.  We would

25     call the Serbs to lay down their weapons.  At the same time, we could say

Page 24993

 1     that we would vouch for their civil rights, and after that the

 2     implementation of the elections in the spirit of the law and so forth.

 3     We would also tell the international community that the Serbs do not

 4     accept a peaceful solution.  So do you think that it would be sufficient

 5     to address only the Serbs?  I have to sign that appeal to them."

 6             Then there's people interrupting saying, "Only the Serbs for

 7     now."

 8             Now, the meeting of VONS, Mr. Granic, the only -- as it concerns

 9     civil rights, the only discussion was about protecting security,

10     providing security, and appealing for people to stay, and guaranteeing

11     their civil rights; correct?

12        A.   Yes, correct.  And I remember well this meeting, and I said

13     myself that our friends from the world are mentioning this as the

14     priority.

15        Q.   Last question:  Have you ever seen a document of any kind from

16     any ministry, police, army, anywhere, an order that would indicate that

17     the Croatian government was issuing orders or implementing plans to do

18     anything other than protect and guarantee civil rights?

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi.

20             MR. WAESPI:  That doesn't arise of --

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, to some extent it does, but at the same

22     time -- please answer the question, Mr. Granic.  It could be a short

23     answer.  Yes or a no would do, as far as I'm concerned.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have never seen anything like

25     that.

Page 24994

 1             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. Granic.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Granic, this concludes your evidence.  I'd like

 3     to thank you very much for coming to The Hague, for spending quite a

 4     couple of days with us and for having answered all the questions that

 5     were put to you and by the parties and by the Bench, and I'm happy that

 6     you're able to leave on this Friday, and I wish you a safe return home

 7     again.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  I don't think that at this moment there's any

10     procedural issue to be raised.  Therefore, we then adjourn, and we will

11     resume on Monday, the 23rd of November, 9.00, in Courtroom III.

12                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.52 p.m.,

13                           to be reconvened on Monday, the 23rd day

14                           of November, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.