130829ED

Page 7841

1 JUDGE DELVOIE: Could you please us your name, first name, name,

2 date of birth, and -- yeah, and your nationality, please.

3 THE WITNESS: Frederick Noseworthy, born 13 June 1948.

4 Nationality Canadian.

5 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you. So I take it your testimony will be

6 in English.

7 THE WITNESS: Oui. Yes.

8 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you. Mr. Noseworthy, you're about to read

9 the solemn declaration by which witnesses commit themselves to tell the

10 truth. I have to point out you that by doing so, you expose yourself to

11 the penalties of perjury should you give false or untruthful information

12 to the Tribunal. Could you now please read the solemn declaration the

13 usher will give to you.

14 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

15 whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God.

16 WITNESS: FRED NOSEWORTHY

17 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you very much. You may be seated.

18 Mr. Gillett, your witness.

19 MR. GILLETT: Thank you, Mr. President. Your Honours.

20 Examination by Mr. Gillett:

21 Q. Now, sir, good morning. Can you hear me loud and clear?

22 A. Yes, I can.

23 Q. I see you have a document in front of you. Could you tell the

24 Court what that document is?

25 A. That's the -- this is my sworn statement. And the affidavit, the

Page 7842

1 witness statement just so that I can remind myself what I said if need

2 be, and I think the Court has this document.

3 MR. GILLETT: Your Honours, if the usher would like to show the

4 document to the Defence, we're fine with that.

5 Thank you very much.

6 Q. Now, sir, could you please tell the Chamber when you first

7 arrived in the former Yugoslavia to carry out your duty with the

8 European Community Monitoring Mission?

9 A. I arrived on the morning of September the 7th, 1992.

10 Q. And what was your role with the mission, I'll call it the ECMM,

11 as I ask the questions.

12 A. I was the commander of the Canadian contingent to the ECMM and I

13 was the Chief Operations Officer for the mission.

14 Q. Now in relation to the statement in front of you, did you provide

15 a statement to the Prosecution of this Tribunal in 2012?

16 A. Yes, I did.

17 MR. GILLETT: And I'd ask that 65 ter document --

18 THE INTERPRETER: The speakers are kindly asked to pause between

19 question and answer for the interpretation. Thank you.

20 MR. GILLETT: Thank you.

21 Q. I'll observe a pause after your answers.

22 MR. GILLETT: Could I ask that 65 ter document 06379 be placed on

23 the monitor.

24 Q. Now, sir, if you look at the document on the monitor, do you

25 recognise that to be the statement that you gave and do you recognise

Page 7843

1 your signature at the bottom of it?

2 A. I don't see my signature on this. But I recognise the document.

3 Q. Perhaps if we zoom on the English version, and if we scroll to

4 the next page?

5 A. Yes, that's my signature.

6 Q. And when you arrived in The Hague this week to testify, were you

7 given a chance to review your statement and make any corrections?

8 A. Yes, I was.

9 Q. Do you affirm the accuracy and truthfulness of the statement?

10 A. Yes, I do.

11 Q. And if you were asked about the same matters today, would you

12 provide the same information?

13 A. I hope so. Yes, I would.

14 MR. GILLETT: Your Honour, at this time the Prosecution tenders

15 65 ter document 6379 together with the associated exhibits.

16 THE WITNESS: I just want to make a comment here that my -- my

17 responses to these questions are based on memory from 21, 22 years ago,

18 so detail is -- is difficult to draw upon, but having read -- read

19 the statement that I gave initially, I'm confident that my answers were

20 as accurate as they could be.

21 JUDGE DELVOIE: It's -- it is reassuring, sir, that you're not

22 claiming to remember everything from 20 years ago.

23 Admitted and marked.

24 THE REGISTRAR: The witness statement shall be assigned

25 Exhibit Number P2891. And the associated documents shall be assigned

Page 7844

1 exhibit numbers to be circulated to the parties at a later stage. Thank

2 you.

3 MR. GILLETT: Thank you very much.

4 Q. Now, sir, I'm going to ask you some questions about some

5 additional documents that relate to matters addressed in your statement.

6 MR. GILLETT: If I could first get 65 ter document 1269 on the

7 monitor.

8 Q. Now, sir, this fax and the attached summary concern a meeting of

9 the joint commission of 20 September 1992. Could you tell the Chamber

10 what the joint commission was?

11 A. The joint commission was a -- was a conference structure set up

12 by the United Nations, which included the European Community Monitor

13 Mission of which I was a member, and the two opposing -- or

14 representatives from the two opposing factions to try and resolve the

15 issue of the pink -- what was known then as the pink zones, which was a

16 zone of -- zone of contention between the official cease-fire line and

17 the zones which were protected by the United Nations forces, the UN --

18 the United Nations Protected Areas, UNPAs.

19 Q. If we could go to the final page of this document, and on this

20 page, under ECMM, we see that your name is listed as the third person.

21 Does that mean that you attended this meeting?

22 A. I did. I also want to point out that the voice of the mission,

23 of the European Community Monitoring Mission was Ambassador

24 John MacDonald from the United Kingdom. I was there as Chief Operations

25 Officer to advise him on operational matters. My input into those

Page 7845

1 meetings, any meetings that I attended, were strictly related to ECMM

2 operations modus operandi and what was reported through our reporting

3 system, but I didn't -- I -- I didn't speak on behalf of the mission. I

4 was an advisor.

5 Q. Thank you. If we could turn to page 2 of this document and if we

6 look at the first paragraph, it states that the joint commission was

7 established to oversee the step by step restoration of Croatian authority

8 in pink zones.

9 You've described what the pink zones are. Now putting aside what

10 was supposed to happen under Resolution 762, who actually controlled the

11 pink zones on the ground at this time?

12 A. It was in contention the -- the Croatian forces, Croatian

13 government, sought to re-establish complete sovereignty over the pink

14 zones, while the ethnic Serb faction, population, at the time, and it's

15 my understanding of the intention at the time, wished to retain control

16 over it for themselves. That was the -- that was the essence of the

17 conflict and the -- the joint -- the objective of the joint commission

18 was to get the two opposing factions to talk to each other so that we

19 could resolve that and do away with the pink zones.

20 Q. If we move to page 3 in the second paragraph, the document states

21 that Cedric Thornberry met with Martic, Spanovic, and Zivkovic, and they

22 agreed to the disarmament of the special police by 15 October 1992. Did

23 that disarmament occur as agreed?

24 A. Not my knowledge, no.

25 Q. And what effect did the presence of these heavily armed special

Page 7846

1 police have on the non-Serb population in the UNPAs and the pink zones?

2 A. I'm a little confused by the term "special police." They were

3 paramilitaries, and the effect of having heavily armed paramilitaries in

4 the zone was an intimidation. It was intimidation to the population, in

5 my view.

6 MR. GILLETT: Your Honours, we would tender this document at this

7 time.

8 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.

9 THE REGISTRAR: Shall be assigned Exhibit Number P2892. Thank

10 you.

11 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.

12 JUDGE HALL: If I might intervene before you go further,

13 Mr. Gillett.

14 Mr. Noseworthy, going back to your answer that appears at line

15 13, "the objective the joint commission was to get the two opposing

16 factions to talk to each other so that we could resolve that and do away

17 with the pink zones."

18 That answer, in part, answers something that I was curious about,

19 namely as to -- if you have the -- these demarcation lines and the UNPAs,

20 how come the pink zones came about?

21 But the question I want to pose now is whether these were --

22 these pink zones had, as it were, fixed boundaries or were they sort

23 of -- having regard to the conflicts of which you speak, whether they

24 were floating areas.

25 THE WITNESS: They were reasonably well defined because there was

Page 7847

1 a fixed cease-fire line and that's where they -- the official conflict

2 ended. But there were -- there were areas that the United Nations had

3 inserted -- what's called the United Nations Protection Force, they were

4 at UNPAs, those areas didn't coincide exactly with the -- the cease-fire

5 line. So you had this zone in between the two in which -- which was --

6 which was contested.

7 I'm sorry if that doesn't make sense.

8 JUDGE HALL: I think I understand. Thank you.

9 Thank you, Mr. Gillett.

10 MR. GILLETT: Thank you, Your Honour. If we could now get 65 ter

11 document 1361. And this again -- 1351, apologies. And this again

12 concerns the work of the joint commission.

13 Q. Now this fax and the attached summary concern a meeting of the

14 joint commission on 9 November 1992. If we turn to the final page,

15 page 7, we see an individual listed under the ECMM called Patrick Curley?

16 Who was Patrick Curley?

17 A. Patrick Curley was an Irish officer, a lieutenant-colonel in the

18 Irish army. He was the commander of the Irish contingent to the European

19 Community Monitor Mission and he worked for me as one of my staff

20 officers. I was not able to attend the joint commission on that day. I

21 was away on a mission myself and I assigned Patrick Curley to attend in

22 my stead.

23 Q. Thank you. And did Patrick Curley inform you of the contents of

24 this meeting?

25 A. He sure did. Yes, he did.

Page 7848

1 Q. If we look at page 1 of this document, we see that the meetings

2 of the joint commission were adjourned without a fixed date for a

3 subsequent meeting and the writer of the fax, Cedric Thornberry, states

4 in the last line of this front page that the Serb side is substantially

5 responsible for the UNPAs.

6 How did the Serb side stand to benefit by impeding the

7 negotiations?

8 A. You know, it wasn't just the Serb side. There were both sides --

9 were -- were stalling the -- the progress here. But by -- by stalling,

10 they were trading time for influence, I suppose. The -- I know that

11 Cedric Thornberry was extremely frustrated by this time, and -- and

12 the -- the two sides weren't prepared to talk to each other at all, which

13 was the purpose of the commission.

14 Q. When you say "they were trading time for influence," could you

15 explain what you mean by that?

16 A. Well, yeah, the -- I mean, yes. By agreeing to meet with --

17 in -- in the form of the joint commission, it would appear to the world

18 that they were co-operating in the -- in the effort to resolve the issue

19 of the -- of the pink zones. But, at the same time, there were

20 paramilitaries roaming the country-side, and they weren't just roaming

21 this was, in my view, organised, and they were intimidating populations.

22 And it was -- in retrospect it would like now as though by stalling for

23 time, in -- in -- they could probably establish themselves as the

24 dominant force in -- in that zone and the Croatian government was getting

25 very, very frustrated. Because, in their view it was clearly -- in fact,

Page 7849

1 the pink zones in -- in the context of what they were -- were recognised

2 as Croatian.

3 Q. When you refer to these organised paramilitaries, what terms were

4 used to describe them?

5 A. In English they were called special police. In practical terms,

6 they were a militia, a paramilitary militia. They were irregulars. They

7 were organised. They operated as -- as an organised militia - again,

8 that's my term - but an organised paramilitary unit. But they were

9 called special police.

10 Q. What type of equipment did these units have?

11 A. Ah. I personally only saw side-arms and assault weapons.

12 Q. Did you read reports of them having any other equipment?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. What type of equipment?

15 A. You know something? I can't -- I just cannot remember the

16 detail. I'd have to read the reports again.

17 Q. Are you able to give a general answer or not?

18 A. Yeah. They had -- in -- as I recall, they had what would be

19 considered as -- as infantry weapons.

20 Q. And if you could --

21 A. A broad spectrum of infantry weapons. Crew-served weapons.

22 Q. Could you explain what crew-served weapons are?

23 A. Well, a crew-served weapon is any weapon that requires more than

24 one person to operate it.

25 Q. Could you give an example?

Page 7850

1 A. Yeah. A machine-gun is a crew-served weapon if it is belt fed.

2 Q. Okay.

3 MR. GILLETT: Your Honours, we would tender 65 ter document 1351.

4 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.

5 THE REGISTRAR: Shall be assigned Exhibit Number P2893. Thank

6 you.

7 MR. GILLETT: Thank you.

8 Q. And my final question. In your statement at paragraph 63, you

9 state that Goran Hadzic was the president of the RSK and that you ran

10 into him in Knin at one point in time.

11 Could you describe what occurred during that encounter?

12 A. It was a very brief -- I'm sorry, I should wait.

13 It was a very, very brief encounter. I was with a member of the

14 Knin co-ordinating centre for the European Community Monitor Mission. He

15 was my guide. I used to visit the -- the various teams and coordinating

16 centres and regional centres around the deployment area. It was part of

17 my duties. I was their immediate superior, and I was being given a tour

18 of the area. We were in a government building, and Mr. Hadzic and I just

19 essentially crossed paths, and it was a very brief encounter.

20 Q. How did you know he was president of the RSK?

21 A. My guide told me.

22 Q. Did he tell you anything else about Hadzic?

23 A. It's one of those things you don't forget. And he -- he stated

24 to me that not much goes on in this area that he doesn't know about, I

25 think, was his -- as best as I can summarise the statement.

Page 7851

1 I tried to -- and I should say to the Court that I tried to

2 reconfirm that issue. The officer who was -- who was escorting me at the

3 time is suffering post-traumatic stress disorder. I was not able to

4 speak to him so that is the -- that is the exchange in the best of my

5 recollection.

6 Q. Thank you very much, sir.

7 MR. GILLETT: That completes my direct examination.

8 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you, Mr. Gillett.

9 Is the Defence ready for cross?

10 [Defence counsel confer]

11 JUDGE DELVOIE: Take your time, Mr. Zivanovic, if you ...

12 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you. May I consult my client for a moment,

13 please.

14 JUDGE DELVOIE: Of course.

15 [Defence counsel and Accused confer]

16 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you.

17 Cross-examination by Mr. Zivanovic:

18 Q. Good morning, Mr. Noseworthy. My name is Zoran Zivanovic and I

19 am counsel for Mr. Goran Hadzic in this case.

20 I would like to discuss two topics in your testimony, the first

21 being demilitarisation.

22 As you testified, you began your work with ECMM on

23 7th of September, 1992?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. And before that you had two weeks of preparatory work, briefings?

Page 7852

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. And through those briefings, did you learn the historical

3 background and recent developments in the former Yugoslavia?

4 A. You know I have to be honest, not in the detail that I would have

5 preferred, but we had a -- we had a lot of briefings, and we were exposed

6 to individuals who had lived in the former Yugoslavia who gave us

7 historical briefings and gave us some history of the area.

8 We were also -- went through a short training period when we

9 arrive in the mission. That was perhaps much more relevant to the

10 mission itself.

11 Q. And you were aware of the details of Vance Plan?

12 A. Oh, yes.

13 Q. The first phase of -- of this plan was demilitarisation and

14 withdrawal of the JNA. Is it correct?

15 A. As I understand it, yes.

16 MR. ZIVANOVIC: May we have Rule 65 ter exhibit 1402.

17 Q. It is a book from Colonel Riley as far as I know.

18 A. Yes. I know him well.

19 Q. Yes.

20 MR. ZIVANOVIC: May we see the page 7 in e-court, please.

21 It is in penultimate paragraph on the left side of the screen.

22 Q. The last sentence reads:

23 "ECMM teams also monitored the withdrawal of the JNA out of

24 Krajina which began in May 1992, having been permitted to enter Krajina

25 in April."

Page 7853

1 Do you agree with that statement?

2 A. Yes, I do.

3 Q. The next page of this document, it is the first -- I think it is

4 the first paragraph and first sentence read:

5 "The cease-fire in Croatian was broken in May by Croatian army

6 attacks north of Split."

7 Do you recall that?

8 A. The actual event, I don't recall it. But it's part of the

9 history of the -- of the conflict. So, yes, I'm aware of it. I was not

10 in theatre in May.

11 Q. And you are aware that in the first week of June 1992, the

12 Croatian army invaded Bosnia and Herzegovina and cut off the corridor

13 connecting RSK with former Yugoslavia.

14 A. That's -- that's a matter of history, yes.

15 Q. Could you confirm that the corridor was vital for survival of the

16 RSK? This connection between Yugoslavia on one side, and the RSK on the

17 other.

18 A. Yeah. It's -- that is -- the answer is yes, if -- if RSK was to

19 be accepted as a -- as a viable entity. But I'm not sure -- I must say

20 I'm not sure that in international law that that was -- that's

21 universally accepted. But from the perspective of the population of

22 the -- the ethnic Serb population within the RSK, that would have to be

23 the way that they would have viewed the situation.

24 Q. Thank you. And you're aware that the corridor was re-established

25 only after the armed intervention of the RSK forces in first part of

Page 7854

1 June 1992?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Could you confirm that on 21st of June, 1992, the Croatian army

4 made an incursion into the Miljevacki Plateau, in contravention of the

5 Vance Plan?

6 A. It is a matter of history. I was not in theatre at the time. So

7 the answer is: I did not observe any of this, but it is -- it -- it's a

8 historical fact.

9 Q. And could you confirm that the RSK forces halted the Croatian's

10 army incursion into Miljevacki Plateau?

11 A. It's a matter of history. It's a historical fact.

12 Q. Thank you. Are you familiar with the UN Security Council's

13 Resolution 762 condemning these acts of Croatian army?

14 A. I'm aware of it.

15 Q. Let me now please -- would you agree that if the RSK had

16 continued disarming its forces, it would not have been able to resist to

17 these and the future acts of Croatia -- Croats?

18 A. You're asking me for an opinion that -- that I'm not comfortable

19 in giving because the situation that you're describing is a -- is a

20 situation that wasn't universally accepted as being legitimate. But from

21 the view of the RSK, I have to -- I have to concede, yes.

22 Q. Thank you. Do you recall that on 22nd of January, 1993, the

23 Croatian army attacked the Maslenica region?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And if the RSK had not its armed forces, they could not resist to

Page 7855

1 this attack. Do you agree?

2 A. Yeah. Yes, I do.

3 Q. And do you recall that UN Security Council passed the

4 Resolution 802, condemning these attacks and calling on Croatia to

5 withdraw its forces to previous confrontation line?

6 A. Yes, I do. Can I comment on that? Because there was much --

7 there was much activity going on back and forth, and there were

8 United Nations Council's resolutions, there was demarches, diplomatic

9 notes were being exchanged all the time because there were -- it was a

10 very fluid situation.

11 I just wanted to put that in the context. That's all.

12 Q. And would you agree that Croatia refused to comply with the

13 resolution?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And, indeed, Croatia continued its action by shelling Serb

16 positions in the Kordun region?

17 A. That did happen.

18 Q. Do you recall that in September 1993, the Croatian army launched

19 an attack on Medak pocket where they committed crimes against Serb

20 civilian population?

21 A. Again, now you're asking me questions that post-date my -- my

22 service in the -- in the theatre. But, of course, I'm well aware of it.

23 There was a Canadian battalion that was involved in that activity, and

24 yes, I do.

25 Q. And you might be aware that the military leaders responsible for

Page 7856

1 this attack were indicted before this Tribunal?

2 A. I'm aware of that.

3 Q. Do you agree that if the RSK did not have its armed formations,

4 they could not resist this attack?

5 A. No, because in the Medak pocket, if you recall, there was a

6 major -- well, in terms of the activities that were going on at the time,

7 but there was a major confrontation between the Canadian battalion, which

8 was a member of the United Nations Protection Force, and the Croatian

9 forces. I'm speaking now from -- from a historical perspective. I

10 wasn't there.

11 Q. Thank you. Could you confirm that the Serb population in RSK did

12 not see any effective measures undertaken by UNPROFOR to deter Croatia

13 from armed attacks --

14 A. Well, if we go back --

15 Q. -- of UNPAs.

16 A. I'm sorry. If we go back to that one particular example that

17 you're using of the Medak pocket, the United Nations Protection Force did

18 offer stiff resistance against the Croatian forces to protect the Serb

19 population. Just an opinion.

20 Q. Thank you. And I repeat my last question.

21 Could you confirm that the Serb population in RSK did not see any

22 effective measure undertaken by UNPROFOR to deter Croatia from armed

23 attacks on UN protection areas?

24 A. You know, I can't -- I can't answer that question because I

25 wasn't a part of the Serb population and I'm looking it from the outside

Page 7857

1 as a -- as a third party.

2 Q. We have in -- just in this book. I read the statement, but I'm

3 not able to find it right now, but ... on that -- maybe you can recall.

4 That the Serb population distrust in UNPROFOR -- have distrust in -- had

5 distrust in UNPROFOR?

6 A. In the RSK?

7 Q. In RSK.

8 A. Yes. I mean that's -- that's a fact. The Serb population felt

9 threatened, and they did express displeasure with UNPROFOR and that's a

10 matter of history. That's a historical fact.

11 Q. And would you agree in light of these attacks, that the Serb

12 population might perceive the insistence that the Serb -- Serbs disarm

13 resemble the policy that would facilitate Croatian military occupation of

14 the UN protection areas?

15 MR. GILLETT: Your Honour, again, the witness is being asked to

16 speculate on the subjective viewpoints of other persons. He said he was

17 looking from a different person, so I just note that in relation to this

18 question.

19 THE WITNESS: I think as a monitor, as -- as a European Community

20 Monitor Mission operator, I would have to say that from our perspective,

21 we -- we were there to monitor the conflict and to -- and to observe that

22 the laws of armed conflict were being respected and I cannot comment on

23 what one faction or the other felt. I can only comment on whether or not

24 the -- their activities, their armed activities were being carried out in

25 accordance with the laws of armed conflict. As I understood them.

Page 7858

1 And so if one faction or another conducted operations that were

2 not in accordance with the laws of armed conflict, then it was our duty

3 to report that and the result of those reports is bearing out in -- in

4 this courtroom right now.

5 MR. ZIVANOVIC:

6 Q. In your communication with the people, did you see any distrust

7 in UNPROFOR intentions?

8 A. And the answer to that is an unqualified yes.

9 Q. Thank you. I'd like to move on to another topic, and that is the

10 resettlement of displaced persons and refugees.

11 You were aware of the large number of Croats displaced from

12 UN Protected Areas East, South, and North. Is it correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Are you aware of the large number of Serbs displaced from

15 Western Slavonia, UN Protected Area of west --

16 A. Yes. I mean, the whole area was -- was affected by the

17 displacement of -- of citizens from one location to another, based on

18 their ethnicity.

19 Q. And most of population from Western Slavonia -- most of Serb

20 population from Western Slavonia were temporarily settled in

21 Eastern Slavonia, in UNP East. Is that correct?

22 A. As I understand it.

23 Q. As you know, the Vance Plan provided for the return of displaced

24 persons and refugees to their homes. Correct?

25 A. That's correct.

Page 7859

1 Q. You saw documents today which indicated ECMM widely discussed the

2 return of Croat refugees to Sector East.

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. And they would return to houses temporarily occupied by the

5 refugees from Western Slavonia.

6 A. That did happen, yes, sir.

7 Q. As far as you can see from these document, the return of refugees

8 from Western Slavonia to their homes elsewhere was not discussed at all.

9 Is that correct?

10 A. I'm not sure that -- that they were not discussed at all. The

11 issue of displaced persons was a major concern at the time, and it was

12 always being discussed, within the missions.

13 Q. My conclusion follows from the documents showed to you, and

14 tendered into exhibits here.

15 A. And I can -- I can understand where you would -- you would choose

16 to take that point of view. And I can't -- I can't disagree with it.

17 Q. And do you agree that Croatian side was not prepared to receive

18 the refugees from Western Slavonia back?

19 A. That was an issue.

20 Q. Yes or not?

21 A. As I say, that was an issue, and I don't know what the Croatian

22 side was or was not prepared to do. I know that that was an issue. I

23 can't speak for the Croatian side. I can't speak for the -- for the RSK

24 side. I can only speak from the position of -- of an independent

25 monitor. But that was an issue; yes, it was.

Page 7860

1 Q. Was it topic of your discussion with Croatia side?

2 A. Always. We discussed that on numerous occasions. There was a

3 reluctance on both sides of -- of the conflict to receive displaced

4 persons from the other. I mean, it's -- the -- the situation as we -- as

5 I understood it at the time was that people were being displaced on no

6 notice, based on their ethnicity. Both sides.

7 Q. Now, I am interested -- interested for the refugees --

8 A. Mm-hm.

9 Q. -- from Western Slavonia. We have many -- many documents

10 indicating that the issue of refugees from Eastern Slavonia was

11 discussed.

12 A. Yes. And that's a -- that's a matter of fact. That's history.

13 Yes, I agree. I can't -- I can't elaborate on it.

14 Q. And let me know, did the ECMM or UNPROFOR have any plan for the

15 people in Eastern Slavonia who temporarily occupied those houses after

16 being expelled from Western Slavonia?

17 A. Yeah. That -- in terms of a plan, that -- that is -- that's an

18 UN issue, that's an UN lead on that one. That's not an ECMM lead on

19 that. Ours was a monitor mission.

20 Q. And are you aware of -- are you aware of such plan?

21 A. I'd have to go back through the documents to look at them again

22 to refresh my memory. I can't speak to you in any detail on it right

23 now. I really can't. I'd like to, but I can't.

24 Q. Let me know, was it inconsistent to insist that Croatian refugees

25 be returned to Eastern Slavonia while no similar accommodation were made

Page 7861

1 for refugees from Western Slavonia?

2 A. You know, if you go back to 1992/1993 and you try and understand

3 what was happening at the time, and there was much confusion, there was a

4 great detail of reluctance on all factions, not just -- not just on -- on

5 any one particular side but there was a great -- there was a great

6 reluctance to get this thing moving and ... and I -- both sides were

7 stalling for time, as I understand it.

8 It was a source of frustration. And we were just as frustrated

9 with the Croatian side as we were with the -- with the RSK side or any

10 other faction in theatre at the time.

11 Q. And whether the Croatian side or UNPROFOR expect -- expect the

12 RSK authorities to re-expel Western Slavonia refugees to Serbia or to

13 live there in open fields?

14 A. Yeah, I'm not aware of -- of -- of any particular plan to that

15 effect. I'm really not. And I would have to go back and refresh my

16 memory by looking at the historical documentation of the day.

17 MR. ZIVANOVIC: May we look -- we have Rule 65 ter exhibit 5324.

18 It is paragraph 52.

19 I will read it for the transcript.

20 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

21 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Maybe we should go to private session. I don't

22 know whether this specific paragraph is confidential or not or ...

23 MR. GILLETT: Yeah, if I could just help on that front. The

24 provider has asked us to use this document confidentially. So if we

25 could go into private session.

Page 7863

1 reportedly occupied houses left vacant by the departure of their non-Serb

2 occupants. While they claim that they are entitled to these houses as

3 long as their own homes are denied to them by the Croatian authorities,

4 the Force Commander is concerned that such actions are part of a

5 concerted effort to change the ethnic composition of these areas."

6 I stop here.

7 Would you tell us, please, how did the ECMM understand this

8 paragraph?

9 A. That was the crux of the problem, that was the crux of the issue

10 that was central to much of what we were attempting to verify, observe,

11 and monitor.

12 So from the perspective of the European Community Monitoring

13 Mission, we would place monitoring teams inside all factions, inside all

14 regions, on both sides of -- of the conflict. And you must have had the

15 opportunity by now to read many of our reports. We tried to provide as

16 objective a view as to what was actually occurring as we could -- as we

17 could honestly -- honestly get, and that -- that's a matter of record and

18 it speaks for itself.

19 That is -- that is the crux of the problem with respect to what

20 is now being termed ethnic cleansing and displaced persons and refugees.

21 Q. And could you tell me, please, how would the ethnic composition

22 of the areas change if Serbs from one part of Croatia move into other

23 part of Croatia?

24 A. You know, I can't answer that because I don't know. But from

25 a -- from the perspective of an international monitoring mission, it

Page 7864

1 would have been our desire to see each faction represent -- or respect

2 the rights of minority groups, whatever their ethnic composition might

3 happen to be. It was a very difficult situation.

4 Q. And let me know, would the relocation of Serbs from

5 Western Slavonia to former Yugoslavia, Serbia, would change the ethnic

6 composition of Croatia?

7 A. I suppose from a Croatian perspective at the time it would.

8 Q. And they would like it?

9 A. From a Croatian perspective at the time, probably not.

10 Q. And --

11 A. But that's just a comment. I mean, I don't know. I can't -- I

12 can't honestly give you an opinion. And it wasn't my role, it wasn't the

13 role of the mission to -- to give opinions on that. It was the role of

14 the mission to facilitate, observe, and report on the -- the developments

15 within the region in -- in trying to find a permanent resolution to the

16 conflict.

17 Q. And let me know if I understand -- if I understand you, Croatia

18 authorities did not like Serbs from Western Slavonia back in

19 Western Slavonia?

20 MR. GILLETT: Your Honours, I have to interject here. The

21 witness has said to the same question effectively, "I don't know, I can't

22 honestly give you an opinion."

23 So the question has been asked an answered, and the witness has

24 recognised that he would speculating on the subjective views of a

25 different party.

Page 7865

1 So we object to that question.

2 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I didn't finish my question. Sorry.

3 JUDGE DELVOIE: Well, let's see if what you add to the question

4 could improve it.

5 MR. ZIVANOVIC:

6 Q. As far as I understand from all the -- all your answers, there

7 was no -- there was no clear plan to return the Serbs from Western

8 Slavonia -- Serbs from Eastern Slavonia to Western Slavonia. Is it

9 correct?

10 A. Okay. Here's what I'm going to say on it.

11 There was a plan but it wasn't universally accepted as being a

12 workable solution and that led to the intransigence that was occurring at

13 the time. But I cannot -- I really cannot see inside the minds of

14 tacticians and strategists from any of the opposing factions, but I can

15 see where you might draw that conclusion.

16 I'm sorry if that doesn't -- that doesn't answer your question.

17 Q. Your last answer reads that it wasn't -- the plan wasn't

18 universally accepted. But whom -- by whom?

19 A. By any of the factions. By any of the factions.

20 Q. It includes Croats?

21 A. It includes Croats.

22 Q. Thank you. It means that the Croats didn't like to see Serbs

23 from Western Slavonia back. Am I right?

24 A. Yes, you are right in assuming that. But, you know, again, from

25 a -- from the perspective of an international operative, we were

Page 7866

1 interested in seeing the laws of armed conflict respected, the rights of

2 ethnic minorities, on both sides, or all sides, because there were more

3 than just the two sides, respected. And however, you know, these events

4 transpired at the time, doesn't excuse the commission of crimes by one

5 side or another. That's just my personal view.

6 Q. Now I'm just interested in the position of the Croat side.

7 A. Okay.

8 Q. And if they didn't want the Serbs from Eastern Slavonia back in

9 Western Slavonia, and wanted to resettle Croats into their homes in

10 Eastern Slavonia where were the Serbs from Western Slavonia, the only

11 option is to resettle these people in Yugoslavia or to leave them on

12 the -- in the open fields. Is that correct?

13 A. Again, pure speculation. But -- but the -- the response that the

14 international community was looking for at the time was to have all sides

15 sit down and resolve the issue through negotiation. And that wasn't

16 happening.

17 MR. ZIVANOVIC: May we have a look at P2677, please. It is

18 paragraph 19. I don't know, is it confidential or not.

19 MR. GILLETT: No. This is the UN Secretary-General report.

20 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yeah, okay.

21 MR. GILLETT: It's not confidential.

22 MR. ZIVANOVIC:

23 Q. It is the second sentence in -- I'm interested in first two

24 sentences from paragraph 19.

25 It reads:

Page 7867

1 "Extremist elements on both sides are nevertheless still present

2 in Sector West. The Croatian police have often played an intimidatory

3 role which has vigorously protested by UNPROFOR."

4 Could you explain what that means, intimidatory role?

5 A. I don't know. That's an UN document and I'm not here to comment

6 on UN documents, sir. I would have read it. And intimidatory involves

7 intimidation, tactics, methods, and could in today's terms could be

8 interpreted as terrorist, terrorist activities. Intimidation.

9 Q. Were you informed about such cases?

10 A. Of course, yes, we were.

11 Q. Thank you.

12 A. But I should say they were happening on both sides.

13 Q. Yeah, yeah.

14 A. Okay.

15 Q. There are a lot of documents in records about it.

16 Could you look at paragraph 20 of this report, please.

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. Just a moment to find this specific sentence.

19 MR. ZIVANOVIC: May we go to next page, please. Hmm. Next page.

20 Oh. Sorry. May we go to -- to previous page. It is last sentence,

21 actually, that's spilled to another page.

22 Paragraph 20, please.

23 I read it for the record:

24 "Certain political leaders have sought to develop movements for

25 return to -- to the UNPAs within stated deadlines, and then to organise

Page 7868

1 mass returns. UNPROFOR has emphasised at all levels that the basic

2 conditions of security do not exist for such mass returns and that the

3 highly publicised attempts made so far not only exacerbate tensions but,

4 if persisted in, could lead to renewed tragedies. On one occasion, in

5 the Osijek area on" - may we go to the next page, please - "on

6 30 September, the situation was made worse by public statements by a

7 senior officer that the Croatian army would support such returns and move

8 up behind the marching people. These events caused great tension in

9 Sector East, which is the displaced persons' stated destination and,

10 indeed, fear among the Serb population in the sector ..."

11 Could you please clarify this statement? Do you recall this?

12 A. Yes -- yes, I do, in fact. And it's a matter of history. It's

13 an accurate statement.

14 Q. Thank you. Just one more question. Today you testified about

15 pink zones.

16 A. Yes, sir.

17 Q. And as far as I know, these zones were almost completely

18 deserted. There was no population in the pink zones, but Croats and

19 Serbs. Is it correct?

20 A. They were being depopulated, yes, they were.

21 Q. Thank you. And the last issue is your -- your very short meeting

22 with Mr. Hadzic and the words about his position told you by your escort.

23 A. I want to clarify. It wasn't a meeting. We bumped into each

24 other as -- as I was -- either he was leaving or I was leaving, but we

25 just passed. And I happened to ask the question, who was this person. I

Page 7869

1 didn't have a meeting with him. I hadn't arranged a meeting with him.

2 It's just that I am aware of who he was through the records, and on that

3 one particular day, we just passed in the hallway. That's -- that's --

4 Q. And would you be able to tell us who was this man who give you

5 information?

6 A. You know, I'm not exactly sure of who it was. I thought it was

7 Lieutenant-Colonel Ray Wolosichuk [phoen], who was with me at the time.

8 And I'm not -- I'm not 100 per cent sure of that. It's a long time ago,

9 sir.

10 Q. Sorry, would you repeat the name?

11 A. Wolosichuk.

12 Q. Wolosichuk. He was --

13 A. He was a monitor who was assigned to the coordination centre in

14 Knin.

15 Q. From what country is he --

16 A. He was from Canada.

17 Q. He is also from Canada?

18 A. He is also from Canada. But I'm not sure that it was him because

19 I was visiting there and -- yeah.

20 Q. Thank you for your time. Thank you very much. I finish.

21 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Your Honours, I finish my cross-examination.

22 Thank you.

23 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you, Mr. Zivanovic.

24 Mr. Gillett, anything in re-direct?

25 MR. GILLETT: Thank you, Mr. President. Probably five to ten

Page 7870

1 minutes.

2 Re-examination by Mr. Gillett:

3 Q. Sir, you were asked about incursions by the Croatian side during

4 cross-examination.

5 MR. GILLETT: Could I get 65 ter document 3151 on the monitor,

6 please.

7 Q. And while this is coming up, this is an UNPROFOR military info

8 summary. Would you have access to these kinds of reports during your

9 time with ECMM?

10 A. Yeah, we shared reports back and forth.

11 MR. GILLETT: Could we go to page 13 of this document.

12 Q. Now, under the heading 18 September 1992, in the middle of the

13 page, we see a series of incidents listed. Inside the UNPA, we see

14 militia cars tried to force their way through Ken position at Civljane to

15 Peruca. Then under inside pink zones, we see an incident with fire from

16 the CA, which I understand to be Croatian army. In number 2, we see fire

17 from the TDF, which I understand to be Territorial Defence Force side to

18 the Croatian army. And then we see another three incidents of this

19 nature.

20 From your experience, were there incidents and provocations by

21 both sides during this conflict?

22 A. Yes, there were.

23 Q. And could I ask, are you aware what HMG - this is point 2 -

24 means, the acronym?

25 A. HMG is heavy machine-gun.

Page 7871

1 Q. Would that be an example of a crew-fired weapon that you referred

2 to?

3 A. That is a crew-served weapon.

4 MR. GILLETT: Your Honours, we would tender this document, 3151,

5 for admission.

6 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Shall be assigned Exhibit Number P2912. Thank

8 you.

9 MR. GILLETT: Thank you very much.

10 Q. You were also asked about the process of demilitarisation during

11 cross-examination.

12 MR. GILLETT: Could we get 65 ter document 3624 on the monitor,

13 please.

14 And this is a United Nations Secretary-General report. If we

15 could go to paragraph 7 of this report. Thank you.

16 Q. We see here that it reports:

17 "The justification given by the Knin authorities for these forces

18 that they are needed to defend Serb-controlled areas from attacks and

19 infiltration by the Croatian army. General Nambiar has repeatedly

20 stressed to the authorities in Belgrade and Knin that it is UNPROFOR that

21 exercises the protection function in the UNPAs, and that the presence of

22 these paramilitary units is contrary to the United Nations plan and has

23 caused the Croatian army to retain some of its forces at the

24 confrontation line. As a result, clashes continue to occur along the

25 line, fueling intercommunal tension in the UNPAs."

Page 7872

1 Would the presence of these Serb militia forces in the UNPAs and

2 pink zones constitute a provocation to the Croatian army?

3 A. It was irritant. I'm not sure that "provocation" is a word that

4 I would use because you have to understand that the Serb population was

5 under siege at the time and they saw themselves as being under siege. So

6 that was, again, the issue in trying to get the -- the implementation of

7 the Vance Plan to move forward.

8 So the answer is yes, but I'm trying to understand it from the --

9 from the Serb side as well.

10 Q. Thank you. And from the reports that you read, how did these

11 armed forces, the Serb militia, treat the non-Serb population within the

12 UNPAs and the pink zones?

13 MR. ZIVANOVIC: It was not a part of my cross-examination, and it

14 was part of witness statement, and it could be matter of

15 examination-in-chief.

16 MR. GILLETT: The reason I'm asking about this is it relates to

17 the issue of Croatian forces being provoked.

18 JUDGE DELVOIE: Objection sustained.

19 MR. GILLETT: Thank you.

20 If we could now go to paragraph 34 of this report. Thank you.

21 And just for the record, this is one of the paragraphs that was

22 inadvertently cut off in D70, which is a draft version of this report

23 that was admitted. This is the full, final version of the report.

24 Q. We see here it states that:

25 "The root cause of the deterioration in the UNPAs since late

Page 7873

1 July has been the Knin authorities' decision to create new paramilitary

2 forces. This action is inconsistent with the demilitarisation of the

3 UNPAs and thus is a blatant violation of the United Nations plan."

4 It then continues in the same vein. Would the creation of new

5 paramilitary forces constitute a provocation to the Croatian side?

6 A. Yes, in my view.

7 Q. Final topic. You were asked about the return of refugees and you

8 were referred to document P2677.

9 MR. GILLETT: Could we get P2677 on the monitor. Paragraph 20,

10 which is page 7.

11 And if we go over to the next page, please.

12 Q. You were asked about the incident concerning the return of

13 refugees to Osijek, which is in Sector East. And we read that these

14 events --

15 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zivanovic.

16 MR. ZIVANOVIC: It was not return to refugees from Osijek. It

17 was the statement of officer in Osijek.

18 MR. GILLETT: Thank you for that clarification. That's correct.

19 Q. If we read the sentence:

20 "These events caused great tension in Sector East, which was the

21 displaced persons' stated destination, indeed, fear among the Serb

22 population in the sector (for fear, on both sides, is still a factor in

23 the UNPAs). This, in turn, provided both reason and pretext for further

24 mobilisation of the Serb special militias and renewed victimisation of

25 the non-Serb people."

Page 7874

1 Would the potential return of refugees to their homes justify

2 further victimisation of the remaining non-Serbs in the UNPAs?

3 A. Could you repeat that question again. I just ...

4 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zivanovic.

5 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Sorry, it is incomplete quotation or incomplete

6 statement. Because it was said, clearly said, that Croatian army would

7 support such returns and move up behind the marching people. It was not

8 just the refugees but Croatian army.

9 MR. GILLETT: Indeed. And that was read in cross-examination. I

10 was reading the passage that wasn't highlighted in cross-examination to

11 give a complete basis for the witness to answer the question.

12 Q. Now, based on that, my question is: Would this paternal --

13 potential, sorry, return of refugees supported by the Croatian army

14 justify the further victimisation of the non-Serbs who remained in the

15 UNPAs?

16 A. Not in my opinion.

17 Q. Okay.

18 MR. GILLETT: No further questions, Your Honours.

19 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.

20 [Trial Chamber confers]

21 Questioned by the Court:

22 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes, Witness. I was waiting for

23 the end of the French interpretation before I put my question to you.

24 I would like to go back to the exhibit that you were shown. That

25 was 65 ter 3624 and that was a report by the Secretary-General of the

Page 7875

1 United Nations.

2 I would like to know: Who was supposed to provide protection of

3 the police in UNPA zones in your sector?

4 A. I'm not sure I understand -- do you mean the United Nations

5 police or the local police of the -- of the area?

6 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] First of all, the very principle

7 of policing, police protection for people and for goods. Would it be the

8 local police or the UN police?

9 A. The UN police, at the time, were in a mentoring role. They

10 weren't providing protection. As I understand it, they weren't providing

11 protection to anyone.

12 The protection of the civilian population was the responsibility

13 of the local police in the various sectors, according to wherever --

14 wherever they lived. There were several different police forces, and the

15 UN -- UNCIVPOL were a -- were a mentoring force. As I understand it.

16 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Indeed. And that's how I

17 understand things as well. But in the report of the UN

18 Secretary-General, we just read that paramilitary forces were created by

19 the Knin authorities which caused difficulties.

20 Now, these forces that were considered as paramilitaries in this

21 report, how did the Knin authorities consider them? Did they consider

22 them as the police or the military? Knowing that it was incumbent upon

23 the Knin authorities to protect the population.

24 A. I understand your question.

25 I can't comment on what the Knin authorities thought. I can only

Page 7876

1 comment on how we, as an international monitoring force, interpreted

2 the -- their actions.

3 There are two -- a policeman is an officer of the law who

4 operates within the law, who operates as an individual who protects a

5 people, citizens, in accordance with the law.

6 The paramilitary forces that we're talking about that were

7 referred to as "special police," in our view, or in my view, were

8 military-type militias, and that was in contravention of the spirit of

9 the Vance Plan. As I understand it. They were a fairly large force.

10 They were more heavily armed than policemen and they operated in an

11 organised military fashion as opposed to the operations of a civilian

12 police officer in accordance with whatever law he happens to be operating

13 inside.

14 Does that make any sense?

15 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes. Thank you very much. I

16 understood you perfectly well.

17 This force, this special police, that was considered by the

18 report as a paramilitary force, were they alone on the ground for the

19 protection of people and property, or were there, in addition, also local

20 police forces?

21 A. There were local police forces. And those local police forces

22 we, as a -- as a monitoring mission, would consider them to be exactly

23 what they were: Police forces. Policemen.

24 The paramilitaries we considered to be a -- or the special

25 police, we considered them to be a paramilitary force.