130903ED

Page 7966

1 [Witness answered through interpreter]

2 Mr. Olmsted, please proceed.

3 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you, Mr. President.

4 Examination by Mr. Olmsted: [Continued]

5 Q. Good morning, General.

6 A. Good morning.

7 Q. I would like to return to the issue of Town Commands, which I was

8 asking you questions about when we concluded your testimony yesterday.

9 MR. OLMSTED: And I'd like to bring up on the screen 65 ter 6106.

10 This is tab 187.

11 Q. And this is a 1st Mechanised Corps report to the

12 1st Military District, dated 25 February 1992. And if we turn to the

13 last page. And if we turn to the last page, we'll be able to see that

14 it's submitted by Major-General Mico Delic.

15 And I'd like to draw your attention to page 2 of this report

16 where Major-General Delic reports on a number of objective difficulties

17 faced by the civilian affairs organs, including, and I believe this is

18 the second bullet point, or about midway through the page, he raises the

19 difficulty of the selection of civilian authority organs is the

20 responsibility of the Executive Councils of the government of SAO SBWS;

21 most often -- and municipalities:

22 "Most often these are their people. If we directly involve

23 ourselves in the selection of these people, it would cause

24 dissatisfaction on the part of the government and its institutions, and

25 even the people."

Page 7967

1 General, were the JNA Town Commands permitted to involve

2 themselves in local politics?

3 A. As far as I know, no, they would just make their observations and

4 assessments. This is simply a statement as to what the situation was and

5 that there are difficulties regarding elections of civilian authorities

6 on the ground, so this is just within the context of this being advisory

7 organs rendering some kind of assistance in establishing a system of

8 government and for having all spheres of life start functioning on the

9 ground.

10 If certain checks were made though and if they had some

11 information about certain persons who would not exactly be eligible to

12 hold a particular post, they could have passed that on, but it wasn't in

13 their hands to decide who it would be.

14 Q. And who would they pass that information on to?

15 A. Well, specifically regarding the situation and problems with

16 establishing civilian government, it's send to the -- from the corps to

17 the 1st Military District, and in the 1st Military District there was a

18 special organ that was in charge of these problems regarding

19 Town Commands and then that report would be sent to them. If there would

20 be some problems in their functioning, they were actually not in charge

21 of resolving disputes and passing judgement. Their reports were sent to

22 the Command of the Military District and then, according to those

23 instructions, they were supposed to inform the government of Serbia about

24 that, and then the government of Serbia would exercise influence

25 vis-a-vis the organs of government in the territory of the SBWS. That's

Page 7968

1 why some of these problems are being indicated here, described.

2 Q. Why was the selection of civilian authority organs causing

3 problems in the SBWS in early 1992?

4 A. Well, I saw some of these reports from different levels, from

5 brigade level to the level of corps. The problem boils down to the

6 following: On the one hand, in certain areas, the population itself

7 opposed the functioning of these authorities. In such reports, it was

8 indicated that there were still quite a few Croats in particular areas,

9 and they distanced themselves from these activities. They didn't want to

10 take part.

11 Also, there was resistance on the part of others because they

12 disagreed with certain candidates who were supposed to hold a particular

13 position in their territory. So then there was this tacit obstruction,

14 if you will. I saw such reports coming from lower levels.

15 Also, there were objections to the effect that there were

16 different personal connections involved, in terms of who would hold which

17 particular office. This was not characteristic only of the situation in

18 the SBWS, but it's characteristic of areas beyond that in Serbia.

19 Q. Just to clarify your last answer, General, you just testified

20 that in such reports it was indicated:

21 "... that there were still quite a few Croats in particular

22 areas, and they distanced themselves from these activities."

23 Who was distancing themselves from these activities, and what

24 were these activities?

25 A. Specifically in one report - I don't know whether it was from the

Page 7969

1 2nd Brigade of the corps - they indicated that Croats did not want to

2 take part in the these activities regarding the appointment of particular

3 organs, their functioning, et cetera, and, generally speaking, that they

4 are resisting the whole effort.

5 This was a particular town - I cannot remember exactly which one

6 it was - where quite a few Croats were still left. Maybe it was Ilok.

7 That's just an assumption, but I know that quite a few Croats did remain

8 in Ilok, for instance.

9 In that situation, although they were a minority, they were

10 rather restrained and they probably did not want to take part in these

11 activities. I assume that some elections were held there, that it wasn't

12 only appointments.

13 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zivanovic.

14 MR. ZIVANOVIC: It seems that the words of the witness were not

15 accurately translated as to Ilok. He said that many Croats left in Ilok.

16 JUDGE DELVOIE: Could you clarify with the witness, Mr. Olmsted.

17 MR. OLMSTED: Certainly.

18 Q. The -- General, the transcript reads that there were quite a few

19 Croats still left in Ilok. Is that what you testified to?

20 A. No. I said what the gentleman, the attorney, said in his

21 objection. In Ilok, in relation to some other places that I know about,

22 many Croats were left because, from the very beginning, the army played a

23 role there. They wanted to keep the situation as it was.

24 Let me not speak at great length about this now. There were some

25 people from Ilok who left with their weapons, but many returned their

Page 7970

1 weapons and stayed in Ilok.

2 Q. And those that stayed in Ilok, what was happening to them in --

3 in early 1992 that caused problems with regard to them?

4 A. I don't know about specific problems that occurred there. But

5 there were some because on the other side is Backa Palanka, as far as I

6 know. There were attempts made to intimidate some of them so that they'd

7 leave the territory. I know that something happened in relation to the

8 local priest in Ilok. So this was the later stage.

9 Pressure was brought to bear against some of them so that they'd

10 leave the territory. I don't have precise information about this, and I

11 cannot speak about it now, but I am aware of the phenomenon.

12 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, may this be admitted into evidence.

13 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.

14 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2950, Your Honours.

15 MR. OLMSTED:

16 Q. General, I just want to look at one more of these

17 Town Command-related documents.

18 MR. OLMSTED: This is 65 ter 6177. It's tab 200.

19 Q. And this is a -- an assessment by the 1st Mechanised

20 Corps Command sent to the 1st Military District organ for civilian

21 affairs dated 20 April 1992. And if we take a look at the last page, we

22 see that it's sent by Colonel Novica Gusic. And I would like to draw

23 your attention to page 1 of this assessment, page 2 in the English

24 version.

25 And if we look under item 1, we see much like General Delic,

Page 7971

1 Colonel Gusic is listing a number of problems that they are encountering,

2 and I want to draw your attention, in particular, to item (e) which in

3 the English version is towards the bottom, as well as in the original

4 version.

5 And under (e), Colonel Gusic lists as a problem that:

6 "In the area of Vukovar and Mirkovci municipalities, the SUP has

7 not ensured the protection of personal and social property or full safety

8 of the people through its professional and executive organs for public

9 security. Moreover, it showed no desire to co-operate with this Command

10 in resolving recruitment and the provision of equipment to police units."

11 General, if the local police refused to co-operate with the JNA

12 Town Commands, what recourse did the JNA have?

13 A. Well, they did what can be seen from the previous two documents.

14 They would report to a higher organ. They were not in charge of

15 resolving the problem by any kind of force. If police -- police stations

16 could not be established, they could not issue a decree or engage in any

17 other activity to appoint the people they wanted to have appointed. They

18 would report to their superiors and that would go all the way up to the

19 command to the Military District, or I don't know -- was already in the

20 army command. I have already explained the army command. Now whether

21 they communicated with the government of the SBWS, then if they could not

22 resolve the problem there, according to General Pujic's instructions,

23 then the army command would resolve that with the government of Serbia,

24 that level. And then by political means this problem would be resolved.

25 So the army was not in charge of establishing any kind of authorities by

Page 7972

1 force.

2 If no result would be achieved, then they would report to their

3 superior command and then that would go all the way up to the government

4 of Serbia, ultimately.

5 Q. Do you know how the -- the local government, the government of

6 SBWS, would respond to these types of problems when they were raised by

7 the military?

8 A. I don't know. Otherwise, in operative terms, I was not involved

9 in these activities because this is not within the purview of the

10 security organs.

11 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, may this be admitted into evidence,

12 Your Honours.

13 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.

14 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2951, Your Honours.

15 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.

16 MR. OLMSTED:

17 Q. General, under the Vance Plan, who had the responsibility to

18 demobilise and disarm the non-JNA armed elements in the RSK?

19 A. In general terms, I know what was regulated by the Vance Plan.

20 That is to say, demilitarisation was supposed to take place in the zones

21 where combat activities had been taking place. That is to say, to

22 disband armed units and to have weapons and the equipment of the

23 Territorial Defence placed in storage, double key, the JNA should leave

24 that area.

25 As for these armed units, only the police - milicija - could stay

Page 7973

1 on, and the army was supposed to be on the ready, in a way, if the other

2 side violates the agreement, if there are any incursions coming from the

3 other side. So they would protect the population.

4 Now who was in charge? Everybody was in charge of their own

5 units. The Territorial Defence was supposed to demobilise and disarm

6 their own units. They had the obligation to fully man the new TO units,

7 according to war establishment, or -- we had a meeting. I think it was

8 sometime in April. Maybe we were in Plitvice or somewhere over there,

9 together with the MUP organs and the organs of the Krajina. That is

10 where everything that was needed by this Territorial Defence was taken

11 care of, units, et cetera. The army gave its equipment, weapons, so that

12 they would be fully armed, equipped, but that all this should be in

13 storage in case of an emergency. So everybody had their own obligations.

14 The army was supposed to withdraw and before that to help the local

15 organs establish these units of Territorial Defence and also in materiel

16 terms, to help them. And then the army was supposed to withdraw. And I

17 think that the Territorial Defence also did what they were supposed to do

18 in relation to the units that been armed up until then.

19 Q. Let me show you a document. 65 ter 6174. This is tab 199.

20 Sir, this is a 1st Military District document addressed to the

21 Command of the 1st Mechanised, I believe, Corps, and the 12th Corps and

22 it's dated 13 April 1992. And I'd like to draw your attention to item

23 number 1, which states:

24 "With regard to all questions concerning the situation in the

25 territory outside JNA units and their activity, European Community

Page 7974

1 observers should co-ordinate their plans to assess the situation with the

2 government of the Serbian District of Baranja, Eastern Slavonia, and

3 Western Srem, but even then they should be accompanied by a liaison

4 officer."

5 General, can you tell us, why is the JNA making this distinction

6 with regard to who is responsible for co-ordinating the plans with the

7 European Commission observers?

8 A. Well, this is the first time I see this document, but I can

9 assume that it only acts as a reminder in terms of who was in charge of

10 what. The authorities in the territory have their own responsibility for

11 the work that is supposed to be carried out. I cannot give a more

12 detailed comment because I'm not aware of this, and I did not take part

13 in this activity.

14 Q. And I understand that. But is this consistent with what you

15 understood were the respective roles of the JNA versus the role of the

16 local authority with regard to issues regarding disarmament and

17 demobilisation?

18 A. Oh, that's clear. I said who was supposed to disarm. They

19 disarmed their own units, that is to say the units of the

20 Territorial Defence that they have. The army reports about how a

21 particular process is evolving in an area where they are so that the

22 command would be kept abreast of what was happening. So there's nothing

23 controversial here. I have nothing to add to that.

24 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, may this be admitted into evidence.

25 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.

Page 7975

1 Mr. Zivanovic.

2 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I would object because the witness clearly said

3 that he doesn't know anything about it.

4 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Olmsted.

5 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, it's consistent with what he was

6 testifying about with regard to obligations under the Vance Plan, with

7 regard to demobilising and demilitarising, with regard to the roles of

8 the JNA versus the role of the local authorities. And he was able to

9 provide some comment on this, and we would tender it at this time.

10 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I think this document is not related to

11 disarmament.

12 MR. OLMSTED: Well, Your Honours, that's an issue for argument, I

13 think.

14 JUDGE DELVOIE: Overruled.

15 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2952, Your Honours.

16 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.

17 MR. OLMSTED:

18 Q. And, finally, General, and very quickly, I want to return to the

19 issue of crimes in Vukovar after its fall.

20 MR. OLMSTED: And if we could have on the screen, 65 ter 5127.

21 This is tab 152.

22 Q. This is a letter from the British Medical Association to

23 General Kadijevic dated 9 December 1991. The signature at the bottom has

24 been redacted because this document has -- is subject to some protective

25 measures.

Page 7976

1 But let me ask you, the contents deal with persons missing from

2 the Vukovar Hospital after the fall of Vukovar. Could you tell us, in

3 December 1991 or early 1992, were you aware that persons from the

4 Vukovar Hospital were missing after the fall of Vukovar?

5 A. No, I was not. I know that there were quite a few wounded

6 persons from the Vukovar Hospital at the collection centre in

7 Sremska Mitrovica and that part of the seriously wounded persons were

8 treated at the VMA, the Military Medical Academy and other medical

9 institutions of the military in Novi Sad.

10 Q. As head of the Security Administration, if you were informed of

11 this issue of missing persons from the Vukovar Hospital, what measures

12 would you have taken?

13 A. This is referred to rather non-specifically. If it says that

14 several persons are missing, then a list should be made as to who these

15 persons who are missing are. This is a rather generalised assessment

16 which is basically incorrect. I think that over 100 wounded persons,

17 persons who were receiving medical treatment, had been evacuated, and I

18 know that they were treated at the VMA and the military hospital in

19 Sarajevo, and in the collection centre itself there were infirmaries

20 where they were treated.

21 This was provided by some, as far as I could interpret this, some

22 group of doctors, some British Medical Association. I see that they are

23 addressing probably General Kadijevic? I don't know who they are

24 addressing. Yes. It is General Kadijevic. I never heard at a single

25 meeting that this question was particularly pointed out and discussed,

Page 7977

1 perhaps because all of these organisations that at the time came to this

2 area and followed the situation, what was going on in Yugoslavia, for the

3 most part, raised problems only from one side, from one angle. We have

4 no information that they indicated such problems in relation to the Serb

5 side. I assume that with regard to these objections, that are rather

6 one-sided in general, they did not even receive an answer. It just says

7 that these persons are missing.

8 In collection centres, there were persons, including persons from

9 the Vukovar Hospital, who were doctors. That just confirms what I've

10 said so far. We did not have any information to the effect that some of

11 the wounded from the hospital had gone missing. They were transferred,

12 some of them to Croatia, some of them to Serbia, or, rather, collection

13 centres there.

14 Q. Just clarification in your last answer. You said that some of

15 the wounded persons were treated at the medical centre in Sarajevo. Is

16 that the correct location?

17 A. No, not Sarajevo. Novi Sad. And the VMA, the

18 Military Medical Academy in Belgrade.

19 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, may I tender this into evidence,

20 Your Honours.

21 JUDGE DELVOIE: To -- to what end, Mr. Olmsted?

22 MR. OLMSTED: I -- I would like to give my explanations, but I

23 think it would be better outside the presence of the witness.

24 JUDGE DELVOIE: Then ...

25 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Before moving on to another topic,

Page 7978

1 I don't know if I've understood correctly.

2 Did the witness answer the question which you've just put to him,

3 Mr. Olmsted? Because you asked him whether as chief of security he was

4 informed about the issue of missing persons at the hospital and what

5 measure would you have taken.

6 I don't know if he answered this specific question. I didn't

7 quite understand the witness's response.

8 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you, Your Honour. I think I should ask the

9 question again.

10 Q. And, General, please, if you could just try to answer it as

11 simply as possible.

12 We understand that you were not aware of this situation where, in

13 this letter, they're reporting about missing persons from

14 Vukovar Hospital. My question to you is simply: Had you been informed

15 of the contents of this letter, that they -- there were a large number of

16 persons missing from the hospital? As head of Security Administration,

17 what actions would you have taken had you had this information?

18 JUDGE DELVOIE: Yes, Mr. Zivanovic.

19 MR. ZIVANOVIC: It was not the same question as put before that.

20 JUDGE DELVOIE: Well --

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is it.

22 JUDGE DELVOIE: Nothing wrong with that, Mr. Zivanovic, I would

23 say. If -- if Mr. Olmsted wants to rephrase or focus the question, and

24 Judge Mindua is satisfied with that, what would be the problem?

25 Please proceed.

Page 7979

1 MR. OLMSTED:

2 Q. General, I -- you --

3 A. Let us simplify. I am not aware of the contents of this

4 document. That would be a simple answer to your question. Had I been

5 acquainted with it, although I don't know along which lines I, as a chief

6 of the Security Administration, should have been, but had I been, I would

7 have demanded this organisation to give me a list of names rather than a

8 general statement that somebody had gone missing. In other words, I

9 would have requested more complete information. And based on what I

10 received from them, I would have taken measures of verification and

11 determination of facts.

12 I don't know if I should reply to anything else because,

13 actually, there were two questions. You asked me what I would have done;

14 and the second question, whether I knew of this. No, I did not know of

15 this. But had I known, I would have requested specific information, who

16 went missing, under which circumstances, and what they know about it.

17 But if what's alluded to - if I may comment - are the persons who went

18 missing at Ovcara, they should have stated that. But obviously at that

19 time they themselves didn't know. They may have heard some accounts but

20 they didn't know. The missing persons for them were Vesna Bosanac and

21 Juraj Njavro and, what do I know, maybe five more doctors. They, as a

22 doctors' association, may have been interested in these people. I

23 suppose that in this text these persons are -- are mentioned somewhere.

24 I haven't read all of it.

25 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Olmsted, just for the record clear, I just --

Page 7980

1 just before Mr. Zivanovic objected, I noted that you added a little bit

2 to the content of the letter. I'm reading, page 14, line 13:

3 "My question to you is simply: Had you been informed of the

4 content of this letter that there were a large number of persons

5 missing..."

6 I think the qualification "large" is an addition by yourself;

7 right?

8 MR. OLMSTED: It's an addition by myself but it is self-evident

9 in the letter because it's talking about -- if you do the math it's not

10 like one or two people, it's many more. And maybe I should have

11 qualified it more is what I meant by large.

12 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay.

13 MR. OLMSTED: Significant number.

14 JUDGE DELVOIE: Yeah.

15 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, may I tender this into evidence.

16 JUDGE DELVOIE: This is the letter -- the document we ask you

17 about the reason for tendering and you said you would explain that -- or

18 are we talking about another -- another document?

19 MR. OLMSTED: It's this document, and if -- if -- if I may -- if

20 I can do it outside of the presence of the witness.

21 JUDGE DELVOIE: So that will be at a later point in time. Thank

22 you.

23 Mr. Olmsted, your time is more than up.

24 MR. OLMSTED: Yes. And I apologise for that, Your Honours, and I

25 have no further questions.

Page 7981

1 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you very much.

2 Mr. Zivanovic, cross-examination.

3 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you, Your Honours.

4 Cross-examination by Mr. Zivanovic:

5 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Vasiljevic, my name is Zoran Zivanovic, and

6 I am Goran Hadzic's Defence attorney in these proceedings. I have read

7 your statement, and I listened to your evidence yesterday and today, and

8 I'll ask you some questions about it.

9 I suppose that you have your statement in front of you; 6444 is

10 the number. If you don't have a hard copy, you will see it on the

11 screen. I'll start with item 4 of your statement where you speak about

12 your military career, especially the latter part, that has to do with

13 your work at the Security Administration of the Federal Secretariat of

14 National defence. I saw that from 1986 to 1988, you were head of the

15 counter-intelligence department. Please tell us whose superior you were

16 at the time? I correct myself. Who -- whose subordinate you were?

17 A. At the time I was subordinate to the chief of the

18 Security Administration, General Ilija Ceranic.

19 Q. From July 1990, you served as deputy head of the

20 Security Administration. Can you tell me who was head at the time?

21 A. Major-General Marko Negovanovic was the head of the

22 administration at the time.

23 Q. In paragraph 5 of your statement, you say that on the

24 16th of June, 1991, you were appointed head of the Security

25 Administration at the Federal Secretariat of National Defence; is that

Page 7982

1 correct?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. You remained in that position until the 8th of May, 1992.

4 A. Correct.

5 Q. In paragraph 7, you say that you are proud to have been a JNA

6 officer and proud of any other senior officer who chose this profession

7 of his own free will. Given this attitude of yours towards the JNA,

8 which is not difficult to understand, let me ask you to what extent you

9 can be objective in assessing the activities of the JNA in this context,

10 especially if we talk about some things that give rise to a suspicion

11 that crimes were committed?

12 A. I can be objective to the extent I had information of events, and

13 I can be objective due to the time that has elapsed since, and we're

14 talking about almost 20 years. Now I can look at some events from a

15 distance.

16 Q. In a word, I understand your answer to mean that your attitude

17 towards the JNA does not hinder your ability to analyse the events about

18 which you gave evidence.

19 A. In the period after the end of my career and after giving

20 evidence, my attitude has not changed significantly. I may have changed

21 my opinion when I learned of some things ten or 15 years after they

22 happened, but when I gave my statement, I gave it on the basis of the

23 information that I had. I don't mean any subsequent corrections. But,

24 in principle, my attitude remains unchanged. This especially pertains to

25 the breaking up of Yugoslavia. In the period from around 1990 until --

Page 7983

1 THE INTERPRETER: Could the General repeat the latter year,

2 please.

3 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Sorry --

4 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Vasiljevic, could you repeat the year you

5 mentioned? From around 1990 until?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 1992.

7 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.

8 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. In paragraph 8, you mentioned some proceedings conducted in

10 Croatia against you. So let me ask you if that fact affects your ability

11 to objectively assess the events?

12 A. No. My opinions when I was in active service and later when I

13 retired, and so on, has remained unchanged. There is no reason for me to

14 change my opinion, and that does not depend on what they allege in their

15 indictment. Why should I change my opinion? I gave their prosecutor

16 replies twice at the War Crimes Court in Belgrade, and I didn't change

17 anything essential before or after that.

18 Q. Let us be a bit clearer. I did not ask you whether you changed

19 your opinion but to what extent your opinion, your attitude, your way of

20 thinking, or your conclusions about some things, can be objective in the

21 context of these two things I have just mentioned: Your emotional

22 attitude toward the JNA, on the one hand; and the fact that there are

23 proceedings against you in Croatia, on the other.

24 A. That didn't influence me at all. Due to these proceedings, I was

25 in the position to review some archive documents. But if you're alluding

Page 7984

1 to the possibility that my statement is affected by the fact that

2 proceedings are conducted against me in Croatia, you can rest assured

3 that this is not the case.

4 Q. We have some information here that round about 2001 or 2002, a

5 commission was established by the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia

6 and the Federal Secretariat of National Defence for co-operation with the

7 ICTY. It was on the 26th of March, 2001.

8 MR. ZIVANOVIC: May we see D79, please.

9 Q. [Interpretation] My question is: Do you know of the

10 establishment of this commission?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Can you tell us what you know?

13 A. That commission was established - I know that - and it was to

14 provide assistance to witnesses and defendants in proceedings. Let me

15 explain so as not to beat about the bush and waste time. I learned of

16 the indictment against Milosevic when it was published in the media. The

17 persons suspected of participating in a joint criminal enterprise were

18 another four generals, one of whom is me. Although I was a pensioner, I

19 reported to the Security Administration because I do have some duties

20 with regard to the institution I worked for. I reported to be

21 interviewed, but they said that there was no need for that. So -- and I

22 contacted the office of the ICTY of my own accord. They interviewed me,

23 and I informed the general in charge who was a member of that commission

24 of what had happened.

25 I also wrote a report -- actually, I dictated it to a

Page 7985

1 non-commissioned officer who put it on paper. After that, I contacted

2 the Security Administration to inform them because that's where I had

3 served, but they replied that they had already been informed by that

4 commission. And I was angry at that man from the commission to whom I

5 had reported because he was also a security organ at his time. He was

6 even my superior for a while because he didn't tell me he would do so.

7 I encountered resistance. Everybody who wanted to speak out

8 openly about what had happened encountered resistance from -- from within

9 the commission that some things -- that it wasn't necessary to speak out

10 about some things.

11 So that's what I wanted to say.

12 Apart from that, I never set any conditions to ICTY personnel who

13 wanted to talk to me. I never demanded to be taken off the list, and

14 even now I don't know if I've been taken off or not. I gave a witness

15 statement and a statement as a possible suspect, but even if I had been

16 indicted I would have said the same thing.

17 Q. I understood you to say that you were indicted together with

18 Milosevic, but --

19 A. No, no, no. I didn't say that I had been accused. I'm sure that

20 all four generals had been indicted if I had not volunteered to be

21 interviewed and given a lot of information to clarify the circumstances.

22 And, as far as I know, none of us four were indicted. We were suspects,

23 but so were many others, I think.

24 Q. Apart from this contact with the commission that you've just

25 mentioned, did you have any other contacts with them?

Page 7986

1 A. With the commission?

2 Q. Yes.

3 A. No, there was no need. I contacted them and they asked me if I

4 wanted to be a witness, and I accepted. And I told the people from the

5 commission that I would testify. But that required the lifting of my

6 obligation to keep secrets. That was in 2002, and the procedure

7 preceding my evidence drew on, and somebody intervened, I think. Then I

8 was invited to be interviewed by the head of that federal commission,

9 where I explained what I had gone through because I was not informed that

10 I was on the list for interrogation about the events at Ovcara. That was

11 in 1997 or 1998.

12 From the Belgrade War Crimes Court, they asked me if my

13 administration or the General Staff had informed me that I was one of the

14 persons to be questioned about the crimes at Ovcara, but they wouldn't

15 tell me that at the Security Administration.

16 Let me explain. I believe that you are familiar with the

17 situation. In 1992, on the 8th of May, I retired. There was a group

18 of -- a total of 70 generals who retired then. I went to see Milosevic

19 on the 5th of March, 1992, for the first time. I spoke about that at the

20 trial, what the purpose of that meeting was, so I needn't go into that.

21 And I was being shoved aside all the time. Because I'm a frank man I

22 know that people are looking -- people are watching and listening. I

23 have nothing to hide. That's why I acted the way I did, and perhaps I

24 will be convicted if I'm -- if I ever find myself in that situation.

25 So feel free ask me any questions you want that had to do with

Page 7987

1 this case.

2 Q. I want to ask you something else about the work of this

3 commission. Please take a look at another exhibit, D80.

4 It's an analysis of the trial before the Tribunal. It is rather

5 comprehensive. We don't have to go through all of it. But let's take a

6 look at the last page -- actually, the last paragraph of this report.

7 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] No, I don't mean that. In the

8 English version, this is the page.

9 Q. It's just the last paragraph where the commission says:

10 "Continue with the preparation of the accused, suspects and

11 potential witnesses before The Hague Tribunal, focussing on the officers

12 in the so-called Operation Dubrovnik ... Operation Vukovar (three

13 persons, Kosovo and Metohija), the officers suspected in connection with

14 the war in Croatia."

15 And among others your name is mentioned too. I would like to

16 know if at least as far as you're concerned what is mentioned here is

17 correct?

18 A. Yes, it is. But it is not true that I was informed of it or that

19 anybody proofed me. Because who can proof me? I was head of the

20 Security Administration. I could proof them concerning these things.

21 How can they proof them -- how can they proof me and in what way? So

22 they didn't, nor was I informed of this.

23 I can't see the name because it is blurred but I suppose that

24 General Terzic signed this. He was -- had a lower rank and fewer years

25 of service than I, so he couldn't have known everything that I know. He

Page 7988

1 couldn't prepare me. I don't know if others were prepared. I was not.

2 Q. There is something that is striking in the beginning of this

3 paragraph. It says, "Continue with the preparation of," et cetera. One

4 gets the impression that these preparations had already taken place and

5 should just continue. But, all right, you've already answered that

6 question. And you say that you were not being prepared by this

7 commission.

8 A. As far as I know, these people - and I was in contact with them -

9 we would see each other even after retirement, at receptions, et cetera,

10 doesn't really matter, in different circumstances. None of them ever

11 told me that they had undergone through these preparations, specifically

12 this Tomislav Simovic. Now why am I saying this? Because

13 Tomislav Simovic responded to the calls of the office of The Hague

14 Tribunal in Belgrade and he engaged a Defence attorney for that, and I

15 said, Why do you need a lawyer? I was also in contact with Zivota Panic.

16 I'm not aware of them having undergone any kind of preparations. Perhaps

17 they were given some assistance.

18 Well, I did that too. If I needed some documents that I knew

19 existed then I would address not this commission, I would address the

20 Security Administration so that they could make it possible for me to

21 obtain these documents, and I do not rule out the possibility that they

22 receive these documents or perhaps that they also gave these documents

23 that somebody was involved in that. They knew about Dubrovnik. Somebody

24 would collect everything about Dubrovnik and then they say, Here it is,

25 everything about Dubrovnik.

Page 7989

1 Admiral Jokic is not mentioned here and he was one of the person

2 who was being prepared in the sense of giving him access to documents

3 regarding the Dubrovnik operation.

4 I believe that preparation is not an adequate word, perhaps to be

5 given assistance in their preparations, in my preparations, et cetera.

6 It is in my interest to get the materials I need.

7 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 9 of your statement, you said that the

8 eight-member Presidency consisted of a representative from, et cetera,

9 et cetera, and then in 1991 and 1992 you said that you attended three to

10 four meetings between members of the SFRY Presidency and the SSNO. That

11 is paragraph 9 of your statement. You can probably take a look.

12 Now I'd be interested in the following: Was this a meeting of

13 the Presidency or individual members of the Presidency with --

14 A. The SSNO.

15 Q. Yes. The Federal Secretariat for National Defence.

16 A. I attended twice a meeting of the federal council for the

17 protection of the constitutional order that was chaired by Mr. Boro Jovic

18 in the building of the Federal Executive Council with General Kadijevic.

19 So these were meetings where we went, where I went, to these federal

20 institutions.

21 There was a meeting -- as far as I know, there were two meetings.

22 Now if I can remember correctly one was on 4th December, 1991. By then,

23 the Presidency was no longer complete. It was the so-called rump

24 Presidency consisting of Bora Jovic, Bulatovic, Milosevic, and they came

25 to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence. There must have been

Page 7990

1 ten other generals present there, but the four of them came to this

2 meeting at the SSNO.

3 Q. When you say "the rump Presidency," tell me, while you were chief

4 of the Security Administration, that is to say, the 16th of June, 1991,

5 until May 1992, was it always that, as you put it, the rump Presidency?

6 A. No. No, it was complete. Up until the 30th of June. Until the

7 Slovenian situation started.

8 The first problem was that Mr. Stipe Mesic was not elected and

9 verified at the Presidency session. I think that was the

10 15th of May, 1991. And then the Presidency functioned without him.

11 Q. But at that time you were not the chief of security yet.

12 A. I was, I was. The 15th of -- oh. The 15th of May. Fine, yes, I

13 was deputy chief. I know that I came from Zagreb where the investigation

14 was taking place, and he became a member of the Presidency. It was

15 verified at the session that was held on the 30th of June at the

16 insistence of the European Commission that the Presidency had to be

17 completed, and that is why I am saying that the Presidency had to be

18 complete because if it is not complete as the Supreme Commander then it

19 cannot be legal to use the JNA. Who commands the JNA? So on the 30th of

20 June, sometime in the evening he came, and he took over at that session

21 of the council for the protection of the constitutional order. He took

22 over from Boro Jovic.

23 Q. Can you tell us until when this Presidency functioned, including

24 all its members?

25 A. Already before the Slovenian situation, Mr. Drnovsek did not come

Page 7991

1 to attend meetings. That was the case also on the 12th of March, 1991,

2 when he did not come to this session when the introduction of

3 extraordinary measures and the state of emergency of Yugoslavia were

4 being discussed. He was in fact a member of the Presidency but he did

5 not take part in the work of the Presidency. I cannot remember when this

6 happened exactly. It was after the Slovenian situation. They started

7 distancing themselves because of the war conflict in Slovenia, but I

8 cannot give you an exact date.

9 Q. You said that the Presidency was the Supreme Commander of the

10 armed forces at the time. Now this is what I'm interested in: What

11 happens when there is a rump Presidency, as it is usually referred to?

12 A. The position of General Kadijevic was, and we accepted that, was

13 that we always treated the Presidency as the Supreme Commander,

14 regardless of how many member it has. The important thing is that not a

15 single member of the Presidency is prohibited from taking part in its

16 work. Drnovsek does not want to come and attend Presidency sessions but

17 that doesn't mean that Yugoslavia is supposed to fall apart. He had the

18 right to attend sessions of the Presidency and that went for Mr. Mesic

19 and everybody else too. No one was prohibited from doing that. So we

20 respected this other part of the Presidency that continued to function.

21 So this so-called rump Presidency, as people called it, we accepted them

22 as our Supreme Commander.

23 Q. You spoke about the then-Territorial Defence and the system of

24 command and control in the JNA and the Territorial Defence. You invoked

25 certain articles of the Law on All People's Defence and also of the

Page 7992

1 constitution, so this is what I would be interested in: I have the

2 impression that when you talked about the Law on All People's Defence,

3 you did not take into account its amendments that were carried out in

4 May 1991.

5 A. Possibly.

6 Q. I'm going to put a few questions to you in relation to this

7 subject matter, although you are not a lawyer, and you don't have to know

8 all these things, but let me see whether you can confirm this.

9 You see Article 110 of this Law on All People's Defence. I think

10 you saw it. It is mentioned here. It is number 13, according to 65 ter.

11 Among other things -- we're probably going to see it on our screen now.

12 Let us just have the English version too, please.

13 Actually, in your statement, you say, in paragraph 11, that the

14 Presidency's orders to the armed forces were passed through the SSNO.

15 That's what your statement says in paragraph 11. I don't know if you

16 have it there.

17 A. No, no, I haven't brought it.

18 MR. OLMSTED: If Defence counsel would like, I could provide a

19 copy to him.

20 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you very much, Mr. Olmsted.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Paragraph 11, page 5.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. However, I think that what it says here is that the

Page 7993

1 Federal Secretariat does not convey orders of the Presidency but commands

2 the armed forces or, rather, the JNA.

3 A. You're talking about 11?

4 Q. I'm talking about paragraph 11 from your statement. And now what

5 I have here on the screen is Article 110 of the Law on All People's

6 Defence. And it says here:

7 "The Federal Secretary for National Defence shall exercise the

8 duties of command and control of the armed forces ..."

9 And I think that that is different from what you said, conveys

10 orders, passes on orders.

11 A. Where does it say passed on or conveyed?

12 Q. It's the last sentence in your paragraph 11, in your statement.

13 In my version, it is page 5.

14 A. May I be of assistance, although I'm not a lawyer. The key thing

15 was that the Presidency of the SFRY was the Supreme Commander of the

16 armed forces; that is to say, of the JNA and the Territorial Defence. If

17 the Presidency of the SFRY as the Supreme Commander transfers the rights

18 of commanding the armed forces, then the Federal Secretariat can command

19 these forces as a whole. If such authority is not given to him, he

20 cannot command these forces. Now this finesse, whether this was

21 transferred, these orders can be transferred by the Presidency. He

22 cannot command on his own so this entire part that we are discussing,

23 there's always this problem, not at a single moment did the function of

24 the Presidency as the Commander-in-Chief stop regardless of whether there

25 were eight of them or four of them. We accepted this Presidency as the

Page 7994

1 Supreme Command.

2 In my statement, later I said that I did not know whether these

3 powers were transferred by the Presidency to the JNA so that the JNA

4 could command the Territorial Defence too. I assumed that that was the

5 case, but I did not have to know about that because at the command post

6 of the 1st Military District we had General Mandaric, who was the

7 provincial secretary, or rather, the provincial commander of the

8 Territorial Defence of Vojvodina. According to one article from the

9 Law on All People's Defence, Joint Commands can be established precisely

10 in such situations, that is to say when the right to command the armed

11 forces was transferred to the JNA; then it is good for the command post

12 of the Territorial Defence, and the Territorial Defence Staff should be

13 together with the JNA command. And this position goes through my entire

14 statement and the entire situation as it was. Now whether this right was

15 transferred, I don't know. I assume it was because General Kadijevic

16 probably would not have given orders to the Territorial Defence of

17 Vojvodina too, and put them into the command post of the 1st Army.

18 Q. Thank you. I am not going to torment you with these provisions

19 of the law any longer. I am going to go on to these questions that have

20 to do the general structure of the JNA.

21 You said that in 1987 there was a reorganisation, modernisation

22 of the JNA and that out of the existing five Military Districts, three

23 Military Districts were created, and then there was the naval district

24 and there was the air force and special segments, and these areas of

25 responsibility no longer coincided with the territories of the republics.

Page 7995

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Can you say why it was that they no longer coincided with the

3 territories of the republics?

4 A. First of all, there weren't five Military Districts. There were

5 five armies. And that is a significant difference, whether it's a

6 Military District or an army.

7 If it is armies, for the most part but not completely, they

8 mostly coincided with the republican boundaries. Not exactly, but for

9 the most part.

10 The 5th Army, the Zagreb Army did not have command responsibility

11 over Baranja. From Beli Manastir and Osijek, that was in the area of the

12 Sarajevo Army, the 7th Army, where I was. So this was absolutely not

13 done according to republican borders but for the most part it did

14 coincide. And then the headquarters were in the centres of these areas.

15 In 1987, there was this serious reorganisation of the armed

16 forces that you referred to in terms of the modernisation of the command,

17 adequate placement of units in terms of operative and strategic

18 directions. So in terms of strategic directions -- for example, if there

19 is an aggression from the Warsaw Pact there would not be two armies that

20 would be in that zone of operations. That is one of the reasons why

21 reorganisation took place and why areas of responsibility were made

22 bigger. Then it also had to do with the modernisation of the entire

23 system of defence; that is to say that divisions were abolished as the

24 largest units according to establishment. And the system of corps was

25 introduced, and it consisted of brigades, not divisions. But five

Page 7996

1 independent divisions stayed on as separate units.

2 This caused a problem because just before the crisis that started

3 in the 1990s and continued, some areas were objectively empty. There

4 weren't any units in that area. The most characteristic situation for

5 that was Lika, Kordun, Banja, where, for example, there was a partisan

6 division as an element of a force to be reckoned with. And if you

7 noticed in my statement that I believe it didn't really matter that much

8 to you when officers were sent from the SSNO who started reanimating the

9 units that had been abolished beforehand because this area had been

10 sidelined, if I can put it that way, in terms of consideration from which

11 side threats to Yugoslavia came from. However, some republican

12 leaderships reacted to this situation and their commands were taken,

13 although these commands were never theirs, if I can put it that way.

14 However, in a few armies, army commanders were people precisely from that

15 area and when Military Districts were established, then this was no

16 longer the case. Then the commander of the 5th Military District was a

17 Slovene and the headquarters were in Zagreb. The commander of the

18 1st Military District was a Croat, and so on. Some republican

19 leaderships and that preceded subsequent to when it started -- reacted

20 and -- and complained that they were being crippled, and so on. That was

21 a mixture of what the army was doing and the -- and the reactions from

22 political circles.

23 Q. You go on to say that in May 1989 - that's in paragraph 30 of

24 your statement - the Presidency of SFRY decided that all assets from TO

25 warehouses are to be transferred to JNA warehouses.

Page 7997

1 Why was this decision taken at that time?

2 A. I was not with the SSNO at that time. I was commander of a

3 division. Now this is -- I'm not saying this by way of defending myself.

4 The Presidency considered that there was a massive misuse with

5 regard to theft of ammunition and weapons. At Prizren, there was a major

6 incident of this kind. Assets from a warehouse were being sold

7 illegally. The former reason was that there was not adequate security

8 and that this must be protected adequately and it was economically and

9 technically best to put all this into JNA warehouses.

10 But, in 1989, in Kosovo, the state of emergency was proclaimed,

11 and that -- those weapons had to be put under control.

12 What I'm talking about was also publicly discussed. And I must

13 say that in all republics of the former Yugoslavia, and not only in

14 Croatia and Slovenia, weapons were placed under the control of the army

15 in army barracks. Only Slovenia did not fulfil this obligation. In 12

16 municipalities, they did not return these weapons. It was in the region

17 of Gorinsko [phoen].

18 Now was -- were these weapons taken away from the TO? No. The

19 commander of the TO was able to access those weapons, or even lower

20 levels, such as a captain or so, who had the double keys to the

21 warehouse. But he had to inform the commander of the Military District

22 that they were organising an exercise or a brigade of the TO and that

23 they need weapons. And then it went down the hierarchy and were

24 eventually allowed to take these weapons. In other words, the republican

25 TOs were not left without weapons but the access of those -- to those

Page 7998

1 weapons was regulated. General Novoselic, commander of the Croatian TO,

2 upon the pressure and persuasion of General Spegelj refused to hand over

3 those weapons, although he could have taken the weapons out of the

4 warehouse for exercise purposes, and so on. And, subsequently, I believe

5 that his house which was somewhere near Osijek was burned down.

6 Q. Tell me one more thing: When the TO weapons were placed under

7 JNA control, the reorganisation of the army and the reduction of army

8 districts from five to three which triggered negative reactions on the

9 part of some republics, did that forebode an internal conflict in

10 Yugoslavia, which did happen subsequently?

11 A. The situation was not assessed not only from that angle but

12 primarily with regard to what was happening in Europe at the time. The

13 Berlin Wall fell. The Warsaw Pact was breaking up. There was unrest in

14 Romania. The president was removed and later killed. All these factors

15 affected our considerations of what was coming.

16 Internally, the multi-party political system was introduced.

17 Various parties emerged, some of which were extremist parties.

18 Q. Thank you, Mr. Vasiljevic.

19 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I see the clock, Your Honours.

20 JUDGE DELVOIE: General, this is the time for our first break.

21 We'll take 30 minutes. Come back at 11.00. The Court Usher will assist

22 you. Thank you.

23 [The witness stands down]

24 JUDGE DELVOIE: Court adjourned.

25 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

Page 7999

1 --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.

2 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Olmsted, we have problems with two of the

3 associated documents, and this is about 65 ter 0249 - let's see - which

4 needs -- do I read the number correctly? 02491, sorry. There is

5 translation lacking. So there needs to be some additional translation

6 for that document.

7 [The witness takes the stand]

8 JUDGE DELVOIE: You'll take care of that?

9 MR. OLMSTED: Absolutely Your Honours, and I'll look at it during

10 the break.

11 JUDGE DELVOIE: And this is another one, and that is 02929 which

12 is unclear. And when we say unclear, we mean unclear in the literal

13 sense. You'll take care of that as well?

14 MR. OLMSTED: We'll take care of that as well. Thank you,

15 Your Honour.

16 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you very much.

17 Yes, Mr. Zivanovic, please proceed.

18 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you, Mr. President.

19 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Vasiljevic, I will continue where I left off

20 with my last question, and I'm sure you can recall it. So my question

21 was this: Did these restructuring measures within the army - not to

22 repeat now the type of measures because you know of that - and the

23 placement of the TO weapons under military control, were they, in a

24 manner of speaking, motivated by the desire to diminish the threat of

25 armed conflict?

Page 8002

1 If we can be shown paragraph 6, please. I believe that's on

2 page 6 of the B/C/S version.

3 It says here that security organs are responsible for, and then

4 we see listed a number of activities that they are responsible for. Now,

5 could you tell us what this means exactly, when we say "responsible for"?

6 A. Well, that means that they are the chief agents or elements that

7 deal and tackle these issues but they're not the only ones because we

8 also had an evolved system of the so-called social self-protection, and,

9 on the other hand, there were various elements that had certain

10 responsibilities within self-protection that were in the

11 League of Communists, including the chain of command that related to

12 certain elements of the protection of the constitutional order and

13 general security to deal with.

14 Now, if you want me to say what the tasks were --

15 Q. Well, they're enumerated here but we don't have to go through all

16 of them.

17 A. Well, there are three main tasks, responsibilities.

18 Q. Well, could you just briefly tell us about them.

19 A. Well, yes, briefly it is the detection and prevention of

20 intelligence work targeting the armed forces, and so on and so forth.

21 The second portion was the monitoring and detection of activities

22 of enemy activities of the enemy emigration, Yugoslav emigration. That

23 was the second part.

24 And the third was what was then qualified as the activities of

25 the inner enemy, working to subvert the constitutional order.

Page 8003

1 So briefly, in brief, that would be the three basic activities.

2 Q. In other words, the first group would relate to foreign

3 intelligence services, the second group would deal with emigration - in

4 other words, our people who lived abroad - and the third group dealt with

5 people who were working against the constitutional order but they were

6 active within the country itself.

7 Am I correct? I've sort of simplified this.

8 A. Well, no, you didn't really simplify it. You actually expanded

9 on it. It's not the entire emigration, for instance, but the enemy, the

10 so-called enemy or hostile emigration that was involved in terrorism.

11 Q. Well, in this particular portion there is mention, I believe, of

12 the detection of enemy activities by certain individuals and groups. And

13 these individuals and groups would actually relate to those people who

14 would attempt to change the constitutional order in the country by use of

15 armed force.

16 A. Well, yes, that's the organised portion that deal with that.

17 More often than not, they are organised groups that take action with

18 weapons and arms. And we were involved in detecting these groups from

19 1991 onwards.

20 Q. Some members of those groups were, later on during the -- during

21 the war, members of the ZNG forces of the Croatian MUP that were later

22 taken prisoner during the war. Would you agree with that?

23 A. Well, yes. A portion of the extreme emigration after the HDZ won

24 in the elections entered the country legally, although they were still

25 registered as persons who should be detained at the border so that some

Page 8004

1 well-known emigrants from Canada and other parts of the world arrived in

2 Croatia and even assumed some very high positions.

3 There were also those people who were engaged in terrorist

4 activities at their lower level, and they were members, for the most

5 part, of the ZNG.

6 In the first category, I would like to name Gojko Susak, who was

7 in a very important position while President Tudjman was president, and

8 later on during the war I believe he was appointed minister of defence,

9 if I recall that correctly.

10 Q. And as part of the work of the security organs, for instance,

11 when dealing with the detained members of the ZNG, their job would be, in

12 fact, to establish the individuals who were, in fact, involved in such

13 activities, that were part of the work of the security organs, as well as

14 those who had committed some crimes, some other crimes?

15 A. Well, among them, there were those who had committed crimes that

16 were both on the -- the jurisdiction of the military security organs and

17 military courts. However, at the time, it was not our priority to

18 establish who the members of the extreme immigration were. Nor the most

19 part we knew the names of those persons and in the final analysis those

20 people actually entered the country legally. So that was not the focus

21 of the work of the security organs. The focus of the security organs's

22 work within these collection centres was to establish, first of all, the

23 identity of all these individuals who were detained because after the

24 first triage and controls, there was an assessment as to who might have

25 been a member of these enemy forces that were involved in activities

Page 8005

1 against the JNA. And in order that to identify that group and those

2 individuals who were there but were not responsible for anything, such

3 individuals were released from the collection centres.

4 As for the other group of individuals, they were then subject to

5 operative processing, and if it was established that they had committed

6 crimes that were not under the jurisdiction of the military judiciary, in

7 other words, that there were minor crimes, such persons would then be

8 exchanged for detained members of the JNA. However, if they were

9 suspected of having committed crimes and serious crimes, those

10 individuals would not be exchanged.

11 Now, the checking of persons, such as in the case of

12 Vesna Bosanac, before she was detained, she was taken and questioned by

13 the investigative judge, and it was then determined that she could be

14 released.

15 Q. Could we now move on to the next paragraph. We can see it. We

16 can see the English version of it. But in B/C/S I would ask that we move

17 to the following page. Here it says that security organs participate in

18 and then they list what it is that they participate in, the detection and

19 prevention of serious crimes, and so on and so forth.

20 Could you just distinguish these two things for us? Could you

21 help us understand the difference? In the previous paragraph, it says

22 that the security organs are responsible for, whereas in this paragraph,

23 paragraph 7, it says that security organs participate in certain

24 activities. What is the difference?

25 A. Talking about state security, that's part of the

Page 8006

1 Ministry of the Interior. There's also public security.

2 But, simply speaking, the security organs of the JNA conducted

3 activities from the purview of state security. Other services went about

4 public security, but the security organs were able to participate mostly

5 pursuant to a request of the prosecutor, although somebody else was

6 responsible for that, such as the military police. They could take

7 measures and initiate activities to collect some information that cannot

8 be collected by -- through the activities of public security.

9 Such tasks as detecting such acts follow the -- follow

10 hierarchical lines. They have some powers. But whoever gets information

11 about a crime that has been committed is duty-bound to inform his

12 superior. In the army, you must inform your commander, and then he is

13 duty-bound to take further measures. He can either forward the case to

14 the judiciary or conduct an interrogation from his own purview.

15 Q. The activities mentioned in paragraph 7 are done by security

16 organs only when requested to do so, such as by the security organ or the

17 commander or so.

18 A. Security organs go about operative work. They have their own

19 methods of collecting information from these three areas. If the source

20 of information points out a problem from without the purview of the

21 security organs, and I am -- now I mean the first three, then he is

22 duty-bound to draft a document and inform the commander because the

23 security organs were, in reality, subordinated to the unit commander.

24 And they were duty-bound to -- to provide information even from without

25 their purview when they were in a position to learn of them.

Page 8007

1 Q. I see that your -- that part of your answer was not recorded, but

2 I'll move on to ask you whether that really means that security organs

3 are duty-bound to do the -- this work as described in paragraph 6 without

4 getting special orders or instructions as opposed to the activities in

5 paragraph 7?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. In paragraph 17 of these rules of service, we read that the JNA's

8 security organs, as far as the methods of work of these -- these

9 activities, are subordinate to the SSNO --

10 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The interpreters only have

11 a redacted version of the text. Could counsel please repeat the latter

12 part of his question.

13 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zivanovic, could you look to the transcript

14 and read the interpreter's intervention.

15 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] I will repeat for the record.

16 Q. According to paragraph 17, the JNA security organs, with respect

17 to the application of methods of -- and tools of work used by these

18 organs, are subordinated to the Federal Secretariat of National Defence

19 or in a -- any senior officer appointed by the secretary. I repeated

20 this part for the record.

21 A. Yes, I will repeat as well. He transferred this authority to

22 some senior officers, not only just before the 1990s, but ever since I

23 have been in service. The security organs are subordinated to the

24 commander -- to the unit commander and not to the superior security

25 organ. That is why. And the right to apply these methods, he

Page 8008

1 transferred to the army commanders and later to commanders of army

2 districts and other senior officers at their level, such as chiefs of

3 General Staff or chiefs of individual sectors at the SSNO, and so on; in

4 other words, the proposal to apply these measures went to the army

5 commander who decided about their use. And he could be briefed about the

6 results of the application of these measures in the same manner as a

7 superior security organ would be, but lower-ranking commanders did not

8 have that right.

9 Q. According to the following section of this same paragraph, the

10 powers of the Federal Secretary in Territorial Defence under the law:

11 "In the Territorial Defence, the commander of the

12 Territorial Defence of a republic or the commander of the Territorial

13 Defence of an autonomous province has the powers of the Federal Secretary

14 under paragraph 1 of this item."

15 In a word, these powers are vested in the commander of the

16 Territorial Defence and this was not transferred to him. This is based

17 on the rules of service.

18 A. Yes, the rules of service regulate this aspect. And they had the

19 same powers with regard to heading the security organs as the command --

20 army commanders in the JNA. The Territorial Defence also had its

21 security organs. These security organs could be transferred from the JNA

22 to the TO, and vice versa.

23 Q. These officers from paragraph 17 can established provisional

24 groups and send them to garrisons and units to carry out complex

25 intelligence tasks.

Page 8009

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Were such groups established in 1991?

3 A. If we take into account the -- when this -- these rules of

4 service were published, what they in mind was establishment of KOGs,

5 counter-intelligence groups. And a distinction was made between an

6 operative group which is a military structure and a counter-intelligence

7 group which is a security structure. The later existed -- had their

8 headquarters where they were detached and at that time that you

9 mentioned. There was a counter-intelligence group of the 1st Army in

10 Belgrade, for example, and it had its -- detached security organs in

11 Osijek and other towns. The difference is that these

12 counter-intelligence groups were not subordinated to the commanders in

13 these towns, such as the corps commander or division commander in

14 Novi Sad but they were subordinated to the chief of the KOG in Belgrade.

15 Because they only went about very specific counter-intelligence tasks.

16 And they did not participate in the work of the command. They were in

17 civilian clothes because they weren't part of the commands. And a

18 detachment of a part of the KOG to Sid is in line with this rule, with

19 this provision.

20 Q. In other words, a member of a KOG was subordinated to the chief

21 of the KOG.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And that chief was really the chief of the KOG at the army

24 district?

25 A. He was subordinated to the chief of the security -- security

Page 8010

1 department. It's a small unit. It only has ten to 11 people, whereas, a

2 counter-intelligence group headed also by a colonel, could have up to 100

3 or 110 men or 70 to 80 and they were dispersed to cover the whole

4 territory and deal with security matters. They were numerous. But the

5 head of that counter-intelligence group was professionally subordinated

6 to the chief of the security department of the army.

7 Q. Let us try and clarify. A member of a KOG, let us say from the

8 1st Army, or rather, head of one of these departments, to whom was he

9 subordinated?

10 A. To the chief of the KOG of the army.

11 Q. On the other hand, chief of the security organ of a unit, such as

12 a corps or brigade, was not subordinated to the chief of the KOG in that

13 territory?

14 A. No. Nor -- nor did that one need to have contacts with him but

15 could. They are parallel structures. They have different tasks. One

16 provides security to the unit and deals with problems connected with the

17 unit and has three tasks, those three tasks in the territory, whereas the

18 KOG works pursuant to the instructions of the chief of the KOG. If there

19 was a major security problem within a unit, such as an organised enemy

20 group which the operative detected, then the chief of the

21 counter-intelligence department --

22 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat his last

23 sentence.

24 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Witness, the interpreters missed part of what

25 you said and they ask you to repeat the last sentence. That means the

Page 8011

1 one you started -- the one just before the one you now started.

2 Can you remember?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.

4 If in a unit there was a major security problem, such as, for

5 example, an organised enemy group, then -- then the operative processing

6 of that group could be done, for example, by a detachment of the KOG from

7 the headquarters, wherever headquarters was.

8 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. And now about this last reply. A member of that detachment of a

10 KOG was not subordinated to the chief of security of that unit.

11 A. No.

12 Q. He is still, in fact, subordinated to the chief of the KOG at the

13 army?

14 A. Yes. And he sends information to his boss and -- who, in turn,

15 gives him directions, professional directions for his work, although the

16 latter works in a unit.

17 Q. The Prosecutor showed you a document yesterday, P1865.1. It's a

18 document from the Security Administration dated 26 May 1992. Could we --

19 or rather, please tell me, I see in the upper left-hand corner -- we see,

20 "Please return after use." What does that mean?

21 A. Because it is the Security Administration that is the source of

22 this information. It is given at the request of the commander and by

23 then it was Zivota Panic, chief of General Staff, so he is the person who

24 ordered the security organs to submit all information to him that have to

25 do with paramilitary units, crimes, and their knowledge about that. They

Page 8012

1 compiled this information, and they submit it to him.

2 All such information is returned to the Security Administration.

3 It could have said up here, Please destroy after use. It could have said

4 that too. However, without a decision of the chief of the General Staff,

5 other persons, his co-workers, could not have been made aware of such

6 information. He could have also given authority to the morale organ to

7 become familiar with that. They are all subordinated to him and carry

8 out tasks issued by him.

9 Q. You say that Zivota Panic was then chief of General Staff.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Were they not subordinated to the Federal Secretariat of National

12 Defence --

13 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We cannot hear the

14 witness. Could he please be asked to speak closer to the microphone.

15 Thank you.

16 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Witness, General, the interpreters ask that

17 you should speak a little bit closer to the microphone, please. Thank

18 you.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. So this information was provided at the request of General Panic.

22 A. As chief of General Staff.

23 Q. As chief of General Staff. And they were supposed to be returned

24 once he was made aware of it?

25 A. Yes.

Page 8013

1 Q. Tell me, I see that this information was sent when you no longer

2 headed the Security Administration. This information -- or rather, do

3 you know why such information was not requested earlier on while you were

4 at the helm of the Security Administration?

5 A. I assume that a problem occurred in relation to the department of

6 the interior because I see that after this, after this information, there

7 was that analysis of what this information says. I assume, I can only

8 assume, that somebody started an initiative. Why was such and such and

9 such not done, and then the chief of General Staff ordered that all of

10 this information be given to the MUP. And then the MUP provided some

11 analysis of their own in response to that.

12 Now, that could have been even some initiative from the military

13 prosecutor's office or from somewhere else.

14 Q. In this information - I think it's already on the next page -

15 there is reference precisely to that crime in Lovas, and -- can we

16 actually move onto the next page, please. First, there is a reference to

17 the Lieutenant-Colonel Dimitrijevic from the Territorial Defence Staff in

18 Valjevo. Do you know whether he was active-duty personnel or whether he

19 was a reserve officer?

20 A. He was an active-duty officer.

21 Q. Further on, it says that he held the position of co-ordinator for

22 combat activities in the village of Lovas. Can you tell us what that

23 means, "co-ordinator for combat activities"?

24 A. The detachment from the Territorial Defence from Valjevo was

25 resubordinated, sent out into the field, and resubordinated, as far as I

Page 8014

1 know, to the 2nd Mechanised Brigade from the 1st Guards Division. And

2 then from the Territorial Defence Staff, Valjevo, they sent a

3 lieutenant-colonel who would help these reservists, because all of them

4 were reserve officers and reserve soldiers, help them in carrying out

5 their activities. That is, he was supposed to co-ordinate these

6 activities with the 2nd Brigade, too; that is to say he did not have true

7 command responsibility there, to the best of my understanding. Rather,

8 he had the following position. Perhaps I should compare this for the

9 sake of clarity. Like Colonel Pavkovic at the command post of the

10 Guards Brigade, so an officer who was sent from a superior command who

11 was sent to help a particular unit function and resolve problems because

12 he was a more experienced officer. After all, this man was a

13 lieutenant-colonel, and those four officers were all reserve officers.

14 Q. Tell me, is the co-ordinator authorised to issue orders?

15 A. No, he did not have that kind of authority because objectively

16 they were subordinated to the commander of the 2nd Brigade, and he was

17 the one who could issue orders.

18 Q. I'm asking you that because I see here that is says that on the

19 18th of October at the order of Lieutenant-Colonel Dimitrijevic, and so

20 on and so forth, a group of 50 residents of Croat ethnicity was engaged

21 in sanitising the terrain around the village. I see that this was done

22 in accordances with his order. That's what this document says.

23 A. The trial at the Belgrade Court has just been concluded with

24 regard to this case. This was done only on the basis of intelligence and

25 only afterwards did an investigation follow and court proceedings, and I

Page 8015

1 don't know what the outcome was. But then there was another trial with

2 all the other members of the Dusan Silni detachment, so I cannot say now

3 that he is the one who issued an order. According to initial

4 intelligence, they were supposed to search the area, and that was

5 supposed to be done by that unit. However, the reservists vacillated and

6 then these volunteers cropped up, and that's how it went. Let me not go

7 into analysis now of the actual situation there. This information was

8 compiled on the basis of some initial intelligence and this intelligence

9 was provided by the Security Administration. As for more complete

10 pictures to what was happening, that could have been requested from the

11 judiciary organs that were involved in the investigation.

12 Q. I am confining myself to this information that exist until

13 May 1992 because I see this information contained here in this specific

14 document that we have in evidence. I see that according to this

15 information that it had to do with sanitising the area around Lovas, and

16 that 40 members of the TO Valjevo unit detachment took part in this and

17 about ten members of the Dusan Silni detachment under the command of a

18 certain Joca. Since this information was compiled about seven months

19 after the actual event, so during these seven and a half months was any

20 more detailed information received? My impression is that nothing more

21 was learned as compared to what is contained in this information that is

22 written up here.

23 A. No. During my previous testimony, I mentioned that this

24 information as mentioned here is not identical to that information number

25 590 of the 25th of October.

Page 8016

1 Now, when I look at this here in this information, there was no

2 reference to any individual called Joca. Some other names are mentioned,

3 namely persons who were identified by the security organ after the

4 initial interviews.

5 Now, my assessment is that some information was included here

6 that was not only the result of the work of the security organs. Further

7 on in this first information of the 25th October, I don't remember that

8 it was stated that there were 40 of them. So obviously this was some

9 additional information as compared to what was stated on the

10 25th of October.

11 Q. I don't think that the transcript reflects -- perhaps it wasn't

12 transcribed, perhaps it wasn't interpreted, but you said that criminal

13 proceedings were instituted and that some information from these criminal

14 proceedings were included here. Did I understand you correctly?

15 A. I assume that.

16 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we move on to the next page.

17 Q. It says here that it is evident from witness statements,

18 eye-witness statements:

19 "That it was known of the existence of the minefield,

20 particularly because it was set up by our units."

21 Also that residents were warned to provide information upon

22 having come across mines and:

23 "Should they try to run away, they would be killed."

24 Did you have information to that effect that these mines were

25 placed there by "our units," as it says here? I mean JNA units by that.

Page 8017

1 A. This includes information that is not included in that first

2 information of the 25th of October. So I'm convinced even more that this

3 is from the investigation.

4 Minefields were referred to then, but it wasn't stated whether it

5 was the JNA that had laid that there. There was no one else who could

6 have, though, so that was clear, and now this is precisely defined.

7 So this has to do with providing supplement information in

8 relation to the initial information provided that was incomplete, and I

9 am certain that it was from the investigation that was carried out at the

10 time, because there is some information that I had not been aware of at

11 the time.

12 Q. I see that it says here - I think it's the third paragraph - that

13 security organs conducted several interviews with

14 Lieutenant-Colonel Dimitrijevic and some other persons. And it says here

15 that the key actors of this event are the members of Dusan Silni and that

16 they left Lovas.

17 I would be interested in the following: When you say that you

18 are convinced that some investigation was being carried out, and that is

19 more than obvious since all these statements were taken, I do not see

20 from here that these persons were identified, the people who left Lovas,

21 these members of Dusan Silni, and I don't see that their names are being

22 provided in this information so that possibly some follow-up action could

23 be taken.

24 A. In that information of mine dated the 25th of October, the one

25 that I've been referring to, there is a precise reference to names. All

Page 8018

1 eight person, as far as I know. There were eight persons. Now why they

2 are not referred to here, I don't know. But this information did go to

3 the military prosecutor of the JNA, so he knew of those persons as well

4 by name. There weren't any statements then that they had been provided.

5 This was initial intelligence, and that's why I went out into the field.

6 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please take a look at an

7 R 65, 610 document. It is paragraph 8. I think that it's on the

8 penultimate page, or the last page. Yes, it's the last page.

9 MR. OLMSTED: I'm sorry, could Defence counsel provide a

10 tab number.

11 MR. ZIVANOVIC: It is 65 ter 610.

12 MR. OLMSTED: No -- 610.

13 MR. ZIVANOVIC: 610, yes.

14 MR. OLMSTED: But I was asking for a tab, either in your binder

15 or in my binder.

16 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I'm absolutely sure that it is in my binder, but

17 I believe it is your binder too.

18 MR. OLMSTED: I'll take a look.

19 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation].

20 Q. This is an order issued by Zivota Panic, commander of the

21 1st Military District. I'm interested in paragraph 8.

22 It reads:

23 "Every unit must fully control the situation in the territory of

24 its area of responsibility. Commanders at all levels will be responsible

25 for this. Wartime laws have not entered into force and therefore - as

Page 8019

1 always - nobody has the right to retribution and other kinds of revenge,

2 which some local TO units carried out. In future, arrest these who

3 commit any such acts and undertake appropriate legal measures."

4 You spoke about the jurisdiction of civilian organs, military

5 organs, and others when it comes to crimes. It follows from this order,

6 which was sent to JNA units, that whoever commits crimes in a territory

7 where those military units are must be arrested and that legal measures

8 must be taken against them. This order is dated the

9 18th of November, 1991. Do you know if the rules and regulation were

10 changed at that time as compared to those that were in force in July or

11 August 19 -- of the same year?

12 A. No, I don't think that any rules changed, and this would not have

13 been the only order of this kind. There may have been different orders

14 at other levels.

15 Here, some negative occurrences are being pointed out and the

16 situation in the units themselves is not sufficiently known. Before item

17 8, we see how much ammunition the 46th Partisan Division from Kragujevac

18 had consumed, and it was subordinated to the army; that is, to the

19 1st Guards Division. It was in the latter zone of responsibility. And I

20 know of some things that happened there. A soldier got killed who

21 changed into civilian clothes, and when he was returning they mistook him

22 for a terrorist. Now it is pointed out here that the situation of units

23 must be known and he reminds the commanders.

24 Let us take a murder which is generally recognised as a crime,

25 and here everybody in the zone of responsibility is responsible in case

Page 8020

1 of such a crime.

2 Now, the local authorities that were in function at the time,

3 that were operational, whether any such letter was sent to them that it

4 was their duty to organise such measures and they had their police

5 stations, and so on, and there was one police station of which

6 Colonel Petkovic had said that he didn't know how they were being set up.

7 However, these people, to whom this is addressed, were not the only ones

8 responsible.

9 Q. To me, this is a clear order that all those who are guilty must

10 be sanctioned, that measures must be taken against them, which means that

11 there was no legal obstacle for military commanders irrespective of the

12 status of any person as a volunteer or member of a TO, to -- there was no

13 obstacle to launching proceedings against them.

14 A. This is about the legal provision saying that any person found in

15 the commission of a crime that is prosecuted ex officio must be

16 prosecuted and the judiciary body in charge must be informed.

17 General Zivota Panic didn't go into legal details, although he

18 had good intentions. Of course, the army cannot arrest persons, but they

19 can detain them. And that person, if he is not a JNA member, is

20 transferred to the bodies of the MUP. But there is no problem with this.

21 I don't think that this is the only such order. It's an effort to

22 introduce law and order.

23 Q. My question is really why such and similar previous orders were

24 not carried out because we have heard repeatedly that the commander

25 simply failed to act upon such orders.

Page 8021

1 A. From that previous document we discussed that was sent to

2 General Zivota Panic contains some cases -- some instances of crime, such

3 as rape, plunder, and so on. The perpetrators were not arrested, but the

4 crime sites were secured and the body in charge informed. Talking about

5 the crime at Sotin, I mentioned the person conducting the on-site

6 investigation. Measures were taken, but you couldn't accept the -- you

7 couldn't expect the army to arrest them and keep them and initiate

8 proceedings that were not in its jurisdiction. It was of key importance

9 that the judiciary bodies are informed and then they would decide whom to

10 arrest and whom to transfer to somebody else.

11 Q. If we look at the following paragraph, number 9, we read that:

12 "All units and formations (volunteers, local communes, et cetera)

13 participating in combat operations in the territory of the

14 1st Military District must be under the command of the JNA or else they

15 will be disarmed and removed, while extremists will be arrested and

16 appropriate legal measures will be taken."

17 Again, I see that before the order issued by the Presidency, or,

18 more specifically, General Kadijevic, about the disarming of volunteer

19 groups, I see that even before there was such an obligation to place all

20 such groups and units under JNA control. According to your information,

21 why was that not done?

22 A. I cannot say that it wasn't done. That's a general statement.

23 Sometimes it was done, sometimes it was not. At Lovas, it was done, or

24 Sotin, Antin, and other places I have mentioned. This isn't anything

25 new. This is not the first order pointing out this problem.

Page 8022

1 In early December the chief of General Staff issued such an

2 order. All groups and units in this zone of responsibility must be --

3 either be placed under JNA command or disarmed and removed. And this was

4 issued even before the combat activities on 15 September. And I'm here

5 to say the truth and not speak for the Defence or the Prosecution. Many

6 commanders, in the tactical sense, didn't really cope. Some were

7 unwilling to go into conflict and some engaged in unlawful activity.

8 When there was -- I'll give you an example: In

9 General Blagoje Adzic's order, and that's something generally known

10 anyway, all volunteers had to wear insignia and uniforms of the JNA and

11 respect that aspect, but you saw photographs what the situation was

12 really like. There were guards who were wearing white belts, as if they

13 were military police. So, objectively speaking, there were problems

14 in -- with the line of command because some units in the field did not

15 take strict measures to make sure that this was complied with.

16 General Kadijevic issued an order on the 7th of December, and

17 then on the 10th of December the Presidency took its final decision. But

18 even when these measures were being implemented, I remember that even

19 then all elements of that order were not complied with. What is Arkan

20 doing there? Why is Leva Supoderica still around? In a word, the

21 situation was almost chaotic, and more determination on the part of local

22 commanders was required to impose law and order in respect of their

23 zones.

24 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zivanovic, shall we keep your next question

25 for after the break?

Page 8023

1 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes -- yes, Your Honour.

2 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.

3 General, 30 minutes again. We will come back at 12.45. The

4 Court Usher will escort you. Thank you.

5 [The witness stands down]

6 JUDGE DELVOIE: Court adjourned.

7 --- Recess taken at 12.15 p.m.

8 --- On resuming at 12.47 p.m.

9 [The witness takes the stand]

10 JUDGE DELVOIE: Please proceed, Mr. Zivanovic.

11 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you.

12 Q. [Interpretation] General, could we now take a look at the

13 Law on All People's Defence. That's 3 -- 65 ter number 13. In B/C/S,

14 that would be page 16, whereas in English that's 59.

15 I will only read out paragraph 2 because that's what is relevant

16 here where it says a member of the armed forces is any citizen who is

17 armed or participates in another way in the ... resistance against the

18 enemy. So from this definition, does it follow that all members of the

19 Territorial Defence and volunteer units and similar units that took part

20 in the fighting in Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem specifically in

21 1991, were all these individuals considered members of the armed forces

22 in keeping with this legal provision?

23 A. Well, first of all, I think that this law pertains to a much

24 earlier period which implied -- which only envisaged a situation where

25 the enemy would actually be on the territory of Yugoslavia. That's just

Page 8024

1 a general comment.

2 However, this is only a part of the definition of which

3 individuals are considered to be members of the armed forces. There are

4 other laws such as Article 119, for instance, which deals with

5 volunteers, where it is stated what all conditions have to be met so that

6 a person may be considered a volunteer. It was not a -- it was not

7 sufficient to just bear arms.

8 So there are additional provisions, not just this one, and they

9 were contained both in the orders which came from the General Staff but

10 also the Presidency which dealt with who was to be considered a volunteer

11 and -- let alone a member of the armed forces. To -- to simplify this,

12 not to be banal, but to simplify it, you couldn't just carry hunting

13 weapons and be considered a member of the armed forces.

14 Q. Well, you are not a lawyer so I will not enter into a debate with

15 you on this, but, according to this formulation, a person is to be

16 considered a member of the armed forces if they take part in the

17 resistance against the enemy not necessarily carrying arms. So this

18 would pertain to any citizen, whether volunteers or not, if I read this

19 correctly. Could you agree with me?

20 A. Well, as layperson I do not want to enter in a polemic. But this

21 would mean that -- well, any armed person in a combat area would have to

22 be subordinated to a military command in order to be considered a member

23 of the armed forces, but let's not polemicize on this.

24 Q. Please tell us, in the second paragraph of 1991, the

25 Yugoslav People's Army considered the Croatian armed forces as an enemy

Page 8025

1 force; correct?

2 A. Well, the JNA considered those forces, forces that had engaged in

3 an armed rebellion. Now, objectively and factually they were the enemy

4 because there was armed combat with them.

5 Q. Are you aware that the volunteers who were, for instance, in the

6 Operations Group South area of responsibility that they were placed under

7 the command of that operations group?

8 A. Yes, I saw that in the order of -- for engagement of the south

9 operations group and the Leva Supoderica detachment was part of the

10 detachment 1, the Assault Detachment 1.

11 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we see Exhibit 779, or,

12 actually, 65 ter 779, page 2, please.

13 Q. Please look at the third paragraph. Let me just check something.

14 That's the penultimate paragraph in the English version. It says there

15 that:

16 "In addition to the Guards Motorised Brigade the Vukovar and

17 Leva Supoderica detachments a large number of volunteers participated in

18 the fighting."

19 The work and sending of volunteers in the -- in the zone was not

20 organised. They arrived in group -- volunteers arrived in groups and in

21 a disorganised manner:

22 "Our unit had major problems with receiving them, checking and

23 equipping them, and employing them in combat. A large number of

24 volunteer arrived with party insignia, which might have had considerable

25 effects on the order and discipline of the units conducting combat tasks.

Page 8026

1 Through daily and relevant activity, we succeeded in placing all the

2 volunteers under JNA command, or rather, under the OG South Command."

3 What is the date of this order?

4 A. What is the date of this order?

5 Q. I believe that the Prosecutor showed this to you when he showed

6 your report. Perhaps we can see the first page. I believe this is a

7 report submitted by Major Sljivancanin on the 10th of December, 1991.

8 I will show you another report by the same individual. You were

9 shown that report yesterday by the Prosecutor as well. And that is

10 65 ter 483 document.

11 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Let me just check the English

12 version. It appears that the translation into English is not complete.

13 Q. I will read out the entire text to you, and then you can see

14 this. It says here:

15 "On the 23rd of October, 1991, because of what blatant cowardice

16 and mass opportunism, 70 volunteers were disarmed and dismissed and the

17 dismissal of another 60 volunteers has been announced."

18 This is a report submitted by the security chief from the office

19 of the Federal Secretary of National Defence reporting on the situation

20 with security within the units, an area of responsibility of the

21 Guards Motorised Brigade. And I see that this practice of disarming of

22 volunteers was already evident in October, but I also see that one of the

23 reasons for that was cowardice and mass opportunism. Now, I don't know

24 exactly what this was supposed to mean, but let me put my question, then

25 you'll understand why I show this to you.

Page 8027

1 It would seem that volunteers were disarmed and dismissed easily

2 if they did not participate in combat as they should and that the

3 dismissal was far less frequent if they were -- if their conduct was

4 contrary to some laws and rules.

5 A. Well, can I perhaps answer? Volunteers arrived from various

6 parts and in various ways. You probably know from the documents

7 available that there were reception centres for volunteers that were

8 established in the beginning. There were two such centres. There, they

9 were trained briefly, and then they were sent in an organised manner to

10 various units.

11 Now, what we are talking about here are two kinds of volunteers,

12 and Major Sljivancanin is talking about one of them. He is discussing

13 volunteer who came and joined the Guards Brigade unit from various parts

14 and in various manners and is he not referring to volunteers that

15 established their own units and had their own unit names. He is talking

16 about the dismissal of volunteers from the brigade itself without going

17 into the details of what the volunteers' situation was like within units

18 like Leva Supoderica, and so on, or volunteers who had come through the

19 TO Staffs. These were volunteers that were assigned to the brigade from

20 various parts and in various manners.

21 Now, when I went to Dalj to be briefed, we were also shown

22 information about losses. But in daily reports of the OG South, you can

23 see that there is also discussion of losses, where they would point out

24 how many officers and JNA soldiers were killed or wounded and then there

25 would be mention of volunteers and then below that, it would say

Page 8028

1 "Chetniks." In other words, those who arrived without any insignia, who

2 came to = the brigade but were not part of it. They engaged in action

3 together with the brigade but not as part of it.

4 So there was this division and this distinction of volunteers

5 when I was in Dalj, so please be aware of this. Those who joined the

6 brigade as volunteers they became JNA soldiers. There were some of them

7 who were not brave who realised that people died there and also all such

8 individuals who displayed cowardice or who were unsure and uncertain,

9 they were dismissed. But these were not dismissals of volunteer who

10 arrived there as member of some other unit; for instance, the

11 Leva Supoderica or any other unit was subordinated to the JNA during

12 fighting but once the fighting was over, they were no longer under the --

13 under the brigade command.

14 Q. Well, that's something that we will clarify in a moment. In any

15 case, I don't see a major difference between those volunteer who came in

16 one way or another, who were members of one unit or another. They were

17 within the same complement and the commanders had the same authority over

18 them so they could disarm or dismiss either ones. Would you agree with

19 me?

20 A. Well, no. They did not have the authority to disarm a group who

21 came from who knows where, from some part of Vukovar or some other place,

22 like Lovas, for instance. Let's go back to Lovas. There is the

23 Ljuban Devetak group in Lovas that was not part of the JNA, and they did

24 not disarm that group as such because that's the kind of group it was.

25 Q. My apologies for interfering, but we're talking about the

Page 8029

1 Guards Motorised Brigade. So let's not go to Lovas or any other area

2 there. Let's just focus on the brigade.

3 So the commander of this brigade was authorised -- had the

4 authority over all the volunteers who were there. Irrespective of the

5 manner that they arrived there, he had authority to disarm or dismiss

6 them or to punish them, and so on and so forth?

7 A. No, he could not punish them. There was no grounds for punishing

8 them. If they refused to fight, what would be the grounds for his

9 punishing them?

10 Q. Well, but if they commit crimes or infractions, then they could

11 punish them?

12 A. Yes. In that case, he could punish them.

13 Q. Reading this material, I see that you said yesterday - and that's

14 on page 7955 of yesterday's transcript - that volunteers were called up

15 because the JNA could not replenish its units. It could not man its

16 units properly. And it is my impression on reading this that those who

17 fought were tolerated even if they committed some criminal act and only

18 those who were incapable of fighting, they were the ones who were

19 returned. Am I correct?

20 A. Well, I don't think so. Because -- well, you also said that

21 these people would be tolerated even if they created problems. I

22 wouldn't agree with that. The problem we're talking about - in other

23 words, who was subordinated to whom - that's where the issue is.

24 In Vukovar, on the 21st, the combat ended. The volunteers then

25 broke into JNA barracks because of the buses that had arrived there with

Page 8030

1 the prisoners from the hospital, and they created chaos there.

2 Colonel Panic at the time who was the chief of the barracks arrived there

3 then --

4 Q. I apologise, but I have to stop you here. You weren't there at

5 the time, on the 21st of November, as you said; correct?

6 A. That's correct. I wasn't.

7 Q. You heard about this later on from various sources.

8 A. Yes, while reading the transcript of the proceedings here. So

9 I'm an indirect witness --

10 Q. Well, the only thing I'm trying to put to you, and I don't have

11 too much time, is this: There is no need for you to refer to these

12 transcripts because we've read most of them and we're familiar with them,

13 both in this case and in some earlier cases.

14 But could you just clarify something to us? The subordination,

15 the chain of command within combat operations or during combat

16 operations, what did that mean practically; for instance, during the

17 Vukovar operation? From what point in time were these territorial units

18 and volunteers under the command, or rather, subordinated to OG -- to the

19 OG. Or perhaps even clearer or more pointedly, up until when would they

20 be subordinated?

21 A. Well, as long as the combat was ongoing they would be

22 subordinated. The combat is carried out upon an order, and everyone is

23 assigned a task. Once a task is completed, they should return to their

24 original unit. In other words, this unit would no longer be responsible

25 for them, because this is outside of the combat operation.

Page 8031

1 Q. According to your information, when did combat activities end in

2 Vukovar?

3 A. I was in Vukovar on the 19th of November, in the evening. I had

4 contact with Sljivancanin and the security organs. They told me that the

5 combat was over. So, according to that, it would have been the 19th or a

6 previous day.

7 Q. Did they give any orders to that effect to the Vukovar TO or

8 Leva Supoderica, saying that their task was accomplished? You said that

9 they would either return to the original unit or be resubordinated to

10 another JNA unit.

11 A. I never discussed that with them.

12 Q. That is exactly why I'm going to show you a document. It's

13 1995. --

14 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Zivanovic please repeat the number.

15 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] The number is 1995.1981.

16 Q. This is an order issued on the 21st of November, 1991, at

17 6.00 a.m. It is about the resubordination and the return to the original

18 units. And it says under item 1 that:

19 "In the course of the 21 November 1991, withdraw the

20 Leva Supoderica volunteers detachment and dispatch them, resubordinate

21 them, to the 12th pmbr."

22 Does that mean that until that time this detachment was

23 subordinated to OG South?

24 A. It could mean that.

25 Q. Let us now look at item 4:

Page 8032

1 "Vukovar TO units to be resubordinated to the

2 80th Motorised Brigade and continue with carrying out the assigned

3 tasks - the provision of security and the control of the captured areas

4 in Vukovar, with an emphasis on the most sensitive facilities

5 (municipality, post office, SUP, educational and cultural facilities)."

6 Does that mean that at that time TO -- Vukovar TO units were

7 resubordinated to OG South?

8 A. This doesn't say that the unit in question was part of OG South.

9 It only says where it is supposed to go. I suppose that, since it was

10 there all the time, it was with OG South, but -- I see you're smiling so

11 I'll follow your example.

12 I saw some documents about -- saying what was going on. Nobody

13 ever reported where they were supposed to report. They stayed behind and

14 did what they pleased. Then approval was given to the command of the

15 1st Army to disarm the Leva Supoderica, and this is very telling as to

16 how things stood.

17 Q. Sorry. Could you please take a look at paragraph 4. This is

18 what it says there. The TO Vukovar units should be resubordinated to the

19 80th Brigade and continue with carrying out the assigned tasks.

20 Does that mean that until then they had some tasks and on that

21 21st of November at 6.00 in the morning, these tasks were still under

22 way?

23 A. Well, you see what it says here? Provide security for the

24 municipality, post office, water works, et cetera. These are typical

25 tasks for a TO unit, very correctly defined. Again I have to say, what

Page 8033

1 is this unit doing on the 21st? Where is it? Is it providing security

2 for buildings or is a considerable part of this unit at Velepromet and at

3 the barracks when the buss arrived.

4 All of this is regulated and written just fine but we are talking

5 about the actual state of affairs. I am defending one thing: What

6 happened. What actually happened. And then you have what it was

7 regulated like.

8 Q. You see, on the 21st of November, I really don't know where this

9 unit was deployed but I know where its commander was. Do you know whose

10 commander it was?

11 A. Whose?

12 Q. The TO Vukovar unit.

13 A. I think that they changed at least once. I may be making a

14 mistake when I say Dusan Jaksic, perhaps that was not the case, or how

15 should I know? Was it that Ljubinko? What was it, Stojanovic? I don't

16 know who the commander is. I cannot say with certainty now because they

17 changed.

18 Q. We have some information to the effect that on the

19 21st of November, General Kadijevic, received a group of officers from

20 the 1st Military District, or rather, from the Guards Brigade, and among

21 these persons was also the commander of the TO of Vukovar. Do you know

22 anything about that?

23 A. I attended the reception. I was shown some footage from that

24 reception here. There was a man from Territorial Defence there. I

25 cannot confirm his first or last names, and it's not that I could

Page 8034

1 recognise him. I think that he had a bandage on his hand or arm. He was

2 wounded but it wasn't in combat but in some kind of fight, so this

3 reception did not last for very long.

4 Q. Tell me now, please, this order that we looked at just now, do

5 you consider it to be the order that is supposed to follow after combat,

6 either in order to have that unit returned to its original units, or for

7 it to be resubordinated to another JNA unit?

8 A. That is what I think because the same kind of order had to be

9 there when they were resubordinated to Operation Group South. And also

10 when it is no longer necessary to engage them, then this kind of order is

11 made because someone cannot leave without knowing on what grounds. So I

12 confirm that.

13 Q. Can we now take a look at the bottom of this page, this order.

14 It says that it was made in eight copies and that it was submitted to,

15 first of all, the commander of the volunteer unit, Seseljevci, Seselj's

16 men. Who is this commander of the volunteer detachment "Seseljevci?" Do

17 you know?

18 A. There is no dilemma in my mind that this is the Leva Supoderica

19 detachment. Because at these levels, different expressions were used.

20 Even the chief of General Staff in an order speaks about armed units of

21 the Republic of Croatia and then in relation to that same document, the

22 political administration says, armed Ustashas. So they used the word

23 "Ustashas," and the chief of General Staff says "the armed forces of the

24 Croatia." Or here, often Leva Supoderica is referred to, that

25 detachment, and they call them Seseljevci, Seselj's Men. So I have no