121022ED

Page 437

1 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zivanovic.

2 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you, Your Honours.

3 Cross-examination by Mr. Zivanovic: [Continued]

4 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Dzakula.

5 A. Good morning.

6 Q. Let us first clarify one thing that you already mentioned on

7 Friday. That reference to the incidents that took place in the first

8 month of 1991 and that were directed against the Serbs in Croatia. Can

9 you please tell us, were there many such incidents?

10 A. Yes, there were.

11 Q. Thank you. Among other things during your examination-in-chief,

12 spoke about the referendum that -- or, rather, two referenda that were

13 held in Croatia before the cessation and that were actually held by the

14 Krajina Serbs as well as in the regions where Serbs lived. Among other

15 things, you explained the difference in the question on referendum posed

16 in SAO Krajina because the question there was whether they wanted to join

17 with Serbia, unlike the other regions, like Slavonia, Baranja, and

18 Western Srem, where the question was whether they wanted to remain in

19 Yugoslavia.

20 Can you tell us what were the results of these referenda and,

21 more specifically, do you know what position was taken by the Serbian

22 authorities, or the Assembly of Serbia, with respect to the referendum

23 that was held in Krajina; that is to say, with the question, do you want

24 to join Serbia. Did Serbia accept such an aspiration or not?

25 A. I don't remember what was the position of the Assembly of Serbia.

Page 438

1 All I remember is that during negotiations prior to the referendum,

2 Milosevic was against the procedure that was implemented in SAO Krajina.

3 Regarding the unification with Serbia, he said that he can support only

4 our wish to remain within Yugoslavia. Now as for any support on the part

5 of the assembly, I don't know about that.

6 Q. After that referendum, do you know if some joint organs of Serbia

7 and SAO Krajina were created. Were some MPs from Krajina admitted into

8 the Assembly of Serbia, provided that they wanted it to become part of

9 Serbia?

10 A. No, not that I remember.

11 Q. Thank you. You spoke extensively, and many questions were put to

12 you concerning Vojislav Seselj, his activities, and his views, including

13 the issues that related to the Serbian Radical Party that he was the

14 president of and the Serbian Chetnik movement.

15 My question is: The Serbian Radical Party and the

16 Serbian Chetnik movement, the period 1990/1993, were they in power in

17 Serbia? Or were they opposition?

18 A. They were opposition.

19 Q. Was the situation identical in Montenegro?

20 A. As far as I can remember, Seselj was not present in Montenegro.

21 Q. I wasn't referring to Seselj in terms of his being in Montenegro.

22 I was just referring whether he -- to the fact that I want to know if the

23 Radical Party was there in opposition as well.

24 A. Yes. As far as I can remember, they were in opposition as well.

25 Q. The same situation prevailed in the Yugoslav parliament. Would

Page 439

1 you agree with me?

2 A. [No interpretation]

3 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter's note: The witness responded

4 yes, I would.

5 Could the counsel please repeat the question.

6 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zivanovic, the interpreters noted --

7 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I note it, Your Honour.

8 Q. [Interpretation] Can you please repeat your answer to the

9 question whether the same situation prevailed in the Yugoslav parliament,

10 whether he was in opposition. I am talking about Seselj and his radical

11 party.

12 A. Seselj's radical party was in opposition in the Yugoslav

13 parliament as well.

14 Q. Was the situation the same in Slavonia, Baranja, and

15 Western Srem?

16 A. Yes. Because as soon as the war started in Krajina, there were

17 no parliamentary activities any longer, so there were no political

18 parties active either in the authorities or in the opposition. The

19 parliament of the Serbian Krajina was not made up of political parties.

20 Q. The similar situation was in Western Slavonia. He was not in

21 power, or, rather, the Serbian Radical Party was not in power there

22 either.

23 A. No, they weren't.

24 MR. STRINGER: Excuse me, counsel, I apologise for the

25 interruption. I'm just looking at page 4, line 21 where the transcript

Page 440

1 reads that: "Because as soon as the war started in Krajina, there were

2 no" -- oh, parliamentary, I'm sorry. I saw the word "paramilitary" but I

3 was misreading it. My apologies.

4 MR. ZIVANOVIC:

5 Q. [Interpretation] So let me just finish with this. According to

6 your knowledge, the Serbian Radical Party was in opposition later in

7 Republika Srpska, i.e., in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

8 A. Yes, that is correct. The Serbian Radical Party was in

9 opposition later in Republika Srpska as well.

10 Q. At the moment, I'm interested in the following: You said that

11 the programme of the Serbian Radical Party and the Serbian Chetnik

12 movement, if I'm not wrong, was to have the boundary of Serbia

13 encompassing certain parts of the federal units that, at that time, were

14 part of Yugoslavia. There was mention of some regions in Croatia,

15 Macedonia, et cetera.

16 At that time - and I'm talking about the 1990s - were there any

17 political parties that believed that Croatia should include parts of

18 other federal units, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina or Serbia? Let me be

19 more specific. I know that there were some parties there who believed

20 that Croatia should occupy even the area of Zemun, which is a Belgrade

21 neighbourhood. Do you remember the existence of any such parties in

22 Croatia?

23 A. Initially these political options were on the table, but it turns

24 out that the HDZ continued claiming certain territories in

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Page 441

1 Q. There were extremist political parties in Croatia, or would you

2 describe them as such?

3 A. Yes, there were Croatian extremists parties in Croatia.

4 Q. But they were not in power there either.

5 A. No, they were not in power.

6 Q. Thank you. The Prosecutor asked you about item 5 of the

7 programme of the Serbian Chetnik movement; that's Prosecution Exhibit 16.

8 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have it on our

9 screens once again. And I'm particularly interested in one section that

10 I think was left out. And I'm talking about item 5.

11 Q. I don't know if you can see it.

12 A. I can see it, but --

13 Q. If you have problems, I can give a copy to you so that you can

14 look at it.

15 A. Yes. Now I can see it now.

16 Q. They are talking here -- maybe I should read it. It's very

17 short:

18 "Systematic, economic and political effort to enable all members

19 of the Serbian ethnic minority in Albania, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and

20 Greece to resettle to Serbia as well as to allow all Serbian emigrants in

21 European and trans-Atlantic countries who so wish to return."

22 Is the emphasis here on the resettlement only on those who want

23 to return?

24 A. Well, that's what it says at the very end of this statement.

25 Q. The reason I'm asking you about this is that early 1990s or prior

Page 442

1 to 1990s, would you agree that a lot of people used to live abroad for a

2 variety of reasons, whether they be economic, political, or some other

3 reasons and that this was nothing uncommon in Serbia, Croatia, and all

4 other republics?

5 A. Yes, I remember that.

6 Q. Do you remember that in 1990, the Yugoslav authorities advocated

7 such policy that would include all emigres, not only Serbs, and that they

8 would be granted return - provided they wished to do so - to their home

9 country and that proper living conditions should be secured for them?

10 A. Yes, there were such kind of invitations.

11 Q. Let me ask you something else. I'm not going to dwell too much

12 about the historical background that you provided with regard to the

13 Chetniks and Ustasha. I don't think that this is so important at this

14 juncture.

15 Can you tell me this: Do you know that Goran Hadzic was on --

16 engaged in a very vehement argument with Dr. Vojislav Seselj?

17 A. I don't know about that, whether that was the case or when. I

18 know that one of his associates from the government of SBWS was

19 Mr. Leskovac, who was the president of the Serbian Radical Party for that

20 region of Slavonia.

21 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Zivanovic, the last exchange, I'm not clear as

22 to whether the argument of which you asked was -- you're talking about

23 one event or whether you're talking about a prolonged disagreement.

24 Could you expand on that, please.

25 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes, I'll do Your Honours.

Page 443

1 JUDGE HALL: Thanks.

2 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Tell me this, please: Did you see in the media as of 1992 or

4 1993 that Mr. Seselj attacked verbally Goran Hadzic, accusing him of

5 criminal conduct, betrayal, and whatnot?

6 A. Yes, for a short while, although I don't remember when exactly.

7 Seselj's practice was that one day he would be on very good terms with

8 someone, and the next day he attacked them. On the third day, they would

9 get together again, and so on and so forth. So I was never able to judge

10 when he was on honestly good terms with anyone. I never agreed with him

11 because I just couldn't go back and forth like that. As for the people

12 he attacked, it turns out that they partnered with him quite regularly

13 too.

14 Q. You will remember that in 1993 in Republika Srpska Krajina there

15 were presidential elections.

16 A. Yes, that was in late 1993.

17 Q. Do you remember who were the presidential candidates running for

18 office?

19 A. I think Milan Babic, Milan Martic, Goran Hadzic. Well, I was in

20 jail at the moment, receiving some special treatment, so I can't recall

21 all the details very well.

22 Q. Yes, indeed. Your stay in prison occurred at the same time as

23 the electoral campaign that I wanted to ask you about. But let me ask

24 you this: Who did Dr. Vojislav Seselj support at those elections?

25 A. I think he supported Milan Martic, although I'm not certain. I

Page 444

1 believe I said Martic, and I see Babic in the transcript.

2 Q. Do you agree with me that he supported Milan Martic because he

3 didn't see eye to eye with Goran Hadzic, politically speaking; otherwise

4 he probably would have supported Hadzic?

5 A. Yes, most likely. As it turned out, Goran Hadzic lost the

6 election.

7 Q. Thank you. You mentioned Rade Leskovac. Do you recall when the

8 Serb Radical Party for Krajina was established?

9 A. You mean the SAO Krajina or Republika Srpska Krajina?

10 Q. Either way. When was the party established in order to cover

11 that area?

12 A. At the beginning of the war, I believe.

13 Q. Let me ask you this then: Do you know whether Rade Leskovac at

14 the time when he was, I believe, deputy minister in the SBWS government,

15 was he a member of the SDS? Was he elected as a member of the SDS?

16 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Serb Radical Party.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know he spoke on behalf of the

18 Serb Radical Party, although I don't know how he was appointed.

19 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Before becoming a member of the Serb Radical Party, do you know

21 if he had been a member of another party?

22 A. He probably had been, although I don't know which one. Perhaps

23 the League of Communists? I'm not sure.

24 Q. I had the SDS in mind, the Serb Democratic Party.

25 A. I don't recall that, because he did not attend the meetings of

Page 445

1 either the regional board or any others. I didn't see him at our

2 gatherings until the beginning of the war, or for as long as our region

3 functioned as such, as well as the SDS.

4 Q. You met Goran Hadzic in the -- at the Obrovac meeting in

5 March 1991. Until June, until the conversation you discussed with the

6 Prosecutor, did you have occasion to see him at that time; that is to

7 say, between late March 1991 and the Obrovac meeting and your meeting in

8 Belgrade which occurred in late June 1991, as you said?

9 A. Yes, I did meet with Goran Hadzic sometime in April or May. He

10 seemed quite depressed at the time. He was down after the time he had

11 spent in jail and one could observe a change in him. He was quite

12 introvert and no longer spoke out clearly and loudly. He seemed in a bad

13 mood.

14 Q. Why did you see each other in April or May; and where?

15 A. We met in Borovo Selo upon his release from prison. I was there

16 when he came out and we talked then.

17 Q. What did you talk about in Borovo Selo, and how come you were

18 there since you did not live there?

19 A. That is correct, I do not live there, and I did not live there.

20 But since I was in contact with Mr. Degoricija, who was directly involved

21 in having Mr. Goran Hadzic released from prison, I was asked by him to be

22 in Borovo Selo when Goran returned, to help him out as a human being,

23 because he had had a hard time in prison. That was the main reason why.

24 I simply wanted to wait for Goran to arrive because we were in the same

25 political party and serving on its Main Board. We were also on our way

Page 449

1 betrayed at the time, and we also felt that someone was trying to use our

2 trust to further their own agenda. And, of course, it had a certain

3 impact on the sentiment in the area.

4 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Let us try to clear up one thing you said a moment ago. You said

6 Goran Hadzic remained living in Borovo Selo. Do you assert that, or do

7 you know that, or is that an assumption, or simply a mistake?

8 A. No, I didn't mean solely Borovo Selo. I was talking about the

9 general area of Eastern Slavonia and Western Srem. That's what I had in

10 mind.

11 Q. Mr. Dzakula, do you know whether representatives of SBWS,

12 sometime in April 1991, had some talks with the then-US Ambassador to

13 Belgrade, Mr. Warren Zimmermann?

14 A. No, I'm not aware of that, and, therefore, I cannot remember.

15 Q. I have information that you were involved in these talks, but

16 it's probably erroneous. I'm going to check it.

17 Can you tell me this: Did you have a meeting - and I'm talking

18 about the regional board of the SDS -- did the board hold a meeting in

19 the village of Pacetin in April or May 1991?

20 A. I don't remember that. I know that there was a meeting in

21 Slavonia and Baranja, and I think it took place in Beli Manastir when

22 Mr. Vojo Vukcevic was under pressure and there were requests for his

23 resignation. That was in Beli Manastir. As for Pacetin, I don't

24 remember attending that meeting.

25 Q. You know that Goran Hadzic used to live in the village of Pacetin

Page 450

1 at the time.

2 A. Yes, I know that he was born there and that he lived there.

3 Q. If I told you a detail which says that this meeting was suspended

4 at one point in time due to a telephone call for Mr. Ecimovic, who -- no,

5 sorry, not, Ecimovic. Sasic, who was also present at this meeting and

6 actually the call had come from Mr. Degoricija. Would that refresh your

7 memory?

8 A. I don't know why, but I keep thinking that this was the

9 Beli Manastir meeting that had to do with Vojo Vukcevic. That's the one

10 I remember. I don't remember the other one.

11 Q. And was this meeting interrupted due to a telephone call by

12 Mr. Degoricija to Mr. Sasic?

13 A. I know that Mr. Sasic said that there was a telephone call for

14 him, but I don't remember any further details.

15 Q. You spoke about a meeting that you had in late June 1991 in

16 Belgrade and your encounter with Mr. Goran Hadzic. Was that an

17 accidental meeting or was that something that was pre-arranged?

18 A. I think that we had agreed to meet in Belgrade.

19 Q. Can you remember how you reached this agreement?

20 A. Probably by the phone.

21 Q. Do you remember, was it you who called him?

22 A. I don't know who called whom, but I think we communicated on the

23 phone.

24 Q. You had his telephone number at the time, didn't you?

25 A. I probably did. I don't know. That's how we communicated.

Page 451

1 Q. Do you know at all where he was living at the time?

2 A. I think in Pacetin.

3 Q. And you had his phone number there?

4 A. Well, I know I had a telephone number, but I cannot remember

5 where that phone was, in which place. All I know is that we agreed on --

6 on the phone.

7 Q. What was the reason for that meeting between the two of you,

8 regardless of whether you called him or not. Because if you called him,

9 apparently you had a reason to meet with him and vice versa. If he

10 called you, he had a reason to see you. Can you tell me what was the

11 reason?

12 A. As far as I can remember, the purpose was for us to exchange

13 information about what was happening all over the place. We hadn't seen

14 reach other for quite a long time and that was one of the additional

15 reasons for us to meet. And, now, looking back, I think that one of the

16 reasons was the establishment of the Serbian Democratic Forum, which took

17 place in Lipik. It's just coming back to my memory at this moment.

18 Q. You said that that occurred in late June 1991. Can you please

19 tell me, correct me if I'm wrong, I know that on the 25th of June, the --

20 Croatia declared its independence and that was followed by Slovenia on

21 the 26th of June. So that was the period when these two former Yugoslav

22 republics declared their independence.

23 A. Yes, that is correct. That was the date when Croatia and

24 Slovenia declared their independence.

25 Q. According to the information that I have, on that same day, JNA

Page 452

1 units set off from Slovenia. They left their barracks and -- in Slovenia

2 and Croatia; do you remember that?

3 A. Yes, I do. I'm waiting for the interpretation.

4 Q. Practically this engagement of the army in a way was a kind of

5 premonition of the war that was coming. Would you agree with me?

6 A. Yes. Yes, that indicated that war was coming, in a certain way.

7 Q. JNA unit already faced armed resistance on both the part of the

8 Slovenian forces and the Croatian forces. Do you agree?

9 A. Yes. As far as I can remember, they were faced with the

10 resistance only by the Slovenian territorials; whereas, Croatia didn't

11 interfere at that juncture at all, which was heavily criticised by the

12 Slovenians.

13 Q. Let us clarify this point. The -- Croatia didn't interfere. In

14 other words, it did -- is not [as interpreted] prevent the JNA from

15 passing through on their way from Slovenia. Do you think that that was

16 the reason for the criticism that came from Slovenia?

17 A. If I remember correctly, Slovenia criticised Croatia for not

18 reacting in a similar way as Slovenia did; but they, rather, let all

19 these forces pass through and leave Slovenia.

20 Q. In this context of all these developments, and you will remember

21 that that was the time when mobilisation started - it even started even

22 earlier - but at the time, reservists were being mobilised in Serbia

23 [Realtime transcript read in error "Slovenia"], Bosnia-Herzegovina, and

24 even in Croatia.

25 A. Yes, I heard of the mobilisation of JNA reservists.

Page 453

1 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] I think that in the transcript

2 instead of "Slovenia" it should read "Serbia," that the mobilisation was

3 carried out in Bosnia and Serbia.

4 Q. In that context, can you please tell me how did you understand

5 this? You said that Goran Hadzic had told you that he was going to war.

6 Now, against the backdrop of all these developments, how did you construe

7 those words of his, if those were his actual words, as you claim, that he

8 was going to war?

9 A. He didn't say those words, I'm going to war. That's for sure.

10 Secondly, as far as I remember, there were skirmishes already breaking

11 out in Slavonia. There was shooting which also indicated the beginning

12 of a war. That is the reason why I understood his position to be that he

13 was going to war, because, similarly, the war in Krajina was already

14 starting at that time.

15 Q. At the time, towards the end of June 1991, what kind of powers or

16 authority did Goran Hadzic have to decide whether to go to war or not to

17 go to war? Did he had -- any armed force at his disposal that he could

18 engage in order to go to war? Except, of course, of what every citizen

19 was subjected to, and that is mobilisation.

20 A. No, he didn't have any powers or -- nor did he have any armed

21 force at the time. However, he told me he had a meeting with a retired

22 general. He did mention his name, but I can't remember it. And after

23 that meeting, the two of us met. That's why I feel that that was his

24 sentiment at the time that he was on the right path and that his decision

25 was right.

Page 454

1 As I say, I don't know what he specifically discussed with this

2 man, but, after that conversation, he made this decision.

3 As I said, he did mention his name, although this name didn't

4 mean much to me at the time. Therefore, I didn't remember it.

5 Q. So my basic question is: How did you understand his statement

6 that he was going to war?

7 A. Well, in the event of war, he would support such an option and

8 that he would find a way to become involved in it somehow.

9 Q. The Prosecution showed you Exhibit 22. It's an article from

10 "Politika" daily of 26 September 1991. If necessary, I can give you a

11 hard copy of the article if you can't see well, although I'm not going to

12 ask you about details of the article.

13 Can you please look at the subheading where it says that a

14 constitutional law was adopted and they explain what this was about. And

15 if you read the last sentence in the subheading -- or I'm going to read

16 it to you:

17 "The law will be in effect provisionally until the Yugoslav

18 crisis is resolved."

19 You know that, on the 25th of June, Croatia declared independence

20 and Slavonia did so on the 26th of June. Do you remember that under the

21 agreement with the then-European community, it was agreed for these

22 decisions not to be implemented until the 8th of October, 1991?

23 A. Yes, I do. That the -- I remember that the European community

24 wanted a moratorium to be imposed on any decisions taken by any republic

25 in that period.

Page 455

1 Q. And it was done precisely because there were attempts to resolve

2 the Yugoslav crisis by political means in order to avoid a war. Do you

3 agree?

4 A. I do agree that it was just one of many attempts to try to

5 resolve the conflict peacefully.

6 Q. Do you agree with this assertion that the law was to be in effect

7 only until the Yugoslav crisis is resolved, as it says here? Yes, so:

8 "This law will be in effect provisionally until the Yugoslav

9 crisis is resolved."

10 So that it is --

11 A. Well, if I read what it says, one could interpret it that way. I

12 did not, however, take part in the drafting of that law, and I was

13 unaware of its true meaning.

14 Q. In my understanding, if the Yugoslav crisis had been resolved

15 politically at the time, in other words, had Croatia remained part of the

16 Yugoslav federation, this law would not have been in effect any longer.

17 Do you agree with my interpretation?

18 A. I can suppose as much by looking at the last sentence from the

19 subheading only.

20 Q. Tell me this: In 1991, when in a way it was becoming obvious

21 that Yugoslavia as a state was in a state of crisis, do you know that

22 many governments and many international organisations supported the

23 territorial integrity of Yugoslavia in 1991?

24 A. Yes, that was the impression that most of us had, that the

25 international community was in favour of preserving Yugoslavia within its

Page 456

1 boundaries, which, at the time, were internationally recognised.

2 Q. Let us establish another thing. As of June, when you had that

3 meeting in Belgrade, in 1991, until December, when there were some

4 further discussions surrounding the Vance Plan, you did not meet

5 Goran Hadzic anymore?

6 A. As far as I recall, I did not. Not until early December.

7 Perhaps the 8th or 9th.

8 Q. You also testified about the establishment of the Serb democratic

9 forum. Among other members, Dr. Jovan Raskovic was also a member of the

10 SDF, perhaps even its president; am I correct?

11 A. He was present at Lipik at the founding assembly but he was not

12 its president. The organisation was then presided by

13 Mr. Milorad Pupovac, but Jovan Raskovic was present, as well as

14 Dusan Zelenbaba, Jovan Opacic, and some others from Knin who were in the

15 SDS leadership at the time.

16 Q. Please clarify for us who Dr. Jovan Raskovic was, briefly.

17 A. Dr. Jovan Raskovic was a member of the academy of sciences, an

18 intellectual and the SDS president in Croatia. He was its founder and

19 one of the people who initiated its founding. That is in briefest terms.

20 Q. By profession he was a physician?

21 A. Yes. He specialised in psychiatry.

22 Q. We were told before that within the SDS there was a hard-line as

23 well as the softer line, so to speak. Where would you place him within

24 that range? Which line did he belong to?

25 A. Dr. Jovan Raskovic represented the moderate democratic line of

Page 457

1 the SDS, or faction of the SDS.

2 Q. Where did he reside in 1990 and 1991?

3 A. In Sibenik, in Croatia, on the Adriatic Coast.

4 Q. Sibenik was never part of the SAO or Republika Srpska Krajina,

5 was it?

6 A. No. Sibenik was never within the SAO Krajina or

7 Republika Srpska.

8 Q. Do you know that the Croatian authorities prohibited

9 Dr. Jovan Raskovic from coming to Sibenik?

10 A. I do recall that. And I also recall that his house or flat was

11 ransacked, looted.

12 Q. Do you know that there were negotiations conducted with the

13 Croatian authorities about his return?

14 A. Yes. As far as I recall, there were some talks along that line.

15 Q. Do you remember who participated in that exercise on the Croatian

16 and Serbian side?

17 A. I think Professor Raskovic himself, as well as Vojo Vukcevic on

18 the Serb side; on the Croatian side I think there was Tudjman and an

19 advisor of his who was recording it all, if that's the part of the

20 conversation you have in mind.

21 Q. Are you talking about a conversation which was secretly recorded

22 and later publicised, made use of, as a pretext, as an excuse for having

23 Dr. Raskovic removed from his position. Is that the conversation you're

24 referring to?

25 A. Yes. Apologies. I have that meeting in mind which was attended

Page 458

1 by Mr. Raskovic which was also secretly recorded without his knowledge

2 and then published in the media in order to comprise his position.

3 As for another meeting, and that's what I had in mind, I don't

4 recall that one in particular. I know there were attempts at different

5 meetings and that Raskovic tried time and again, but unless you specify

6 it exactly, I am a not sure what happened and when.

7 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zivanovic. Mr. Zivanovic, I would like to

8 have clarified what position of Mr. - what is his name? - Raskovic was

9 in danger because of this negotiations and who did record them.

10 I -- the witness said:

11 "I have that meeting in mind which was attended by Mr. Raskovic

12 which was secretly recorded without his knowledge," so I would like to

13 know who recorded it, "and then published in the media in order to

14 compromise his position."

15 This position is what?

16 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. What was Mr. Raskovic's position at the time when the

18 conversation was secretly recorded?

19 A. Politically speaking, he was the president of the SDS in Croatia.

20 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [In English] I would refer now on our Exhibit 21.

21 It is one of the exhibit that should not be present at the screen. And

22 my line of questions will go to this, but it is for your information or

23 for the information of Your Honours and my friends from the Prosecution.

24 JUDGE DELVOIE: No need to go into private session,

25 Mr. Zivanovic?

Page 471

1 THE REGISTRAR: We're back in open session, Your Honours. Thank

2 you.

3 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.

4 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. According to your testimony, only two days later, two days after

6 your peace initiative, on the 14th of August units of the MUP of Croatia

7 got into Okucani and that was when fighting started.

8 A. Yes. No more than two days later, the Croatian police got into

9 Okucani. According to what my friends told me, there -- that was quite

10 timid an attack, so the local population managed to repel that first

11 attack without the assistance from the JNA or anyone else. But then the

12 attack was restaged in the afternoon, and the JNA emerged as a force that

13 would separate the warring parties, as it were.

14 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Dzakula, could you please give us the date of

15 that first attack, just because there's something not really clear in the

16 transcript? The date of the -- of that first attack by the Croatian

17 forces.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, on the 14th of

19 August, Okucani came under attack from the Croatian police forces; that's

20 to say, the Okucani inhabitants did.

21 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You're welcome.

23 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. In your area among the people you knew, was it interpreted by

25 anyone as a response to your peace initiative?

Page 472

1 A. It was by some. Others thought that it was a game of nerves,

2 because there were tensions on both sides. Both sides were anticipating

3 an attack to come from the other side, as it were. So that's how the

4 Okucani reaction came about. Anyway, the event did upset the local

5 population, and some of my friends felt that the peace initiative that I

6 pushed for did not stand a chance, really.

7 Q. And immediately thereafter, you had some troubles with

8 Mr. Vezmar, virtually the following day.

9 A. Yes. He's my nemesis.

10 Q. During examination-in-chief, two documents were shown to you.

11 Just for the sake of refreshing our memories, let's look at them again.

12 Let's start with P24. It's a request send by the commander of the

13 Territorial Defence. The name is illegible, but it is addressed to the

14 Serbian Radical Party in Belgrade in which he is asking for volunteers to

15 be dispatched. You remember that? I'm sure you have seen this.

16 A. Yes, I do.

17 Q. At the same time, we can also take a look at P26. It's been

18 shown to you as well. And I think that it's also being sent by the

19 territorial staff of Territorial Defence of Podravska Slatina, but again,

20 I don't think we can clearly see the name of the person who signed it.

21 It's dated the 19th of October, 1991. And this is a repeated request for

22 volunteers from the Serbian Radical Party.

23 Now, what I'm interested in is the following: In October, when

24 these volunteers were requested, was there something significant going on

25 in Western Slavonia in that period?

Page 473

1 A. Yes, there was. On the 15th of October, 1991, a first exodus of

2 the population from the municipality of Grubisno Polje took place, and

3 they were joined by the army. When I say "the army," I mean the local

4 Territorial Defence and other local people because there were no JNA

5 units there.

6 When this exodus started, in military terms, it disrupted the

7 stability of the territory that was being defended at the time because it

8 directly jeopardised the position of Daruvar and Podravska Slatina

9 municipalities. This left a gap that was devoid or void of any

10 population or any local people who could put up any resistance or

11 defence.

12 Q. Speaking about an exodus of population and the abandonment of

13 this territory by the TO, you're talking about the Serbian population in

14 the Serb-held territories; is that correct?

15 A. Yes. I'm talking about the Serbian population and the Serbian

16 Territorial Defence of Grubisno Polje municipality.

17 Q. In a nutshell, this defence line or one section of that line that

18 existed until October 1991, was disrupted because there were no JNA units

19 deployed there and the TO also abandoned these positions. That is why

20 I'm under the impression that that was the reason why the TO commander

21 was asking the Serbian Radical Party to sent volunteers.

22 A. Well, that was not the only reason. These positions that they

23 themselves were holding - and I'm talking about Podravska Slatina TO -

24 they were undermanned and, therefore, it was impossible to close this gap

25 between the Serbs and the Croats. Therefore, I think that at the time

Page 474

1 they wanted to reinforce their ranks, although I cannot know exactly what

2 this commander had in mind as his aim because I was not in touch with

3 him.

4 Q. But, at any rate, one can say that the event that you have just

5 described that was happening on or around the 15th of October coincides,

6 in time, with these requests?

7 A. Yes, that happened immediately after these events. And also the

8 Territorial Defence of Daruvar municipality was rather shattered and was

9 going to pursue the same policy.

10 Q. Speaking about the exodus, as you said, the one that took place

11 on the 15th of October, was that the end of the exodus or was it

12 continued intermittently at a later stage? Later, of course.

13 A. The exodus continued in intervals. Around the 1st of November,

14 or maybe a little bit later, there was exodus of TO and population of

15 Daruvar. And then, on the 15th of December, Podravska Slatina did that,

16 then some parts of Orahovica, Slavonska Pozega, and then on

17 23rd of December, 1991, elements of the Territorial Defence of Pakrac

18 municipality all the way to the Pakrac-Pozega main road. They withdrew

19 from that area on the night between the 23rd and the 24th.

20 Q. And this was all Serbian population; right?

21 A. Yes, the whole population was Serb. There may have been a Croat

22 here and there, or some members of other ethnic communities, because

23 there were quite a few mixed marriages, but this was just a low number in

24 comparison with the entire population that was on the retreat. Because

25 we are talking about exclusively Serb villages. The people who lived in

Page 475

1 towns managed to flee in a different way, and here we are talking about

2 the rural population of that area, the Serb rural population.

3 Q. Do you perhaps know the number of the people involved? Roughly

4 speaking, of course. I'm not expecting you to give me a precise figure.

5 A. If you're going to discuss any total number of the Serbs in

6 Western Slavonia, there were some 80.000 of them there. As for the

7 number of people who fled at that point in time, well, about half of that

8 number, say 40- or 50.000 people, withdrew between the

9 15th of October and the 24th of December.

10 Q. Can you tell us where those people went once they left

11 Western Slavonia?

12 A. They went via Banja Luka. Some of them ended up in

13 Eastern Slavonia, in places like Ilok and Sarengrad, as well as other

14 towns in Baranja, Eastern Slavonia and Western Sirmium. Some ended up in

15 Vojvodina, while others went towards Serbia proper.

16 Q. Where did they find accommodation upon their departure from

17 Western Slavonia? Where were they accommodated in Vojvodina and Serbia?

18 A. Once they arrived in Banja Luka, first, they were accommodated in

19 reception centres. In Eastern Slavonia, I heard that they entered

20 Croatian villages, where Croats used to live. In Serbia, they placed

21 them in vacation centres, hotels, and refugee centres which were

22 established at the time. And they were many of those, in particular, in

23 Vojvodina and the environs of Belgrade.

24 Q. What happened with their houses in Western Slavonia? What

25 happened with the villages they abandoned? Who came there?

Page 476

1 A. Following the exodus, the villages were burned and looted in

2 succession, although some villages remained intact, such as Ceralije near

3 Slatina and Bastaj [phoen] near Daruvar. The villages that were well

4 developed were preserved and Croats from Kosovo were moved in. The other

5 villages were mined, torched and looted, and the remaining civilians were

6 killed.

7 Q. Who did all that? Who torched the villages and killed the

8 civilians who were left behind? Who set up explosives?

9 A. The Croatian army. In the words of Mr. Stipe Mesic, who was

10 Croatian president, apparently one of the ministers submitted a report to

11 President Tudjman that Western Slavonia was to be torched in three

12 shifts, meaning round the clock. They worked at it non-stop. It was all

13 done by the Croatian army.

14 Q. You spoke at length during examination-in-chief about the

15 Vance Plan. First of all, I'd like us to clarify something, because in

16 several places in the transcript, you used both "the Vance Plan" and "the

17 Vance-Owen Plan." Since, to my knowledge, these were two separate plans,

18 I wanted to know whether you were indeed discussing the two separate

19 plans, or did you have in mind only one, the Vance Plan, and the

20 Vance-Owen term, so to say, is when you misspoke?

21 A. I can't believe I mentioned the Vance-Owen Plan, although I

22 cannot be concern. If I did, I must have misspoken. The plan in

23 question is the Vance Plan, drafted by Cyrus Vance, a UN representative,

24 and was supposed to cover the Republic of Croatia.

25 Q. As far as I know, in the transcript, we find it on page 327 and

Page 477

1 onwards. I believe it was on the 18th and the 19th of October. Then we

2 have it at pages 368 and 377 on the 18th of October. It is on pages 326

3 to 330. It was used on multiple occasions, the term "Vance-Owen Plan."

4 This is what I want clarified: When you mentioned the

5 Vance-Owen Plan, it's a mistake. It should be the Vance Plan; correct?

6 A. Only the Vance Plan should be mentioned. Being as hard-headed as

7 I am, I believe I only discussed the Vance Plan rather than the

8 Vance-Owen Plan. I can't imagine myself making that mistake, but for the

9 sake of argument, let's say I did make a mistake. In any case, it is the

10 Vance Plan.

11 Q. It could be a mistake in the transcript, indeed. In any case,

12 that has been dealt with now.

13 I'm interested in this: Can you tell us when you learned for the

14 first time of this possibility that the UN were to be included in trying

15 to resolve the Yugoslav crisis by sending a peacekeeping force to former

16 Yugoslavia?

17 A. It was in early December, following the 2nd or the 5th of

18 December. I heard that there was some discussion about that and that an

19 agreement had been reached for peacekeeping forces to enter the area.

20 Q. Were you notified or do you know at all who asked for the

21 engagement of peacekeeping forces of the UN?

22 A. As far as I recall, Yugoslavia asked for it, although I am not

23 certain. Believe me, I was so deep in the problems of the people in

24 Western Slavonia and whether we would survive or not, since we were left

25 alone to our own devices and particularly because we were cut off from

Page 478

1 receiving media reports, that news only arrived subsequently, and once

2 you have information coming your way in that manner, it is difficult to

3 put them in sequence. We were completely cut off. At times, I was in

4 villages where there was no electricity, no telephone communication. We

5 could barely receive any news by radio. So the period of the exodus was

6 particularly difficult and cumbersome.

7 Q. In other words, in late 1991 and early 1992, you were busy

8 dealing with refugee problems in Western Slavonia, and you did not pay as

9 much attention to some other events happening elsewhere?

10 A. Well, if you will, as early as December 1991, in particular on

11 the 9th and the 12th of December, I participated at sessions of the

12 Yugoslav government, where the topic of the Vance Plan was discussed.

13 When I returned following the second session on the 12th of December, I

14 came upon the Serb exodus in Western Slavonia which took place on the

15 15th, on the 15th of December. I simply encountered the long columns of

16 people fleeing, and I was involved in these discussions of peace plans.

17 It was difficult to believe that at such a time when we were discussing a

18 peace process and the arrival of peacekeeping forces the entire area was

19 to be left void, empty of the population because no Serbs were left,

20 since so much pressure was exerted on them. So, on the one hand, I was

21 taking part in those talks, and at the same time people were leaving

22 Western Slavonia as the Vance Plan was being discussed.

23 Q. In the transcript, when discussing the Vance Plan on page 312,

24 lines 17 to -- through 20 you said that on the 2nd December, some

25 agreement was signed and that the Vance Plan was proposed.

Page 479

1 Could you clarify that part for us? Tell us what was it that was

2 signed, because I didn't understand that part? What was signed on the

3 2nd of December, 1991?

4 A. I always go back to that date, the 2nd of December, unless it was

5 the 2nd of January. Believe me, so many years later I can't recall. But

6 I think it was the 2nd of December when a peace agreement was signed in

7 Sarajevo between Yugoslavia and the UN about the Vance Plan and the

8 arrival of the Blue Helmets. I know that it was in Sarajevo, and I

9 believe it was on the 2nd of December when the peace agreement was

10 signed.

11 Q. I don't think the date is correct. I think you said the correct

12 date a moment ago. In any case, it's been a long time and no wonder you

13 may have made a mistake. You said that something was proposed, too, on

14 the 2nd of December. Can you remember what it was that was proposed?

15 A. Well, I seem to recall the peace plan, unless you can specify or

16 remind me of anything else. I don't remember anything else.

17 Q. On page 322, lines 2 through 12, you said that the leaders of the

18 Serb Autonomous District of the Serbian Krajina were against the plan

19 initially. When did you learn for the first time that Goran Hadzic was

20 against the plan? Was it at the Presidency session you attended or

21 later?

22 A. Well, there are minutes where you can read about Mr. Hadzic's

23 position. He attended one session, and he did not attend another. Babic

24 at the outset did not come at all because he was vehemently against it.

25 Mr. Hadzic and Ilija Koncarevic and the people around them defended their

Page 480

1 position by saying that it was unacceptable. I don't want to repeat the

2 entire minutes, but later on as it turned out, Mr. Hadzic accepted the

3 Vance Plan and he backed it up.

4 Q. I have minutes here from the Presidency session dated the

5 9th of December, 1991. Please bear with me.

6 Just one thing more before I show you the minutes. You said that

7 Goran Hadzic was in charge of negotiations with international

8 representatives and that Milosevic supported him in that? You recall

9 that?

10 A. I do recall having said that.

11 Q. Do you know why did representatives of the international

12 community conduct talks with Goran Hadzic in the first place?

13 A. Well, he was the president of the SAO Slavonia, Baranja, and

14 Western Sirmium and international representatives at the time were still

15 open to negotiations with regional leaders and politicians. In the Vance

16 Plan, furthermore, it states that the local authorities will remain as

17 such at that moment. Hence, it comes as no surprise that the

18 international representatives engaged in talks with Goran Hadzic, who was

19 the president of the SAO Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium.

20 Q. Talking about the Vance Plan, inter alia, you said that

21 Yugoslavia was to guarantee the implementation of the Vance Plan. What

22 does it actually mean?

23 A. I did say that and it has to be put in a wider context. First of

24 all, they were to convince local leaders to have the Vance Plan accepted

25 and implemented. During the meetings we held, on a number of occasions

Page 481

1 due to the fear and reserve of some leaders, the then-Yugoslav Presidency

2 also obliged itself to be the guarantor of security and safety in the UN

3 areas. In other words, should anything happen, they were to be included,

4 too. They wouldn't leave the Serbs there to their own devices. Since

5 Yugoslavia was one of the signatories, and we from the Krajina did not

6 have any contact with the Croatian authorities because we were in

7 conflict with them, it was normal to expect Yugoslavia to appear as

8 guarantor pending the arrival of UN forces. That's how we saw it;

9 whereas, some others saw Yugoslavia as the guarantor even later.

10 Q. What were these fears or reserves of the Serbs in Croatia and

11 their political leaders, as well as the leaders of Yugoslavia and Serbia,

12 vis-a-vis certain provisions of the Vance Plan? Did any of the

13 provisions raise doubts or cause concern?

14 A. The most important reservation was that, according to the

15 agreement, the UN forces under Vance Plan, were not planned to be

16 deployed along the separation line between the Croatian army and the JNA

17 and other forces. On the other -- or, rather, the plan was to have these

18 forces deployed in SAO and if provided that the Croatian army, the JNA

19 and other forces would stay away from that area, 5 kilometres.

20 Now, the plan envisaged that there would be no military in the

21 area. The only force there would be the police with side-arms and that

22 created a lot of problems. In some contact that I read about which

23 involved Mr. Hadzic as well, I think that Mr. Vance said that they were

24 going to recognise Croatia within its borders, whatever happened. Now

25 this statement and the fear that was displayed by the leadership and the

Page 482

1 population --

2 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please slow down.

3 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Witness, Mr. Dzakula, could you please slow

4 down a little bit. The interpreters have difficulty following you.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will. I apologise, Your Honours.

6 Let me just focus again.

7 So this was supposed to be placed again under the jurisdiction of

8 the Republic of Croatia. The then leaders believed that through fighting

9 and as a result of fighting, they will never again be part of Croatia.

10 That is why they insisted to have UNPROFOR troops deployed along the

11 separation line as a guarantor for the objectives that they achieved and

12 also as a guarantee that the Croatian army was not going to penetrate

13 that area and capture it militarily.

14 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Was there also fear of the announced withdrawal of the JNA from

16 that area?

17 A. Yes. There was a lot of fear, especially in SAO Krajina and the

18 former Slavonia and Baranja and Western Srem. Because the JNA was very

19 much involved there in the fighting that was going on in that area.

20 As for Western Slavonia, there was no such fear because we almost

21 did not rely on the JNA at all because it was covering only one-fourth of

22 our area. We solely relied on the UN forces.

23 Q. More precisely, at that time the SAO Western Slavonia practically

24 was non-existent. It didn't have its own territory. Would you agree

25 with me? And I'm talking about the period of the Vance Plan.

Page 483

1 A. I don't agree with you. Western Slavonia, if you are talking

2 about the Serb side or the Serb TO, was holding part of the territory of

3 Western Slavonia between Nova Gradiska -- there was the municipality of

4 Okucani and all the way up to the town of Pakrac and the village of

5 Kricak [phoen] in Pakrac municipality.

6 So, at that time, we were holding Okucani municipality and part

7 of Pakrac municipality. It was under the control of the Serbian army, or

8 TO, if you wish. So that is the area that was reached by the JNA, and

9 this coincides exactly with the area that we managed to hold in military

10 terms.

11 Q. Can you tell me approximately how much of the territory of the

12 SAO Western Slavonia are we talking here about.

13 A. Definitely at least one-fourth.

14 Q. So, to recap, the Serbs of Croatia were afraid, first of all,

15 that the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army, or the JNA, would result in

16 their being attacked and they would not be able to maintain these

17 territories and that they won't be able to defend themselves; am I right?

18 A. Yes, you are. I'm still waiting for the transcript. I am not

19 hesitating with my answer.

20 Q. I don't want to put several questions to you at once. Then they

21 were afraid that they would be sent back or reintegrated into the

22 Republic of Croatia?

23 A. Yes, that was one of their fears.

24 Q. And they were also afraid that in the wake of the withdrawal of

25 the JNA, Yugoslavia would lose its sovereignty over that territory

Page 484

1 altogether?

2 A. Yes. But they were more suspicion and doubtful about their own

3 power, and they -- they were not sure whether with the forces that they

4 had at their disposal could defend the territory on their own.

5 Q. Did they believe that UN troops were supposed to come in that

6 area would provide sufficient protection for them, equal to the one

7 provided by the JNA?

8 A. There was no such belief among the leadership, but part of the

9 population believed that, especially once the UN troops arrived and they

10 became acquainted and closer with each other.

11 Q. When you say "part of the population," are you referring to

12 Western Slavonia?

13 A. I am talking about all population. Later on, it turned out that

14 the communication between the UN and the local people was good, and they

15 became friendly, and they were spending a lot of time together. So they

16 trusted them.

17 Q. I am not talking about personal contacts between UN peacekeepers

18 and locals. I'm talking about the UN troops or UN units. Did the

19 population have confidence that they were capable of providing them

20 protection identical to the one that the JNA used to provide?

21 A. I am sure that the JNA instilled in them much more confidence and

22 much more security. However, later on they accepted the UN forces. But

23 initially, the departure of the JNA was a tremendous shock, as was the

24 announcement of the arrival of foreign troops.

25 Q. Can you please tell me what kind of protection was there in

Page 485

1 place, the protection of this territory following the acceptance of the

2 Vance Plan?

3 A. In response to your short question, I need to give you a long

4 answer, but I'll try to be brief, and I will say it was different,

5 different in SAO Krajina and Western Slavonia and SBWS. And I can

6 explain this in detail, both to you and the Honourable Chamber.

7 Q. Please do.

8 A. Since the Vance Plan, among other things, envisaged

9 demilitarisation, which means disarming, the point of disarming meant

10 that in that area there could not be two armies. We discussed that in

11 great detail with UN forces, because if there were two armies then the UN

12 would be wedged between two armed parties. And, in that scenario, they

13 wouldn't assume the responsibility for the protection.

14 We had an opportunity to see that happening in Western Slavonia.

15 When demilitarisation was effected, the UN assumed a responsibility and

16 there were no incursions into the territory nor entry by the Croatian

17 forces into Western Slavonia all the way until Operation Flash in

18 May 1995. As far as SAO Krajina is concerned, already in 1992, the

19 Miljevacka plateau incident took place, then the Maslenica incident in

20 1993 and Medacki Dzep in 1993 as well. In these three locations the

21 Croatian army entered the territory with their forces and killed a number

22 of soldiers and a lot of civilians in Medacki Dzep as well. The aim was

23 to demonstrate that the UN forces were not providing protection to that

24 area. And this showed what the essence of demilitarisation was.

25 Mr. Martic insisted on having an army armed with long barrels.

Page 486

1 He insisted on having his own army, but it turns out that it was not

2 capable of defending the area on its own against any form of aggression

3 or incursion by the Croatian army and police. And, on the other hand,

4 the UN did not think it was incumbent upon them to defend this

5 demilitarised area. To all of you it might seem like a legal catch, but

6 this is the essence. The militarisation, had it been effected and if

7 this would happen nevertheless, then it would seem that the UN were not

8 undertaking their obligations. And we all know that the main reason was

9 fear and I think that was the reason why Mr. Martic wanted to have his

10 own army because later developments showed that the Army of the

11 Republic of Serbian Krajina did not have enough capacity to preserve this

12 area from police and army actions undertaken by the state of Croatia, and

13 the UN forces were not utilised to carry out the tasks that they were

14 obliged to undertake according to the agreement.

15 Now, when we discussed the situation in Western Slavonia and when

16 there was an announcement of an impending attack, General Zabala told me,

17 We have undertaken upon us that if you do not take to -- up the arms we

18 are going to protect you and I'm going to direct my soldiers against the

19 Croatian army if they attack you. However, if you get hold of heavy

20 weapons, we are going to pull out and we don't want to be involved in

21 that. And thanks to that, we preserved our status until 1995.

22 I think I was clear enough.

23 Q. Yes, you were. And in May 1995 was retaken by the Croatian army.

24 Do you agree?

25 A. Yes, I do. And I can explain. You are right that when you say

Page 487

1 in May 1995, Croatia occupied Western Slavonia in Operation Flash. After

2 we were dismissed from our posts in 1993, Martic set up new civilian

3 authorities, and he militarised this area again by setting up army and

4 police with long barrels which was not the case before that.

5 So when this happened in May 1995, unfortunately, we had an army

6 but it was not capable of defending the area and, again, the UN just

7 pulled back. Thanks to our people who managed to keep one patrol of UN

8 soldiers, we managed to establish communication with the UN and to seek

9 cease-fire. And I can tell you that thanks to our exacts with

10 General Zabala and the UN, the 5.500 people who were left in encirclement

11 managed to survive because they knew we were in favour of negotiations

12 and peaceful solutions. If we were not militarised, again I'm sure that

13 the UN would have defended us, but as it turned out, due to the

14 circumstances, their mission was not fulfilled as the plan was.

15 Q. In a nutshell, you think that your government was not -- had your

16 government not been replaced the Croatian Operation Flash would never

17 have happened.

18 A. I'm sure that had this area not been militarised, there would be

19 no incidents that took place on the highway. Although I cannot guarantee

20 that the Croatian side would not attempt something, they may have done

21 so, but I am sure that in the course of the peace process, we would have

22 gone too far for them to catch us unawares. I am quite sure, because we

23 had an upper hand in this process because, believe me, the Croatian side

24 did not support our initiative either because we were a thorn in the

25 Croatian side as well, because on many occasions including the Daruvar

Page 488

1 agreement that we signed and which could have cost us our lives, they

2 wanted to deceive us on that agreement, too. However, when you're at war

3 and when you represent the people living in your area, you have to react.

4 And it turned out that the after Medacki Dzep, Miljevacka plateau and the

5 Flash, we still had to negotiate, because there's no other alternative.

6 We were quite aware of that. The UN failed to help us only after the

7 Daruvar agreement because they left us on our own and they gave into

8 Martic's requests. Had that not been the case, the Western Slavonia

9 would not have faired as it did. We had responsible people and we

10 enjoyed authority among our people.

11 In such a small area, there were a lot of people; for example,

12 there were 17 people sharing the same house, because their only wish and

13 aim was to return to their homes. Only people who are refugees, people

14 living in other people's houses, one can only try to understand what they

15 were thinking and wishing. However, we were the Croatian side that

16 didn't want to grant this, and we also had people in Krajina who were --

17 opposed that. Our desire was to live in our houses, but, unfortunately,

18 not under the conditions that we strived for, and it's still the case

19 nowadays. I apologise for this long answer.

20 Q. Mr. Dzakula, out of all you have explained, my impression is

21 this, and please correct me if I'm wrong: The Croatian side would have

22 taken back that territory no matter what the case was, but they would not

23 have had an excuse if there had been no armed Serbs there. Am I correct?

24 A. That's not what I said.

25 Q. I'm not saying you said it. I said it was my conclusion. And do

Page 489

1 correct me if it is inaccurate.

2 A. Yes. I still believe honestly, although I'm not a naive person,

3 that they would not have dared do it the way they did, but they would

4 have tried through various initiatives or small incursions. However, we

5 acted, and then they reacted. Unless we act, the other side takes over

6 and we are forced to react, and that's how the things panned out. We had

7 to have had a peace initiative. It was our utmost obligation.

8 Unfortunately, the Serbs did not have it, and the Croatian side made best

9 use of it.

10 Q. Just before the break, one last question: Tell me, when you

11 discuss the peace initiative, do you include in that, or do you believe

12 that such initiative meant accepting the political requirements the

13 Croatian side had? In other words, that you should accept all of their

14 requests. In that case, they would have no need to act. You would have

15 agreed to the Croatian army entering and, hence, any incidents would be

16 superfluous.

17 A. No, it's a mistake. When we discussed the return of Serbs to the

18 villages in Pozega and Pakrac, which were Croat controlled, we had agreed

19 with a Canadian battalion and we had a condition that the Croat police be

20 removed from that area, because the villages in question were exclusively

21 Serb, and that only CIVPOL or the UN police remain. We wanted people to

22 return and we did not trust the Croatian police. The Canadian battalion

23 accepted that condition.

24 As for the Croatian conditions imposed on us, they had every

25 right to table them, but we had no right to accept anything that the

Page 490

1 people living there did not want.

2 As for the agreements we signed, it was approved by the SAO

3 Western Slavonia Assembly to negotiate and sign, provided the assembly

4 ratified it. We knew what the burden of responsibility was. We knew we

5 had to keep the people informed and to follow the procedure. It was up

6 to the people to decide which political settlement they would accept for

7 the area.

8 JUDGE DELVOIE: We'll take the break now.

9 Mr. Usher, if you would escort the witness out of courtroom.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11 [The witness stands down]

12 JUDGE DELVOIE: Court adjourned. We'll be back at 12.45.

13 --- Recess taken at 12.16 p.m.

14 --- On resuming at 12.45 p.m.

15 [The witness takes the stand]

16 JUDGE DELVOIE: Please proceed, Mr. Zivanovic.

17 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

18 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Dzakula, we will continue discussing the

19 Vance Plan, but we will turn to the Presidency session held on the

20 9th of December, 1991, which both you and Goran Hadzic attended. This is

21 Prosecution Exhibit P28.

22 From page 3 in both versions of the minutes, one can see that the

23 chair of the session, Branko Kostic, sets out the items of the Vance Plan

24 item by item.

25 Next, there follows a debate which you will surely remember,

Page 491

1 where both Branko Kostic, and Borisav Jovic - that's the same Presidency

2 members of Yugoslavia - took an active part as well as others.

3 Before I quote the words by Goran Hadzic which I believe is very

4 important, I will take you to some of the points of the interventions by

5 Branko Kostic and Borisav Jovic to see if you remember any of it and what

6 your position was.

7 Branko Kostic -- that's page 19 of the Serbian text and page 15

8 of the English - Branko Kostic says that the way in which the

9 international forces of the United Nations were engaged automatically

10 excludes the areas from what could be the jurisdiction of the Croatian

11 authorities. Do you recall that portion of what was said?

12 A. Yes, I do.

13 Q. What was your position in that regard? Did that truly reflect

14 what the plan said or not?

15 A. In that area, there was only the UN that had jurisdiction over

16 it.

17 Q. Thank you. Now I'm quoting from page 23 of the Serbian version

18 and 17 of the English. He goes on to say that the agreement would be

19 signed by Yugoslavia and the UN Security Council only. It -- excluding

20 Croatia. Do you recall that?

21 A. Yes, I do.

22 Q. Next, that the Security Council would not interfere with the

23 numbers of members of armed formation of the MUP of Croatia and that,

24 similarly, it would not interfere with the numbers of armed members of

25 the police in the Serbian Krajina. This is page 29 in Serbian and 21 in

Page 492

1 English. Do you recall him saying that?

2 A. I do. I'm listening carefully to what you're reading out.

3 You're referring to the numbers, that they would not be interfering with

4 the number of policemen present there?

5 Q. The numbers of armed members of internal affairs of Krajina.

6 A. Yes. In other words, policemen.

7 Q. Next, it was Borisav Jovic's turn to speak. He said, among other

8 things -- and that's page 31 of the Serbian version and 23 of the

9 English. Among other things he said:

10 "In fact, with this we are ensuring that the United Nations

11 preserve our achievements."

12 Was that your understanding as well, that the United Nations be

13 would preserving what had been achieved?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. He went on to say what would happen in the event of the excursion

16 of the Croatian police into the area after the withdrawal of the JNA.

17 So he says at page 32:

18 "Do not think that we, as the Presidency of Yugoslavia find it

19 less of a cause for concern when the army withdraws and that we are not

20 concerned what might happen if the Croatian forces break through. If

21 they head forward, so will we, and much faster than them."

22 That's page 23 in Serbian and 24 in English.

23 Let me now explain to you why I cited these particular pages. We

24 will move onto what Goran Hadzic had to say. That's page 37 and 38 in

25 English. I'm sorry, that's pages in Serbian. And pages 27 and 28 in

Page 493

1 English.

2 He said as follows:

3 "I would like to say something with regard to my contacts with

4 Henry Wynaendts in The Hague and Paris. What he told us over there is

5 something that I can see coming into effect here. I am pleased that

6 there are such optimistic views of these positions, although I am the

7 pessimist. However, I am optimistic in terms of the ultimate victory.

8 Wynaendts said, We will recognise Croatia, whatever the cost, and you

9 will remain within the Republic of Croatia under a special status. These

10 positions are not a prejudice. They do not anticipate what will happen.

11 They are a prejudice. It is not a pure chance that they are mentioning

12 the Republic of Croatia. It is not by chance that they are mentioning

13 it. When they say that our goal is to preserve Yugoslavia. That is

14 true. However, when everything is said and done I will state two things

15 only."

16 I will proceed to quote from this later. From what I have read

17 out, would you agree with me that what Goran Hadzic in fact said here was

18 that the Vance Plan --

19 MR. STRINGER: Apologise for the interruption, counsel.

20 Your Honour, in the transcript just before the page disappears

21 toward the top, page 58, line 17, the transcript at the moment, if --

22 unless it is changed will attribute -- there's a statement here: I'm

23 optimistic about the final victory. And the statement is attributed to

24 Mr. Hadzic in the exhibit which is the minutes. However, the transcript

25 unless it is changed will attribute that statement to Mr. Wynaendts and I

Page 494

1 just wanted to note that for the record.

2 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes, I failed to say that is under inverted

3 commas, sorry. [Interpretation] For the sake of correction, let us say

4 that this was inverted commas:

5 "We will recognise Croatia no matter what happens and you will

6 remain having special status within the Republic of Croatia."

7 These are the words that Goran Hadzic quoted as having coming

8 from Wynaendts. Everything else that was said were Goran Hadzic's words.

9 I just wanted to make that distinction.

10 Q. This is my question for you: Based on the quoted words uttered

11 by Goran Hadzic, would you conclude that it was his position that the

12 Vance Plan was, in fact, a plan that was to materialise something that he

13 had already heard from Mr. Wynaendts. In other words, that the Serbian

14 Krajina would remain within Croatia?

15 A. To the extent I followed statements read about them and recall,

16 the Vance Plan was a peace process which had nothing to do with the

17 political settlement --

18 Q. I am sorry to interrupt you. I'm only asking you now about what

19 Hadzic had to say. Do you take his words that I've just quoted to you to

20 mean that he saw the Vance Plan the way he just described it; in other

21 words, that it was a materialisation of what Wynaendts had already told

22 him? We don't want to go into the Vance Plan and what it had to do with.

23 A. Yes. According to how Mr. Hadzic saw it, this was -- the

24 Vance Plan was a way of keeping them within Croatia and, hence, probably

25 his reaction to it.

Page 495

1 Q. I'm reading the last two paragraphs of his intervention at the

2 time and we will, of course, go back to what has been said as well.

3 At page 40, the last two paragraphs, he says as follows:

4 "I don't want to try and persuade all those present here because

5 I am convinced that we are of the same opinion. What I will have to say

6 will be in different words. Perhaps we will want to say what the

7 position is like and what it is that the people will accept. I'm sure

8 that the people from the three Krajinas can come to an agreement. We can

9 convince one another but it is not important and makes no sense because

10 we cannot go back with just any kind of view-point. What we got here is

11 that the Serbian Krajinas may stay within the Republic of Croatia, while

12 the Republic of Croatia itself is being given independence by the mere

13 fact that the JNA is withdrawing for Croatia. The JNA has so far been

14 the only footing, the only representative of Yugoslavia and the rump

15 Presidency.

16 "Do not take my speech as too bitter or arrogant but our opinions

17 should be based on better premises. We should see what is really best

18 for us and then say it. It is bad but it is the best option so far. We

19 should not be trying to convince one other instead of something that, in

20 my view, is not correct."

21 Do you understand what Goran Hadzic said here as meaning that the

22 leadership should come out with truthful facts and tell the people what

23 was at stake, rather than disseminate misconceptions or delusions about

24 staying within Yugoslavia, and I mean the Krajinas and everything else?

25 A. This is Goran Hadzic's interpretation because he had additional

Page 496

1 discussions like the one with Mr. Wynaendts which had to do with the

2 political settlement. If you place these discussions that he had in the

3 context of the Vance Plan then his view is that the Vance Plan was in the

4 service of it; whereas, I said that these were two separate processes.

5 Ultimately, Mr. Hadzic accepted the Vance Plan as something that was

6 binding on all these issues, whereas the Vance Plan proper did not deal

7 with the political resolution.

8 Q. Nobody said from among us here that the Vance Plan offered a

9 political solution. Rather, that it was in the service of finding one,

10 and I did say that that was what Mr. Hadzic had to say.

11 A. Mr. Hadzic's interpretation was that the Vance Plan had a role to

12 play in the process of finding a political solution, and that was his

13 view-point.

14 Q. Thank you. He said, among other things right at the start and

15 I've already quoted that: I am please that there are such optimistic

16 views of these positions, although I myself am a pessimist. Would you

17 say that in saying this he meant those positions presented by

18 Branko Kostic and Borisav Jovic that I quoted earlier on?

19 A. Yes, I believe that Goran Hadzic did not trust their explanation

20 of the Vance Plan and the political positions.

21 Q. Thank you. This was something that the Prosecutor asked you

22 about. It's just that the question as it was put outside of the context

23 may distort of whole picture about Goran Hadzic's address at this point.

24 He said, I would agree with Yugoslavia being preserved in such a way as

25 to deploy even more JNA forces in Croatia than has been the case before

Page 497

1 much. Now let's tie it in with what he says at the end, which is that:

2 We should place our view-points on more solid grounds. Look at what is

3 more favourable for us and say, Well, this is what the situation is like.

4 It is bad but it is the best so far.

5 Would you say that in a way by saying this he says, We have said

6 that we are committed to Yugoslavia but obviously nothing will come of

7 it, and it has to be said loud and clear?

8 A. Well, to be frank, I did not analyse, really, the meaning of his

9 words but listening to what you have to say, I can conclude that he was

10 upset by the fact that he was not going to achieve what he wanted to

11 achieve and that he would not have the military support to go as far as

12 he wanted, although I must say at the time I did not really examine his

13 words to see what it was that he meant. I'm merely, by listening to your

14 words now, trying to summarise it. Because he was trying to tie in the

15 political process with the Vance Plan whereas I saw these two processes

16 apart. Of course, I didn't have the sort of contacts that perhaps

17 Mr. Hadzic had where he spoke of political solutions, the peace process

18 was set in motion, and it had to be implemented as such. There was no

19 alternative.

20 Q. Let us clarify one thing: You say that he realised that he was

21 not going to be able to achieve what he wanted to. What did he want to

22 achieve? He spoke of the preservation of Yugoslavia and, in fact, this

23 was the situation of the majority of the Serbs that -- at the referendum

24 that had been carried out in Slavonia, Baranja, West Srem, as well as in

25 all the other Krajinas. That was not his personal will. Would you

Page 498

1 agree?

2 A. Well, it was his personal wish to preserve Yugoslavia, to have

3 Krajina become a federal unit. This was something that most of the

4 political leaders talked about, dreamt of and wished for. But I think he

5 was confronted with the fact that with the withdraw of the JNA that odds

6 were much lower. Of course, he had many more contacts and much more

7 information that he could put together. But I repeat, these were

8 processes that only had to be launched and they were not directly related

9 to the Vance Plan. They kept seeing the Vance Plan as a means for a

10 political solution; I myself did not, so it's difficult for me to

11 empathise with what he might have thought about it.

12 Q. I can go on to read the rest. He said, among other things, that

13 he believed that the JNA and the ZNG could not be treated the same way,

14 that the National Guards Corps was a paramilitary Ustasha formation,

15 et cetera. Tell me, in the context of the then-legislative framework and

16 we're talking about December 1991, Yugoslavia was still the only state

17 that existed in the area as an internationally recognised state. Would

18 you agree with me?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Croatia was not yet recognised as an independent state?

21 A. No, it wasn't.

22 Q. Under the constitution and all the regulations in force in

23 Yugoslavia, was the National Guards Corps, the ZNG, a legal formation?

24 A. No, it wasn't. Not under the constitution. Nobody was, save for

25 the JNA.

Page 499

1 Q. He also goes on to talk about the cease-fire and that they agreed

2 with the cease-fire as was the general practice in the world by the green

3 belt. I personally don't know what the green belt stands for. Is it the

4 separation line, is it a more general area? But it -- it is of no

5 concern for us at this point.

6 I'm interested in something else. Did you see anywhere in his

7 intervention that he said that he was opposed to the Vance Plan?

8 A. All of his doubts expressed in his intervention pointed to the

9 fact that he was not in favour of it. He did not say, I agree to the

10 Vance Plan and it is something that we need to adhere to. And he did not

11 say so openly until I think it was on the 19th of January.

12 Q. These words that I have quoted for the third time, does it not

13 confirm, does it not speak in favour of his accepting it? He says, Let

14 us base our reasoning on sounder grounds. Let's see what's best for us,

15 and let's say this is the situation. It may be bad but it's the best one

16 thus far.

17 Wasn't this his call to face the reality, although he believed it

18 not to be the best solution but it was a solution given the political

19 imbalance and that nothing better could be expected under such

20 circumstances?

21 A. I honestly believe that Mr. Hadzic was aware of the real

22 situation but he dared not speak openly in favour of the Vance Plan until

23 he gauged the reaction in the field. He was aware of it all. That is

24 probably why he was absent for the second meeting, and by the third

25 meeting the field was set and then he decidedly spoke out. He did

Page 500

1 address doubts and fears here but he wasn't clear. He didn't say, Yes,

2 we are going to accept it as there is no alternative. When one discusses

3 a peace plan you cannot be skeptical or discuss things. You have to

4 agree or not. I think he was aware of it all, but at that point in time

5 he did not publicly accept it.

6 Q. You, too, spoke during that session meeting?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And you accepted the plan?

9 A. Yes, I did. Things were clear with me. I wasn't important.

10 They knew I was in favour of such things. And you can see that I was not

11 invited to any sort of talks like Babic, Martic and others were. It was

12 known beforehand that as regards Western Slavonia things were clear. And

13 I have to be honest, we did have it a bit better because our military

14 component was no match and had no military record to show and we could

15 clearly set out our decision. But even if that were not so, we were

16 always clear on such matters. And I have in mind the political

17 leadership of Western Slavonia.

18 Q. You see, Mr. Dzakula, I read your contribution, and you discuss

19 the exodus of the population at length, although that had not been

20 concluded by that time. You mentioned a number of things. However, when

21 you address the Vance Plan at some point, which is page 114 in the

22 English -- in the Serbian, sorry. And 85 in the English.

23 This is what you say --

24 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could Mr. Zivanovic wait

25 for the page to appear on the screen.

Page 501

1 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation].

2 Q. "Don't let this have any influence over your thinking and

3 decision as you have to see and consider there is a bigger and different

4 problem. That means starting to resolve it in different ways and a

5 decision doesn't have to be made tonight."

6 It is my impression that you did not accept the Vance Plan

7 either; am I correct.

8 A. If we take this portion of my statement, it doesn't come clear

9 that I accepted it.

10 Q. I understood you to have accepted it.

11 A. I did. This was not the only discussion at a meeting. There

12 were also discussions during the breaks, and my position was always

13 clear. There was -- there was no mention whether Dzakula was against the

14 Vance Plan and you have gone through all these minutes and there's no

15 mention of it. It must have been clear to all.

16 Q. You see, this is what I'm interested in. You say Goran Hadzic

17 was against the Vance Plan and that's how he spoke out on the

18 9th of December and that you were in favour of it. I don't know what

19 went on during the breaks, but if we read the minutes of the meeting, I

20 conclude that neither was Goran Hadzic against the Vance Plan, nor that

21 you were in favour of it.

22 A. If we go by the minutes, you won't find it that I was in favour.

23 Q. Thank you. You see, I'm asking you this for another reason.

24 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [No interpretation] [In English] May we move into

25 private session, please.

Page 505

1 That's Mr. Vance's report, so he is explicitly mentioning only one person

2 that is not accepting the plan.

3 A. He said at least one. But what date is that?

4 Q. I think it's the 13th of December, but we can check that on

5 page 3. Perhaps page 1?

6 A. All right. If it is 13th then it is after the 9th. But he said

7 at least one. He wasn't specific, so you're not completely right,

8 frankly speaking. I don't know with whom he talked about this issue.

9 Q. That's the 11th of December, which is following this Presidency

10 meeting. I also don't know who he spoke with, but I think the one means

11 Milan Babic.

12 A. Definitely Milan Babic.

13 Q. Thank you. The Prosecutor showed you document P30. It's a

14 public exchange of letters between Slobodan Milosevic and Milan Babic.

15 They were published in the "Politika" daily.

16 Do you know if -- or, rather, shall we agree that the only topic

17 addressed in this correspondence and the motive behind it was that Babic

18 didn't want to accept the peace plan, the Vance Plan?

19 A. Yes. Mr. Milosevic's motivation was to appear in the media and

20 to settle the scores with Milan Babic and his policies because

21 Milan Babic was opposed to the Vance Plan.

22 Q. Do you know if Mr. Milosevic or maybe somebody else wrote such

23 letters to Mr. Hadzic?

24 A. No, I'm not aware of that, and I never read any such thing in the

25 media.

Page 506

1 Q. You attended a meeting of the Presidency on the

2 12th of December, 1991. That's Prosecution Exhibit 29. That's the

3 meeting that was not attended by Mr. Goran Hadzic?

4 A. Yes, I remember that.

5 Q. Do you recall -- because I see here that some other

6 representatives from Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem were present as

7 well, do you recall what they said with regard to the Vance Plan? You

8 will agree that the Vance Plan was again on the agenda.

9 A. I believe that Ilija Koncarevic expressed some reservations

10 towards the Vance Plan, and so did Martic and Paspalj.

11 Q. Tell me, please, what was the post that Ilija Koncarevic

12 occupied; do you remember?

13 A. Well, later, he was the deputy Speaker of the

14 Assembly of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem. He was a prominent

15 figure and always attended these kind of meetings. And I think that at

16 that meeting, Milosevic inquired about Hadzic and Babic, because he

17 obviously held their opinions in high regard.

18 Q. You have been shown video footage made during an assembly session

19 that you said was held in Beli Manastir. On that occasion, the

20 government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina was elected on the

21 26th of February, 1992. In this footage, you recognised Goran Hadzic and

22 Stevo Bogic. You recall that?

23 A. Yes, I do.

24 Q. You were practically on the same government with Stevo Bogic.

25 Did you recognise anyone else?

Page 507

1 A. Yes, I did. Vojin Susa, who was the minister of the judiciary.

2 And sitting next to Stevo Bogic was the minister of education, but I

3 don't remember his name. And also Mile Paspalj, the Speaker of the

4 Assembly, because he chaired the meeting.

5 Q. You recognised him, too?

6 A. Yes, I did.

7 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we look again at this

8 video-clip. That's P35.

9 Q. Can you please indicate Mr. Paspalj in this clip?

10 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

11 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zivanovic.

12 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes.

13 JUDGE DELVOIE: I'm told by the Registrar that if a video has to

14 be played, you have to play it.

15 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I haven't prepared it for -- I believe that it is

16 in e-court and that it could be played by the Registrar.

17 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

18 JUDGE DELVOIE: Videos are not uploaded in e-court,

19 Mr. Zivanovic. They're only available on CD.

20 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I didn't know that, sorry.

21 JUDGE DELVOIE: Can you assist, Mr. Stringer.

22 MR. ZIVANOVIC: No --

23 MR. STRINGER: I think that, first of all, for the record, P35 is

24 the still photograph that was tendered into evidence that was taken from

25 the video. So the video itself is still 65 ter -- well, but in any

Page 508

1 event --

2 JUDGE DELVOIE: Sorry, we can perhaps start with the photo and

3 see whether Mr. Dzakula can answer the question based on this photograph.

4 I'm not sure, but it's worth a try.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The person that I encircled is

6 Mr. Stevo Bogic. The one next to him with black hair and the parting,

7 was the minister of education from Eastern Slavonia. I still cannot

8 remember his name.

9 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation.

10 Q. I suppose that Paspalj was some place else in this photo?

11 A. Yes, he was chairing the meeting. And Vojo Susa is sitting in

12 this row, to the right from Goran Hadzic and Stevo Bogic towards me.

13 Q. Can you tell us if in this video-clip you recognise someone from

14 Western Slavonia, for example?

15 A. No, it was a very short video and I didn't pay attention.

16 Q. How about Krajina, the then-SAO Krajina?

17 A. Yes. I said Paspalj, and I indicated him.

18 Q. This is what I wanted to ask you, and I can do so even without

19 the clip: According to my information, or, rather, the information

20 available to us, this is not the video of the 26th of February, 1992.

21 A. I remember this assembly meeting, and I remember that president

22 of the republic, Goran Hadzic, was there, and I see Mr. Stevo Bogic here

23 in this photograph. I saw Vojo Susa, and I saw Paspalj.

24 Now, where that took place, there are a lot of video-clips. They

25 all look almost the same.

Page 509

1 Q. Well, if not now, we're going to play this video for you

2 tomorrow. But you recognised the hall, and this is right, this is

3 exactly the hall in Beli Manastir. However, according to my information,

4 the meeting of the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina held on

5 the 26th of February, 1992, was held in Borovo Selo, not in

6 Beli Manastir.

7 A. I still think it's Beli Manastir now.

8 Q. According to some other information that I have, the venue where

9 the meeting took place was actually a gym, not the regular meeting hall

10 of the assembly. And there are stands in this gym, and there's a

11 handball, or, rather, basketball court there. Do you remember that?

12 A. I know that I attended this assembly meeting, and I am convinced

13 that it took place where I said. Now, these details that you are

14 quoting, I don't remember them at all. I know that this was an assembly

15 meeting. I know that I was there. And I know that it took place in

16 Beli Manastir.

17 Q. Do you remember, for example, that there were stands on both

18 sides of the hall, sports stands that one normally see in a gym or in a

19 sports hall?

20 A. Well, come on. I cannot remember such details.

21 Q. You see, according to some information that we have, and I think

22 that it is somewhere in the transcript. I cannot find it exactly on

23 which page at the moment. But if you listened to what the anchor was

24 talking about, or the voice-over on this footage, he said that that was

25 an assembly meeting of the SAO Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem and

Page 510

1 not of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

2 A. But we cannot hear it now.

3 Q. It's in the transcript. It's no problem. And that the assembly

4 was actually held on the 19th of December --

5 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zivanovic, I think Mr. Stringer could assist

6 eventually.

7 MR. STRINGER: Yes. Just to suggest, our Case Manager has pulled

8 it up, and if counsel would like we can -- we can run the video that

9 you're referring to, or tomorrow you can do it. However you choose.

10 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I'd be very grateful to the Prosecution if we can

11 watch the video now.

12 [Video-clip played]

13 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Did you see Mr. Paspalj?

15 A. The one who chaired the meeting?

16 Q. Let's play it back.

17 A. Well, as I'm looking at it now, that's Paspalj. And I also saw

18 Vojin Susa. Vojin Susa is from Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem.

19 There was no way that Paspalj could have chaired this meeting.

20 Q. Let me ask you one more thing: The president of the republic was

21 elected on the assembly meeting held on the 26th of February, 1992. Also

22 elected was the government. And you were elected as one of the deputy

23 prime ministers.

24 Can you please tell us, how did it come about that you were

25 elected to this office?

Page 511

1 A. Well, before the meeting, we all got together, and it was agreed

2 that presidents of the three SAOs would be deputy prime ministers and the

3 president of the assembly would be president of the three SAOs. And this

4 was something that took place immediately before the beginning of the --

5 Q. Who was it that agreed on that? Who took part in it?

6 A. Martic, Zecevic, Goran Hadzic, and several other people from the

7 three regions, I believe.

8 Q. Out of those who were appointed deputy prime ministers - and I

9 believe you mentioned something to that effect previously and there's no

10 need to go into private session - that Bosko Bozanic, too, was a deputy

11 prime minister, so there were four in total.

12 I wanted to ask you this: Since you said that the

13 prime ministers of SAO governments were to become deputy prime ministers,

14 I wanted to ask you whether any of them was the prime minister in any of

15 the SAOs, like Mr. Bozanic or Stevo Bogic?

16 A. Since Goran Hadzic was to be the president of the republic, it

17 was said that in Eastern Slavonia it was to be someone else and Martic

18 was to be the same person for Krajina. I couldn't decide who would be

19 the person on that end. Zecevic was also agreed upon, and proposals were

20 made for the respective districts.

21 Q. In other words, there was no key that was used in terms of SAO

22 prime ministers should become deputy prime ministers of the future

23 government of the RSK.

24 A. Realistically speaking, it wasn't possible because the SAO

25 Krajina prime minister was Babic who was out of the picture by then,

Page 512

1 politically speaking. President of the SBWS government was Goran Hadzic

2 who became the president of the republic. So I was the only

3 prime minister remaining and I became deputy prime minister for the new

4 government, and then the other positions were filled in. I don't know if

5 Goran Hadzic suggested Bogic and Zecevic came from the area of Knin. So

6 they suggested Jovo Kabalar and you reminded me now that Bosko Bozanic,

7 too, was to be another deputy prime minister. There could have been no

8 one else.

9 Q. The Prosecutor also asked you about the Presidency meeting on the

10 2nd of March, 1992. The new prime minister of the RSK, Zecevic,

11 discussed that there would be panic if 15.000 Croatian refugees returned

12 to Benkovac. You recall that?

13 A. I do.

14 Q. And you said you did not share that view of his.

15 A. I did not.

16 Q. At that time, on the 2nd of March, 1992, you were already deputy

17 prime minister.

18 A. Right.

19 Q. I'm interested in what your reaction was when the prime minister

20 of your government speaks of panic and yet you disagree. Did you speak

21 out?

22 A. I discussed it with Mr. Zecevic. For a long time, we had several

23 days en route to the US and back, we discussed the very issue of refugee

24 return and we had plenty of time on our hands. I told him that that was

25 the moment when he should start working on the return process and the

Page 513

1 opening up. Because they won't be transporting tomatoes from Zadar to

2 Belgrade if Knin was closer. And yet he said he was aware that the

3 problem was a grave one and that the people wanted to return but that he

4 was not ready for that. In those initial stages, it didn't mean anything

5 to me to confront Zecevic right away. It turned out eventually that

6 Dzakula was right. After our conversations to New York and back, he told

7 Goran Hadzic that I was in favour of co-habitation with the Croats. No

8 one else could have. So I was closely observed in terms of what I was to

9 say. And I had to gradually prepare them to what was inevitable. Once I

10 was a member of the government, demilitarisation was supposed to be set

11 in motion, thus creating preconditions for returns and that was to be the

12 fruit of all my labour in that vein.

13 Q. You say you were closely observed. Please explain. What does it

14 mean?

15 A. Since I was in favour of the peace option, since in the time of

16 war I did not put myself forth as someone who would be in favour of the

17 war option, as it was believed that Western Slavonia was lost because of

18 my passivism because I was against fighting, they observed me. They

19 observed my statements, especially when I publicly condemned the crimes

20 of Seselj's volunteers in Western Slavonia. And there were a number of

21 such statements of mine, and many people were sensitive to it because I

22 stood out. I didn't discuss firm boundaries. I wasn't saying, Let's

23 leave Croatia. My rhetoric was far more moderate. Had I started right

24 away at the session to discuss the return of Croats they would have told

25 me I was crazy, and from that point on any dialogue with them would have

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1 been made impossible, especially with Zecevic. He was in panic what to

2 do in terms of Croatian return. As soon as I made a move in that

3 direction I was immediately summoned.

4 Q. Well, since you say your positions were different, they stood

5 out, and I believe you even said that most ministers in the government

6 had different positions, I'm interested how was it that you were

7 elected -- appointed in the government in the first place?

8 A. Quite simply, when the peace agreement was signed, they needed

9 such a leader who would accept the peace process, who would support it,

10 because the Yugoslav Presidency met for the first time with the people

11 from Krajina and Eastern Slavonia which had a much firmer stance towards

12 the Vance Plan, and the people in charge of some other operations were

13 comprised. Thus, I was accepted as the key solution for

14 Western Slavonia, in terms of the peace process.

15 As regards your question about the ministers, there were sessions

16 of government in Western Slavonia in Okucani when I insisted an agenda

17 item was the return of refugees, and it was Stevo Bogic whom we saw in

18 the picture who came to me and cautioned me. He said, Veljko, brother,

19 you will remain alone. No one will support you in the return process.

20 The only person who supported to me to some extent was Milan Martic, who

21 was the minister of the interior, because he saw that I was much in

22 favour of returns. And then he said, I agree that returns are important,

23 but the conditions are still non-existent. There was this constant

24 excuse that there were no conditions for the refugees to return. Believe

25 me, though, that no one worked on those conditions save for us in

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1 Western Slavonia. The condition, the basic condition for refugees to

2 return was demilitarisation and it was only Western Slavonia who did so.

3 Others turned a -- simply did not want to discuss that because they did

4 not want Croatians returning to Krajina.

5 Q. You say you were accepted as the key person in terms of solutions

6 for Western Slavonia within the peace process. That's what I understood,

7 and I believe it is so in the transcript.

8 What did this key role of yours consist of? What was this key

9 solution? Were you supposed to have a peace mission as a member of the

10 government? Please explain.

11 A. I did have a peace mission in terms of Western Slavonia. At the

12 moment when decisions were being made, there was a need for someone from

13 the field in Yugoslavia who enjoyed a certain authority in a Serb

14 community, such as Western Slavonia, and to have that person placed in

15 the position of deputy prime minister. It was widely known that I was in

16 favour of the peace process. There was never a question whether Dzakula

17 would accept or not; whereas, the other positions were discussed at

18 length. So that was my role for Western Slavonia, not necessarily in the

19 government but locally. And I always initiated such topics.

20 Q. When did you initiate such topics in the government which had to

21 do with the peace process?

22 A. First and foremost, I was in favour of demilitarisation, trying

23 to explain the importance of it. I even discussed it with Milan Martic

24 as well as the commander of Sector South. And only once we had

25 implemented this process of demilitarisation, we created a return

Page 516

1 programme. We even went so far as to ask for a meeting with Milosevic

2 because we thought he would exert his influence over the Krajina

3 government. There was a delegation from Western Slavonia which had

4 prepared a return programme, had the programme ratified by the assembly

5 and went to see Milosevic with the programme. He said that it should be

6 further elaborated and supported and then there was another government

7 session. When I arrived in Knin, they agreed to have a session in

8 Western Slavonia to see what to do with it. That was the thrust of my

9 activity.

10 Q. Let me conclude then. Within the government you had a very

11 important role, which had to do with demilitarisation, return of

12 refugees, if I understood well?

13 A. Apologies. It wasn't a great role in the government, but I

14 discussed it. We, as ministers and deputy prime ministers, enjoyed the

15 same status. However, I worked in the field, and everyone knew about it.

16 I set things in motion as envisaged by the Vance Plan.

17 Finally, the Under-Secretary-General of the UN, Marrack Goulding,

18 came to Okucani in December to congratulate in -- on the way we

19 implemented the Vance Plan, to congratulate on the demilitarisation and

20 return of refugees. Myself and my team were congratulated for what we

21 had done. It was an enormous success at the time because it was

22 completely non-existent elsewhere.

23 Q. I'm asking you this because I understood your testimony on

24 discussing your role in the government, I understood you said you were in

25 charge of forestry.

Page 517

1 A. Correct. In the government, I was in charge of forestry and

2 economic affairs but I also had a role to play in Western Slavonia about

3 the implementation of the Vance Plan and the results were visible and

4 widely known. You could have seen in the documents that Mr. Goulding

5 discussed it, as well as Mr. Nambiar, or anyone from the international

6 community who were present there and who worked on the implementation of

7 the Vance Plan. When I proposed the forestry law at the assembly -- I

8 also founded the council for forestry in the Krajina, and then I also

9 discussed the things that we were obliged to implement when we accepted

10 the Vance Plan.

11 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zivanovic, it is that time.

12 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you.

13 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.

14 So the usher may escort the witness out of court. Mr. Witness,

15 Mr. Dzakula, I remind you that you are still under oath, and we hope to

16 finish your testimony tomorrow morning. Thank you.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

18 [The witness stands down]

19 JUDGE DELVOIE: Tomorrow 9.00, same courtroom.

20 Court adjourned.

21 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.01 p.m.,

22 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 23rd of October,

23 2012, at 9.00 a.m.