1 Thursday, 10 January 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
5 JUDGE DELVOIE: Good morning to everyone in and around the
7 Mr. Registrar, could you call the case, please.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case
9 IT-04-75-T, the Prosecutor versus Goran Hadzic. Thank you.
10 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you. May we have the appearances, please,
11 starting with the Prosecution.
12 MR. STRINGER: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honour
13 Judge Mindua. Douglas Stringer with Alexis Demirdjian; intern,
14 Adam Birnbaum; and Case Manager, Thomas Laugel for the Prosecution.
15 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you. For the Defence Mr. Zivanovic.
16 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. For the Defence of
17 Goran Hadzic, Zoran Zivanovic and Christopher Gosnell. Thank you.
18 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you. Mr. Stringer, I understood that you
19 have something to raise before the witness comes in.
20 Mr. Demirdjian, sorry.
21 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Good morning, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE DELVOIE: Good morning.
23 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Allow me to wish everyone in and around the
24 courtroom a happy new year. I have a practical suggestion to make in
25 relation to the documents that are put in the report of Dr. Nielsen. You
1 have probably seen the exchange of e-mails we've had in the last few
2 days. Now, there are two categories of documents essentially that we're
3 going to be looking at today, documents that are footnoted in the report
4 and documents that are not footnoted in the report which have been shown
5 to the expert in December.
6 Now, in order to keep matters neat, I understand there will be a
7 decision eventually about the admission of these documents. I would
8 suggest that for the documents that are in the report, I will not seek
9 their admission during the examination-in-chief of the witness, whereas
10 documents that are not in the footnotes, that are not in the report,
11 those ones I will seek to tender them, so that at the end of the
12 examination-in-chief when I seek to tender the report and the footnoted
13 exhibits, if there are any arguments, and I believe there will be some,
14 we can keep those that are in the footnotes in one set, one bundle, if I
15 could call it that way.
16 Does that make any sense?
17 JUDGE DELVOIE: I'm a little bit surprised, Mr. Demirdjian,
18 because I thought that that was exactly what we proposed in the e-mail
20 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Well --
21 JUDGE DELVOIE: So that means that we agree.
22 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: We agree.
23 JUDGE DELVOIE: If there is no objection from the Defence.
24 MR. GOSNELL: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honour
25 Judge Mindua. My understanding was that essentially there would be a --
1 in a sense a formal tender of the documents at the close of the direct
2 examination by the Prosecution and then there would be a subsequent
3 decision by the Chamber, and then we would have an opportunity in the
4 course of -- well, at some stage to make any submissions. So in that
5 sense that was the manner in which I thought it would be carried out.
6 JUDGE DELVOIE: Unless -- unless I am wrong, but I thought that
7 that particular course of action would only apply to the footnote
8 documents and not to the other ones.
9 MR. GOSNELL: Yes, indeed, Mr. President, that was my
11 JUDGE DELVOIE: So we all agree.
12 MR. GOSNELL: We do, I believe.
13 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay.
14 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: And I just wanted to clarify that because I will
15 be displaying these documents that are in the report, I will be showing
16 them to allow the witness to expand. Even when I show them, I will not
17 seek to tender them at that very moment. I will call up the 65 ter
18 number, but I will not seek to tender at that very moment.
19 JUDGE DELVOIE: I -- I understand, Mr. Demirdjian. I think in --
20 in -- it would be helpful, then, if you could indicate that it is a
21 footnoted document --
22 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Yes.
23 JUDGE DELVOIE: -- that you are showing to the witness --
24 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Absolutely.
25 JUDGE DELVOIE: -- so we know that we are not to expect your
1 request to tender it immediately afterwards. Thank you very much.
2 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: That's all I had.
3 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay. The witness may be brought in.
4 And may the record reflect that we sit pursuant to Rule 15 bis,
5 Judge Hall being absent. Thank you.
6 [The witness entered court]
7 JUDGE DELVOIE: Good morning, Mr. Nielsen. Thank you for coming
8 to The Hague to assist the Tribunal. Could you for the record state your
9 name and date of birth, please.
10 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. Good morning.
11 Christian Axboe Nielsen, born it 12 September 1973.
12 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you very much. I have to tell you, you of
13 course already know, that you're going to make the solemn declaration now
14 which exposes you to the penalties of perjury should you give misleading
15 or untruthful evidence to this Tribunal. Could you now please read the
16 solemn declaration.
17 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
18 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
19 WITNESS: CHRISTIAN AXBOE NIELSEN
20 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you very much. You may be seated.
21 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
22 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Demirdjian.
23 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Thank you, Your Honours.
24 Examination by Mr. Demirdjian:
25 Q. Good morning, Dr. Nielsen.
1 A. Good morning.
2 Q. Could I to begin ask you a few questions about your professional
3 and educational background before we get into the subject matter of your
4 report. First of all, could you tell the Court what is your current
6 A. I am currently employed as associate professor of south-east
7 European studies at the University of Aarhus in Denmark.
8 Q. Very well. And while I'm asking you a few questions about the
9 background perhaps we could display Dr. Nielsen's CV which is at
10 65 ter 3215. That is at tab 27.
11 Doctor, could you tell us a little bit about your educational
12 background, perhaps dealing only with the university level onwards.
13 A. Yes. I did all of my university studies in the United States. I
14 took a bachelors degree in political science and Germanic languages and
15 literatures at Washington University in St. Louis. I then took a master
16 of international affairs degree specialising in human rights and
17 humanitarian affairs in east Central Europe at Columbia University's
18 school of international and public affairs. I then continued on at
19 Columbia University at the graduate school of arts and sciences where I
20 received a Ph.D. in east central European history particularly
21 specialising in the history of Yugoslavia between the two world wars.
22 Q. Very well. And following -- and this was, I believe, your Ph.D.
23 was in -- that would be 1999 -- 2002; is that right? In May of 2002.
24 A. Yes, that is correct.
25 Q. Okay. And following your -- your Ph.D., it is correct to say
1 that for a number of years you worked for the Office of the Prosecutor at
2 the ICTY?
3 A. Yes, I worked for the Office of the Prosecutor at the ICTY from
4 2002 until 2004 and then again from 2006 until the end of 2007.
5 Q. Very well. Are you also currently working as a consultant for
6 any other Tribunal?
7 A. Yes. I am currently working as an external consultant analyst
8 for one of the Defence teams at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, and I
9 also work as an external expert consultant for the Canadian Department of
10 Justice on cases that their crimes against humanity and war crimes
11 section handles.
12 Q. Very well. Returning now to your current occupation, you
13 explained that you were teaching at the University of Aarhus. What is
14 your area of specialisation?
15 A. I am a historian by training. I specialise in the history of
16 south-eastern Europe or the Balkans with a particular focus on the area
17 that used to be Yugoslavia.
18 Q. Very well. And are you currently conducting any research or are
19 you working on any publications?
20 A. Yes. I have a forthcoming publication on the dictatorship of
21 King Aleksandar in Yugoslavia, and I'm currently working on a new
22 research project which involves producing a history of the police in
23 socialist Yugoslavia.
24 Q. And this -- on this last relating to the history of the police,
25 can you expand a bit on what is the subject matter exactly?
1 A. My intent is to write a complete history of the
2 Ministry of Internal Affairs in the socialist Federal Republic of
3 Yugoslavia from the end of World War II until the collapse of Yugoslavia
4 in 1991, and I am conducting this research as I did with my previous
5 research for the Ph.D. and also research done here at the Tribunal based
6 on archival material that I myself am retrieving from the relevant
7 archives in the former Yugoslavia, in this case in particular the archive
8 of the Republic of Slovenia.
9 Q. Very well. And prior to working on this research, is it correct
10 to say that you have done other research on police related matters?
11 A. Yes, that is correct. I would point out that my dissertation
12 that I wrote at Columbia University was overwhelmingly based on police
13 sources from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. I then during my years working
14 for the Tribunal focused again primarily on police sources, and in that
15 sense there is a continuity in my current research which also is
16 predominantly focused on police sources and relevant political and other
18 Q. Going specifying to your years working for the Tribunal and the
19 years following that, it is correct that you have testified at the
20 Tribunal on three separate occasions for three separate trials?
21 A. Yes, that is correct.
22 Q. That would be the case of Krajisnik, Stanisic and Zupljanin, and
23 Karadzic; is that correct?
24 A. Yes, that is correct.
25 Q. What was the scope of your reports in those cases?
1 A. In all three cases I focused on the Ministry of Internal Affairs
2 of the Serbian Republic in Bosnia and Herzegovina, its establishment and
3 its performance from November 1990 until the end of 1992.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Your Honours, Dr. Nielsen's CV is not directly
6 footnoted in his report. May I ask to tender 65 ter 3215.
7 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
8 THE REGISTRAR: It shall be assigned Exhibit P364. Thank you.
9 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Thank you very much.
10 Q. Dr. Nielsen, I'd like to turn to your report now and to the
11 methodology you applied in preparing this report. Is it correct to say
12 that at the end of the year 2011 you met with members of the
13 Office of the Prosecutor and agreed on terms of reference and the scope
14 of the report which you were to prepare for this trial?
15 A. To be honest, I cannot recall whether I actually met with members
16 of the Office of the Prosecutor at the end of 2011, but I certainly had
17 communications with the Office of the Prosecutor during the course of
18 which I agreed to produce the report which is before us today, and I was
19 given terms of reference on the basis of which I was to produce that
21 Q. Very well. And would it be correct to say that the scope of your
22 reporting included mainly two items, one being the historical and
23 political developments in the former Yugoslavia and Croatia between the
24 years 1990 and 1993, and the second would be to focus on the MUP
25 structures in Croatia during again the years 1991 to 1993, particularly
1 in the Serb entities? Would that be correct?
2 A. Yes, that is correct.
3 Q. I'd like you to explain to the Court how you prepared your report
4 and more specifically how you selected the sources for the preparation of
5 your report.
6 A. I was initially provided with a quite substantial number of
7 documents and also videos by the Office of the Prosecutor. This was a
8 selection that had been made by the Prosecution team. I was invited to
9 review those documents as a way of commencing work on the report. Once I
10 became more familiar with the material that I had been provided with, I
11 then subsequently identified on my own a significant additional number of
12 documents that I wished to examine, and I requested and received all the
13 documents that I thought would be additionally relevant from the
14 Office of the Prosecutor. At several instances, the Office of the
15 Prosecutor of its own volition also identified new material that they
16 deemed relevant for the report, and I was provided with this material and
17 asked to review it to see whether it should be included in my analysis.
18 Q. Now -- and is it correct to say that you were also provided
19 access to the databases of the Office of the Prosecutor?
20 A. Yes, although I did not myself conduct a substantial number of
21 searches on the OTP's databases for the -- for documents relevant to this
22 report. I was in all cases able to identify and obtain when I wanted any
23 relevant additional material. This material was identified by myself
24 largely based on review of the initial batch of documentation which
25 caused me to identify other relevant documents and also by reviewing
1 earlier reports and judgements of this Tribunal that are pertinent, in
2 particular, to the Republika Srpska Krajina.
3 Q. Very well. In reviewing this material, would you be reviewing
4 the originals or the translations?
5 A. It is important for me to stress as I have done in previous
6 testimony at this Tribunal that I in all cases conduct my analysis and
7 base my conclusions exclusively on the B/C/S originals of the documents.
8 I speak, read, and write B/C/S fluently, and I in all cases rely on the
9 original documentation as I do in my historical research as well. This
10 also means that I in most cases have not examined, unless I was asked by
11 the Prosecution to do so, any of the relevant translations of these
13 Q. And this is something I may have skipped on your resume. Is it
14 correct to say that you also teach the language?
15 A. Yes. I have also taught B/C/S at the university level in
17 Q. Thank you. In addition to the material that you have had access
18 to at the ICTY, did you also use other sources?
19 A. Yes. In addition to the material that I received from the ICTY,
20 I also used a small number of secondary sources, monographs produced by
21 other authors and made limited use of those sources in those cases where
22 the primary source base, that is the documents possessed by the Tribunal,
23 were unable to provide relevant information on, in particular, events
24 that I knew to have happened during this period and which would, in my
25 opinion, have been curiously absent if I had not been able to cite them
1 somehow. Therefore, I made use of a number of works, a number of books,
2 that I myself identified and which we had scanned and ERN'd.
3 Q. Very well. Now, since we're talking about the use of books
4 published by other authors, there are a few names that come to mind. For
5 example, I've seen that you used the book of Ilija Petrovic, the book
6 published by Nikica Baric, and a chapter of a book published by
7 Caslav Ocic. Can you tell us how you came about to select these books
8 and how much you relied on them?
9 A. I should amend something that I just stated earlier. I consider
10 as an historian and as an analyst the books of Ilija Petrovic and
11 Caslav Ocic - Ocic, excuse me - to be in both cases primary sources.
12 That is how they would be considered by professional historians because
13 they are written by persons who themselves were participants in the
14 events they describe. In the case of Caslav Ocic, he was the
15 Foreign Minister for a time of the Republika Srpska Krajina. He produced
16 what I find to be a quite handy chronology of events in
17 Republika Srpska Krajina, and in the case of Ilija Petrovic, he provides
18 a detailed narrative of political and other events in Eastern Slavonia,
19 Baranja, and Srem. He was himself a principal participant these events.
20 I should note that in accordance with the professional standards of
21 history and analysis, I weight in my analysis those accounts keeping in
22 mind that those authors themselves have their own subjective points of
23 view, but I have to quite some extent compared their accounts to other
24 documents which bear on similar events and particularly as accords the
25 dating of specific meetings or specific events in Eastern Slavonia and in
1 Krajina as a whole, I find them to be reliable in their recounting of
2 when certain events took place, and it is as such that I have made
3 limited use of those books.
4 In the case of Nikica Baric, he is a Croat historian, a young
5 Croat historian, and I would not normally make use of a book by a Croat
6 historian on what he calls the Serb uprising in Croatia, particularly
7 because of the risk that he has a bias, but I would point out that not
8 only do I make very limited use of this book, again mostly to establish
9 points of chronology, but that Baric's work has been favourably received
10 throughout the former Yugoslavia, and he has published in -- on the RSK
11 in peer reviewed historical journals of the highest order in Serbia and
12 as such is perceived by Serbian historians as being a prominent historian
13 of this period.
14 Q. Speaking of a peer review, Dr. Nielsen, could you explain to the
15 Trial Chamber the difference, perhaps, between how a historian would
16 select documents and incorporate in a report as opposed to how lawyers
17 would approach the admissibility of the document?
18 A. Well, at the most basic level I would again come back to this
19 distinction which I think to some extent the court, lawyers, and
20 historians share which is the important distinction between primary
21 sources and secondly sources. Primary sources being documents produced
22 by government institutions, political parties, et cetera, who themselves
23 are actually participating in, as it were, historical events. Here again
24 I include the memoirs correspondence, telephone conversations, whatever
25 else may be accessible, e-mails, of principal actors who themselves
1 participate in the historical events that a court or an historian is
3 I then would mention secondary sources which in most cases are
4 works, scholarly works, or publicistic works which provide second-hand
5 summaries or accounts of these events, and in those cases, of course, I
6 think both historians and lawyers would attach a much lesser weight to
7 those sources not only because those sources to a large extent are
8 informed by hearsay and by subjective considerations of other evidence or
9 source material but because they are themselves also distant in time and
10 place from the original accounts and are not themselves participants in
11 the events.
12 So to that extent, I think particularly as an analyst, as a
13 historian in my work for the Tribunal, I've tried in this report as well
14 to rely as much as possible on primary sources and in particular I would
15 note primary sources produced by the Serbian side in order that we can
16 reduce the inherent bias that would emerge if I were instead to rely on
17 accounts of these events produced by the Croats.
18 Q. And to close on this chapter, Dr. Nielsen, can you explain to the
19 Court the selection you have made of newspaper articles?
20 A. Yes. In a small number of cases in the report, I have used
21 newspaper articles or segments of television shows, what we generally as
22 analysts refer to as open sources. I believe that in the vast majority
23 of cases, I've again availed myself of Serb open sources again to reduce
24 the risk of any bias that might have occurred had I relied instead on
25 Croat open sources from this period.
1 I also rely on a number of interviews that have been published in
2 the Serbian media in particular and which are interviews with principal
3 actors in the RSK or other areas of -- other earlier areas of -- and
4 political structures of the Krajina.
5 Q. Speaking of interviews --
6 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Demirdjian.
7 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Yes, Your Honours.
8 JUDGE DELVOIE: May I have just one moment, please.
9 Dr. Nielsen, you said that:
10 "In particularly I would note that primary sources produced by
11 the Serbian hide in order that we can reduce inherent bias that would
12 emerge if we were instead to rely on accounts of these events produced by
13 the Croats."
14 Could you clarify that for me, please.
15 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. I believe given what is known
16 about the political police and military organs of all sides in the
17 conflict in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in the period from 1990
18 until 1995 that it would be extremely problematic to write an analytical
19 account of, for example, the police in Serb-controlled areas of Croatia
20 that would rely heavily on Croat sources. Those Croat sources would have
21 a very high interest in portraying the Serbian side and their actions in
22 the most negative light possible, and it would be very difficult for me
23 to be in a position to corroborate whether those Croat sources were
24 actually providing reliable accounts or not.
25 Conversely, I believe that the Serbian/Yugoslav sides in the same
1 period have little logical inherent interest in portraying their own
2 actions negatively. On the contrary, they would have an inherent
3 interest in portraying them more favourably. It follows for me as a
4 point of logic that if the Serb or Yugoslav forces speak of events which
5 they, I believe, are problematic, negative, or detrimental to the
6 security situation, then there is a substantial likelihood that such
7 events did, in fact, occur. For the same reason in dealing with the
8 Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs, I relied almost exclusively on
9 the Bosnian Serbs' own documents so as to avoid any bias that was
10 abundantly evident in the documents produced contemporaneously by the
11 Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats about the Bosnian Serb police.
12 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you very much. Please proceed,
13 Mr. Demirdjian.
14 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Thank you, Your Honours. Can we display on the
15 screen 65 ter 2130. That's at tab 302.
16 Q. Just to give an example of a newspaper article that you've
17 selected for the purposes of your report.
18 Dr. Nielsen, I don't know if you are able to see already the
19 B/C/S version on the left side of the screen.
20 A. Yes, I can.
21 Q. Very well.
22 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Can we scroll to the left and up in the B/C/S
23 version so we could see the author and the magazine this was published
24 in. Towards the left, perhaps. Are we able to see this? In the B/C/S
25 version, can we see the left part of the -- the screen. Is that the
1 whole page? Very well?
2 Q. Dr. Nielsen, do you recognise this article?
3 A. Yes, I recognise this as an interview of Goran Hadzic that I cite
4 in the report. If I maybe of assistance, I believe that the -- in the
5 B/C/S version, the author's name, that is the journalist's name, appears
6 at the end of the article rather than at the beginning.
7 Q. Thank you, Dr. Nielsen. Quite right. Now, this is a -- is
8 "Intervju" a magazine or a newspaper?
9 MR. GOSNELL: Objection, Mr. President. As you know, there is an
10 objection that we've made to this document being admitted as an exhibit.
11 Now, of course that doesn't in and of itself preclude hearing Mr. Nielsen
12 on his expert opinions about the content of that proposed exhibit, but I
13 would suggest that if ultimately you decide that this is not admissible,
14 going through this document in detail, hearing its content and having the
15 commentary of Mr. Nielsen -- Dr. Nielsen on these issues would undermine
16 any ultimate ruling that you make on admissibility. So my suggestion
17 would be that we make a decision now on whether or not statements of
18 Mr. Hadzic to a journalist well after the events that are described in
19 the document are going to be admitted by this Chamber before we hear
20 Mr. Nielsen on it.
21 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Demirdjian.
22 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Yes. I don't know if this will change my
23 learned friend's position -- I'm not sure if this is going to change my
24 learned friend's position, but I do not intend in exploring the newspaper
25 article at this stage. I just want Dr. Nielsen to give us his
1 explanation of how and why he selected this interview and how does he
2 assess the reliability of it. So I will not go into the details or even
3 the substance of the article. I don't know if that changes my learned
4 friend's position on the matter, because we will be strictly relying on
5 this article as a tool reference just to support what is said in the
6 report and nothing else.
7 MR. GOSNELL: Well, it's hard for me to understand how he could
8 make any comments about reliability without delving into the content at
9 least to some degree. And our position, to be clear, is that there are
10 not sufficient guarantees or indicia of reliability that the journalist
11 here accurately recorded what Mr. Hadzic may have said to the journalist.
12 It falls well below the standard of what would be deemed admissible by
13 this Chamber under regular circumstances. And bootstrapping it to an
14 expert opinion doesn't change that. In fact, it almost makes it worse.
15 So that's the basis for the objection.
16 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Well just in that case, Your Honours, I believe
17 that it would be -- it would be sufficient for Dr. Nielsen to simply
18 explain why and how he selected the newspaper article, again without
19 going into the substance, and if needs be if there's still a standing
20 objection we will have to see if we can find the journalist if there is
21 really a strong objection about the accuracy and reliability of the
22 article. We can always make investigations to find if the journalist is
23 available, but at this stage it's really about the selection of sources
24 of newspaper articles in relation to -- and there are many more in the
1 [Trial Chamber confers]
2 JUDGE DELVOIE: Please proceed as you indicated you would,
3 Mr. Demirdjian.
4 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Thank you, Your Honours.
5 MR. GOSNELL: Sorry, Mr. President. Thank you. I just have a
6 request from my client which I think is a legitimate request. Could we
7 request that the image of Mr. Hadzic's children not be displayed to the
9 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: That's fine.
10 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
11 Please proceed, Mr. Demirdjian.
12 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Thank you, Your Honours. Could we go to the
13 last page in the B/C/S version, to the bottom part.
14 Q. Dr. Nielsen, I believe that in the English version we could see
15 what -- the author Gordana Jovanovic. Now, could you explain to us how
16 you came about to select this newspaper article and perhaps explain it to
17 the Judges what your assessment is of it?
18 A. I cannot recall whether this was a document that was provided to
19 me by the OTP or whether I myself requested it. I can comment, however,
20 that the reason I chose to cite it in the report is that this is an
21 interview with the accused, a relevant actor in the context of the RSK
22 and the RSK MUP. The interview stems from "Intervju," which as the name
23 suggests is a Serbian magazine that published a large quantity of
24 interviews with important actors in Serb-controlled areas of Yugoslavia
25 in the mid 1990s.
1 I had the ability in earlier years while working as an analyst to
2 read many issues of "Intervju" and therefore am well familiar with this
3 particular magazine and with the type of interviews and type of persons
4 who were interviewed by the journalists working for this magazine.
5 As an analyst, it is my experience that the interviews -- the
6 content of the interviews in "Intervju" magazine often corresponds quite
7 closely to statements made by those persons interviewed that have been
8 stated publicly by those figures elsewhere on television, in political
9 documents, in political speeches, et cetera. Therefore, as an analyst, I
10 have no reason at present to doubt the veracity of the reporting or
11 transcription, if you will, of the interviews that appear in this
12 magazine, and I do not a priori have any recollections of significant
13 disputes post factum between journalists of this magazine and the persons
14 that they had interviewed regarding the content of these interviews as
16 Q. Very well. Now, Dr. Nielsen, your report was made available at
17 the end of -- well, it was finalised in June and was made available to
18 the Defence at the end of June of 2012. Since then, it is correct to say
19 that you were provided with a collection of new documents; is that right?
20 A. Yes, that is correct. I was recently provided with a collection
21 of documents from Serbia that had not been available to the Office of the
22 Prosecutor at the time that I produced my report.
23 Q. Very well. And did you have the opportunity to review some of
24 this material?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Very well. We'll be dealing with them at a later stage. And it
2 is correct to say that in December of last year, in 2012, you met with
3 members of the Office of the Prosecutor for a proofing session at the end
4 of which was prepared an errata sheet; is that right?
5 A. Yes, that is correct.
6 Q. And in this errata sheet a number of typographical corrections
7 were made; is that right?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Could we go in private session for a moment,
12 JUDGE DELVOIE: Private session, please.
13 [Private session]
23 [Open session]
24 THE REGISTRAR: We're back in open session, Your Honours. Thank
1 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
2 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Thank you.
3 Q. This closes this chapter of my examination-in-chief, Dr. Nielsen.
4 I would like to now turn to your report. I believe you requested to have
5 a copy available to you. I have a printed copy here. Unless there are
6 any objections, I'd like to make this available to Dr. Nielsen.
7 I will begin with the general historical and political
8 background, and I will move through your report in the order that it is
9 presented in there. I'd like to begin with paragraph 3 where you quote
10 the census, the 1991 census in Croatia, which indicated that out of a
11 population of 4.7 million inhabitants in Croatia, 78 per cent were of the
12 Croatian ethnic background and 12 per cent of the population were of
13 Serbian ethnicity.
14 Just to clarify, you obtained these numbers directly from the
15 census results which were published by the Croatian bureau of statistics;
16 is that right?
17 A. Yes, as is indicated in footnote 1.
18 Q. And how -- to your knowledge, have these numbers ever been
19 contested or are these numbers accurate?
20 A. To my knowledge, there has been no significant contestation of
21 this number.
22 Q. Now, in the census, of course, you have a number of ethnic groups
23 which are listed. You always have Croats, Serbs, ethnic Hungarians,
24 Ruthenians, et cetera, and you also have a part of the population which
25 is named Yugoslavs. Can you tell us to your knowledge how we should
1 assess this -- this -- this term "Yugoslavs"?
2 A. In socialist Yugoslavia there was in the later censuses the
3 possibility of declaring oneself as a Yugoslav rather than as, for
4 example, a Croat or a Serb. Based on my knowledge as an historian,
5 the -- those who identified themselves as Yugoslavs were primarily urban
6 inhabitants of various cities in Yugoslavia, and in a significant number
7 of cases persons who were born out of ethnically mixed marriages and
8 therefore did not wish to choose one ethnicity over the other, but this
9 category of Yugoslavs was never at any time one of the largest categories
10 of self-identification in the Yugoslav censuses.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Demirdjian, just for an error in the -- in
13 the record. It's not me giving evidence here.
14 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Yes, I can see that.
15 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
16 MR. DEMIRDJIAN:
17 Q. If we can move now to paragraph 5 of your report where you
18 discuss the elections in Croatia in April and May of 1990. You refer
19 here to the main political parties such as the HDZ and the SDS, and to
20 support that, I think it is in footnote 4 that you refer again to the
21 book published by Nikica Baric in relation to the seats that were won by
22 the SDS.
23 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Now if we can perhaps display 65 ter 2578. That
24 is at tab 314. And in the English version I think there are two files.
25 We should display the one that has the ERN 06247029. This is a summary,
1 an English summary which is part of the book. Yes, thank you.
2 Now, in the English summary if we go to page 2, please. Yes. I
3 think it is towards the bottom of the page that Nikica Baric explains
4 that some of the actions of the new Croatian government could not find
5 the support of ethnic Serbs and this is following the -- the elections.
6 Q. Could you explain to us what he is referring to here?
7 A. Well, as I state in paragraph 5, the first multi-party elections
8 that were held in Croatia in 1990 led to the victory of nationalist
9 parties, in particular the quite nationalist Croat Democratic Union or
10 HDZ which obtained the largest percentage of votes and on the other hand,
11 the Serb Democratic Party, the SDS, a nationalist party representing the
12 Serbs in Croatia also received a substantial portion of the vote of Serbs
13 residing in Croatia. Both of these parties portrayed themselves
14 primarily as political organisations that would defend Croat interests in
15 the case of the HDZ and Serb interests in the case of the SDS, and as
16 such they were diametrically opposed and both parties spent a
17 considerable amount of political energy on convincing their respective
18 ethnic populations that -- that they could only find protection and
19 security, political, financial, and economic security if they were
20 gathered on a national basis.
21 In the case of the HDZ, the party and in particular its leader,
22 Franjo Tudjman, on repeated occasions engaged in displays of nationalist
23 symbols, many of which harked back to the so-called
24 Independent State of Croatia, a fascist state that existed from 1941 to
25 1945, and it was such displays, such rhetoric, among other things, that
1 also led, as Nikica Baric says, ethnic Serbs to severely doubt whether
2 they would have a future in a Croatia, in particular in a Croatia that
3 might be moving towards independence.
4 Q. Now, the very next sentence after the following the one that I
5 quoted earlier says that:
6 "Nevertheless, Serbs used every possibility to show that Croats
7 are endangering them and used this as a pretext for their own aggressive
9 What can you say about this?
10 A. What I can say is that it is my observation of Serb politics in
11 Croatia during this period that they reacted very negatively to the
12 overwhelming victory of the HDZ and the election of Franjo Tudjman as
13 president of Croatia, and as I state in paragraph 6, the anxiety created
14 among the Serb minority in Croatia by this victory was frequently very
15 quickly and later consistently linked to past memories -- excuse me,
16 memories of past oppression of Serbs in Croatia. This -- this anxiety
17 and fear was to a considerable extent manipulated by Serb politicians in
18 Croatia, again as a way of mobilising the Serb ethnic populous in Croatia
19 around the Serb Democratic Party which increasingly portrayed itself as
20 the sole legitimate political representative of Serbs in Croatia.
21 Q. Now, on the basis of documents and books that you have read, what
22 to your knowledge was the position of Serbs in relation to an independent
24 A. It is the case that the only previous independent Croatian state
25 that had existed in living memory, if we look at it from the perspective
1 of 1991, was the aforementioned fascist Independent State of Croatia.
2 For that very reason and because of the genocidal politics that the
3 Independent State of Croatia had pursued against the Serb population of
4 Croatia, the very notion of an independent Croatian state was even under
5 the best of circumstances likely to create enormous anxiety among at
6 least a substantial portion of the Serb population in Croatia.
7 As I stated, the inflammable political rhetoric of
8 Franjo Tudjman, who had also as an historian dabbled in revisionism and
9 at times denied the suffering of Serbs in Croatia or at least minimised
10 the suffering of Serbs in Croatia during World War II contributed to the
11 creation of an atmosphere of extreme anxiety among many Serbs in Croatia.
12 Q. And was there a -- you said this rhetoric created an anxiety
13 among at least a substantial portion of the Serb population. Was there a
14 portion of the Serb population in Croatia which looked favourably toward
15 an independent Croatia?
16 A. It is difficult to state whether there was any portion of the
17 Serb population that really looked favourably towards an independent
18 Croatia. However, it can probably be stated that among a certain section
19 of Serbs, particularly those living in the larger cities of Croatia, they
20 might possibly have been willing to support more autonomy if not
21 independence for Croatia had the HDZ gone about propagating this policy
22 in a more conciliatory manner. Again, that is, unfortunately, I have to
23 say speculation, because the HDZ did anything but that.
24 Q. Very well. If we move to paragraph 6, you explain here how Serb
25 politicians in Croatia cultivated a fear amongst the Serb minority, that
1 Serbs would be subjected to discrimination, linking this fear to genocide
2 that occurred during the Second World War. Could you tell the Court what
3 is the position amongst academic circles in relation to the assertion
4 that genocide was committed against Serbs during the Second World War?
5 A. I believe that it is an accurate reflection of the consensus in
6 scholarly circles to state as I do in paragraph 6 of my report that the
7 fascist independent State of Croatia implemented extremely discriminatory
8 policies against Serbs and other minorities, in particular Jews and Roma,
9 in Croatia, culminating in a genocide against the Serbs and these other
10 minorities on the territory of the NDH which we should remember not only
11 incorporated or included the territory of present-day Croatia but also
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina and a substantial portion of Serbia.
13 The policies of the NDH state varied at times in intensity and in
14 particular certain very negative policies pursued by that state such as
15 forced conversions of Serb Orthodox believers to Roman Catholicism varied
16 over time. However, I believe it is an accurate reflection of the state
17 of scholarly knowledge to state that the NDH's policies were absolutely
18 toxic and negative and in some genocidal particularly as concerned the
19 Serb, Roma, and Jewish populations of that state.
20 Q. In that paragraph, I think it is at footnote 6 where you referred
21 to a statement made by Milan Martic in an interview in 1994. Perhaps we
22 can display. It's 65 ter 4981, and that is at tab 315.
23 In the footnote you indicate that Milan Martic stated, or
24 referred to a clear indication of the restoration of Nazism from the
25 period 1941 to 1945. And again returning to your comment in paragraph 6
1 of how Serb politicians used this -- the events the Second World War,
2 what can you make of this statement?
3 A. The statement made by Milan Martic is an accurate reflection of
4 the political rhetoric of Serb leaders in Croatia in the period from the
5 time of the multi-party elections in Croatia and then forward until 1995
6 in which he and others choose to characterise the newly created -- or
7 the -- excuse me, first the movement to create an Independent State of
8 Croatia and after 1991 the newly Independent State of Croatia as the
9 second coming of the fascist Independent State of Croatia from the
10 Second World War.
11 As I state in paragraph 6, a logical and again unfortunate
12 corollary to this was a choose by many Serb political leaders and some
13 Serbs in the general population of Croatia to refer generically to Croats
14 as the -- as Ustasha, that is the fascist movement that led the
15 Independent State of Croatia to refer to the organs of the Croatian state
16 in Zagreb as Ustasha or NDH organs and again after 1991 to refer to the
17 newly Independent State of Croatia as the NDH.
18 I should note as I do in paragraph 6 that this type of
19 association, discursive association between the Croatian independence
20 movement and the Croatian independent state in the 1990s on the one hand
21 and the fascist Croatian state of the 1940s on the other hand was
22 mirrored on the Croat side by an equally unfortunate tendency by many
23 Croatian media and Croat politicians to refer to Serbs generically as
24 Chetniks, that is, as extreme nationalist Serbs, Chetniks being the
25 royalist nationalist movement that existed during World War II.
1 Q. Thank you. Moving on to paragraph 7, Dr. Nielsen, you explain
2 here how in June and July of 1990 the Croatian Serbs begin to contemplate
3 the establishment of self-rule and declare autonomy of the Serb Nation.
4 Now, this took place it would be approximately half a year before
5 the adoption of the new constitution in Croatia; is that right?
6 A. I'm sorry, did you say approximately half a year before or after
7 a year --
8 Q. Half a year before.
9 A. Yes, that is correct.
10 Q. And just to be clear, when was the new Croatian constitution
12 A. It was promulgated on the 22nd of December, 1990.
13 Q. Now, it appears though that at this time some constitutional
14 changes were already proposed by the summer of 1990. Perhaps if we could
15 look at tab 8. That's 65 ter 50, 5-0. Again, this is a document which
16 is in your report. It is a press report from Tanjug, from the
17 31st of July, 1990. And it states here that in line with the decision by
18 the recent gathering a Serb referendum would be held. Towards the end of
19 this article the paragraph before the last one, it reads here:
20 "At today's session the Serbian National Council rejected all
21 amendments to the constitution of the Croat republic adopted by the Croat
22 Assembly. The council also rejects the use of Croat national symbols,
23 especially the coat of arms," et cetera.
24 Although the constitution was adopted in December of 1990, it
25 appears that already in the summer of 1990 some constitutional changes
1 were already in the works. Now, generally what was the position of the
2 Serb politicians in relation to these constitutional changes?
3 A. The position of the Serb Democratic Party was certainly negative
4 as regarded the proposed changes which would lead or pave a path towards
5 Croatian independence and towards any constitutional changes which might
6 certainly in the eyes of the Serbs lead to a diminishing or erasure of
7 their status as a constituent nation of Croatia as they -- a
8 constitutional status that they had enjoyed until 1990. So in this case,
9 what we see is that the drafting of the new constitution is obviously a
10 longer procedure which is discussed in the Sabor or parliament in Croatia
11 and that the Serbs are already at this stage expressing quite serious
12 concerns about where this is all headed.
13 Q. Now, at paragraph 7 you explain that a referendum was held in
14 relation to Serbian autonomy, and you cite the report of the central
15 commission which was overseeing the vote. This is at 65 ter 59, at
16 tab 12. We can display that for a moment. Yes.
17 Now, could you -- could you tell us how you view the result here
18 whereby 567.127 persons voted for Serbian autonomy versus 144 who voted
19 against? How do you review this result?
20 A. Well, what we see in this period both in Croatia and in
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina are moves by ethnic Serb political parties, in both
22 cases in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina called the Serb Democratic Party,
23 to stake out their political positions which were against increased
24 autonomy or independence for Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. One of
25 the ways in which these parties mobilised political support and
1 publicised their opposition to moves towards Croatian or Bosnian
2 independence was by holding such referenda. This referendum for example
3 in Croatia is pretty much a self-selective referendum. Anyone who is
4 likely to participate in this referendum organised by the Serbs in
5 Croatia is likely to vote yes. Anyone who opposes it is not likely to
6 participate in the referendum. And it is also for this reason that as I
7 state in paragraph 8 the authorities in -- of the republic of Croatia
8 regarded this referendum as informal and also illegal and attempted to
9 stop it.
10 Q. If we return to page 1 in the English version, under item 2 we
11 see the municipalities which towards the bottom of the page, if we could
12 zoom in on the -- yeah. Thank you. We can see the municipalities where
13 the vote was held. We see Knin, Benkovac, et cetera, and in the fourth
14 line we can see that some municipalities in Eastern Slavonia and Baranja,
15 namely Beli Manastir and Vukovar, also participated in this -- this
17 I'm mentioning this because I'd like to tie this to the next
18 document, which is P62.50. This is at tab 334. It's a report from a
19 police station. This is a document, actually, that is not in your
20 report, but I believe you've had a chance to look at it?
21 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Can we display it on the screen, please. Right.
22 Q. Now, we can see on the top left-hand corner Djakovo public
23 security station. I don't know -- I haven't asked you this before, but
24 do you know where Djakovo is exactly?
25 A. Yes, I do. Djakovo is located in Slavonia.
1 Q. Very well. And it appears here that if we look at this report,
2 that the Croatian police did try to interfere, as it is indicated in your
3 report, during this referendum. You were mentioning just a few moments
4 ago that this was a self-selective report -- referendum. Can you gather
5 anything from this police report in relation to that?
6 A. Well, I would first remark that in the previous document we saw
7 the list of municipalities. They're -- and in some cases portions of
8 municipalities conforms to those areas in which there were substantial if
9 not majority Serb populations. So that again shows that this was not a
10 country-wide referendum but, rather, a referendum that was conducted
11 first and foremost in areas where the Serb population in Croatia was
13 Looking at the document in front of us, we see that there are
14 individuals who have been using their own vehicles and essentially
15 volunteering in order to organise informally this referendum where they
16 go around to villages in various municipalities and sit down with
17 persons, Serbs whom they regard as being favourably predisposed towards
18 organising this and holding this referendum. These persons were then
19 charged with identifying other Serbs in their municipalities and
20 villages, et cetera, and mobilising them to vote in this referendum so
21 that the result could be as considerable as possible.
22 I would note that both in this document and the document I refer
23 to in paragraph 8, the hostility of the authorities of the Republic of
24 Croatia and in particular the deployment of Croatian police to try to
25 confiscate ballots or in other ways obstruct the referendum in some ways
1 seems to have functioned as confirmation in the minds of some Serbs that
2 the Croatian police was indeed aiming to act in ways that were against
3 the interests of Serbs in Croatia.
4 Q. And we see at the third -- in the third paragraph here the very
5 last sentence when they're discussing Veljko Brkovic's activities, the
6 last sentence reads:
7 "For this purpose he planned to visit Serbian majority villages."
8 Does that match with your understanding of how the referendum was
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Very well. Now, if we move to -- if we skip to paragraph 14 of
12 your report, you explain that various developments took place during the
13 spring of 1991, including a referendum which was held by Croatian Serbs
14 on the 12th of May. This is at 65 ter 150, which is tab 48 in the list.
15 If we could display this -- this document, please.
16 And I think it is correct to say that during this referendum,
17 again a very large majority of the people were leaving - and in this case
18 this is in the SAO Krajina - voted in favour of remaining in Yugoslavia.
19 Now, before we get into the document itself, is it correct to say
20 that during the same month the government of Croatia held its own
21 referendum on independence?
22 A. Yes, I believe so.
23 Q. All right. And that Croatia declared its independence a month
24 later, on the 25th of June; is that right?
25 A. Yes, that is correct.
1 Q. Okay. And looking at this document, could you again comment on
2 the municipalities which -- where this referendum was held.
3 A. Well, the municipalities we see on the list here are the
4 municipalities in what is known as -- as the Krajina region of Croatia,
5 which is a historical region that had existed for several centuries and
6 in which, therefore, a number of again historical reasons was a very,
7 very significant Serb population and indeed a majority Serb population.
8 So it is these municipalities and this region known as the Krajina that
9 becomes the driving force in the organisation of the Serbs in Croatia.
10 It should be pointed out as a point of general interest that a
11 very large number of Serbs in Croatia were sighted in major cities such
12 as Zagreb, Karlovac, Osijek, Split, and so on, and that in many cases
13 these Serbs numerically constituted larger groups than the sum population
14 of the sparsely populated Krajina municipalities, but it was these rural
15 municipalities where the Serbs constituted a solid majority that, as I
16 said, were the driving force in the organisation of the Serbs.
17 Q. Well, in relation to that, under number 10 we see Knin. Could
18 you perhaps describe to the Trial Chamber how important of a city Knin
19 was before the beginning of the conflict.
20 A. Knin is a city that is located in a rural part of the
21 Dalmatian Krajina, and I think could safely -- it could safely be said
22 that Knin in no way prior to 1991 was a place that figured prominently in
23 the popular mind of residents of the Republic of Croatia. It is a much
24 smaller town than the primary urban settlements in Croatia and in the
25 context of policing was subordinate to the more significant population
1 centre of Sibenik.
2 Q. All right. And before we break, I would like to ask you a
3 question relating to paragraphs 15, 16, and 17, because here we see you
4 mentioning Milan Martic, who was at the time secretary of the
5 SAO Krajina SUP. Paragraph 16, we see that he's appointed as the
6 minister of defence of the SAO Krajina. This is on 29th of May, 1991.
7 And if we flip to paragraph 17, and this is about a month later, he's
8 also -- here it says re-appointed as minister of internal affairs of the
9 SAO Krajina.
10 Could you explain perhaps to the Trial Chamber this accumulation
11 of titles?
12 A. It's difficult for me to explain the accumulation of titles other
13 than to state that it is clear that Milan Martic in -- who was one of the
14 most prominent police officers in Knin, again was perhaps the actor who
15 played the leading role in organising the police structures in Krajina.
16 This -- perhaps we could explain the conglomeration or accumulation of
17 titles by noting that Martic and other members of the police in Knin and
18 in the SAO Krajina regarded the police as the most proximate reliable and
19 useful line of defence against possible movements to put down attempts at
20 establishing Serbian autonomy in the Krajina, and in that sense it
21 follows logically that the police not only would be a force for internal
22 affairs as it has traditionally been in socialist Yugoslavia, but also a
23 force that could be part of a nascent defence effort and hence the title
24 of minister of defence.
25 Q. Thank you, Dr. Nielsen.
1 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Your Honours, I will be moving to a new chapter,
2 so this may be an appropriate time to break.
3 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you, Mr. Demirdjian.
4 Dr. Nielsen, this is the time for our first break. We'll come
5 back at 11.00. You will be escorted out of the courtroom. Thank you.
6 [The witness stands down]
7 JUDGE DELVOIE: Court adjourned.
8 --- Recess taken at 10.27 a.m.
9 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.
10 [The witness takes the stand]
11 JUDGE DELVOIE: Please proceed, Mr. Demirdjian.
12 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Thank you, Your Honours.
13 Q. Dr. Nielsen, I would like to turn to section B of your report
14 dealing with the establishment of the SAO SBWS. You indicate at
15 paragraph 18 that a referendum was held on autonomy for Serbs in August
16 and September 1990, and then at paragraph 19, you deal with the creation
17 of the Serb National Council in the SAO SBWS.
18 Now, at paragraph 20, you describe the content of the declaration
19 of sovereign autonomy of the Serb Nation and the SBWS. This is P81.50 at
20 tab 143. Can we perhaps display this. P81.50. Yes, thank you.
21 Now, we see the declaration on sovereign autonomy of the Serb
22 people of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem. Could we go to the next
23 page in the English versions and take a look at the items 7 and 8,
25 Right. Here we see that the establishment -- this discusses the
1 duties of the Serb National Council, and I would like you to comment,
2 Dr. Nielsen, on what the nature of this -- was the nature of this body,
3 the Serb National Council. How are we supposed to view it in the context
4 of the events in early 1991?
5 A. Well, what we see here is a process that first started in the
6 area called the SAO Krajina and which was later emulated in the area of
7 Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem and also separately in the area of
8 Western Slavonia in which the Serb people led by -- primarily by the
9 Serb Democratic Party mobilised in response to what they viewed as
10 Croatia's and Croat politicians' drive towards increasing autonomy and
11 independence for Croatia.
12 What this results in can most neatly be summarised under the
13 saying: Why should we end up being a minority in your country if you can
14 potentially end up being a minority in our country? That is to say the
15 Serb politicians as we saw already with the referendum are identifying
16 those portions of Croatia in which the Serbs constitute a demographic
17 majority. They are proclaiming autonomous districts in those areas and
18 establishing of their own volition institutions such as the
19 Serb National Council here in January 1991 which they view as the sole
20 legitimate political representatives of the Serbs in those areas of
22 Legally speaking, with a happens during this period is that the
23 Serbs go from, as we see in the document before us, stating that they
24 will disregard any legislation coming from Zagreb that conflicts with the
25 constitution of Yugoslavia or in any way negatively affects the interests
1 of Serbs in Croatia to a later phase in which they again reassert the
2 primacy of federal Yugoslav legislation until they finally after the
3 independence of Croatia state that they regard all legislation stemming
4 from Croatia and all regulations as null and void.
5 So this is an attempt at politically, legally and ultimately also
6 militarily and in a police sense organising the Serbs to defend their
7 interests against what they see as this hostile emerging independence
8 Croatian state.
9 Q. Well, in terms of the territory where this autonomy was to be
10 exercised, I think under item 9 we could see that this decision indicates
11 or this declaration indicates that the autonomy was to be, how would I
12 say, exercised over a territory where Serbs have majority now and where
13 they had majority on April the 6th, 1941. Could you explain to the Court
14 what is the significance of this date?
15 A. Well, in April 1941, Nazi Germany, together with several of its
16 allies in the axis forces, commenced an armed attack against the then
17 Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and in the course of this attack, Yugoslavia
18 quickly capitulated and the aforementioned Independent State of Croatia
19 was established.
20 As I also mentioned as a matter of historical consensus it can be
21 said that the Independent State of Croatia implemented a genocidal policy
22 against the Serbs which had very detrimental effects for the Serb
23 population of Croatia. So what we see here, and I mention this in
24 paragraph 20 of my report, is an assertion by Serb politicians in Croatia
25 that they not only wish to provide autonomy and ethnically based
1 political representation for Serbs where they are currently a majority
2 but also in a way as they see it rectify the historical injustice of the
3 genocide and therefore incorporate areas where Serbs were already -- were
4 a majority in 1941, that is, before the establishment of the
5 Independent State of Croatia.
6 Q. Very well. I would like to display a video which you refer to in
7 your report. This is 65 ter 4804, and I'd like to play the first clip
8 which starts from the beginning of the video and ends at about the
9 1-minute mark. We can play it now.
10 [Video-clip played]
11 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] A member of the National Council,
12 Ilija Koncarevic, the General-Secretary, Pero Matic, professor from
13 Beli Manastir, Slavko Dokmanovic, resident of the municipality of
14 Vukovar, Goran Hadzic, the president of the Municipal Board of the
15 Serbian Democratic Party of Vukovar, and a member of the Main Board of
16 the SDB of Knin and Caslav Ocic from Dalj. The Serbian National Council
17 for Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem was set up this year in
18 Sidski Banovci, on Orthodox Christmas. Only the name of the
19 General-Secretary Ilija Koncarevic was known and tonight we identify
20 another member, that's Ilija Petrovic. Mr. Petrovic, tell us, is it --"
21 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Thank you.
22 Q. Dr. Nielsen, first of all, have you seen this footage before?
23 A. Yes, this is one of the videos that I reviewed in the course of
24 preparing my report.
25 Q. And having reviewed this video before, could you tell the
1 Court -- the names were mentioned, but could you tell the Court who we
2 have seen, who were introduced in this -- in this show?
3 A. Well, we have a number of people here, Pero Martic, Slavko
4 Dokmanovic, Goran Hadzic, Caslav Ocic. These, as the speaker says -- and
5 Ilija Petrovic is there as well who is the author of the book which I
6 avail myself in -- in footnote 45 where this video is also cited. These
7 are the principal actors at least those who were public -- ready to
8 appear in public at this time who were involved in establishing the
9 Serb National Council of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem.
10 Mr. Petrovic makes mention in his book of the fact that a considerable
11 portion of the initial political organisation was done covertly and
12 therefore not everyone involved in this process was ready to appear
13 publicly in a television appearance such as this at this time.
14 Q. Okay. And can we play the second clip, which starts at the
15 51 minutes mark, 51.53.
16 [Video-clip played]
17 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] Anchor: By bringing this show to
18 an end, let's ask Mr. Koncarevic, the Secretary-General of the
19 Serbian National Council for Baranja and Western Srem, what is your view
20 of a solution for Serbia?
21 "Mr. Koncarevic: I'm somehow limited by the views of the
22 Serbian National Council in this evening's broadcast. We have today
23 adopted a position as regards the solution to this problem that we shall
24 forward to the Presidency. There is disputable and indisputable
25 territories in Croatia. The indisputable territory is the territory
1 where Croats were ethnic majority before the beginning of the
2 World War I. Indisputable, that is disputable territory, is the one in
3 Krajina and Western Srem, Baranja, Slavonia and Moslovina. We propose
4 that Yugoslav Presidency suspend the authority of the Croatian Sabor and
5 Croatian leadership in all territories where Serbian people live. This
6 because elementary human rights of Serbian people have been jeopardised
7 and one has elementary right to live. This right has been threatened.
8 Furthermore --"
9 MR. DEMIRDJIAN:
10 Q. Thank you. Now, here Ilija Koncarevic discusses disputable and
11 undisputable territory in Croatia. Can you comment on that, again tying
12 into the document we just saw before?
13 A. This is a statement which reflects the general sentiment among
14 the politicians who -- and others who were involved in creating the Serb
15 National Council of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem and, in fact,
16 also reflects the thinking of those involved in creating the other SAOs
17 that were emerging in Croatia at the time, that there were historical
18 areas that were so to say undisputably Serb and that those areas needed
19 to be included in any political reorganisation of Croatia under Serb or
20 Yugoslav control. And again we see the notion that these territories are
21 defined in, if you will, a historical way that is not just based on
22 contemporaneous demographical data but also based on the Serbs'
23 understanding of areas in which they had, historically speaking,
24 particularly before World War II and in some cases before World War I,
25 constituting -- constituted a majority.
1 Q. Now, we see Ilija Koncarevic here, and earlier we also saw
2 Ilija Petrovic. You mention them in your report. Could you tell the
3 Court what was their role from the documents that you have seen during
5 A. Well, these two gentlemen were among the most prominent actors in
6 organising the Serbs politically in the area of Slavonia, Baranja, and
7 Western Srem, and they became part of the Serb National Council and were
8 prominently involved in drafting its policies, and as I noted, that is
9 one of the reasons why I rely in no small -- to no small extent on, in
10 particular, the member -- the memoirs of Ilija Petrovic, who was a member
11 of the Executive Council and whose account is generally corroborated by
12 documents such as the Gazetted declaration that we saw earlier.
13 Q. Now, at paragraph 21, you describe how Goran Hadzic was appointed
14 as president of the Serb National Council on the 17th of March, 1991.
15 And then at paragraph 22, you explained the decision whereby the SBWS
16 joined the Vojvodina on the 31st of March, 1991. And just to clarify
17 this for the Judges, where is Vojvodina located exactly?
18 A. First, I would just like to state as pertains to paragraph 21 and
19 the appointment of Mr. Hadzic as president of the Serb National Council,
20 it should be noted that Mr. Petrovic in his account states that it took
21 quite some time and effort on his part and on the part of other Serbs in
22 the area of Eastern Slavonia to persuade in Hadzic to take an active
23 political role. So that, I think, is relevant for the Court to know.
24 As regards Vojvodina, Vojvodina is an autonomous area -- or
25 autonomous region within the Republic of Serbia, roughly speaking the
1 area north of the Danube, and it is the area that is contiguous with
2 Eastern Slavonia. This is one -- if -- and perhaps the first effort in
3 the declarations of the politicians, the Serb politicians in
4 Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem to amalgamate themselves with
5 the -- either the Republic of Serbia or in this case the autonomous
6 region of Vojvodina. Again this is an expression that if the Croats were
7 to move towards a succession from -- of a secession, I should say, from
8 the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, then the Serbs would wish
9 to find some way to remain within Yugoslavia, and one of the ways to do
10 this was to amalgamate with Vojvodina.
11 Q. Very well. In relation to that, I think at paragraph 23 you
12 refer to a letter which was sent by the Serb National Council to the SFRY
13 Presidency about the deterioration of the situation, and I think it is
14 Petrovic who signs this document where he writes that all Croatian police
15 stations have drawn up lists of Serbs who were to be arrested or killed.
16 This is again at paragraph 23 of your report.
17 How would you qualify this statement?
18 A. I would qualify this as a statement that is indicative of the
19 perceptions, some would argue misperceptions, of the Serbs in terms of
20 what they could expect from the police in Croatia, that is, the police
21 controlled by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of
22 Croatia. There were a number of important symbolic and other changes of
23 nomenclature undergoing in the police of Croatia at this time. For
24 example, the shift from the word "milicija," which had been used in
25 socialist Yugoslavia to characterize the uniformed police to "policija."
1 Also the use of certain other Croatian words which led Petrovic and
2 others to the conclusion that what they were witnessing was the
3 re-establishment of an ethnic Croatian police force that potentially
4 would resurrect the very negative and persecutory policies of the
5 Independent State of Croatia during the Second World War. So when
6 Petrovic as a responsible and leading politician in the area expresses
7 this, this is something that people would listen to and which would
8 contribute to the increase in anxiety and insecurity that was informing
9 the area and the population at that time.
10 Q. Very well. Now, just in passing, at paragraph 25 you describe
11 there the events on the 25th of June which we've heard plenty of evidence
12 about before this Court.
13 I would like to skip to paragraph 32 of your report whereby you
14 state here that on the 23rd of August, the Serb National Council
15 proclaimed a general mobilisation in SBWS, and perhaps if we could
16 display 65 ter 01939, and that is the -- at tab 292. That is the book by
17 Ilija Petrovic.
18 And if we could go in the B/C/S version to the page 360. Thank
19 you. I believe we have an English translation. Maybe it's there as a
20 separate file.
21 While the English version is being pulled up, Dr. Nielsen, can
22 you tell us in the B/C/S whether this is the right -- the correct page in
23 relation to the general mobilisation?
24 A. Yes, it is.
25 Q. Very well. I'm not entirely sure this is the right page in the
1 English version.
2 MR. GOSNELL: If I may assist, it should be somewhere after
3 page 23 of the English translation. I don't have an exact reference, but
4 it should be --
5 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Thank you.
6 MR. GOSNELL: -- in that range.
7 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: If we can go to the next page. I apologise for
8 that, Your Honours. I believe there is a separate translation.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Just for the record, there are two English
10 translations attached to this document. Thank you.
11 [Prosecution counsel and Case Manager confer]
12 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Can we go to the other English file, please.
13 Okay. We will return to this once we have located the correct page. I
14 apologise for this.
15 Q. Dr. Nielsen, we will come back to this paragraph, but for now I'd
16 like to take you to paragraph 37.
17 Now, in the preceding paragraphs, 35, 36, we start seeing a
18 certain amount of legislative activity in the SAO SBWS, and we see the
19 appointment of several members of the government, and on the 9th of
20 October, we see a law on the government is adopted.
21 Now, you indicate at paragraph 37 that as -- as of that moment,
22 the government replaced the Serb National Council.
23 Just to clarify this, was the government -- was there any
24 governmental activity prior to the 9th of October, 1991?
25 A. Yes, there was. As I indicate in the preceding chapter -- excuse
1 me, paragraphs, there were a number of things going on. For example, in
2 paragraph 36, the establishment of staffs and units of civil protection
3 by the government of the Serb district of Slavonia, Baranja, and
4 Western Srem. I have to state as a point of information to the Chamber
5 that it is my experience as an analyst that both in the SAO Krajina and
6 also in the SAO of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem there was a great
7 deal of inconsistency in the terminology used during this period in terms
8 of whether one or another thing was being done by, for example, the
9 Great National Assembly, the government, or the Serb National Council,
10 and that sometimes creates a bit of confusion in trying to figure out
11 exactly which body was doing what, but according to Ilija Petrovic, as of
12 the 9th of October, the government replaced the Serb National Council.
13 Q. Now, in the next paragraph you mention that a decision was
14 adopted to -- by the Great National Assembly to formally merge the
15 Territorial Defence of the SBWS with the armed forces of the SFRY. Could
16 you tell us based on the documents you have seen what was the JNA's
17 perception of the emerging government in the SAO SBWS?
18 A. This is an excellent question and it is in many ways contingent
19 in the sense that it depends on which JNA officers one looks to in terms
20 of their own documents on the SAOs during this period. It can be
21 generally said that the JNA's policy during this period is evolving in a
22 way that they regard the attempts of the Serbs to -- of Croatia to
23 organise themselves and to protect themselves against a Croatian polity
24 that is moving towards independence as a legitimate process and therefore
25 are willing to extend logistical and other assistance to the Serbs of
1 Croatia in their organisation and their self-defence. Again, this is
2 because the JNA has -- the Yugoslav People's Army was obviously
3 doctrinally and legally obliged to protect the territorial integrity of
4 Yugoslavia, and henceforth -- or, hence, many in the JNA, if not most at
5 this time, particularly officers from Serbia and Montenegro, and Serbs,
6 officers from other parts of Yugoslavia, viewed Croatia and Slovenia's
7 move toward independence as an illegal or hostile act.
8 It should also be noted, however, that in a number of
9 contemporaneous JNA documents, JNA officers, including officers of the
10 security organs of the JNA refer to the Serb autonomous districts that
11 are being established in Croatia as self-proclaimed and sometimes list
12 the names of these districts in quotation marks, thereby indicating at
13 the very least a skepticism as regards their legal legitimacy.
14 Over time the JNA particularly after the declaration of
15 independence of Croatia in June 1991 tends to regard the SAOs in a much
16 more favourable way and lend much more overt assistance to them.
17 * Q. On that topic, could I ask that we display 65 ter 6022 at
18 tab 337. This, Your Honour, is a document that is not in Dr. Nielsen's
19 report. It is part of the collection which was obtained after the
20 preparation of his report.
21 And, Dr. Nielsen, this is a document from the command of the
22 12th Corps on the 8th of November, 1991, from the village of Dalj. Do
23 you remember having reviewed this document before?
24 A. Yes, I do.
25 Q. Very well. It does deal a bit with the police, and we will deal
1 * with the police in a moment, but I would like you to look at the first
2 dash, if that were to -- yeah. Perhaps the fourth paragraph in the B/C/S
3 version. And you can see here that the 12th Corps in fact is sending
4 this to the 1st Military District, which is its higher command and is
5 requesting some clarification. Can you comment on that -- on that first
6 sentence here in this first dash.
7 A. Yes. This is a military document from this period in the autumn
8 of 1991 where we see that a portion of the military is -- of the JNA is
9 clearly still struggling to come to terms with what the exact legal
10 status or authorities of the Assembly of the Serb district of Slavonia,
11 Baranja, and Western Srem and the government of that district are. That
12 is, as they say, have they established their legal legitimacy? Are they
13 international recognised? And obviously what they're trying to find out
14 from the military perspective is to what extent are they to co-operate
15 with the government of that district, to what extent are they even
16 supposed to adhere to orders, laws, instructions or regulations
17 promulgated by those organs. So this is an illustration, if you will,
18 even after the independence of Croatia. This is quite some time after
19 the independence of Croatia that the military is, at least parts of the
20 military, the JNA, is still not quite sure what the exact legal status is
21 of this -- of these SAOs.
22 I would point out as I hope a helpful reference to my previous
23 answer and this one that in paragraph 68 of my report, which deals with
24 the earlier March 1991 incidents at Plitvice, I also quote a document of
25 the JNA in which they refer and I quote, "to the so-called SAO Krajina."
1 * Again, this is an indication where we can see the JNA struggling to come
2 to terms with the status of these SAOs.
3 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
4 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Demirdjian.
5 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Yes.
6 JUDGE DELVOIE: The Registrar shows me your -- I suppose this is
7 part of your list of documents where it says that this document should be
8 used in closed session.
9 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Let me just double-check on this.
10 [Prosecution counsel and Case Manager confer]
11 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Your Honours, we will verify the status. We
12 believe that we had an answer from the relevant government indicating
13 that there were no objections in using these documents, but for the time
14 being perhaps to be safe I will use these documents in private session
15 until we have a definite answer.
16 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
17 JUDGE DELVOIE: We will then for the time being also redact --
18 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Yes.
19 JUDGE DELVOIE: -- the record on that part.
20 We go into private session for the moment.
21 [Private session]
11 Page 2447 redacted. Private session.
22 [Open session]
23 THE REGISTRAR: We're back in open session, Your Honours. Thank
25 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Thank you.
1 Q. Dr. Nielsen moving on to paragraph 42 of your report, and as you
2 said, this nascent government is establishing its authority, you quote
3 the Great National Assembly's Law on the Temporary Territorial
4 Organisation of the SAO SBWS. This is Exhibit L42 - if we could display
5 that on the screen - at tab 131. This law was adopted on the
6 22nd of November, 1991. Now, if we could go to Article 11. It should be
7 at page 3. Yes.
8 Now, Dr. Nielsen, you can see here a description of the territory
9 and the municipalities of the Serb region. You can see a number of
10 villages here such as Bapska, Bogdanovci, Boksic, et cetera. Now, from
11 the documents you have read and have seen, what would you say about the
12 ethnic composition of this region and the villages listed here?
13 A. I'm not an expert on the demography of individual villages and
14 settlements in this region. However, I can state that my understanding
15 is that Article 11 includes all those areas in the region of Slavonia,
16 Baranja, and Western Srem which conform to the expressed intent of the
17 members of the Serb National Council in the area to include in the Serb
18 district all those settlements that had a Serb majority as of the
19 6th of April, 1941. In some cases, the reality -- the military reality
20 on the ground as of this date was such that not all of these settlements
21 conforming to those criteria could be included practically in the
22 temporary territorial organisation, and that is why as I note Osijek is
23 included, though with a temporary seat at Tenja as was Vinkovci with a
24 temporary seat at Mirkovci.
25 It should be noted also that just from the point of language,
1 there is the interesting observation here that this document tends to be
2 alphabetised, according to the latin alphabet although it's written in
3 the Cyrillic alphabet which is one of many indications that at least some
4 of the primary actors in Eastern Slavonia were still struggling to come
5 to terms with their new found devotion for the Cyrillic alphabet.
6 Q. Perhaps we could take a quick look at the census book. Can we
7 pull up 65 ter 118, please. And this is a document that is referred to
8 in your report. And we will be looking at -- just very quickly at the
9 ethnic composition of these villages.
10 In the B/C/S version could we go to page 202, please. Yes. Can
11 we zoom on the bottom part, please. Thank you.
12 Sorry, first of all let's go to the top to see the headers, and
13 we could see, Dr. Nielsen, that in row 3 we have numbers of Croatians,
14 the word Hrvati is indicated there, and in row 8 we have Serbs, Srbi.
15 And now if we could scroll down to the bottom of the page. Now let's
16 take, for example, the -- under the municipality of Vukovar, the first
17 town, Bapska. Do you see the numbers of Croats and Serbs there?
18 A. If I have the columns correct, I believe there would be,
19 according to this census, 1.478 Croats and 33 Serbs in Bapska
21 Q. Now, I will not go through each of these villages because we
22 could see that some villages have a Serb majority such as Borovo and
23 Brsadin. Other villages have a Croat majority. I can think of Ilok and
24 other municipality -- villages we see here. What is your comment on this
25 when we think of the last document we were looking at, the long temporary
1 organisation of the territory?
2 A. I can only restate my conclusion that this is again an accurate
3 reflection of the political aspirations of the Serb leadership of the
4 Serb National Council of -- and later government of Slavonia, Baranja,
5 and Western Srem to include not only those areas in which there was an
6 actual Serb ethnic majority as of the 1991 census but also had
7 historically been, particularly prior to April 1941, a Serb majority. As
8 such, although I do not have the 1941 -- or, rather, 1931, it would be,
9 census figures in front of me, it would not surprise me if they had been
10 to the archives and determined that, for example, Bapska had been a Serb
11 majority area prior to 1941.
12 Q. Thank you. Very well.
13 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Your Honours, I just received an answer from the
14 people in the background who have been very helpful. We have received a
15 response from the relevant government and no protective measures are
16 necessary for the documents which were received last summer, part of this
17 collection of documents we received after the report was filed. So the
18 document which was previously tendered under seal indeed can now be
19 marked as an exhibit not under seal.
20 JUDGE DELVOIE: So ordered. Thank you.
21 THE REGISTRAR: For the record, Exhibit P365 becomes a public
22 exhibit. Thank you.
23 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Thank you.
24 Q. I would like to now move on to the subchapter D which deals with
25 the unification of the SAOs and the establishment of the RSK. This is at
1 paragraph 50 of your report, Dr. Nielsen.
2 You indicated in paragraph 50 that on the 19th of December, the
3 constitutional Assembly of the RSK promulgated a constitutional law
4 enabling the passage of a new constitution of the RSK. Just to clarify
5 this here, at the beginning of the paragraph you do indicate that this is
6 unification of the three SAOs; is that right?
7 A. Yes, that is correct.
8 Q. Now, in parallel to this, could you tell the Court where the --
9 what -- what other developments were happening in the neighbouring
10 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, thinking back to the date of the
11 19th of December, 1991?
12 A. In Bosnia and Herzegovina during this period, there were also a
13 number of Serb autonomous districts that had been formed starting in
14 September 1991, again as an attempt by the Serbs of Bosnia, in that case
15 to ensure that they would not be subjected to rule by political entities
16 that were not under Serbian control and that they would be able to remain
17 within Yugoslavia in the case that Bosnia and Herzegovina moved towards
18 independence as Slovenia and Croatia had already done. In December 1991,
19 around this time in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the SDS of Bosnia and
20 Herzegovina issued a set of instructions that became a blueprint for how,
21 as they called it, Serb power was to be established in those areas of
22 Bosnia and Herzegovina they regarded as historically Serbian.
23 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: In relation to this could we display 65 ter 811,
24 which is at tab 328, please.
25 Q. Dr. Nielsen, are you able to -- yes, you can see both versions
1 now. Have you seen this -- sorry. Have you seen this document before?
2 A. Yes, I have.
3 Q. Very well. This is a letter from Momcilo Krajisnik on the
4 19th of December, 1991. Just very briefly could you tell the Court who
5 Krajisnik was?
6 A. As is indicated in the document, Krajisnik was at that time the
7 president of the Assembly of the Serb Nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
8 He had also been the president of the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
9 Q. This letter is also dated the 19th of December, 1991, and I
10 believe here Krajisnik is informing members of the SAO Krajina that he
11 will be unable to attend. It appears he's been invited here. Could you
12 tell us again from the totality of the documents you've viewed what was
13 the relationship between the member of the Bosnian Serb Assembly or
14 government and the members of the Croatian Serb entities?
15 A. The relationship between the Bosnian Serb leadership and the
16 Croatian Serb leadership was quite consistently good and is quite
17 epiphanally expressed in this document where Mr. Krajisnik notes that all
18 Serbs are engaged in a struggle for the same goal under the same banner
19 and that we are all convinced of our final victory.
20 There were in the period from 1992 until the end of 1995 -- or I
21 should say until August 1995, a recurring number of occasions on which
22 the Bosnian Serb leadership and the Croatian Serb leadership entertained
23 the notion of joining together into one greater political entity, either
24 separate from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or together with the
25 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. However, any contemplated merger despite
1 these discussions never came to fruition.
2 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Your Honours, this document is not in
3 Dr. Nielsen's report. May I ask to -- for it to be admitted, please.
4 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
5 THE REGISTRAR: It shall be assigned Exhibit P366. Thank you.
6 MR. DEMIRDJIAN:
7 Q. You indicated to us, Dr. Nielsen, that this relationship or
8 partnership lasted from the period of 1992 until 1995. I would like to
9 show you a video which is 65 ter 4826.1 at tab 393, please.
10 Sorry, before we play it for the interpreters, we can go to
11 page 8 of the English transcript in e-court. All right. You apparently
12 already have the right copy. We can start from the beginning.
13 [Video-clip played]
14 "Ms. Plavsic, you are part of a mixed delegation visiting
15 Bijeljina today to visit the alleged destruction which has been widely
16 reported by Sarajevo media. What are your first impressions?
17 Biljana Plavsic: As we have just passed through the city, my
18 escorts and I, we failed to notice any broken windows or shops or such
19 that had been reported by the media in Sarajevo. We didn't see any of
20 that. Somebody even made a remark about the shoe store, which would have
21 been the first to be robbed."
22 MR. DEMIRDJIAN:
23 Q. Thank you. I'm not necessarily interested in the substance of
24 what Mrs. Plavsic is saying here, but who can you identify on this
25 screen, Dr. Nielsen?
1 A. I can identify of course Biljana Plavsic who is being interviewed
2 by the journalist. On her -- well, let's say as we see it on the screen
3 to the right of her on the screen is Zeljko Raznjatovic, also called
4 Arkan, in a camouflage uniform, and on the other side of her in a suit is
5 Mr. Goran Hadzic.
6 Q. Now, have you seen this footage before?
7 A. Yes, I have.
8 Q. And are you able to tell the Court around which time this was
10 A. I recall that this is, I believe, from early April 1992, and if
11 memory serves, she's referring to her visit to Bijeljina where she and
12 Fikret Abdic and others went in response to reports of very violent
13 altercations between Muslims and Croats in that city.
14 Q. And what can you make of the presence of Goran Hadzic and Arkan
15 during this interview?
16 A. I don't have the transcript in front of me here but I believe I
17 actually said Muslims and Croats. I meant Muslims and Serbs, of course.
18 Could you repeat the question, please.
19 Q. Yes. I was asking you what you could make of the presence of
20 Goran Hadzic and Arkan at this stage?
21 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Gosnell.
22 MR. GOSNELL: Mr. President, I'm going to object to that
23 question. There's no foundation at this point. There is nothing in the
24 report that suggests that this expert has any expert opinion to offer on
25 the question. So I am not exactly sure what my learned friend is driving
1 at, but I object to such a question posed in that way.
2 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Demirdjian.
3 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Yes, Your Honours without necessarily getting
4 too much into the details and not affect the witness there is an entire
5 section relevant to this point at the end of the report from paragraphs
6 201 until paragraph 211. If we need to discuss this further, I would ask
7 that Dr. Nielsen not be privy to this exchange.
8 JUDGE DELVOIE: Dr. Nielsen, could you leave the courtroom for a
9 brief moment, please.
10 THE WITNESS: Certainly, Your Honour.
11 [The witness stands down]
12 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Demirdjian, we are discussing here the
13 presence of Mr. Hadzic and -- --
14 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Arkan.
15 JUDGE DELVOIE: -- Arkan in Bijeljina in Bosnia-Herzegovina;
17 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: In April 1992, yes.
18 JUDGE DELVOIE: In April 1992. That would be Republika Srpska
20 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Yes.
21 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay. And your question to the witness is what
22 would you make of their presence at that stage.
23 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Yes and I --
24 JUDGE DELVOIE: Can you clarify?
25 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Yes. Your Honours, this relates to the last
1 section of the expert's report which deals with the relationship between
2 the accused and Arkan. That is the first topic, and we have a number of
3 videos which we have shown also in the past showing them being together
4 at various locations. That is number one. And Dr. Nielsen deals in the
5 last chapter of his report about -- specifically about this relationship
6 between Goran Hadzic and Arkan. That's number one.
7 And number two, it also deals with the co-operation that the
8 Bosnian Serbs and the Croatian Serbs had which Dr. Nielsen just referred
9 to and which he also refers to in his report. So I think that the
10 question is legitimate.
11 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Gosnell, any further comment?
12 MR. GOSNELL: Briefly. There's no mention of this video in
13 Dr. Nielsen's report. So it's not part of his opinion. It's not part of
14 the foundation for the opinions that he gives in his report, and without
15 any adequate notice of what we're going at, what we're driving at, what
16 the Prosecution is trying to obtain here, I would suggest that it's
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE DELVOIE: As we understand it, Mr. Gosnell, your problem is
20 a problem of notice. So we'll give you until tomorrow and ask
21 Mr. Demirdjian to put this question to the witness tomorrow.
22 MR. GOSNELL: Thank you, Mr. President.
23 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you. The witness may be -- the witness may
24 be brought in.
25 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Thank you, Your Honours. At what time do we
1 usually take the break, quarter past or --
2 JUDGE DELVOIE: Quarter past.
3 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Yes. Thank you.
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay. While we're waiting for the witness, I
6 would like to put on the record that the previous redacted -- the
7 previous redacting order has been lifted. It's about -- it's about the
8 document we were not sure whether it should be under seal or not. Thank
10 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Thank you, Your Honours.
11 Q. Dr. Nielsen, as a result of a procedural exchange, I will
12 continue with this video tomorrow. So for now we'll go -- put that
13 question on the ice until tomorrow.
14 I will move to paragraph 56 of your report where you indicate
15 that on the 25th or 26th of February, 1992, Milan Martic was elected as
16 minister of internal affairs in the RSK. And following this you indicate
17 that RSK president, Goran Hadzic, awarded Martic of an extraordinary
18 promotion to the rank of general-colonel of the Serb army of the
19 Republika Srpska Krajina.
20 Now, from the documents that you have seen at this time, what was
21 the status of the Serb Army of Republika Srpska Krajina at that time in
22 July of 1992?
23 A. Well, as I'm not an expert on military issues in the RSK, I'll
24 restrict my answer to the general observation that the Serb army of the
25 RSK emerged out of the Territorial Defence units that had been present or
1 created by the Serbs in the areas they controlled in Croatia and
2 supplemented with some portions of JNA units and that there were also --
3 there was also a relationship between the police and these aforementioned
4 units that was heavily affected by the dual heading of Milan Martic as
5 both minister of internal affairs and minister of defence particularly
6 after Vance Plan came into effect and where there was a transformation of
7 military units into police units at least in part in attempt to
8 circumvent the restrictions effected by the Vance Plan.
9 Q. Now in the relation to the promotion of Milan Martic on the
10 16th of July, 1992, is it correct that you have had the opportunity to
11 view a video where this was -- this promotion was celebrated?
12 A. Yes, that is correct.
13 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: That is Exhibit P48, Your Honours. I would like
14 to show the first minute or so. If we can display it on Sanction,
16 [Video-clip played]
17 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Can we freeze here.
18 Q. Do you recognise this person?
19 A. Yes, that is Milan Martic.
20 [Video-clip played]
21 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] Milan Martic: Before I say
22 anything, let us hold a minute of silence in honour of all our killed
23 soldiers, the Serbian heroes at this corridor and the soldier -- soldiers
24 at the Miljevacki plateau. May they rest in peace.
25 "All: May they rest in peace.
1 "Milan Martic: Dear fellow citizens, let me first thank you for
2 your magnificent welcome. I know these are not the times for
3 celebrations because we are living in very unfortunate times. Trouble
4 and misfortune forced us to follow this path. You were all witnesses
5 when we were closed off and attacked, when all roads towards the
6 Republic of Srpska Krajina were closed off and when it was made
7 impossible for us to have the most basic means of living, no medicine,
8 our sick were dying, our wives were forced to ask foreign soldiers for
9 cigarettes. We suffered the ultimate misfortune. We addressed our
10 requests to the UNPROFOR to make that passage and the corridor available
11 to us. But the UNPROFOR did not meet that request, and they did not make
12 that passage available. This should not be a surprise when it is known
13 that the USA, Germany and other countries which most certainly are not
14 well-intentioned toward the Serbian people are directing the UNPROFOR.
15 All credit to the Kenyans who are definitely for us, but a majority of
16 the representatives of UNPROFOR are most certainly not well intentioned
17 towards us and do not have our best interest at heart and that is why we
18 decided not to beg anybody for mercy, not even the the UNPROFOR, not
19 Genscher, not Kohl, not Bush, and not that wretched Yeltsin. We had set
20 off penetrating with our Serbian heroes to break through the corridor,
21 aware that it could cost us our lives. Unfortunately that did happen.
22 25 of our heroes from --"
23 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Just to pause here.
24 Q. Dr. Nielsen, when Martic talks about the breaking through the
25 corridor, what is he referring to?
1 A. He is referring to a military operation with extensive police
2 participation that took place in the summer of 1992, the strategic goal
3 of which was to make sure that there was a corridor, a territorial
4 corridor linking the eastern and western portions of Republika Srpska in
5 Bosnia and Herzegovina. Forces including RSK MUP forces from the RSK
6 participated extensively in that operation and it is again an
7 illustration of the common goals and co-operation between the RS and the
9 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Before we break, can we play the rest of this
11 [Video-clip played]
12 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] Milan Martic: ... from our
13 Krajina police brigade died in that bloody battle for the corridor.
14 Those men were certainly not killed or erased from our memories. Those
15 are the Serbian Obilics, rest assured. Commander Raso, one of the
16 biggest heroes ever known to the Serbian people will go down in the
17 history books of the Serbian people and that is where he belongs. All
18 others who fell in glory at this corridor in order to secure a better
19 future for you deserve that place. They were also not killed but we --
20 it is up to us who have stayed behind. It is our obligation not to
21 forget their families and we will never do that. We will never forget
22 them, rest assured. I am absolutely sure that when we had set off. I
23 had -- we had a blessing from 99 per cent of you and that you were
24 convinced that we would complete our task given to us by president of the
25 Republic of Serbian Krajina, Mr. Goran Hadzic, and by the government of
1 the Republic of Serbian Krajina to open this corridor up. You were
2 convinced that we would complete that task. You knew that these heroes
3 who participated in many battles --"
4 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Thank you.
5 Q. Here Martic is saying that the opening of the corridor was a task
6 given to us by our president of the republic. Based on -- on which I
7 would say constitutional powers, perhaps, was the president of the
8 republic issuing such assignments?
9 A. In my report in paragraph 55, I mention the constitutional
10 articles that describe the functions, authorities, and responsibilities
11 of the president of the republic, and these include as we see on the top
12 of page 18 of my report, commanding the armed forces in war and peace,
13 preparing the defence of the republic and ordering mobilisations. To the
14 extent that we hear no as is stated in various RSK documents that the
15 police is also included in definition of armed forces, this is an
16 operation that could be said to have been instructed or ordered as Martic
17 is just saying here pursuant to this article of the constitution.
18 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Thank you. Your Honours, would this be an
19 appropriate time.
20 JUDGE DELVOIE: Indeed. Dr. Nielsen, we will take the break and
21 come back at 12.45. The usher will escort you out of the courtroom.
22 Thank you.
23 [The witness stands down]
24 JUDGE DELVOIE: Court adjourned.
25 --- Recess taken at 12.16 p.m.
1 --- On resuming at 12.46 p.m.
2 [The witness takes the stand]
3 JUDGE DELVOIE: Please proceed, Mr. Demirdjian.
4 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Thank you, Your Honours.
5 Q. Dr. Nielsen, before I move to the next chapter which is the
6 emergence of the Serb police in Croatia, I would like to show you a
7 second clip from the same video we were watching now on Sanction.
8 Following Martic's speech, we see here a speech by Goran Hadzic. Can we
9 play it now, please.
10 [Video-clip played]
11 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] May God be with you heroes. May
12 God with be you."
13 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: He gives a short speech for about a minute and a
14 half. Can we go towards the end which is at the 52 minutes and
15 25 seconds mark.
16 [Video-clip played]
17 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] Now I don't want to tire our brave
18 troops in this sun any more. I would like to thank them once again and
19 to publicly announce here for the first time that from today we have two
20 new generals of the Serbian Army. Those are Borislav Djukic and
21 Milan Martic. Cheers and thank you."
22 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Thank you.
23 Q. And so I just wanted to tie this in with paragraph 56 of your
24 report where you mentioned the promotion of Martic and Djukic. So this
25 would have been a promotion of these two gentlemen. Under which powers
1 again would they be promoted?
2 A. My understanding of the constitutional structure of the RSK is
3 that the president of the republic is also commanding the armed forces in
4 war and peace as I noted stated in paragraph 55 of my report from
5 Article 78 of the constitution, and as such the president also has the
6 authority to promote military officers, in particular senior military
8 Q. Very well.
9 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Your Honours, this second clip was not admitted.
10 Can I please tender it.
11 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
12 THE REGISTRAR: I assume 65 ter document 4945.3.
13 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Yes, that's the one.
14 THE REGISTRAR: It shall be assigned Exhibit P367. Thank you.
15 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
16 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Thank you very much.
17 Q. Now, Dr. Nielsen, I will move to the section dealing with the
18 emergence of the Serb police in Croatia. Before getting into the section
19 of your report, could I ask you about the documents that were at your
20 disposal in relation to the Croatian Serb police force. You have written
21 reports in the past relating to the other -- for example, the
22 Bosnian Serb police. How would you regard the quality of the material
23 that was available in relation to the Croatian Serb police in comparison?
24 A. The overall state of documentation that was collected by the OTP
25 regarding the various permutations of the Croatian Serb police is far
1 inferior to the comparable state of documentation that was available to
2 me as an analyst when I performed my analysis of the Bosnian Serb police.
3 This raises a number of methodological issues, but I should note it is
4 also my conclusion that the sparse and at many times unsatisfactory
5 condition of the documentation and its contents regarding the Croatian
6 Serb police is reflective of what is comparatively speaking a much more
7 skeletal and amateurish operation when compared to their Bosnian Serb
9 It should also be noted, and I'm well aware given my history as
10 an employee at the Tribunal, that the state of documentation for the
11 Croatian Serb police also reflects the difficulties encountered during
12 repeated attempts to obtain that material from the relevant governments,
13 not least because when we speak of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Srem
14 during the long transitional period that was in place there, much of the
15 documentation was removed to other locations and still remains
16 unavailable, if it indeed exists at all today.
17 Q. Now, in this chapter you deal with the creation of the SAO
18 Krajina. I will not delve into that, because I think you sufficiently
19 describe it.
20 If we look at the creation of the MUP and the SBWS, at
21 paragraph 99 you describe the appointment of Borislav Bogunovic as the
22 first minister of internal affairs in September of 1991, and again in
23 relation to the availability of sources, were you able to find documents
24 relating, for example, to the structure of this ministry?
25 A. I was not able to find any what I as an analyst would call core
1 documents that clearly and concisely outline the structure of the
2 Ministry of Internal Affairs that was established in Slavonia, Baranja,
3 and Western Srem. Again if I may speak comparatively of the sources
4 available to me, then I would state where I have already observed that
5 the overall state of Croatian Serb police documentation was inferior
6 compared to that available for the Bosnian Serb police, it is also the
7 case that even within the -- let's say the -- the world of documentation
8 pertaining to Serb police structures in Croatia, there the best
9 documentation pertains to the SAO Krajina area and the later RSK and the
10 sparsest information is by contrast available for SAO Western Slavonia
11 and the SAO Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem.
12 Q. Later you indicate that Borislav Bogunovic stepped down at the
13 end of 1991, and at paragraph 118 you indicate that he was replaced by
14 Predrag Radlovic. You wrote in your report that it may be inferred that
15 as of February 1992 Radlovic was the minister. Now this document was not
16 available to you at the time.
17 Could we display 65 ter 817 at tab 397, please.
18 And Dr. Nielsen does this document give you additional
19 information in relation to paragraph 118 of your report?
20 A. Yes. This document is a -- the gazetted version of the decision
21 to elect a minister of internal affairs, Predrag Radlovic and is dated
22 the 19th of September, 1991.
23 Q. I think it is December actually, if I'm not incorrect. Is it
24 September or December?
25 A. I thought I said September -- excuse me, December. It is
2 Q. December. Thank you. Your Honours, may I tender this document
3 which is not in his report?
4 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
5 THE REGISTRAR: It shall be assigned Exhibit P368. Thank you.
6 MR. DEMIRDJIAN:
7 Q. At paragraph 117, 117, sorry, you also explain the creation of a
8 service of national security in the SAO SBWS and again you explain you
9 had very limited documentation available about this service. Could you
10 tell the Court typically what is the role of the national security
12 A. If we speak of the police and other organs of internal affairs in
13 Yugoslavia historically, then there has since 1945 been public security
14 and a state security as the two component branches of internal affairs.
15 State security in some cases, later also called national security in
16 various structures established by the Serbs in the 1990s, is entrusted
17 with protecting both the integrity of the state and chiefly with
18 protecting the constitutionally established order of the state against
19 enemies internal and external.
20 Q. Very well. Now, at paragraph 120, you cite a report from the
21 Vukovar district centre for the first six months of 1992.
22 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Can we display 65 ter 1190, 1190, at tab 221.
23 And if we could zoom into the first paragraph, please. Thank you.
24 Q. Now, can you give us your comments on the first paragraph,
25 Dr. Nielsen.
1 A. As noted, this is a report on the work for the first six months
2 of 1992 by the State Security Department of the state security centre in
3 Vukovar temporarily located in Dalj, and we see here that they have been
4 carrying out operational work attempting to encounter and eliminate
5 threats of the enemy and trying to organise the defence and protection of
6 that area in co-operation with other authorities. Again, this is -- this
7 concurs with what I just stated about the classic role of the work of the
8 State Security Service within the Yugoslav context.
9 Q. Could we go to page 4 in English, the top part, and this is the
10 equivalent of page 3 in the B/C/S version towards the bottom. Now,
11 throughout this report the state security describes the activities of its
12 units in the first part of 1992, and here it describes also if you see
13 the paragraph in English which starts with truly speaking, this describes
14 what appears to be -- here the term is used moving out of some Croats,
15 which is labelled as extremely inappropriate way. Can you comment on
16 this paragraph, Dr. Nielsen?
17 A. The State Security Service was among its many activities also
18 charged with keeping an eye on the state of security in the areas over
19 which they had jurisdiction and this included reporting on any
20 manifestations or actions that in any way, shape, or form would threaten
21 the security of the state. In this context, they have seen fit to also
22 report on what they call the moving out or -- or emigration of Croats
23 from this area which they state happened in an unacceptable manner or
24 inappropriate manner, and I can point out that looking at the totality of
25 documentation that I've been able to examine, including documentation
1 produced by the police, by some organs of the TO and some organs of the
2 JNA, there are a number of reports that indicate that in the fall of 1991
3 and the spring of 1992, a significant number of Croats were removed from
4 this area in a way that others, including -- others than just the
5 State Security Service, found inappropriate and detrimental to the
6 security situation in the area.
7 Q. Now, in relation to this topic, I would like to deal with some of
8 the new documents which weren't contained in your report before.
9 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: If we could display 65 ter 6052, please. This
10 is at tab 347.
11 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
12 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: This is again part of the same collection for
13 which we haven't answered. We can use it in public session. I
15 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
16 MR. DEMIRDJIAN:
17 Q. Dr. Nielsen, this is a document which we can see was issued on
18 the 17th of December, 1991, by the 1st Proletarian Guards Mechanised
19 Division. Now, have you had the opportunity to review this document?
20 A. Yes, I have.
21 Q. And perhaps as a general assessment from you, could you perhaps
22 provide to the Trial Chamber your views on this collection of documents
23 which were provided to you after the drafting of your report? Did you
24 find them to be relevant to the topics in your report?
25 A. The bulk of the additional documents that were provided to me
1 stem from various military units of the JNA, particularly from the second
2 half of 1991, and deal with various events and observations that they
3 have about these events in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem,
4 and in many cases although these are military documents, they see fit to
5 comment on the activities and behaviour of the police forces and their
6 relationship in turn with various paramilitary formations that were
7 present during this period in that area in 1991. As such, they touch on
8 a number of points which were previously dealt with in my report before I
9 was able to review these documents.
10 Q. Now, looking at this report and this first large paragraph,
11 the -- this division of the army deals with the settlements which were
12 predominantly inhabited by Croatians.
13 Towards the end of the paragraph, there is a sentence here which
14 explains that many settlements the Serbian population through the TO
15 staffs exercised pressure to have the Croatian population move out
17 Can you give us some background to -- to this?
18 A. First I would just like to assist the Chamber by pointing out
19 that the subject header of this document is missing from the translation.
20 The B/C/S original right below the addressee, which is the 1st military
21 command of the commission for civilian affairs, states that the subject
22 of the correspondence is the opinion regarding the question of emigration
23 and immigration that is being sought. So what is happening here is that
24 this command is writing to the 1st military command to find out what are
25 we supposed to do with regards to people who were being removed in or
1 being moved out of -- of this particular area in which they are present.
2 And one thing we see in this particular document, and this is
3 reflected in a number of the other new documents that I've been able to
4 examine, is that the military is struggling with the question of how to
5 categorise the remaining residents of, in particular, Croat nationality,
6 who, as they state in point 1 down on the first page, who are loyal and
7 who do not have any family members in the Croatian armed forces. How to
8 treat locals who maybe had children, sons or grandsons, in the Croatian
9 armed forces but had not themselves compromised themselves in any way by
10 assisting those forces.
11 The military is very much struggling and so is the police at some
12 point -- at the same point in time as to whether there is some kind of
13 collective guilt that -- that obtains on an ethnic basis for Croats which
14 would result in a need to remove all of them from this area or whether
15 some of them may be permitted to remain resident in this area if they
16 have not in any way compromised themselves by assisting the Croatian
17 armed forces.
18 Q. And as you pointed out here, this division, the 1st Proletarian
19 Guards Mechanised Division, is seeking advice or is seeking guidance from
20 its higher command? Is that how we should read it?
21 A. That is correct. They are stating what the situation is on the
22 ground and they are referring to a very volatile situation, in particular
23 as we see also from other documents because of the arrival of large
24 number of displaced Serbs from Western Slavonia who of course wish to
25 settle in areas of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem that are
1 now under Serbian control and who in many -- on many occasions are
2 forcibly removing Croats and others who are not of Serbian ethnicity from
3 houses if these houses are not already vacant so these types of issues
4 are the military is aware of them, and they are seeking clarification:
5 How are they supposed to act given this very dynamic and volatile
6 situation that they're confronting on the ground.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Your Honours, we will request a revised
9 translation so that the title which is missing in the English version is
10 included. So in the meantime can we mark it for identification, please.
11 JUDGE DELVOIE: Marked for identification.
12 THE REGISTRAR: It shall be assigned Exhibit P369 marked for
13 identification pending translation -- correct translation, thank you.
14 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Can we now look at 65 ter 6053 at tab 348,
16 Q. Dr. Nielsen, you can see that this is again a document from the
17 same unit, the 1st Proletarian Guards Mechanised Division on the 23rd of
18 December. So this is six days after the previous document, and it starts
19 with "To the questions asked," and you see questions 1, 2, 3, 4. If we
20 can go to the next page in the English version, please. You see on the
21 top of the page, "we have received the following reply from the command
22 of the 1st Military District."
23 Now, before I ask you more questions about that, have you had the
24 opportunity to review this document?
25 A. Yes, I have.
1 Q. What can you say about the answers that were provided by the
2 1st Military District?
3 A. First, as we see from the very beginning of the response of the
4 military command this is, as I previously mentioned, tied to the -- not
5 only the departure of Croats from this area but also the arrival of Serb
6 refugees from other areas, in particular Western Slavonia, that creates
7 this dynamic to which I referred. And then the military is -- or
8 military command is responding that they should insofar as possible
9 attempt to resolve this in accordance with the requests of the Serbs who
10 come from those other areas and also in co-operation with civilian organs
11 of authority where they exist, where they do not exist, then one should
12 defer to the town command in terms of resolving this and if no town
13 command exists either, then obtain an opinion of the government of the
14 Serb district of Baranja, Eastern Slavonia, and Western Srem.
15 Q. Now, based on this collection of documents you have seen and we
16 will see more in a minute, what can you say about this relationship
17 between JNA units and the local civilian organs of authority?
18 A. What I can say and again based on the limited amount of
19 documentation that exists on this question is that it's a highly
20 contingent relationship, and what I mean by that is that it very much
21 hinges in many cases on, as we see in this document, whether any civilian
22 authorities and in particular also in police authorities exist in these
23 areas, and when those authorities exist, the further resolution of this
24 problem is highly contingent upon the personalities involved and their
25 personal views on whether Croats and others who are not of Serbian
1 ethnicity should be allowed to remain in that area and how the settlement
2 of the arriving Serb displaced persons should be achieved.
3 It is also further contingent upon the presence or absence in
4 some cases of paramilitary units in those municipalities and settlements.
5 Generally speaking, of course, where the paramilitary units are present,
6 that tends to significantly complicate the picture and in many cases lead
7 to attacks on the remaining Croats and others.
8 Q. If we could quickly look at page 3 in the English version, and,
9 Dr. Nielsen, in the original it is probably the third paragraph from the
10 bottom with starts with "All cases of illegal moving away." First of
11 all, could you perhaps give us some clarification as to the term that is
12 used in the original Serbian version. I'm referring to the term "illegal
13 moving away."
14 A. Well, yes. If I may also be permitted to refer to the previous
15 document. There's two essential terms that need to be understood in
16 Serbian here. One is "iseljavanje" and the other is "useljavanje," where
17 "iseljavanje" means literally moving away and "useljavanje" means
18 settling into. So this is a dual process. Serbs who have been forcibly
19 removed, "iseljavanje," from Western Slavonia are moving in,
20 "useljavanje." In Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, Croats
21 who used to reside in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem are
22 moving out, "iseljavanje," from that area and probably being resettled in
23 other areas in Croatia although we know some of them also go abroad.
24 Q. And what -- what would you make the term "ilegalnog," which is
25 right before the word "iseljavanje" in this document?
1 A. Well, that -- that, of course, means illegal. That is --
2 certainly the perception of Major-General Delic, who is the author of
3 this document, is that there were if not in all cases, certainly in a
4 large number of cases occurrences where people were being illegally
5 removed from their residences and such cases needed to be documented and
6 resolved as he notes in co-operation with the security organs of the JNA
7 and the organs of public security of the district, that is of the SAO, or
8 of the places, and organs of public security concretely, that means in
9 co-operation with the police.
10 Q. And -- well, we have skipped a little bit over some of the events
11 that took place towards the end of 1991. This document is dated
12 December 1991. What was the -- to your knowledge, from the documents you
13 have reviewed, what was the state of combat activities in
14 Eastern Slavonia at that time?
15 A. As a matter of general knowledge, I believe that after the fall
16 of Vukovar in the second half of 1991, major combat operations and
17 activities had ceased in this area.
18 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Thank you. May I offer this document,
19 Your Honours.
20 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
21 THE REGISTRAR: It shall be assigned Exhibit P370. Thank you.
22 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
23 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: On the same topic, could we display 65 ter 6058,
24 please. That is at tab 350. I apologise. This is not the right
1 Q. Now, Dr. Nielsen, here we see this is a document issued by the
2 town command in Ilok on the 25th of December, 1991. Have you had the
3 opportunity to review this document?
4 A. Yes, I have.
5 Q. And this document again deals with the settlement or movement of
6 population after the -- the end of combat activities. Could I ask you to
7 look at the end of the first paragraph which makes a comment about the
8 attitude of the SAO government at the time, and could you perhaps comment
9 on this entry.
10 A. The JNA command in the city -- or town of Ilok is expressing
11 quite strong dissatisfaction with what, as the document notes, is the
12 indifference and unjustifiable indolence of the government of the SAO
13 which in a rather odd term they say causes a handful of unobjective
14 difficulties. I read that as problems that did not have to exist if a
15 more magnanimous or constructive approach had been adopted by the
16 government. This again reflects the contingency to which I referred
17 where it is highly dependent on which decision-makers and actors are
18 being asked to address this issue of people moving in or out of the area.
19 I should also note since we dealt with terminology that a keyword
20 in these documents around this time is the word "loyalty," whereas we saw
21 in the previous document, the military expresses the opinion that persons
22 who have behaved in a loyal manner towards the JNA and Yugoslavia should
23 be permitted to remain, but in this very volatile atmosphere of ethnic
24 conflict, it is not at all clear who is allowed to determine whether
25 someone has been loyal or not or whether objective criteria for that even
2 Q. And if we could take it to page 2 in the B/C/S version and page 3
3 in the English version, please.
4 What is the JNA suggesting here? They seem to be proposing a
5 number of items.
6 A. Well, among many other things, they are suggesting that this
7 procedure of resettlement has to take place in a much more organised
8 manner where there would be precise lists made of people leaving or
9 arriving, not least to mitigate against unorganised forced removal of
10 persons. They are asking also for decisions by the SAO that would entail
11 them receiving some kind of written permission and justification that --
12 for where they were supposed to move in and inventories of those houses,
13 inventory of the items they brought with them, et cetera, and again to
14 the extent that much of this is taking place without any documentation or
15 all -- at all, and where the military and to some extent the police also
16 report that people are arriving from Western Slavonia and in some cases
17 grabbing the first available house regardless of whether it is inhabited
18 or not particularly if the inhabitants are not Serbs, the military
19 clearly wants to see a structured official system that could also be
20 documented to reduce the abuses that they're witnessing.
21 Q. And towards the bottom of this document and in English if we
22 could scroll down, we see here that the very issue of the unauthorised
23 settlement in Ilok, as you say, has not been done with -- with the proper
24 issuing of permits. And if we could continue to the next page in the
25 English version.
1 The army here is assuming the involvement, it appears, of the
2 members of the government. How would you take this sentence?
3 A. What they are stating here is that it would essentially be --
4 they talk about the forcible, "useljavanje." Again, this is the forcible
5 settlement to the place of Ilok or the settlement of Ilok even though the
6 command has not given or issued a single order to that effect. They
7 don't want to waste time on details, but they speculate the military
8 does, that a behind the scenes minister, the minister of internal affairs
9 of the SAO, Bogunovic and Ljubo Loncarevic, a former police officer,
10 currently in Backa Palanka that they are involved in this. This again is
11 indicative of a larger group of documents that I've examined, some from
12 the Serbian DB, some from the JNA, some from the police in
13 Eastern Slavonia in which it is often speculated that various
14 individuals, some of them linked to the authorities in the region, are
15 deriving personal economic gain from the forcible resettlement of the
16 population in the area.
17 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Your Honours, may I offer this document.
18 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
19 THE REGISTRAR: It shall be assigned Exhibit P371. Thank you.
20 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
21 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: May we display 65 ter 6093, which is at tab 361.
22 Q. Dr. Nielsen, you're going to see a document which is dated a
23 couple of months after these suggestions by the JNA. This is dated the
24 11th of February. Could you tell us first of all who is the author of
25 this documents?
1 A. Well, the author of the document is the central commission for
2 settlement, which is composed of Borislav Bogunovic. I see that's listed
3 as illegible though it isn't on the original. And also Bogdan Vojnovic,
4 and Vojin Susa -- Susa, and one more person.
5 Q. And it appears that here the -- these members of the central
6 settlement committee are responding to a memo issued by the Mohovo local
7 commune. Could you just in terms of context tell the Judges where Mohovo
8 is if you're aware?
9 A. I'm not off the top of my head precisely aware of its location
10 but I would note that Mohovo is dealt with in the document we just
11 reviewed; that is to say that it was one of the places listed in the
12 previous document where there were houses that had been vacated by Croats
13 which according to that previous document were available for settlement
14 by Serbs.
15 Q. Okay. Thank you for that. So what advice or what is the answer
16 provided here by the central settlement committee to the questions or the
17 memo sent by the Mohovo local commune?
18 A. In this document, they note that the process of resettlement is
19 ongoing and they state the central settlement commission does that they
20 must inform the Mohovo local commune that no decisions have been taken as
21 yet by the government of the Serb district regarding the moving out of
22 persons of Croatian nationality. However, they express some
23 understanding for the desire of the Mohovo local commune to potentially
24 remove those individuals who have collaborated with the enemy and as they
25 call it the Ustasha authorities if these actions can be established. But
1 again, this is one of these documents from this particular period in
2 which we see that various authorities are trying to determine whether
3 there can be a uniform policy that can be implemented on these crucial
4 questions and we also see as this is -- clearly a response to the Mohovo
5 local commune that there is pressure from the bottom, from the ground up,
6 from the local communities to resolve these questions as quickly as
7 possible and they are seeking guidance as to that.
8 Q. And in the third paragraph of this document, the one that begins
9 with "However," in the third line, at least in the English version, we
10 seem to see this association again to collaboration with the enemy and
11 the Ustasha authority. Does that match with what we were mentioning just
12 a little bit earlier?
13 A. Yes, it does, and again they are actually stating here in the
14 first sentence of that paragraph that the organs of the local commune in
15 Mohovo can establish whether these individuals on the list they provided
16 had violated the law and the legal order of the Serb district. So this
17 again goes to this question of who is it precisely who is allowed during
18 this period to determine whether someone has been loyal and -- a loyal
19 and law-abiding citizen or not.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Your Honours, may I tender this document.
22 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
23 THE REGISTRAR: It shall be assigned Exhibit P372. Thank you.
24 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Could we display 65 ter 6096, please. That's
25 tab 363.
1 Q. Dr. Nielsen, this is a document from around the same time as the
2 previous document. This time it's on the 16th of February, 1992, from
3 the command of the 1st Mechanised Corps. First of all, have you had the
4 opportunity to review this document?
5 A. Yes, I have.
6 Q. Now, this is specifically drafted by the organs of the CP. Have
7 you seen this acronym before?
8 A. Yes. This is a report of the organs for civilian affairs. That
9 is the "civilni poslovi." B/C/S.
10 Q. Okay. Now, under item 1, there is a discussion about the
11 creation of local communities and civilian organs of authority. Under
12 item 2 I believe there will be a discussion about the creation of the
13 police on the territory. I don't know if you can see it on this page.
14 Let's -- that's on the next page. Yes. Thank you for that.
15 Now, we go to item 4 in the English version. It's at page 4. On
16 the B/C/S version I think it's on the same page.
17 Now, it tells us here in the course of its work the civilian
18 organ of this command has encountered the following problems, resolving
19 the issue of settlements and displacements, and you can see here again at
20 paragraph 2 the issue of relocated persons putting pressure on the local
21 population, and they mention here the support of the local organs of
22 authority ranging from the government to the local commune.
23 Can you give us your views on this, please.
24 A. This document again illustrates the contingency of what's going
25 on here geographically speaking. There are various phases in which the
1 civilian organs or authorities, including the police, are being
2 constructed. The military is trying to keep up with where such
3 authorities exist or not and to establish co-operation with them if that
4 is the case. However, the military is also confronting in many cases as
5 we see here a hostility on the part of already existing local organs of
6 authority to the very notion of any continued co-existence between Croats
7 and others not of Serbian nationality on the one hand and Serbs on the
8 other. And they also note that in a number of cases, the various
9 representatives of the government, including a group of secret police,
10 have appeared. It's difficult for the military to determine again
11 whether these are legitimate organs or not, but they note that in many
12 cases these groups seem to have some kind of official support and are
13 engaging in activities that among other things involve the forcible
14 movement of persons.
15 They also again note this problem of the elderly who remain in
16 the area and who it is -- we're able to understand from this and other
17 documents have not themselves in any way violated the newly established
18 legal order of the Serb district but who are targeted at least by some
19 authorities because they had sons, daughters, or other members of the
20 family who participated in the Croatian armed forces or police.
21 Q. Now, if we return to page 1 in the B/C/S version and page 2 in
22 the English version, I'd like to bring your attention to the paragraph
23 which begins -- the large paragraph towards the end of the first page in
24 B/C/S, members of the local population and Serbs who have settled from
25 other parts.
1 Now, we see the type of crimes they're dealing with here.
2 They're talking about unsolved murders and pressure to have the Croatian
3 population move out, and as you indicated earlier, we see a number of
4 villages including Mohovo, and the fact that the Croatian houses are
5 being occupied, et cetera.
6 Again, does this match with other documents that you have seen
7 around this time?
8 A. Yes. This conforms to the type of manifestations and actions
9 that I've been describing.
10 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: I'd like to tender the document this document,
11 Your Honours.
12 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
13 THE REGISTRAR: It shall assigned Exhibit P373. Thank you.
14 MR. DEMIRDJIAN:
15 Q. In this series of documents, I'd like to refer to one last
16 document which is 65 ter 6162 at tab 392, please.
17 Now, Dr. Nielsen, this is again another document from the
18 1st Mechanised Corps. In previous documents we have seen that the --
19 those who were targeted by these resettlements mainly were targeting
20 Croat -- members of the Croat ethnicity. Here we see that -- and you can
21 see this towards the end of the first paragraph, we're dealing with
22 Ruthenians and Ukrainians in the territory of the Vukovar municipality.
23 What can you say about the targeting of this group of the population?
24 A. Speaking again on the basis of the totality of documentation that
25 I've been able to examine not just this new military documentation but
1 existing police documentation including documentation of the
2 State Security Service of Serbia, I would note that whereas the main
3 thrust of the removals from this area was focused on Croats, this was of
4 course an area that featured a very diverse and multi-ethnic demographic
5 population. And what I mean by that is that we have these Ruthenians,
6 Ukrainians, Hungarians, Slovaks, some Czechs, and in a number of cases
7 the military indicates that it is not just the Croats who are being
8 pressured to resettle or who experienced security problems, that is
9 lacking protection by the civilian or other authorities but also as in
10 this case the Ruthenian and Ukrainian population that is concerned. I am
11 also aware that the Slovaks in particular actually sent a delegation to
12 the federal secretariat for internal affairs around this time in an
13 effort to get the authorities in Belgrade to offer them some measure of
14 security against what they viewed as threats to their continued existence
15 in this area. It is plain from that and other documents that the Slovaks
16 in particular were targeted by some Serbs because Slovakia, like Croatia,
17 had during World War II been a fascist puppet state allied with
18 Nazi Germany.
19 Q. Thank you, Dr. Nielsen.
20 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Your Honours, may I offer this document, please.
21 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
22 THE REGISTRAR: It shall be assigned Exhibit P374. Thank you.
23 MR. DEMIRDJIAN:
24 Q. Now, on this topic of forcible resettlements, Dr. Nielsen, I
25 would like to take you to paragraph 206 of your report. You mentioned
1 that, and this is contemporaneous to the reports we have just seen, on
2 the 2nd of March during a SFRY Presidency at which Goran Hadzic and other
3 members of the Serb leadership were present, there was a discussion by
4 Radovan Karadzic in relation to population exchange, and you quote from
5 these stenographic records that Dr. Karadzic states:
6 "Who will force the Croats from Vojvodina to go to Krajina?
7 Those are nebulous ideas and the world is shocked by them. Although
8 India and Pakistan even did also such things."
9 And you carry on to say that Hadzic interjected by saying that
10 these are not -- this is not nebulous.
11 Having reviewed the stenographic records, can you tell us how we
12 should interpret this answer given by Goran Hadzic?
13 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Gosnell.
14 MR. GOSNELL: Mr. President, since we seem to be describing
15 specific words in the stenographic reports, wouldn't it be appropriate to
16 call those up and have them in front of the witness when he's commenting?
17 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: That's P37 - thank you - at tab 171. In the
18 B/C/S version we're looking at page 92, and in the English version it's
19 page 68. Yes. Thank you.
20 Q. Dr. Nielsen, would you need me to repeat the question, or are you
22 A. I am happy to answer the question, and I'm thankful that I have
23 the transcript in front of me, or the stenographic records, rather. Here
24 at this meeting this is one of a number of occasions where there's a
25 quite loose discussion of not just specific topics but general problems,
1 and Karadzic has at one point as I note mentioned this very memorable
2 episode of the partition of -- in south Asia where a very large number of
3 people passed away violently during the migrations that took place there,
4 and then he says that it's at this moment in Europe questionable whether
5 that would be feasible. And as I note, the -- and I can supplement if we
6 take the full quote of Karadzic, he says that these are -- it's not as
7 much as questionable, but he says that, "I'm making -- mentioning this so
8 that we know about their way of thinking, their way of hopes because it
9 will not be organised and nobody will be able to hold -- to hold on down
10 there." He's indicating, as I read it, that this is not a process that
11 can easily be controlled by anyone if such a huge process is set into
12 motion, and I think as a matter of general knowledge, we all know how
13 that transpired in India and Pakistan.
14 And then we have the response from Goran Hadzic. He says, There
15 is nothing nebulous, or, as I translate it, That is not nebulous, and
16 then he goes on to say which appears to be a bit of a conundrum in the
17 transcript, Serbs from Zagreb need to be resettled and Serbs from
18 Belgrade and now from this territory, that's actually missing from the
19 translation, and now from this territory, there's -- there is no
20 question. And I would there respectfully differ with whether he's saying
21 that is out of the question now. I see it as being that there is no --
22 there is no discussion of that.
23 So what is clear is that there's a discussion in this particular
24 meeting of the supreme defence -- excuse me, socialist Presidency --
25 excuse me, the Presidency of Yugoslavia in which they have a discussion
1 of a well-known historical incident of mass migration that had very
2 violent consequences, and Hadzic and Karadzic are both expressing their
3 opinions on it here.
4 Q. Thank you. I would like now to move to the section of your
5 report where you deal with the police and the RSK between 1992 and 1993.
6 You discuss here the union of the Serb autonomous regions. This is
7 paragraph 121 onwards, and the adoption of the Law on Internal Affairs.
8 I would like to ask you about, and this is a topic we discussed
9 earlier, about the relationship between the JNA and these emerging
10 civilian authorities and perhaps to illustrate this if we could display
11 65 ter 6026 which is at tab 338, please. It's 65 ter 6026, tab 338.
12 Thank you.
13 Now, this document is dated 20th of November, 1991, and it seems
14 to be issued by the 1st Military District. Dr. Nielsen, under item 2 we
15 could see here that in relation to the task of local commands, the
16 military is discussing the establishment of military authority, making
17 lists of military conscripts and establishing the civilian authorities
18 and taking steps to ensure law and order, et cetera.
19 If we go to page 2 in the English version and the B/C/S version,
20 we can see at the bottom of the B/C/S version and also at the bottom of
21 the English version mentions members of the local government and
23 Now, again this is just an illustration, but on the totality of
24 the documents that you have seen at the time following the fall of
25 Vukovar, how could you -- how can you qualify this relationship between
1 the JNA and the local authorities?
2 A. Again, I keep coming back to the term contingent. It really
3 depends on which particular settlement, which particular municipality
4 we're looking at, because the civilian authorities, in that I include the
5 police, the organs of internal affairs and public security, are in
6 various stages of formation and in many cases not particularly well
7 functioning at this case -- or at this time, rather. But in all cases,
8 the military is quite keen to identify the relevant civilian organs of
9 authority to help them become operational and to obtain their assistance
10 in resolving the pressing problems that they're all trying to confront.
11 Q. And without treading too far in military matters because we will
12 have a military expert, to your understanding as these combat operations
13 come to an end, what is the role of these local commands or town
15 A. On that question I would simply defer to the military expert.
16 Q. Very well. And could we move to 65 ter 6071, which is at tab
18 Now, this is about a month and a half after the previous
19 document. It was issued by the 1st Mechanised Corps on the
20 13th of January, and it deals with the organisation and subordination of
21 the civil affairs organ.
22 In the English version, if we go to page 3, which is item 4. I
23 believe we can stay on the same page in the B/C/S version. Here the
24 1st Mechanised Corps deals with the units which are present in the area,
25 and it says that they are fully responsible in co-operation with SUP
1 organs for organising and implementing security measures. And under item
2 5 it talks about command organs for civil affairs and town commands shall
3 closely co-operate with legal and official government organs in populated
4 areas and municipalities.
5 And again I'm come back to the question I asked you earlier.
6 Based on these documents, we see this term "co-operation." How you do
7 read this?
8 A. Likewise, I can again only come back to the answer I offered
9 earlier which is that where the civilian authorities, including the
10 organs of internal affairs, are functioning, they are to co-operate with
11 the military and vice versa in resolving the issues that are -- are
12 confronting everyone, and that includes, of course, the settlement issue
13 that we discussed earlier. It includes public security. It includes
14 registration and securing of property. It includes to some extent
15 sanitation and other issues, all of which are mentioned in these numerous
17 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Very well. May I offer this document,
18 Your Honours.
19 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
20 THE REGISTRAR: It shall be assigned Exhibit P375. Thank you.
21 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
22 MR. DEMIRDJIAN:
23 Q. Now, I'd like to move to a section of your report around
24 paragraph 156 onwards. You mentioned in this section of your report that
25 the few orders issued by Goran Hadzic to the RSK MUP. Now, 156, I think
1 we have clarified this in the errata sheet that the sentence should read
2 that President Hadzic ordered the RSK MUP to take over the security of
3 the buildings. I believe you remember that.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And at paragraph 161, and I would like you to clarify this for
6 us, you mentioned that in August 1993, Goran Hadzic ordered the
7 Ministry of Internal Affairs to arrest all dealers and resellers on the
8 entire territory, and you wrote there "of narcotics."
9 Could you explain to the Trial Chamber how you came to the -- to
10 that conclusion?
11 A. Well, I can certainly explain. It may be useful to have the
12 document on the screen as well, but I can tell you that again it's
13 important to state, as was noted in your comment, that there are really
14 very few documents, and I think that needs emphasising, very few
15 documents issued by Goran Hadzic directly to the police. One of them, of
16 these few documents, is the one in paragraph 161, and in the B/C/S
17 original, the term used that I translate as dealers and then put
18 narcotics in parentheses is "diljeri," plural, which is obviously an
19 English word, from the English word "dealer," and in my experience of
20 that word in both the open sources and in other documents is used almost
21 exclusively to refer to persons who sell or purchase narcotics. That is
22 why I added that comment in parentheses.
23 Q. Thank you. And in your experience have you seen similar orders
24 where narcotic dealers are mobilised in armed forces?
25 A. My only recollection of such an order would be some similar
1 orders that were issued by the police in Republika Srpska, in
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, during the same period.
3 Q. Very well. Yes. Now, in section 5 of your report you deal with
4 the co-operation between the police of the Serb-controlled entities in
5 Croatia and the MUP of Serbia. And you refer to a number of documents
6 where the DB writes reports about killings of men, for example, who were
7 imprisoned in Dalj. That's at paragraph 104 of your report. You also
8 deal with another report relating to -- paragraph 106 of your report, the
9 events on the 18th of October, again about Arkan and a man named
11 I'd like you to look at a document which is 65 ter 6075, at tab
12 356, in relation to this topic.
13 Yes. Dr. Nielsen, this is again part of the package of documents
14 that you were provided after the completion of your report. It is issued
15 by the command of the 80th Motorised Brigade on the 18th of January, and
16 it deals with units. At that talks about paramilitary Chetnik formations
17 wandering about, and it talks about the liquidations -- quiet
18 liquidations of citizens here.
19 Now, this is a report by the army itself, and it states here that
20 neither the military police nor the civilian police know anything about
22 With regards to the reports that are quoted or cited in your
23 report, how -- how does this one compare to them? Those are in your
24 report or DB reports, and this is a military report. What are your
25 comments on this one?
1 A. My comment would be that there are certainly available police
2 reports both from the RSK and in particular from the DB of the
3 Republic of Serbia that indicate that there was an awareness among the
4 police that liquidations of civilians were being carried out by
5 paramilitary formations.
6 Q. Very well. And have you had the opportunity to review this
8 A. Yes, I have. And again it could be possible that in this case
9 the author of the document is referring very narrowly to recent
10 discussions he'd had with specific members of the military police or the
11 civilian police who insist that they know nothing about this particular
12 case of liquidation of this couple that is mentioned here, but certainly
13 there was a general awareness again reflected in the overall available
14 documentation that such liquidations were occurring particularly at the
15 hands of paramilitary groups.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: May I offer this document, Your Honours.
18 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
19 THE REGISTRAR: It shall be assigned Exhibit P376. Thank you.
20 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Your Honours, is it the appropriate time to
22 JUDGE DELVOIE: Dr. Nielsen, this is the end of today's hearing.
23 You will come back tomorrow at 9.00, I presume. You are -- you are still
24 under oath, which means, as you probably know, that you're not allowed to
25 discuss your testimony with anybody, and you're not to speak to anyone of
1 the Prosecution or the Defence in the meantime.
2 THE WITNESS: I understand, Your Honour. Thank you.
3 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you. You will be escorted out.
4 [The witness stands down]
5 JUDGE DELVOIE: Court adjourned.
6 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.00 p.m.,
7 to be reconvened on Friday, the 11th day
8 of January, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.
* The bold and italicised text was previously confidential pursuant to a redaction order of the Chamber. The status of this redaction order has been changed from confidential to public per Chamber's decision of 10 January 2013.
* The bold and italicised text was previously confidential pursuant to a redaction order of the Chamber. The status of this redaction order has been changed from confidential to public per Chamber's decision of 10 January 2013.
* The bold and italicised text was previously confidential pursuant to a redaction order of the Chamber. The status of this redaction order has been changed from confidential to public per Chamber's decision of 10 January 2013.