1 Monday, 1 July 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.59 p.m.
5 JUDGE DELVOIE: Good afternoon to everyone in and around the
7 Madam Registrar, could you call the case, please.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours.
9 This is the case IT-04-75-T, the Prosecutor versus Goran Hadzic.
10 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
11 May we have the appearances, please, starting with the
13 MR. STRINGER: Good afternoon, Mr. President, Your Honours.
14 For the Prosecution, Douglas Stringer, Alex Demirdjian,
15 Case Manager Thomas Laugel, and legal intern, Kathryn Fox.
16 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
17 For the Defence.
18 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Good afternoon, Your Honours. For the Defence of
19 Goran Hadzic, Zoran Zivanovic and Christopher Gosnell. Thank you.
20 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you very much.
21 The witness may be brought in.
22 Yes, Mr. Demirdjian.
23 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Yes, Your Honours. We're calling
24 Mr. Adnan Abd El Razek as our next witness. And if we didn't put it on
25 the record last week, let me just thank the Trial Chamber for organising
1 the additional sessions to ensure we can complete his testimony. Thank you.
2 [The witness entered court]
3 JUDGE DELVOIE: Good afternoon, Mr. Witness. Thank you for
4 coming to The Hague to assist the Tribunal. I suppose you will testify
5 in English? Is that right.
6 THE WITNESS: Yes. Yes, sir. Thank you.
7 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you. Could you please tell us your name
8 and date of birth.
9 THE WITNESS: My name is Adnan Tawfiq Abd El Razek. I was born
10 on the 4th of June, 1940.
11 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you very much. You are about to make the
12 solemn declaration by which witnesses commit themselves to tell the
13 truth. I need to point out to you that you expose yourself to the
14 penalties of perjury should you give false or untruthful information to
15 the Tribunal.
16 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
17 JUDGE DELVOIE: May I ask you to now read the solemn declaration
18 aloud that the court usher will give to you.
19 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
20 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
21 WITNESS: ADNAN ABD EL RAZEK
22 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you, Mr. Abd El Razek. Please be seated.
23 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
24 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Demirdjian, please go ahead.
25 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Thank you very much, Your Honours.
1 Examination by Mr. Demirdjian:
2 Q. Good afternoon, Dr. Abd El Razek.
3 A. Good afternoon.
4 Q. Before I begin with some of my questions, allow me to give you a
5 little guidance. Since we both speak the same language, we should make a
6 pause between questions and answers, perhaps count to three mentally to
7 make sure there's a pause, as we have interpreters translating for the
8 accused and other people outside the courtroom.
9 A. Yes, sir.
10 Q. You have stated your name on -- on the record, may I ask you to
11 provide the Trial Chamber with your nationality or ethnic background?
12 A. I was born to a Palestinian family prior to the creation of the
13 state of Israel in what is so-called the mandated Palestine. We are --
14 my family is an Arab Muslim Palestinian family who luckily did not leave
15 the country after its occupation by then the Israeli forces. We stayed
16 in the state of Israel as Palestinian Arab minority and I -- our identity
17 historically and realistically, we're Arab citizens of Israel.
18 Q. Can I ask you to give us a brief overview of your educational
20 A. With pleasure, sir. At my age as a good remember back on the
21 good days of being a student. Never mind my high school as it is not --
22 I started my academic studies undergraduate the Hebrew University in
23 Jerusalem. My major was social work. I worked as probation officer for
24 seven years after graduation. Then I moved back to the Hebrew University
25 to have my graduate studies and I was teaching at the Hebrew University
1 for seven years social work. And then I was teaching in Bethlehem
2 University in West Bank and Al-Quds University in Jerusalem. Then I
3 decided to go for my Ph.D. I went to University of Michigan at Ann
4 Arbor. I have a double major, sociology and social work. I finished my
5 Ph.D. on August 19 -- 1982. And then I went to work for the UN.
6 Q. Is it correct to say that as of -- it is October 1982, I believe,
7 that you started to work for the United Nations?
8 A. 1st of October, I moved to New York. I assume my work at the
9 Political Department. Then it was Political and General Assembly
10 Department. I worked until my retirement on 1st of July, 2000. All the
11 time I was in the Political Department, even when I was borrowed or sent
12 or volunteered to go with UNPROFOR 1992.
13 Q. Now, let's get to that period of time, Dr. Abd El Razek. Is it
14 correct that in April of 1992, you were assigned to go on a mission to
15 the former Yugoslavia?
16 A. Actually I was supposed to go on -- end of March that same year.
17 We arrived to Belgrade on the 3rd of April, 1992, and then the whole
18 contingency of civil affairs were very limited, very small. By the time
19 I arrived to Belgrade - very nice city, by the way - something happened
20 in the airport in Sarajevo. The plane of -- of then -- or the late
21 President Alija Izetbegovic was stopped and kidnapped by local forces,
22 and I would say that was the mark of the unrest, which is a mild
23 expression, but the mark of upheaval in -- in Sarajevo.
24 We could not -- I could not arrive to Sarajevo then because of
25 the situation. I was appointed to be the political advisor, if you wish,
1 to the civil police of UNPROFOR, and then most of our commanders, civil
2 commanders, commander -- military commander, civil affairs were in
3 Sarajevo. I was supposed to be stationed in Sarajevo. We could not
4 reach Sarajevo. And then we stayed for a week in Belgrade, which gave me
5 the pleasure of being in that city and chat with people from all walks to
6 realise how harsh was then in Belgrade the economic situation and the --
7 the -- the financial crisis. We stayed in a hotel. I regret it, I did
8 [indiscernible] five stars, I paid hardly 12 dollars per night. This
9 period was very difficult for all of them.
10 Q. Now, if I could ask you to go back a little bit before you arrive
11 in Belgrade. In -- in New York before you departed, what type of
12 preparation or training, if any, was provided for the task that was ahead
13 of you?
14 A. I would want -- I would like to say something that maybe then the
15 UN leadership would not like to hear. The entire mission was arranged in
16 a hurry, and in short period of time, at least the civil affairs had to
17 organise itself in few days or maybe maximum ten days and to start
18 planning and going around for -- being stationed in -- initially we used
19 Bosnia as the neutral, quote/unquote, neutral territory, to host the
20 civil affairs and the sector commander and -- and the logistic was
21 Banja Luka, actually, but the major chiefs of -- of operations were in
23 They sent contingency of civil police and military to tour the
24 occupied then Croatian areas. In New York was nobody to brief us, but we
25 were sent to read whatever the Security Council then discussed or decided
1 upon. Of course, I -- I did go and read the -- the deliberation on the
2 first resolution, it was the 721/91. This is the slash, this is mine
3 because, you know, I saw the comments all over, they say 721 of the
4 security, but this is the mark in Security Council, S3.
5 Anyway, on the resolution of the cease-fires creating the PAs or
6 the protecting areas, and later on the vision of Vance, Cyrus Vance,
7 special envoy to share this project, if you may call it, or to the
8 mission. We knew very few things.
9 This small episode, my colleague, I went to -- then it was no
10 Google. I went to the atlas, I went to the British encyclopedia and I
11 had to draw by hand drawing the areas taken from the British encyclopedia
12 and I had both Croatia and Bosnia and with the names that then the -- the
13 encyclopedia mentioned. In the first day or first week I was later on in
14 Sarajevo. On my desk, I had this map. I was visited by one of the major
15 or high-ranking Presidency, call it, officer and he saw the maps and he
16 was mad at me because this map was something to do with ethnicity and --
17 et cetera.
18 So the -- our knowledge of the entire area was very poor.
19 Q. Before I move on with my next question. I see you have some
20 notes in front of you, doctor. As I explained to you before, this is not
21 really a memory test, so unless you really need to refresh your memory, I
22 think that the Trial Chamber would prefer that you don't have notes in
23 front of you while testifying. Unless you really need to refresh your
24 memory, then could you ask for permission.
25 But can I you to not have the notes in front of you. I
1 understand that you -- with the dates and the numbers it is quite
2 complicated bu --
3 A. Yeah. I'm a disciplined person, I'll do. But remember, I'm not
4 young anymore, and particularly with dates and names, Your Excellency,
5 you have to forgive me if I sometimes need to refer to my written memory,
6 not this. I'm not -- I'm closing this one.
7 Q. Thank you very much.
8 A. And I appreciate these procedures. I'm not intending to be
10 Q. And as I say, if you ever need to look at your notes, you could
11 always ask for leave to do so.
12 A. Yes, sir.
13 Q. Now I understand you explained to us the type of preparation you
14 had. You mentioned the Security Council resolutions and the reports.
15 Were you familiar with them at the time?
16 A. With the Vance Plan, I read it. I'm not sure that then I totally
17 comprehended what happens, and there is a difference between reading
18 about the vision of the plan with the areas, functions, and the real
19 mental perception of yourself. And I did then understood the major --
20 sorry, major points of the plan. If you wish, I can explain it now, what
21 I thought then the plan was about.
22 Q. Perhaps you could explain to the Trial Chamber, before you left
23 New York, what did you understand the mandate to be and your task when
24 you arrived in the former Yugoslavia.
25 A. Even in -- in the Security Council, in that reports of the
1 Security ... Council was clear, almost differences of task for the
2 military and those for the civilians. While earlier -- excuse me, for
3 going back, we just finished as UN our successful mission in Namibia, and
4 Namibia was led by civilians, by civil leadership, Mr. Ahtisaari, became
5 later on president of Finland. He was assisted by police contingency and
6 some guards on this.
7 The Security Council based on the deliberation and the reports
8 from the field felt that this time the mission -- cannot be handed or
9 handled by only civilians. This is why they appointed Mr. Satish
10 Nambiar, Indian General, very respected general with great integrity, to
11 be the chief commander of that mission. And Mr. Thornberry, Cedric
12 Thornberry, British citizen, as the head of civil affairs, to be advisor
13 or escorting, helping, being a mentor, political mentor to the -- the --
14 Mr. Nambiar, and this is what happened. And he was supposed to lead our
15 work as civilians, and I was, of course, a civilian. He was too busy to
16 re-establish the whole hierarchy for -- for -- for handling this crisis
17 with this vast things in -- but then I had the -- the chance or the
18 opportunity to be with her -- with him, sorry, in Belgrade, forcefully,
19 and then we talked more details about our missions.
20 In New York, there was still euphoria of the success of Namibia
21 and really did not pay attention to the details of what really we are
22 going to do. And I regret that we did not have better knowledge of -- of
23 what is going to be in the coming few months or years.
24 Q. Now, when -- when you arrived in Belgrade, as you just explained
25 a moment ago, you had the opportunity to speak with Mr. Thornberry about
1 the mandate.
2 Could you the tell the Court what was mandate? What were you
3 expected to do in the region.
4 A. I can -- I can explain the package, but, of course, I'm -- I'm
5 more -- was interesting in -- in our duty as civil affairs. But the
6 package was clear and -- for us at least. There was Cyrus Vance Plan
7 which after -- during the signature or signing of the cease-fire in -- in
8 Croatia, was to, (a), to consolidate the cease-fire, to disarm those --
9 to design or designate PAs or protecting area. And those protecting
10 areas, we are to demilitarise those protecting areas, and to see that
11 there's -- that civilian safety, but major thing was also that, you know,
12 we were instructed to focus on as civilians is the return of the
13 refugees, let alone, of course, not -- not to let further exploitation
14 and further deportation of people from those areas.
15 As civil affairs assisted or assisting both ways of the military,
16 we were supposed to go to those areas and to see to it that, (a), there
17 is really -- civilians are not targeted and civilians are not chased,
18 civilians are not harmed, and to work on the exchange of the refugees.
19 Q. Okay. Thank you for that.
20 In relation to what you just told us, I'd like to you take a look
21 at a document which is 65 ter 5140. And that is at tab 41 of our list.
22 You will see it in a moment on the screen in front of you. If you have a
23 hard time reading on the screen, please let us know and we'll try to
24 adjust the screen.
25 A. If you can just enlarge a little bit, the font. Can we -- oh,
2 Can I -- I cannot do it here myself.
3 Q. You cannot handle the document but you cab ask us to move it
5 If we start with the top right-hand corner, so we can see the
6 date on the document --
7 A. Yes, it is 15 February 1992.
8 Q. 1992, okay.
9 A. Yes, S/23592.
10 Q. Before coming to court today, did you have an opportunity to
11 review this document?
12 A. Yes. Yes, sir.
13 Q. Okay. You see in the initial paragraph that there are references
14 to several Security Council resolutions --
15 A. Yes, sir.
16 Q. -- 721, 740, 724, et cetera.
17 A. 74 -- 740, this is the UNPROFOR thing.
18 Q. Right. Now we have a second section at the bottom which deals
19 with the recent developments.
20 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: And if we go to the second page, it's moving
21 now. Yes, if we can enlarge it a bit.
22 Q. Very generally, you will see that there's a narrative of
23 exchanges between political leaders.
24 What I want to you look at is the next page, page 3. Under
25 section 2, which is called: "Implementation of the plan." Starting at
1 paragraph 9.
2 A. Okay.
3 Q. Very well. Now looking at paragraph 9, it talks about the plan
4 has already been submitted on the 11th of December, 1991. And what I
5 want you to look at now is item 10, paragraph 10. It talks here about:
6 "First, I should like to draw attention to the provision in
7 paragraph 9 of the plan that the exact boundaries of the United Nations
8 Protected Areas will be decided by an advance party of the United Nations
9 force, after consulting local leaders."
10 Now, at the time as you were leaving or -- when you arrived
11 Belgrade, were you familiar with the concept of United Nations protected
13 A. Not border, but areas, yes.
14 Q. The areas, yes. What did you know about the areas? How many
15 were there and where were they?
16 A. The major one were three and then add the fourth one. It was
17 Sector Sarajevo was Knin area. Sector East which is the one that I later
18 assigned to, and Sector West, closer to Zagreb. Sector East was really
19 along the Danube River. The top, up there is Beli Manastir. And down
20 Sombor, Erdut, Dalj, go to Vukovar and down all area. We are more
21 familiar with the region that is close to Osijek because this was our way
22 for -- interfering with the parties in that area.
23 Q. Very well.
24 A. This is called Sector East. And initially was -- sector
25 commander was a Belgian, I think that lieutenant-general, but not
1 colonel, above colonel. Chief of Staff also was Belgian, was contingency
2 of seven, eight people, soldier, not more. Civil affairs was located or
3 assigned to Mr. Lubin, and there was a second man in that sector,
4 supposed to be second man. And this is what happens when we went to that
6 Q. Very well. Can you look at the next paragraph, 11. It deals
7 with -- well, I'll look at it here for you. Paragraph 15 --
8 A. [Overlapping speakers] ...
9 Q. Sorry. I want to take your attention to the second sentence
10 which starts with: "In discussion with parties concerned, it has" --
11 A. This is paragraph 11?
12 Q. 11, yes.
13 A. Okay.
14 Q. In the second line you see at the end it starts with: "In
15 discussions with the parties concerned ..."
16 Do you see that?
17 A. Yeah, yeah, okay.
18 Q. Yes. And then it follows here:
19 "It has emerged that the most practicable way of dealing with the
20 weapons of the Territorial Defence units and personnel based in the
21 United Nations protected areas would be for them to be placed in secure
22 storage under a two-lock system, with one lock being controlled by the
23 United Nations force and the other by the president of the council of the
24 opstina concerned."
25 Now were you familiar with this concept of a two-lock system?
1 A. We call it double locked. Call it double locked. I'm sorry, but
2 this reminds me of some funny things happening in -- the arms were
3 supposed to be double locked and supposed we have control on this.
4 The time I was in Erdut was a short time. I seen men are --
5 armed vehicles running all over, they were not locked. I seen tanks.
6 And then when I left, there were stories about how some people from ours
7 handled those -- those double locks. I prefer not to mention that
8 incidents but this is a bit painful.
9 We did not really had at the beginning initially control. The
10 JNA was stationed in -- in the boat, east of Dalj, but the boat was
11 surrounded by big forest, hosting a clear military camp with heavy
12 equipments, guarding not only the boat but, you know, being there around.
13 They impose on us curfew and blackouts, and they moved through
14 night-time. When we go to meet the general in the boat, we were escorted
15 by their vehicles with no lights. And I was wondering how they could see
16 the road, but -- but the JNA would say clearly that we are out of the
17 areas. Yet you will see JNA contingency in the morning or day around --
18 around our place.
19 Q. Very well. And if I asked you to look at the next paragraph,
20 which is 12, it says:
21 "With reference to paragraph 11 of the plan, I have come to the
22 conclusion that, for technical and practical reasons, it would be better
23 for the force's headquarters to be located at Sarajevo, although the
24 logistics battalion would be headquartered at Banja Luka."
25 I think you made a reference to this at the beginning. Is this
2 A. Yes. Yeah, yes.
3 Q. Okay. And paragraph 13 deals with the fact that the plan
4 provides for a civilian chief for this mission. I believe you've looked
5 at this paragraph which continues onto the -- the next page and which
6 suggests, and if we go to the top of the next page. At the top of the
7 next page you see the sentence which starts with:
8 "I intend therefore to entrust the overall command of the United
9 Nations operations to the Force Commander."
10 Is that what happened on the ground?
11 A. I just mentioned that at the beginning of my statement that while
12 in Namibia was the -- the mission was run by civilian. In the former
13 Yugoslavia, was run by general -- initially, or the first year, General
14 Satish Nambiar as commander of the missions, while Cedric Thornberry was
15 the -- assisting him in civil affairs. It is, you know, the -- the major
16 surprise to our teams and to our mission, and you mention earlier how
17 much we knew about -- about the region, is that we believed, and I don't
18 know if it is naively, that Sarajevo would be safe and Banja Luka would
19 be safe and our people were functioning from those places in a safe and
20 organised way. It took very few weeks to realise that even Sarajevo was
21 not safe for the mission to operate, and not Banja Luka, definitely not.
22 Q. Thank you for that clarification, Dr. Abd El Razek.
23 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Your Honours, may I tender this document please.
24 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
25 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, document with 65 ter 05140 receives
1 number Exhibit P2296.
2 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
3 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Thank you.
4 Q. Mr. Abd El Razek, you told us that when you arrived -- you
5 arrived in Belgrade initially.
6 A. Yes, sir.
7 Q. Before moving on to Erdut, how much time did you spend in
8 Belgrade approximately?
9 A. We arrived the 3rd of April. We left the morning of the 11th of
11 Q. And while you were in Belgrade, what kind of work did you do
13 A. First of all, we definitely were following every morning the
14 sitrep. Sitrep is the situation reports written by the military
15 contingency. We call it "sitrep" shortly. And we were, of course,
16 following the news all around, following the incidents in Sarajevo,
17 wondering what will happen to our mission. And then, of course, during
18 the day with Mr. Thornberry and I think there were three of us only,
19 civilians and that is -- we'll try to figure out our mission what to do,
20 what to do, et cetera. This seven or those seven days were a good break
21 for me, because then I could re-educate myself on -- on -- on the -- on
22 this issue, and to take a brief breath before I started. I was a little
23 bit, of course, disappointed that I was not sent immediately to Sarajevo
24 but then I was sent to Erdut.
25 Q. The -- the sitreps that you mentioned, where were they coming
1 from, from which locations?
2 A. Still -- still was Sarajevo is the headquarter. We have small --
3 then small office [indiscernible] in Belgrade and smaller in Zagreb. But
4 the sitreps will come from the commander's office. They normally are
5 written and sent by the Chief of Staff.
6 Q. And then the sitreps themselves, which -- the information that
7 was in the sitreps, which area did it cover?
8 A. The Belgrade sitreps that we received mostly on the PAs areas.
9 In Sarajevo, they came later because they themselves did not what was
10 happening in Sarajevo. And most of the reports, the military reports,
11 sitreps, came each sector with details of that morning, et cetera, what
12 happens. Clashes, fighting, and mostly - mostly, unfortunately, sadly -
13 how many people were deported or expelled in that -- that area. The
14 civil police has its own report but they did not call it "sitrep" and
15 they did not report on daily on a -- to -- to -- to the participants over
16 there. And civil affairs, you know, being assigned, allocated, to work
17 with them, they would send me a few things but very, very, very few. In
18 the areas where -- the hot areas, and particularly then it was Knin, very
19 hot area, UNMOs, United Nations Military Observers, were reporting, but
20 not directly to us, to the headquarter and the headquarter would write
21 the sitreps and send to headquarter New York to Mr. Goulding, who was
22 then the undersecretary for peacekeeping --
23 Q. With respect to the sitrep that you reviewed while you were in
24 Belgrade, what did you learn about the situation in the PAs, in the
25 protected areas?
1 A. I will be -- pretended that I knew everything then. No.
2 I -- I -- the impression was (a) then -- I'm telling impression and
3 forgive me if I don't go to the details because the whole thing is
5 The impression was, (a), the cease-fire not always was maintained
6 or kept. That from here and there, there are still fighting. That --
7 and mostly for our -- as civilians our civil contingency the ethnic
8 cleansing, that's all then called ethnic cleansing, or the expelling of
9 non-Serbs residents from those area continue.
10 Q. Now, with respect to what you just told us I would like you to
11 take a look at a document.
12 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Which is 65 ter 5882 at tab 8. I have a note
13 here saying that is under seal. Perhaps it shouldn't be broadcasted.
14 [Prosecution counsel confer]
15 THE WITNESS: March 24.
16 MR. DEMIRDJIAN:
17 Q. Yes. So this is before the time you were deployed, a week or so.
18 When you arrived here in The Hague a few days ago, did you have an
19 opportunity to review this press release?
20 A. Yes, sir.
21 Q. Very well. Now, in the upper header we see "Republic of Croatia,
22 Ministry of Information." As you say, 24th of March, 1992. And if we
23 look at the first sentence here, it discusses that:
24 "The Office of Interethnic Relations with the Croatian government
25 sent today a letter to the command of UNPROFOR and the EC mission asking
1 them to make efforts to prevent forced deportations of the non-Serb
2 population from the occupied areas of Croatia."
3 Now you mentioned this a moment ago --
4 A. Mm-hm.
5 Q. -- is this the sort of information that was available to you
6 while you were in Belgrade?
7 A. Not -- not -- not this. We have more -- more press reports on
8 those, and not -- not the Croatian -- I was not made available, not
9 exposed to any -- then any Croatian reports. I -- we -- we hardly had
10 any reports from the fighting forces. We had mostly from our sources,
11 and UNMO and the sector commanders.
12 Q. Now with respect to the substance of this report, it continues on
13 to talk about the escalation and deportations. It mentions here the
14 ethnic groups that are concerned.
15 Now, did you have this type of information available to you from
16 the sources that you were reviewing?
17 A. Yes. From -- from UNMO and from, of course, the sitreps we
18 talked about, but not at 23rd of March because I was not in the mission
20 Q. Absolutely.
21 A. In Belgrade we had those reports on -- if you wish, I can tell
22 you. The day we arrived -- on the 11th, actually, of April, we had full
23 report on -- for deportation areas. Dalj was 110 if I remember. In
24 Erdut, in Beli Manastir, and there is the city in the south, very
25 south-east of the Croatian area. What's it called? And yesterday I had
1 it in mind. It started with P. A city in -- in -- bordering the new
2 south, very south-east of Sector East.
3 Q. Very well. And let's get to Erdut.
4 First of all, you mentioned now the 11th of April as a date that
5 you arrived.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Where exactly in Erdut did you arrive to?
8 A. The headquarter of UN in Erdut was the very north-east of the
9 village. Apparently it was either an old camp or -- there are some ruins
10 around it, Ottoman ruins or Turkish ruins. It was two buildings -- this
11 is the very first -- the very last buildings on the villages. No -- not
12 any building north of that area. If you go north and if you go to top of
13 there -- of the building you see the river. It was a building, a small
14 building that served the military and that sector commander, and small
15 building that we civilians stayed is -- and dining room. I think that
16 even the road from the main road was lasted there. Going to ours it
17 was -- it was sand road, was not really a -- an organised or
18 [indiscernible] road.
19 This is -- we were -- the whole -- the whole village is not very
20 big. Yes? I mean, you could walk from there to, whatever you call it,
21 mid town. So that meant the village was walking distance. But we were
22 stationed away from the building, from citizens -- from the citizens in
23 that area. I cannot tell if it was really former military place or not.
24 This -- I cannot recall that I knew this.
25 Q. Now upon your arrival in Erdut, who -- who do you find there at
1 the barracks?
2 A. We were immediately received by the sector commander and the
3 civil affairs commander who was -- Mr. Zitterman was the chief of civil
4 police, and Mr. -- and General Hoover -- Hoven -- was the sector
5 commander and Jean Pierre is Chief of Staff. Were -- we hardly had a
6 coffee and then Mr. -- or General Satish Nambiar arrived to give us
7 briefing and to discuss with us our missions. I cannot tell, and I did
8 not ask, whether it was co-ordinated that he will come to brief us or
9 accidentally he came, but luckily he came and we could have chance to
10 talk with him and to hear him and to clarify our mission.
11 Q. Now, as part of the civilian affairs there, who was your direct
13 A. We were three people in that place. Jim Lubin, British citizen,
14 who was UN official earlier and retired, and upon retirement he was
15 joining that programme. And his wife, young wife. I regret I don't
16 remember her name.
17 Q. That's fine.
18 A. He was supposed to be the -- a civilian officer of -- of that --
19 the sector. We call it chief of civilian co-ordinator of the sector.
20 And myself, of course, and mostly we considered then that -- the civil
21 police to be on our side, not on the military side. This is our
22 colleagues because this -- mostly we talked about civilian things and
23 was -- we felt okay. It was good -- good team. Not big team. Not --
24 not fantastic team, but it was okay.
25 Q. And very briefly, Mr. Jim Lubin himself, who was he reporting to?
1 A. Our chief, it was, of course, Cedric Thornberry. We call it CT.
2 And if you see that reports to him, we'll address as CT, Cedric
3 Thornberry. He was then still stationed in Belgrade. And we sent our
4 report to him. Bureaucratically and orderly and ranking speaking, he
5 would sign the report, not me. Whether it is action that -- done by me
6 or the civil affairs or the others, police affairs, Mr. Thornberry --
7 Mr. Lubin would be reporting directly to Mr. Thornberry.
8 Q. Thank you. Now before we get into the details of your time in
9 Erdut, can you tell us how much time did you spend in Erdut?
10 A. I arrived on 11th, afternoon. I left on the 21st of April.
11 Q. Very well. And again, very briefly, where were you stationed to
13 A. The coming few days, I was requested to go to Zagreb to brief the
14 internal minister and the chief of police on the incidents that took
15 place a day earlier in Marinci. I went with chief of civil police, was
16 the name, a Norwegian officer, fine gentleman, Kjell Johansen, his name.
17 We went to the internal minister to have an extreme attack on us and how
18 there we helped the Serbs in the sector deporting 400 non-Serbs the day
19 earlier from Ilidza. I was trying to explain. Luckily the blame went to
20 Lubin not to me personally, and -- and this is -- we spent two days in
22 Then I have to -- to be stationed back in Sarajevo, and you know
23 then transportation, communication connecting to Sarajevo was not via the
24 missile system, via the transportation today. We had to go to cross
25 through Croatia, almost down to the shore, back to Sarajevo. Took us
1 something like 14, 16 hours from the airport of Zagreb to reach Sarajevo.
2 Q. Doctor, I don't mean to interrupt you but just, very briefly, how
3 many time did you spend in Sarajevo, in total?
4 A. All in all, if excluding the 11th, ten days.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Just for the record, Your Honours, the exhibit
7 which was admitted, P2296, I'm informed that it should be admitted under
8 seal. We just did a verification.
9 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
10 To be admitted under seal, Madam Registrar.
11 MR. DEMIRDJIAN:
12 Q. Now, returning back to Erdut, you told us that when you arrived
13 you were received by Zitterman who was the civilian --
14 A. Zitterman, yes.
15 Q. Yes. By that time had the UNPROFOR arrived in the area?
16 A. UNPROFOR is -- is -- civil police is UNPROFOR, was part of
17 UNPROFOR, but sector commander was sitting there. If you are talking
18 about the massive deployment, no. We had sector commander, the Chief of
19 Staff, and four, five assistant people sitting with him in that
20 headquarter, military, and the three of us civil affairs, and two
21 police -- civilian police in -- in this. And we had a civil police
22 station in Dalj and we had UNMO along that border with Osijek. This all
23 UNPROFOR. We are together, I believe, not -- fill normal bus.
24 Q. You mentioned earlier that in Sector East there was a commander
25 who was part of the Belgian contingent. How large was the Belgian
1 contingent there?
2 A. Now, of course, later on, and gradually a Belgian battalion came
3 to be stationed in Beli Manastir. Beli Manastir is over the bridge,
4 overlooking -- it's something like, well, I would say, in normal drive,
5 not crazy drive, something 40 minutes from Erdut through the main road.
6 There was a Belgian battalion led by Colonel Joachim [phoen] I believe
7 his name was. They were supposed to deal with mostly the area of
8 Beli Manastir. I haven't seen them coming down to Erdut or to Dalj.
9 They were not -- totally were not part of that. And then, a few days
10 after I arrived, we had something like 20, 25 young Russian soldiers
11 arriving to the headquarter to be under -- and I failed maybe to mention
12 that the deputy sector commander was a Russian colonel. So, actually --
13 the way -- the way the forces were distributed or allocated or
14 distributed is not something with the battle or war arrangement.
15 Headquarters either at the sector or the chief headquarter will have
16 representative of the battalions of -- of countries that were deployed
17 their battalion under the flag of the UN, the UNPROFOR. So every
18 headquarter, the people in that headquarter, the people in the sector
19 would be representing the battalions. Some of them not but mostly yes.
20 Definitely a sector commander will be represent the major power, major
21 forces in that region.
22 So in Erdut because of the presence of the -- of the Belgian
23 battalion, so the Belgian commander was -- the commander was a Belgian
25 Q. Very well. Now, before getting into specific events,
1 Dr. Abd El Razek, could you tell us, upon your arrival, what were your
2 assignments, what were you expected to do as part of your role in the
3 civilian affairs?
4 A. To be honest with you, with the Court, of course, with
5 Your Majesties, we were close to guessing what we would be doing next
6 morning, but definitely in the sense of theoretical mission or political
7 mission, we knew as civil affairs we had to take care of the civil
8 affairs of the people in the PA areas, not the military affairs, not to
9 interfere in, what they call it, the double lock, army, or the
10 cease-fire, or chasing fighters around. UNMO was to register those
11 violations. The civil police is to receive complaints of the civilians.
12 The civilians would go to the civil police, but later on, when we
13 arrived, civilians start coming to us, not to civil police.
14 We were supposed to work with whatever we had, and then the Red
15 Cross and UNHCR, United Nations High Commission for Refugees, and others
16 to see, (a), if you can help the people of that -- that region with this
17 crisis, stressful situation, and hopefully that, in time, will be
18 facilitating the return of some of the refugees. To find out that
19 immediately after we arrived, and I -- we -- we were briefed immediately
20 when we arrived on three, four incidents of hundreds of deportees from PA
21 from the area, including Erdut, that the 8th or 9th of -- of April, two
22 days before arrive, were deported 110 or something from Erdut, something
23 from area of the villages of Vukovar and Beli Manastir. I remember
24 something, vaguely something like a total 400-something, 500 people were
25 deported between the 7th and the 10th of -- of -- of that month and, of
1 course, this is horrifying and we felt immediately that this is our
2 project. We cannot let this go.
3 And we start our communications. The first one was really --
4 that night, I think, or the night before the -- that night, I think, we
5 went to meet the general, the boat general, the JNA, because the civil
6 police has already the reports so we could -- we have material to go and
7 to discuss it with him. And then we started looking for the civil
8 authorities around to see if we can do something about this.
9 So -- I would say we concentrate mostly on -- not, of course, not
10 the return of the refugees but the prevention of further expelling people
11 on this, with very, very limited ability and means and presence.
12 Your Excellency, if -- we came to protect those people. We came
13 to provide them with help. We were subjected to curfew and blackout, and
14 we accepted this. I regret it. I regret it that UN accepted such a
15 provision. While you have clear mandate by the Security Council, whether
16 it's Chapter 6 or 7 does not make any difference because Chapter 6 --
17 plenty to do in this. We accepted. Why we accepted was too small potato
18 to challenge this, but I was wondering why we accept. We are coming here
19 to protect civilians and then we could not move in the evening, and most
20 of the actions, most of the action were done after evening.
21 If you permit me, may I have some water. I want to show you the
22 pattern -- just to explain the pattern of this.
23 In the evening, armed people will go to marked houses, marked not
24 by -- by ink or something, but marked, those are non-Serbian houses.
25 They start shooting at the windows, doors, in the air. They kill
1 animals. I know that one evening that they kill two horses, and I mean,
2 a guy was crying and I wish they killed my son not the horses. But this
3 is something else. Horses. And then they leave. Then the police come
4 in the morning. They call them, said, What happened to you? Police
5 would say, Listen, those are military men. He will not say any milicija
6 or some military, armed people, not from here, not ours, and we cannot
7 help it but we advise you to leave, for your safety, please leave.
8 Now some of them will get the hint, some others no. They call
9 the next evening, do the same thing but escalated. And those people come
10 to back the police to let them leave. This was repeated [indiscernible]
11 not only Erdut, Osijek, Beli Manastir. I witnessed in Beli Manastir two
12 families that I help leave that area. The same story. In the evening,
13 boom boom boom boom. The doors, windows, animals, thieves, and the
14 morning say, Hey, guys, the only choice you have is to leave. We cannot
15 protect you.
16 Q. Now let's go back on -- yes.
17 MR. GOSNELL: Sorry, just before this is lost on the transcript
18 and I fully understand why the word was used at -- at page 24, line 11,
19 the Serbian word that was used there, but I believe that my learned
20 friend and I will both agree that the word that was actually used by the
21 witness based upon the word that he has used in his statements is not the
22 Serbian word. It's in fact the English word. I don't want to use the
24 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: I will clarify.
25 MR. GOSNELL: Thank you.
1 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Just a second, please.
2 [Prosecution counsel confer]
3 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Couple of tell matters, Your Honour, as ...
4 Yes. First of all, with respect to the exhibit which was
5 admitted and a moment ago I said it should have been under seal, I was
6 incorrect. That one is to be kept public. It is the document which was
7 on the screen, the press release that we have on the screen which was not
8 to be broadcasted. I think we had said that earlier. So for the record,
9 P2296 does not have to be under seal. And the document that we have on
10 the screen right now was not to be broadcast, so if it was, we can redact
11 or -- no, it was not. Okay. We can remove it from the screen.
12 JUDGE DELVOIE: I'm sorry, I'm not quite -- I'm not following.
13 You say the press release should not be -- can be public.
14 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: No.
15 JUDGE DELVOIE: And then the next one? Because I had still had a
16 press release on my screen. Which one is the next one?
17 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: So the press release that was on the screen,
18 65 ter 5882, was not supposed to be on the screen, whereas the United
19 Nations report from April 1992 that we tendered, P2296, that one can be
20 admitted in public. I made an error and I asked for it to be admitted
21 under seal, so that one can remain in public.
22 JUDGE DELVOIE: Is that clear to you, Madam Registrar?
23 MR. STRINGER: I apologise because I'm properly injecting the
24 confusion. The one mistake that does still exist is that the press
25 release, tab 8, is 65 ter 5882. And at the moment the transcript
1 incorrectly indicates that it was called up as 65 ter 5828. So it's not
2 5828. It's 5882. And that is at page 16, line 9, I believe.
3 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Yes, that's correct.
4 JUDGE DELVOIE: And if we can still help it, it should not be
5 broadcasted? Right? Thank you.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, for the record, 5882 was not
7 broadcast at all.
8 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Thank you very much.
9 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
10 MR. DEMIRDJIAN:
11 Q. I apologise, Dr. Abd El Razek. We'll return now to the portion
12 of your evidence.
13 You told us earlier that the first night you went to the JNA
14 headquarter on the boat. First of all, were you aware of what was the
15 name of the unit or where it came from?
16 A. JNA is -- I'm sorry, but -- it's written somewhere. I cannot
17 verify it right now but --
18 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Abd El Razek --
19 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
20 JUDGE DELVOIE: -- just one moment, please.
21 Mr. Demirdjian, are you now addressing Mr. Gosnell's problem with
22 one word?
23 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: I will come to that as part of my examination.
24 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay.
25 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: I plan on doing that, yes.
1 MR. GOSNELL: Sorry. I don't mean to be persnickety about this
2 but I would suggest that it was a transcription error so ...
3 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Okay. Well, let me deal with it now.
4 Q. Earlier, Dr. Abd El Razek, you said the word "milicija," I
5 believe. Can you tell us, how do you understand this and how do you
6 spell it and -- yes.
7 A. There's an army with uniforms that each army, national army would
8 identify itself, as the civil police, police, I dealt with police all my
9 life, I know -- whereas arms people who go around with same uniforms with
10 fully machine-guns and weapons, with berets, one green and red in my
11 area, we in general terms call them militia, not milicija, militia. If
12 you wish, I can call them fighting arm -- armed people, armed persons,
13 arm -- I'm -- I did not invent the term, milicija. We call them the
14 militia. And it was the militias in Lebanon, the militias in this,
15 militias in this. It's a very common term. If, Your Excellency, you
16 want to use a different concept, I have no control of this. I am not the
17 owner or the inventor of such a concept.
18 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: No, I do see the problem, Your Honours. It's
19 because the term militia was used once in the transcript with a t,
20 whereas now it is being used with the Serbian, where it's milicija.
21 Q. Dr. Abd El Razek, am I correct in assessing that you're referring
22 to militia?
23 A. Militia, not milicija. And I didn't say Serbian milicija, I said
24 militia. You know, I did not look at their IDs, I -- but it is -- it is
25 to become known that those militias belonged to groups of Serbian
1 fighters with the locals and mostly locals but not only locals. Some
2 people came from Belgrade came to fight and others. I don't want to tell
3 the story. I think it is known. If it is not known, I'm apologising to
4 confuse. But those fighters were the main forces on the ground to
5 perform the ethnic cleansing.
6 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Abd El Razek, you probably know what in
7 Serbian is referred to as militia, right?
8 THE WITNESS: I know militia is police --
9 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay --
10 THE WITNESS: -- and it's not the police.
11 JUDGE DELVOIE: And this is not what you meant --
12 THE WITNESS: No.
13 JUDGE DELVOIE: -- when you used this word.
14 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
15 JUDGE DELVOIE: Are we --
16 THE WITNESS: I don't -- I don't name the police. We call it
17 polica. Polica with c-a --
18 JUDGE DELVOIE: Problem is solved.
19 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: I think the problem is solved, yes.
20 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
21 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Let's move on.
22 Q. Dr. Abd El Razek, with respect to the JNA unit which you saw on
23 the boat, how many times did you go to the headquarters?
24 A. I believe three times.
25 Q. And who did you meet with there?
1 A. Now we will go, first of all, Lubin and the chief, the commander
2 of the -- the sector commander, the Belgians, myself, and meet. There
3 was two personalities, two people, one is the high commander, the
4 general, and one the assistant or the deputy. I think that one time we
5 met with the deputy, twice we met the general. We also met the general
6 later on. This is something else on the boat of Osijek, on the case
7 of -- of that village. But on the boat we went three times.
8 Q. And to be clear, how did you communicate with the local JNA
10 A. Our military commander would do that. I mean, the -- our
11 Belgian -- they do. I -- I believe that --
12 Q. I apologise, I meant with respect to language.
13 A. Oh. We had -- we have translator. We had a young guy from
14 Beli Manastir with us, a [indiscernible] I don't remember now, but --
15 Your Excellency, you have to forgive me. This is 20 years old and the
16 names is a bit -- a bit problematic but, you know, I can visual. 20
17 years from now I can describe this sitting but not names.
18 JUDGE DELVOIE: It isn't but natural, sir.
19 THE WITNESS: We had an interpreter from this -- a nice guy and
20 intelligent who would come with us for interpretation. The generals,
21 nobody spoke English.
22 MR. DEMIRDJIAN:
23 Q. Now with respect to the three times that you met the JNA generals
24 or his deputy and your relations with the JNA, can you tell us what was
25 your impression of the role of the JNA in the region?
1 A. We were very frustrated, extremely frustrated because this is
2 like ping-pong. Go to JNA, they tell us nothing. Go to police, it's not
3 me, go to the -- later on we'll talk about Mr. Hadzic, no, not me.
4 Nobody is admitting that the control and what's happening on the nights
5 and the days on the streets of -- of the whole sector. But the JNA
6 generals were stressing and they want us to send the message clear to our
7 headquarter that JNA is out of the territories, that the boat is in the
8 Danube, is not -- is outside the areas. Yet there is a camp surrounding
9 that -- that boat. It is in Croatian traditional -- Croatian territory.
10 And you see -- from time to time we saw tanks, armed vehicles, those are
11 not police, except who come maybe to [indiscernible] police was starting
12 using or were starting using PC armed vehicles, colour them with a
13 police -- with the police marked colours. But the JNA was in on the
14 ground, and they were denying total involvement on the complaints that we
15 were presenting or conveying, and we could not use their authority to
16 stop this mess of semi-military personnel going around doing the job,
17 including humiliating us. We had from our headquarter north to
18 Beli Manastir, down to Osijek, at least four check-points manned, not the
19 police, not the army, but also I call them militias. No English, but
20 pushing with a gun. This is something that the JNA will continue denying
21 any -- any responsibility in the access. They also denying that they
22 have any political influence in this. It's not -- they're out. We are
23 clean, we're out.
24 Q. Now, you just mentioned a few topics here. What were the
25 subjects of the conversations you had with the JNA commanders?
1 A. Details with complaints, bring complaints of people, of local
2 people. We bring to them, brought to them UNMOs' reports, United Nations
3 Military Observers, we bring to them the civil affairs reports on what's
4 happening the night before or the week before or the two days before on
5 this ethnic cleansing manufacture, ethnic cleansing project, ethnic
6 cleansing activities. These are the main -- as civilians this is
7 our main -- we did not discuss any military things with them.
8 Q. Now, you told us earlier that there was a curfew that was in
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Were you aware of who was enforcing the curfew?
12 A. When we arrive, and before that, our commanders would inform us
13 of the curfew. The military commander, the sector commander, and then
14 the civil police. And we never verified clearly who's enforcing this but
15 that the civil police, the local civil police deny any -- any access or
16 any control over this or anything to do with this. The local police, not
17 our civil police. The local police that we talked with them about this,
18 they deny any -- any -- any charge of these things. They later on they
19 refer us to other people that responsible of what's happening to that.
20 Q. Now, coming to that topic, who did they refer you to?
21 A. Just as introduction. When go to the police, they will tell you,
22 Mr. Adnan, Mr. Lubin, this, we understand, and, by the way, I must say,
23 and I say that also in Bosnia, many of them are very respectful people.
24 They are educated, they have -- they know the law, they know what civil
25 rights means, and many of them were embarrassed to see what was
1 happening, especially the higher rank but some of them are associated --
2 they will tell us, Listen, we have no control on those people going
3 around and shooting. But when we pushed them, later on, they refer us to
4 Mr. Hadzic. Said, If you want to solve this problem, you have to go to
5 Mr. Hadzic. He is the commander of this. He's the chief. We cannot
6 argue with him. We cannot stop them. This is Mr. Hadzic's project.
7 This is how and when we decided to go and meet with Mr. Hadzic. Based
8 on -- on -- on the police, a denial of their responsibility, be hinting
9 to us, not hinting, more than hinting to us that Mr. Hadzic is
10 responsible for these things and we have to appear to him.
11 Q. Now you mentioned a moment ago that this was information that was
12 provided to you through your contacts with the local police?
13 A. Local -- yes.
14 Q. Now, what was the -- how frequently were you in contact with the
15 local police?
16 A. The ten days I was there, I would say at least eight times we met
17 with the police. I never went to any police station there. I know that
18 there is police station down in Dalj but not in Erdut. We have them --
19 communicate with them, they come to our place. Sometimes we met them at
20 the winery. But -- and those guys, persons, gentlemen, whatever, would
21 say, Hey, we have no responsibility. I remember once that the guy with
22 the two horses were shot. I went to the police and said, Listen, why
23 horses? They don't have any -- anything to do. They said, Mr. Adnan,
24 it's not -- we did not do that. We -- we -- nothing. I mean, we feel
25 sorry. And horses from that region, meaning the farming region, horses
1 and animals and cats -- cattles were the assets of their life. And the
2 police knew that. So they will not -- they will say, It's not our
4 Q. When you reported these complaints to the local police, what, if
5 anything, did they do?
6 A. I doubt if they did anything. I know that some of the local,
7 future deportees then were afraid to go to the police too because they
8 were telling us that the police would report them to the -- I don't know
9 if you don't like the militia, I'm sorry, but this is the expression that
10 we -- we discussed, that they will report them to the militia.
11 So actually that -- the citizen -- they did not know even if they
12 could trust us. They have nobody to trust around. They are left --
13 excuse me for the expression, with no God. And go and do something about
14 it with curfew, blackout. Two soldiers and two civil police with no arms
15 and yourself with nice necktie and [indiscernible].
16 Q. Now earlier you said that when you were speaking to the police
17 they told you you have to go to Mr. Hadzic?
18 A. Yes, sir.
19 Q. What did you do about that?
20 A. We asked the police themselves, the local, to arrange for us a
21 meeting with Mr. Hadzic.
22 Q. And when did that happen?
23 A. And happens, Mr. Lubin, his wife, myself, and the interpreter, we
24 went and were escorted towards -- the police take us to this and then
25 they handed us to the army personnel around. They took us to his office.
1 Q. Where was this office?
2 A. This area is a strange within this village that nowhere. There
3 was a nice winery area. And within an area there is a castle and the
4 hangars and there's a building. We went to the building, not the castle.
5 I believe, if I'm wrong maybe [indiscernible] but I know that we were
6 escorted through an opening or a door with an office to his office.
7 Q. Can you -- can you describe the office. What did it look like?
8 A. Office was simple, not -- not fancy. A lot of key personnel that
9 you have no privacy even sitting there and [indiscernible] and lots of
10 communication that's come and how supposed to have this talk
11 [indiscernible] and Mr. Hadzic was there. He was with darker beard.
12 We're all getting old. And -- yes. He was -- the first time we went, we
13 spent something like 45 minutes with him and we told him our story about
14 what's happening in the night, in the day, on -- on -- on -- ethnic
15 cleansing or -- and forced expelling people, forced deportation. And, of
16 course, we discuss also matters of the UN, our headquarter, what is this,
17 what is that, but mainly we went to complain and to ask his help to stop
18 this ethnic cleansing.
19 Q. Who was present during your meeting with Mr. Hadzic?
20 A. Beside Lubin, his wife and myself and interpreter, lot of people
21 goes and comes, but I cannot recognise them. The police did not enter
22 with us to that place.
23 Q. And when you say "a lot of people," what did they look like?
24 A. The one that I describe as militia people with armed --
25 Q. How did the militia look like?
1 A. It depends what area coming [indiscernible]. I don't want to be
2 dealing with ethnicity and -- and -- be careful not to go to Lombroso
3 description. Some of them, they look very bad, very sloppy, very -- with
4 not really serious look and dress and this, but a lot of arms. Some of
5 them were more sophisticated, looks more apparently, if I may, Your
6 Excellency, say they don't look like peasants. And some of them looking
7 very much as peasants.
8 Q. What kind of clothing did they have?
9 A. Always close to khaki, but not really camouflage, there's no --
10 red and green. Mostly green in our area, I think [indiscernible] or
11 something. Some of them with not beard, big one, but unshaven. I guess.
12 Not beard. The one in -- in -- in -- I met down in that village was --
13 was beard. I -- I don't want to be somebody who classify people or claim
14 or pretend they can, I can, identify identities of peoples by -- by -- by
15 this -- but we were told the difference between the real Chetniks and --
16 in the militia, the new ones. I -- I cannot -- I cannot, but I saw
17 earlier in -- in Belgrade people look like a Chetnik, like
18 [indiscernible] that were fancy dressed, et cetera -- I don't know. I
19 cannot tell what is the difference. I cannot be responsible of making
20 any differentiation of bodies or nose or eyes or ears. I'm not Lombroso
22 Q. That's fine, Dr. Abd El Razek. Before we break for the day,
23 could you tell us what was Mr. Hadzic's response to your report?
24 A. It was strongly, very strong response on -- on -- on -- on
25 denying, on saying, Not my people. How come you want to know about it?
1 This with -- then brought us to understanding with him and then
2 with the rest, that next time that people want to leave voluntarily,
3 freely, they will, the police will come to us to verify, to make it clear
4 that those people want to leave voluntarily, on their own, and not force,
5 and this was not a written agreement, gentlemen agreement, verbal
6 agreement. There's -- Mr. Hadzic pledged that his people -- and don't
7 ask me if he defined his people. He did not define his people. His
8 people will -- and the police will help us verify or help those people
9 leave voluntarily not forced.
10 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: I think it's the appropriate time for --
11 JUDGE DELVOIE: Indeed, Mr. Demirdjian.
12 Mr. Abd El Razek, this is the end of the today's hearing. We
13 will see you again tomorrow morning at 9.00 for the morning hearing.
14 You're not released as a witness, which implies that you -- which implies
15 that you are not allowed to discuss with anyone your testimony, nor are
16 you allowed to speak to any of the parties.
17 You understand?
18 THE WITNESS: I will not disappoint you, sir.
19 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you. The court usher will escort you out
20 of the courtroom.
21 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
22 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
23 THE WITNESS: Have a nice evening.
24 JUDGE DELVOIE: [Microphone not activated] You too.
25 [The witness stands down]
1 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Demirdjian, time-wise, and only time-wise --
2 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Yes.
3 JUDGE DELVOIE: -- is your examination-in-chief going as you wish
4 it would go? If you understand what I mean.
5 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Yes, I do issues. We're expecting to not take
6 the entire four hours as we had initially announced, and I expect to
7 finish within the first session tomorrow. Again depending on the
8 answers, but I do understand, and, if necessary, will focus the witness.
9 JUDGE DELVOIE: That's good to hear, Mr. Demirdjian, that, if
10 necessary, you will focus the witness.
11 If there's nothing else.
12 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
13 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Demirdjian, the press release, is that to be
14 tendered or not?
15 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Oh, we didn't tender. Yes. Yes, please,
16 Your Honours.
17 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Gosnell.
18 MR. GOSNELL: Objection, Mr. President.
19 JUDGE DELVOIE: Oh. Then I shouldn't have asked the question.
20 MR. GOSNELL: I'm sorry to have to do it. The source, it's a
21 press release from the Ministry of Information of the Republic of
22 Croatia. There are some very loaded allegations in this press release
23 and some specific information that this witness could not confirm and the
24 witness in fact said he had never seen this press release or any other
25 press release because that wasn't where he was getting his information.
1 So in relation to what the witness knew relative to what -- the
2 specific information in the press release, I would suggest there is
3 neither foundation nor is this document admissible.
4 JUDGE DELVOIE: My question was purely technical, to see whether
5 this was a -- just forgotten by the OTP but now it becomes something
6 else, Mr. Demirdjian.
7 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Yes, Your Honour.
8 I'm not going to press on the matter. The witness gave his
9 answers about the information he had at the time. He did say he had not
10 seen the document at the time. We're satisfied with the answers on the
12 So I'll withdraw my application.
13 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you, Mr. Demirdjian. Seems sensible.
14 If there's nothing else, court adjourned.
15 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.34 p.m.,
16 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 2nd day of July,
17 2013, at 9.00 a.m.