1 Thursday, 25 March 2004
2 [Open session]
3 --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.
4 [The accused entered court]
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, could you call
6 the number, please.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Case Number IT-01-47-T, The
8 Prosecutor versus Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar. Could
10 we have the appearances for the Prosecution.
11 MR. WITHOPF: Good morning, Mr. President, good morning,
12 Your Honours. Good morning counsel. For the Prosecution Daryl Mundis,
13 Ekkehard Withopf, and the case manager Ruth Karper.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Withopf. And the
15 appearances for the Defence.
16 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. President. Good
17 morning, Your Honours. On behalf of General Hadzihasanovic, Edina
18 Residovic, counsel, and Stephane Bourgon co-counsel.
19 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Good day, Your Honours. On
20 behalf of Mr. Kubura, Rodney Dixon, Fahrudin Ibrisimovic, and Mr. Mulalic
21 our legal assistant.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Trial Chamber would like to
23 greet everyone present in the courtroom, the Prosecution, the Defence, the
24 accused, and everyone else. As you are aware, at the request of the
25 Prosecution, we will be working for longer hours today. The Registrar has
1 informed me that we can start working again at 2.45 after the break, which
2 will start at 1.45. We will have a one-hour break, and we will resume at
3 2.45. But we will only have an hour and a half, given the interpreters'
4 obligations. I hope that this additional time will allow us to conclude
5 the hearing of the witness who is here and start hearing the second
7 I'd like to remind the parties to ask questions that are essential
8 because your questions are to inform the Tribunal about the facts, about
9 what happened, so it is necessary to ask essential questions. Sometimes
10 the questions put to a witness are not very useful. So this is an effort
11 you should make. Questions should put which are useful for the Defence
12 and for the Prosecution. If the Judges think that additional questions
13 are needed, we will put them to the witness. But it is better if the
14 parties put the questions, rather than the Judges.
15 If the Judges ask questions, this will just be to fill in any
17 Could the usher please call the witness into the courtroom.
18 [The witness entered court]
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Good day, Witness. I hope
20 you're receiving the interpretation. We will continue with your testimony
21 today. And I believe that you'll be able to go back to your country
23 In fact, we had already started the cross-examination, so the
24 Defence may take the floor. I was thinking of the Prosecution's
25 re-examination. But the Defence still has questions to put to the
2 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Good
3 day, Mr. Kiggell
4 WITNESS: CAMERON KIGGELL [Resumed]
5 Cross-examined by Ms. Residovic: [Continued]
6 Q. [Interpretation] Yesterday, before we broke, you spoke about a
7 number of reasons, and you confirmed that these were possible reasons for
8 which it was necessary for you to have permission from the 3rd Corps
9 command to pass through checkpoints. This concerned the vicinity of the
10 front line and the security of UNPROFOR. Do you remember us discussing
11 this subject yesterday?
12 A. Yes, I do.
13 Q. However, apart from the situations we mentioned, you can certainly
14 confirm that sometimes the soldiers at checkpoints expressed their
15 dissatisfaction because of the permission you had been given, and they
16 asked for authorisation and the agreement of their local commanders. Did
17 you witness such events?
18 A. Yes, quite often I would have to get permission from the local
19 brigade commander.
20 Q. And that was obviously proof that the BH army was having great
21 difficulty when being formed, and sometimes the local commanders had
22 actual power. Is that correct?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. In fact, during your stay in Zenica, it was quite obvious that the
25 BH army, in spite of all the efforts it made, was not able to establish
1 its structure up to the line of subordination, which is usual for an army
2 which is well organised. Is that correct?
3 A. Yes, there were problems with communication, and this would delay
4 our sort of trip through the area.
5 Q. As a professional soldier, you are certainly aware of the fact
6 that in conditions of peace, in order to form a corps, several years are
7 required; whereas the 3rd Corps was being formed in conditions which are
8 very unfavourable, two wars were being waged. Is that correct?
9 A. Yes, that's correct.
10 Q. During your stay in Zenica, you were aware of the fact that the
11 3rd Corps held the line towards the Serbian forces. It was several
12 hundred kilometres long. It was exposed to constant attacks. And in
13 1993, another front was opened up, a front facing the HVO. Were you aware
14 of this fact?
15 A. Yes, I was.
16 Q. You may also have witnessed a situation in which the commander and
17 deputy commander, in order to secure your position, they would sometimes
18 negotiate with local commanders instead of issuing orders. Is that
20 A. That is correct.
21 Q. However, as you said yesterday, the 3rd Corps commander was a
22 professional officer. And it was difficult for him to admit in front of
23 you that the system of command and control was still not functioning in
24 the army. So he sought to justify his soldiers in various ways. Is that
1 A. Yes, I would say that's correct.
2 Q. When my learned colleague from the Prosecution asked you what the
3 purpose of your liaison officer was, you said that Mr. Hadzihasanovic
4 complained to Lieutenant Colonel Duncan, that you were collating too much
5 information, and in your opinion this could be something like a
6 countermeasure taken by the 3rd Corps. Is that right?
7 A. Yes, that seemed to be the case at the time. I was going round,
8 getting a lot of information. And the 3rd Corps commander played the same
9 game, assigned a liaison officer to me to, you know, replicate what we
10 were doing.
11 Q. However, as a professional soldier and a soldier who was trained
12 before arriving in Bosnia and Herzegovina, you were certainly aware of the
13 difference between the UN mission in accordance with the Chapter 6 of the
14 UN charter and the mission according to Chapter 7 of the UN charter. Were
15 you aware of the difference between these two things?
16 A. I can't obviously recall what the difference between the two
17 chapters were. I know what our UN mission was at the time.
18 Q. Perhaps in order to refresh your memory, I could say that Chapter
19 7 of the charter provide for establishing peace and enabled the UN forces
20 to use force in order to establish peace; whereas the mission that you
21 took part in pursuant to Chapter 6 of the charter was only a mission, the
22 purpose of which was to support the delivery of humanitarian aid provided
23 for in this UN chapter. You didn't have a mandate to establish peace;
24 your mandate was to provide humanitarian aid. Is that right?
25 A. That is correct. We were there to provide conditions where aid
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13 English transcripts.
1 could be delivered.
2 Q. You're aware of the fact that that mission, providing support when
3 delivering humanitarian aid, included firstly taking -- meant that the
4 measures taken couldn't influence the rights of the parties involved in
5 the conflict or the measures that they would take. Is that right?
6 A. Yes, we were there to support the delivery of aid in the area. We
7 weren't to intervene in the fighting.
8 Q. You're also aware of the fact that the UN support was provided,
9 with the agreement with all the parties concerned, and the agreement of
10 the BH state. In this territory you were active. Were you aware of this
12 A. Yes, I was.
13 Q. Similarly, and this was your testimony yesterday, as soldiers, it
14 was your responsibility to provide such support for humanitarian aid, but
15 you were only allowed to use force when it was a matter of legitimate
16 self-defense. Is that right?
17 A. That is correct.
18 Q. And even as far as using the right to defend yourselves, there
19 were rules according to which force could only be used as a last resort.
20 Is that right?
21 A. That's right. It's known as the rules of engagement.
22 Q. So as you were very familiar with the nature of your mission, you
23 knew that the BH army wasn't obliged to let the liaison officer, or
24 rather, UNPROFOR members, move around freely in the vicinity of the combat
25 lines. Is that correct?
1 A. Our mission was to move freely in the area. And if I recall
2 correctly, you know, we could get through checkpoints. Sometimes we would
3 be delayed getting through them, perhaps because they didn't want UNPROFOR
4 to go into the area because of what operations were going on. And it was
5 said that as -- so for our own security as well.
6 Q. I apologise. Although I can follow what you're saying, it would
7 be more precise if I listened to the interpretation. Thank you.
8 However, as far as you are aware, UNPROFOR attempted to avoid any
9 sort of activity that could be interpreted as getting involved in the
10 positions taken by the parties in the conflict. Is that right?
11 A. Yes, that's correct.
12 Q. Your battalion, or the mission that was assigned to you, could not
13 collate intelligence in the way that battalions engaged in a conflict do.
14 Is that correct?
15 A. That is correct.
16 Q. Yesterday, your testimony before this Court was that it was your
17 duty to collate information on the BH army, the positions of its units,
18 their military officers, and the existing or future combat operations. Is
19 that right?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. However, you also stated that the reason for which you did this,
22 in order to ensure -- was in order to ensure the security of humanitarian
23 convoys and the British soldiers. Is that right?
24 A. Yes, just to get an accurate picture of what was going on in our
25 area of responsibility.
1 Q. However, these broadly defined activities of yours could give rise
2 to suspicion, and the army involved in the conflict might believe that you
3 were going beyond the scope of your mandate. Is that correct?
4 A. Very possibly, yes.
5 Q. As the British army is part of NATO, you know that the idea of
6 liaison officer within NATO is such that such an officer only establishes
7 contact between two armies in a conflict. The armies, then, reach certain
8 agreements and implement these agreements. Is that right?
9 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Withopf.
11 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President, the Prosecution objects against this
12 question. The witness was in the area of Central Bosnia under the
13 auspices of UNPROFOR. And this question is related to customs used within
14 NATO. This appears to go beyond the scope what can be asked in
15 cross-examination. And it certainly wasn't an issue that has been
16 addressed in examination-in-chief.
17 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, this is just one of
18 a number of questions I wanted to put to the witness in order to clarify
19 an answer provided by the witness yesterday as to why a 3rd Corps
20 commander would introduce or assign a liaison officer. But I don't think
21 it's that important for the witness to answer this question, as he has
22 provided sufficient explanation. So I will withdraw the question to avoid
23 any further debate.
24 Q. So, Witness, you could agree with me and you have already said
25 that this is the case, the way you proceeded when carrying out your
1 mission may have resulted in a corps commander assigning a liaison
2 officer, and that would be in accordance with his position. Isn't that
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Yesterday, you spoke about how you collated certain information.
6 Would you agree with me if I told you that even such a manner of collating
7 information, the manner used by the British Battalion, was, in fact, a
8 reduced manner of collating information. It was a sort of restricted way
9 of gathering information, the kind of information that a battalion
10 involved in combat would usually gather. Is that correct?
11 A. Yes, because all we could do is either talk to the people
12 concerned or have the people physically on the ground observing what
14 Q. So what you would usually have done as a battalion involved in
15 combat in order to obtain reliable information, for example, using certain
16 means of gathering information, ways of checking information, these
17 methods weren't accessible to you and these weren't methods that you used.
18 Is that right?
19 A. That's right, yes.
20 Q. However, in addition to the fact that your activities could be
21 interpreted as going beyond the scope of the mandate, you nevertheless
22 confirmed yesterday that the corps commander and the deputy commander and
23 the liaison officer tried to make it possible for you to gain access to
24 all the information you were interested in. Is that right?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Similarly, in the building of the 3rd Corps command, you were
2 given access to all sections of the command that you were interested in.
3 Is that correct?
4 A. Yes. I was assigned the liaison officer, so he was the point of
5 contact to get information.
6 Q. According to your testimony yesterday, you were in Zenica for not
7 even three and a half months before you went to Tuzla. From the 21st of
8 May to the 31st of August?
9 A. That's correct, yes.
10 Q. You also mentioned the daily meetings that you had in the
11 battalion command. My question is: Would it be correct to say that quite
12 frequently at those daily meetings which were held at 1800 hours in Vitez,
13 many of your colleagues, officers from the BritBat who should have
14 attended these meetings, didn't do so because they were involved in other
15 operative tasks at the time?
16 A. Yes, that was true. There were occasions when everybody was not
17 available due to operations.
18 Q. The milinfosum which were drafted contained all the relevant
19 information presented by those who attended the meeting. Is that correct?
20 A. Not exactly correct. The information was collated from everybody
21 operating on the ground, which were then debriefed, the intelligence
22 officer. He would then give a brief on that information gathered to the
23 meeting at 1800. Then additionally, the officers present there would give
24 a short summary of what they had been doing that day.
25 Q. Reports which were compiled in this way were reports that you did
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13 English transcripts.
1 not forward to the parties involved in the conflict. Is that right? The
2 milinfosum -- the milinfosums weren't sent to the 3rd Corps command. Is
3 that correct?
4 A. That's correct, because it reported activities on all sides.
5 Q. BritBat's relationship to the parties in the conflict were
6 relationships that you had at meetings or when there were official records
7 concerning BritBat and the 3rd Corps command. Is that how you
8 communicated with them?
9 A. Sorry, can you clarify your question, please.
10 Q. Yes, gladly. You said that you did not forward your information
11 to the parties involved in the conflict; that is to say, to the 3rd Corps
12 and the HVO. However, when you discussed certain issues, this was done
13 either by having individual meetings between you and other officers, or
14 you had contact at organised meetings attended by a number of individuals,
15 or there was an official record which you would provide to the party
16 concerned; in this case, the 3rd Corps. Is this how you communicated with
17 the 3rd Corps, or on the other hand with the HVO on the other side?
18 A. Yes, it was a series of meetings that we had. We had sent
19 letters, telephone calls. It was just any level of communication we could
21 Q. Similarly, the parties involved in the conflict, the 3rd Corps,
22 too, did not provide BritBat with their military plans, their orders or
23 reports on activities carried out unless they were directly related to an
24 UNPROFOR request. Is that right?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. I would now like to move on to another area that you have
2 discussed with the Prosecution. In response to a question put to you by
3 the Prosecution, you said that you had the opportunity of meeting
4 Mujahedin; that is to say, foreign combatants who were in the area of
5 Central Bosnia while you were there. Is that correct?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. At that time, you saw that some of the local Muslims joined these
8 foreign combatants. Is that the information you had?
9 A. Yes, it would seem that the local Muslims joined the Mujahedin.
10 Q. Similarly, on the basis of what you personally observed, you saw
11 that some of the local inhabitants were imitating these foreigners, both
12 as far as the clothes they wore are concerned or the beards they wore, or
13 perhaps they adhered more strictly to religious principles. Were you in a
14 position to observe such behaviour?
15 A. Yes, we saw that -- this -- of the local Muslims who were more
16 fundamental in their Muslim faith developed, growing the beards and the
18 Q. However, a significant part of the local population was afraid of
19 the Mujahedin and did not approve their behaviour and their presence
20 there. Is that right?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. If I have understood this correctly, when you explained the nature
23 of your meetings with these foreign combatants, with the Mujahedin, you
24 said that the first time you met them was in a cafe, and they were unarmed
25 foreigners on that occasion. On the second occasion, you spoke to a group
1 who said they were from Turkey, and the third time was in the village of
2 Arnauti. Have I understood you correctly when you spoke about your
3 meetings with these foreigners?
4 A. Yes, I may have met them on more than one occasion, but this one I
5 can definitely recall.
6 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness now be shown
7 milinfosum dated the 30th of May 1993. This is necessary in order for me
8 to be able to ask the witness a number of questions.
9 I apologise. I meant the 31st of May 1993, and not the 30th of
11 Q. Would you please tell me whether in paragraph 3 of this milinfosum
12 there is reference to your own information as a liaison officer in Zenica?
13 A. Yes, that's correct. It refers to the Zenica LO, which was me at
14 the time.
15 Q. On that day, you spoke with three Mujahedin who said that they
16 were from Turkey. Is that right?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. They didn't tell you anything about their military affiliation,
19 nor about their relations with the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, did
21 A. No.
22 Q. You inferred that they were not under the control of the 3rd
23 Corps. Is that what it says here?
24 A. That would seem to be the case.
25 Q. Will you please look at paragraph 4. This paragraph also relates
1 to your contact in Zenica, doesn't it?
2 A. Yes, it does.
3 Q. On that day, you met Jasmin Saric, the commander of the municipal
4 staff of the Territorial Defence of Zenica. Is that right?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Commander Saric also made it quite clear that the Mujahedin were
7 not under the control of the army. Is that right?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. In view of the fact that this is a milinfosum and information that
10 this witness gained possession of personally and confirmed it in answer to
11 my questions, I move that this infosum be admitted into evidence as a
12 Defence exhibit.
13 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President, no objection.
14 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, for the benefit of
15 the transcript, the Defence is tendering the document, but also because of
16 the truthfulness of paragraphs 3 and 4 contained in this milinfosum.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, will you give us
18 a number, please.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, the Exhibit number will be DH108.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
21 Please continue.
22 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Mr. Kiggell, is it true, and I am interpreting your statement
24 given to the Prosecutor, if I say that on the 14th of June you were
25 present at a meeting between Lieutenant Colonel Duncan and
1 Commander General Hadzihasanovic?
2 A. Yes.
3 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown
4 Document DH72(ID) for me to be able to ask the witness some questions
5 about it.
6 Q. Will you please focus your attention on paragraph 1, please.
7 As you explained yesterday, when attending these meetings, you
8 kept notes, you kept a record of the meeting. Is that right?
9 A. That is correct.
10 Q. You will remember that at that meeting, the question of the
11 Mujahedin was raised, and that the deputy commander Dzamal Merdan stated
12 clearly on that occasion that the Mujahedin were not under the control of
13 the 3rd Corps. Is that right?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. That was, in fact, stated at the end of this paragraph, the
16 one-but-last sentence of paragraph 1 of this milinfosum. Is that right?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Commander Hadzihasanovic told Lieutenant Colonel Duncan about his
19 letter which he had addressed to the supreme command headquarters and
20 showed it to him in order to convince him of the measures being taken by
21 the 3rd Corps for the Mujahedin to be placed under control or removed from
22 the area. Is that right?
23 A. Yes.
24 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness now be shown a
25 document dated the 13th of June, DH73(ID). A letter by
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13 English transcripts.
1 Enver Hadzihasanovic dated the 13th of June.
2 THE REGISTRAR: The witness has the exhibit DH73(E-ID).
3 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Can you remember, Mr. Kiggell, that this is the letter shown to
5 Lieutenant Colonel Duncan by Commander Hadzihasanovic during that meeting
6 on the 14th of June?
7 A. I cannot accurately recall if this was the letter.
8 Q. But you do know that the letter has to do with the Mujahedin and
9 that it was addressed to the supreme command, and that it was shown to
10 Lieutenant Colonel Duncan. This is stated in your milinfosum as well.
11 A. Yes, it's stated that a letter was shown, and obviously this is
12 the one that relates to it because it's dated at the time and to the staff
14 Q. Thank you.
15 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, in view of the fact
16 that the witness was present at the meeting referred to in paragraph 1 of
17 the milinfosum dated the 14th of June, I should like this document to be
18 finally admitted into evidence and given an exhibit number. Also, the
19 witness confirmed that on that day, a letter addressed to the supreme
20 command was shown to Lieutenant Colonel Duncan, and that is why I would
21 like this document to be admitted into evidence as a Defence exhibit.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Before giving the floor to
23 Mr. Withopf, the Chamber wishes to recall that these two documents were
24 given an ID number, DH72 and DH73, the reasons being that these documents
25 had a direct link to Lieutenant Colonel Duncan, whose testimony has been
1 planned. And that is why we gave a provisional number to these documents.
2 The witness is familiar with the contents of paragraph 1 of the document
3 dated the 14th of June. He is of the opinion that the letter should
4 correspond to the letter mentioned in that document, but he is not telling
5 us that he himself read that letter.
6 Now, what are the comments of Mr. Withopf concerning the final
7 admission of these two documents?
8 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President, Your Honours, in view of what the
9 witness said, there's no objection by the Prosecution.
10 [Trial Chamber deliberates]
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. In view of the fact
12 that the Prosecution has no objection, the numbers 72 and 73 now become
13 final exhibit numbers. So Mr. Registrar, please confirm that these two
14 documents have finally been given Exhibit Numbers 72 and 73.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, I can confirm that now the documents
16 are marked as admitted, DH72, DH73, and DH73(E).
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Continue, please.
18 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Mr. Kiggell, as a liaison officer who was in the 3rd Corps Command
20 on a daily basis, you certainly knew that the supreme command staff after
21 this started to take measures against the Mujahedin asking them that they
22 be either placed under control or that they leave the region. Were you
23 familiar with those steps taken?
24 A. I can't recall those steps.
25 Q. Thank you. Yesterday, my learned friend from the Prosecution
1 showed you the milinfosum dated the 20th of May 1993.
2 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] So could the witness be shown
3 Exhibit Number P99, please, dated the 29th of May 1993.
4 Q. In paragraph 3 --
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Your question, please.
6 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Please, look again at paragraph 3, which you commented on
8 yesterday. On the basis of the grid reference indicated in paragraph
9 3(a) , you marked the position of Fazlici. Is that right?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. I should like to ask you to look at a map which we will show you
12 now. And it is Defence Exhibit DH98. It's a map in the scale of
14 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Could you please place it on the
16 Q. Could you please point on the map to Fazlici, where allegedly the
17 Mujahedin were seen.
18 A. [Indicates]
19 Q. Thank you.
20 Do you know that north of Fazlici, several kilometres to the
21 north, the last inhabited place towards the front line with the Serbs was
22 Gluha Bukovica?
23 A. I don't recall that.
24 Q. However, if I were to tell you that that locality was still under
25 the control of the army deep within the rear, would you agree with me then
1 that Fazlici was not close to the front line? Because you can see where
2 Gluha Bukovica is located.
3 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Withopf.
5 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President, the Prosecution objects to this
6 question. This is a theoretical question. It's phrased "if I would tell
7 you..." My learned friend obviously tries to somehow testify, and she
8 makes or tries to make the witness comment on a theoretical situation.
9 Nobody knows whether this situation is actually the correct situation.
10 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, such questions are
11 permissible, especially as I wish to refer to the comment in this
12 milinfosum. And the Prosecution yesterday asked the witness several times
13 to comment on the comments in the milinfosum. The places on the map have
14 not been changed. The witness is a soldier, and he's able to answer that
15 question. If the witness has been able to find the village of Gluha
16 Bukovica, which is deep behind the front line, my question is: Is it true
17 that in that case Fazlici is not close to the front line, the front line
18 with the Serb forces.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It would be better to ask him
20 first to pinpoint the front line. Why don't you ask him whether he knows
21 where the front line is, and then you can go on to your second question.
22 So Witness, you have a map front of you. As you moved around in
23 the area, could you point during -- using the parameters of the map where
24 the front line was. And show us the front line with the pointer, if you
25 remember. If you don't, tell us. Please go ahead.
1 THE WITNESS: I can't accurately recall where the front line was.
2 But the Serb front line was to the west, and then obviously there was the
3 front line, area of conflict, with the Croats in this region. But I
4 couldn't give you an accurate picture of where the front line is now.
5 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President, Your Honours, we were not able to see
6 what the witness marked on the map.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Will you do that again, please.
8 Point with the pointer to the front line with the Serbs approximately, if
9 you remember.
10 THE WITNESS: I don't accurately remember. I just remember the
11 front line being to the west on this map. I couldn't draw it on it. And
12 the same with the line of confrontation with the HVO forces, I couldn't
13 accurately do it. I just know the rough area.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
15 I'm addressing the Defence counsel. The witness is telling us
16 that he cannot say where the front line was. Regarding the front line
17 with the Serbs, he remembers that it was to the west, but he cannot
18 provide any additional information. So please continue.
19 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Mr. Kiggell, if you were to remind you and tell you that the front
21 line with the Serb forces was on Mount Vlasic, would you then be able to
22 express an opinion?
23 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President, my learned friend from the Defence
24 continues with this line of questioning "if I would tell you..." My
25 learned colleague is only allowed to ask questions that are based on the
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13 English transcripts.
1 testimony of the witness. The witness is not here as an expert. And what
2 my learned friend does, she actually testifies.
3 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] I'll withdraw the question to
4 avoid further debate about it. But I would in that case --
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Chamber thanks you for that.
6 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Could the map be removed, please,
7 and could the witness be shown Prosecution map P98 on which the front
8 lines have been marked. And I won't ask him about the front lines. But I
9 will put a completely different question to him. So this map, could it be
10 removed, and could the witness be shown the map that he looked at
11 yesterday. It is Prosecution Exhibit P98.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] He has the map in front of him
14 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Mr. Kiggell, yesterday you marked on this map the village Fazlici
16 on the basis of the grid reference in the milinfosum. In the top corner,
17 you have the front lines mark in the northwest. Can it be said,
18 Mr. Kiggell, that Fazlici was significantly removed from the front line?
19 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President, the Prosecution very strongly, very
20 strongly objects to this question. Number one, this map doesn't have a
21 date on it, and nobody is in a position to say as to when the markings
22 were made and what situation, to what point in time such markings show.
23 The Prosecution showed this map to the witness and tendered it into
24 evidence for the only purpose to show a geographical location. It's an
25 interpretation by the Defence that any of the markings do show a front
1 line. The Prosecution objects.
2 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I'm surprised that
3 the Prosecution would not provide a map that refers to the time period
4 covered by the indictment. But let me just ask the witness that according
5 to the best of his knowledge, do the lines indicate the front lines in
7 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President, I again object against this line of
8 questioning, and the Prosecution would appreciate if the Chamber could
9 rule on this issue. And of course, the Prosecution -- if Defence would be
10 allowed to continue such questions, what lines is my learned friend making
11 reference to? There are many lines on this map. And in respect to the
12 comment of my learned friend that the Prosecution would not show a map
13 that represents the situation in 1993, it's the view of the Prosecution
14 that the geographical locations of villages like Fazlici were located in
15 the very same area in 1993 and at any other time, before or after 1993.
16 However, the Prosecution would appreciate if the Chamber could rule on
17 this issue to avoid further discussion.
18 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, perhaps the witness
19 himself can tell us whether he can identify the front lines of the Serbs
20 on this map. Maybe that is the only way for me to move on or to withdraw
21 the question.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. The Chamber notes
23 that this document was produced yesterday by the Prosecution, and it was
24 shown to the witness who at the time was a military officer with the rank
25 of captain. This witness was a liaison officer, and within the framework
1 of his mission he moved around in the area. He also explained that he was
2 coming from Vitez to this area. He formally identified this village
3 yesterday, thanks to the coordinates provided on the map. Of course, he
4 couldn't be exposed to fire, but one could ask him whether, to the best of
5 his knowledge, whether on this map which was a map used by the military:
6 Witness, on the basis of this map, were there the positions of the hostile
7 forces indicated often this map? Could you tell us? To the best of your
8 recollection, because this was more than ten years ago, and the Chamber
9 fully understands that it is difficult for you to recollect today certain
10 facts of a very precise nature. However, looking at this map used by the
11 military, could you tell us whether there were enemy forces there; if so,
12 which; and where, roughly, were they positioned? And then, on that basis,
13 perhaps we can move on to the question of the front line.
14 THE WITNESS: We had the Serbs to the west with the front line
15 there with the 3 Corps.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Sir, could you use
17 the pointer to show the west on the map and the area that was under the
18 control of the Serbs.
19 Could you use the pointer to point to the positions of the Serbs.
20 If you can remember them.
21 THE WITNESS: I can't give accurate positions of the Serbs. I
22 remember it being west of Travnik. And the Mount Vlasic was, I think,
23 along the line of confrontation with the Serbs.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Can you see Mount Vlasic on the
1 THE WITNESS: I don't think I can. I don't think that's Mount
2 Vlasic. I think it's further west.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So the Serbs were to
4 the west. As for the other forces, the Croats, where were they? Where
5 was the HVO?
6 THE WITNESS: They were centrally located around Vitez. And I'll
7 just point to the map where I can roughly recall where they were
8 situated. [Indicates] Very approximately.
9 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Kiggell.
10 Mr. President, may I continue.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes.
12 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Mr. Kiggell, could you now have a look at the comment in the
14 milinfosum, after item 3 that we have referred to, and where you have
15 referred to Fazlici. The comment states that "it is quite apparent that
16 large numbers of BH troops are still deployed along the confrontation
18 On the basis of the map that you have, can you now confirm that
19 Fazlici isn't the front line with the Serbian forces or in the vicinity of
20 the front line where the Croatian forces are located? In fact, it is in
21 between those two areas. Is that correct?
22 A. I couldn't accurately say which front -- it's more likely to be
23 the HVO front line than the Serb front line.
24 Q. Yes. You pointed to Vitez. And at the time, there was fighting
25 with the Bosniak forces there. Is that correct? However, Fazlici is not
1 at the front line. Is that correct?
2 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President, this is just for the sake of the
3 transcript. My learned friend asked a question "is that correct" and the
4 witness wasn't given a chance to respond to this question. It's for the
5 sake of the transcript.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Mr. Kiggell, I apologise if I didn't wait for your answer. Please
9 go ahead.
10 A. Sorry, I couldn't accurately recall that being the front line.
11 Q. Thank you. We can return this milinfosum. And I have further
12 questions for the witness now.
13 Yesterday, you also said that as requested by a Norwegian NGO you
14 went to Arnauti. Is that right?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. The information you obtained when you visited Arnauti was
17 mentioned in the milinfosum dated the 5th of June shown to you by the
18 Prosecution yesterday.
19 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown
20 Prosecution Exhibit P100, please. Could the witness also be shown a map,
21 the scale of which is 1:25.000, registered as Defence Exhibit 106.
22 Q. Mr. Kiggell, can you point to Arnauti on this map.
23 A. [Indicates]
24 Q. Mr. Kiggell, could you please show us where Zenica is located on
25 the map.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. It's located to the west of this location. It's not physically
2 shown on the map.
3 Q. Could you confirm that Arnauti is in a removed part, removed area
4 east of Zenica, and it is not that easy to reach Arnauti.
5 A. That's correct.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 According to what is stated in the milinfosum under item 10B, you
8 said that on that day, you confirmed that there was a training camp for
9 the Mujahedin in Arnauti. Is that correct?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. On that day, you did not see the persons who were being trained in
12 that camp. Is that right?
13 A. I think according to the milinfosum I may have met them that day,
14 and that's why I said "they have confirmed they run a training camp."
15 Q. In fact, you met the Mujahedin. And it's the Mujahedin who
16 confirmed that fact. Is that right?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. But you did not meet the persons who may have been involved in
19 training. Is that correct?
20 A. I'm not sure exactly. I mean, I had a series of meetings. And
21 whether on that day I met them or it was another occasion, I can't
22 accurately recall.
23 Q. However, you have no information as to who went to the camp or as
24 to who sent men to be trained in that camp. Is that correct?
25 A. That's right. I mean, all we were aware of that the Mujahedin had
1 set up the training camp, maybe to train fellow Mujahedin.
2 Q. Mr. Kiggell, would it be correct to say that at the time as the
3 liaison officer you were aware of the fact that the army had an officers'
4 school of its own for the education and training of its commanders. Were
5 you familiar with that fact?
6 A. Not for the BiH. I'm sure for the JNA army, as it was they had an
7 officers' training school. But not the BiH. I wasn't aware of that.
8 Q. But during the war in 1993, were you aware of the fact that an
9 officers' school was established in Zenica, a school to train leaders in
10 order to establish and develop the BH army? Were you aware of that?
11 A. I can't recall.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 Please have a look at item 1. I apologise. Have a look at item
14 5, the heading of which is "Zenica." Have a look at item 5 in the
15 milinfosum. And we can remove the map now.
16 Yesterday, you commented on the facts mentioned under this item.
17 They were mentioned by your battalion commander. Your attention was drawn
18 to a sentence which says that it was possible to conclude that Bosnia and
19 Herzegovina - I'm now paraphrasing this; it's the last sentence. It says
20 that Bosnia and Herzegovina were not going to restrain themselves and were
21 not likely not to take military initiative. This sentence was referred to
22 yesterday. Do you remember that?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. That was on the 5th of June 1993. As someone in the 3rd Corps,
25 you were aware of the fact that on the 4th of June 1993, the HVO from
1 positions around Travnik attacked the town of Travnik. Is that correct?
2 A. That would seem to be stated in the milinfosum.
3 Q. You were also aware of the fact that Velika Bukovica was attacked,
4 and there were a significant number of victims who were observed there.
5 Is that something you're familiar with?
6 A. Not that I can recall. I'd obviously have to look at the
7 milinfosum to give a description of what happened.
8 Q. That fact is mentioned under item 3. It says: Alagic, Merdan
9 and Kulenovic represented the BiH and Leutar the HVO. Merdan claims that
10 18 Muslims have been massacred in the village of Bukovica, and that
11 something similar happened in Radojcici. That's the information contained
12 in this milinfosum. Is that right?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. As a soldier aware of the difficult situation that the BH army was
15 in, they were between two enemy lines, it was quite normal that the
16 commander who had been attacked on the previous two days, it was quite
17 normal that he would launch a counterattack in order to liberate, open up
18 the passage between Travnik and Zenica. Was this something that was quite
19 logical from a military point of view in your opinion?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Thank you.
22 You were aware of the fact that after these attacks against
23 Travnik and Velika Bukovica and other areas in the Bila valley, and the
24 army continued with its counterattack and launched military activities
25 throughout the area of the Bila valley. Were you aware of this?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. As a result, from the 6th to the 9th of June 1993, you were not
3 able to have meetings with anyone from the 3rd Corps command, is that
4 right, giving that fighting was ongoing at the time?
5 A. Yes, that's correct.
6 Q. Yesterday, the Prosecution also showed you a milinfosum dated the
7 23rd of June 1993. This is Prosecution Exhibit 501 [as interpreted].
8 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Could it please be shown to the
9 witness in order for me to ask the witness a number of questions. It's
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In the transcript, it says 501.
12 It should be corrected. It's 101.
13 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 Q. Please, have a look at item 7. But before I ask you something
15 about this item, I have some other questions I would first like to put to
16 you. Mr. Kiggell, would it be correct to say that you personally never
17 saw Mujahedin participating in combat operations together with the BH
19 A. I didn't physically see them doing assaults, but I may have come
20 across them at a checkpoint which I travelled through.
21 Q. Similarly, to the best of your recollection, you can't remember
22 anyone -- any of your colleagues saying at your meetings that they saw how
23 the Mujahedin were present at the front lines when combat operations were
24 being conducted. No one personally said that they had observed such a
1 A. I think it may have been mentioned, but I can't recall the
2 incidents. The comment was that they were used as the elite troops in the
3 front line.
4 Q. But all you can remember is the comment made by your colleagues.
5 Is that correct?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. In June in Zenica, and in particular, from the 14th onwards --
8 from the 14th when you were at a meeting with General Hadzihasanovic and
9 Lieutenant Colonel Duncan, and right up until the 23rd of June, you didn't
10 see a single attack launched by the Mujahedin in Zenica itself? You did
11 not observe a military attack carried out by the Mujahedin in Zenica. Is
12 that correct?
13 A. Yes, I didn't observe any Mujahedin attack in Zenica.
14 Q. You can confirm, then, that the comment in the milinfosum under
15 item 7, according to which the campaign in the Bila valley, we're
16 referring to the combats of the 6th to the 9th of June, you have testified
17 about this, these combats and the events in Zenica couldn't lead to the
18 conclusion presented in this item. And this was shown to you yesterday.
19 You cannot conclude that these events show that the Mujahedin were under
20 the control of the 3rd Corps. Is that correct? The information that you
21 had, the fact that you didn't see a Mujahedin attack of any kind in
22 Zenica, and the fact that you didn't have any direct information about
23 that participation in Bila, all this is contrary to the conclusion that --
24 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President, I note that the question of my
25 learned friend is about 10 or 11 lines long. And I also note that there
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 are -- is reference made to "these events." The Prosecution doesn't
2 understand what events my learned friend is making reference to, other
3 than the fact that the witness hasn't seen a Mujahedin combat operation in
4 Zenica. So if my learned colleague could please ask a clear question to
5 my -- to the witness. Thank you.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, ask the witness a precise
8 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Mr. Kiggell, the comment says that the recent campaign in the Bila
10 valley clearly shows that this is the case. "That this is the case" means
11 control of the 3rd Corps over the Mujahedin. So my question is: On the
12 basis of your personal experience, on the basis of what you saw in Zenica,
13 and on the basis of what you saw in the village of Bila, on the basis of
14 what you heard about, is it true to say that given all these factors one
15 can't draw the conclusion that has been drawn here?
16 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Withopf.
18 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President, the witness has been asked yesterday
19 during the examination-in-chief a question of the very, very similar
20 nature. He was asked by the Prosecution whether based on what he has
21 seen, what he got to know attending the daily 1800 hours meetings and what
22 he got to know from having talked to a variety of people he detailed
23 yesterday, he can confirm this conclusion made under paragraph 8 of the
24 milinfosum in front of the witness. The Prosecution is of the view that
25 the witness has already answered this question.
1 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. He answered the question
3 yesterday. Is the purpose of your question to get the witness to state
4 the contrary today?
5 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, the purpose of the
6 question is to have the witness tell us what he is aware of. Here, it
7 says that they were participants in the campaign in the Bila valley. The
8 witness answered my question and said that he never saw anything of this
9 kind. He said that he only heard comments. Here, it says that this
10 conclusion was drawn on the basis of the attack in Zenica. The witness
11 said that there weren't attacks of any kind in Zenica. Given the facts
12 that the witness is familiar with, my question for the witness is: Now
13 that he has gone back to the events that he was a witness of, would he
14 agree that this conclusion can't be reached on the basis of the facts that
15 he is familiar with?
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. The problem concerns
17 the way the question is presented. So you're asking this question to
18 arrive at what the witness says, and then you tell the witness yesterday,
19 in line X and Y, you said such and such a thing. Do you stand by what you
20 said -- do you stand by what you say, or are you changing this statement?
21 In such a case, there would be no problem, and the Prosecution couldn't
23 I will now ask you the question. This is important. Yesterday,
24 in response to a question put to you by the Prosecution, you said that, as
25 it says in item 8, the Mujahedin were subordinated to the 3rd Corps. The
1 Defence has asked you a series of questions, and you said that you
2 couldn't confirm certain facts because you weren't present, or you said
3 that there was hearsay evidence. You said that you didn't have such a
4 precise vision, as it might -- or your vision wasn't as precise as it
5 might have appeared initially. Today, it's Thursday, 10.30, do you now
6 stand by what you said with regard to the Mujahedin, bearing in mind all
7 the factors? This is what the Defence is pointing now to. You were a
8 liaison officer in contact with the various individuals. Were they
9 subordinated at the time to the 3rd Corps? Do you say that that is a
10 hundred per cent concern? Or what can you tell us about this matter.
11 Yesterday, you confirmed what was stated in item 8. What can you tell us
12 about this today in light of the questions that have been put to you and
13 that might have refreshed your memory? If you can answer the question,
14 you'll answer it. If not, just tell us that you don't know the answer.
15 What can you tell us about it? It's not a complicated matter.
16 THE WITNESS: Due to the information I had at the time, it was my
17 opinion that the Mujahedin were used in attacks as they were perhaps the
18 elite troops. They were more courageous. So my answer from yesterday in
19 my opinion still stands.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. The Defence has
21 heard the answer, which appears in line 15, page 33.
22 MS. RESIDOVIC: Thank you.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Continue, please.
24 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. In the course of the meeting held on the 14th with
1 Lieutenant Colonel Duncan and Commander Hadzihasanovic, as you've already
2 said --
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It's 10.30. It would be best to
4 have a break now so that the interpreters can rest, unless Mr. Withopf has
5 something to say. Mr. Withopf, what did you want to say?
6 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President, Your Honours, I would only like to
7 respectfully ask my learned friend from the Defence side how long she
8 intends to continue with this series of questions? It's the view of the
9 Prosecution that a significant number of the questions put to the witness
10 today are irrelevant or even highly irrelevant. And I only wish to know
11 as to how long this line of questioning is likely to continue.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. Without making any
13 judgement about the relevance or no relevance, how much more time do you
14 need, please?
15 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Another 15 minutes, Mr. President.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] 15 minutes.
17 Mr. Dixon?
18 MR. DIXON: Your Honour, we only have a few questions. We'll be
19 no more than approximately 15 minutes.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Therefore, the Defence is
21 telling us 30 minutes in all. The Judges will also have some questions.
22 But as the Judges synchronise their questions, it won't take 30 minutes.
23 And then of course you also will have the floor for re-examination.
24 We will have the break, and we will resume at 5 to 11.00.
25 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.
1 --- On resuming at 10.59 a.m.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed. I give
3 the floor to Defence counsel.
4 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Mr. Kiggell, you already said earlier on that at the meeting of
6 the 14th of June, Commander Hadzihasanovic showed a letter to Lieutenant
7 Colonel Duncan, and the letter has been admitted into evidence. Is it
8 true that Lieutenant Colonel Duncan on that occasion did not comment on or
9 challenge the letter shown to him by Commander Hadzihasanovic?
10 A. I can't recall whether he challenged the letter or not.
11 Q. Thank you. As far as the military situation in the 3rd Corps is
12 concerned at the time that you were there, could you please answer a few
13 questions for me. Is it true that at the time, the 3rd Corps had a
14 confrontation line of several hundred kilometres against the Serb forces?
15 A. Yes, that's correct.
16 Q. Is it true that at the time there was a fierce conflict with the
17 HVO forces?
18 A. Yes, that's correct.
19 Q. Is it true that the HVO used as a powerful weapon against the BH
20 army blockades of the main routes which also blocked the arrival of any
21 kind of aid to Central Bosnia?
22 A. Yes, that did occur.
23 Q. Is it true that in the area of responsibility of the 3rd Corps in
24 1992 and 1993, more than a hundred thousand refugees had arrived from
25 Eastern Bosnia, Krajina, Northern Bosnia, as well as from areas under the
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 control of the HVO?
2 A. I was aware that a lot of refugees came into the area. Exact
3 numbers I didn't know at the time.
4 Q. Is it true that in 1993, both the population and the military were
5 confronted with extreme shortages of food, medicines, and other supplies,
6 and that they depended heavily on humanitarian aid?
7 A. Yes, that's true.
8 Q. Is it true that there was constant fighting in Gornji Vakuf
9 against HVO forces?
10 A. Yes, there was a lot of fighting in that region.
11 Q. Is it true to say that the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not
12 have sufficient equipment, nor resources to engage in such extensive
13 combat operations?
14 A. Yes, that's true.
15 Q. Is it true to say that at the end of June, a new front was opened
16 to the north of Zenica in Zepce, and in the fighting there the HVO
17 captured more than two-and-a-half thousand civilians?
18 A. I knew there was fighting in that region. Whether they caught
19 two-and-a-half thousand civilians, I don't recall.
20 Q. Were you aware that at the time the HVO overtly cooperated with
21 the Serb forces and let them take over a part of the territory that they
22 had had control of?
23 A. I think that may have happened. But again, I can't accurately
24 recall that fact.
25 Q. As a military man with experience and in view of all these and
1 other facts that I have not mentioned now, can you confirm that the corps
2 commander waging two wars and at the same time the army was in the process
3 of formation, that his position was untenable?
4 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President. Mr. President, it may be a
5 translation issue only, but it sounds a bit odd if my learned friend asks
6 the witness "in view of all these and other facts that I have not
7 mentioned now," how can the witness comment on facts that were not
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, you are quite right. The
10 question could be put, but it should be limited to the facts that he is
11 aware of, because if we say "other facts," but rather the facts the
12 witness is aware of. Because you're asking the witness for an opinion,
13 him being someone who in touch with the commander of the 3rd Corps. And
14 you're asking him his opinion. But he can only testify on the basis of
15 facts that he was aware of. And the Prosecution is quite right in making
16 this point.
17 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise to my learned friends,
18 Their Honours, and the witness. I shall rephrase my question.
19 Q. All these facts that I have now mentioned, and everything else
20 that you personally were able to see during your stay in Zenica and in the
21 area of the 3rd Corps, as a professional soldier, can you agree with me
22 that the commander of the 3rd Corps in 1993 found himself in a virtually
23 impossible situation?
24 A. Yes. At that stage of the confrontation, the BiH forces had
25 suffered heavily, and they were now trying to regather themselves to try
1 and fight their enemy. So it was a very hard time for BiH.
2 Q. Thank you. Very briefly, a few more questions for you. In answer
3 to the President of the Trial Chamber, you expressed your opinion in
4 connection with the comment that I showed you. My question now is, for
5 things to be quite clear to me, is it true that in those days, there was
6 quite a bit of confusion regarding the position of the Mujahedin?
7 A. Yes. And hence the comment in the milinfosum that with
8 information we had at the time, we thought this they were working for 3
10 Q. To make things quite clear, could you please answer as briefly as
11 possible, some question that I asked you already, but are the result of
12 your own knowledge. Is it true that you met the Mujahedin for the first
13 time at this coffee bar unarmed? Was that your answer?
14 A. Yes, I think they were unarmed in the coffee bar.
15 Q. The second time you met these three Turks who told you that they
16 were not under the control of the army. Is that right?
17 A. Yes, as I think reported in the milinfosum.
18 Q. On the 31st of May, you presented your own view that they were not
19 under the army's control. Is that right?
20 A. I can't recall. I think -- was that the result of my conversation
21 with Merdan?
22 Q. Very well. We showed you that milinfosum, and it is an exhibit
23 now. Commander Saric told you that they were not under their control. Is
24 that right?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. At the meeting on the 14th of June, deputy Merdan told you clearly
2 that they were not under the army's control. Is that right?
3 A. That's the same meeting with General Hadzihasanovic. Yes.
4 Q. At the time the letter was shown, the letter that I showed you
5 here. Is that right?
6 A. Yeah.
7 Q. You did not see the Mujahedin involved in any combat operation?
8 A. I did not physically see them carry out an attack. As I said, I
9 only saw them at checkpoints.
10 Q. You saw them in Arnauti, at the training camp?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. You knew that they were good fighters, and it was on that basis
13 that you concluded that they might have been under the control of the 3rd
15 A. There was a lot of information to say that the Mujahedin were
16 there to help the 3 Corps efforts in fighting the war. So with all the
17 other information that my colleagues had been collecting, that was our
18 opinion at the time.
19 Q. All the other information you were unable to convey to
20 Their Honours because they were comments made by other persons. Is that
22 A. In the milinfosum, the intelligence officer would sort of analyse
23 the information he'd received. So therefore, he's the one who wrote those
24 comments on there. So therefore, he may have gathered that comment from
25 the debriefing of the people on the ground.
1 Q. However, this opinion of yours, you were not able to corroborate
2 personally with facts that you personally saw?
3 A. No. I think it was comments made at the time.
4 Q. Thank you, Mr. Kiggell.
5 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I have no further
6 questions for this witness.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Madam. I turn now to
8 the other Defence counsel who have some questions.
9 MR. DIXON: May it please Your Honours.
10 Cross-examined by Mr. Dixon:
11 Q. Good morning, Mr. Kiggell. I have a few questions for you on
12 behalf of Mr. Kubura. You said in your testimony yesterday, Mr. Kiggell,
13 that you saw Mr. Kubura on occasions, and that you saw him at the
14 headquarters of the 3rd Corps. Is that right?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. You never actually had a formal meeting with him or any
17 discussions with him?
18 A. Only when I met him at 3 Corps. But I never met him at his
20 Q. You met at 3 Corps only in passing by. Is that right?
21 A. Yes, that's right.
22 Q. He invited you on one occasion, did he not, to attend at his
23 headquarters, the 7th Brigade headquarters?
24 A. That's right.
25 Q. As you've said, that meeting never materialised for whatever
1 reason, as you explained yesterday. So in the end, you never actually
2 attended at the 7th Brigade headquarters for a meeting with him?
3 A. No.
4 Q. You never met anybody else there in the headquarters?
5 A. No.
6 Q. You were not functioning on the front lines. Your area of
7 responsibility was Zenica and some of the surrounding parts?
8 A. That's right. For a short stage only, I covered in the Vitez
9 area. But naturally we sort of got to know the area, because of various
10 problems we helped each other out, the liaison officers, that is.
11 Q. You never travelled to the front lines to make observations?
12 A. Not in Zenica area, because we used the main routes, going over
13 the mountain and through the bypass. So that was my sort of visual
14 inspection when I crossed the front line at that stage.
15 Q. You never ever personally observed the 7th Brigade on the front
16 lines in the field?
17 A. No, I think the only time I saw them was at the checkpoints.
18 Q. Would you agree with me that your direct knowledge of the 7th
19 Brigade was, therefore, relatively limited, the structure of the brigade,
20 the composition of that brigade?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. You said in your testimony yesterday that at the end of May, you
23 reported that Mr. Kubura was the commander of the 7th Brigade, that that's
24 recorded in a military information summary as well?
25 A. That's correct.
1 Q. That was the first time you knew that he was the commander?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And that's how you understood his position, as "the commander"?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Did you know that he was a substitute commander or acting
7 A. No, I don't think I did.
8 Q. The information that you used to find out this fact was the
9 sources that you've mentioned time and time again, the people you spoke to
10 on the ground?
11 A. Yes, that's right.
12 Q. What other people told you?
13 A. Yes. I was introduced to Mr. Kubura as the 7th Brigade commander
14 I think when I was at the 3 Corps headquarters.
15 Q. In respect of the foreign fighters, the Mujahedin, you were not
16 briefed about them and their presence in Central Bosnia before you arrived
17 at the end of April?
18 A. I can't recall if we were.
19 Q. But when you arrived there, you didn't have detailed information
20 about them?
21 A. No.
22 Q. You have said in your testimony that you met them on three
23 particular occasions. I don't wish to repeat all the details again. But
24 I think it's important to pinpoint the dates. The first was in a cafe in
25 the suburb of -- a suburb of Zenica. Is that right?
1 A. That's right.
2 Q. And there you saw some of these foreign fighters. They weren't
3 armed. And that was at the end of May?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. So you had been there approximately a month already?
6 A. I'd actually been in the Zenica area for just over a week, I think
7 it was. Because I came back down from Tuzla.
8 Q. Right. The second time was the camp in Arnauti.
9 A. Yes. You know, it was...
10 Q. That was on a date in early June?
11 A. Right.
12 Q. And there was another occasion which you mentioned meeting a
13 number of foreign fighters, on the 31st of May or a date around then?
14 A. Right. Yes, okay.
15 Q. When you met with them, they never mentioned the 7th Brigade to
17 A. I think in one meeting, they wouldn't give me military
18 information. I can't recall whether they then, in subsequent meetings
19 they denied being part of 7 Muslim Brigade.
20 Q. But you can't recall whether they ever said anything to you about
21 under whose control they were?
22 A. No.
23 Q. In fact, in the military information summaries that we've seen in
24 Court and in your reports, you don't mention that they are generally as
25 you put it under the control of the 7th Brigade.
1 A. No.
2 Q. We have seen one report, which has been referred to on a few
3 occasions, that being the one of the 31st of May. That's Prosecution
4 Exhibit -- sorry, Defence Exhibit DH108. Where you formed the impression
5 that they were not under the control of the 3rd Corps.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Mr. Kiggell, can you confirm that in the middle of July, there
8 were reports received that there was an assassination attempt on
9 Mr. Kubura by foreign fighters, a group of Mujahedin?
10 A. Yes, there had been a report.
11 Q. You noted that in your diary, which you had. You had a war diary,
12 did you not?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And the date of that was the 14th of July?
15 A. I can't remember the exact date. But...
16 Q. But it was the middle of July?
17 A. I think so.
18 Q. It was the view at the time that this incident confirmed the gulf
19 between the local Muslims and the foreign Muslims. Is that right?
20 A. Yes.
21 MR. DIXON: Thank you, Mr. Kiggell. I have no further questions
22 for you.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I now give the floor to
24 Mr. Withopf for re-examination. And then the Judges will have some
25 questions for the witness, too.
1 Re-examined by Mr. Withopf:
2 Q. Mr. Kiggell, I have a few questions for you for clarification of a
3 number of issues that have been addressed by my learned friend -- by my
4 learned friends on the Defence side in the course of their
6 Yesterday, the issue of the reliability of the milinfosums, or
7 more concretely, the reliability of the sources of information that was
8 contained in milinfosums was discussed. The question is, sir, whenever an
9 information was questionable or whenever the source of an information was
10 questionable, was this to your knowledge made clear in the milinfosums?
11 A. Yes. I think when we received some information, we would have
12 some doubt about it and try and verify it by other means.
13 MR. WITHOPF: Can the witness please be shown Prosecution
14 Exhibit P100. And can the witness please also be shown Prosecution
15 Exhibit P101.
16 Q. Sir, if I may draw your attention first to the milinfosum number
17 37, of 5th of June 1993, which is Prosecution Exhibit P100. On page 1
18 under paragraph 2 at the end, there is a section "comment." It's a
19 five-line section. And it says: "The reliability of this information
20 cannot be assessed."
21 And if I may, in addition, draw your attention, sir, to the
22 milinfosum number 55 dated 23rd of June 1993, page 3, which is paragraph
23 6. And under (b), the comment which reads: "The CS attempted to verify
24 these claims by visiting the areas mentioned." And then it's further
25 mentioned that "further investigation was impossible."
1 Based on your experience with milinfosums, would you say that such
2 statements on the reliability or in the event a source was questionable
3 were always contained in milinfosums, and these two examples I just showed
4 you were very typical examples?
5 A. Yes, I think that's generally true.
6 MR. WITHOPF: The two milinfosums can be removed from the witness,
8 Q. Mr. Kiggell, sir, your statement in the milinfosum of 31st of May
9 in respect to the subordination of the Mujahedin was repeatedly an issue
10 during the examination-in-chief and during the cross-examination. It was
11 the statement of the 31st of May 1993. Can you please inform the
12 Trial Chamber and can you please repeat as to when you arrived and as to
13 when you were assigned the liaison officer for the 3rd Corps.
14 A. I was assigned liaison officer, it must have been round about
15 around 22nd or 23rd May, and I left that post 31st of August.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Defence is on their feet.
17 But the question hasn't been completed. The witness is simply being asked
18 when he arrived.
19 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, but on page 46, line
20 4, there's an error, either in the transcript or maybe my learned friend
21 made an error because he mentioned the milinfosum used in the
22 examination-in-chief. Instead, it should state the milinfosum used in the
23 cross-examination. This is in the interest of the precision of the
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Quite right. This document,
1 P108, was produced by the Defence during the cross-examination, or rather
2 it was used during the cross-examination.
3 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President, Your Honours, that's obviously
4 completely correct. And my question did not suggest anything to the
5 contrary. I only introduced this issue as being discussed during the
6 examination-in-chief and during cross-examination.
7 However, if you allow me to continue, Mr. President, with the
8 follow-up question.
9 Q. Having arrived or having assigned as the liaison officer on the
10 22nd or 23rd of May 1993, and having made this statement contained in the
11 milinfosum on the 31st of May 1993, would you agree that this is an early
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Can you please inform the Trial Chamber on what information, on
15 what initial information this assessment was based upon.
16 A. Through my discussions and meetings with various members of the
17 Mujahedin and 3 Corps.
18 Q. For clarification, sir, Mr. Kiggell, does this mean this statement
19 was based on information you received from the ABiH?
20 A. Yes.
21 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, by his question,
22 the Prosecutor is suggesting the answer of the witness. The witness said
23 "on the basis of conversations with the Mujahedin and the 3rd Corps."
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Chamber notes that the
25 Prosecution is indicating the fact that the witness took on his duties on
1 the 22nd or 23rd of May. And eight days later, eight days after his
2 arrival, he mentions in paragraph 3 of the report dated the 31st of May
3 these matters. The Prosecution is asking him on what basis, since he had
4 only just arrived, he mentions these facts. And the witness says that it
5 was on the basis of the conversations he had, both within his unit and
6 with other persons. Then the Prosecution asks him whether the other
7 persons were members of the BiH. And he answered yes. So this is
8 specifying the answer.
9 Continue, Mr. Withopf. Because what was of interest was to learn,
10 and the Defence is well aware of the context, and that is to learn the
11 context within which this paragraph was drafted. And as you know, we
12 attach importance to the context, as does the Prosecution.
13 Mr. Withopf.
14 MR. WITHOPF: Thank you very much, Mr. President.
15 Q. Mr. Kiggell, sir, the statement under paragraph 8 in the
16 milinfosum dated the 23rd of June 1993, which is Prosecution Exhibit P101,
17 that, and I'm quoting from it, "this cell believes they are under
18 effective control" and it's making reference to the Mujahedin. This
19 statement is obviously different. Based on the information that you
20 received between the 31st of May 1993 and the 23rd of June 1993, and based
21 on information you received not only from the BiH, but also from
22 intelligence received by BritBat based on what you got to know travelling
23 around in the area of Zenica and having talked to a variety of individuals
24 you detailed yesterday, did you over the time change the initial
25 assessment you made on the 31st of May 1993?
1 A. Yes. As a result of seeing the intelligence reports and
2 conversations with my colleagues, we felt that the Mujahedin were used in
3 the offensives.
4 Q. Were used in the offensives and also were under the effective
5 control as it is stated in the milinfosum of the 23rd of June 1993. Is
6 this what you are saying?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Let's move on, sir, Mr. Kiggell, to my very last line of
9 questioning I wish to discuss with you. That's the issue of Arnauti. You
10 have been shown a map, and you identified the location known as Arnauti.
11 How far away is Arnauti from Zenica?
12 A. It must be maybe about 20 kilometres perhaps.
13 Q. Have you yourself, sir, have you yourself been in Arnauti?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. How long did it take you from Zenica to reach the location of
17 A. Approximately half an hour, I think.
18 Q. And what sort of vehicle did you use?
19 A. A Land Rover.
20 MR. WITHOPF: Thank you very much, Mr. Kiggell, sir.
21 Mr. President, Your Honours, the Prosecution has no further
22 questions at this time.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. The Judges have some
24 questions for the witness.
25 Questioned by the Court:
1 JUDGE SWART: Good morning, Mr. Kiggell. Just a few questions,
2 not to take too much time again. My first questions relates to the patrol
3 that was denied access in the neighbourhood of Fazlici. They could not
4 pass the control post that was there. Do you remember the -- which
5 company that was or which unit that was?
6 A. I don't recall the exact unit. We in our British Battalion have a
7 reconnaissance platoon. And attached to it we had reconnaissance platoons
8 from the light dragoons regiment. So it would be in our logbook which
9 vehicle that was and who was the commander.
10 JUDGE SWART: But you don't recall personally what officer was
12 A. No.
13 JUDGE SWART: Okay. Thank you. My other questions are related to
14 Arnauti. Much has been said about Arnauti. Much has been asked of you
15 about Arnauti. I have still some supplementary questions. I heard you
16 saying this morning that saw the Mujahedin in a camp in Arnauti. So this
17 supposes that you had been within the camp of the Mujahedin.
18 A. No, I was actually in the camp of Norwegians' People Aid. We met
19 at their location.
20 JUDGE SWART: It's not in the Mujahedin camp?
21 A. Not in the Mujahedin camp.
22 JUDGE SWART: Okay. You spoke with -- you have been there several
23 times, I understand, because it was a longer process of discussions
24 between them.
25 A. Yes, I think I visited on a couple of occasions. I can't remember
1 the result. In one go, we -- or we talked for the meeting -- we may have
2 come back for two meetings.
3 JUDGE SWART: And this was all also in Arnauti itself.
4 A. Yes, in the Norwegians' People Aid location again..
5 JUDGE SWART: On the other occasions did you visit the camp
7 A. No.
8 JUDGE SWART: You've never been in the camp?
9 A. No.
10 JUDGE SWART: How many representatives from the camp have you ^K
12 A. I think it's about three or four people.
13 JUDGE SWART: Three or four people. High-ranking people,
14 low-ranking people.
15 A. They didn't have any sort of rank, but they claimed to represent
16 who ran the camp.
17 JUDGE SWART: The discussions about the question what were the
18 links with the -- between the Mujahedin and the 3rd Corps, and I would
19 pose you that question in a very specific way concerning Arnauti. The
20 people you met there, the officers or soldiers you met who you suppose are
21 Mujahedin, did they consider themselves to be a member of the 3rd Corps or
22 any signs they were a member of the 3rd Corps.
23 A. I don't think so. I don't think it came up in the conversation.
24 I think because they were in the 3 Corps area, I think they may had some
25 agreement with 3 Corps.
1 JUDGE SWART: They didn't wear insignias or --
2 A. I couldn't remember.
3 JUDGE SWART: You couldn't remember. Okay. Thank you.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I have a question that follows
5 on the one that was just put to you. You had a discussion with these
6 three or four Mujahedin. Did you have a discussion with them in English
7 or were you assisted by an interpreter?
8 A. I was assisted by an interpreter.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] As an officer, you didn't ask
10 them to go and visit the area. Did you ask them to accompany them to the
11 area that they were in?
12 A. No I was concentrating on resolving the issue with the Norwegian
13 Peoples' Aid so that the aid organisation could continue in the area. And
14 I didn't want to upset the Mujahedin.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Mujahedin that you had a
16 discussion with, were they armed or not?
17 A. I can't accurately reflect whether they were armed or not on that
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] If they had been armed, would
20 you have informed your superiors of the fact, since there were armed men
21 in an area that was supposed to be a sensitive, a delicate area?
22 A. It was not unusual to have armed people working in sort of where
23 the aid organisations were, Zenica, perhaps. In this instance, if they
24 were carrying arms, if wouldn't have been unusual. So therefore, there
25 wouldn't have been a need to report it.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] This morning, in response to a
2 question put to you by the Defence, you said that over a period of several
3 days in June, you had no contact whatsoever with people from the 3rd
4 Corps. During that period of time, what happened with your liaison
5 officer who had been assigned to you by the 3rd Corps? He wasn't present
7 A. I again can't recall whether I actually got into 3 Corps and spoke
8 to the liaison officer for those three days.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And my last question: You said
10 that you had meetings at 1800 hours, and about 20 of you attended them.
11 You had the rank of captain in the battalion. How many other officers
12 were there above you? How many commanders were there, and how many
13 captains were there? Because we know that there was a
14 Lieutenant Colonel Duncan. But between yourself and
15 Lieutenant Colonel Duncan, were there any other officers?
16 A. I reported directly to Lieutenant Colonel Duncan. And he had
17 working for him the intelligence officer. So those were our two main
18 points of contact. Under Lieutenant Colonel Duncan, he had the majors in
19 charge of the companies. And you'd either have other officers there who
20 represented the logistics part of the battalion, and then also you would
21 have other captains who were liaison officers and had the specialist roles
22 within the British Battalion such as we had a mortar officer or an
23 anti-tank officer would be -- normally be a captain.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The intelligence officer, what
25 rank did he hold?
1 A. Captain.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And as we know that this is the
3 person who compiled the milinfosums, in the course of his duties, did he
4 have other officers, NCOs or other members of the military, or did he work
5 alone as an intelligence officer? Was there a unit that he had at his
7 A. He had a small team. And directly underneath him, he had what is
8 called a staff sergeant. And then he had a couple of lower-ranking NCOs
9 to help.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] If you think that my question
11 concerns certain secret matters, don't answer it, but if you can, please
12 do. This intelligence officer had an important role, as we can see. Did
13 he have the financial resources to pay informers or to -- did he have
14 technical means which would allow him to collate information? If you
15 don't want to answer the question, don't answer it.
16 A. I don't think he did.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 Does the Defence have any other questions? Mr. Bourgon.
19 MR. BOURGON: Good day, Mr. President. Good day, Your Honours. I
20 have a number of questions, Mr. President, as a result of the questions
21 put to the witness by the Trial Chamber. I would like to go back to the
22 objection raised by my colleague. The Trial Chamber commented on this on
23 page 87, line 18.
24 THE INTERPRETER: Page 47. Interpreter's correction.
25 MR. BOURGON: I would simply like to go back to this subject,
1 Mr. President, in order to clarify something. The objection raised by the
2 Defence at that point in time was that when responding to a question put
3 to the witness by the Prosecution, the witness said that the information
4 that he had on the basis of which he compiled a report came from the 3rd
5 Corps. The witness replied that in fact the information did come from the
6 3rd Corps. The Defence's objection was that the information that he had
7 at the time did not come from one source, but from two sources. I would
8 quite simply like the witness to confirm whether the information he had at
9 that point in time came from the 3rd Corps alone, or whether it came both
10 from the 3rd Corps and from the meetings that he had with the Mujahedin.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. Could you answer the
12 question, please.
13 A. Yes. Initially, when I first arrived in the area, we assessed
14 that the Mujahedin weren't under the control. And therefore, however, our
15 opinion changed as time moved on. And that's where we came to the second
17 Re-examined by Mr. Bourgon:
18 Q. My question, Mr. Kiggell, is rather when you made that assessment,
19 your information came from two sources. From things you had heard from
20 3rd Corps as well as your meetings with Mujahedin. Is that correct?
21 A. Yes. From several people.
22 Q. That's the only small issue I wanted to confirm.
23 Will you agree with me, Mr. Kiggell, that -- you've mentioned that
24 any important issue would need mention in the milinfosum. You've answered
25 that question a number of times.
1 A. Yeah.
2 Q. Now, the Chamber has raised with you your visit to Arnauti. And
3 your answer to the question raised by the Trial Chamber was what you were
4 doing at that time. And your response was your main interest was to deal
5 with the issue of the Norwegian aid organisation to allow them to continue
6 with their work. Is that correct?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Now, in order to allow them to continue with their work, that was
9 your focus. And their problem was the Mujahedin. ^L
10 A. That's right.
11 Q. Now, the Mujahedin, which was this problem, you never raised this
12 problem with the 3rd Corps?
13 A. I can't recall if I had mentioned it to 3 Corps in passing.
14 Q. But if you had mentioned that problem to the 3rd Corps, it would
15 be in the milinfosum, which it is not.
16 A. It may have been. Again, I can't accurately recall if it was
18 Q. A quick question concerning your liaison officer, which was also
19 raised by the Trial Chamber. This liaison officer which was assigned to
20 you, a gentleman called Edo --
21 A. Mm-hmm.
22 Q. -- to your knowledge, this gentleman, the fact that he was your
23 liaison officer, he also had another job. To be your liaison officer was
24 simply your point of contact.
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Is that correct?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. One final question, because the Trial Chamber has discussed with
4 you the role of your commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Duncan, with
5 respect to intelligence. You are -- you can confirm today that
6 Lieutenant Colonel Duncan was indeed involved in the intelligence process?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. That Captain Harrison was working for him?
9 A. That's right.
10 Q. And that Lieutenant Colonel Duncan would attend most of the
11 briefings at 6.00 because in fact they were his orders group.
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. That's correct. Now, do you recall Lieutenant Colonel Duncan
14 either writing or mentioning to General Hadzihasanovic the fact that
15 there was any doubt about the veracity of his letter that he wrote to his
16 headquarters asking for the mudj to be expunged from the country?
17 A. I don't recall him challenging this.
18 Q. And if he had challenged this issue, it would have been something
19 that you would have included into the milinfosums?
20 A. Possibly, yes.
21 MR. BOURGON: Thank you very much, Mr. Kiggell. .
22 MR. DIXON: Your Honours, thank you. We have no further
24 MR. WITHOPF: There are no further questions for the Prosecution,
25 Mr. President.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Kiggell, for
2 having testified here. Your testimony has taken up two days. And I think
3 it's the first time that you have testified in a court. This brought back
4 memories of events that took place a long time ago. We would like to
5 thank you for having answered the questions put to you by the Prosecution,
6 by the Defence, and by the Judges. Thank you for your answers. We wish
7 you a good trip home. And I will now ask the usher to escort you out of
8 the courtroom. And of course, we wish you all the best in your profession
9 as a teacher.
10 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
11 [The witness withdrew]
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Withopf, the last witness
13 that we have for this week, is the witness present?
14 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President, Your Honours, according to my
15 information, the witness is present and available.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. How long do you
17 think your examination-in-chief will take? Because as you know, we will
18 be working this afternoon, too. And tomorrow we will have to adjourn at
19 1.45. Could you tell us how long you expect the examination-in-chief to
20 last, providing that there are no objections by the Defence, which would
21 result in a loss of time? But how many hours do you think your
22 examination-in-chief will take?
23 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President, Your Honours, the net time, and
24 that's excepting the issue you, Mr. President, addressed, the net time of
25 the questioning will certainly not be longer than two hours.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
2 Could the usher bring the witness into the courtroom.
3 [The witness entered court]
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Good day, sir. Can you hear me?
5 Are you receiving the interpretation of what I am saying?
6 THE WITNESS: Yes, I can, sir.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. You have been called
8 here as a witness for the Prosecution. As you will be testifying in this
9 case, you have to make a solemn declaration. Before you do so, you should
10 inform me of your identity. Could you please tell me your first and last
12 THE WITNESS: Mark Bower.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] What is your date of birth?
14 THE WITNESS: 2nd of October 1964.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Which town or village were you
16 born in?
17 THE WITNESS: York.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We know the town. But which
19 country is it in?
20 THE WITNESS: It's in Great Britain.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] What position do you hold at the
23 THE WITNESS: I'm a major in the British Army, currently serving
24 in the United States of America.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In 1993, what rank did you hold?
1 What position did you have at the time?
2 WITNESS: I was a captain in the 1st Battalion of the Prince of
3 Wales Own Regiment of Yorkshire, and I was a liaison officer.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Have you already testified in a
6 THE WITNESS: Yes, I have.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Did you testify before an
8 international court, or was this a national court.
9 THE WITNESS: It was here at the international court.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Do you remember the case that
11 you testified in, and on how many occasions did you do this?
12 THE WITNESS: I testified for the Prosecution in the Blaskic case,
13 and again for the Prosecution in the Kordic case.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you have already testified in
15 two other cases.
16 THE WITNESS: Yes.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you have been to The Hague on
18 two previous occasions, and this is a third occasion.
19 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] As you have already testified
21 before this Court, you are familiar with the proceedings. It is necessary
22 for you to make the solemn declaration now. So could you please read out
23 the text that the usher will show you.
24 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
25 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. You may sit down
3 As you're already familiar with giving testimony before an
4 international court, the information I'll provide you with will be very
5 brief. You will first have to answer the questions put to you by the
6 Prosecution. The representative of the Prosecution is to your right. He
7 is behind the plastic lectern. After the examination-in-chief has been
8 concluded, Defence counsel, who are to your left, will conduct their
9 cross-examination. The three Judges sitting before you may also ask you
10 questions at any point in time. The questions that -- will have a
11 relation to the questions put to you by the Prosecution or by the Defence,
12 or questions that might help determine the truth, questions that might not
13 have been put to you by either of the parties. Before answering a
14 question, think about your answer, because sometimes the questions are
15 complicated. Try to answer the questions in a clear and precise manner,
16 and if you don't understand the question, ask the person putting it to you
17 to rephrase it. Because sometimes a number of elements can be contained
18 within a single question. And simply saying yes or no may not be an
19 adequate response to a question. I know that the parties do try to put
20 precise questions to witnesses, but sometimes they forget to do so.
21 There are two other factors that I would like to draw your
22 attention to. The first is you have made the solemn declaration. You
23 should not lie. If a witness gives false testimony, he could be
24 prosecuted. And the sentence -- the penalties could be a sentence or a
25 fine. This probably doesn't apply to you. But when one answers a
1 question and provides information that could be used against the witness,
2 in such cases the witness can refuse to answer the question. This is a
3 rule that exists in Anglo-Saxon law, but the Trial Chamber could compel
4 you to answer the question. However, if you do answer the question, you
5 have a form of immunity because the information you provide cannot be used
6 against you. So this is roughly speaking the manner in which your
7 testimony will be given here.
8 We'll continue with the hearing in the afternoon, and you will be
9 back here tomorrow morning, too. We hope that we will conclude your
10 testimony tomorrow morning so that you can return to the United States.
11 Mr. Withopf, we have half an hour before the break.
12 MR. WITHOPF: Thank you very much, Mr. President.
13 WITNESS: MARK WILLIAM BOWER
14 Examined by Mr. Withopf:
15 Q. Good afternoon, Major.
16 A. Good morning.
17 Q. Major, can you please for the benefit of the Trial Chamber briefly
18 summarise your military career?
19 A. I joined the army in 1983 and was commissioned in 1985. I joined
20 an infantry battalion and remained with that battalion throughout my
21 career. I've served in Canada, France, Holland, Germany. I was involved
22 in numerous tours in Northern Ireland. I was involved in the first Gulf
23 War. Obviously the tour in Bosnia in 1993. I was involved in the
24 operation to enter Kosovo in 1999. And I'm currently serving in the
25 United States as an instructor.
1 Q. Can you please, Major, can you please briefly elaborate on the
2 commanding positions you had at the different points in time.
3 A. The initial part of my career for the first six years was
4 commanding a platoon of 26 infantry soldiers. 18 months, two years of
5 that was spent in operation in Northern Ireland. I've also commanded a
6 company of 120 soldiers for a period of two and a half years, again, on
7 operations in Northern Ireland, and also in Africa.
8 Q. I understand, sir, that your current rank is major, isn't it?
9 A. That's correct. I'm a major.
10 Q. I think you already mentioned it, but can you please again inform
11 the Trial Chamber, what was your military rank in 1993 once you were in
12 the area of the former Yugoslavia?
13 A. I was a captain, a platoon commander of the support weapons
14 platoon. And I was moved from that position to be a liaison officer.
15 Q. Can you please tell the Trial Chamber, Major, from when to when
16 you were deployed in the area of the former Yugoslavia.
17 A. I arrived in the Lasva valley in -- sorry, the 24th of April, and
18 I left the 6th or 7th of November. I can't exactly remember which date.
19 Q. Just for clarification, Major, the dates are the dates in the year
21 A. Yes, sir.
22 Q. In what context did you arrive in the area of the Lasva valley?
23 A. Sorry. I don't understand "context".
24 Q. What was the broader mission?
25 A. The battalion had been told to replace the Cheshire regiment,
1 which was the 1st British Battalion which had been sent into the Lasva
2 valley. It was to support United Nations, specifically the UNHCR, and the
3 mandate which we had been given, the mission statement, was to provide
4 humanitarian assistance at the request of UNHCR. But it was then later
5 changed and Save Life was added to that mandate.
6 Q. You were making reference, Major, to the area of the Lasva valley.
7 Can you please inform the Trial Chamber where exactly you were
9 A. The battalion headquarters was in an old school in Stara Bila,
10 close to Vitez. But there was a company based in Gornji Vakuf. And that
11 second company was based in Tuzla.
12 Q. Again, just for clarification, Major, did your military unit form
13 part of UNPROFOR?
14 A. Yes, the battalion was working as part of the UNPROFOR mission.
15 Q. Prior to arriving in Central Bosnia, did you get any briefing in
16 respect to the situation in exactly that area?
17 A. In our base in Germany, we were given very general information as
18 to the background and a very broad overview as to the current situation.
19 There was very little specific information given as we were concentrating
20 on deployment training. But on our arrival, we transited through Split,
21 and we were given much more detailed information as we arrived. But the
22 majority of information we received on our handover from the previous
24 Q. And Major, what was the information, the more-detailed
25 information, about?
1 A. The detailed information we received was very much about
2 personalities and locations, the ethnic groupings, their capabilities,
3 their weapon systems. And also what was our part within the United
4 Nations mission and part of our UNPROFOR mandate.
5 Q. You already touched on this issue, Major, but can you please in
6 more detail for the benefit of the Trial Chamber describe in detail what
7 your duties have been at the time.
8 A. I was assigned as the G-5 liaison officer, which was specifically
9 to deal with humanitarian issues. I was not required to do specific
10 liaison with any military headquarters, either HVO or ABiH. My primary
11 role was to forge links with the ICRC and all the NGO agencies which were
12 currently operating in the Lasva valley. I would then also work on
13 assessing the effectiveness of the humanitarian aid effort to act as
14 another pair of eyes to assess the effectiveness of the UNHCR and all the
15 NGO campaigns to try and coordinate it so that the outlying and
16 outreaching areas who may need it but not have been visited, was to try
17 and assess and provide input to the aid agency so they could then resolve
18 those issues.
19 Q. For the benefit of the Trial Chamber and for clarification, can
20 you please explain what a G-5 liaison officer means.
21 A. The G-5 is a military term given to the area of humanitarian or
22 nonmilitary assistance. So very much it's civil liaison, rather than
23 military liaison.
24 Q. Major, in fulfilling your duties as a G-5 liaison officer, can you
25 please describe a typical day at the time you have been in Central Bosnia.
1 A. We could only operate in daylight hours. We found it was too
2 risky to drive our vehicles after dark because we couldn't guarantee that
3 the whiteness of them could be identified. So we started as soon as
4 daylight came. I would go to Zenica, to the headquarters of the ICRC. I
5 would brief them on the previous 24 hours' operations. I would give them
6 any information which we had assessed which would be useful for them to
7 ensure their safety throughout their area of operations. I would then
8 listen any concerns they may have, any assistance they may want from me.
9 That meeting would take approximately one hour, 90 minutes.
10 I would then start visiting the local hospitals, starting in
11 Zenica, working my way through Travnik, Stara Vitez, Vitez, Novi Bila.
12 Again, very much just seeing what assistance they required were casualty
13 evacuations required, and it -- just assessing the results of the previous
14 24 hours. I would make continual radio communications with the base at
15 Stari Bila and see if I was needed elsewhere. And that would continue
16 until daylight finished when I would then return for a briefing at 1800
17 hours back in the BritBat location.
18 Q. Who at the time, Major, was your superior?
19 A. My commanding officer was Lieutenant Colonel Alistair Duncan.
20 Q. And to whom did Lieutenant Colonel Alistair Duncan report to?
21 What was his chain of command?
22 A. He had a UNPROFOR chain of command to the headquarters in
23 Kiseljak. But he also had -- there was a British national element which
24 was in Split. But that was very much for the administration side rather
25 than anything for the UNPROFOR mission.
1 Q. Having provided the Trial Chamber with a comprehensive overview of
2 a typical work day at the relevant time, in fulfilling your duties, did
3 you travel a lot?
4 A. Every day, I would be in my vehicles travelling around. Very
5 rarely would we spend a day sitting in the BritBat location waiting for
6 something to happen. There was always something which needed to be doing,
7 even if it was just going into an area which hadn't been visited for some
8 particular time to see how the locals were feeling, what was the opinion.
9 Were there any requirements or concerns?
10 Q. Can you please in geographical terms describe what can be called
11 your area of responsibility.
12 A. It stretched from Zenica through to Travnik. It included Novi
13 Travnik, Vitez. And it stretched into maybe 20 miles north and south of
14 the main Travnik-Zenica road. There would be one or two occasions I would
15 have to go further afield, Maglaj, Kakanj, but that was on specific
16 request of aid agencies. As a general rule, I very much kept along the
17 line of Zenica-Travnik, and 20 miles north and south of it.
18 Q. In the course of you travelling through the areas you just
19 mentioned, to what sort of people or to what people did you talk to in
20 order to fulfil your duties?
21 A. Initially, I would always talk to doctors or aid agencies. But as
22 the tour progressed, I invariably needed the permission to conduct my
23 activities from military commanders. So invariably, I would be drawn into
24 seeking permission from the various military command, whether HVO or ABiH
25 in the region with which I was trying to conduct a specific operation.
1 Q. Earlier on, Major, you mentioned that your typical workday ended
2 with an 1800 hours briefing in Vitez. Can you please inform the Trial
3 Chamber what this briefing was about and who attended it.
4 A. The 1800 hours briefing was a daily occurrence. It was chaired by
5 Lieutenant Colonel Duncan. And it was all the primary commanders of the
6 battalion, all the liaison officers, company commanders, operations
7 officers. And the aim of the meeting was to inform everybody of what all
8 units had done that day. The military information officer would give an
9 assessment as to what he believed the action of that day, what his
10 analysis of it was, what it may project, to try and give some idea as to
11 where we could or couldn't go the next day, or where we should go the next
13 The commanding officer would then give his opinions. He may
14 direct specific actions to be conducted. And then he would summarise at
15 the end of the meeting which was scheduled for about 45 minutes to an
16 hour, on what he felt were the important issues of the day.
17 Q. During your more than six months' stay in the area of Central
18 Bosnia, did you always attend the 1800 hours meetings?
19 A. I attended every meeting there was except for the two weeks I was
20 on rest and recuperation on leave back in Germany which I think was
21 sometime in August, late August beginning of September.
22 Q. Did others to your knowledge also, other members of BritBat
23 obviously, did they also regularly attend the 1800 hours meetings?
24 A. It was the same personalities every day. It was what we termed
25 the command group. It was the commanders of the subunits of the
1 formations, the people who were going to then go away and write their
2 orders and command the soldiers in whatever operations were going to be
3 conducted. So it was the company commanders, the liaison officers,
4 everyone who was in -- responsible for making decisions.
5 Q. Having attended almost each and every day during your stay, during
6 your six months' stay in the region, do you think that you could -- got a
7 full and comprehensive picture after having attended the 1800 meetings?
8 A. The aim of those meetings was to ensure that everybody had a
9 common view as to what was happening and what was the purpose of the next
10 day. So certainly, I felt that I was as well-informed as anybody else as
11 to what the situation was, who the personalities were, and what the
12 assessments of that previous 24 hours, how we got to those assessments.
13 Q. Was what has been discussed in the course of the previous meeting,
14 was it summarised in writing?
15 A. The military information officer was produce a military
16 information summary, which I believe is shortened to milinfosum, which was
17 produced daily. It wasn't necessarily a record of that meeting, but it
18 certainly held the majority of information, the salient information, which
19 was discussed at the 1800 hours meeting. The military information summary
20 was produced by all troops who had been on the ground in that day, would
21 come back in and brief the military information officer as to what they
22 had seen. They may make comment on it. And then he would collate all
23 that information. And then much later that night, he would produce the
24 military information summary and add comment based on his analysis of the
25 information he had been given.
1 Q. For what purpose, Major, was the milinfosum put together?
2 A. There were two reasons for the military information summary. The
3 first was it was an external document that would go up the UN chain of
4 command, and also to our bordering units, the other international
5 battalions, to let them know what was happening in our area as their
6 convoys transited through our area as well. But I think the primary
7 reason for this document was to allow what we call pattern analysis, to
8 identify patterns in operations so that we have a reference document to go
9 back to to try and identify trends, to try and predict what is going to
10 happen so we can offer the best advice to the agencies with which we are
11 charged with dealing with.
12 Q. The milinfosums, as you describe them, being a pattern analysis,
13 can you please inform the Trial Chamber about the reliability of the
14 information contained in the milinfosums.
15 A. The information is what whoever had been on the ground, liaison
16 officers, patrols, had seen with their eyes or they had learned with the
17 use of interpreters when speaking to locals or wherever they had been.
18 They would then come back and give that information over. So it was very
19 much a one-to-one opinion view or something that had been seen on the
20 ground. So it was a collation of all this raw data. And it was difficult
21 to confirm all the time from a second, third, or fourth source, as we
22 didn't have -- and there was no requirement to have human intelligence or
23 any electronic intelligence-gathering means. That's not why we were
24 there. So it was a very much what had been seen that day. That was why
25 it was called military information and not military intelligence.
1 Q. Moving on to a different subject, Major, earlier on you were
2 informing the Trial Chamber that you were travelling a lot within the area
3 you have detailed. Were you allowed to travel freely in this area?
4 A. The majority of time, I was allowed to travel pretty much where I
5 wanted to go, but there were times when my travelling down main routes or
6 side roads was blocked when I came to checkpoints. These checkpoints,
7 majority of the times, were the front lines between two opposing forces.
8 But occasionally, the checkpoints would appear behind the front lines and
9 would invariably require us to go up the respective HVO or ABiH military
10 chain of command to get authority to pass through.
11 Q. Which was the competent ABiH chain of command to get such
13 A. Invariably, I was sent to the 3 Corps headquarters to get
14 permission to travel through the checkpoints which I needed to.
15 Q. And who was responsible for providing such permissions? With whom
16 did you deal in asking such permissions?
17 A. The majority of the time, I would deal with a Colonel Merdan. But
18 I believe once when Colonel Merdan wasn't available, I saw
19 General Hadzihasanovic.
20 Q. What was General Hadzihasanovic's position at the time, to your
22 A. I understand that the general was the commander of 3 Corps.
23 Q. What was Colonel Merdan's position at the time, to your
25 A. I made the conclusion that Colonel Merdan was a military
1 assistant, or he coordinated his outer office. Somebody who worked
2 closely with the general who could give permission on the general's
4 Q. Have you ever been in General Hadzihasanovic's office, 3rd Corps
5 headquarters office?
6 A. I recall a time when Colonel Merdan wasn't there. I went into an
7 office. I believe it was the general's, because the general was there,
8 but I can't honestly say if it was his specific office.
9 Q. This office in which you met Mr. Hadzihasanovic, how would you
10 describe it?
11 A. I would say it would be a typical three-star general's office.
12 Good furniture. There wasn't the trappings or paraphernalia of an
13 operations room. So, no banks of radios, no plethora of map boards with
14 traces written all over them. It was what I would call a smart office.
15 Chairs to sit down in for the guests, or visitors. There was a map on the
16 wall from what I can recall. But it wasn't an operations room, per se.
17 Q. In saying it was a typical three-star general's office, was it
18 similar to the ones you experienced within NATO forces?
19 A. When I was involved with headquarters ARK, I worked for a
20 three-star general. It was very similar. An outer office, followed by
21 the general's office, which I would equate to a large businessman's
22 office, rather than what people may expect as a military office.
23 Q. Coming back to the issue of granting approval to go through
24 checkpoints, were such permissions always given when you asked for them?
25 A. Generally, the permission could be achieved, not necessarily
1 immediately. Sometimes there would be some delay or some bargaining, some
2 negotiations. But occasionally, permission was refused.
3 Q. To your recollection and to your knowledge, did you get to know
4 why occasionally permission was refused?
5 A. We were never specifically told why permission was refused to
6 cross checkpoints or to have access to areas. We could make educated
7 assessments due to information which other units, other patrols had seen.
8 We came to the conclusion that it was inconvenient for UNPROFOR to be in
9 that area because something was happening which necessarily the forces
10 didn't want us to see.
11 Q. The forces didn't want you to see, does this include the ABiH 3rd
13 A. Yes, that's the assessment I had to make for denial of access to
14 one of the routes which I regularly used for evacuating wounded or dying
16 Q. Having been in the area of the 3rd Corps of the ABiH 3rd Corps
17 from April to November 1993, how would you describe the relationship
18 between BritBat and ABiH 3rd Corps over the time?
19 A. The impression which I got from the commanding officer was that
20 the relationship was actually very good, and that generally there was a
21 willingness to try and work through any difficulties. But generally, I
22 would say it was a good relationship. I can't speak for Colonel Duncan,
23 but the impression he gave me was that he had no specific problems when he
24 went to 3 Corps. It was not something that he did not look forward to.
25 He found it quite a -- sort of a professional relationship.
1 Q. Over the time from April to November 1993, did you yourself
2 experience a change of the habits and of the relationship between you and
3 ABiH 3rd Corps officers?
4 A. I would say that the relationship changed around mid or late
5 September in 1993. Up until that time, in the area which I was working
6 in, the HVO appeared to be in the ascendancy and were causing the majority
7 of the casualties on the Bosnian Muslim side. So I was very much involved
8 in dealing with the Bosnian Muslim casualties. But in September, there
9 seemed to be a specific shift in the fortunes of the two warring sides.
10 And the HVO began receiving and, if anything, lost the initiative. And it
11 was at that time that we were trying to shift our emphasis dealing with
12 Bosnian Croat casualties. And I found that I couldn't always get the
13 assistance that I needed at that particular time.
14 Q. Could you please, Major, expand a bit on this issue.
15 A. One of the hospitals which I visited on a regular basis was the
16 makeshift hospital in Novi Bila set up in a monastery. And as a result of
17 the changing fortunes of the fighting at that time in September, there was
18 a large increase in the number of casualties at that hospital to the stage
19 that it was overflowing. They didn't have the resources, the doctors or
20 the medical supplies with which to deal with, not just the resultants of
21 war, the battle trauma, but the day-to-day injuries: People still got
22 cancer, people still had broken limbs or the general illnesses. So there
23 were significant requests for evacuation of casualties to the number of 50
24 or 60 at the time, rather than the two or three which I was used to
25 dealing with. And to move 50 or 60 seriously wounded people, the plan was
1 to move them to Kiseljak, and then from Kiseljak they would be moved to
2 Split. That required the cooperation of all sides, because we would have
3 to travel down a road which was the front line between the BiH and HVO
4 forces, between the Cajdras feature and Vitez. So it took considerable
5 negotiation on behalf of the military liaison officers and myself to
6 ensure we had a window of opportunity with which to move these people. It
7 was a fairly large undertaking. There were times when it was denied or
8 permission was initially given. And I remember one specific instance,
9 we'd actually loaded the casualties onto the backs of trucks, and then the
10 permission was denied by 3rd Corps. So we had to unload the casualties
11 and take them back in.
12 Q. To your knowledge, Major, which military units of the ABiH 3rd
13 Corps did operate within the area which can be described as your area of
14 responsibility as you detailed earlier on today?
15 A. I specifically remember the 325 mountain brigade, because that was
16 the primary route that I would use to travel to Zenica on the mountain
17 road which went by the Cajdras checkpoint. And that was the main unit
18 which I really had difficulties dealing with.
19 Q. To your knowledge, which ABiH 3rd Corps unit operated in the area
20 of Zenica?
21 A. I don't recall the unit, the unit name which operated in Zenica
22 itself. But I know that next to the ICRC headquarters, just up from the
23 ICRC headquarters, heading towards the mountain road, the back road
24 heading through the Cajdras checkpoint, at the music school there was the
25 headquarters of the 7 Muslim Brigade.
1 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President, Your Honours, I think it would be
2 advisable to have the break now, since I wish to enter into a different
3 sort of questioning later on.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, we're going to have a
5 break. And we will resume work at 5 to 1.00. Then we will continue until
6 1.45. Then have an hour break, and resume at 2.45. So we will resume at
7 5 to.
8 --- Recess taken at 12.28 p.m.
9 --- On resuming at 12.58 p.m.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Withopf, we have 45
12 MR. WITHOPF: Thank you very much, Mr. President.
13 Q. Major, prior to the break, you informed the Trial Chamber that in
14 the music school in Zenica, there was the 7th Muslim Brigade. During your
15 time in Central Bosnia between April and November 1993, what did you get
16 to know about the 7th Muslim Brigade?
17 A. The information which was given to us, and whether it's from
18 military briefings, contained in the military information summary, but
19 also what I saw travelling through Zenica and seeing the headquarters, was
20 that it was a military unit within 3 Corps. It was part of their
21 operational units which could be deployed as part of their plans.
22 Q. From what you got to know, Major, was the 7th Muslim Brigade of
23 any particular significance for the 3rd Corps?
24 A. It was assessed by the British Battalion that we would sort of
25 term the 7th Muslim Brigade as a combat indicator. And by that I mean,
1 where a main effort was being planned or where a specific action was
2 required that was essential, then 7 Muslim Brigade would be in that area
3 rather than in a supporting effort. It was very much a, I would say a
4 primary unit, not necessarily used as a terrain-holding unit for manning
5 checkpoints, and remaining in a static position for a long time. It
6 appeared to be a unit which was part of the manoeuvre element employed by
7 the 3rd Corps.
8 Q. Can you, please, Major explain on the phrase "combat" -- expand on
9 the phrase "combat indicator." What do you mean by that?
10 A. The phrase combat indicator is a term which the military use as
11 part of our information assessment. We try and create through this
12 pattern analysis I talked about earlier of logging incidents which on
13 their own may seem insignificant, but when viewed with hindsight,
14 retrospectively, it can create a pattern, a pattern leading to a
15 subsequent action. And so if we can identify these patterns, we will
16 then, if we see these patterns forming again, be able to predict as to
17 what future operations may be happening. And we identified that 7 Muslim
18 Brigade was one such combat indicator, that they were an important unit
19 because they were always involved where the main fighting was taking
20 place. So if we could track the location of a combat indicator unit, and
21 in this case, 7 Muslim Brigade, we hoped to identify where the next
22 battles were going to take place. Because ultimately, the aftermath of
23 those battles is where the aid is going to be required or where I was
24 going to have to try and bring in more medical aid or evacuate casualties.
25 Q. On what you've seen and from what you got to know having attended
1 regularly the 1800 hours meetings and having talked to the variety of
2 people you mentioned earlier on, were there foreign fighters within the
3 7th Muslim Brigade?
4 A. It was known that even before we arrived in Central Bosnia that
5 there were mercenaries. And that was the phrase that was initially used,
6 that there were mercenaries in Central Bosnia, because we were advised
7 what to do when British mercenaries approached us for assistance. But it
8 became they clear early in the tour that there were -- there was an
9 element of 7 Muslim Brigade who were more -- although they were adhering
10 to stricter Islamic codes, and they were termed the Mujahedin element of 7
11 Muslim Brigade. And I came across them in large numbers once early in
12 May, early in the tour. And it was quite apparent that they were from
13 either the Middle East. There was one from Great Britain. At least one
14 from Great Britain, which we identified. And there was -- there were a
15 couple that I saw from North Africa. The best estimate which we can guess
16 of where they came from.
17 Q. Major, from what you got to know and from what you've seen
18 yourself, and from what you got to know from having talking to the variety
19 of people you mentioned earlier on, in the early stages of your tour in
20 Central Bosnia where these foreigners which were referred to as Mujahedin,
21 were they part of the 7th Muslim Brigade?
22 A. The assessment which I came to, and it was generally felt that
23 they were part of 7 Muslim Brigade. They certainly operated as a formed
24 unit. The foreign element which we termed "Mujahedin" didn't operate in
25 1's and 2's or small numbers spread throughout the 7 Muslim Brigade. They
1 were a formed unit. They certainly kept together and were concentrated,
2 rather than spread across the whole fighting element within the area which
3 we were operating in the Lasva valley.
4 Q. You were mentioning, Major, that the Mujahedin could be identified
5 as people from Arab countries. Why could they be identified as people
6 from Arab countries?
7 A. I was able to identify them, having served in Kuwait, Iraq, and
8 Saudi Arabia. But generally by their features. There were a number who I
9 would say may even have come from the Afghan -- Afghanistan-style, by
10 their style of dress, how they wore their facial hair, their beards. And
11 their attitudes towards us. It was markedly different from the regular
12 ABiH who we had day-to-day dealings with. They were -- at times, very
13 intimidating, and they were people to be very wary of. Because I got the
14 impression that they were generally unpredictable in how they may react to
15 general requests. For example, some of them would refuse to use our
16 female interpreters. They only wanted to speak to us through male
18 Q. Can you please, Major, can you please inform the Trial Chamber
19 about what you have seen in respect to the weaponry of the Mujahedin.
20 A. I saw the Mujahedin were equipped with the standard Kalashnikov
21 AK47s, but they also had RPG 7 rocket launchers. The majority of them
22 carried large knives, not the small knife I would considered called a
23 bayonet. Much larger knives, hunting knives, which were brandishing just
24 as a matter of emphasis more than anything else. They appeared to be well
25 equipped for fighting, and they had this confidence in themselves, and
1 bordering on arrogance. And it was a difficult element to deal with when
2 we came across them, because we generally came across them by accident
3 rather than by any planning because they moved. They were a manoeuvre
4 element. We couldn't predict where they were going to be. We had to try
5 and track them, and that meant finding them.
6 Q. Can you please inform, Major, the Trial Chamber about the
7 uniforms, if any, the Mujahedin wore at the time.
8 A. The time when I came across the Mujahedin was in May, and the
9 weather was not particularly good. So the majority of them had some
10 semblance of a camouflage uniform on. Invariably, they didn't have
11 matching camouflage jackets and camouflage trousers. It would be one or
12 the other. But what I did notice was that they would -- the majority of
13 them had the Shemagues wrapped around their heads hiding their faces.
14 There were a number which would have, I would call, a traditional
15 Taliban-style hat, soft-felt hat on the tops of their heads with exposings
16 of a very full beard. The majority, I would say, didn't have camouflage
17 trousers on, but they had camouflage jackets. Some had badges either on
18 the pockets of their uniform, on the sleeves. And they appeared to be
19 well equipped. They certainly didn't seem to lack the ability to resupply
20 themselves or move around the areas.
21 Q. Major, you were informing us that at the early stages of your tour
22 in Central Bosnia, and you started your tour in April 1993, you saw the
23 Mujahedin or you got to know that the Mujahedin you just described were
24 together with the 7th Muslim Brigade. How are the Mujahedin within the
25 7th Muslim Brigade, how are they linked to the phrase you used earlier on
1 today, namely, "combat indicator"?
2 A. Because we identified through either Mujahedin prisoners or
3 Mujahedin dead, which had been informed to us by HVO because they wanted
4 to use them in exchange, we could certainly track where they had been
5 involved in the fighting. And they always appeared where the fighting was
6 the heaviest. So to us, it appeared that the 7 Muslim Brigade and
7 Mujahedin were a mobile, main effort force that was used to, whether it be
8 to spearhead or reinforce the main effort attack or the main effort
9 assault. And as I said, not be wasted on manning checkpoints in a static
10 environment. And so that's what was the key thing for us. I equated them
11 to my dealings with the Djukara [phoen] in the HVO in that aspect of they
12 were a unit which had to be tracked because wherever they were, then
13 something was liable to happen.
14 Q. Something was liable to happen. What does it mean, in more
15 concrete terms, please?
16 A. We mean that ultimately, if they are near the front lines, that is
17 where the main effort attack is going to be weighted. It's probably where
18 the majority of the assets have been moved to, to assist in that attack.
19 And we know that that's ultimately where the humanitarian effort, which I
20 was going to be involved in, would be heaviest.
21 Q. Something was likely or was liable to happen, does it make
22 reference to attacks by the ABiH?
23 A. Yes. An operation of an offensive nature which could be an attack
24 or an assault, either seizing terrain or destroying enemy.
25 Q. Just a few minutes ago, Major, you mentioned the Mujahedin
1 spearheading attacks. Can you please in some more detail, inform the
2 Trial Chamber what you mean by the Mujahedin spearheading attacks, ABiH
4 A. What I mean is that where the Mujahedin 7 Muslim Brigade were, it
5 is certainly where the fighting would be the most intense, and we could
6 expect that that would be the prolonged main effort for the attack, that
7 it is something which was, as I say, this combat indicator. It was of
8 great importance that that's where this unit would be. It was -- it
9 happened on a number of occasions, and it was too many occasions for it to
10 be circumstance or coincidence, that wherever the main effort was, as part
11 of the overall campaign within the six months we were there and witnessed
12 the overall campaign, for it to be coincidence. It was too coordinated
13 for this unit to just be in the right place at the right time on a
14 battlefield, more than once or twice.
15 Q. This unit, and I'm asking you, Major, whether you're making
16 reference to this unit, is this, just for clarification, the 7th Muslim
17 Brigade with the Mujahedin?
18 A. Yes, that's correct. "This unit," I'm referring to the 7th Muslim
19 Brigade and the Mujahedin.
20 Q. Earlier on, Major, you were mentioning that you were yourself
21 being involved in the exchange of Mujahedin soldiers. How were such
22 exchanges organised? Was the ABiH command involved in it?
23 A. The initial request would either come through military liaison
24 that HVO had a number of dead or captured ABiH and would want an exchange
25 for their respective dead or captured from that engagement. I would then
1 arrange with the ICRC, who would lead in any prisoner release, prisoner
2 negotiation. But ultimately, anything like that required again
3 cease-fires of both sides, because invariably it would be done within the
4 front lines, the no-man's-land between the battle lines. And invariably,
5 it was done with the ICRC leading, but they required us to create the
6 conditions to set the continues to allow the prison exchange and also the
7 dead-body verification. The majority of the times, they wouldn't just
8 accept us bringing dead bodies across the front line. We had to collect
9 the bodies, lay them out for independent ABiH and HVO to verify that the
10 dead bodies were who they claimed to be. And if they weren't, then the
11 exchange would be cancelled, and we would have to try again.
12 Q. Does this mean, Major, just for clarification, that the ABiH 3rd
13 Corps command was involved in organising and facilitating such exchanges
14 of Mujahedin soldiers?
15 A. Certainly we used the ABiH chain of command. At times, we would
16 be informed by ABiH that they wanted certain Mujahedin back, either
17 prisoner or their dead. And there would have to be some quid pro quo
18 release of somebody from their side, an HVO dead, HVO prisoners would have
19 to be released. And the authority for the release of these people,
20 although the HVO may well have been detained at a much lower level at the
21 front line, there was quite clearly no ability to make a decision at that
22 lowest level to release HVO prisoners or HVO bodies. We always ended up
23 having to go back up the chain of command. And this was a continual
24 process and a continual repeat performance. Everything ultimately we came
25 back for -- big issues, back to 3 Corps.
1 Q. Major, do you know Mr. Vaughan Kent-Payne?
2 A. Yes, I know Vaughan Kent-Payne. He was an officer in our
3 battalion. He was the company commander of Charlie Company during the
4 six-month tour in 1993 in Bosnia. And I knew him before we deployed to
5 Bosnia. And I'm still friends with him now.
6 Q. Do you recall a situation, Major, in which you and Vaughan
7 Kent-Payne travelled into the area -- into the wider area of Bandol and
8 Guca Gora?
9 A. I remember the incident in May. I can't remember the exact time.
10 I know it was early in the tour, because the weather hadn't really turned
11 into the full heat of summer. But I had received a request from Thomas
12 Osario, who worked for the United Nations High Commission for refugees. I
13 believe he was an investigator of some sort. And he approached me on a
14 Friday or a Saturday with a badly drawn sketch map which he said had been
15 given to him by a refugee who had witnessed the killing of civilians. And
16 he said this map indicated where there was a mass grave.
17 He -- Thomas Osario asked me, as the humanitarian officer, if I
18 could go into the area around Guca Gora, Bandol, Maljine, to see if I
19 could find this mass grave. The difficulty was this was after a main ABiH
20 assault on Guca Gora, so it was still quite a tense area. So I couldn't
21 travel in my own softskin vehicles. I needed armoured protection to go in
22 there. So I used Vaughan Kent-Payne's vehicles. He used his two Warrior
23 armoured fighting vehicles to take myself, interpreter, and Randy Rhodes,
24 who was the UN representative to the battalion.
25 We left on a Sunday to go. I know it was a Sunday because it is
1 unusual for us to be using armoured vehicles on a Sunday. It was normally
2 a maintenance day, to prepare all our equipment for the remaining days.
3 And I travelled in the back of Vaughan Kent-Payne's vehicle with Randy
4 Rhodes and the interpreter. And we stopped at Guca Gora. We stopped at
5 Guca Gora because our route was blocked by the Mujahedin, who were --
6 there were a dozen of them congregated around the church in Guca Gora.
7 And we had the mortar hatches open in the back of the vehicle. So as I
8 was looking out, my head would have been the height of the grass around
9 the church because the road is sunken by the side of the church.
10 The Mujahedin, some of them were coming out of the church. There
11 was a lot of furniture outside the church. And they were quite agitated
12 by us, by our presence. They were well armed. There was an RPG 7 rocket
13 launcher. They had a heavy machine-gun. The majority of them were armed
14 with AK47s. Initially, they wouldn't engage us in discussion because they
15 refused to talk to us through our female interpreter, which caused some
16 significant problems to try and negotiate either our withdrawal or our
17 continued mission.
18 We noticed that there was an English accent among them,
19 specifically from west Yorkshire which is where my battalion recruit's
20 from. He wouldn't engage us in conversation either. And one of the
21 Mujahedin negligently discharged his rifle. So he mistakenly fired his
22 rifle. Fortunately it didn't come in our direction. It went over our
23 heads. I don't know which one it was that -- that opened fire. That
24 caused a bit of a standoff. We traversed our turrets, and we all made
25 ready and waited for something else to happen. Fortunately, it didn't.
1 There was a very long pause. And I think that forced negotiation, face
2 had been lost, I think, on the part of the Mujahedin, so they entered into
3 negotiations with us. But they refused to let the vehicles progress
4 towards Maljine. Vaughan Kent-Payne managed to persuade the Mujahedin to
5 take us in a vehicle. And by us, I mean myself, Randy Rhodes, and
6 Vaughan, but we had to leave our weapons behind. So we left our rifles.
7 We didn't have any radios. We just had this sketch map. And when I look
8 back on it, I would suggest it was military naivete on our part to
9 actually put ourselves in their hands. We'd been in -- in the theatre
10 maybe six or seven weeks and it was my first encounter with the Mujahedin
11 and I think it may have been Vaughan Kent-Payne's. We were driven along a
12 road to a village, and I don't know which village we were taken to. I was
13 in the back of a pickup truck. And all I had was a sketch map. The
14 sketch map had no reference points on it, no north pointers. It was just
15 a road, a barn, high ground, and X marks the spot, as it were.
16 As we were travelling down the road, we continually saw Mujahedin
17 walking in both directions. They were greeting each other with the
18 traditional "Allah-HU-Akbar." And it was quite apparent we were in the
19 middle of the Mujahedin. We stopped at a village which some of the houses
20 were still habitable, but were being searched. The animals had all been
21 killed. And we were allowed to walk around with our guides, for wont of a
22 better phrase, but were unable to correspond the sketch map to the ground
23 we were at. What we could see was across the valley, a village was on
24 fire. So we decided we were going to achieve nothing where we were. I
25 think Vaughan had given a cutoff time of one hour to his remaining
1 vehicles, that if we had not returned they were to come and find us. But
2 how they were going to do that, I'm not quite sure.
3 We returned to the vehicles, and we negotiated our way back out of
4 Guca Gora, and made our way to the smoking village which we then found to
5 be Bandol.
6 Q. Having been in Guca Gora, Major, what actually have you seen in
7 Guca Gora whilst there?
8 A. I didn't see the -- our route into Guca Gora because I was in the
9 back of the vehicle. I actually came out of the vehicle when we stopped,
10 so that was at the church. So I didn't see the whole village. But what I
11 could see, some of the -- some of the houses were clearly were being
12 ransacked in the fact that their furniture was outside. I didn't see
13 people physically throwing anything out, so how it happened, whether it
14 was during the fighting or whatever, I can't comment. But certainly it
15 was clear that there had been a lot of movement through that -- through
16 the area which I could see. And specifically, the church, because during
17 the evacuation of the Croat population from the church, it certainly
18 wasn't in the state which we then found it in. A lot of the furniture was
19 outside the church.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes.
21 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, thank you, Mr. President.
22 Just a technical comment I would like to make. I'm referring to the
23 question put to my learned colleague from the Prosecution. The witness
24 said that this was the first time he had contact with the Mujahedin, and
25 this part of the witness's answer hasn't been recorded in the transcript.
1 Perhaps this is something that the witness could confirm or clarify.
2 THE WITNESS: Yes, this incident was the first time which I had
3 certainly come across the Mujahedin. And I believe it was the first time
4 that Major Vaughan Kent-Payne had come across the Mujahedin.
5 MR. WITHOPF:
6 Q. At that day, and I'm referring to the day you saw the Mujahedin in
7 the area of Guca Gora, once you left the area, did you also come across
8 soldiers of the 7th Muslim Brigade?
9 A. It was difficult to try and differentiate between the two, other
10 than their appearance. We certainly left Guca Gora to extract ourselves
11 from the area, once we had tried to find the site. And we then transited
12 through, if I could phrase it, as regular ABiH people from that region,
13 rather than foreigners, foreign mercenaries. So there was -- it was like
14 a buffer period before we then got to the front line and then came back
15 towards our BritBat location. Whether they were 7 Muslim Brigade or a
16 regular ABiH unit I couldn't honestly say. But there was a definite -- an
17 area where we found the Mujahedin, then there were ABiH soldiers from the
18 region of Yugoslavia and former Yugoslavia, and then we crossed into HVO
20 Q. One last issue, Major, I wish to discuss with you: Based on your
21 experience and from what you experienced whilst you stayed in Central
22 Bosnia between April 1993 and November 1993, how would you describe the
23 communication abilities within the 3rd Corps?
24 A. I got the impression that there was good communication in the fact
25 that I knew by working in Stari Vitez, a Muslim enclave within the Croat
1 pocket, the HVO-Croat pocket, that they had ready communications to 325
2 Brigade at the Cajdras checkpoint. And I also know that the Cajdras
3 checkpoint had communication with 3 Corps because of my involvement with
4 requests to go into Stari Vitez from, I think his name was Kulestra, 325
5 brigade. And he would say, he would have -- he knew that there were
6 various casualties, whatever, because of his radio communications. And
7 there were other occasions when he would stop me, or his troops would stop
8 me from going through a checkpoint. He would say I he'd had orders, you
9 know, I can speak to 3 Corps, they've told us. So whether it was by radio
10 or by land line, I can't comment. But there certainly appeared to be
11 communication ability between the various elements, down to the lowest
12 level in the area where I operated in frequently.
13 Q. Does this, Major, does it apply for the whole period of time you
14 stayed in Central Bosnia?
15 A. From what I could recall, there would be days when communication
16 would be not possible, and no other reason was given than that. But I
17 would say generally, throughout the period of time, I would say the
18 ability was there, but there could be times when communication was not
20 MR. WITHOPF: Thank you very much, Major.
21 Mr. President, Your Honours, the Prosecution for the time being
22 has no further questions.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. If I have understood
24 you correctly, you have now concluded your examination-in-chief.
25 We have another 15 minutes before the break. I'll make good use
1 of these 15 minutes and let the Defence take the floor immediately.
2 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I would kindly ask
3 you to tell us whether we will be working today as usual, in view of the
4 fact that it is quite clear that both our team and our colleagues in the
5 other team can finish the cross-examination quite quickly tomorrow so that
6 maybe we don't have to work this afternoon.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Prosecution asked us to sit
8 this afternoon. The Registry has taken steps to ensure a team of
9 interpreters to be here as of 2.45. Therefore, we will be working from
10 2.45 until 4.15, and then tomorrow we'll begin at 9.00, and we'll be
11 working nonstop until a quarter to 2.00.
12 However, if you feel that you don't need so much time and that
13 tomorrow's sitting will be quite enough, there are others, too. We have
14 to see whether the Prosecution agrees. In that case, we don't have to sit
15 in the afternoon. But you know best. If you are telling us that you only
16 need one hour tomorrow, and also the other team one hour or less, and the
17 Prosecution a quarter of an hour or no time at all, there's no problem.
18 We wish to avoid the witness having to stay over the weekend.
19 So what are you telling us?
20 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I never intended to
21 ask for more than two hours for the cross-examination of this witness, as
22 the Prosecutor told us yesterday. However, as the Prosecutor abbreviated
23 that period of time, I, too, will shorten my cross-examination. So that I
24 don't believe it can take more than an hour and a half. If my colleagues
25 don't have too many questions either, then it is quite certain that we can
1 finish the cross-examination of this witness by midday tomorrow. And then
2 the witness can leave without us having to work this afternoon.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you said tomorrow, you'll be
4 cross-examining from 9.00 to 10.30. Then there will be the break. We
5 begin at 5 minutes to 11.00. Let me ask the other Defence team now.
6 MR. DIXON: Thank you, Your Honours. We certainly won't be longer
7 than half an hour tomorrow morning.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Then 11.00 to 11.30.
9 And let's hear Mr. Withopf now, because we have to measure our time. Can
10 you tell us whether you will have possible re-examination tomorrow? Of
11 course, that depends.
12 MR. WITHOPF: That's exactly the point. It depends on the scope
13 of the cross-examination and of course on the questions asked during
14 cross-examination. However, it appears to be possible to conclude the
15 testimony of this witness, if we don't continue today and would sit during
16 the regular hours tomorrow morning.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. In that case,
18 obviously the best thing to do is to fit everything in tomorrow. So we
19 don't need to continue this afternoon. And this will allow the Defence to
20 contact their clients. And I think that we will finish tomorrow as
22 Therefore, you prefer to start your questions tomorrow? Is that
23 right? Very well. In any case, we have only eight minutes left until the
25 So I'm grateful. Witness, you will come back tomorrow at 9.00.
1 Because originally we had planned to continue this afternoon, but in view
2 of the timing, your hearing will be resumed tomorrow morning. And rest
3 assured, that it will be completed by a quarter to 2.00. I'm going to ask
4 Madam usher to be kind enough to escort you out of the courtroom, inviting
5 you to be back here tomorrow at 9.00.
6 [The witness stands down]
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] On the part of the Defence, are
8 there any observations or remarks?
9 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President, as we have
10 a few minutes before the normal adjournment, I'd simply like at this stage
11 to speak about Exhibit DH1, which is a videotape used at the very
12 beginning of the trial. And as we have a few minutes at our disposal,
13 it's simply to tell you that when that exhibit was tendered, after a lot
14 of discussion between the technical department and the Defence, the
15 complete videotape is much longer than the 45 seconds that were viewed on
16 the first day of trial.
17 In this connection, Mr. President, we were now able to isolate the
18 exact scene that was viewed during the first day of hearing. A copy of
19 the tape has been given to our friends on the Prosecution side. And now,
20 the exhibit consists of only the scene viewed on the first day of trial.
21 Therefore, I would simply like to ask the Chamber to be kind enough to
22 substitute the new exhibit for the old one. And this is simply to say
23 that DH1 shows only what was viewed on the first day of trial.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 Mr. Withopf or Mr. Mundis, your opinion about this substitution.
1 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, in fact, Mr. Bourgon has provided us a
2 copy. I have reviewed that tape, as it was a witness that I led in direct
3 examination. And of course, the Prosecution has no objection to the
4 substitution as proposed by my friend, Mr. Bourgon.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. Very well. In that
6 case, the Chamber, after consultations, orders that the videotape that was
7 tendered at the time and given the Exhibit Number DH1, that the Registry
8 replaces that tape with the new tape that has now been checked and
9 reviewed by the Prosecution. So we have a copy of that tape, do we? So
10 this is the new tape, which will be DH1.
11 Mr. Withopf.
12 MR. WITHOPF: Since there are still five minutes left, I only wish
13 to use this opportunity to inform the Trial Chamber that today we
14 disclosed the B/C/S translation of the amended expert report of
15 General Reinhardt to the Defence.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. The Defence now has
17 in B/C/S the amended report of General Reinhardt. As the General has been
18 planned for the months of May, the Defence will have plenty of time to
19 study the document.
20 Are there any other points to be raised? Mr. Bourgon.
21 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. We also
22 have an additional document that was disclosed without being fully
23 translated from B/C/S into English. This was a document used during the
24 testimony of -- but I need to go into private session to tell you that.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, let us go into
1 private session.
2 [Private session]
23 [Open session]
24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we are back in open session.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar. As
1 there are no further questions or comments, we will all meet again here
2 tomorrow at 9.00 a.m.
3 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m.,
4 to be reconvened on Friday, the 26th day of March,
5 2004, at 9.00 a.m.