Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 6026

 1                           Thursday, 20 June 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 8.59 a.m.

 5             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Good morning to everyone in and around the

 6     courtroom.

 7             Madam Registrar, could you call the case, please.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.

 9             This is the case IT-04-75-T, the Prosecutor versus Goran Hadzic.

10             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Could we have the appearances, please, starting

11     with the Prosecution.

12             MR. STRINGER:  Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours.  For

13     the Prosecution, Douglas Stringer, Matthew Gillett, Thomas Laugel, and

14     Kathleen Childs.

15             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

16             And for the Defence, Mr. Gosnell.

17             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours.  It's

18     Christopher Gosnell for Goran Hadzic along with Liane Aronchick our legal

19     assistant.  Thank you.

20             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

21             On Monday, the 1st of July, the Trial Chamber has been instructed

22     not to sit due to the opening ceremony of the Residual Mechanism.  I

23     would have the parties to note that we will not sit on Monday, the 1st of

24     July.  Thank you.

25             The witness may be brought in.


Page 6027

 1             MR. GOSNELL:  Mr. President, just while that's taking place, a

 2     waiver was filed, I believe, yesterday for Mr. Hadzic's absence for the

 3     last session today.  And -- and he would respectfully request permission

 4     to be absent for that session.

 5             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Granted.

 6             MR. STRINGER:  Mr. President, just in relation to not sitting on

 7     the 1st of July, is it be possible the Chamber might be amenable to

 8     sitting on Friday of that week which would not push us off schedule for

 9     the following week with the witness logistics.

10             JUDGE DELVOIE:  We'll discuss that during the first break,

11     Mr. Stringer.

12             MR. STRINGER:  Thank you.

13                           [The witness takes the stand]

14             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Good morning, Mr. McElligott.

15             THE WITNESS:  Good morning, Your Honours.

16             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Are you comfortable where you are?

17             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

18             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.  May I remind you that you're still on

19     your oath.

20             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

21             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

22                           WITNESS:  JOHN GERARD McELLIGOTT [Resumed]

23                           Examination by Mr. Gillett: [Continued]

24             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Gillett.

25             MR. GILLETT:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Your Honours.

Page 6028

 1        Q.   Good morning, Mr. McElligott.  Are you hearing me loud and clear?

 2        A.   Yes, sir.

 3        Q.   And could I ask you again today to speak very clearly and slowly

 4     again because we're speaking the same language and to leave a pause after

 5     my questions.  Thank you.

 6             Now, at the end of the day yesterday, you were describing

 7     measures that UNCIVPOL took to address crimes and you said that the

 8     people with responsibility for addressing the crimes, the 7.000, as you

 9     described them, could have made a significant impact on these

10     communities.  This is transcript 6023.

11             What types of measures could the RSK police have taken to reduce

12     or prevent crimes?

13        A.   The primary function of a policeman and of a police service is to

14     prevent crime.  And to do that, you have to be visibly active in your

15     community, you have to be very much in contact with your community, and

16     you've got to have respectability of your community.  And I think they

17     were deficient in many of those fields.  It is clear that a minority

18     group were afraid to report crimes to them, they didn't report crimes to

19     them, and there is no doubt - only for the involvement of our monitors -

20     many crimes would have gone unrecorded, not to mind being investigated.

21        Q.   Final question.  Your evidence that you've provided has various

22     examples of the RSK police being involved in crimes against civilians.

23     What impact did the police involvement in crimes have on the non-Serb

24     inhabitants of these areas?

25        A.   In this instance, we're talking about the special police.  I'd


Page 6029

 1     like to distinguish that there were what I would regard as two different

 2     fields of people.  And one were the professional police officers, and

 3     many of them behaved in a very professional manner.  There's no doubt

 4     about that and we have to acknowledge that to them.  But on the other

 5     side of the house, there was a group and they did not function in a

 6     policing way.  In fact, I would say they were the problem.  And we have

 7     many instances where they are engaged in criminal activity, they have

 8     been reported by witnesses as seeing in militia uniform, and there are

 9     many accounts where they behaved improperly in the sense that we have

10     reports where they would go into a community or a town and literally

11     shoot up the place, discharge fire-arms, and that brought a reign of

12     terror.  I have accounts of my own monitors where this happened at

13     night-time, and they would jump up from their beds and lie on the floor

14     until things settled down again.  And that was happening inside of small

15     communities, and there's no doubt it had a terrible impact on people.

16        Q.   Thank you.  That completes the questions on direct examination.

17             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you, Mr. Gillett.

18             Cross-examination.

19                           Cross-examination by Mr. Gosnell:

20             MR. GOSNELL:  Thank you very much, Mr. President.

21        Q.   Good morning, Mr. McElligott.

22        A.   Good morning, sir.

23        Q.   As you know, Mr. McElligott, my name is Christopher Gosnell.  I

24     represent Mr. Hadzic in these proceedings.  I'm going to ask you a few

25     questions today.  If anything is unclear, please feel free to ask me to

Page 6030

 1     elaborate or clarify and I'll do my best.

 2        A.   Mm-hm.

 3        Q.   And always remember, sir, please to observe a pause after the end

 4     of -- of my question and the start of your question [sic].

 5        A.   Okay.

 6        Q.   And I'll try my best as well not to -- to observe a pause after

 7     your answers.

 8             Now, before Mr. McElligott before we get into a discussion of the

 9     crimes that you observed and your reporting of those crimes in some of

10     the documents indicating crimes, I'd like to talk about the context of

11     your mission.  And at paragraph 13 of the your statement, you say:

12             "The role of the UN troops was to ensure that the area remained

13     demilitarised and that all persons in them would be protected from fear

14     and armed attack."

15             MR. GOSNELL:  Now, if we could just please bring up L2, which is

16     Defence tab 5.

17        Q.   Am I correct in characterising the overall concept of the

18     Vance Plan to be that there would be a military element of UNPROFOR whose

19     primary responsibility was to ensure protection for the United Nations

20     Protected Areas and that there would be a police element, UNCIVPOL, that

21     would monitor law enforcement within those protected areas?  Is that a

22     fair overview of the Vance Plan?

23        A.   That is -- yes, indeed, yeah.

24             MR. GOSNELL:  If we could please go to page 11.

25        Q.   Sir, I'd like to direct your attention there to paragraph 7.  And

Page 6031

 1     let's, first of all, look at the language that seems to be the basis for

 2     what's in your --

 3        A.   Apologies, I just have a difficulty with the distance on sight.

 4     So could it be enlarged a little.  Could the size be enlarged.

 5             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we please zoom in on paragraph 7.  A little

 6     bit.

 7        Q.   Is that all right, Mr. McElligott?

 8        A.   If you could enlarge a little more.  My apologies.  Yeah go

 9     ahead.  Yeah, fine.

10        Q.   Now, there, we see the -- the third sentence:

11             "The role of the United Nations troops would be to ensure that

12     the areas remained demilitarised and that all persons residing in them

13     were protected from fear of armed attack."

14             Now, that language is a little bit strange.  It says "protecting

15     them from fear" as opposed to protecting them from armed attack.  Would

16     you agree, though, that for everyone on the ground the understanding was

17     to prevent those protected areas from coming under attack?

18        A.   I think we have to take a step back before we look at that and

19     there was to be a demilitarisation before these things came into effect.

20     So, in other words, the conflicting parties were to withdraw and

21     demilitarise and then UNPROFOR took up its responsibility of managing a

22     demilitarised area.  And it's within that environment the local police

23     would function as well.

24             So, in reality, we were never there at that beginning.

25        Q.   Well, in an imperfect world, and UNPROFOR was certainly operating

Page 6032

 1     in an imperfect effect world, and we're going to look at some documents

 2     as we go along that address this, it was nevertheless - notwithstanding

 3     that there had been insufficient withdrawal by Croatian forces from the

 4     confrontation lines and insufficient or incomplete demilitarisation

 5     within the protected areas - nevertheless, it was UNPROFOR's goal and

 6     mandate to protect those areas; correct?

 7        A.   Once the initial commitment was given and undertaken by those

 8     signing up to the agreement, they had a role to fulfil.  And they didn't

 9     do it.  And we found ourselves in the middle of that conflict, trying to

10     handle a brand new situation and an extremely difficult situation.

11             So while we were there -- and negotiations were taking place from

12     the one man on the ground level to, I'm sure, at UN headquarters level to

13     try and bring people to a point where let's go back and start at the

14     beginning and try and achieve what you set out to do and what you agreed

15     to.  In the meantime, we were functioning and running inside of that

16     environment where there was total conflict.

17        Q.   Now, two sentences forward, it says here in paragraph 7 of the

18     Vance Plan:

19             "As the United Nations Force assumed its responsibilities in the

20     United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) all JNA forces deployed elsewhere

21     in Croatia would be relocated outside the republic."

22             Now looking at that formulation, would you agree with me that the

23     bargain that appears to be reflected here is that the JNA is withdrawing

24     in exchange for UNPROFOR coming and providing security for the UNPAS?

25        A.   Naturally there is a transition period where when the place

Page 6033

 1     becomes demilitarised and UNPROFOR establishes itself, and I think I have

 2     set out some dates there in relation to UNPROFOR establishing itself in

 3     Sectors North South, East and West.  In reality, they were on the ground

 4     prior to those dates, but being established takes a certain period of

 5     time, and they declared it where they had taken responsibility even

 6     though they were in there perhaps months in advance.

 7             So you can see there was a leeway to get to the point where you

 8     could say, "I'm available and I'm ready now," and hopefully when they

 9     were declaring that, the other parties would have come to the position

10     where they would leave them in a functional state.  But that didn't

11     happen.

12        Q.   Let me try to approach this from a different angle.

13             Amongst your Serb interlocutors, did you understand that they

14     were looking to UNPROFOR to provide protection, military protection, for

15     the UNPAs from Croatian attack?

16        A.   I'll answer it probably in this way in the sense that I've said

17     it before.  I'm there as a policeman with a particular role to play.

18     There were political levels to be engaged in, there were military levels

19     to be engaged in, and there I'm sure is plenty of evidence available as

20     to what measures they took along the way on those issues, so I don't

21     think I should go off into the politics of it or go into the military end

22     of it.  There is lots I'm sure who can account for those things.  So I --

23     I can look at it from my policing point, and all I can say to you is:  We

24     were not where we expected to be when we got there.

25        Q.   You were in the region for how long?

Page 6034

 1        A.   About 13 months.

 2        Q.   And how frequent were your contacts with Serb officials?

 3        A.   With Serb officials, I would say very -- very little with

 4     officials because the commissioners of the day went to the meetings and

 5     the only times I did attend specific meetings were in Geneva and Vienna,

 6     and, again, I would have been there perhaps as an observer in a sense to

 7     the negotiations and available in the event of issues arising in relation

 8     to policing matters or policing plans that may emerge from the

 9     negotiations so that would be my level of involvement, on the ground,

10     with people.

11        Q.   You were --

12        A.   Our commissioner and both commissioners, actually, attended.  But

13     the political and civil affairs side of it was dealt with by civil

14     affairs so they focused on what would be the political end of the

15     mission.

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Could --

17             MR. GOSNELL:

18        Q.   You were kept abreast of the content of the contacts that your

19     bosses, namely the commissioner of UNCIVPOL, was having with the Serb

20     side; correct?

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   And you could --

23             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please move closer to the

24     microphone.

25             MR. GOSNELL:

Page 6035

 1        Q.   And you were kept abreast of the contacts that the political

 2     affairs, civil affairs people, were having with the Serb side; correct?

 3        A.   Would be reasonably familiar, yes.

 4        Q.   And many of the documents -- and let me ask one more question on

 5     that line.

 6             You were kept abreast as well of contacts that some of the people

 7     on the military side, including the Force Commander, was having with the

 8     Serb side; correct?

 9        A.   Yes.  I would be aware of meetings, yes.

10        Q.   And many of the documents that you have been asked to

11     authenticate and comment upon are indeed from the military side and the

12     civilian affairs side; is that correct?

13        A.   Correct, Your Honours.

14        Q.   All right.  So are you in a position to comment on contacts that

15     the civilian affairs and military people were having with the Serb side;

16     isn't that right?

17        A.   Yes, based on the documentation I've seen, yes.

18        Q.   All right.

19             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we please have 1367, please, which is Defence

20     tab 30.

21                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

22             JUDGE DELVOIE:  You have seen the court reporter's note on the

23     screen, Mr. Gosnell?

24             MR. GOSNELL:  I am going to do my utmost.  I apologise.

25             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

Page 6036

 1             MR. GOSNELL:

 2        Q.   Now, this is a code cable, possibly, it's a communication, in any

 3     event, from General Nambiar to Mr. Goulding at the United Nations in

 4     New York.

 5             MR. GOSNELL:  Perhaps this should not be broadcast.  I'm not sure

 6     whether the Prosecution can assist me.  It is on the Prosecution list,

 7     and I -- I don't recall what the standard policy is on these documents.

 8             MR. GILLETT:  If you just give me 30 seconds, I can check.  I

 9     don't think there's a problem, but I'll just check that.

10             MR. GOSNELL:  In the meantime, perhaps it's best not to broadcast

11     it.

12             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Indeed.

13             MR. GOSNELL:  And if we can go over to page 2, please.  And this

14     is reflected also on the cover page.

15        Q.   We see that this is a letter from the state committee for

16     co-operation with UNPROFOR of the RSK government.

17             Now, can I first ask you, Mr. McElligott, did you know that there

18     was a state committee for co-operation with UNPROFOR in the RSK?

19        A.   There were a variety of committees.  I would be familiar with the

20     fact that there were numerous committees of linking and talking to each

21     other, yes.

22        Q.   And the date of this letter is the 10th of November 1992, so are

23     you in -- in country at this point; right?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   Now, if we can turn the page, please.

Page 6037

 1        A.   Could it be enlarged a little, please.  Thank you.  A little

 2     more.  Oh.  Yeah.

 3        Q.   And here we have Mr. Zecevic righting to Mr. Nambiar,

 4     General Nambiar, and I want to draw your attention to a couple of

 5     passages here.

 6             "It should be repeated that the basic reason for accepting the

 7     Vance Plan was a total security of the population in the protected

 8     territory provided by the presence of the UN troops, i.e., your task

 9     defined in Article 7 of the Vance Plan which we quote:  'The role of the

10     UN troops would be to ensure that these areas remain demilitarised and

11     that all the inhabitants in these areas be protected from the threat of

12     armed attack [sic].'"

13              "This provision of the Vance Plan was the main reason to accept

14     it.  In my deepest conviction, this provision expresses the very essence

15     of the Vance Plan and this is why we insisted on it in all our contacts

16     with the representatives of UNPROFOR."

17             Now if we please go down the page:

18             "But what is unacceptable for us is your attitude that the

19     cease-fire is violated by the Croatian side because the total

20     demilitarisation has not been carried out in the protected areas.  Such a

21     logic is completely unacceptable and absurd.

22             "Likewise, we insisted on having your answer and guarantees for

23     complete realisation of the obligation under point 7 of the Vance Plan,

24     and no adequate response has been given, least of all a positive one."

25             Now let me just start with the last point there.  Were you

Page 6038

 1     informed or do you know whether UNPROFOR told the Serb side that they

 2     could not guarantee the territorial protection of the protected areas

 3     from Croat attack?

 4        A.   I have to go back to the first point to perhaps address the issue

 5     and it is -- starts with a point that it would remain demilitarised,

 6     which would suggest that when UNPROFOR started, they were starting with a

 7     demilitarised situation, and going forward you can see how complex it

 8     was, how lacking in trust there was on both sides because you can see

 9     where the Croatian side failure or threat of coming towards the Serbian

10     was an issue.  And there's a total lack of trust being seen there, and

11     that's where UNPROFOR found themselves with having to negotiate.  And

12     it -- they -- they start with remaining demilitarised which would suggest

13     it should have taken place.  But neither side had moved and one was

14     saying, Well, if you move, I'll move, so it's -- where do we start?

15        Q.   Well --

16        A.   And they're setting out their position to say, "Look, we see a

17     problem on the far side of the fence."  I'm sure the other people were

18     saying the same thing.  And that's where UNPROFOR would have to sit in

19     and try and bring them to that point again.  So that's the complexity of

20     it.  That's the environment we were in.

21        Q.   At this point, the JNA had withdrawn, correct?

22        A.   My understanding is that the area was not demilitarised.

23        Q.   Sir, that wasn't my question.

24        A.   But -- I -- I -- as to who had withdrawn, I can't be specifically

25     sure.  The military would know who specifically had done what.  So that

Page 6039

 1     can be obtained from them.  I can't provided you with details on the

 2     military element of it.

 3             MR. GILLETT:  Just a quick note, we checked.  There's not a

 4     problem with that document.  It's been cleared to be used publicly.

 5     Thanks.

 6             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

 7             MR. GOSNELL:  I thank my friend.

 8        Q.   Well, let me ask you this:  In your time there, did you see where

 9     UNPROFOR forces were deployed?  How were they dispersed in the UN

10     protected areas?

11        A.   We had -- UNMOs were basically on the front line, as I understand

12     it, on both sides as liaison officers.  There was a battalion of

13     military, UN military in a very - how do you call it? - sector.  In fact,

14     there may be a couple of battalions in some sectors so that they were

15     dispersed throughout the region, throughout the UNPAs.

16        Q.   Were they in any way oriented towards the limits of the protected

17     areas?  In other words, were they stationed in such a way that they

18     could, first of all, observe; and, secondly, protect or prevent

19     incursions into the UNPAs from the Croat side?

20        A.   My knowledge of them is that they had a military base in all the

21     areas, that the troops were there.  And how they actually deployed, I

22     don't know because we dealt with the policing side when we needed and

23     indeed we had drawn on the reserves to help us.  They were available to

24     us, and we knew about that level of participation.  And as for their

25     absolute functions and how they performed, I won't account for that nor I

Page 6040

 1     do it -- can I do it.  They were there and I have no doubt they were

 2     committed.

 3        Q.   The reason I ask you and the reason I think you're in a unique

 4     position to comment on this is that you had, if I'm not mistaken, 600

 5     CIVPOL monitors scattered in some cases into the far reaches, I would

 6     say, of the protected areas; isn't that right?

 7        A.   Yes.  We had monitors literally in every community right up to

 8     the -- right inside the pink zone.  We had several stations.

 9        Q.   So your monitors and you, when you toured --

10        A.   Mm-hm.

11        Q.   And can I just ask you, how often did you yourself tour

12     [Overlapping speakers]?

13        A.   It would be of a random nature.  Initially, I went for two weeks

14     just to establish myself on the ground and know what was out there, and I

15     went to every police station we had and met, I would say, most of our

16     people.  So when I got back I knew what I was looking at when people

17     spoke to me.  So I would -- apart from that, then I would have gone, I

18     would say, quite often in a sense.  You know, that if something happened

19     that needed to be seen, and I talked about going down to Benkovac.  I was

20     in Medak pocket, I was in -- come to various other places, other sectors,

21     so I would have a reasonable input into travelling around the sectors.

22        Q.   You've just referred to pink zones.  What were the pink zones?

23        A.   The pink zones were -- they were established by way of an

24     additional resolution to the UN Protected Areas.  That there were areas

25     outside the UNPAs and they were in Croatia, and they were up to the full

Page 6041

 1     confrontation line, and basically they were occupied by the JNA and were

 2     the dominant or -- not dominant, but the overall -- the majority

 3     population was Serbian.  So their resolution then was that the UN mission

 4     could function there.

 5        Q.   And there were CIVPOL monitors in the pink zones right?

 6        A.   Yes, we had several stations pink zones.

 7        Q.   And it was UNPROFOR's view, as with the protected areas, that

 8     there should be no military attack from the Croatian side on the pink

 9     zones, correct?

10        A.   Correct, yes.  And if can I recall correctly, there was a -- the

11     confrontation line, I think there was a 5 kilometre, let's say, no man's

12     land between the two parties to create a vacuum or to divide, keep them

13     apart.

14        Q.   Would a fair summary of the disposition of UNPROFOR forces be

15     that their battalions to a very large extent were located centrally in

16     some major centre in the sectors, and that they, in effect, sent out

17     patrols towards the confrontation lines, right?

18        A.   The barracks were located in -- I suppose in the simple sense

19     they -- they -- they were provided with barracks because of -- that's

20     where the space was and the scope was to locate them.  How they

21     patrolled, that is what they do, and I suppose in a sense they were

22     looking at their operational matters and patrolling in an effective way

23     to meet that desire.  We were doing it to meet our results, and I'm sure

24     they can account for how they did it.  But you can see from the military

25     reports the activities they engaged in.

Page 6042

 1             MR. GOSNELL:  Mr. President, we would tender this document.

 2             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Gillett.

 3             MR. GILLETT:  It is -- are we talking about the document 1367,

 4     the Zecevic --

 5             MR. GOSNELL:  That's correct.

 6             MR. GILLETT:  The witness hasn't confirmed any of the contents.

 7     He hasn't really adopted this document.  In fact, he's said on a number

 8     of occasions that he couldn't offer comments on it.

 9             So we don't think the sufficient nexus has been established for

10     this.  We don't have a problem in terms of the format as it is attached

11     to a document, but we don't think the witness has added any particular

12     value and his evidence is clear enough on the record.

13             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Gosnell.

14             MR. GOSNELL:  That as may be, but I am surprised that the

15     Prosecution - and this isn't the first time - is objecting to the

16     admissibility of documents on its own exhibit list.

17             MR. STRINGER:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  I apologise for

18     interjecting here, but on that point, we've got a 65 ter list in this

19     case that consists of over 6.000 documents put together during a time of

20     intense trial preparation.  Yesterday, the Chamber declined to allow the

21     Prosecution to add an exhibit to its list.

22             The point being that simply because something's on the list

23     doesn't mean that it's admissible by either side.  And so the suggestion

24     simply that it's on the list does not signify that it's admissible or

25     that it is otherwise stands on its own.  It's within the universe of

Page 6043

 1     potential exhibits.  That's all.

 2             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

 3                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 4             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Objection sustained for failure of nexus with

 5     this witness.

 6             MR. GOSNELL:  Thank you, Mr.  President.

 7        Q.   Now, Mr. McElligott, at paragraph 55 of your statement, and

 8     perhaps we could bring that up.  This is 6363.  It's now P2168.  And I --

 9     I suppose -- do you have it there in front of you, sir?

10        A.   I do.  Yes, Your Honours, I have it.  Yeah.

11        Q.   So at page 17 there's a heading entitled:  "Incursions into the

12     Sectors by All Sides to the Conflict."  And it reads:

13             "There were incursions over the UNPA demarcation lines by all

14     parties to the conflict.  The incursions by the Croatian side included

15     operations in Benkovac in January 1993 and in Maslenica and the

16     Medak pocket in September 1993."

17             Now I note you say there were incursions by all sides but then

18     the only examples you give are incursions by Croatian forces?

19        A.   That is correct.

20        Q.   Is there a clarification that you would wish to make in respect

21     of that?

22        A.   Yes, Your Honours.  In that matter, I referred to "by all sides,"

23     and in doing that, I was also including the - what would you call it? -

24     the -- the -- what do you call it?  Explosions or attacks by military

25     operations.  Not just personal attacks by individuals.

Page 6044

 1        Q.   You mean --

 2        A.   Shelling -- sorry.  Shelling is what I mean, yes.

 3        Q.   Violations of the cease-fire?

 4        A.   [Overlapping speakers]... shelling, yeah.  So I generalised it in

 5     that sense by both sides, but in this instance I'm referring to

 6     incursions of the type I am specifying here which would be on the ground.

 7        Q.   But during the entire period of 1992 and 1993, isn't it true that

 8     the only side that crossed confrontation line with troops that that been

 9     established was Croatian forces; is that right?

10        A.   I have cited what I know here, and on recall, I would think - and

11     I remember reading it again - there was one minor one at the front line,

12     and I think it just got to the front line before again it was headed off

13     in some fashion probably by negotiation and discussions, but it wouldn't

14     have got into a serious situation.  Not to the scale we're looking at

15     here.  It was of a minor nature, I would think.

16        Q.   Let me put the question again because I don't think I got a clear

17     answer.

18        A.   Okay.

19        Q.   And that's understandable, sir, I'm not criticising you.

20             As far as you know, the only side that crossed the confrontation

21     line that had been established at the time of the Vance Plan with troops

22     were Croatian forces --

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   -- in 1992 and 1993.  Correct?

25        A.   Correct.  Yes, that's my situation.

Page 6045

 1        Q.   And in addition to the examples you've cited, did you know there

 2     was an attack on a place called Miljevacki Plateau in June of 1992?

 3        A.   I have heard of it referred to and perhaps read something about

 4     it somewhere along the way.  But, yes.

 5        Q.   Were Croatian forces still in Miljevacki Plateau when you were

 6     there?

 7        A.   I can't be sure.  I can't.  I don't know.  I don't recall.

 8             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have 1D468, please, which is Defence

 9     tab 39.

10        Q.   Now, sir, this is a video which I believe and hope we should be

11     able to broadcast.  And can you see on the screen in front of you?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   And let's -- let's just play it and then I'll ask you some

14     comment, some questions.

15                           [Video-clip played]

16             "THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] Where is Niper?  What do you mean

17     you didn't?  I am left without everything.  What are you talking about?

18     Take him with us.  The Croatian army in the hinterland of Sibenik

19     completed a successful action of the liberation of Miljevac.  We got

20     these -- this footage later.

21             "He has two golden teeth."

22             MR. GOSNELL:

23        Q.   Have you ever seen that footage?

24        A.   No, Your Honours.

25        Q.   Now, my understanding is that this video was shot by Croatian

Page 6046

 1     forces.  They took the video.  And apparently in 1992, it was

 2     subsequently shown on television and it became somewhat infamous,

 3     certainly on the Serb -- amongst the Serb population in the protected

 4     areas, particular in Sector South as being one of the incidents that

 5     occurred during the Miljevacki Plateau operation.

 6             Did you ever hear any of your monitors or did you yourself hear

 7     from the Serb side that they were concerned about the manner in which

 8     Serbs had been abused during this operation?

 9        A.   Yes.  And we referred to the report yesterday of the 27th of July

10     where there was a substantial volume of crimes recorded in respect of

11     Croats.  I know that our monitors also interviewed numerous, indeed, I

12     think all Serbian people who came from outside of the United Nations

13     protected area on -- when they arrived and documented accounts from them.

14     And, again, there are horrific accounts.  You know, we have some terrible

15     stuff in that report of 27th of July.  I think you will find the same in

16     the other one.  And you can see the level of abuse.  We saw an account

17     yesterday from Kjel Johansen, where he met a man who had been beaten.  He

18     was in bed and in a terrible state.  So the human brutality is visible.

19     It's appalling.

20        Q.   And what kind of impact did this have, as far as you were able to

21     learn, on the confidence of the Serb side in the UN's ability to protect

22     either the pink zones or the protected areas?

23        A.   I think you have to look at it in this way is that both sides had

24     endured the situation.  UNPROFOR was coming in as a new pair of hands to

25     try and start a new beginning and stop this and put -- start again and

Page 6047

 1     hopefully get people to see a new -- a new vision of where they wanted to

 2     go.  And I think that's where UNPROFOR was coming from, is to get people

 3     to stand back, enter negotiations, I know it's going to be -- it won't

 4     happen in a week or it won't happen in ten years, I go back to my own

 5     country.  Perhaps it took 15 years to get to an agreement.  But we got

 6     there.  And it's still been [inaudible].  So, you know, you are dealing

 7     with an appalling situation with a historical background and there is no

 8     simple answer.  All you could hope is that the leaders would lead and

 9     that they would work in the direction of gaining peace.

10        Q.   But this occurs in June 1992, almost immediately after the

11     arrival of UNPROFOR.

12        A.   Absolutely --

13        Q.   Isn't that right?

14        A.   Yeah.

15        Q.   So the first time that the entire structure or the bargain of the

16     Vance Plan, so to speak, is tested, there's a failure in -- in -- and

17     when I say "failure," I -- I don't know mean to impugn any one person.  I

18     mean to say that the objectives, the laudable objectives that you've just

19     described, those objectives were not being fulfilled in this incident;

20     correct?

21        A.   In this environment, you're going to take one step forward and

22     two steps back very frequently.  And you know, that is the way you had to

23     go.  You're not going to have a magic wand and say, "Everything changes

24     today."  You are -- the change you are about to make is monstrous and all

25     you can do is hope that UNPROFOR would get in there, give the guidance,

Page 6048

 1     give the leadership, and leadership would come from other places, and

 2     eventually over time that you can build -- you're looking at something.

 3     Not sorting a problem out today, you're looking at sorting out the

 4     future.  And it has to be looked at in that scope.  And the UN being

 5     there for six months is only getting your leg in the door.  You could be

 6     there for 20 years and still working at it.

 7             So the change you have to make and indeed -- you can see how

 8     people would be terrorised on the ground.  I mean, looking at it was

 9     frightening.

10        Q.   How did this incident in particular or more generally the events

11     of Miljevacki Plateau affect based on what you were able to observe or

12     learn intercommunal, interethnic tensions in Sector South and

13     Sector North?

14        A.   There was an amazing environment.  On the ground in the

15     community, before I suppose the troubles broke out there was a -- an

16     interrelationship between communities in -- in a friendly sociable way,

17     and we have had many monitors who have been approached in the sector when

18     they were going on breaks outside of it to say, "My neighbour has been

19     kicked out.  When you go to wherever you're going, would you convey my

20     greetings."  They never fell out.

21             Now, when you go to other levels, the levels of hatred came in,

22     politics came in, and the dynamics changed.  But on the ground with

23     society, there was still a bond of friendship and a bond of good

24     neighbourship.

25        Q.   Mr. McElligott, could you look back on the screen to my question?

Page 6049

 1     And I -- I was just wondering if you could focus on that specific point.

 2        A.   The film is still in display.

 3             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we please assist the witness with the

 4     transcript.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Which question?

 6             MR. GOSNELL:

 7        Q.   It's at line 21, sir.

 8        A.   I'm in difficulties with my eye-sight.  Apologies.

 9        Q.   I'm sorry.  Let me just repeat it then.

10        A.   Yeah.

11        Q.   The question was how did this event and the other events that

12     people knew about as having occurred at Miljevacki Plateau, how did that

13     impact upon intercommunal tensions in Sector North and Sector South in

14     particular?

15        A.   Of course, they have a very destabilising effect.  You know,

16     there's a -- people would not sleep in their bed at night when they know

17     that there's a risk of attack from one corner or another.  That --

18     that's -- it has a serious impact on the community, and again you're back

19     to trust, mistrust.  You know, there's total -- the place is just totally

20     unstable.

21        Q.   And that impacted on the ability of both you and the police to

22     maintain law and order in Sector South, in particular, correct?

23        A.   It made things extremely difficult.

24             MR. GOSNELL:  Mr. President, we would tender the video.

25             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Gillett.

Page 6050

 1             MR. GILLETT:  No objection.  We note there's no transcript in

 2     e-court for this.  On a previous occasion where this has come up, I noted

 3     that it got MFI'd pending a translation being added.  So I'd suggest if

 4     we follow that, that procedure, would be -- we'd have no objection to

 5     that.

 6                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 7             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Perhaps the parties know now -- know more than we

 8     do, but do we have any elements to know what this video is, when it has

 9     been filmed, who the people are on the -- on -- on ...

10             MR. GOSNELL:  Mr. President, my -- I was only able to rely on

11     open sources for this information, so I cannot vouch for its -- for the

12     reliability of the information I have.  I can only say that I have a

13     good-faith basis to belive that it is what I described it to be in court,

14     and if Your Honours are not comfortable with that, then we'll tender it

15     at a later time.

16             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Unless I suppose parties agree on what it is and

17     where it comes from and when it has been taken.

18             MR. GILLETT:  No, we're not aware of that information.  As I

19     said, we haven't had a transcript in e-court either, so, yeah, we're in

20     the dark, just as Your Honours are.

21             MR. GOSNELL:  For the time being, Mr. President, we'll put this

22     on the back burner.

23             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

24             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have 01273, please.  Defence tab 25.

25        Q.   Now, this is a crypto-cable from General Nambiar to

Page 6051

 1     Marrack Goulding.  The date is the 22nd of September.  The third sentence

 2     reads:

 3             "In these circumstances, you might perhaps feel able to impress

 4     upon Tudjman, as we sought to do yesterday with Milas in Zagreb, the

 5     imperative necessity of the Croatian army pulling well back from Peruca

 6     and behaving immaculately for a change."

 7             First of all, let me ask you:  Do you know -- do you have any

 8     information that would help us understand why General Nambiar would use

 9     that particular expression, namely, that the Croatian army should behave

10     immaculately for a change?

11        A.   I would suspect that he grounding it on a previous profile of

12     activities and that he is seeking a higher standard in how things are

13     done.

14        Q.   Well, in general did you observe provocative actions while you

15     were there or did you learn about provocative actions by the Croatian

16     army?

17        A.   I wasn't --

18        Q.   Sir, let me just finish my question.

19        A.   Okay.

20        Q.   Other than the specific incursions that we've already talked

21     about and that you've mentioned in your report?

22        A.   Personally I'm not familiar with any that I can recall right now.

23     If there were activities, say, in the pink zones where our monitors would

24     be close to the front line, they would be reported in our sitreps.  But

25     asking me that right now, I just can't say.

Page 6052

 1        Q.   And can you recall anything about this incident being referred to

 2     in Peruca?

 3        A.   I suspect you're referring to the Peruca dam here, so that's what

 4     became a serious area of contention in the sense that from what I'm aware

 5     it was mined with perhaps the objective of blowing it and that would

 6     could caused major flooding and destruction of property and people.

 7     Everything.

 8        Q.   Was Peruca in Sector South.

 9        A.   It was, yes.

10        Q.   And do I understand correctly that Croatian forces threatened

11     frequently to seize the dam by force?

12        A.   I know that it was a contentious issue and that it was mined.  As

13     to the politics of it, I'm not too sure.  But I was very aware of it, the

14     risks of it.  Let's put it that way.

15        Q.   Generally, did you learn from your monitors in their contacts

16     with Serbian police that they were concerned about an incursion by

17     Croatian forces in Peruca?

18        A.   Yes, I believe there was a situation there.  It was -- let's put

19     it, always a risk of heightening the tensions.

20        Q.   Can I ask you, were police, regular police now, I'm talking

21     amongst the 7.000, were those regular police liable to perform duties

22     other than law enforcement?

23        A.   Looking --

24        Q.   -- at any time?

25        A.   Looking at the situation reports and accounts given by them for

Page 6053

 1     not being available or performing would indicate that they were

 2     being sent -- some were being sent to the front line.

 3        Q.   So the regular police could be sent to the front line; is that

 4     right?

 5        A.   I don't know but I know it has been presented as a reason for not

 6     being available.  So I take it on face value that they may have.

 7        Q.   In any event that occurred?

 8        A.   That account has been given to us.  Yes.

 9        Q.   By -- your own monitors reported that?

10        A.   Our mon -- yes, it would -- it would be seen in situation reports

11     that on occasions they called to a station and there was nobody -- I

12     think there is one specific one there for Sector South where there was

13     nobody available on a particular day, and I think the account given was

14     everybody was on the front line or engaged.  I think that could go around

15     to the Maslenica bridge occasion.  And I think I referred to it earlier,

16     that we thought they would have at least left one person behind to honour

17     the Vance Plan.

18        Q.   So let me just understand this.  You're saying that there was a

19     situation when all or most or all of the regular police officers in a

20     police station left that station, left their regular duties, and were

21     sent to the front line to respond to whatever threat may have been

22     occurring there; is that correct?

23        A.   I do not know if they went there or what happened, but that was

24     presented as the reason why they didn't engage on a particular day.  And

25     I made the point at the time as saying that they thought -- we thought

Page 6054

 1     somebody would be left behind or at least somebody would be available to

 2     deal with it.

 3             So I don't know where they went, but they certainly weren't

 4     available.  One could take the view as well that in view of hostilities

 5     they were just going in another direction at that particular time.  I

 6     don't know, and to be fair I don't want to nail it down one way or the

 7     other.

 8        Q.   Your monitors were reporting that they were leaving --

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   -- for that reason?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   Was that a frequent occurrence?

13        A.   Frequent, I wouldn't refer to it as frequent, but I know it has

14     appeared on occasions.  I wouldn't consider it a frequent situation, and

15     I think the circumstances of meetings and so forth wouldn't -- wouldn't

16     justify that as being the case.  There were police available.

17             MR. GOSNELL:  This document is tendered, Mr. President.

18             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Gillett.

19             MR. GILLETT:  No objection.

20             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Admitted and marked.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D69, Your Honours.

22             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have 65 ter 1254, please, Prosecution

23     tab 9.

24        Q.   Sir, this is a document that I believe is referred to in your

25     report, although I don't have a paragraph reference, and --

Page 6055

 1             MR. GILLETT:  If I could assist.  It's paragraph 113 of the

 2     statement of the witness.

 3             MR. GOSNELL:

 4        Q.   And there, at the -- that doesn't seem to be the right document.

 5             MR. GOSNELL:  10 -- or, sorry.  01253.

 6        Q.   This is a status report on the Serbo-Croatian conflict and

 7     UNPROFOR mission.  It's dated 7th of September, 1992.  No authorship is

 8     indicated, but, sir, you -- you've probably looked at this document.

 9     Based on the idiom, the way in which it's written, can you tell us who

10     you think wrote this document?

11        A.   Could you enlarge it a little, please.

12             I would -- I would associate it with perhaps a civil affairs-type

13     document.

14        Q.   Is this a document -- would it probably have been authored by

15     Mr. Andreev?

16        A.   Hmm, September 1992 ... I think -- yes, oh I can't say he

17     authored, but I think Viktor was in the mission when I arrived.  He was

18     because we -- we met because -- we had met in Namibia, so I would have

19     recalled him in the sense when I met him as meeting with somebody from

20     the past.

21        Q.   What was his position at the time?

22        A.   He was head of civil affairs in Sector South.

23        Q.   Paragraph 1 says:

24             "UNPROFOR's mission is still in a military phase."

25             And your statement echos that at one point.  Can you tell us what

Page 6056

 1     that means, that UNPROFOR's mission was in a military phase?

 2        A.   I think basically what he is say something that demilitarisation

 3     has not taken place, and they find themselves in that environment.

 4        Q.   And how does that impact on UNPROFOR's duties or role?

 5        A.   Go back to the Vance Plan again.  The basic concept of what your

 6     functions were couldn't be fulfilled because the pitch was not clear.

 7        Q.   If we could turn to page 3, please.

 8             At the top of the page it reads:

 9             "Risks of military action to restore Croatian authority are

10     indeed realistic.  Croatian side's patience and good will is reaching the

11     point of non-return.  They seem to react out of pure nationalism.

12             "October is a deadline for them and therefore a turning point for

13     the whole operation.

14             "Provocation/retaliation process is intensifying.  Pressure on

15     the front line from Croatians increases daily under form of incursions,

16     infiltrations of both armed groups and civilians.  Clashes and incidents

17     between milicija and Croatian police are expanding daily.  The

18     confrontation might result from this milicija's like trend with probable

19     intervention of CA followed by the opening up of heavy arms stores to

20     back it.  Mobilisation is probably ongoing overnight."

21             Now, I just want to focus in particular on the part where he says

22     "pressure on the front line from Croatians increases daily under form of

23     incursions, infiltrations of both armed groups and civilians."

24             Now do you know what he is referring to when he refers to

25     infiltrations of -- infiltration of armed groups?

Page 6057

 1        A.   In -- I'm sure the military will account for certain aspects, but

 2     CIVPOL also would have encountered incidents.  Indeed, I would think if

 3     you look over that period of time, you my find there were murders

 4     committed in the UNPAs.  I referred to earlier a number of incidents

 5     which took place and I dealt -- or the Croatian authorities actually

 6     complained of their people being killed, and I was asked to prepare a

 7     report on it, and I examined the records available at that time and it

 8     may go back to around that period.  And I established that in fact the

 9     Croatians had actually killed more Serbs and that was noticed -- that was

10     sent back to them.

11             In addition to that, in the same report we also sought an

12     explanation from them in respect of a situation where a Serb was detained

13     in a Croatian prison and that was recorded as death by suicide.  When the

14     body was returned to the family, our monitors carried out an inquiry and

15     they also engaged a British medical doctor, if I can recall correctly, to

16     carry out a post-mortem examination on the body, and they established

17     that this man was beaten to death.  And that was sent back to them.  So

18     you can see the impact of it is that, you know, there was activity and

19     indeed at that particular moment of time, the figures showed that they

20     were the greater aggressors.

21        Q.   Infiltration of armed --

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could the witness please

23     stay closer to the microphone.  Thank you.

24             MR. GOSNELL:

25        Q.   Infiltration of armed groups is one thing and another thing being

Page 6058

 1     referred to is infiltration of civilians.

 2             Do you understand what Mr. Andreev was referring to when he

 3     referred to infiltration of civilians?  Why does he draw that

 4     distinction, if you know?

 5        A.   I think -- again, I think there is evidence of what I would

 6     consider as just maverick groups who just went on a rampage.  They were

 7     armed.

 8        Q.   You mean to say that there were Croatian maverick groups, as you

 9     describe them, crossing over the confrontation line from the Croatian

10     side into the UNPAs and committing crimes?

11        A.   I think there is a report in existence from down south in --

12     in -- indicating that that is one of the scenarios for the killings, or

13     some of the killings that has been put forward, yes.

14        Q.   And it says there that there were clashes between militia and

15     Croatian police.  Now, when I see the word "militia," I often caution

16     myself that it may be a reference to "milicija," namely, the Serb police.

17     As far as you know, were there direct clashes between the Serb milicija

18     and the Croatian police?  Were they fighting each other in any way?

19        A.   The -- what do you call, the group of policemen from within the

20     700 group are you referring to or the special police as I would?

21        Q.   Well, there's no reference to special police here.  I'm not sure

22     precisely what Mr. Andreev may be referring to you, but what I'm asking

23     you is whether there was any direct confrontation between the regular

24     police on the Serb side, and any Croatian police?

25        A.   I'm not aware of it.  During my time there, no, I'm not.  But I

Page 6059

 1     think historically there were incidents of that type.

 2        Q.   And how did actual infiltration or the threat of infiltration

 3     affect the ability of the police, and by police I mean here the 7.000?

 4     How did it affect their ability to conduct law enforcement in the UNPAs?

 5        A.   Again, they were faced with a difficult situation.  I suppose you

 6     could say they were starting on a playing pitch that was never designed

 7     for them either.  If you take it, in reality they were coming into a

 8     field that wasn't what was promised.  If they were starting with the

 9     Vance Plan, they were going into what should be a demilitarised area, so

10     you can see the difficulties they had.  And we understand that.

11        Q.   And they were not permitted under the Vance Plan to carry

12     anything other than side-arms, right?

13        A.   Correct.

14        Q.   Were the groups, the maverick groups that you described, based on

15     what you know, did they tend to be heavily armed?

16        A.   I can't say what they had, but I would suspect that they would be

17     heavily armed.  Yes.  Certainly would.  I would think so, yes.

18             MR. GOSNELL:  We would tender this document, although it may

19     already be tendered.  I'm not sure.

20             MR. GILLETT:  It should come in as an associated exhibit with the

21     statement.  This is 1253.

22             MR. GOSNELL:  Thank you.  Could we have 1290, please, which is

23     Defence tab 26.

24        Q.   Now, Mr. McElligott, this is the further report of the

25     Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 743 and 762.

Page 6060

 1     The date is 19 September 1992.  If we could please turn to page 4,

 2     paragraph 6.

 3             "General Nambiar has repeatedly stressed to the authorities in

 4     Belgrade and Knin that is UNPROFOR which exercises the protection

 5     function notice UNPAs and that the presence of these paramilitary units

 6     is contrary to the United Nations Plan and has caused the Croatian army

 7     to retain some of its forces at the confrontation line."

 8             Now just an aside there, from the context it appears that the

 9     paramilitary forces being referred to -- paramilitary units are the

10     special police.  And then he goes on:

11             "As a result, clashes continue to occur along the line, fueling

12     intercommunal tension in the UNPAs."

13             Now, first of all, sir, there's a connection being drawn here

14     between the clashes and the intercommunal tension.  Does that correspond

15     with what you know was going on at the -- what was fueling intercommunal

16     tension, amongst other causes?

17        A.   Yes.  You can see where just one is sparking off the other.  And

18     on it goes.  That's where you are.

19        Q.   And would you agree with me that here General Nambiar appears

20     to -- is reported as having asserted that it is indeed UNPROFOR which

21     exercises as, it's put here, the protection function in the UNPAs?

22        A.   Yes.  And what he is saying is simply that the special police

23     should not be there, and if they got a foothold in the situation, you may

24     get a different attitude from the other side, and you may get into

25     discussions, into negotiations, and advance somewhat.  So that's what

Page 6061

 1     he's saying to them.  He's saying, "Look, you're breaking the Vance Plan.

 2     The other people don't trust you because you're doing.  Please let us

 3     take responsibility for what we should be taking responsibility and

 4     withdraw," and I think that's the message he is trying to convey and

 5     trying to get a starting point on.

 6        Q.   Not only withdraw, disarm; correct?

 7        A.   Disarm.  It's absolute -- absolutely.  Yeah.

 8        Q.   And that was the consistent message of UNPROFOR, wasn't it, that

 9     UNPROFOR will provide the protection, and therefore these units must be

10     disbanded and there must be full demilitarisation; correct?

11        A.   They're basically saying give us a chance to do the job.

12             MR. GOSNELL:  This document is tendered, Mr. President.

13             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Admitted and marked.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D70, Your Honours.

15             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

16             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have 01321, please.  Prosecution tab 12.

17        Q.   Do you remember that there was a joint commission set up to

18     address various issues between the Croat and Serb side under the auspices

19     of UNPROFOR?

20        A.   Yes -- yes, I think it came as part of the pink zone resolution,

21     if I recall correctly.

22        Q.   And do you know whether it was restricted to discussion of pink

23     zone issues or was it an across the board forum for discussion of any

24     issues?

25        A.   My recollection is from reading some minutes is that it was used

Page 6062

 1     actually as a forum to broaden out and engage in a rather broad field.  I

 2     think it became on occasions quite an open agenda.

 3        Q.   And the chair of the joint commission was Mr. Thornberry; is that

 4     correct?

 5        A.   Mr. Thornberry, yes.  The UN chaired the meeting.  I think Cedric

 6     was the -- generally in charge.  I think Viktor may have -- Andreev may

 7     have also chaired some meetings.

 8             MR. GOSNELL:  Let's go to page 2, please.

 9        Q.   "Chairman's report:

10             "The presence of these armed irregular forces was totally

11     unacceptable.  He wished also to ask the Serb delegation for a

12     clarification of recent statements attributed to, inter alios,

13     Mr. Goran Hadzic and Mr. Milan Martic, in which they had been reported as

14     saying that their authorities did not accept the basic elements of

15     Resolution 762 and wished to renegotiate the Vance Plan."

16             Now, is this another example of UNPROFOR pressuring for complete

17     demilitarisation of any forces in the UNPAs on the Serb side?

18        A.   I haven't been able to read the document, but ...

19             Could you start where -- enlarge it slightly, please.

20             MR. GILLETT:  If it helps, it's in the binder in the first lot of

21     documents, if you prefer to look at the hard copy.  1321.

22             THE WITNESS:  Is that the early stage of the folder?

23             Could you lead me to ...

24             MR. GOSNELL:

25        Q.   Yes.  It's page 2, sir.  The first paragraph, under "Chairman's

Page 6063

 1     report."

 2        A.   Your question?

 3        Q.   Does this again reflect that UNPROFOR at the highest levels is

 4     insisting on complete, full, and absolute demilitarisation of the Serb

 5     side in the UNPAs?

 6        A.   Yes, they are asking for demilitarisation.  That is the Vance

 7     Plan coming into effect.

 8        Q.   And this is about a month and a half after Mr. Andreev's report.

 9     You remember we looked at that, the second-last document, in which he

10     said there was a danger of a threat of Croatian attack; correct?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   And notably there's no reference in this document to that threat,

13     is there?

14        A.   Not in that paragraph.  I haven't read the rest.  But again, it

15     reflects the slowness of the situation, the mistrust.  At least they're

16     still talking and, you know, that's the way you go.

17        Q.   But my point is that here we have UNPROFOR asking for full and

18     complete demilitarisation at the very moment when they know, based on

19     their own intelligence, that Croatian forces are as was said in the

20     second-last document mobilising; isn't that right?

21        A.   And I have no doubt they are talking to them as well and trying

22     to calm the situation down and bring them into discussions, negotiations,

23     and adjust the position they're holding.  And that's what I said earlier,

24     you're taking one step back -- or forward or maybe taking two steps

25     backward.  So all you can say is you still have them talking in some

Page 6064

 1     fashion, and they haven't gone into total aggression because that is

 2     where it could go, is total head-on, and I think if the UN wasn't there

 3     to create that type of engagement, you know, where would you have gone?

 4        Q.   And the basis of this demand that full demilitarisation should

 5     take place is General Nambiar's assurance, an assurance provided on other

 6     occasions I'm sure, that UNPROFOR would protect those areas, right?

 7        A.   He's saying let's go back to the Vance Plan.  You said you would

 8     give your full commitment to getting engaged in it and so forth and get

 9     it into a proper beginning.  And he is then saying, "Well, we have a role

10     to play, we will do it."  And again you can see that could be a very

11     difficult role, extremely difficult.

12        Q.   And --

13        A.   As I say, it was one that would probably take years.  So we were

14     never going to solve it in a day, or a year.

15        Q.   And the role is to militarily protect the protected areas?

16        A.   To protect the protected areas.  And I think again the military

17     protect is referred to in -- the role of the military is referred to as

18     the level of engagement is by, you know, more or less basically defending

19     themselves and limited force.  And again, once you got to that point, you

20     are looking at negotiating, negotiating, and stabilising.  Using -- using

21     your fire-arm should be the last option in your situation.  And you know,

22     there's a lot of space for talk in between.  The day you go to the gun,

23     you have lost the real purpose of going forward.

24             MR. GOSNELL:  Let's go to 03170, please.  Defence tab 37.

25        Q.   Now, am I right, sir, about two months after this meeting, the

Page 6065

 1     joint commission meeting that we've just looked at, on or around the 21st

 2     January there was a major Croatian offensive --

 3        A.   Correct.

 4        Q.   -- against the area in which Benkovac was located; is that

 5     correct?

 6        A.   Yes, Your Honours.  Yeah.

 7        Q.   Can you describe, please, as best you know about that event what

 8     occurred.

 9        A.   I understand the attack took place from Maslenica bridge and they

10     came forward certainly to Benkovac because I was there that morning, and

11     the town was shelled from what I know.  And the population fled from the

12     countryside ahead of it.  And many of them ended up at the CIVPOL station

13     in Benkovac.

14             When I was departing that morning on the 22nd, the hotel

15     reception area was full of civilians.  The car park area was crowded.

16     There are accounts there of people being injured.  There's an account

17     there of a lady starting to give birth to a child.  It -- there was --

18     they were in absolute panic, and our monitors took some -- the -- people

19     injured and casualties to hospital, they dealt with the lady who was

20     giving birth, and these people were in absolute terror.  And that was

21     the -- the civilian impact on it.

22        Q.   Many civilian casualties?

23        A.   I don't have the figures myself, but there were.  There were many

24     from what I know, yeah.  I don't have the actual figures here.  I'm

25     unfamiliar with them.  But there were casualties, human casualties, yes

Page 6066

 1        Q.   Artillery --

 2        A.   Indeed.  I think when -- our monitors who were held hostage went

 3     to the hospital and with -- with some patients, and they saw several

 4     people at the hospital injured and very seriously injured.  So they saw

 5     first-hand the fallout.

 6        Q.   Artillery shelling of urban areas, including Benkovac --

 7        A.   Yeah.

 8        Q.   -- while you were there?

 9        A.   I didn't -- believe it or not, I slept through the whole thing

10     and I had to be called in the morning.  But I -- I -- I was aware of it

11     when I got up.  Let's put it that way.  I slept soundly.

12        Q.   I'd like, if I may, to ... turn to page 2 of this document.

13             And this is, again, General Nambiar.  And he's writing to

14     Mr. Goulding.  At paragraph 5, down at the bottom --

15        A.   Which page number, please?

16        Q.   Sir, I don't think that that document is the right one.  In fact,

17     you don't have this one in your binder, I'm sorry.

18        A.   Okay.  Okay.

19        Q.   But we could perhaps dispense with the B/C/S on the screen and

20     just zoom in on the English.

21              "The credibility of the various parties to the conflict in this

22     region has always been debatable, but what we have been subjected to over

23     the last few days has made it impossible to place any value on any

24     assurances that are given, no matter what the level.  A senior colleague

25     has used the term surreal too describe conduct which none of us, in our

Page 6067

 1     diverse years and fields of experience has previously encountered at high

 2     levels of government.  This factor will have a serious effect on future

 3     discussions and negotiations."

 4             Now I suggest that in paragraphs 4 and 5 he is talking about the

 5     Croatian side, and then here we have at paragraph 6 his analysis of the

 6     Serb side:

 7             "On the Serb side, as I mentioned in one of my earlier cables, we

 8     are seen as traitors and betrayers.  This is mainly because we had relied

 9     on Croatian assurances of willingness to sit and talk and had persuaded

10     many of our Serb interlocutors of that faith.  While the vehemence of

11     their denunciation is beginning to abate as some see what the real

12     situation was, I cannot see them placing their weaponry back into storage

13     areas in the near future."

14             Did you understand at this time that in fact it turned out that

15     UNPROFOR felt completely betrayed by the Croatian assurances that they

16     would not attack the UNPAs and the pink zones?

17        A.   I think --

18             MR. GILLETT:  Sorry --

19             THE WITNESS:  Sorry.

20             MR. GILLET:  Sorry to interrupt.  Just in relation to which side

21     is being referred to in which paragraph.  I see in paragraph 4 they are

22     referring to the political parties in Croatia, but then at paragraph 5

23     the opening line says:  "The credibility of the various parties to the

24     conflict in this region..."  And my learned friend has suggested that

25     both these paragraphs refer to the Croatian side but that didn't seem to

Page 6068

 1     reflect what had been read onto the record in that paragraph.

 2             MR. GOSNELL:  That's my interpretation.  My learned friend is

 3     more than welcome to ask further questions on re-direct.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think it clearly sets out

 5     General Nambiar's position at that time, the difficulties he had.  It --

 6     there's no doubt.  You can see the difficulties of the mission.  They are

 7     truly reflected there, and the level of negotiation and

 8     confidence-building that would have to take place before you could

 9     advance anywhere.  You know, it's -- I think it focuses precisely how the

10     stalemate was there and he almost -- there's a level of frustration on

11     his part as well.

12             MR. GOSNELL:

13        Q.   Now you were present there at the time.  And presumably you were

14     in communication with your colleagues in UNPROFOR.  Did you hear whether

15     UNPROFOR took any steps to prevent this attack?

16        A.   UNPROFOR is -- their role at that point was negotiate, negotiate.

17     And you go back to the Vance Plan for your beginning, and you have got to

18     say to yourself:  "No, this is where we are beginning with defence, and

19     the pitch is not where we should have it."  Do they become the aggressors

20     at that point?  And I don't think -- I certainly wouldn't envisage it as

21     being the way to go about it.  And all you can do is negotiate and get

22     people talking and try and withdraw in -- in a -- in a sensible way, to

23     put it mildly, and you're looking at those with the authority and the

24     responsibility at the highest level of government there to be talked and

25     the difficulties UN is encountering with them.  And that is the type of

Page 6069

 1     change that they were pursuing, and you can see the difficulty of it.

 2        Q.   But UNPROFOR --

 3             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Gosnell.

 4             MR. GOSNELL:  I see the time, Mr. President.

 5             JUDGE DELVOIE:  We've reached that time.

 6             And also, Mr. Gosnell, I am still looking at what you said about

 7     paragraph -- paragraphs 4 and 5 of this document.  If it is -- I don't

 8     have it on the screen.  But if as Mr. Gillett said paragraph 5 says, "The

 9     credibility of the various parties to the conflict in this region," what

10     you call your interpretation would rather be a misinterpretation.

11             MR. GOSNELL:  Perhaps I should respond to your question in the

12     absence of the witness, Mr. President.

13             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Witness, it's the time for our first break.

14     We will be back in 30 minutes.  The court usher will escort you out of

15     the courtroom.  Thank you.

16             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honours.

17                           [The witness stands down]

18             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Could we have paragraph 5 on the screen, please.

19     Oh, we have it.  The -- we have it here, yes.

20             Yes, Mr. Gosnell.

21             MR. GOSNELL:  Mr. President, I -- I believe it's beyond dispute

22     that paragraph 5 is referring to the Croatian side, notwithstanding that

23     preamble in the first sentence where he says "the credibility of all

24     parties."

25             And the reason I say that is because you see the discussion in

Page 6070

 1     paragraph 4 which is all about the position on the Croatian side,

 2     including a speech by -- or an interview given by president Tudjman to

 3     "Der Spiegel."  And then if you look at the second and third sentences of

 4     that paragraph, and in fact even the first sentence itself, there's only

 5     one side whose assurances could be being referred to.  It's definitely

 6     not the Serb side.  There are no Serb assurances under discussion.  It's

 7     the Croatian assurances that are in discussion.  And in that context, I

 8     say that it's quite clear that this is referring to the Croatian side.

 9     There's nothing in -- in the context that would suggest that this is in

10     any way referring to assurances that have been given by the Serbs or that

11     anything that they had done would have been described as surreal.  That

12     can only be the Croatian side.  And the discussion of what the Serbs are

13     doing is in paragraph 6 and beyond because that goes on.

14             MR. GILLETT:  I -- I may have jumped up precipitously, and I do

15     see that possible interpretation.  I also think there is a possible

16     interpretation that paragraph 4 refers to the Croatian side, paragraph 5

17     is more of a general paragraph, and paragraph 6 is referring to the Serb

18     side.  But I may have jumped up too early on this point.  It just was the

19     first sentence that put me off at paragraph 5.

20             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you very much.

21             Court adjourned.

22                           --- Recess taken at 10.35 a.m.

23                           --- On resuming at 11.05 a.m.

24                           [Trial Chamber confers]

25                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

Page 6071

 1                           [The witness takes the stand]

 2                           [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]

 3             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Gosnell.

 4             MR. GOSNELL:

 5        Q.   Now just before the break, Mr. McElligott, you said that

 6     UNPROFOR's role at that point was negotiate, negotiate.  But, in fact,

 7     UNPROFOR's role was broader under the Vance Plan, wasn't it?  Its role

 8     was to protect the protected areas from fear of armed attack.

 9        A.   That was its mission.

10        Q.   And the Maslenica or Benkovac attack, as I think you refer to it,

11     that was a major failure for the UNPROFOR mission, wasn't it?

12        A.   I don't accept it in that term.  I think that the UNPROFOR

13     mission was never one of going to war with another nation.  We had go

14     back to the Vance Plan for the starting point of all the points.  And

15     what you have is breaches of the Vance Plan that the UN have to cope it.

16     And that's where I see it.  I don't see it as UNPROFOR literally having

17     to go to war with the parties, and this is why I talk about negotiate,

18     negotiate, because the commitments given by the various parties in

19     signing into the Vance Plan were not honoured.  And that is where

20     UNPROFOR was trying to bring them to.  And you had breaches and extremely

21     serious breaches with consequences.  And this is ... where I see it.

22        Q.   The very least that can be said is that UNPROFOR was not able and

23     did not perform what General Nambiar referred to as the protection

24     function.  At least in that regard, Mr. McElligott, would you agree that

25     this was a failure on UNPROFOR's part?

Page 6072

 1        A.   I think the protection function has to be always based on the

 2     Vance Plan and that is your foundation stone, and how you assess your

 3     function mostly based on that rock, that foundation.  And I think the

 4     opposing parties have a big contribution to make in changing what did

 5     happen.  So our role was defined and set on what could be determined a

 6     good basis for a beginning was to get those who were warring to stop and

 7     to withdraw.  They had been down that road.  This was a new -- potential

 8     for a new beginning.

 9        Q.   What was your observation or what did you learn of the Serb

10     reaction to this event, and in, particular, in respect of how they viewed

11     UNPROFOR?

12        A.   I have no doubt there was a reaction.  There's always a reaction

13     to situations of this gravity.  And from a CIVPOL point of view, our

14     monitors lost all their stations in the -- in the pink zones and had to

15     withdraw.  We were out of action in that area for a long period of time.

16     You can see what happened at the hospital in Benkovac where they were

17     taken hostage.  So you -- there was a natural reaction.  Of course there

18     would be a reaction, and a blame will pursue -- to it as well.  And the

19     tensions escalate on all sides.  That totally predictable.

20        Q.   Amongst your interlocutors on the Serb side, would you say that

21     they were then less trusting of assurances given by UNPROFOR?

22        A.   You were starting from a position of nobody trusts anybody.  And,

23     you know, we have seen that in very simple ways as CIVPOL monitors.  And

24     if I could only give an example, Your Honours.  They're just practical

25     things.  Our monitors engage -- in the height of the conflict we engaged

Page 6073

 1     in various humanitarian things, and I'll just cite a couple, and one is

 2     there was to be a body exchange.  And our monitors -- one of our monitors

 3     went to the scene with the parties who were going to exchange of bodies,

 4     and these were buried in graves and nobody would start to dig or start

 5     the process.  And our monitor picked up the shovel and started to dig the

 6     grave himself, and it's only when he was well down the grave that others

 7     stepped to help and do their part and they got on with the job and the

 8     exchange took place.

 9             And what was seen as a big achievement on another occasion, they

10     agreed that today we will exchange the bodies of Croatian people and

11     tomorrow we will do it with Serb people, and the trust was sufficient

12     that they would agree to do it on two separate days.  And that was seen

13     as a major change, that you could build an amount of trust that could

14     last for two day, and two days later it was gone again.

15             So you can see, you go right up the scale and add to the gravity

16     of the situation, the trust will diminish.  And this is where the UN was

17     given this huge task, not to be solved in a day or week.  They were in a

18     difficult position.  All you could do was hope to keep the parties apart

19     and that somewhere along the way you could gain the confidence and that

20     you would advance.

21        Q.   Now let's go to the paragraph 7 and this pertains to some events

22     that you testified about during your direct.  Paragraph 7 reads -- and

23     again, this is the same document we've been talking about.  I think it's

24     on the screen in front of you, still.

25        A.   Oh yeah, okay.

Page 6074

 1        Q.   And paragraph 7 says:

 2             "After initial confusion and setbacks, the Serbs are gradually

 3     reorganising but may have logistical problems in our opinion.  They have

 4     mobilised, deployed on the front line, and have even begun lying

 5     minefields in many places.  What is more disturbing, however, is the

 6     increasing presence of external elements like Arkan's troops and possibly

 7     other such forces who, from what one can gather are ruthless but highly

 8     organised and professional."

 9             We need to turn the page, please.

10        A.   Could you enlarge the print slightly, please.

11        Q.   "The impact of their presence is that the present Serb leadership

12     in Knin who were difficult to deal with before, because of their

13     diversity and rather weak top leadership, may already be beginning to

14     lose control of their own side.  A new leadership, marching to a

15     different drum, is already emerging."

16             Now I first want to ask you, do you agree with the

17     characterisation that there was a diversity, as it's described here, and

18     a weak top leadership in the RSK?

19        A.   As I said previously, Your Honour, I'm not a politician and I'm

20     not going to go down that road.  I don't know.  I can't go into the

21     field.

22        Q.   Well, in respect of police matters did you observe that?

23        A.   On policing side?

24        Q.   Yes.

25        A.   From the police side, there -- we have set out already that, you

Page 6075

 1     know, there were difficulties, they didn't make -- we'd -- they didn't

 2     follow through in investigations, they didn't report matters to it.  They

 3     didn't -- refused to carry out investigations.  There were serious

 4     deficiencies and indeed they had confided in us on occasions that when

 5     the special police came into being the culprits in the situation, let's

 6     put it that way, it was beyond their power, so to speak, to handle the

 7     issue.  These people were out of their control.  And that presented them

 8     with a clear difficult.

 9             Now, looking at it from a police officer's point of view and

10     looking at the -- you know, you look at and say, "Well, if this is where

11     we are," you would be looking upwards to your authorities to say, "Well,

12     how do we solve this problem?"  And Mr. Martic would have been there,

13     highest authority, at the highest level, and he was also the highest

14     authority for the special police.  So I think honestly, if I was a police

15     officer there, I would be feeling that I was abandoned perhaps, in

16     certain circumstances.  And, you know, there was another agenda, when it

17     arose, I didn't have control of it.

18             So, you know, there was a lack of -- I would think from a

19     policing point of view, they had a difficulty, and they declared:  When

20     certain people are involved, we have a problem.

21        Q.   Did you observe in Benkovac and Knin for that matter on -- and I

22     believe you testified it was on two occasions in the aftermath of the

23     attack that you were there, did you observe that there was an increasing

24     presence of what is described here as external elements?

25        A.   When I returned the second time, that is the day we released our

Page 6076

 1     monitors, the place was basically a military base.  And while I was --

 2     unaware of it on the day, I am aware that Arkan and his people were there

 3     in the -- in the hotel.  And perhaps to a degree were the controllers

 4     within that group there.  And, again, if we look at the policing side of

 5     it, in that scenario, you had a police officer there who was held in the

 6     highest esteem, I think, on all fronts, indeed in the community.  He was

 7     a man who showed professionalism, human sensitivity, and on the day he

 8     became the hostage taker.  And, you know, he had confided in our people

 9     in advance that he was in this -- faced with this problem --

10        Q.   Mr. McElligott, I will come back to that particular aspect of

11     things.

12        A.   Okay.

13        Q.   Can we just go back now to page 1.  And paragraph one says:

14             "We have kept headquarters fully informed of developments in the

15     area since 22 January 1993 when the Croatian government resorted to

16     unilateral use of force.  Since then, despite various calls for a

17     cessation of operations, and assurances received, operations have

18     continued until late afternoon 28 January 1993, when the Peruca dam was

19     retaken by the Croatian army."

20             Were you aware - and you were following certainly events in

21     Benkovac --

22        A.   Mm-hm.

23        Q.   -- were you aware that the operation was continuing --

24        A.   Oh yes.

25        Q.   -- until -- through the 28th of January, at least?

Page 6077

 1        A.   Yes, I was conscious of the fact that it was an ongoing

 2     situation.

 3             MR. GOSNELL:  This document is tendered, Mr. President.

 4             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Admitted and marked.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D71, Your Honours.

 6             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have 01466, please, which is Defence

 7     tab 32.

 8        Q.   This is from Jeannie Peterson and we had some discussion about

 9     her during the direct examination to Mr. Thornberry.  The date is 1st of

10     February, 1993.  And I just want to look at a few parts of this fax.

11     Paragraph 1 says:

12             "At a meeting in Knin not so many days ago, shortly after the

13     surprise Croatian attack on Sector South, President Hadzic addressing

14     UNPROFOR's representatives said, You are our diplomacy.  The Krajina

15     Serb, under UNPROFOR protection, are now appealing to UNPROFOR to ensure

16     that their side of the story is communicated and as Nambiar and

17     Thornberry have both told them, that is our responsibility."

18             Now, I want to ask you:  In the area of policing, did you find

19     that the Serbs had difficulty, the Serb side, I'll say broadly, did they

20     have difficulty conveying their side of the events to the outside world?

21     And I ask you that question, sir, because you were observing them.  You

22     were observing the events on the ground.  You were able to appreciate the

23     nuances.  Did you find that the Serb side was being fairly characterised

24     in the media, in general?

25        A.   I think that they accepted themselves that they had an extremely

Page 6078

 1     bad image.  And in fact I remember going up to one of the negotiations

 2     in -- in -- in Geneva -- in Vienna, actually, on the plane with one of

 3     them, and we actually entered that area of discussion.  And he -- his

 4     attitude was almost one of -- almost why should we engage in PR because

 5     our image is absolutely tainted.  And we're -- we're -- you know, we're

 6     seen as the villains and -- you know, like, he was that frank about it.

 7     And that's how he saw it.  And, in fact, I mentioned yesterday when I

 8     went round to -- to finalise the negotiations on the release our --

 9     policemen, the same issue arose about, you know, like, that the PR image

10     that was being put to them, that instead of going on to a PR response and

11     saying, "Look, this is what's happening to us," they turned the whole

12     thing against themselves and grabbed 20 policemen and turned the whole

13     international world against them.  So -- and talking to the politician on

14     the plane, he had thrown in the towel in respect of PR and generating

15     their side of the story.  They felt they were just the villains and they

16     had literally given up on it.  That was the sad impression I got from

17     him.

18        Q.   There's a description in paragraph 3 of what's going on in this

19     area, or in Benkovac, Knin:

20             "However, the immense buildup of the last few days which now

21     appears to be completed, the recent inflow of volunteers from the FRY,

22     the presence of Dragan, Arkan, and his men, and the redeployment of

23     troops and artillery, appear to indicate that everything is ready for a

24     major confrontation.  (According to one unconfirmed report they were

25     running out of buses in Belgrade to transport the volunteers for the

Page 6079

 1     Krajina battle)."

 2             Now, sir, did you hear that there were a large number of

 3     volunteers, as they're characterised here, who were seeking to join this

 4     battle?

 5        A.   Yes.  There's no doubt there was an influx and it was building up

 6     to what could be termed a full-scale -- an outbreak of war, let's put it

 7     that way.  And, again, that's -- that's what was facing us.  How do you

 8     stop it?

 9        Q.   Do you know where these volunteers were coming from?

10        A.   Not specifically.  But I would expect they would have been coming

11     from the east side from the Krajina, Bosnia, perhaps, from Serbia, I'm

12     not sure.  But they were certainly coming from the outside.

13        Q.   Paragraph 4.  Again, this is Jeannie Peterson's report:

14             "The Knin authorities are extremely concerned and are under

15     tremendous pressure, and they urge the international community to move

16     fast, fast, to implement Resolution 802 in order to avoid a tragedy of

17     possibly momentous proportions."

18             Let me just stop there.  Do you remember the Security Council in

19     response to this incursion by Croat forces ordered that they retreat?

20        A.   We're back to the Vance Plan principal again, I'm sure here, of

21     halting conflict that's coming.

22        Q.   No, Mr. McElligott.  Let me just cut you off there and simplify.

23        A.   Okay.

24        Q.   Do you remember that the Security Council called upon Croat

25     forces to retreat after this offensive?

Page 6080

 1        A.   I don't specifically remember that, but I have no doubt that that

 2     is the road they would be taking.  Is looking for fallback.

 3        Q.   And then it -- this goes on, and we can turn the page now:

 4             "They warn that the battle," and "they" is referring to the Knin

 5     authorities, whoever that might be.

 6             "They warn that the battle that may start in the very near future

 7     could escalate to all of the UNPAs and then engulf all of the former

 8     Yugoslavia, the Balkans, Europe, and/or even the world.  On 31

 9     January they asked Thornberry, as they had earlier asked the force

10     commander, if UNPROFOR is able to ensure the implementation of resolution

11     802.  He replied that UNPROFOR could not accomplish this by force but the

12     political and diplomatic efforts are under way.  In somber terms, they,"

13     and again this appears to be a reference back to the Knin authorities,

14     "They say that despite their disillusionment with the protection

15     capabilities of the UN, they still hope that the Security Council will

16     see to it that 802 is implemented."

17             Do you remember from the Serb side that that was a demand that

18     they were making in your -- in any of your discussions with the Serb

19     officials with whom you had contact at the time?

20        A.   Could you just clarify for me 802 again, just to be -- is that

21     referring to the pink zones?

22        Q.   Well, my understanding is that Resolution 802 - I don't think

23     there will be any controversy about this - was a resolution that called

24     for the withdrawal of Croat forces following this offensive.

25        A.   Yeah.

Page 6081

 1        Q.   So that's --

 2        A.   [Overlapping speakers] ... yeah, yeah, yeah.

 3        Q.   That's what 802 is.

 4        A.   Yeah.  If it's a resolution that was agreed, and obviously it was

 5     if it's a resolution of the UN, again, that's a foundation stone that

 6     would have been laid and people would be looking to -- try and establish

 7     it, yes.

 8        Q.   But what I'm asking you, and you, for example, had a conversation

 9     with Mr. Spanovic and perhaps others, do you recall them mentioning that

10     as a matter of high priority as far as they were concerned and that

11     UNPROFOR should act accordingly?

12        A.   I don't remember talking to them about it, but I certainly

13     remember it coming through in correspondence so for that -- you know, the

14     element of where are we going and what's going on, so I would be aware

15     that, you know, this type of talk and negotiation was taking place.  So,

16     yes, it -- if it's an anchor that's there, I have no doubt it would be

17     drawn, to be utilised, and to be respected.

18        Q.   Did you observe in your conversations, and I'm asking you a

19     general question now, and I ask you this because it appears implied in

20     some of what you said during your direct testimony, did you see that

21     there was a spectrum amongst the officials who you were dealing with in

22     Knin between moderates and more extreme elements?

23        A.   There were.  There was a difference, yeah.

24        Q.   And --

25        A.   The only two people I can refer to specifically are the two men I

Page 6082

 1     mentioned yesterday, was Mr. Martinovic.  I had met him, I think on -- I

 2     met him on the night prior to this -- my first meeting with him on the

 3     hostage talking, and I think he was seen as moderate, he was

 4     approachable, and he was -- yeah, I would describe him as that.  And

 5     likewise in relation to the release of our monitors, Mr. Spanovic.  I met

 6     him on a prior occasion as well, and I always remembered the sense that

 7     when I left him on the day - I met him with Jeannie Peterson - when I

 8     left him on the day, you know, he -- you felt you could go back and talk

 9     to this man again, and fortunately I had the opportunity to do so, and it

10     was clear, you know, we got on quite politely and well and he delivered

11     to us, something that, you know, I thought might be a very difficult

12     thing.  So there was that moderation there and there was the capacity

13     within those people to do things, you know.  That's one thing about them.

14        Q.   Would you agree with me that these events, namely, the Croat

15     offensive and subsequently to that, their failure to the withdrawal, and

16     the failure of UNPROFOR to secure their withdrawal, did that undermine

17     the position of the moderates?

18        A.   I have no doubt they stand back and look at the situation and it

19     has to generate some reaction from them.  Yes, of course, I -- I expect

20     it would affect them.

21        Q.   Paragraph 5 --

22        A.   And despite that, I think they still held the moderation that was

23     within them, was it the part of their psyche, there were still people who

24     were amenable and disposable to us.

25        Q.   Paragraph 5 says -- again, Jeannie Peterson in her report dated

Page 6083

 1     1st of February, 1993:

 2             "Their great sense of urgency may suggest that they," and again,

 3     "they" is referring to these unidentified Knin authorities, "are worried

 4     about something over which they do not have complete control.  For

 5     example when Zadar was shelled ... the second time, Spanovic said it had

 6     not been ordered and was not authorised.  Also, during a critical period

 7     of time, re explosions that occurred add Peruca, Spanovic said he did not

 8     have clear information about what was happening there.  At Benkovac,

 9     Arkan's Men said they would not take orders from Spanovic, Martic, or

10     Martinovic but only from Arkan."

11             Now that last comment, because you said something about this

12     during your testimony, is it true that Arkan said he wouldn't take orders

13     from these individuals.  Did you hear that said?

14        A.   I didn't hear it said but I was conscious of the fact that Arkan

15     was a forceful unit to be dealt with.  That he carried a lot of power and

16     in my view in doing so he was doing it with the blessing of somebody.

17     The only point I can make on it, in relation to accountability,

18     Mr. Spanovic agreed to release our monitors.  He told me that he would

19     have released -- he would have them with us at 8.00 the following

20     morning, and he contacted Benkovac and secured our release.

21             Now Arkan was the man in charge there at the time.  Arkan called

22     down police monitor Mitchell, one of our monitors, and he gave him what I

23     would consider as a rather flippant reason for his release -- to release

24     the remaining ten monitors, so in that sense I would say he responded to

25     the requirements of Mr. Spanovic.  Okay, it may have been a very simple

Page 6084

 1     matter, but up to that point, we were not getting our monitors back.

 2             So you know, I -- like -- what we're looking at, a simple issue

 3     here.  We're looking at political, military matters there.  I'm not sure

 4     how powerfully he exerted his power.  But that being said, he was deemed

 5     to be a formidable force.

 6        Q.   Ms. Peterson in this report appears to be saying that the Knin

 7     authorities are very concerned about losing control.  In your

 8     conversations with Mr. Spanovic or anyone else, did you have the sense

 9     that they were concerned about that?

10        A.   We didn't get into that area of conversation, but I think that I

11     would also be conscious of the fact that there were greater powers to the

12     east who were probably still likely to influence the situation and engage

13     in it maybe so that the greater Serbia issue was somewhere in the

14     background as well.  So that was a conscious thing.  And you can see in

15     the earlier paragraphs where the escalation of the conflict could go up

16     to such a level and draw in those people, so it's being alluded to in

17     that report already.

18        Q.   Was it also because there was a large influx of forces at this

19     time from the outside who were not and could not be brought under the

20     control of those authorities?

21        A.   Well, I don't think it was a situation where everybody at a given

22     moment decided we're all going to go to Benkovac.  I'm sure they went

23     there by direction.  Whether it was at the behest of the Knin authorities

24     or not, I don't know.  But that report on the basis of Jeannie Peterson's

25     assessment would indicate that it was presenting a difficulty.  That

Page 6085

 1     there may have a difficulty, that it was bigger than themselves, and it's

 2     is alluded to there.

 3             MR. GOSNELL:  This document is tendered Mr. President.

 4             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Admitted and marked.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D72, Your Honours.

 6             MR. GOSNELL:

 7        Q.   Now, sir, I'd like to move away these questions about context,

 8     and I'd now like to come specifically to what you have said about

 9     policing.

10             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have 05404, Prosecution tab 57.

11        Q.   And, Mr. McElligott, this is your summary report on crimes

12     committed against Croats in Sector South.  May I ask you, did you prepare

13     reports for other sectors or was this the only report of its kind that

14     you prepared?

15        A.   That was the only one done at that point, yes.

16        Q.   You say --

17        A.   There may be others done subsequently.  I don't know.  I think --

18     I know that there was another one done in Sector South in respect of the

19     Serbian population who had become victims of crime and various other

20     serious assault.

21        Q.   And this report covers a ten-month period; is that correct?

22        A.   Yes, roughly.  Yeah.

23        Q.   And there on the cover page it says there were 497 crimes

24     committed during this -- or crime incidents committed during this

25     ten-month period.  So that would be approximately 50 crime incidents per

Page 6086

 1     month, correct?

 2        A.   Yeah.

 3        Q.   Do you know or have any idea as to the Croat population of

 4     Sector South during this time?  The total population.

 5        A.   I was aware of it at some point, yes.  But now I have no idea.

 6        Q.   Do you have any idea or any statistics as to the total number of

 7     crime incidents that occurred in Sector South during this same ten-month

 8     period?

 9        A.   No, I don't, Your Honour.

10        Q.   Do you have any idea how many crime incidents were committed

11     against just the UN, UNPROFOR, during the ten-month period mentioned

12     here?

13        A.   They are all logged at some point, yeah.  Every one of them, as

14     far as I can see it, are logged, yeah.

15        Q.   For Sector South, was that in the hundreds?

16        A.   I don't know.  But I wouldn't go up to 100.  Yeah, I don't think

17     so.

18        Q.   And my question should have been more precise.  During this

19     ten-month period, namely, between May -- excuse me.  August 1992 to the

20     31st of May, that ten-month period, I don't know whether there was report

21     that precisely mirrored this time-period for crime statistics against the

22     UN, but were there monthly reports of crime statistics against the UN?

23        A.   Yeah.  These would be recorded at headquarters, so they were

24     there in -- yeah, every incident coming in or situation report was coming

25     into headquarters and being recorded so that they were available, and

Page 6087

 1     they would be consolidated in some fashion throughout the mission.

 2        Q.   And of the 497 crime incidents, 120 were committed by individuals

 3     in uniforms.  So that's just over 20 per cent, right?

 4        A.   In fact, I went back to that document again since and I have 490

 5     is the figure I've come up with.  One page was duplicated.  And I think

 6     there were one or two then where it started on the bottom line with

 7     one -- and was -- and was missed or so forth.

 8             There were suspects seen at -- not seen as -- 490 suspects were

 9     seen at in the case of militia in uniform, 39 people in other uniforms,

10     97 -- and I think it's 135 where suspects would be deemed to be civilian,

11     let's put it that way.  And the other remaining groups, there is no

12     evidence to indicate who the suspect was.

13        Q.   Mr. McElligott, those numbers didn't appear to have come through

14     quite correctly.  Could you please just lean forward and -- and, sorry,

15     just repeat those numbers again?

16        A.   The figures I -- the figure I'm putting forward from this report

17     is that there were a total of 490 crime incidents recorded.  Within that,

18     39 of the incident reports are apply to people what described as militia

19     or in uniform, or policing uniform.  And another 97 are people in

20     military uniform or other uniform.  And I think it's 135 in what I would

21     refer to as civilian attire.  And in the balance, there is no indication

22     of who the suspect was.

23        Q.   Well, those numbers don't add up quite perfectly to 120, but

24     let's not detain ourselves with that.  Is it correct that somewhat more

25     than two-thirds of those who were identified as having been perpetrators

Page 6088

 1     wearing uniforms were in what would be described as regular military

 2     uniform?

 3        A.   I put the forward 97.  You can work out the percentages by

 4     yourselves, but I've -- 97 is the figure I have and 39 in the other case,

 5     and I think it's 135.

 6        Q.   And during your testimony at 5977, you said 48 per cent of the

 7     perpetrators were seen at the -- seen at the scene of the crime.  Is that

 8     figure correct?

 9        A.   We should take those figures, the ones I have again you.  They're

10     the figures -- I -- I'm going on my memory here, but I do have it.

11        Q.   So more than half of these crimes of the 497 were not seen at the

12     scene of the crime, correct?

13        A.   I think so, yes.

14        Q.   Now, does that mean that since many -- well, let me just ask

15     first:  Are most of these reports based on information provided by the

16     victims?

17        A.   Well, in the case of murder you don't have a victim but there

18     would be other witnesses, and the victims where there is a robbery, a

19     burglary, whatever, you know, where the party is present, you have a

20     description from them.

21        Q.   Well, leaving aside murder, are the reports in this report based

22     primarily or if not exclusively on information provided in whole or in

23     part by the victims?

24        A.   In general I would say as being provided by the victims or

25     perhaps an independent witness in the locality.

Page 6089

 1        Q.   So that means that if I follow the train of thought, in about

 2     half of these cases, the victims were not present when the crime was

 3     committed?

 4        A.   Somewhere in that region, yeah.

 5        Q.   And I presume those would primarily be property crimes such as

 6     theft or what's characterised as looting, possibly arson; is that

 7     correct?

 8        A.   They are specifically referred to, yes, and in general, I would

 9     think, yes.

10        Q.   And am I correct in understanding that in this report where the

11     perpetrator is not identified in one way or another, that means that the

12     complainant or the victim or whatever other witness may have been present

13     was not able to positively identify the person?

14        A.   Yes.

15             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we go to page 29 of e-court, please, of this

16     document.

17        Q.   Now the reason I asked you that last question, Mr. McElligott,

18     is -- and this page is, I think, fairly representative of many pages in

19     the report, where we see a reference to -- as in the first, second,

20     fifth, sixth, and seventh entries on this page, it says armed/uniformed

21     men forced or armed/uniformed men committed, whatever crime.  But in none

22     much these cases is there -- or does there appear to be a specific

23     identification of a perpetrator.

24             Am I right in understanding that all these cases there's been an

25     identification of the attire of the person but no identification of the

Page 6090

 1     identity, the specific identity of the perpetrator?

 2        A.   In general that would be the case.  I think there are a few

 3     instances where a person is named.  But, in general, it would be

 4     referring to them as wearing a uniform.

 5        Q.   Now, uniforms were very widespread in this area, I believe you'd

 6     agreed with me, amongst everyone, the adult male population at the least.

 7     That's true certainly for regular military uniforms.  Can you tell us

 8     whether there were also blue uniforms that were available at large for

 9     anyone to purchase?

10        A.   I'm not aware of them being aware in that fashion, but I think

11     there are one or two reports both in the military and in our own reports

12     suggesting our -- saying that blue uniforms were being given out --

13     readily given out to people whom I would consider had no training

14     whatsoever in a policing background, but they were being provided.  I'm

15     not -- I'm not aware of a situation where they were being sold on or

16     whatever, but they were being given out.  We have a couple of reports

17     where that is shown.

18             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we go to page 49, please, in e-court.

19        Q.   If we could look at the third entry down, focus on the third

20     entry down.

21        A.   Could you enlarge, please.

22        Q.   It's P2-114/92.  The crime is theft of livestock.  And the

23     summary says:

24             "Four milicija men stole the victim's sheep."

25             Now can you tell from looking at that whether that's an inference

Page 6091

 1     based on the fact that they were wearing milicija uniforms or can you say

 2     whether they were positively identified as milicija members?

 3        A.   I can only read it on the basis of what it says there and they're

 4     describing then as milicija men.  You again have the victim making the

 5     report who has lived in the community, who would have a good knowledge of

 6     who the people in a general sense are.  He may not know everybody but he

 7     has referred to them as being in this uniform, so that's the starting

 8     point you have for your information.

 9        Q.   You can't say one way or the other whether these individuals

10     were --

11        A.   The investigation --

12        Q.   Just let me finish.  Whether these individuals were merely seen

13     wearing the uniforms or whether they were identified as members of the

14     milicija?

15        A.   This is where the investigation should produce some results and

16     that was a matter for the local police.

17        Q.   Is the answer to my question yes?

18        A.   As I say, it's open-ended at that point.  The facts have not been

19     fully established.  All we have is the initial report.

20        Q.   Well, I'm not talking about police processes here.  I'm just

21     talking about trying to understand the content of your report.  And --

22     and -- and what we can understand it to mean.  And, sir, I suggest to you

23     that unless you have some further information --

24        A.   I'm --

25        Q.   It appears to me that it's not clear looking at this entry

Page 6092

 1     whether the individuals are identified or whether they merely were seen

 2     wearing these uniforms.

 3        A.   I would say that based on what's stated there, they were not

 4     identified in name.  If they were, I expect they would be named, and

 5     there may be reports where they are actually named.

 6        Q.   Can you say anything at all looking at that third entry about the

 7     motive of the perpetrator or perpetrators?

 8        A.   There are two elements to it.  One is the victim.  It's a source

 9     of food and so forth and continuity of keeping his stock.  On the other

10     side, you ask why do they take that away from them, people in uniform,

11     one would expect better things they, and let's take it in the context

12     that they are police.

13             And the other end of the scale is you have people, living

14     conditions were quite horrific there was -- there was lack of food, so

15     people had little to eat as well.  So you have a number of social issues

16     surrounding the crimes committed, and on one side you have the victim who

17     has little, and the other side who knows on the basis of what we see.

18        Q.   Well, precisely.  Who knows on the basis of what we see.

19        A.   Correct.

20        Q.   Would you agree with me that there's not enough information there

21     to draw an inference about the motive or motives of those four

22     individuals?

23        A.   It's a crime report, it's setting out the preliminary element of

24     the report which CIVPOL established.  That in turn would be conveyed to

25     the police for investigation or indeed they may have given it to us.

Page 6093

 1     There were occasions where they did provide.  So that could quite easily

 2     be the case too.  So this is where you look for follow-up on

 3     investigations to see what were the full facts of what's going on.  But

 4     there is a victim there.

 5        Q.   I fully understand that, sir, and I'm not suggesting otherwise.

 6     All I'm asking is:  Based on the information in your report, based on

 7     this description, based on the fact that it's a -- a theft, you can't

 8     draw an inference that the motive behind this crime was ethnic abuse or

 9     discrimination, can you?

10        A.   I think if you look at it as just one single crime incident and

11     say you want me to make a decision on that, I would say you can't.  But

12     when looking at the full picture, and you see a community who have had

13     numerous incidents of people in uniform, of one fashion or the other,

14     stealing their goods, killing them, burning down houses, I think you

15     would look at it in another light again.  And as a police force, you

16     would have to ask yourself how do we respond to this problem?  There is

17     what is clearly a problem bigger than just crime or individual crimes,

18     and I think you have to look at a carpet approach to how you approach

19     that.  So it's not --

20        Q.   Well, Mr. McElligott, I'm not asking you about the proper

21     policing response.  I'm asking you what we can infer based on the

22     information in the report.

23        A.   On the single report what you have is a preliminary report from a

24     victim, and basically they're saying this is what I have, this is what I

25     saw.  An investigation process which would broaden out into the

Page 6094

 1     community, find other witnesses who could identify the individual

 2     concerned, and you may say, yes, he was a member of the milicija, or he

 3     was not a member of the milicija.  So this is where investigation -- and

 4     by conducting proper investigations, you can go back to your community

 5     and show the facts to them and build their confidence and say, we are

 6     with you, and, you know, this report, the individual concerned, is not a

 7     member of our police force or a member of the authority of this state.

 8     And, you know, that's all part of the confidence building that will take

 9     place from a police point of view.  You know, nothing about it, you know,

10     it's just abandoning.

11        Q.   You wouldn't say, would you, that merely because the victim is

12     identified as Croat that a crime of theft, for example, would be

13     motivated by ethnic animosity?

14        A.   Indeed it could.

15        Q.   That wasn't my question.  It wasn't whether it could.  It was

16     whether you would necessarily draw that inference?

17        A.   On a single incident, no.  But when you take the overall profile

18     of crime occurring in your area, you have to look at it and say what is

19     going on here?  Do we have a specific problem, and how do we address it?

20     And I think you have to -- you have to stand back and approach the

21     situation on that basis.  But if you have a single crime you may keep an

22     eye on it, but you don't call out the biggest response to it at that

23     particular point.

24        Q.   There's no doubt there is a broader context.  I'm not suggesting

25     that should be ignored from a policing perspective.  What I'm simply

Page 6095

 1     suggesting to you is isn't it very possible that there were individuals

 2     who were opportunists, took advantage of the situation in order to steal

 3     sheep because not only were crimes taking place against Croats but

 4     because there was general situation of insecurity.  Isn't that extremely

 5     possible?

 6        A.   I think it's quite frank to say that no matter what is going on,

 7     you would have an element of criminal activity.  And taking the

 8     circumstances, as you mentioned, I have no doubt you would have another

 9     percentage who would exploit that situation.  I think that would be quite

10     realistic to say.  But then have you another situation that is left

11     behind that has to be addressed as well.

12        Q.   Would you agree that a large percentage of the criminality that

13     occurred was simply beyond the milicija's ability, and I'm speaking here

14     about the 7.000, the regular police, was simply beyond their capacity to

15     control or punish?

16        A.   I think from a prevention point of view, and if you go back to

17     that police force, and they have to face the issue on the basis of the

18     Vance Plan that they only carry side-arms, and when they find themselves

19     in a situation that there's a crime scale of a proportion that is

20     presenting us with a difficulty, they would have to look upwards towards

21     their authorities to say, you know, here we are, there's a crime problem

22     in our area, there's a specific element -- problem attached to it, and we

23     need additional support.  And when I say that, I am not talking about

24     fire-arm arms.  I'm talking about -- what we would a term a government

25     response.  And if I can refer back to my own particular country in kind

Page 6096

 1     of putting into some sense of context, my country, my police force, is an

 2     unarmed police force and was from the formation of the state and still

 3     is.  Our police officers do not carry fire-arms.  And indeed, when it was

 4     formed, the commissioner of the day, and if I might quote it for, just

 5     put it in there, is that he stated that our force would not succeed by

 6     force of arms or people but under moral authority of -- of the officers

 7     who will act as servants of the community, and he made them an unarmed

 8     force.

 9             Over the years we had confronted political issues, we met with

10     serious crime, our government responded, and they introduced such a thing

11     as a the special criminal court.  Normally we would have a trial by jury.

12     They brought in a three-judge court and dealt with the problem.  It

13     assisted with witnesses, there were no juries, and it was an effective

14     way of handle that crisis.

15             Subsequently we met with organised crime and a serious drug

16     issue.  They again responded with mechanisms such as criminal assets

17     bureau, went down to seize the assets of criminals.  So, you know, the

18     policemen on the ground, you -- how -- you can't put too much blame on

19     them to a degree when you look at the scale of what's going on.  Upwards

20     is where management and indeed government has to respond to protect its

21     police force and protect the community.  So they may have felt abandoned

22     at that point, to a degree.  That's on -- on -- on the -- the -- the

23     strategic end.  But on a day-to-day basis there were also problems.

24        Q.   Let me -- let me -- let me ask a different and perhaps a slightly

25     less subjective question.  Would you agree that it would be unfair to say

Page 6097

 1     that most of the regular police were themselves engaged in criminal

 2     activity?

 3        A.   Of the regular police?  Oh, no.

 4        Q.   Correct, the regular police.

 5        A.   The regular police in general we had regarded them as

 6     professional police officers, and in fairness we met some very fine

 7     people.  There is no doubt about that.  We have already alluded to that

 8     man in Benkovac.  He was one of the finest officers you could meet.

 9        Q.   And according to what you just told us, taking your Sector South

10     report as a point of reference, there were only 39 incidents where people

11     were even identified as wearing a milicija uniform, correct?

12        A.   Yeah.  I'm not -- I think in fairness to them these are what we

13     would refer to as the special police, not what I would call the 7.000

14     group.  And I -- you know, we have to be fair.  There might be one or two

15     incidents there where they did engage in incidents, but they are small.

16     I can considered them to be quite okay.

17             Now they had difficulties within themselves in -- okay they --

18     they may not -- I touched on them earlier where they didn't let us know

19     of crimes, they failed to investigate at times, and, indeed, you know,

20     they down right refused to investigate.  And there are instances of

21     murder there where they just did nothing.  And, you know --

22        Q.   Sir, Mr. McElligott, just for the transcript if you could speak a

23     little bit more slowly.

24        A.   Okay.

25        Q.   That would be helpful.  But thank you very much for that answer.

Page 6098

 1             Perhaps we could look at -- usefully at some documents.

 2             Could we have 1335, please.  Prosecution tab 14.

 3             This is a briefing about UNCIVPOL Sector South.  It's a monthly

 4     report I presume for October because the date is the 2nd of November,

 5     1992.  And if we could just turn over to page 3.  General zone B down

 6     there towards the bottom:

 7             "The a/m incidents show that the violations of human rights

 8     continues.  The local milicija seems to be unable to protect people.  As

 9     far as we know, not many night patrols are carried out.  However,

10     milicija have promised to increase patrolling in some villages."

11             Now first, what is a/m?

12        A.   Where is the --

13        Q.   There's an a/m?

14        A.   You're at zone B?  Sorry, apologies.  It's gone.  Could you

15     enlarge it, please.  Okay.  I have it.  Yeah.

16             Zone -- you mean zone B?

17        Q.   Yes, yes.

18        A.   The a/m incidents.  These must be -- I'd say the morning

19     incidents.  Is it -- you know, these are probably reports.

20        Q.   Now was there any particular difficulty for the police in

21     engaging in night patrols?

22        A.   Night patrols are standard procedures in policing.  And indeed

23     our own monitors did engage in night patrols.  Again, you have to ask

24     yourselves the question with them, what was their standing in -- in a

25     community, what would the response of the people be to them, and they

Page 6099

 1     would have to be considered.  You could end up in a situation where they

 2     may not feel safe to go out themselves.  So that can be a factor as well.

 3     But, you know, you've got to go back to the roots and say, How can we

 4     change that?  And this, again, is back to your management and your higher

 5     authority in creating an environment will bring about real policing.

 6        Q.   Although even that higher authority might not be in a position to

 7     put in place all of the conditions for what you would describe as

 8     successful policing; isn't that right?

 9        A.   I think if you look at some of the reports of, say, people in

10     milicija uniform causing the problem, you know, if -- as an organisation

11     can head off that end of it, and head off of uniformed element of the

12     crime, you know, you will solve a lot of the problem.  You will also be

13     sending a very positive message to the community that, you know, we are

14     supporting you as a community and are with you rather than being seen

15     within the community as part of the problem, and I think that if --

16        Q.   Can I go back -- sorry to cut you off.  Can I go back to a

17     question that I asked you earlier about the numbers, the relatively small

18     number of individuals in uniforms who were identified by either the

19     victims or other witnesses.  Now, what does it tell you as a policeman

20     that even though you have -- as you testified, a high percentage of

21     individuals who were spotted at the crime scene but relatively few who

22     managed to be identified by the victims or other witnesses?  What does

23     that tell but those perpetrators?

24        A.   If you are -- well, what you have is an established community,

25     and you have people functioning within it that they do not know,

Page 6100

 1     certainly.  And what you have and what we started with in this mission

 2     was a group of 16.000 who were put into uniforms and literally let free

 3     within the territory.  So they were not known.  But their uniform was

 4     known to the community and, indeed I would say, perhaps terrorised by it.

 5     And I think I've been quite frank when I said that.

 6        Q.   Does it suggest to you that the soldiers or the individuals

 7     wearing the uniform came from outside those communities where the crimes

 8     were committed?

 9        A.   The special police we talk about were put in there by the

10     authorities of the day and are shown as being under Milan Martic.  So,

11     you know, that is a group that there were in there.  And they were a

12     problem and indeed the policemen themselves responsible for law and order

13     indicated to our monitors that they were a problem.  And when they were

14     brought to book, so to speak, they still presented a problem in the sense

15     that they could not deal with them.  So that reflected back into the

16     community.  And you can see how it impacted on them.

17             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we go to 1502, please.  Prosecution tab 27.

18        Q.   This is a sitrep.  It's coming up on the screen in front of you.

19     It could even be in your binder as 1502.

20        A.   If you enlarge it.  It's quite okay.  Yeah.

21        Q.   And at page 1, item 1, under operations --

22        A.   Could -- could you enlarge, please.

23        Q.   And the date of this is the 22nd of February, 1993.  So this is

24     about a month after the Croatian offensive on Benkovac.

25             "CIVPOL monitors from Kistanje, accompanied by local milicija,

Page 6101

 1     visited the village Madrino Selo and found 16 Croats living in a hut

 2     which is TDF/milicija post.  It was also learned that about 42 other

 3     Croats are making their way to this place."

 4             Would you agree that this seems to be an occasion where the local

 5     population is apparently take refuge at a Territorial Defence or a

 6     milicija post, as it's described here?

 7        A.   It seems that they have left their homes anyway.  They're

 8     [indiscernible] could I refer back to it?  Are they -- they're referred

 9     to as Croatian, are they?

10        Q.   16 Croats and then 42 other Croats?

11        A.   Croats, yeah.  So they with taking refuge there, yes.  That

12     would -- read on until we see the full context of it.

13        Q.   So at least in this case this is a circumstance where the local

14     Croat population trusts the milicija or the Territorial Defence enough to

15     seek their protection, right?

16        A.   It doesn't say if there are others there.  They say the CIVPOL

17     monitors accompanied by the milicija went there and found them at what I

18     would say as a vacant post other than the fact that they themselves are

19     occupying it.  Is that the -- I think that's the way it's coming, is it.

20     The conditions are horrible.  They're cold, hungry.  So it seems that

21     they just found this place to take refuge.

22        Q.   You would infer from this, this is an abandoned TDF/milicija post

23     and that that is where these Croats have sought refuge?

24        A.   I don't see any reference to other people being present on the

25     basis of what I read.  So I don't know.  It's not saying that there is

Page 6102

 1     anybody else there.

 2             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have 01478, please.  It's Prosecution

 3     tab 25.

 4        Q.   This is dated the 8th of February, 1993.  It's from UNCIVPOL HQ,

 5     Sector South.  Daily situation report.

 6             MR. GOSNELL:  If we could go to page 3.

 7        Q.   Second paragraph:

 8             "A common problem at present is that local Croats are still being

 9     forced out of their houses and apartments by both newly arriving refugees

10     and local opportunists.  Local authorities appear powerless to stop

11     this."

12             Let me just stop there.  Do you know that there were newly

13     arriving refugees to the area who posed a particular threat to law and

14     order?

15        A.   There was a sequence of people coming into the sector from

16     outside areas and they did displace Croatian people, yes.  I think we

17     have it in Sector East and there was some in Sector South, and I think

18     that was part of a fallout following the Benkovac situation.  I think

19     there was almost a double hit of people being moved.  That one crowd was

20     displaced and their houses were occupied by one group and when they moved

21     forward they displaced group of other people.  So that was -- yeah, that

22     happened.

23        Q.   And would you agree, based on what you observed, that in many

24     cases local authorities were powerless to stop the hostile intentions and

25     acts of those individuals?

Page 6103

 1        A.   Again, you're back to how you respond to the greater problem.

 2     What is your policy on housing?  How do you look after the people who are

 3     already in the house?  Somebody has to say how do we deal with this

 4     problem.  And, you know, if -- if somebody takes over my house tomorrow

 5     morning and they call the police, I don't expect that they would say to

 6     me, you can't go back in there but we will send you somewhere else.  So

 7     that type of situation is there and the displacing was taking place and

 8     it did present a problem.  No doubt about that.

 9        Q.   And did the milicija continue to provide UNCIVPOL with

10     information about the crimes that were taking place in the areas under

11     their jurisdiction?

12        A.   They did provide information and there were occasions when they

13     didn't provide it.  We found it out for ourselves and went to them with

14     it.  And there were occasions where the victims perhaps would have never

15     gone to them because of the policing style at the time.  So you had all

16     those situations there.

17        Q.   Would you say that the vast majority of reports -- of crimes, for

18     example, that appear in your report, did those -- did that information

19     originate from the regular police, the 7.000?

20        A.   I think the reports tend to indicate whether it was given to them

21     by the milicija or the police or that they had brought it to them.  I

22     think the overall situation reports would reflect some of that in them.

23     Now the specifics.  You had a two-way traffic in that.

24             MR. GOSNELL:  I see the clock, Mr. President.

25             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Indeed, Mr. Gosnell.


Page 6104

 1             Mr. McElligott, this is our second break.  We'll come back at

 2     12.45.  The court usher will escort you out of the courtroom.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 4             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

 5                           [The witness stands down]

 6             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Court adjourned.

 7                           --- Recess taken at 12.15 p.m.

 8                           --- On resuming at 12.44 p.m.

 9                           [The accused not present]

10             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Stringer, about your request to sit on the

11     5th, Friday, the 5th of July, unfortunately, there is no courtroom

12     available on that day.  Is there a particular problem with your -- with

13     your planning for that week?

14             MR. STRINGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

15             If we could briefly go into private session.  That may I with

16     perhaps mention some names without --

17             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Private session, please.

18                           [Private session]

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 6105











11 Pages 6105-6106 redacted. Private session.
















Page 6107

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10                           [Open session]

11             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honours.

12             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

13                           [The witness takes the stand]

14             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. McElligott, sorry for the delay.  We had some

15     procedural matters to take care of.

16             Mr. Gosnell, please proceed.

17             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have 01383, please, which is Defence

18     tab 31.

19        Q.   Mr. McElligott, coming up on the screen in front of you will be a

20     memo from -- or a letter from Nambiar to Goulding dated the 30th of

21     November, 1992.  Subject: "Discussion with Knin Authorities."

22             MR. GOSNELL:  If we could go to page 3, please.

23        Q.   "The visit ended today with a two-hour tour and CIVPOL briefing

24     in the fraught Benkovac area, wherein there have recently been a number

25     of especially nasty murders and ambushes, most of which quite probably


Page 6108

 1     have been committed by Croat infiltrators and others.  A quite

 2     understandable though not defensible process of destabilisation by the

 3     Croats seems to focus on Benkovac as well as one or two other areas in

 4     the pink zones."

 5             Now, Mr. McElligott, I believe you've already given some

 6     testimony about infiltrators, so I'm not going to go back and ask to you

 7     repeat that.  What I would like to know, however, first, is:  Were you a

 8     participant in this CIVPOL briefing that's referred to here?

 9        A.   I'm familiar with what is mentioned here, very much so.

10        Q.   And can you help us understand how far behind the confrontation

11     line these murders took place?  How far -- how far on the Croat -- on the

12     Serb side of the confrontation line did these events take place?

13        A.   They came in -- in -- in distance, I am not sure, but they

14     were -- would be regarded as very serious incursions, yes.

15        Q.   And how did this affect the activities of the Serbian milicija,

16     and by that, I mean the regular police, in this area, if at all?

17        A.   There was a heightening of tensions there and the Serbian

18     police -- I think Benkovac were particularly impacted on because in --

19     our own monitors set up patrols in the area, and I think again they had

20     the assistance of -- I think the Kenyan Battalion were there in that area

21     at the time.  There was a liaison I know with the local chief of the

22     milicija as well.  And things were brought under control to some degree,

23     but there were -- there were repercussions and on the other side that

24     there were other people attacked as well.  So you had a reaction to the

25     activities.  So it was a tit-for-tat kind of scenario.

Page 6109

 1        Q.   Did -- did the extent of their patrolling, to take a specific

 2     example, decrease?

 3        A.   In that specific area, I'm not sure in that specific moment of

 4     time, but their patrolling was up and down.  It would vary.

 5             MR. GOSNELL:  This document is tendered Mr. President.

 6             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Admitted and marked.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D73, Your Honours.

 8             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have 01277, please.  And I've sent the

 9     Prosecution an e-mail about this document, even though it doesn't appear

10     on our list.

11        Q.   And this is -- if we can go to page 3, this is an out-going

12     crypto-cable from Nambiar to Vance dated 26th September, 1992.  And in

13     item 2 down there at the bottom, it says:

14             "We are still in a military phase, step 3 in the pink zone.  Pink

15     zones are presently controlled by militia which is organised in military

16     units, heavily armed.  The behaviour of the militia in the pink zone

17     responds to orders received from Knin to prevent Knin -- to prevent any

18     return process without RSK clearance.  The impression is that the trend

19     is increasingly towards a situation of anarchy.  Some local commanders

20     seem ready to take initiatives to react towards any sign of Croatian

21     presence in the pink zone."

22             Did you sense that, in some area, let's say the pink areas, there

23     was a situation of anarchy?

24        A.   I wouldn't describe it as anarchy in that sense, but there was

25     that group of -- what I refer to in general terms as the special police

Page 6110

 1     who were functioning, I would say, with a free hand.  And I think, you

 2     know, that is reflecting that to some degree there, and it is suggesting

 3     that they are not under control, but I don't accept that to be exactly

 4     the case.  They certainly ran with a free hand.

 5        Q.   Well, there might be a distinction between a free hand and acting

 6     on their own initiative.

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   Did you observe that there were some elements of the special

 9     police who took it upon themselves to act on their own initiative in

10     various ways?

11        A.   I don't have experience of it but I would expect that with that

12     looseness of scope that the boundaries would be extended by individuals.

13        Q.   Let's go back, if we could, to the last document, 1383.

14             If we go to page 2, paragraph 6.  Again, this is from Nambiar to

15     Goulding, dated 30th of November, 1992.

16             "We kept clear of displaced persons' issues on this occasion and

17     said little about disarmament.  But Spanovic volunteered that they were

18     making a very big effort to clean up their act by arresting their bandits

19     and making life hot for their gangsters, especially in Sector East."

20             Now, first of all, would you agree that the authorities viewed

21     those who were committing crimes as bandits and gangsters.  In short,

22     they viewed them as criminals, didn't they?

23        A.   We certainly referred to -- we're talking about specifically --

24     if we're talking about Arkan, yes.  He would be a person with a criminal

25     background and behaved in that way.  And he was operating in the area, I

Page 6111

 1     would say, with a degree of -- of approval.  And it -- this would suggest

 2     that they are now approaching this problem with a view to taking some

 3     sanctions in the matter.

 4        Q.   Well, you don't know that they were acting with their approval

 5     when they were commits crimes, do you?

 6        A.   I think their activities were well known.  Like, it was -- let's

 7     put it this way:  When they were in the area, they established a control.

 8     Their presence alone had an impact, and if they are -- the governing

 9     authorities of that area didn't realise that, I think they would be blind

10     to reality.

11        Q.   Well, it goes on:

12             "Clearly very sensitive to this matter, now, he agreed precisely

13     with our analysis, and felt the 'decline into anarchy' line we have been

14     publicly taking could destroy any residual credibility they may have.

15     Colleagues confirm that they are indeed attempting to crack down on at

16     least some of their thugs and that the serious crime rate has dropped

17     appreciably."

18             Is that true?  Is that what happened?

19        A.   Again, I would need to look at the crime figures for that time.

20     But it's indicated there that that is the case, and if it's going from

21     one senior UN official to the other, I expect the background research

22     would have been done to substantiate what they are say.

23        Q.   Well, you were monitoring the crime figures --

24        A.   Well, I am --

25        Q.   -- was that --

Page 6112

 1        A.   You're asking me for a specific period of time 20 years later.  I

 2     don't have the facts in front of me now.  But what I would say is that

 3     those writing the report would have had access to relevant information at

 4     the time of writing.

 5        Q.   Considering that the RSK authorities under the Vance Plan were

 6     not supposed to be in possession of any armed forces with long barrels,

 7     how do you suggest that they would have put under arrest an armed group

 8     of 100 people who did have such long barrels and who were well armed?

 9     Were they capable of doing that?

10        A.   This again goes back to the core issue of starting the Vance

11     Plan, and we are now getting to a signal that that may happen.  In

12     reality, I think you will get 90 per cent or perhaps in that region who

13     will go -- go with the plan and you will demilitarise.  You're then going

14     to be left with a hard-core group.  And, in reality, they will -- can

15     cause you continuing difficulties.  And, at that point again, you're back

16     down to disarming and dealing with that issue.  And you may have to mete,

17     at that point, a response that is effective.

18             And, again, going back to what I said this morning, it is

19     bringing all the pillars of the criminal justice system into play, to

20     bring a final measure and a control measure to the most extreme ends of

21     it.  And I suppose, in reality, you will always be left with an extreme

22     percentage, no matter how good your system is.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Could we have 01344, please.  Defence tab 29.

24             The cover sheet is from Nambiar to Goulding dated the 9th of

25     November, 1992.  The attachment is a letter -- we've seen a different

Page 6113

 1     letter of this type, but this is a -- not the same one.  From Zecevic to

 2     Nambiar; Zecevic writing as the president of the State Committee for

 3     Co-operation with UNPROFOR.

 4             And if we turn to page 3 in e-court of the document.  Again,

 5     there is a -- Zecevic telling Nambiar that there are responsibilities

 6     that, in his view, are not going carried out by UNPROFOR.  And then at --

 7     but what I'm interested in is the end, where he says:

 8             "At the same time, armed groups which might eventually be seen on

 9     the terrain are outside of the composition of our militia units and are

10     presenting to us at this moment a bigger problem than they are to you."

11             Now the question that I simply have for you is:  Did you see

12     indications that there were elements of the milicija that were out of the

13     control of the government?

14        A.   That is -- there was a group, as I mentioned, who ran with a free

15     hand, and I suppose when you allow a situation like that to happen, they

16     become an unaccountable group that you are now left having to face the

17     monster yourself; the one that you created on the first day.  And that's

18     where they perhaps have found themselves at that point.

19             So -- but it does indicate that they are coming around, starting

20     to address the issues and, you know, I think that you could sense a door

21     opening to getting back to the beginning of the Vance Plan again, so

22     that, you know, the -- the serious issues are there, and they realise

23     they have big problems.

24             And it doesn't mean it's impossible to address it.  It will be

25     difficult.  But there will be means.  And the UN is there to enhance

Page 6114

 1     witness support them in addressing that issue in an appropriate way.

 2        Q.   Now, yesterday at page 6007, you were discussing the chain of

 3     command in the police, and I want to ask you some questions about what

 4     you understood the chain of command in the police to be.

 5             And you said:  "You have the police functioning as a police

 6     force, and, at station or opstina level, they are a role, and their line

 7     of command, as I would see it, to the ultimate height is Milan Martic."

 8             Now before we get to Milan Martic, can I ask:  Was that statement

 9     exclusively in respect of the 7.000, the regular police force, so to

10     speak?

11        A.   The regular police force, as I've seen on the chart, goes to him.

12             But I understand as well that, say, within a sector, as the UNPAs

13     are set out, there was what I would see as a regional headquarters as

14     well.  So that perhaps a number of opstinas came within its remit.  And

15     then you went to what would be the government level of control.

16        Q.   Now, in the Vance Plan, and we don't need to turn to it, but at

17     paragraph 19, it says:  "The local police forces would be responsible to

18     the existing opstina councils in the UNPAs."

19             Now I'm not saying that that's exclusively the managerial

20     hierarchy, but I want to ask you:  What did you observe on the ground?

21     Can you help us understand what was the relative respective

22     responsibility of the opstina versus the RSK in respect of the regular

23     police?

24        A.   My recollection is that the mayor of the opstina played a role in

25     the management element of the policing and, indeed, on occasions, would

Page 6115

 1     sit in on meetings so that he had in an authoritative role somewhere in

 2     the system.  It was designed to function on an opstina basis.

 3             But overriding that, then you have the regional area.  So you're

 4     carrying basically the same philosophy of policing across a greater area

 5     and, ultimately, the entire territory.

 6        Q.   And that would be Milan Martic with ultimate responsibility at

 7     the regional level; correct?

 8        A.   Yes.  He is recorded as being the person there at the

 9     [indiscernible]

10        Q.   And that's both for the regular police and the special police;

11     correct?

12        A.   Correct [indiscernible].

13        Q.   And am I right in saying that the only two interlocutors of

14     UNPROFOR on the Serb side at the regional level were Mr. Martic or

15     Mr. Prijic?  Ilija Prijic.

16        A.   Mr. Prijic featured quite frequently in Sector South, and I think

17     I have alluded to him in the sense that Hakun Jufors, the Swedish sector

18     commander following K. G. Andersson, established pretty good

19     relationships with him, and they did improve things at, say -- you could

20     take Sector East, there would have been contacts at the regional level as

21     well, with the police heads there.

22             And, indeed, I remember reading one report where there was a

23     particular difficulty in a particular area.  I think it was referred to a

24     mafia operating in that particular area.  The regional police did join

25     with the local police in taking on the issue.  And our monitors were part

Page 6116

 1     of developing that initiative.

 2        Q.   And that's Martic at the top of that regional

 3     structure [Overlapping speakers] ...

 4        A.   [Overlapping speakers] ... of the -- what I would call the

 5     national level of it; let's put that way.

 6        Q.   And that's Martic?

 7        A.   That's Martic.

 8        Q.   Have you seen any documents addressed to Mr. Hadzic about police

 9     issues?

10        A.   There was a number of documents sent to Mr. Martic.  I think we

11     have alluded to them along the way, but -- [Overlapping speakers] ...

12        Q.   [Overlapping speakers] ... sorry, I --

13        A.   [Overlapping speakers] ...I -- I --

14        Q.   [Overlapping speakers] ...I think the question was --

15        A.   Okay --

16        Q.   [Overlapping speakers] ...the question was misunder -- yeah, may

17     not have been heard correctly.

18        A.   Okay.

19        Q.   What I am saying to you is, you haven't seen any documents

20     addressed to Mr. Hadzic about what I would call bread-and-butter law

21     enforcement issues; correct?

22        A.   A number of letters were sent to him, and some were presented

23     here.  But if you're asking me specifically on policing, I would need to

24     go through the letters again to just clear my mind on it.

25        Q.   From what you can recall, Martic was the --

Page 6117

 1        A.   But he was the -- he was the person that one would look at for

 2     accountability.

 3        Q.   And you don't know what the managerial control or political

 4     control was of Martic in the structure of the RSK, do you?

 5        A.   All I can say is that he what I would have considered part of

 6     that parliament at that point.

 7        Q.   I want to ask you a few questions about the hostage taking.

 8             Was the hotel, by all outward appearances where the monitors were

 9     held, by all outward appearances, was that a civilian structure?

10        A.   Oh, yes, absolutely.

11        Q.   Did it appear that way throughout the period of the so-called

12     hostage taking?

13        A.   On closer view, once it was filled with troops, there would be

14     visibility [indiscernible].  As I say, when I arrived on the day, you

15     could sense there is another presence here by what you saw in the car

16     park.  So that would be the biggest visible feature.  There was also the

17     installation of communication aerials on the roof.  That would be part of

18     it.

19        Q.   Did you see those aerials yourself?

20        A.   I didn't see them, but I was made aware of them being there.

21        Q.   And how big and how visible were they?

22        A.   As I say, I didn't see them but I was made aware of them being

23     there.  So if you're -- aerials can vary in size, depending on the scale

24     of your range of communication.

25        Q.   And a civilian hotel might have an aerial; correct?

Page 6118

 1        A.   It could.

 2        Q.   So, from a distance, there was no indication that the hotel had

 3     become a military installation; correct?

 4        A.   No.

 5        Q.   Well, that being the case, why do you say that the Serbs were

 6     holding them there as shields for a military location, if there was no

 7     outward indication that, indeed, it was a military location?

 8        A.   One has also got to factor in the sense that those engaged in

 9     these activities will also have intelligence to give them the fuller

10     picture of what is on the ground.  And that is, I have no doubt, a

11     reality of anybody carrying out a policing function or, I'm sure, a

12     military function, is that intelligence-gathering is vital.  So I would

13     be rather naive if I thought that the opposition didn't know a certain

14     amount about me.

15        Q.   Did some --

16        A.   I saw that as an extreme -- as a very serious risk, risk to our

17     people, and I raised the matter with Cedric Thornberry to take it up with

18     the Croatian government.

19        Q.   Did someone on the Serb side tell you that it was there -- the

20     purpose of them being held there was to serve as human shields?

21        A.   The police monitor who was given the job of taking them hostage,

22     and I said to him -- I said before he was a very honourable man.  He told

23     them that they were going to be taken hostage and -- so that was the

24     reality.

25        Q.   Well, being taken hostage -- and I don't think I'm splitting

Page 6119

 1     hairs here.  But being taken hostage or detained or being restricted from

 2     free movement is one thing.  Being used as a human shield is quite

 3     another.  Wouldn't you agree?

 4        A.   That is what they were being used for.  They were put onto the

 5     top floor, or the third floor, and that was what they were for.  And we

 6     had other intelligence to say that would happen in respect of other

 7     installations, if they came under attack.  It didn't stand alone on this

 8     particular instance.

 9        Q.   Let's come back to my question.  Did someone on the Serb side

10     tell you that they were being used as human shields?

11        A.   We had it from other sources that our monitors and other civilian

12     staff in UNPROFOR would be taken hostage to act as human shields.  And

13     that's the simple call on it.  If you were put into an installation and

14     put in there strategically so that the installation would not be

15     attacked.  That's the simple version.  I wouldn't call it anything else.

16        Q.   So this -- how far in advance of this event taking place were you

17     informed of that?

18        A.   The date is stated on the report made by Mitchell.  I think it's

19     two days in advance but -- I think it's 17th, 16th.  It's actually

20     specifically referred to, when he was told.

21        Q.   And was he told that they would be not permitted to leave

22     Benkovac as a means of deterring an incursion by Croatian forces?  Or was

23     he told - and maybe you don't know this - was he told that they were

24     going to be used specifically as human shields at a military location?

25        A.   There was no doubt in any of our minds that if the situation

Page 6120

 1     arose, we were to be used as human shields.  No doubt.  And we were very

 2     conscious of that risk for our people in the field.  I wouldn't call it

 3     in any other way.

 4        Q.   When you use the term "human shield," do you understand it to

 5     have meant and now do you understand it to mean that you would be held at

 6     a military location, a military -- a place that could be militarily

 7     targeted to provide protection for that location and facility?

 8        A.   I think the information we had went beyond that.  They were going

 9     to even use it for facilities such as electrical stations or whatever.

10     So, again, what you're doing is you're putting something in front of the

11     opposition to say do you want to go down that road take on the

12     international community.  You had 21 monitors there from, I would say,

13     perhaps ten nations.  You can see the implications of that.  So it was a

14     very strategic move and it's placing lives at serious risk.  And we

15     mentioned earlier that there were always people, mavericks, who will do

16     their own thing, so no matter what control you have of your sources -- of

17     your resources, there can be an individual who will just blow the place

18     away.  So it was a real, real risk to our people.

19             And I'll tell you something, it left its mark on many of them.

20        Q.   When you say there are mavericks who might do anything, are you

21     suggesting that the individuals who directed the detention of these

22     UNCIVPOL monitors, were they acting on their own?

23        A.   No.  This was planned.

24        Q.   By whom?

25        A.   By those who were planning the strategies to resist the attack

Page 6121

 1     and, indeed, any attack from Croatian sources.  As I mentioned, the

 2     information was available and it also included installations.  So it

 3     wasn't just it happened on the day for this situation.  It was a planned

 4     situation.

 5        Q.   Well, who was involved exactly; do you know?

 6        A.   At the end of the day, I would think you could go back up to the

 7     Kenyan authorities.  It was a strategic plan.  You have to go back to a

 8     serious level of the management.

 9        Q.   Was Spanovic in on it?

10        A.   I don't know who was in -- you look at a strategic op -- a strike

11     like that, it has to be at a serious level because they are literally

12     challenging the international community.  They're saying to you:  We're

13     taking your people and we are going to use you.  They're drawing other

14     nations into the situation.

15        Q.   Is it true that at one point during the hostage taking some of

16     the UN observers were escorted outside of the hotel?

17        A.   At gunpoint.

18        Q.   Were they at gunpoint when they drove to the hospital in Knin?

19        A.   I believe they were.  And indeed I remember, if I recall

20     correctly, they asked to go down to the local police station, that's the

21     UNPROFOR office, and were refused permission.

22        Q.   How far is the hotel in Benkovac from the hospital in Knin?

23        A.   It could be 50 miles.

24        Q.   The UN observers were held at gunpoint while being driven

25     50 miles?

Page 6122

 1        A.   They were held at gunpoint, yeah.

 2        Q.   And while, as you suggest, they were being held at gunpoint

 3     during this 50-mile journey, did you hear that at one point,

 4     notwithstanding that they were under milicija escort, you say at

 5     gunpoint, notwithstanding that they were under milicija escort, that they

 6     were run off the road by an angry Serb soldier.  Do you know about that

 7     incident?

 8        A.   There was an incident, yes, and they were shot at.  And I would

 9     say indeed their own assessment was despite the fact -- they felt they

10     would have been killed only for the presence of the other people, and

11     basically the point I'm making on it, and they made, was even despite the

12     peer pressure of their own people, these guys reacted and fired.

13        Q.   And wasn't there another incident, a separate incident right in

14     front of the hotel when another angry soldier saw the UN Land Cruiser and

15     used an automatic rifle and fired almost 40 bullets into the car?  Didn't

16     that occur too?

17        A.   Yes, it did.  And again it highlights, if our monitors were free,

18     would they stay there?  Certainly not.

19        Q.   Well, we'll come to conclusions in a moment.  Isn't it the case

20     that there were two French soldiers who were killed --

21        A.   Yes, Your Honours.

22        Q.   -- by a mortar shell and essentially they were killed on impact,

23     instantly?

24        A.   Correct, Your Honours.

25        Q.   And the military operation was ongoing for at least seven days,

Page 6123

 1     possibly more?

 2        A.   It was on for a period of time, yes.

 3        Q.   And their release happened to coincide with the end of the

 4     military offensive, didn't it?

 5        A.   The release -- no, the release commenced with my going down

 6     there.  My going down there wasn't designed on what was happening in the

 7     greater picture.  I just came to a point where nothing was happening to

 8     get them out and I took the initiative to go on that particular day.

 9     That wasn't written by other agendas, let's put it that way, other

10     factors.

11        Q.   That -- that wasn't my question.  The question was:  Their

12     release coincided with the end of the military operation, did it not?

13        A.   I don't think so.  I think we mentioned earlier that it went down

14     to Benkovac -- or into -- approached the dam up to the 28th.

15        Q.   Would you agree that to an outside observer, there was a very

16     credible basis to think that unarmed, and you were unarmed, that unarmed

17     UN officials might be under threat or danger either from the fighting or

18     from elements amongst the Serb forces who were out of control, angry, in

19     particular at the UN at this point?

20        A.   We always felt that being unarmed was perhaps the best weapon we

21     had, for the use of a word, in the sense that we were not going to cause

22     danger to anybody.  And we always believed that was the best approach to

23     take and to ensure our safety.  And that's the way it was.  And you can

24     see that in this situation, we were used.

25        Q.   Let me be clear about what I'm asking you.  I'm not suggesting

Page 6124

 1     necessarily that everyone who was involved in this incident was animated

 2     by a genuine desire to protect the observers.  What I'm suggesting to you

 3     is, from an outside perspective, wouldn't a reasonable observer be able

 4     to say, Well, maybe there was legitimate reason to not permit the UN

 5     observers to drive around under these circumstances, for their own

 6     safety?

 7        A.   You go back and you ask the observers who were involved what the

 8     facts are and they are quite clear that they were hostages, and there is

 9     no other call on that.  And they are quite clear on that.  And I think

10     there's nowhere else to go with it, in my view.  It's quite honest,

11     saying that to you.

12        Q.   You don't know what Mr. Hadzic may have been told before he gave

13     the press conference that you were shown by the Prosecution during your

14     testimony, do you?

15        A.   No, I'm not privy to his briefing.

16        Q.   Now I want to ask you some questions about returns of internally

17     displaced persons.

18             MR. GOSNELL:  And if we could have, please, 01212.  That's

19     Defence tab 23.  This is the Secretary-General's report of the 27th of

20     July, 1992.  If we could go to page 6, which is paragraph 18:

21             "The Force Commander estimates that the conditions do not yet

22     exist for a large-scale voluntary return programme into the UNPAs."

23        Q.   Was that view widely shared amongst UNPROFOR officials?

24        A.   Yes, Your Honours.

25             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have 1-0 -- excuse me, 01253.  Prosecution

Page 6125

 1     tab 9.

 2        Q.   This is a status report and we've looked at this before.  I'm not

 3     going to discuss it again.  But the date is the 7th of September, 1992.

 4             If we could turn to page 3, please.

 5             "Return of displaced Croats."  And then we're looking for a

 6     sentence that begins:

 7             "But the latest escalation of events in Sector South, Croatian

 8     rights violations included, indicated that it might be unrealistic to

 9     carry out any return in the forthcoming future.  It is necessary to

10     carefully consider the dangers of jeopardizing the entire process of

11     return in phase 3.  But when started, even in limited manner, Croatians

12     will expand it elsewhere, and uncontrolled mass-scale return with

13     possible escalation into war."

14             Can you help us understand why -- if you can, can you help us

15     understand why the author is making that comment?

16        A.   You have a couple of comments there.  First of all, it is about

17     coming in in small numbers and scaling it in.  I think in reality there

18     was no scope to go down that road.  And I think what's being indicated

19     then is even if you do, you will be taken advantage of.  And the other

20     side will push on to go beyond the boundaries of what your plan may have

21     been in bringing in a minimal group and just trying to take one step

22     forward and that it would be exploited.

23             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have 01273, please.  Again this is a

24     document that we've looked at.  It's Defence tab 25.

25        Q.   This is General Nambiar reporting to Goulding on the 22nd of

Page 6126

 1     September, 1992.  And that date is significant, September 1992, because

 2     wasn't there much discussion about a planned mass return of refugees at

 3     the end of the month?

 4        A.   Yes, Your Honour.

 5        Q.   And then -- and in this first paragraph, we've looked at it

 6     before, General Nambiar says:

 7             "Perhaps you might also bring home to him," him being Tudjman,

 8     "the disastrous consequences which could ensure if the proposed mass

 9     march of refugees into Sector East were to take place on 30 September."

10             Was that the view of UNPROFOR that that march was not a good

11     idea?

12        A.   I think so, yes.

13        Q.   And UNPROFOR opposed it.

14        A.   They -- they opposed it.

15        Q.   Do you know whether UNPROFOR took any steps to prevent it from

16     taking place?

17        A.   Again, the steps UNPROFOR would be taking would be ones of

18     negotiation to downscale the likelihood of it happening.

19             Now what they actually did, I do not know.  But I would see that

20     as being the road they would go.  And, again, with respect to negotiating

21     yourself out of a serious conflict.

22             MR. GOSNELL:  Could we have 01290, please, which is Defence

23     tab 26.

24        Q.   Again, further report of the Secretary-General dated the

25     29th of September, 1992.  Am I right in recalling that this is the day

Page 6127

 1     before the scheduled mass march that we've been referring to?

 2        A.   I'm not sure of the actually date of it now, on -- off the top of

 3     my head but it's somewhere at the end of September.

 4             MR. GOSNELL:  If we can turn, please, to page 9 in e-court.

 5     Paragraph 21.

 6        Q.   "However, constant agitation by the media and certain political

 7     authorities for immediate return is building up dangerous pressures, with

 8     unilaterally proclaimed timetables for return and advertised mass marches

 9     to the sectors.  UNPROFOR has told the authorities that such exploitation

10     of the deep and very understandable desire of people to return to their

11     homes is irresponsible.  Ill-timed and uncoordinated returns could lead

12     to a further disaster."

13        A.   That's real, yeah.

14        Q.   Was Croatia playing -- let me put it a bit more neutrally.  Was

15     Croatia using the issue of the return of internally displaced persons as

16     a wedge to accomplish goals in the war?

17        A.   It's in my view that this issue was being driven to further other

18     agendas, yes.  These civilian people were just being used.  And I think

19     if we look at some of the reports from the other side, the Serbian side,

20     you will see that there was an increasing of a military response on that

21     side of the house.  I think there are mention of reports where we had

22     people armed with AK-47s and going to Batina bridge, and if you have a

23     mass march of innocent civilians walking into that situation, what is the

24     outcome?  It's pushing the board out a long way.

25        Q.   Thank you, Mr. McElligott.


Page 6128

 1             MR. GOSNELL:  Mr. President, no further questions.

 2             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

 3             Mr. Gillett, re-direct.

 4             MR. GILLETT:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Your Honours, I'll try

 5     and go through this -- a couple of points quickly.

 6                           Re-examination by Mr. Gillett:

 7        Q.   So, Mr. McElligott, again I'll ask you to speak slowly and

 8     clearly.  Thank you?

 9             If we go back, at transcript page 47 you were asked about the

10     regular police and ability to control the special police.  You said:

11             "From the police side there were difficulties.  They had confided

12     in us on occasion that the special police were out of their control."

13             Can I just clarify who you mean by "they" when you say "they had

14     confided"?

15        A.   We're talking about the -- the normal police had confided on us,

16     to us.

17        Q.   And do you know any individuals who were confiding that

18     information or is it a more general response?

19        A.   I met one or two myself who did tell me, that they had a problem.

20     It has emerged in some of the reports as well or it was declared.  There

21     were men there who wanted to police and there is no doubt their hands

22     were tied.  They couldn't do their job and they did it as best they could

23     at local level, and that's where their goodwill and their commitment came

24     into -- at just local level they were able to do the thing in their own

25     corner as best they could.  And there were times when they had to back

Page 6129

 1     away.

 2        Q.   Okay.  Thank you, Mr. McElligott, I think the identity of the

 3     "they" is clear enough.

 4             Another clarification, at transcript page 66 you were asked about

 5     essentially the possibility of opportunist crime being an explanation for

 6     some of these crimes referred to in report 5404.  And you said that:

 7             "There is always an element in any context of this type of

 8     crime."

 9             And then you said that:

10             "Then you have another situation, what is left behind, that has

11     to be addressed as well."

12             What did you mean by that second sentence?

13        A.   I meant the people who were committing crime and who were dressed

14     in uniform.  I think, you know, if you are a police force and you receive

15     a complaint from a victim that the person engaging it has a police

16     uniform or a police identity, you would take a very, very serious view of

17     it, first of all, to establish your own credibility as a police force

18     and, secondly, to reassure the community of the facts of the situation.

19     And if you found it to be some policemen involved, that you would take

20     very effective measures to make sure your professional standards are

21     maintained.

22        Q.   Thank you.  And in relation to crimes by police members, you were

23     asked whether Hadzic was ever contacted in relation to these issues.

24             MR. GILLETT:  Could we get document 65 ter 5312 on the monitor,

25     please.  And as this is coming up, you'll see it's a similar protest,

Page 6130

 1     it's a pair of protest letters similar to ones that have been admitted

 2     through this witness.  I'm interested in the second page.

 3        Q.   Now, on the second page, this is a letter from Nambiar, Force

 4     Commander.  It says:

 5             "I write this letter to express my deep concern at the deliberate

 6     shooting of one of our Military Observers on 21 December 1992 in the

 7     Bapska area in Sector East."

 8             Now would you consider that a criminal matter?

 9        A.   Yes, indeed.

10        Q.   And why would that be sent to Mr. Hadzic?

11        A.   It is also --

12             MR. GOSNELL:  Objection.  It calls for speculation.

13             MR. GILLETT:  Well, the witness has commented on a number of

14     protest letters sent to Mr. Hadzic concerning shelling and other topics,

15     and he was asked about this in cross-examination, whether letters would

16     be sent to Mr. Hadzic, so I'm verifying whether he does have an opinion

17     based on his experience with UNCIVPOL as to why this letter would have

18     been sent.

19             THE WITNESS:  It would also be --

20             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Overruled.

21             MR. GILLETT:  Thank you.

22        Q.   If you could answer.  Thank you.

23        A.   It would also be a very serious breach of the Vance Plan

24     agreement.  Our monitors were entitled to free movement and this would

25     certainly inhibit your movements.

Page 6131

 1        Q.   And in the second paragraph it also refers to restrictions of

 2     movement in place.  I know this is covered in your statement in quite a

 3     lot of detail, so I won't ask you about that.

 4             MR. GILLETT:  I would ask to admit this document, 5312, at this

 5     stage.

 6             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Admitted and marked.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P2184, Your Honours.

 8             MR. GILLETT:  Thank you very much.

 9        Q.   In relation to Benkovac, you were asked about the reason for

10     which the UNCIVPOL monitors who were taken hostage were accompanied by

11     armed militia.

12             Now, your forces, as you've said, were unarmed, correct, and they

13     were always unarmed while they were in the region, and did they face

14     dangers at other times other than at the Benkovac incident?

15        A.   Yes, indeed they did.  They were confronted on various ways along

16     the period of their service.  They were held at gunpoint on prior

17     occasions.  There's -- I recall a specific incident where they were held

18     at gunpoint and indeed the interpreter stepped in between them and

19     literally -- I did declare that they would have to take her out if they

20     wanted to take the monitors out and she eventually settled the situation

21     down and got them back out of the situation safe.  And they had been

22     robbed at gunpoint.  There was a series of serious crimes committed

23     against our monitors at gunpoint.

24        Q.   Thank you.  And again, that's referred to in the statement.  And

25     in instances other than Benkovac, were your monitors provided armed

Page 6132

 1     guards as has been suggested by my learned friend for the Defence?

 2        A.   I know -- we have never been provided with armed guards but we

 3     have gone on joint patrols with the military, I think KenBat is

 4     specifically mentioned to -- in the Sector South, and again, that the

 5     basic idea behind that was to spread our resources and our capacity to

 6     engage in a lot of patrols by having, perhaps, one policeman in a car and

 7     accompanied by a soldier or two soldiers.  Now I do not know if they

 8     carried weapons, but in general principle, as police officers we would

 9     generally not allow a situation where you're going to have somebody with

10     arms engaging with or be with -- or be accompanying somebody who doesn't

11     be armed.  We go for the neutral situation because if the gun is there,

12     the opposition are likely to engage with us, or readily, so we don't want

13     to expose the unarmed person.  And the philosophy is to go back to

14     unarmed for safety of all.

15        Q.   Final question.  In relation to the issue of the attempted mass

16     return in late 1992, you've been asked about this.

17             MR. GILLETT:  And if I could call document 65 ter 1277, this is

18     from the Defence list, on the monitor.  And if we could go to page 3 of

19     this document.

20        Q.   And you were asked several questions about this document during

21     cross-examination.

22             MR. GILLETT:  That's 1277.  Thank you.

23             And if we could zoom in near the bottom, there is ... thank you.

24        Q.   There is a bullet point that reads:

25             "The recent violations of human rights in the pink zone, mainly

Page 6133

 1     destruction of houses already burned, of churches, are messages to warn

 2     against any return of DPs," which I take it to mean displaced persons.

 3             Did that have an impact on the conditions for the return of

 4     people to these areas in which you operated?

 5        A.   Yes, it did.  Of course, yes.  Again it was creating the unstable

 6     environment.  Taking down the churches and the houses was, as I've said

 7     earlier, literally breaking down the sense of community.  Church was a

 8     place where people went where there was very often social engagement by

 9     old folk who may not meet from one end of the week to the other, so there

10     was -- just apart from a religious element, there was a community side to

11     it as well.  So it was destabilising the whole community approach.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             MR. GILLETT:  We'd tender 1277 into evidence.

14             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Admitted and marked.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P2185, Your Honours.

16             MR. GILLETT:  Thank you.  No further questions, Your Honours.

17             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

18                           [Trial Chamber confers]

19             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. McElligott, this brings your testimony to an

20     end.  We thank you very much for coming to The Hague to assist the

21     Tribunal.  You're now released as a witness, and we wish you a safe

22     journey back home.

23             The court usher will escort you out of the court.

24             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honours.

25                           [The witness withdrew]


Page 6134

 1             JUDGE DELVOIE:  In the meanwhile, it has been confirmed that we

 2     can sit this afternoon for an extra session starting at 3.00, 3.00 to

 3     4.30, and I thank everyone who is facilitating this to enable us to

 4     finish this week's witness.

 5             If there's nothing else, Mr. Gosnell.

 6             MR. GOSNELL:  Just one comment that may assist with scheduling.

 7             I may well have no more than five minutes of cross-examination.

 8     I don't know whether that might accelerate our plans or not.  I just

 9     thought I would say that now.

10             JUDGE DELVOIE:  I don't think we could -- we could take the

11     witness immediately and -- and -- and finish the witness within this

12     session.  I don't think that's a realistic ...

13             MR. STRINGER:  No, Mr. President we've confirmed that the

14     Defence -- sorry the Prosecution direct examination is still to be

15     previewed to be at 30 minutes or so --

16             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Okay.

17             MR. STRINGER:  -- so we can't finish by 2.00.

18             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Okay.  So let's stick to the plan, and we'll see

19     each other at 3.00, and probably we will be out before 4.30.

20             Thank you very much.  Court adjourned.

21                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.47 p.m.

22                           --- On resuming at 3.00 p.m.

23             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Gosnell.

24             MR. GOSNELL:  Mr. President, may I, for the record, indicate that

25     the Hadzic Defence is joined at this time by legal intern

Page 6135

 1     Jolana Makraiova.  Thank you.

 2             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

 3             MR. STRINGER:  And I should say now for the Prosecution, we have

 4     with us in the courtroom, Ms. Sarah Clanton and legal intern,

 5     Marija Bukovac.

 6             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you, Mr. Stringer.

 7                           [The witness entered court]

 8             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Good afternoon, Madam Witness.

 9             Can you hear me in a language you understand?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can.

11             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.  Thank you for coming to The Hague to

12     assist the Tribunal.  I will ask you in a few minutes to make the solemn

13     declaration by which witnesses comment themselves to tell the truth, and

14     I have to point out to you that by doing so you expose yourself to the

15     penalties of perjury should you give untruthful information to the

16     Tribunal.

17             Could I ask you to stand for a moment and make the solemn

18     declaration the usher will give you.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

20     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

21                           WITNESS:  SARLOTA FORO

22                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

23             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you very much.  You may be seated.

24             Ms. Clanton, your witness.

25             MS. CLANTON:  Thank you, Your Honour.  Good afternoon.


Page 6136

 1     Your Honour, I note that I don't believe we introduced the witness.

 2     Would you like for me to --

 3              JUDGE DELVOIE:  You're right.  I forgot to ask her name and date

 4     of birth.

 5             Could you give us -- tell us, Ms. Witness, Madam Witness, what

 6     your name and date of birth is.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My name is Sarlota Foro.  I was

 8     born on the 4th of January, 1963, in Vukovar.

 9             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you very much.

10                           Examination by Ms. Clanton:

11        Q.   Ms. Foro, do you recall that you testified here in The Hague in

12     November 2005 in the case of Mrksic, Sljivancanin, and Radic?

13        A.   I do.

14        Q.   And since you arrived here in The Hague this week, have you had

15     an opportunity to listen to the audio recording of your testimony?

16        A.   I got an audio recording and I re-listened to it.

17        Q.   And is there anything in your testimony that you listened to this

18     week that you no longer believe to be correct?

19        A.   There's only one detail regarding the identification of a person

20     from a picture that was shown to me during that trial.  The picture

21     doesn't show the whole person, just the hands, or arms, so obviously by

22     mistake, I misidentified the person.

23        Q.   And to make the record clear, Ms. Foro, who was the person that

24     you misidentified based on the hands?

25        A.   That's Major Veselin Sljivancanin.

Page 6137

 1        Q.   Now, with the exception of the change to your evidence that you

 2     just discussed with us, if you were asked the same questions today that

 3     you were asked when you testified before, would you provide the same

 4     answers?

 5        A.   As for the rest of the statement, I stand by it fully, except for

 6     that one detail.

 7        Q.   And now that you've taken the solemn declaration, do you affirm

 8     the accuracy and truthfulness of your testimony?

 9        A.   To the best of my recollection, I stated everything correctly.

10     And my testimony was truthful.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             MS. CLANTON:  Your Honours, at this time we would seek to tender

13     Prosecution 65 ter Exhibits 04638.1 and 04638.2, which are at tab 14.  We

14     would also seek to tender the associated exhibits with the exception of

15     associated exhibits 02601 and 02990, these are at tabs 2 and number 12.

16     And the reason that we would not seek to tender these is that these are

17     the exhibits that relate to the correction that the witness has just

18     made.

19             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Admitted and marked.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P2186 and P2187, Your Honours.

21             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

22             MS. CLANTON:

23        Q.   Now for the first question I want to ask you has to do with your

24     testimony about the events in Vukovar in the Autumn 1991.  You said that

25     the people in Vukovar were living in shelters or cellars because of the

Page 6138

 1     bombing that was happening, and this is at transcript page 2399 for the

 2     record.  You further testified that the destruction in Vukovar had

 3     reached a point that because the roofs and the walls were missing,

 4     projectiles were falling down the level of the shelters and there were

 5     civilian casualties that resulted.  And this is transcript page 2409.

 6             Can you describe for the Chamber a particular instance in which

 7     this happened.

 8        A.   If you give me the right to describe the events that were

 9     happening already in November 1991.

10        Q.   If there was a particular instance that occurred at that time,

11     yes, please, do continue with your answer.

12        A.   In 1991, at that time, at the time that you referred to, and that

13     was already the month of November when the devastation of the city had

14     reached such a degree that even in shelters people were not safe anymore,

15     an incident happened involving our family friend, who got killed with his

16     entire family in a shelter in the centre of the town.  He got killed, his

17     wife, his mother, and his very small child.

18             Another young man was killed on occasion.  What happened was that

19     a projectile flew in through the window of the shelter and exploded.

20     Those are the civilian casualties that I spoke about last time, and such

21     things were happening already in November 1991.  People were getting

22     killed in large numbers even in shelters.

23        Q.   Now, Ms. Foro, you've just told us that there was a very small

24     child that was killed as a result of this projectile exploding in a

25     shelter.  Can you tell us, what did you hear later on about this small

Page 6139

 1     child?

 2        A.   Specifically it was the family Aleksandar, the name of the child

 3     was Matija Aleksandar.  The parent's names were Vlasta and Emil.  The

 4     Aleksandars were our family friends because the husband worked with my --

 5     with my husband.  The next thing I heard of it, I next thing I saw, was

 6     when I came to Sremska Mitrovica where I was for questioning and on the

 7     desk of the colonel who was conducting the questioning, I saw a Belgrade

 8     newspaper with the photo of the little child that was killed on the front

 9     page.

10        Q.   And what were you asked about the photo of this child on the

11     front page of the Belgrade newspaper?

12        A.   They didn't ask me anything.  They just maintained that the child

13     was a Serb child who had its throat killed by the Croats; one among 40

14     Serb children who were killed by Croats.  That was a very notorious

15     scandal at the time and it was in all the media, all over the media.

16             The colonel who was conducting the interrogation put that to me,

17     and I said that I have completely different information about the case,

18     and I can share it with him, if he wishes.

19        Q.   And when you offered to share this information to him, what did

20     he say?

21        A.   He asked me to explain.  And I explained it in the same way as I

22     did to the Court today.  I said the name of the child, who the parents

23     were, under what circumstances the child was killed, and I also made a

24     written statement about it in longhand, and I signed it.

25        Q.   And what did you find out thereafter about this story about the

Page 6140

 1     40 children being -- being killed.

 2        A.   Later on, I found out that some sort of a scandal, a outcry had

 3     broken out in Serbia in that connection because all the allegations

 4     printed in the press right after the fall of Vukovar were later refuted

 5     by the same journalist who made the initial report, or perhaps his

 6     editorial team.  I'm not sure.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  You previously testified that due to the destruction

 8     and the shortage of ammunition and food that it became clear to the --

 9     the people, including yourself, in Vukovar, that could you no longer

10     remain in the city.  This is at transcript page 2409.  You said that when

11     the people of Vukovar realised that Vukovar would be occupied that they

12     decided to begin surrender negotiation with the JNA and, for the record,

13     is this at page 2410 and 2411.  The question I want to ask you now is:

14     What concerns did the Croats in Mitnica have about an occupation by the

15     JNA?

16        A.   Considering that I mentioned several times in my statement that

17     the war in Vukovar was waged by the local residents.  People who had

18     their families there, who lived there, and some of them were members of

19     the ZNG, the Home Guards Corps.  Some were members of the defence effort,

20     they just guarded their own homes, but most of them were members of the

21     ZNG who later surrendered at Mitnica and their families lived precisely

22     in that part of the city in that neighbourhood.

23             What worried them and all the other people the most at that time

24     was what was going to happen with the civilians, women and children, who

25     had lived in basements those three months.

Page 6141

 1             At the command of the ZNG, they debated how to approach it and on

 2     what conditions to talk to the JNA about the surrender of that part of

 3     the town.

 4             The conditions that I mean is that all civilians be able to go to

 5     the unoccupied part of Croatia, the part of Croatia that was not a war

 6     zone; and the second was that the members of the ZNG would surrender and

 7     lay down their arms on the condition that they be treated as prisoners of

 8     war, and that they be registered or filmed.

 9        Q.   Ms. Foro, a moment -- excuse me, if I can stop you there, I'm

10     going to go back to something you just said.

11             You said that the members of the ZNG or the Home Guard Corps and

12     some were member of the defence effort who guarded their own homes, that

13     these were people -- were you able to hear me?

14        A.   Now I do.

15        Q.   I'm going to ask my question again.

16             A moment ago, you said that the people who were members of the

17     ZNG, or the Home Guard Corps, were involved in civilian protection,

18     defence of their homes, you said that they were the people from your area

19     and that they were worried about what was going to happen to the

20     civilians.  And I want to ask you to tell us why they were worried about

21     what would happen to the civilians?

22        A.   Well, the circumstances were as follows:  The citizens of Vukovar

23     had been shelled for the previous three months from all the heavy

24     weaponry of the JNA as the only armed force that had that kind of

25     weaponry in the former Yugoslavia.  The city was devastated and the

Page 6142

 1     civilians were in basements.  A large number of civilians had been killed

 2     by that time.  What concerned us all, civilians and members of the ZNG

 3     alike, was why would the Yugoslav People's Army which had tried to kill

 4     all of us civilians and destroy the entire city, why would they suddenly

 5     change their behaviour once they occupy the city?

 6             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Ms. Clanton.

 7             MS. CLANTON:  Yes.

 8             JUDGE DELVOIE:  I wonder whether you could clarify with the

 9     witness what the witness meant when saying that "the war in Vukovar" --

10     "in Vukovar was waged by the local residents."

11             It's at -- it's at page 109, line 12.

12             MS. CLANTON:

13        Q.   Ms. Foro, are you able to respond to the Presiding Judge's

14     question?

15        A.   I don't know which passage is meant, which part of my evidence?

16     If you can clarify.

17             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Shall I read it to the witness, Ms. --

18             MS. CLANTON:  If you could.  I'm sorry, mine is frozen.

19             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Ms. Foro, you -- you -- you answered to

20     Ms. Clanton the following in the English record, that is.  I quote:

21             "Considering that I mentioned several times in my statement that

22     the war in Vukovar was waged by the local residents."

23             Is that what you said?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.

25             JUDGE DELVOIE:  What was it -- what was it that you said?  Do you

Page 6143

 1     remember?

 2             There's probably a problem with the translation.  So do you

 3     remember what you -- what you said?

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I just explained that members of

 5     the Home Guards Corps, the ZNG, the Croatian army that we are discussing,

 6     where indeed the Croatian army and they were indeed armed, but in all

 7     parts of Vukovar they had been recruited from the local population, the

 8     population of that area.

 9             So in the course of the evacuation of the city and the

10     surrendering of the troops at Mitnica, all these people were people who

11     normally lived at Mitnica with their families and were part of the

12     Croatian army.  I don't know if I have answered your question.

13             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you very much.

14             Please continue, Ms. Clanton.

15             MS. CLANTON:  Thank you, Your Honour.

16        Q.   Ms. Foro, a moment ago we were talking about the situation in

17     Vukovar concerning the JNA.  I want to ask you now, what, if anything,

18     did you know about the activities of the JNA in the towns and villages

19     outside Vukovar?

20        A.   We knew that already in October some places were occupied and

21     evacuated, some places between Vukovar and Serbia - that is to say, Ilok,

22     Sarengrad and Sotin - and it was known that these places had been

23     occupied and the population evacuated or displaced.  Of course we

24     listened to the radio as well, up to a certain point we were able to

25     watch television, and we learned some things from both the Croat and the

Page 6144

 1     Serbian television.

 2        Q.   And how did this information about what had happened to the

 3     populations in Ilok, Sarengrad and Sotin, how did this information affect

 4     you?

 5        A.   Of course, the people who were hearing what was going on around

 6     them, not far away from them, were afraid.  And they were thinking what

 7     our own fate might be.

 8             MS. CLANTON:  I would like to ask for the assistance of the Case

 9     Manager, please, to bring up 65 ter 04780.9.

10        Q.   And while that's coming up I want to ask you, Ms. Foro, what were

11     the names of the Croat negotiators?

12        A.   There were three of them:  Zdravko Komsic, Matija Mandic and

13     Filip Karaula.  They were practically the command of the Home Guard Corps

14     for that part of the city.

15             MS. CLANTON:  For the record, this is a video-clip from the video

16     ERN V000-686, and the clip is time code 8 minutes and 45 seconds to

17     9 minutes and 2 seconds.

18             And, thank you, I'm reminded there is no need for a transcript

19     here.  We are only going to look at the images, and I would like to ask

20     for the video to be played but paused at 8 minutes and 47 seconds,

21     please.

22                           [Video-clip played]

23             MS. CLANTON:

24        Q.   Now, Ms. Foro, who are the persons who are walking in the line

25     behind the soldier?

Page 6145

 1        A.   Behind the armed soldier is Filip Karaula, followed by

 2     Matija Mandic and Zdravko Kondic [as interpreted].  They were together.

 3        Q.   For the sake of the transcript, can you repeat the last name of

 4     the third person, Zdravko, and I don't think we got the last name.

 5        A.   Zdravko Komsic.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             MS. CLANTON:  Now I would like to ask for this video to be played

 8     to the 9-minute mark, please.

 9                           [Video-clip played]

10             MS. CLANTON:

11        Q.   Now, Ms. Foro, who is on the far left side of the shot?

12        A.   Filip Karaula, one of the negotiators on the Croatian side.

13        Q.   Now, the person next to him, the one who is wearing sun-glasses,

14     do you know what this person was doing at the negotiations.

15        A.   I don't know the man.

16        Q.   Now, since you arrived in The Hague were you able to watch a

17     longer version of this video?

18        A.   I've seen the entire video-clip, which is perhaps an hour long,

19     maybe a little bit longer.

20        Q.   And from viewing this video-clip, are you able to indicate what

21     the role or the position was of the person wearing the sun-glasses?

22        A.   He's obviously the interpreter for the representative of the ICRC

23     who was also there.  At the negotiations.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             MS. CLANTON:  Your Honours, at this time we would want to tender

Page 6146

 1     this clip, 65 ter 04780.9, please.

 2             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Admitted and marked.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P2188.

 4             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

 5             MS. CLANTON:

 6        Q.   Now, Ms. Foro, you testified in the Mrksic case that after these

 7     negotiations took place, that the negotiators went back to Mitnica and

 8     they said that you would be going to a collection point which is near a

 9     veterinary clinic in approximately one hour in order to prepare for

10     departure and this is at transcript page 2417.

11             MS. CLANTON:  I would like to ask for the Case Manager's

12     assistance, please, to pull up video with 65 ter number 4780.11.  And

13     this is a clip of the same video from the same -- with the same ERN and

14     the time code is from 43 minutes, 42 seconds to 47 minutes and 52

15     seconds.  And I would like for the Case Manager to play it and please

16     pause at 43 minutes and 50 seconds.

17                           [Video-clip played]

18             MS. CLANTON:

19        Q.   Ms. Foro, from the view on the screen in front of you, can you

20     tell the Court where the collection point was located?

21        A.   It was not a collection centre.  It was a place that everybody

22     knew, everybody knew where it was.  That is the veterinary clinic at

23     Mitnica.  The road widen there a bit and that's the place where they told

24     us it would be best for us to come and form a column, a convoy, to exit

25     Vukovar.  This place is just before this road sign on the road.

Page 6147

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us, in what direction are the people

 2     that we see between the tanks, in what direction are they walking?

 3        A.   In the direction of the new cemetery at Mitnica.  Towards the

 4     exit from Vukovar.  You can see the sign, Vukovar, in blue, and from

 5     there, in that direction, you walk towards the new cemetery, towards

 6     Sotin and Vucilevo.

 7             MS. CLANTON:  Now if I can ask the Case Manager to please skip

 8     forward to 46 minutes and 52 seconds.  And if we could play here until

 9     46 minutes and 58 seconds, please.

10                           [Video-clip played]

11             MS. CLANTON:

12        Q.   Ms. Foro, do you recognise this woman?

13        A.   That is a neighbour who lives in the same street where my husband

14     used to live with his parents.

15        Q.   And where were you at the time that this footage was being taken?

16        A.   I was already -- also walking in that column.

17             MS. CLANTON:  Your Honours, at this time we would seek to tender

18     65 ter 04780.11.

19             MR. GOSNELL:  Can I just ask how -- how long the clip is

20     that's --

21             MS. CLANTON:  The clip is 4 minutes.

22             MR. GOSNELL:  Well, I'm not sure what is on the other 4 minutes

23     of the video or whether the witness has commented on any of it.  I would

24     prefer to only have the portions that the witness has been shown and

25     commented upon admitted.

Page 6148

 1             MS. CLANTON:  I am skipping to this point for the sake of time.

 2     If I could ask for Your Honours to give us an additional ten minutes on

 3     the direct then I would be happy to play the 4-minute clip.

 4             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Ten minutes to play the 4-minute clip,

 5     Ms. Clanton?

 6             MS. CLANTON:  In addition to the time that I would -- 30 minutes

 7     I would request to have a bit more time so that we could build in the

 8     time to play the 4-minute clip, please.  If this is a concern to

 9     Your Honours.

10             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Well, you'll have five minutes extra.

11             MS. CLANTON:  Okay.

12             Mr. Laugel, could we go back to, I believe we stopped at 43:42,

13     please.

14                           [Video-clip played]

15             "Get on the tank.  Get on the tank.  Go on, get on the tank.

16             "We need to get down to the Red Cross.  Just get down to the

17     Red Cross.  Let's go down to the Red Cross, eh?

18             "Sorry -- down.  Down.

19             "Where is the next ..."

20             MS. CLANTON:

21        Q.   Now, Ms. Foro, I want to ask you is everything we've seen in this

22     video-clip just now, is this consistent with what you saw on that day?

23        A.   Everything on the video is consistent with what happened.

24     There's nothing that happened in a different place.  Everything that we

25     see in the video did happen there.  I just want to say that it's just a

Page 6149

 1     small fraction of what happened during that day.  This video does not

 2     show us anything like a full picture of what transpired that day.  I have

 3     seen the whole video.  I mean, the whole video doesn't show what happened

 4     that day.

 5        Q.   Ms. Foro, would you agree that this video-clip that you've just

 6     seen now is an accurate depiction of part of what happened on that day?

 7             MS. CLANTON:  Your Honours, I seek to tender.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] [Overlapping speakers] ...

 9     accurate.

10             MS. CLANTON:

11        Q.   Excuse me.

12             MS. CLANTON:  We would like to tender this video-clip at this

13     time.

14             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Admitted and marked.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P2189, Your Honours.

16             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

17             MS. CLANTON:  May I ask the Registrar how much time I have left,

18     please.

19             JUDGE DELVOIE:  How much do you need, Ms. Clanton?

20             MS. CLANTON:  About five minutes, Your Honour.

21             JUDGE DELVOIE:  That's okay.  Sorry.  That's okay.

22                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

23             MS. CLANTON:  Thank you for your assistance.

24        Q.   Ms. Foro, the last topic that I want to talk to you about today,

25     to ask you about, is your experience at Sremska Mitrovica.

Page 6150

 1             Now, you've given evidence about how you arrived at

 2     Sremska Mitrovica.  And I want to ask you where were you and the other

 3     women taken?

 4        A.   We were taken to the prison at Sremska Mitrovica, and we were

 5     locked up in a large room inside the prison.

 6        Q.   And in this large room, were there any persons in the room who

 7     did not come with you on the bus that you were on from Ovcara?

 8        A.   Mostly those were women who had come from Ovcara and Dr. Bosanac

 9     was brought two days later, I think, along with two other young women,

10     who, as far as I know, were not from Mitnica.  They, too, were brought a

11     couple of days later.

12        Q.   And what happened to these two women who were not from Mitnica

13     who came a couple of days later?

14        A.   If I remember well, one of them was injured by shrapnel; a

15     smaller injury.  They were with us very briefly, and then they were taken

16     away from our room.

17        Q.   What did you find out what happened after they were taken away?

18        A.   I found out they had been taken to a different part of the prison

19     where isolation cells were, and there they were interrogated and abused.

20        Q.   Since you arrived in The Hague, have you had an opportunity to

21     see a list of names containing -- lists of names with people from

22     Sremska Mitrovica on it?

23        A.   Yes, I did see a list of names.  And that list names of names is

24     very familiar because it originates from the office where I worked after

25     I came to Zagreb following the events we have discussed.

Page 6151

 1             MS. CLANTON:  If we could please have 65 ter 02406.2 brought up.

 2     This at tab 27.  And this is a document that was circulated by e-mail

 3     yesterday.  The Defence indicated that they don't have any objection for

 4     this document to be added to the 65 ter list, so we would request that it

 5     be added and made available to the witness at this time.

 6             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Request granted.

 7             MS. CLANTON:

 8        Q.   Ms. Foro, do you recognise the signature on this page?

 9        A.   I do.  I reviewed that list, and I signed the first and the last

10     page of the list.

11        Q.   Now, if we could please turn to page 4 of the list.  This is ERN

12     ending in 8716.  Now, Ms. Foro, we see that the number 136 is circled and

13     there's a letter A next to the name Bosanac, Vesna.  What does this

14     marking mean?

15        A.   That means that Dr. Bosanac, Vesna Bosanac, was with me in the

16     room.

17        Q.   And --

18        A.   At the Sremska Mitrovica prison.

19        Q.   And now above this row in line number 135, we see that -- that

20     number is also circled and that there's a letter B next to the name

21     Bosanac, Lavoslav.  Can you tell us why there's a B next to this name?

22        A.   Because, to the best of my knowledge, Lavoslav Bosanac was also

23     locked up in the Sremska Mitrovica prison.  He is the husband of

24     Dr. Bosanac.

25        Q.   Do you know who Lavoslav Bosanac was before you saw his name on

Page 6152

 1     this list?

 2        A.   Yes, yes.

 3        Q.   Ms. Foro, can you confirm that the marking of the letter A

 4     throughout is the same for the other markings as it is for Dr. Bosanac,

 5     that is, that you've indicated with a letter A if it was somebody who was

 6     in your room?

 7        A.   All the persons that I recognised from this list as having been

 8     in the prison at Sremska Mitrovica with me, I marked with an A.

 9        Q.   And is it correct that throughout you marked with a B, as you did

10     for line 135, the persons that you knew?

11        A.   That's correct.  All the people that I knew personally, I knew

12     who they were, I marked with a B.

13             MS. CLANTON:  Your Honour, we would seek to tender 02406.2 into

14     evidence at this time.

15             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Admitted and marked.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P2190, Your Honours.

17             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

18             MS. CLANTON:

19        Q.   Ms. Foro, the last thing I want to ask you about is you testified

20     in the Mrksic case that your husband was also held at Sremska Mitrovica.

21     And this is at transcript page 2435.

22             What information did your husband share with you about the

23     conditions for the men who were detained there?

24        A.   According to what he told me, I understood their circumstances

25     had been much worse than ours, and they were regularly mistreated and


Page 6153

 1     abused.  After being beaten up in Sremska Mitrovica, he came home,

 2     missing a tooth, and generally they mistreated them.  The men had worse

 3     conditions than the women, and their treatment was much worse.

 4        Q.   During the time that your husband was at Sremska Mitrovica, did

 5     he ever tell you about why he was being held there?

 6        A.   Nobody talked to them about such things.  Nobody gave them any

 7     reasons why they were there, just as they did not tell us anything, and

 8     we had no opportunity to ask.

 9             MS. CLANTON:  Your Honours, I have no further questions.

10             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you, Ms. Clanton.

11             Mr. Gosnell.

12                           Cross-examination by Mr. Gosnell:

13        Q.   Good afternoon, Ms. Foro.  My name is Christopher Gosnell.  I

14     represent Mr. Hadzic in these proceedings, and I just have a few

15     questions for you.  If I'm not clear at all, please feel free to ask me

16     to rephrase, and I'll do my best.  Do you understand?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   Did you watch Croatian television in 1992?

19        A.   1992?  Yes.  Yes, I was in Zagreb and I watched Croatian

20     television.

21        Q.   Are you familiar with a programme named "Latinica"?

22        A.   Yes, I am.  I just have to say that I didn't watch television too

23     much because I worked in an office that was busy 24 hours a day.  We

24     prepared material and other things for exchanges of prisoners and we had

25     little time for TV.

Page 6154

 1        Q.   Was it a nightly newscast, or a weekly news programme?  What

 2     exactly was this programme, "Latinica"?

 3        A.   "Latinica"?  I think it was on in the evening.  I didn't follow

 4     it.  I know there was such a programme, but I did not follow it really,

 5     with any attention.

 6        Q.   If I understand correctly, you took shelter during the siege of

 7     Vukovar in the cellars of a utility company called Komunalno; is that

 8     correct?

 9        A.   Yes, I worked at the utility company.  Since it was a strategic

10     company for the city under those circumstances, our manager told us,

11     employees, to set up a group if we wished that would be on stand by in

12     that shelter, on stand by, meaning our work.

13        Q.   And how many of you were there who took shelter in the basement?

14        A.   There were perhaps ten of us from the utility company, 10 to 15

15     maybe.

16        Q.   And then at some point were you joined there by members of the

17     ZNG?

18        A.   At one point, when the attacks at Vukovar became more intensive,

19     the command of the ZNG joined us because it was a large cellar, formerly

20     a wine cellar, dug deep into the ground, divided into several rooms, so

21     the command of the Home Guard Corps joined us in that basement, but, of

22     course, they were in a different part of the cellar.

23        Q.   And did they have some radio equipment with them?

24        A.   Yes.  They had a radio, radio communications.  We had a TV set

25     and we had radios where we were able to hear the programmes of Croatian

Page 6155

 1     Radio Vukovar, and, of course, we were interested in the news.

 2        Q.   Thank you very much, Madam Foro.

 3             MR. GOSNELL:  Mr. President, I have no further questions.

 4             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

 5             Anything in re-direct, Ms. Clanton?

 6             MS. CLANTON:  No.

 7             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Madam Foro, this brings your testimony to an end.

 8     We thank you for coming to The Hague.  You're now released as a witness,

 9     and we wish you a safe journey back home.

10             The Court Usher will escort you out of the courtroom.  Thank you

11     very much.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13                           [The witness withdrew]

14             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Court adjourned.

15                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.56 p.m.,

16                           to be reconvened on Monday, the 24th day of June,

17                           2013, at 9.00 a.m.